buglerbilly
12-07-10, 03:08 PM
Published: 12 July 2010
As the world's aerospace and defense industry prepares for the Farnborough Airshow, Europe and America are struggling to reshape their military spending.
On the Atlantic's eastern shores, cuts are seen as necessary to pare down staggering national debts. France now has joined a growing list of leading defense nations to slash spending, and it's clear that more cuts are to come.
In Washington, where the growth of defense spending is merely being slowed, DoD acquisition chief Ashton Carter issued draft guidelines to save $100 billion that Defense Secretary Robert Gates wants for troops and equipment.
Carter wants to adopt reasonable goals, eliminate redundancies, reduce bureaucracy, institute better requirements control, and foster correct outcomes rather than mindless processes. If everyone operates on those principles - more like commercial industry - the entire system will become more efficient.
The U.S. acquisition chief deserves credit for asking industry, his own acquisition corps and Congress to make recommendations before he issues final guidelines in September.
Yet executives are skeptical. They wonder, for example, how much can be saved without laying off people or shuttering excess facilities.
Carter also has suggested profit sharing, a notion unpopular with industry. Execs are worried about declining budget growth, fiscal pressures that threaten programs, critical skills and politically important facilities.
Success depends on incentives to cut costs and improve DoD and industry performance.
Here, America can learn from Britain, where outsourcing has improved efficiency, preserved skills and cut costs. The real enemy is the same in both countries: excess people and facilities. In America, an independent panel can review defense agencies, organizations, offices and programs to eliminate duplication; in Europe, a more regional approach is needed.
a better understanding of the costs of uniformed and civilian personnel and contractors is vital. In America, true personnel levels are a mystery; contractors are deemed "off the rolls," so neither DoD nor Congress can fairly assess what efforts are under way nor how efficient they are.
Greater authority vested in fewer expert and better-paid acquisition professionals, and less onerous processes, make sense anywhere.
Finally, planning matters. Where do governments want to end up after they finish cutting, either in terms of capability or industrial capacity? The U.K. military and industry that emerges from the Strategic Defence and Security Review in late October will be very different than it is today. Ditto for France, Italy and Germany.
The worst outcome would be more cuts made piecemeal or in isolation, particularly in Europe, where countries are shedding entire capabilities to make ends meet. Indeed, as unpopular a notion as national specialization is, it may be the only way for the region to preserve its military capabilities. Protectionism for its own sake must be rejected at every turn.
The stakes of getting it wrong are massive for both sides of the Atlantic. As the world's superpower, America needs robust capabilities as the guarantor of global security.
In Europe, if everyone cuts the same things nationally, the region will end up with the same problem that the states doing the cutting will suffer: military capabilities that are out of balance or entirely absent.
As the world's aerospace and defense industry prepares for the Farnborough Airshow, Europe and America are struggling to reshape their military spending.
On the Atlantic's eastern shores, cuts are seen as necessary to pare down staggering national debts. France now has joined a growing list of leading defense nations to slash spending, and it's clear that more cuts are to come.
In Washington, where the growth of defense spending is merely being slowed, DoD acquisition chief Ashton Carter issued draft guidelines to save $100 billion that Defense Secretary Robert Gates wants for troops and equipment.
Carter wants to adopt reasonable goals, eliminate redundancies, reduce bureaucracy, institute better requirements control, and foster correct outcomes rather than mindless processes. If everyone operates on those principles - more like commercial industry - the entire system will become more efficient.
The U.S. acquisition chief deserves credit for asking industry, his own acquisition corps and Congress to make recommendations before he issues final guidelines in September.
Yet executives are skeptical. They wonder, for example, how much can be saved without laying off people or shuttering excess facilities.
Carter also has suggested profit sharing, a notion unpopular with industry. Execs are worried about declining budget growth, fiscal pressures that threaten programs, critical skills and politically important facilities.
Success depends on incentives to cut costs and improve DoD and industry performance.
Here, America can learn from Britain, where outsourcing has improved efficiency, preserved skills and cut costs. The real enemy is the same in both countries: excess people and facilities. In America, an independent panel can review defense agencies, organizations, offices and programs to eliminate duplication; in Europe, a more regional approach is needed.
a better understanding of the costs of uniformed and civilian personnel and contractors is vital. In America, true personnel levels are a mystery; contractors are deemed "off the rolls," so neither DoD nor Congress can fairly assess what efforts are under way nor how efficient they are.
Greater authority vested in fewer expert and better-paid acquisition professionals, and less onerous processes, make sense anywhere.
Finally, planning matters. Where do governments want to end up after they finish cutting, either in terms of capability or industrial capacity? The U.K. military and industry that emerges from the Strategic Defence and Security Review in late October will be very different than it is today. Ditto for France, Italy and Germany.
The worst outcome would be more cuts made piecemeal or in isolation, particularly in Europe, where countries are shedding entire capabilities to make ends meet. Indeed, as unpopular a notion as national specialization is, it may be the only way for the region to preserve its military capabilities. Protectionism for its own sake must be rejected at every turn.
The stakes of getting it wrong are massive for both sides of the Atlantic. As the world's superpower, America needs robust capabilities as the guarantor of global security.
In Europe, if everyone cuts the same things nationally, the region will end up with the same problem that the states doing the cutting will suffer: military capabilities that are out of balance or entirely absent.