Damn the Torpedoes!

[buglerbilly]

Lightweight Torpedo Replacement Project (excerpt)

(Source: Australian National Audit Bureau; issued May 20, 2010)

Lightweight torpedoes are self-propelled, underwater projectiles that can be launched from ships and aircraft and are designed to detonate on contact or in close proximity to a target. The Australian Defence Force’s (ADF’s) primary anti-submarine capability is provided by its maritime patrol aircraft, embarked helicopters and surface platforms. The lightweight torpedo is the main anti-submarine weapon deployed on these platforms.

A Defence study concluded in mid-1990, that the lightweight torpedo ‘was the most cost and operationally effective anti-submarine warfare weapon in all situations’. In July 1997, the Defence Capability Forum concluded that there was a need to acquire a new torpedo because the ADF’s existing Mark 46 lightweight torpedo had significant limitations and was not adequate for the ADF’s needs.

Subsequently, in March 1998, Phase 1 of Joint Project 2070 Lightweight Anti-submarine Warfare Torpedo (JP 2070) was approved by Government to select and procure through subsequent phases, a replacement lightweight torpedo, procure associated support systems, and integrate the torpedo onto the following ADF platforms:
--Adelaide Class Guided Missile Frigates (FFGs);
--ANZAC Class Frigates (ANZAC ships);
--AP-3C Orion Maritime Patrol aircraft (Orion);
--S-70B-2 Seahawk helicopters (Seahawk); and
--SH-2G(A) Super Seasprite helicopters (Super Seasprite).

The Super Seasprite was removed from JP 2070’s scope in March 2008 when the Government took the decision to cancel that project. Subsequently, in February 2009 the Orion and the Seahawk were also removed from the scope of the approved phases of JP 2070. Accordingly, the currently approved phase involves integration of the replacement lightweight torpedo with only the two surface platforms, the FFG and ANZAC ships.

The procurement approach adopted for JP 2070 was one of the Defence Materiel Organisation’s (DMO’s) first attempts at conducting a major capital equipment acquisition using an alliance contracting model. As a consequence of it being a prototype alliance10, JP 2070 carried additional project and contract management overheads in the establishment and initial management phases.

The total budget for all three approved phases of JP 2070 is $665.48 million. As at February 2010, the DMO had spent $397.51 million of the combined approved budget for JP 2070.

Some 12 years after JP 2070 commenced, and nine years after Government approved Phase 2, which was to buy an initial batch of torpedoes and integrate the torpedo onto five ADF platforms, the Project is yet to deliver an operational capability. (end of excerpt)

Click here for the full audit report (199 pages in PDF format) on the ANAO website. (ends)

http://www.anao.gov.au/uploads/documents/2009-10_Audit_Report_37.pdf

ANAO Audit of Lightweight Torpedo Replacement Project

(Source: Australian Department of National Defence; issued May 20, 2010)

John Faulkner, Minister for Defence, and Greg Combet, Minister for Defence Material and Science, today welcomed the release of the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) report into the Lightweight Torpedo Replacement Project.

“The ANAO report clearly demonstrates that there have been - and remain - significant and serious problems associated with the development and procurement of the Lightweight Torpedo under Project JP 2070,” Senator Faulkner said.

“I frankly acknowledge that the management of this project and capability has simply not been good enough.”

Mr Combet said Defence had accepted the report and all of its recommendations. “The project has been a complex undertaking and has a long history of project management difficulties and failures,” Mr Combet said.

”It is clear that the project, first approved 12 years ago, should have been better defined, costed and managed.”

Since 2008, the Government has taken the following actions to remediate this project:

-- Placing the Project on the Government’s new ‘Projects of Concern’ list. This allowed for a significant increase in the level of Government and senior management oversight of the project, and monthly reports of the project being delivered to Government.

-- Creating the Explosive Ordnance Division within the Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO) in February 2008 to provide a dedicated and increased focus and management of explosive ordnance project and sustainment activities.

-- Cancelling the air integration of the Lightweight Torpedo in mid 2009 due to ongoing concerns about its successful achievement.

Senator Faulkner said these actions have not been sufficient to fully address the problems with this project.

“Accordingly, I have asked the Secretary, the Chief of the Defence Force and the Chief Executive Officer of the DMO to report to Ministers every two months on the progress of this project. We believe we can get this project back on track, but this will take some time and a lot of hard work,” Senator Faulkner said.

“In order to promote increased transparency of this project I recently wrote to the Auditor General to request that he conduct a follow up review on the Project in twelve to eighteen months time, to provide an external assessment of its progress.”

Mr Combet said the ANAO report demonstrated the critical importance of the Government’s program to reform defence procurement.

“Since coming to power the Government has crafted a comprehensive program of defence procurement reforms which are designed to avoid issues such as those raised in today’s Audit Report,” Mr Combet said.

-ends-

[ADMk2]

And some parts of Defence industry have the nerve to whinge about ADF buying kit 'off the shelf'...

God. Australian defence industry should be thanking it's lucky stars it is provided with ANY work whatsoever. If Politicians ever realise truly that defence industry jobs within electorates means squat in votes in the overall scheme of things, I wonder how long our "self reliant defence posture" will last?

[Gubler, A.]

An entire generation of combat equipment has been immensely delayed because it was supposed to be 'off the shelf' but all of it was not: LPA, FFGUP, MU90, SH-2GA, ARH Tiger, MRH-90, M113AS4, etc. Interestingly in the ANAO report in relation to the MU90 the vendor advised Defence that the torpedo was "in production for four navies" when asked about OTS status. This was then translated to the MU90 was OTS by Defence even though it had never been accepted into service or meet any typically associated milestones with being in service.

[Milne Bay]

An entire generation of combat equipment has been immensely delayed because it was supposed to be 'off the shelf' but all of it was not: LPA, FFGUP, MU90, SH-2GA, ARH Tiger, MRH-90, M113AS4, etc. Interestingly in the ANAO report in relation to the MU90 the vendor advised Defence that the torpedo was "in production for four navies" when asked about OTS status. This was then translated to the MU90 was OTS by Defence even though it had never been accepted into service or meet any typically associated milestones with being in service.

So what exactly is the problem with the MU90?
Are these teething difficulties with a new product, or has it developed problems recently?
Or is it simply another POS?
MB

[buglerbilly]

Just think we could have been using STINGRAY for the last 10 years which now has the vaunted, but not proven, shallow water capability of MU90..............:violent

Stingray is OTS..........AND is in active use around the World.

[Gubler, A.]

The Sting Ray option was the Mod 1 and would have suffered the same delays as the MU90. Mod 1 was only offered on the market in 2006! Mod 0 Sting Rays wouldn’t have offered much of an advantage over legacy later mod Mk 46s. Also like the MU90 the Sting Ray would have introduced an exotic battery for torpedo propulsion into the ADF. With the Mk 46 and Mk 48 the ADF was only using Otto fuel torpedoes which are much cheaper and easier to manage – not to mention already in RAN and RAAF service.

The reality was the ADF wanted a lightweight torpedo of the most advanced sort and only those torpedoes still under development were offered to meet the specification. Under those circumstances the best option would have been the US Navy’s Mk 54 which combined the front end of an in-service Mk 50 and the back end of the Mk 46. While still developmental it offered the lowest risk as has been borne out by its entry into USN service. Otherwise the LWT should have been delayed 5-10 years until these weapons were ready.

[Gubler, A.]

So what exactly is the problem with the MU90?
Are these teething difficulties with a new product, or has it developed problems recently?

It needed to be developed more. Which of course means shcedule delays.

[buglerbilly]

The Sting Ray option was the Mod 1 and would have suffered the same delays as the MU90. Mod 1 was only offered on the market in 2006! Mod 0 Sting Rays wouldn’t have offered much of an advantage over legacy later mod Mk 46s. Also like the MU90 the Sting Ray would have introduced an exotic battery for torpedo propulsion into the ADF. With the Mk 46 and Mk 48 the ADF was only using Otto fuel torpedoes which are much cheaper and easier to manage – not to mention already in RAN and RAAF service.

The reality was the ADF wanted a lightweight torpedo of the most advanced sort and only those torpedoes still under development were offered to meet the specification. Under those circumstances the best option would have been the US Navy’s Mk 54 which combined the front end of an in-service Mk 50 and the back end of the Mk 46. While still developmental it offered the lowest risk as has been borne out by its entry into USN service. Otherwise the LWT should have been delayed 5-10 years until these weapons were ready.

The battery aspect is irrelevant to the discussion as it is not where the problem lies. Stingray's delays have more to do with the paucity of UK funding than anything else, that and the fact it was not thought a priority for UK use.

Overall however you are most likely correct, the programme should have been delayed............and where is our shallow water threat coming from? Just a thought............

[McDethWivFries]

Yeah I thought that they had the MU90 (that's that 'eurotorp' thing right?) already fitted etc to the Anzac, FFGs & Seahawks and that they decided not to go with the Orions because they were retiring them anyway...

[Gubler, A.]

The battery aspect is irrelevant to the discussion as it is not where the problem lies.

No it isn’t. Introducing a new type of torpedo propulsion system is going to contribute to schedule delay and risk. If one torpedo in the competition uses the same propulsion as the in-service torpedo and as long as it meets the performance specification (which it did) then it will have a significant advantage in ease of introduction into service.

[buglerbilly]

No it isn’t. Introducing a new type of torpedo propulsion system is going to contribute to schedule delay and risk. If one torpedo in the competition uses the same propulsion as the in-service torpedo and as long as it meets the performance specification (which it did) then it will have a significant advantage in ease of introduction into service.

That may well be the case INITIALLY but it becomes irrelevant rapidly if you then transition all other light torpoedo units to the same make and model. The basis of your argument means we'd never change due to not wanting to upset the status quo and make personnel learn something new.

It doesn't add schedule risk if it bloody worked as it was supposed to but it hadn't even succeeded in meeting ANYONE's requirements at that stage! As you say they should have stuck with the existing then modified USA design UNTIL there were actual OTS designs available elsewhere.

[buglerbilly]

Defence sustains friendly fire over torpedo

TIM LESTER

May 21, 2010 - 1:21PM

Gamblers know it as "doubling-up". Every time you lose a bet, you double the next bet. The gambler reasons that sooner or later they'll win a bet, recovering all the lost money plus the amount they stood to win on the original wager.

Casinos have limits on the size of a bet. They form road blocks to this practice. The gambler can often finish up staking thousands in the sad hope of winning back the paltry size of their original bet – and then lose the lot anyway.

It's a shame when it happens to a gambler. It's jaw-dropping when it happens to a federal department betting with taxpayers' money.

I am not suggesting those in the Defence Department — in whom we trust $26 billion a year from the budget and management of the most expensive government projects in this country's history — went on "doubling-up" time and time again.

But what they did in trying to recover from a mismanaged effort to buy a new lightweight torpedo system, amounted to a "double-up" and it was done with wad of taxpayer dollars so large, most jaw muscles don't extend far enough for the required drop.

In polite terms, the Auditor-General says as much in a report on the program to install the MU90 anti-submarine torpedo on naval vessels and aircraft.

Approved more than 12 years ago, the program "is yet to deliver an operational capability".

From the start, this new tool for shooting enemy subs was far more explosive for those trying to buy it than the foreign navies it was supposed to frighten.

Defence and the Howard government thought they were buying a proven torpedo. They "believed the MU90 to be an off the shelf acquisition . . . already in service with the other navies. This was not the case" says the Auditor-General.

How do you get that wrong? Who knows, but the Auditor-General notes "it took several years . . . to identify this".

"Planning and management was inadequate," the report says. There was "an underestimation of . . . risk".

Risk became an even more critical issue in August 2005 when Defence asked the government to approve the project's third phase.

Consider the equation that confronted John Howard's cabinet. The cost of stage three alone: $264 million. The progress to date: ". . . no torpedoes had been delivered under Phase two, and the integration of the torpedo onto the (frigates and naval aircraft) had made limited or no progress."

So what did they do? They doubled up.

According to the Auditor-General, when the government committed $264 million to the project's third phase in August 2005, Defence already felt it was "in a such a weak negotiating position (with those selling the technology) . . . it was necessary to use (the) commitment to Phase three work as leverage to improve Defence's poor overall contractual position".

Andrew Davies, the director of operations and capability at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, has another name for it — "the sunk cost fallacy".

"I don't think anyone wants to be the person who stands up and says, 'Look we've spent this amount of money and this many years, but we should stop this now,' " Davies says.

"They tend to limp on and limp on and limp on and nobody wants to cut their losses."

It's not a bad description of a small-time gambler, ratcheting up their bets and ignoring the risks.

Twelve years on, the Auditor finds almost $400 million of taxpayers' money has been sunk into the anti-submarine missile program.

Even when the $665 million budgeted cost is finally spent our Navy will not have "the capability originally sought by the ADF, with uncertainty surrounding what will be delivered".

The purchasing process used by Defence has changed since this debacle. In the years ahead we will find out whether the new process neutralises the risk that embarrassed bureaucrats will sometimes "double up" with staggering amounts of money.

Tim Lester is national bureau chief.

[Gubler, A.]

That may well be the case INITIALLY but it becomes irrelevant rapidly if you then transition all other light torpoedo units to the same make and model. The basis of your argument means we'd never change due to not wanting to upset the status quo and make personnel learn something new.

It’s still a cost burden to the ADF. If the Army wants to replace a vehicle with a crew of two and one vendor offers a vehicle with a crew of three then the cost of additional soldier would have to be factored into the assessment process. This is more than just a new brand of black box it means replacing an Otto fuel infrastructure with an exotic battery infrastructure. This means a whole range of additional costs and burdens to the ADF to make the change.


It doesn't add schedule risk if it bloody worked as it was supposed to but it hadn't even succeeded in meeting ANYONE's requirements at that stage! As you say they should have stuck with the existing then modified USA design UNTIL there were actual OTS designs available elsewhere.

Yes or they could have assessed that the Mk 54 was considerably less risky than the other advanced torpedos because it involved combining two actually OTS – in fleet service – weapon systems to produce a low cost and compliant capability. The Mk 54 is what the RAN and RAAF want for the FNACS and P-8 because with the AUD *generally* high to the USD compared to the Euro and GBP it offers better value for money, more mission system capability and a much cheaper propulsion and refuelling capability (Otto). They were happy to dump the MU90 on the destroyers so to lower their operating costs.

But none of this – common sense – seems to be able to compete with vendor competition in Defence procurement. Lets not specify for what we need so as to enable some competition… Thanks to that we have a range of failed or severely delayed projects.

[buglerbilly]

It’s still a cost burden to the ADF. If the Army wants to replace a vehicle with a crew of two and one vendor offers a vehicle with a crew of three then the cost of additional soldier would have to be factored into the assessment process. This is more than just a new brand of black box it means replacing an Otto fuel infrastructure with an exotic battery infrastructure. This means a whole range of additional costs and burdens to the ADF to make the change.


Why is it Defence appears to have a problem operating more than one type of a system YET in civvie life we operate multiple items of equipment and heavy gear with little problem at all? Training is part of the problem but fer Crissakes its imbecilic in extreme to believe we can only have ONE of everything..................my last comment on this matter.

[buglerbilly]

MU90 Lightweight Torpedo Deliveries Continue At Cruising Speed

(Source: Eurotorp; issued Sept. 13, 2010)


Deliveries of the MU90 lightweight torpedo, seen here during its acceptance trials, continue to its six customer navies, including developers France and Italy. (French MoD photo)

SOPHIA ANTIPOLIS, France --- Eurotorp today announced that the delivery of its 200th lightweight MU90 torpedo for the French Navy has been accepted by the French Defence Procurement Agency (Direction Générale de l’Armement, DGA).

This delivery marks another key milestone in the contract awarded to Eurotorp for the delivery of several hundred of torpedoes to the French and Italian Navies.

The MU90 equips F70 and Horizon frigates, ATL-2 Maritime Patrol Aircraft and Lynx helicopters. It will soon be fitted on board FREMM frigates and NH90 helicopters for both the French and Italian forces.

The MU90 has also enjoyed significant export success with several hundred torpedoes ordered by Navies across the world.

It has already entered into service with German, Danish and Polish Navies and has been accepted by the Commonwealth of Australia (CoA) where the torpedo is undergoing acceptance into service.

Designed and built with the most advanced technologies, the MU90 is a fire-and-forget weapon conceived to counter any submarine threat, conventional or nuclear, whatever the environment and the scenario. It can be deployed in deep waters as easily as in shallow waters below 25m.

The MU90 is powered through a closed-loop Aluminum–Silver Oxide sea water battery giving more [range], increased performance and improved safety. It is equipped with a fully insensitive directed energy shaped charge warhead proven to penetrate double hulled large submarines, and contains latest generation “mission software”.

BACKGROUND NOTES:

- Germany: the MU90 will be fitted on board the F124 frigates and Lynx helicopters, then on board the future MRH and P3-C MPAs.

- Denmark: the MU90 equips the Absalon flexible ships, the Stanflex 300 multi-role vessels and will equip the patrol ships.

- Poland: the MU90 equips FFG-7 Frigates as well as Mi-14 and SH2-G Sea Sprite helicopters and will equip the Gawron corvettes and the future ASW helicopters.

- Australia: the MU90 is embarked on board FFH (Anzac class) and FFG-7 frigates, and will be fitted on board the Hobart destroyers. The MU90 is also the natural candidate for ASW Australian air platforms to be selected in a near future. While Australia has already taken delivery of several batches of torpedoes, a quantity of torpedoes will be partially produced and fully assembled in Australia under Joint Project 2070 (with the CoA).

These six countries are gathered in a “Users Club” created in June 2007, aiming to reap the economic benefits of cooperative management of maintenance, logistic support and repair activities.

EUROTORP (GEIE) is a consortium established between DCNS (26%), Thales (24%) and WASS (50%, a Finmeccanica company) and is the world leader in the field of Light Weight Torpedoes (LWT) and associated systems. Eurotorp is fully responsible for Commercial management, Program management, Technical coordination, Industrial coordination and after sales. EUROTORP is certified ISO 9001 & AQAP 2110.

-ends-

[Deks]

That's all very well and good, but have they got them working yet?

[buglerbilly]

Eurotorp’s MU90 LWT Takes Further Step Towards Breakthrough for Air Platforms

(Source: Eurotorp; dated April 22, issued April 27, 2011)


French navy aircraft like this Lynx helicopter are working up with the recently-introduced MU90 lightweight torpedo, developed jointly with Italy. (DGA photo)

SOPHIA ANTIPOLIS, France --- The MU90 continues its operational progression with the French Navy, following the delivery of the 200th MU90 lightweight torpedo in July 2010 by the French Direction Générale de l’Armement (DGA).

Since then, the French Navy has started to deploy its first MU90 LWT for operational exercises in parallel with batch acceptance tests. During an advanced anti-submarine exercise in April 2011, the operational crew of one ATLANTIQUE2 (ATL2) Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) successfully performed tracking, classification and long range engagement of a CALAS autonomous target simulating a submarine.

Thanks to using the MU90 the French Navy has made a significant step change in ASW capability. Following early operational capability validation in 2008 in partnership with Eurotorp, the French Navy has started to conduct exercises on its own with the MU90, helping the torpedo on its next step towards full operation.

Today, almost all the ATL2 have been modified to ensure the launching capability of the MU90, The MU90 airborne solution adopted for this aircraft is a semi-integrated one so as not to interfere with the aircraft data management system while being connected to the platform attitude data, thus granting maximum freedom of manoeuvre to the crew prior to the launch. This intermediate solution has minimized modifications on board the aircraft without degrading any of the MU90’s performance.

The MU90 is preset through the very user-friendly “PCA” semi-integrated airborne presetter, providing the TACCO the full range of MU90 presets through pre-defined scenarios in which every preset can be modified if needed.

The success of MU90 air launches demonstrates the full efficiency of MU90 when embarked on board any air platform.

Of 324mm diameter, the MU90 can be embarked on board any type of ASW air fixed or rotary wing aircraft. In addition to ATL2, the MU90 is qualified on board NH90, Lynx, EH101 Merlin, SH-2G Sea Sprite with different solutions ranging from stand-alone to fully integrated ones, through specific equipment or aircraft Store Management System. MU90, offering an unmatchable flight domain up to 900m in altitude and 400kts in speed, is today a candidate to be embarked on board all anti-submarine warfare air platforms, including the helicopters Panther, AW159, S70B, MH-60R and MH92 as well as the Maritime Patrol Aircraft C295, ATR72, Dash8, P3C and P8.

Eurotorp is already in advanced talks with the majority of air platform suppliers to achieve this goal.

The MU90 is a fire-and-forget weapon designed to counter any type of nuclear or conventional submarine, acoustically coated, deep and fast-evasive, deploying active or passive anti-torpedo effectors. The torpedo features unique system characteristics which allow real operational capability in coastal waters. The MU90 is powered through a closed-loop Aluminum–Silver Oxide sea water battery delivering twice the energy of all the other LWTs as well as total safety. It is equipped with a fully insensitive directed energy shaped charge warhead proven to penetrate double-hulled large submarines, advanced acoustic head and last generation “mission software”.

Of extremely long endurance, the engagement distance is beyond 12 000m, whatever the submarine depth. The MU90 operates without any speed degradation and without any limitation of salinity and temperature at depths >1000m or as shallow as 25m whilst retaining navigation capability up to 3m.

The MU90 LWT is in service with the French, Italian, German, Danish, and Polish Navies, and has also been delivered and accepted by the Commonwealth of Australia (CoA). In France, the MU90 is embarked on board F70 and Horizon frigates, ATL2 MPA and Lynx helicopters. It will be also embarked soon, in France and in Italy as well, on board FREMM frigates and NH90 helicopters.

Eurotorp (EEIG) is a consortium established between DCNS (26%), Thales (24%) and WASS (50%, a Finmeccanica company) and is the world leader in the field of Light Weight Torpedoes (LWT) and associated systems. Eurotorp is fully responsible for Commercial management, Program management, Technical coordination, Industrial coordination and after sales.

-ends-

[buglerbilly]

Terma and DCNS Have Developed A Fully Automatic Anti-Torpedo Decoy System

(Source: DCNS; issued September 16, 2011)

At the Defense & Security Equipment International exhibition Terma and DCNS announced that their technical cooperation has resulted in an important improvement for ships with a need for protection against torpedoes

Terma and DCNS have developed a fully automatic anti-torpedo decoy system. The system uses the Terma 130mm Soft Kill Weapon System (SKWS) to fire DCNS CANTO-V anti-torpedo decoy. The SKWS upgrade for twin AAW and ASW purpose use the jointly developed software with advanced algorithm (embedding DCNS CONTRALTO-V reaction software) to support fully automatic firing.

This provides the ship with an effective protection against torpedoes attacks. The decoys will be placed in the water in the best way to confuse the torpedo together with ship evasive manoeuvres proposal.

With advanced algorithms, this system will provide the best firing solution and protection of all types of ships against torpedo attack.

Terma develops products and systems for defense, non-defense, and security applications, including command and control systems, radar systems, self-protection systems for ships and aircraft, space technology, and advanced Aerostructures for the international aircraft industry. The company has a total staff of 1,200 and realized 2010/11 revenues of 190 mil euro. Terma A/S is headquartered at Aarhus, Denmark, and maintains international subsidiaries and operations in The Netherlands, Germany, the U.S., and Singapore.

-ends-