China’s Navy Gets Its Act Together, and Gets Aggressive

[buglerbilly]

By admin April 26, 2010 | 3:11 pm

Abe Denmark directs the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. This is his first post for Danger Room.



China’s decades-long military modernization effort is paying off. After assembling a revamped arsenal of new ships, subs, planes, and missiles, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is showing that they can use all those assets together, in an operation far from its shores. This display of improved military capabilities have occurred in conjunction with messages to the U.S. indicating a more aggressive approach from Beijing on China’s claims over disputed waters of the South China Seas. The United States must respond to this emerging challenge with a responsible approach that keeps tensions low while sending a clear message to Beijing that the U.S. will not accept China’s efforts to unilaterally control Southeast Asia’s maritime commons.

The South China Morning Post recently reported that destroyers, frigates, and auxiliary ships from the North Sea Fleet (based in Qingdao) passed through the Bashi Strait between the Philippines and Taiwan to conduct a major “confrontation exercise” in the South China Sea. A few days later, Sovremenny guided missile destroyers, frigates, and submarines from the East Sea Fleet (based in Ningbo) passed through Japan’s Miyako Strait without warning Tokyo and conducted anti-submarine warfare exercises in the Pacific waters southeast of Japan. There have also been reports of naval aviators from several bases in the Nanjing and Guangzhou military regions conducting long-range exercises that incorporated radar jamming, night flying, mid-air refueling, and simulated bombing runs in the South China Sea.

While provocative in their own right, these exercises are a sign that China’s Navy has taken a major step forward. The SCMP article quotes an unnamed Asian defense attaché: “We’ve never seen anything on this scale before - they are finally showing us they can put it all together.”

The implications of “putting it all together” are significant. The U.S. military’s ability to dominate the skies over any battlefield is not just due to its technological superiority, but its ability to incorporate capabilities together to support one another. Anti-submarine warfare and mid-air refueling are very difficult and complex operations to undertake, requiring good technology, effective command and control, and highly skilled operators. China’s ability to conduct these operations demonstrates a significantly increased prowess in complex military operations.



These exercises are also notable for their location and their timing. By transiting the Miyako Strait and operating in highly contested waters, China is sending a signal to the region that it is developing the ability to back up its territorial sea claims with more than just rhetoric. These exercises were conducted a few weeks after Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg and NSC Senior Director for Asia Jeff Bader visited Beijing. As reported by the New York Times, they were told that the South China Sea is a “core interest” for the PRC. This is an important phrase for Beijing – it raises the South China Sea to the same level of significance as Taiwan and Tibet – and suggests a newly aggressive and provocative approach.

China has long claimed that the South China Sea is within its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and that the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) forces foreign militaries to seek permission from Beijing before they can transit through. Of course, xix other countries in the region also claim all or part of the South China Seas. So the United States has long identified EEZs as international waters through which military vessels can freely pass. “We do not favor one claim, or one claimant country, over another. We urged then, as we do today, the maintenance of a calm and non-assertive environment in which contending claims may be discussed and, if possible, resolved,” Secretary of Defense Robert Gates noted in a 2008 speech, “All of us in Asia must ensure that our actions are not seen as pressure tactics, even when they coexist beside outward displays of cooperation.”

By labeling the South China Sea as a “core interest” and conducting these exercises just days later, China has issued its reply: China will aggressively back its claims with a robust military capability.

The other, more implicit, message from Beijing could not be more stark: China’s military is growing more capable, and the PLA Navy is now at the vanguard of China’s military modernization effort. By acquiring advanced military technologies and developing the ability to conduct complex operations far from shore, China is changing military balances throughout the region with implications far beyond a Taiwan-related scenario.

The U.S. and China have been in a similar position before. The 2001 collision between a Chinese jet and an American EP-3E in international airspace over the South China Sea caused a significant downturn in U.S.-China relations. Disturbingly, aggressive Chinese behavior toward American naval assets in the South China Seas in recent years, as happened in 2009 with the USS Impeccable, suggest that a naval EP-3 incident is a distinct possibility in the future.

While the U.S. has been adjusting its posture in the Asia-Pacific region to account for China’s military modernization, it must recognize that there is a political dynamic at play that should not be ignored. The South China Sea and the adjacent littoral waters off the coasts of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore will be the most strategically significant waterways of the 21st century. Already, 80 percent of China’s oil imports flow through the Strait of Malacca, and Japan and Korea are similarly dependent on access to those waters.

The United States should continue to pursue the calm and non-assertive approach described by Secretary Gates at Shangri-La, and has been doing so through the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) dialogue with China. Yet there are two other avenues for the U.S. to ensure those important waterways remain open.

First, the U.S. should ratify the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which defines Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) as international waterways through which warships may make innocent passage. While the U.S. has long operated within its dictates, ratifying UNCLOS would add the weight of international law to American objections to claims of sovereignty over international waters.

Second, the U.S. should adhere to the Law of Gross Tonnage, and regularly conduct freedom of navigation exercises through the South China Sea to ensure its continued openness. Continuing to treat the South China Seas as international waters will prevent habits of deference to Chinese claims from forming. This is not a bellicose or an aggressive approach, but is rather a continuation of long-standing American and international policies towards international waterways.

China’s claims of sovereignty over the South China Sea, if left unchallenged, would make Beijing the arbiter of all international maritime traffic that passes through, which the U.S. cannot allow. As we can see from the U.S. Defense Department’s annual reports to Congress on the Chinese military (pdf), China has been developing these capabilities for some time, and there is no sign that its ambitions have yet been satisfied.

Bottom line: this is just the beginning.

[Photos: China Daily, Kobus/Picasa]

Read More http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/04/chinas-navy-gets-its-act-together-and-gets-aggressive/#more-24023#ixzz0mFgaBba9

[Weasel]

Starts out strong, but then falls apart from here on;


China’s ability to conduct these operations demonstrates a significantly increased prowess in complex military operations

Is better written if it said :


China’s ability to conduct these operations demonstrates a significantly increased prowess in being able to learn complex military operations

Then he goes on to make 3 assumptions in the last 5 paragraphs while patently ignoring the elephant in the room -- that the United States of America claims the EEZ surrounding the USA as territorial waters. This has always been a bit of a buggaboo for us, as does anyone remember Libya in the 80's and how the USS JFK has a couple of mig kills painted on its citadel? That little incident occurred just after we claimed the EEZ as territorial waters. Libya then promptly followed suit (Like China is now) and ummm, we went in and shot down a few planes, because we were in International waters that would have been territorial waters, if it were the USA but wait, you guys are rag heads and we aren't. lol. Mind you, no one had ratified the territorial claim :D.. .I love it.

Anyway, the point is, all we taught the world was that if you have the military might, you can do and say what you like and further undermined the UN.

As to the report. Bit of scare mongering. Needs to go back to "Marketing to the Federal Government 101" if he is going to get any traction and stop making assumptions. Makes it Sound like an Aus Air Power NOTAM (?) by Eric Goon.

cheers

w

[buglerbilly]

Chinese navy 'challenges regional order'

April 28, 2010 - 12:19PM

AAP

China's growing naval power poses a direct challenge to the US sea-based alliance system and the regional order that underpins it, a new study warns.

The Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) aspires to be able to conduct distant operations but its key focus remained on seas closer to home, a paper by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) says.

"China's East Asian maritime preoccupations, not its occasional bluewater forays, are of greatest strategic significance," said author Dr Chris Rahman, from the University of Wollongong's Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security.

"They pose direct challenges to the US sea-based alliance system and the regional order that the system underpins."

China's naval build-up during the past decade had been widely commented upon, with arguments that it was set on becoming a global naval power to protect its economic interests and project power globally.

However, China has yet to spell out the strategic rationale for this buildup.

Although it publishes a defence white paper, it has yet to reveal a specific naval strategy.

Dr Rahman said China's bluewater naval capabilities - the ability for naval units to operate far from home - were not China's main focus.

Although China has been building larger and more capable warships, it has not been building the replenishment ships needed to sustain distant missions.

Similarly, China has constructed new nuclear submarines but most of its undersea fleet are conventional diesel-electric boats, less suited to distant operations.

China appeared set on developing a capability to dominate regional seas and deny freedom of action to the US, Dr Rahman said, adding its preoccupation with Taiwan was driving this particular geostrategic agenda.

"China's strategic focus on area denial capabilities since the US intervention during the March 1996 Taiwan Strait missile crisis has been intended to degrade US capacity to reinforce its allies and clients should conflict erupt, or even to deter intervention in the first place," he said.

It was not China's current limited ability to conduct distant water operations or its potential aircraft carrier development that should be a primary cause for concern.

"Rather, it is the PLAN's growing ability to deny access to east Asian seas in a crisis or conflict, and so to disrupt the security system led by US Pacific Command, that most threatens regional order and harmony at sea," Dr Rahman said.

© 2010 AAP

[buglerbilly]

The news from Tokyo on 10 April 2010 that the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force had monitored ten Chinese warships passing 140km south of Okinawa through the Miyako Strait marked a new stage in China’s naval development. The deployment was of unprecedented size and scope for the Chinese navy, and was the second such operation mounted by China in rapid succession: in March, a smaller flotilla had been deployed on exercises. The two sets of exercises, along with Chinese counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, demonstrate the flexibility of China’s naval forces and their greater prominence in Beijing’s strategic calculations.

The flotilla from the People’s Liberation Army Navy contained some of its most advanced warships, including two Kilo-class diesel-powered attack submarines and at least two Russian-built Sovremenny-class destroyers. The March and April missions were the first of any size beyond the ‘First Island Chain’ – the term used by China for the line formed by the Aleutians, the Kuriles, Japan’s archipelago, the Ryukyus, Taiwan, the Philippines and Borneo – and indicated that deployments beyond the chain were now official policy, having been discussed by naval officers for some years beforehand.

South China Sea tensions

The timing of the exercises appears to be directly linked to rising tensions in China’s long-running sovereignty disputes over islands in the South China Sea. The current Chinese boundaries for the region first appeared on a survey conducted by the Nationalist Chinese government in 1935, and were retained by the Communist government after 1949. They define as Chinese several island groups including the Paracels (Xisha), the Spratlys (Nansha), the Pratas (Dongsha), Macclesfield Bank (Zhongsha) and Scarborough Shoal (Huangyan Dao). For decades, China has disputed some or all of these islands with Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. Mineral, natural-gas and oil deposits are claimed to be at stake, although the absence of independent surveys leaves the extent of these open to question. But this uncertainty has not deterred claimant nations from building military installations on many of the reefs. Currently China has installations on Cuarteron, Fiery Cross, Hughes, Johnson, Mischief, Gaven and Subi reefs. These range from small three-storey buildings with helipads, to facilities capable of acting as a refuelling dock.

The fiercest arguments, which have intensified over the past year, have been between China and Vietnam, which officially claimed the Spratly Islands as a Vietnamese province in 1973. Vietnam occupies 29 of the islands and reefs in the area, while China is in possession of about nine. As the dispute is as much over the surrounding water as the islands, commercial activities such as fishing have evolved in recent years into a strategic issue. Vietnamese and Chinese fishing vessels routinely congregate in the same areas.

In March, China responded to pleas from Chinese fishing vessels off the Spratly Islands that they had been subjected to harassment by the Vietnamese coastguard service. The Yuzheng 311, China’s largest fishery patrol vessel displacing 4,600 tonnes, was dispatched to the South China Sea from Sanya, Hainan Island, on 18 March, accompanied by the 202 patrol vessel. A Chinese news report specifically highlighted the presence of heavy machine guns on board the 311.

On 1 April Vietnamese President Nguyen Minh Triet, escorted by two destroyers, visited the disputed Bach Long Vi (known as Bai Long Wei to China) island, which is located between Haiphong in Vietnam and China’s Hainan Island. Triet announced from the island that Vietnam would ‘not let anyone infringe on our territory, our sea, and islands’. Hanoi formally lodged a protest with Beijing over the seizure of nine fishermen by the Chinese fisheries department on 22 March near the Paracels.

First operation

Meanwhile, China had embarked on the first of what were described in official media as ‘long-range naval exercises’. A flotilla of six ships from the North Sea Fleet had left their base in Qingdao and sailed through the Miyako Strait near Okinawa in three pairs on 18 March, possibly in an attempt to avoid attention. The Japanese destroyer Amagiri reported seeing a Luzhou-class destroyer and a Jiangwei II frigate. Another destroyer, the Asayuki, detected both a Jiangwei II and a Jianghu III frigate. A Chinese tanker and a salvage vessel followed. Prior to the ships passing, a single Chinese KJ-200 airborne warning-and-control system aircraft was tracked by Japanese F-15s as it flew over the strait on 12 March.

A report in the PLA Daily in mid-April described this as a ‘long-distance training exercise’. The official CCTV-7 Military News programme also offered clues as to the nature of the deployment: the deputy commander of the North Sea Fleet stated that ‘China needed to protect its maritime territorial integrity through long-distance naval projection’. The report also showed J-8 fighters providing long-range air cover, and anti-submarine warfare exercises (ASW) being carried out. The flotilla made its presence felt as it travelled through the Miyako Strait and later the Bashi Channel between the Philippines and Taiwan. The ships conducted numerous live-fire exercises, as well as confrontation drills with elements of the South Sea Fleet. The PLA report said the fleet visited Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratly Islands, as well as conducting further exercises near the Malacca Strait between Malaysia and Indonesia. The deployment and exercises were a clear message of the willingness of the PLA Navy to assert Chinese power in the region. The flotilla returned to base in early April.

Second operation

The Japanese were surprised once more when a second task group – consisting of as many as ten ships from the East Sea Fleet, including destroyers, frigates and several auxiliary vessels – sailed through the Miyako Strait on 10 April. Two Kilo-class submarines accompanied the flotilla, surfacing as they passed through the strait in accordance with international law. This time Tokyo decided to go public with the news. The Japanese destroyer Suzunami and surveillance aircraft were dispatched to take pictures of the Chinese flotilla which, rather than passing in pairs, sailed in one large group past Okinawa. The Suzunami was buzzed by a Chinese Ka-28 ASW helicopter, which came within 90 metres of the Japanese warship. By late April the flotilla appeared to have halted east of Taiwan, and was conducting ASW exercises. The halt of its journey southwards seemed to be directly linked to a change in the plight of the Chinese fishing vessels in the Spratly Islands.

When the 311 and 202 Chinese fishery patrol vessels arrived in the Spratly Islands, they found that Chinese fishing boats were surrounded by large numbers of Vietnamese boats. The situation deteriorated after the first naval flotilla returned home as more and more Vietnamese vessels congregated around the Chinese ships. An embedded press reporter on the 311 claimed that on 8 April some 20 boats were encircling the vessel, and by 10 April the number had climbed to 60. They were only 200 metres from the 311, and were photographing the Chinese ships.

The Vietnamese perhaps did not expect further Chinese naval action, since the first flotilla had reached the limits of its endurance after 19 days of sailing over 6,000 nautical miles. However, the report from Japan that the second group of ships had passed through the Miyako Strait had a startling effect on the Vietnamese vessels. The reporter on the 311 described the Chinese sailors’ amazement as every single Vietnamese vessel vanished from the area on 12 April.

It appears that news of the second Chinese flotilla surprised the Vietnamese. Moreover, the decision to sail through the Miyako Strait without any of the caution displayed previously may have been intended to produce as much publicity as possible in order to send a warning to the Vietnamese boats surrounding the stranded 311. Once the Vietnamese vessels withdrew, the Chinese group halted its move south and began conducting ad hoc exercises.

Evolving naval policy

The operations were a testament to the modernisation of the PLA Navy over the past decade. They would not have been possible if it were not for the continued focus on long-range projection exercises that has dominated its training for the past decade. The Chinese decision in December 2008 to join the international anti-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden has led to Chinese naval ships using some of the world’s main maritime routes more often. For some Southeast Asian countries, the recent operations represent an attempt by China to set a precedent for the establishment of a long-term naval presence in the region. The navy’s strategy of continued expansion, including an aircraft carrier – refurbishment of the former Ukrainian carrier Varyag is under way – and new submarines, has also been a concern for China’s neighbours. In 2009, Vietnam responded by ordering six Russian Kilo-class attack submarines.

It is clear that the PLA Navy is beginning to take on a much more prominent role in Chinese foreign policy. At its 60th Anniversary Review in 2009, President Hu Jintao said that it had reached a new ‘historical starting point’. Five years earlier, Hu had set out the PLA’s ‘historical mission’ for the future: to consolidate the ruling status of the Communist Party; to help ensure China’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and domestic security; to safeguard China’s expanding national interests; and to help maintain world peace. Clear indications that a new policy had been officially adopted came when naval officers made ‘proposals’ to the National People’s Congress in 2009 and 2010.

Reach and flexibility

Underlining the results of the change of naval strategy, no less than 19 warships, including three returning from anti-piracy operations off Somalia, passed through the disputed islands in the South China Sea in March and April. Japanese Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa described this activity as an ‘unprecedented situation’.

Most significant has been the PLA Navy’s demonstration of its ability to organise and conduct far-ranging operations with a wide array of platforms. This indicates an increase in command-and-control abilities, as well as improved coordination between the navy’s different fleets. Although the East Sea Fleet was favoured by former president Jiang Zemin as a priority force in dealing with the Taiwan issue (such as the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis), neither it nor the North Sea Fleet have previously been involved in deployments in the South China Sea. During Hu’s presidency, the South Sea Fleet has been radically modernised and has usually been the main force used by China to assert its maritime sovereignty.

This new flexibility signals a considerable change in the navy’s strategic thinking. The interoperability and mutual support between the three fleets marks a shift towards a consolidated central command and away from the out-of-date system of having three independently operating fleets. It shows that the navy is willing and able to break through the First Island Chain and into the Pacific – a substantial change from previous doctrine. The new focus is now on ‘long-range maritime training’ in order to ‘protect national maritime sovereignty’. Senior PLA Navy officers have also called for the ‘formation and [maintenance] of lasting long-range combat capabilities’.

Significant progress has been made towards achieving China’s objective of building a fully fledged blue-water navy by 2050. Substantial new funding has allowed it to evolve rapidly from a coastal defence force to a navy capable of limited power projection. The completion of the Varyag, due in 2012, will further extend its ability to project power by providing valuable training for a future indigenously designed carrier force.

For the region, the strategic implications will be complex. Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries will have to contend with a more assertive China in the Paracel and Spratly Islands. Japan and other countries will have to get used to Chinese flotillas moving more frequently into the Pacific. However, its primary focus will be on preserving territorial integrity rather than on aggressive expansion.

Copyright ©2006 - 2010 The International Institute For Strategic Studies

[buglerbilly]

China Extends Military's Reach

Eyes Long-Range Airlifters; Navy Sails Off Africa

By PIERRE TRAN

Published: 24 May 2010

BEIJING - The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is transforming a one-time barefoot peasant army into a modern and deployable military, racking up operational hours in an anti-piracy naval mission in the Gulf of Aden as military officials study strategic airlifter requirements.

"Projection is one of the priorities," a European official said. "They are very interested in any industrial program, whether aircraft or naval, American, British or European, that offers projection."

In March, Beijing dispatched missile destroyer DDG 168 and a fleet auxiliary supply ship, the fifth task force to sail since December 2008 to protect Chinese and other commercial shipping from pirates working off the Somali coast.

The operations in the Gulf of Aden, the farthest China has ever deployed its ships, constitute valuable training, Navy Capt. Xie Dongpei, deputy head of the office of the Navy commander, said May 10 at a rare press briefing.

Xie said the Navy is keen to cooperate with European and other foreign navies off Somalia and elsewhere.

But Western forces see little to learn from the Chinese Navy, and little incentive to teach them, the European official said.

Such power-projection missions will help China protect its maritime zones of economic interest and safeguard the foreign trade that powers its economy, said Army Gen. Jia Xiaoning, deputy director for foreign affairs in the Ministry of Defense.

Jia said that China's modernization will require spending more on the Navy and Air Force relative to the Army, which has been the backbone of national defense.

One thing that might show up on the shopping list: an aircraft carrier.

"We're in the process of studying the possibilities and conditions for having a carrier," Jia said. "When you look around the world, other major powers have a carrier, all except China."

Interest in A400M

Another possibility is long-range airlifters. Beijing has ambitions to develop a replacement for its Ilyushin Il-176s, but no one knows how far it has progressed, the European official said.

More intriguing to China is the A400M transport aircraft built by EADS subsidiary Airbus Military.

"It's natural they're interested in the A400M because it's happening," the European official said.

The unarmed A400M is certified as a civil aircraft, though it carries military equipment and self-protection gear. But selling it to China would be a charged and complicated political decision, requiring consent from each of the producer countries - mainly Britain, Germany, France, Spain and Turkey, said a French official in Paris.

China remains under U.S. and European Union arms embargoes imposed after the 1989 killing of pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square.

French President Nicolas Sarkozy has called for lifting the ban, arguing that China should be treated as an equal partner. Yet his efforts have earned him little credit with the Chinese, who have cold-shouldered France since Sarkozy met with the Dalai Lama in 2008, a second European official said.

Neither has Spain, the current holder of the EU presidency, earned Chinese political capital for its own calls to end the embargo. This is because Beijing understands that it will have to deal with this question at a European level, the second European official said.

But Britain, keen to nurture trans-Atlantic ties with Washington, has opposed an end to the EU embargo, a position supported by German Chancellor Angela Merkel.

The ban hampers China's efforts to develop military equipment, said China's Jia. China has tried to import technology from countries, including France, but runs into the "system of blockage from the EU and other things," he said. As a strategic partner, there is no reason to restrict trade in technology, he said.

China is talking to "other countries" but is in no hurry, he said.

The second European official said China could help make its case for an end to the embargo by ratifying the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and increasing military transparency.

Technology Leaks

U.S. officials, who want to keep advanced defense technology from leaking to Beijing, still need reassurance that Europe has a robust arms-control regime in place.

Such worries are holding up a prospective sale of French air-to-air missiles and fire-control systems to Pakistan, which wants to upgrade 50 JF-17 Thunder fighter aircraft co-developed with China.

"It's on standby," the French official said in Paris. "It's a region of the world which is complex, with different influences: China, India, Pakistan."

France has refused to approve the export of the RC400 fire-control radar and other avionics for the JF-17, a Thales spokeswoman said in Paris.

The sale of gear for the JF-17 also is opposed by India, which is in talks with Thales to upgrade its Mirage 2000H fleet and which is weighing Dassault's Rafale in the competition for 126 new fighters.

"No one in French industry, neither MBDA or Thales, particularly wants this [JF-17 upgrade] deal," a French defense executive said in Paris.

Even if the embargo were canceled, the new EU Common Position on arms sales is stricter and would impose legal restrictions on arms exports, said Alexander McLachlan, political councilor at the EU delegation here.

The sanctions no doubt sting because China insists on being treated as an equal; indeed, its natural reference in military matters is the United States. Beijing also keeps alive the humiliation of 100 years of colonialism that began when Royal Navy Capt. Charles Elliot claimed Hong Kong for the British crown in 1841.

Absence of Black Hawk Spare Parts

For Col. Li Guo of the Army Air Corps, the American embargo has meant his helicopter regiment, based at Chengdu in the southwestern Sichuan province, has been unable to get hold of spare parts for around 10 Black Hawk transports. The U.S.-built helicopters entered service here in 1984 under the name of Black Eagles.

Asked how he has been able to maintain the helicopters without spare parts for 20 years, Li said the regiment had built up stocks before the embargo came into effect.

"They can be used indefinitely," he said.

The pilots fly about 60 hours a year, about 40 percent as much as French Army helicopter crews.

The Black Hawks, although they cost more to buy, are easier and cheaper to maintain than the regiment's 20 or so Russian-built Mi-171 helicopters, not to mention easier to fly and more maneuverable, Li said.

"It comes out the same," he said.

Li said the PLA lacks a modern heavy-lift helicopter and has not started designing one.

In 2008, the regiment flew 2,500 missions - sometimes 20 flights a day - to help residents of the earthquake-devastated Sichaun region. After the Black Hawks picked up six foreign tourists there, the authorities asked the U.S. government for spares after the earthquake but received no answer, Li said.

[buglerbilly]

The Carrier In the Cornfield

(Source: Forecast International; issued June 7, 2010)

NEWTOWN, Conn. --- The Chinese Navy's aircraft carrier program appears to be picking up momentum with Chinese news sources reporting two major steps forward in the development of the necessary systems for these ships.

The most remarkable of these steps is the construction of what appears to be a hybrid of an office building and an aircraft carrier. This has already been dubbed the "Carrier in the Cornfield" in reference to the famous U.S. Naval Surface Warfare "Cruiser in the Cornfield" facility at Moorestown, NJ. The New Jersey facility was used to test out the AEGIS air warfare system and subsequently provided a research capability to test new items of equipment under carefully controlled conditions. It is likely that the Chinese facility is intended for similar work.

Aircraft and helicopters are frequently seen on the roof of this building. It appears that current efforts are aimed at developing the operational art needed for on-deck operations and flow, and then on training PLAN personnel in these functions. It also appears that the dummy superstructure on the roof of this facility is being used to test the phased-array radars being developed for the new carriers. It can be assumed that the facility is also being used to check for electromagnetic interference between the radar and the aircraft. One thing can safely be assumed - the Chinese are not landing aircraft on the roof of the building. The aircraft there are being lifted into position by a crane.

The other new development is based on reports that Shenyang is designing a new J-15 naval fighter, possibly using technologies from its next-generation fighter bid for J-14, which appears to have been rejected in favor of Chengdu's design. Whether this is a development of the Su-33 (one example of which was reportedly purchased from Ukraine in 2001) or a completely new design is unknown.

A J-15 prototype was seen parked at the Shenyang Aircraft Corporation airfield in May 2010, revealing its arresting hook retracted beneath the redesigned tailcone, enlarged folding wings, strengthened landing gears with twin nosewheels, and a pair of small canard foreplanes to improve its low-speed handling.

These developments suggest that the CPLAN is very serious about establishing a carrier-based aviation arm. The degree of research that is under way speaks of a well-planned and systematic approach to developing an indigenous carrier force.

The more interesting question is, why have the Chinese allowed this information to appear at this time? It is most unlikely they did so to satisfy the curiosity of Western naval analysts. A more likely hypothesis is that there is conflict between those who see the Chinese fleet as a primarily coastal defense force and those who envision a more assertive power projection role.

For the last few years, the former group has appeared to dominate the debate, with Chinese major surface combatant construction slowed to a crawl while the building of frigates and fast attack craft has accelerated.

Releasing information on carrier design and development may well be a ploy to use Western reaction to these programs as a way of motivating the Chinese authorities into increasing support for the carrier program,

-ends-

[buglerbilly]

Russian Official Delivers Smackdown On China’s Carrier-Based Fighter Knockoff



Back in the 1990s, China bought a prototype of the Russian built Su-33 Falcon (a navalized version of the Su-27 Flanker) from Ukraine, and has reverse engineered the plane to produce its own naval fighter, designated the J-15. The Chinese plan to fly the J-15 off an aircraft carrier, if they’re ever able to produce a working one.

A Russian military official now says the Chinese fighter knock-off will be an inferior product:


“The Chinese J-15 clone is unlikely to achieve the same performance characteristics of the Russian SU-33 carrier-based fighter, and I won’t rule out the possibility that China could return to negotiations with Russia on the purchase of a substantial batch of SU-33s,” said Col. Igor Korotchenko, a member of the Defense Ministry’s Public Council.

Korotchenko said that China was unlikely to solve technical problems related to the design of the folding wings and to develop a reliable engine for the aircraft, although the first J-15 prototype reportedly made its maiden flight on August 31, 2009, powered by Chinese WS-10 turbofan engines.”

Of course, this could be an indication that Russia fears China is encroaching on potential foreign military sales. Or, the Chinese still aren’t able to produce cutting edge fighter aircraft of their own. Although, its not like a lot of countries are flying jets off carriers so I’m not sure how many sales the Chinese could potentially take away from Sukhoi.

– Greg Grant

Read more: http://defensetech.org/#ixzz0qK3Bs3OA
Defense.org

[buglerbilly]

China to Test Carrier Killing Missile On Fourth of July?



Chinese media reports that beginning today the People’ Liberation Army (PLA) will hold six days of military exercises in the East China Sea, a message, analysts say, to the U.S. Navy not to steam its carrier battle groups too close to Chinese shores.

While a Chinese military official said the drills are routine, observers say the anti-carrier exercise is intended to pressure the U.S. Navy not to hold joint exercises with the carrier USS George Washington and South Korean ships in the Yellow Sea.

Respected China analyst Andrew Erickson says the live fire training aims to demonstrate China’s ability to attack a U.S. carrier strike group and may include the first test of China’s long talked about anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM). He sees hints that China’s Second Artillery, a powerful organization within the Chinese military which operates the country’s missile force, may be at a point where it’s ready to test an ASBM.

Recent indications include the reported completion of a DF-21D rocket motor facility in 2009 and the recent launch of 5 advanced Yaogan satellites, three of which were apparently placed in the same orbit on 5 March–thereby perhaps offering better coverage of critical areas along China’s maritime periphery. Another possible indication is a recent news release attributed to China Aerospace Science & Industry Corporation (CASIC) citing Wang Genbin, Deputy Director of its 4th Department, as stating that the DF-21D can hit “slow-moving targets” with a CEP (circular error probable, meaning half of missiles fired will strike within) of dozens of meters.

I attended Erickson’s presentation at a recent National Defense University conference on Chinese naval modernization and he said China is rapidly putting into place the component parts of an advanced reconnaissance-strike complex, including launching a series of ocean observation satellites and electro-optical military satellites. An actual live-fire test of a missile would of course be a big step in ASBM development, he says.

The U.S. military has the advantage of its GPS constellation, in addition to a fleet of electro-optical satellites, to provide precise targeting for its guided weapons. Analysts believe China would use ocean-surveillance satellites to get the initial bearing and distance to an approaching carrier strike group and then launch missiles towards the target that would rely on active-radar or radar-homing to hit a carrier (that’s how the Soviets planned to do it in the Cold War days with their missile launching Backfire bombers and Oscar class subs).

Erickson says Chinese tactics would aim for “multi-axis saturation” of a carrier strike group’s missile defenses by combining swarms of missile boats (such as the Houbei Type 022 fast missile catamaran), missile launching submarines and land based ballistic missiles.

– Greg Grant

Read more: http://defensetech.org/2010/06/30/china-to-test-carrier-killing-missile-on-fourth-of-july/#more-7987#ixzz0sLbjEFCL
Defense.org

[buglerbilly]

China’s PLA Navy Sends Largest Surface Combatant to Gulf of Aden



China is sending its largest surface combatant, the amphibious landing ship Kunlun Shan, to the Gulf of Aden to serve as a command ship for a PLA Navy anti-piracy task force, according to China Defense Blog. This marks the first deployment of the 071 LPD, launched in 2006, the largest naval ship of its own design China has built to date with an estimated displacement of around 20,000 tons.

China is scheduled to command the multinational task force operating off the coast of piracy haven Somalia. Accompanying the Kunlun Shan is the destroyer Lanzhou and the supply ship Weishanhu. Available specs on the Kunlun Shan say it has a lift capacity equivalent to the U.S. Navy Austin class LPD; it has a large helicopter flight deck and a floodable bay that could fit up to 4 air cushion landing crafts (LCAC).

There was lots of discussion about the challenges China’s PLA Navy faces in operating at long distances at a National Defense University conference on Chinese naval modernization I attended earlier this month. These range from difficulties in maintaining and repairing ships to providing medical care and fresh produce to personnel.

A shortage of underway replenishment ships and the obvious lack of overseas bases places an upper limit on the number of ships China can deploy and how long they can remain on station in distant waters.

The PLA Navy has been increasing their “out of area” naval operations incrementally in recent years. They are very methodical about it, using a small number of their most modern ships. These deployments have a noticeable political “soft power” component to them. Expect more of that soft power naval diplomacy when China soon deploys its purpose built hospital ship.

Check out this really cool cutaway diagram of the Kunlun Shan provided by Hobby Shanghai.



– Greg Grant.

Read more: http://defensetech.org/2010/07/01/china%e2%80%99s-pla-navy-sends-largest-surface-combatant-to-gulf-of-aden/#more-8010#ixzz0sUeAqWBt
Defense.org

[buglerbilly]

China focuses on 'far sea defense'

By Joseph Y Lin via Asia Times

Recent discourse concerning the Chinese People's Liberation Army's (PLA) modernization has principally focused on technological advances and less on the human dimension of PLA force transformation. In particular, a review of these discussions revealed the absence of a publicly available database of Chinese military leaders with the rank of full general (shangjiang).

Against the backdrop of the PLA's stated intention to reorient the armed forces as part of its modernization efforts, an analysis of promotion patterns of the 118 PLA generals (1981-2009) may yield important insights into the foci of PLA force transformation.

PLA to build up navy and air force

A string of recent statements by senior Chinese military officials alluding to the realignment of the PLA indicates that significant changes in the composition of the armed forces may be in the offing.

In April, the Chinese Defense Ministry's spokesperson Senior Colonel Huang Xueping stated during an interview, "It's quite natural that we want to build up a streamlined [emphasis added] military force which has more focus on technologies rather than man power." Huang's statement, taken in the context of increasing Chinese naval assertiveness in international waters near Japan and in the South China Sea in recent years, has raised questions over the PLA's intentions and capabilities.

To be sure, the Chinese military leadership seems to be signaling its intention to depart from its long-held emphasis on the army for the air force and navy. By enhancing the role of the navy and air force, the goal of its effort appears aimed at extending China's military power projection capability into the Pacific while reducing the size of its total military force.

According to Senior Colonel Yang Chengjun, a researcher with the Second Artillery Force of the PLA, the proportion of the army in the Chinese military is a "problem" rooted in history and points out the need to "optimize the composition of different arms" in order for the Chinese military to meet its modern day challenges.

Echoing the Chinese Defense Ministry's position, the director of the Center for Arms Control and International Security Studies at the China Institute of International Studies in Beijing, Teng Jianqun, considers China's focus on naval and air force development to be "inevitable".

Taking the analysis one step further, Xu Guangyu, a retired PLA major general now with the government think-tank China Arms Control and Disarmament Association (CACDA), believes that China can achieve these transformative goals with a budgetary allocation among China's army, navy and air force at a 50:25:25 ratio, representing a shift from the current 60:20:20 ratio.

Xu does not see a 40:30:30 ratio since he believes that China's naval and air power will "mostly be used to enhance the combat effectiveness of our [China's] ground forces". Xu's statement seems to imply that the PLA - at least for the time being - is not emulating American global power projection capabilities supported and enabled by US military budgets that have in recent years allocated resources among the army, navy and air force roughly along a 40:30:30 ratio [1].

'Far sea defense' strategy

The advent of the People's Liberation Army Navy's (PLAN's) "far sea defense" (yuanyang fangyu) strategy calling for the development of China's long-range naval capabilities, appears to be one of the major drivers behind the push to transform the composition of the Chinese armed forces.

Yin Zhuo, a retired PLAN rear admiral who is now a senior researcher at the navy's Equipment Research Center, stated in an interview with People's Daily Online that the PLAN is tasked with two primary missions: preservation of China's maritime security (including territorial integrity) and the protection of China's burgeoning and far-flung maritime economic interests.

And while the former is still the PLAN's chief concern, the PLAN is beginning to prioritize more attention to the latter. Rear-Admiral Zhang Huachen, deputy commander of the PLAN's East Sea Fleet argues, "With the expansion of the country's economic interests, the navy wants to protect the country's transportation routes and the safety of our major sea lanes." The rear-admirals' statements present a legitimate rationale behind the PLAN's new strategy.

The far sea defense strategy is significant for two reasons. First, it declares that China's naval ambitions extend beyond its traditional coastal area or "near sea" (jinyang). Secondly, it expands the PLAN's defense responsibilities to include the protection of China's maritime economic interests - which China's latest defense whitepaper did not explicitly address [2].

It stands to reason then that a possible key motivation behind the reorientation of China's armed forces stems from China's perceived need to project power beyond its coastal area to where the PLAN is required to carry out the newly expanded far sea defense duties.

CMC as China's highest military commanding body

As the highest military policy and commanding body in China, the CMC supervises and commands five service branches of China's armed forces: the PLA ground forces, PLAN, People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), Second Artillery Corps (SAC) and the People's Armed Police (PAP) (which falls under the joint leadership of the CMC and the State Council).

Since the restoration of military rank (junxian) in 1988, the CMC has promoted 118 military leaders to generals: 17 under Deng Xiaoping (1981-1989), 79 under Jiang Zemin (1989-2004) and 22 to date under Hu Jintao (2004-present)

The Chinese military has traditionally been influenced by its ground forces because of China's historical status as a land power. Additionally, the PLA ground forces can trace their roots to the 1920s, predating the founding of the People's Republic of China and all other service branches.

Therefore, ground forces generals not surprisingly represent a lion's share or 71% of the total. Yet, Hu has promoted substantially more "non-ground forces" (PLAN, PLAAF, SAC and PAP) generals than his predecessors. In percentage terms, 45% of Hu's generals are non-ground forces, compared to 25% and 24% for Jiang's and Deng's, respectively.

Strategic Second Artillery Corps

The CMC directly supervises and commands the SAC, which controls China's nuclear arsenal and conventional missiles. Its small manpower (estimated at 100,000 or 3% of Chinese military manpower) notwithstanding, the SAC has produced a disproportionately large number of generals.

Of the 118 military leaders promoted to generals, six (or 5% of the total) were SAC generals - which may be an indication of the SAC's special status in China's armed forces. Hu has promoted the most SAC generals in percentage terms (9%), compared to Deng (6%) and Jiang (4%). Hu's relative overweight in his SAC generals is a reflection of the strategic emphasis he places on the SAC.

Internally oriented People's Armed Police

While other service branches are externally oriented, the internally oriented PAP is charged with "the fundamental task of safeguarding national security, maintaining social stability and ensuring that the people live in peace and contentment" [3].

Jiang successfully incorporated the PAP into the CMC's command structure by promoting the first PAP general in 1998. Altogether, he promoted five PAP generals, representing 6% of his total. Continuing the emphasis on PAP generals, Hu has promoted two PAP generals, representing 9% of his total. Since domestic stability remains among Hu's and the CCP's highest governing priorities, one can expect Hu to continue promoting PAP generals.

Hu to promote more admirals

Excluding the strategic SAC and the internally oriented PAP to determine the relative proportions among the army, navy and air force generals, one finds that 33% of Hu's generals are non-ground forces (PLAN an PLAAF), compared to 17% and 19% for Jiang's and Deng's, respectively.

In other words, Hu's generals are 67% army, 11% navy and 22% air force. Jiang's generals were 83% army, 7% navy and 10% air force, whereas Deng's generals were 81% army, 13% navy and 6% air force.

Hu appears to have begun the process of reorienting his generals by emphasizing the promotions of military leaders in the navy and air force. Given China's naval ambitions and the relative under-representation of PLAN admirals (when benchmarked against Xu's stated target proportion at 25%), one can therefore expect Hu to emphasize the promotions of PLAN admirals.

As CMC chairman, Deng promoted 17 generals in a single "class" in 1988. Jiang on average promoted generals once every two years between 1989 and 2004, with the average "class size" at about 10 generals. Hu on average has promoted generals once every year between 2004 and 2009 with the average class size at four generals. Where Jiang appears to have institutionalized the promotion process, Hu appears to have regularized the promotion process.

Implications

If Hu continues to promote generals at roughly the same pace as he has in the past, he could reasonably promote another 10 generals by the end of his tenure as CMC chairman in 2012 (although he may hold on to CMC chairmanship beyond 2012 following Jiang's example). Given the reorientation of China's armed forces as a PLA priority, one should expect to see an overweighting in the promotions of non-ground forces generals in Hu's remaining tenure.

Of the additional 10 Hu generals, assuming one slot is set aside for each of the SAC and PAP, one may find it reasonably likely that the other eight could comprise three army, three navy and two air force generals.

This combination will result in a final relative weighting of 58% army, 19% navy and 23% air force for Hu's generals - a directionally consistent outcome when compared with Xu's stated goal of 50% army, 25% navy and 25% air force.

The number of PLA Navy admirals is not likely to leapfrog as Hu is expected to continue his gradualist and balanced approach in promoting his generals in the future, taking into consideration each service branch's interests and representation as in the past. This also reflects Hu's rather cautious approach to the military given his lack of a military background. Yet the goals are clear. This is only the beginning of a long-term trend.

Notes

1. Todd Harrison, Analysis of the 2010FY Defense Budget Request (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, August 12, 2009): 38. When the "defense-wide" item is excluded from the US military budget, the relative budgetary ratio among the army, navy (including the Marine Corps) and air force has been approximately 40:30:30 in recent years.
2. Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, "China's National Defense 2008", January 2009, Section V: 7.
3. Ibid, Section VIII: 10.

Joseph Y Lin currently studies at the Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies of Tamkang University in Taipei, Taiwan. He has held executive positions in multinational corporations and investment companies in the US, China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. Lin's most recent article "The Changing Face of Chinese Military Generals: Evolving Promotion Practices Between 1981 and 2009" was published in The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis in March 2010.

(This article first appeared in The Jamestown Foundation. Used with permission.)

(Copyright 2010 The Jamestown Foundation.)

[buglerbilly]

State Push or Commercial Pull Driving China’s Naval Modernization?



When analyzing China’s naval modernization one of the most difficult aspects to discern is: What’s behind it all? China is clearly intent on becoming a real maritime power; but is that a strategic choice made out of necessity or out of a desire to challenge other nations on the high seas.

Two China watchers, Gabriel Collins and Michael Grubb, in China Goes to Sea, argue that China is embarking on a different development path than other nations that sought to become maritime powers.

“The Soviet Union, Meiji Japan, and Wilhelmian Germany built their navies first and then promoted merchant marine development. Thus the relationship was based on a “push” from the state, rather than a “pull” in which commercial interests led the way and then the state stepped in to create the capacity to protect these new commercial maritime interests.

China is following a different path marked by an emphasis on commercial maritime development, with naval development trailing. If China continues to expand its naval forces, the drivers will include a mix of a desire for status in the international community and a perceived need to defend economic interests, but the single most prominent element will be that Beijing’s policymakers are struggling to keep up with China’s dynamic commercial mariners.”

How strong is that “pull” from China’s dynamic commercial mariners? In 1980, China built 220,000 tons of commercial shipping; China is on pace to exceed 20 million tons in 2010. As the authors point out, the push for that huge expansion in commercial shipbuilding came in the late 1970s with Deng Xiaoping’s reform and “opening up” to the world; which included a process of “defense conversion,” transforming inefficient defense industries into viable commercial enterprises.

The interesting thing to watch will be whether China moves to put in place some of the key missing elements – such as overseas bases and a large logistical support fleet – it needs if it intends to provide true global security coverage for its far reaching mariners.

– Greg Grant

Read more: http://defensetech.org/#ixzz0t8NLsaoR
Defense.org

[buglerbilly]

China Builds First Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Base?

By WENDELL MINNICK

Published: 5 Aug 2010 07:49

NOT operated by Naval Regiments but Army Artillery BUT of more relevance to naval..............

TAIPEI - China's new anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) will be deployed at the Second Artillery Corps' new missile base in Guangdong Province in southeastern China, if a new report issued by Washington-based Project 2049 Institute is correct.

On July 28, the state-run Xinhua News Agency reported the visit of local government officials to a new missile base in the northern Guangdong municipality of Shaoguan. The media report is the first to acknowledge the existence of the new missile base.

The new 96166 Unit will be outfitted with Dong Feng 21C medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM) and possibly the DF-21D ASBM, said Mark Stokes and Tiffany Ma in a new report "Second Artillery Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Brigade Facilities Under Construction in Guangdong?" posted on Project 2049's website.

The DF-21C was introduced into active inventory in 2005 and is designed for land targets. Though the DF-21D ASBM is nearing the stage of low rate initial production, expected in 2011 or soon after, it is not likely to be deployed into active service until after lengthy testing of the prototype.

Though the province is already home to a Second Artillery short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) base in Meizhou (96169 Unit), the new base could "have unique capabilities that could complicate the strategic calculus in Asia, and the South China Sea in particular."

The ASBM has been dubbed the aircraft "carrier killer" by observers and is part of China's larger anti-access/area denial strategy designed to discourage the U.S. Navy from coming to the aid of Taiwan during a war. Now it appears China is using the same strategy to deter U.S. and other regional navies from operating in the South China Sea.

Though U.S. aircraft carrier groups have significant air defense capabilities, including SM-3 missiles, the threat ASBMs pose is a new one, said Stokes. No country has yet developed a reliable ASBM system and therefore there is reluctance among some analysts to dismiss the possibility China has developed the capability of locating and destroying a moving target at sea with a ballistic missile.

However, U.S. Pacific Commander Admiral Robert Willard told members of the U.S. House and Senate Armed Services Committee in March that China was nearing a test phase for an ASBM.

China has recently announced that the South China Sea is a "core interest" and now state-controlled media outlets are claiming the entire South China Sea as Chinese territory.

"Seems to me they are staying on policy by asserting their ownership of the South 'CHINA' Sea," said a former U.S. intelligence officer now based in Singapore. "They aren't going to deviate from that policy. They've got the patience until they own it."

The deployment of ASBMs near the South China Sea adds a new dimension to the problem regional powers and the U.S. are facing as China begins enforcing maritime claims.

The 1,700 km range DF-21D MRBM can hit most land targets in Vietnam as well as the northern Philippines, including Subic Bay, with little difficulty.

The 1,500-2,000 km range DF-21D ASBM should be able to cover the Spratly Islands at 1,800 km. This would include roughly seventy percent of the South China Sea, if the maximum range of 2,000 km is confirmed.

Additionally, the DF-21C and D will easily handle land targets on Taiwan and naval targets beyond the island with no difficulty. The eastern coast of Taiwan is roughly 800 km from the base. China already has 1,300 DF-11/15 SRBMs aimed at Taiwan and an unknown number of cruise missiles.

During China's 60th anniversary parade in Beijing in October 2009, the military displayed a variety of mobile missile systems, including the DF-11A and DF15B SRBM, DF-21C MRBM and DF31A intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). The parade also displayed the DH-10 land-attack cruise missile.

The DF-31A is China's first road mobile ICBM capable of hitting Washington. Before this missile, China relied on aging silo-based DF-5 ICBMs for use as nuclear counterstrikes on the U.S.

As mobile missile systems, they will be difficult to locate and destroy during a war with the U.S. To add more difficulties for the U.S., the Shaoguan area is near tunneling projects through the Nanling Mountains that divide Guangdong and Hunan provinces.

"A Second Artillery engineering unit known to be responsible for tunneling work under the so-called 'Great Wall Project' has been in Shaoguan since as early as 2008," said the Project 2049 report.

[buglerbilly]

China's New "Carrier-Killing" Missile Is Overrated

(Source: Lexington Institute; issued August 9, 2010)

(© Lexington Institute; reproduced by permission)

Last week saw another round of semi-hysterical speculation about China's new Dong Feng missile, which supposedly has the accuracy required to attack U.S. aircraft carriers from 900 miles away.

Prof. Toshi Yoshihara of the Naval War College told the Associated Press that the new missile signals "the U.S. Navy no longer rules the waves as it has since the end of World War II," and "sea control cannot be taken for granted anymore." Patrick Cronin of the Center for a New American Security said the missile is "potentially capable of stopping our naval projection." Investor's Business Daily compared the Pentagon's lack of response to the Dong Feng with Navy complacency in the days leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor, and saw the emerging antiship threat as further evidence the world is entering a "Chinese Century."

I haven't seen the intelligence reports, so maybe all the alarm is warranted. But I doubt it. China has yet to conduct a single realistic test of the conventionally-armed ballistic missile. Even if it performs as feared, there is a glaring omission in all the threat mongering: the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) has no reliable way of actually targeting U.S. carrier task forces when they are at sea. No matter how accurate the new missile's guidance system may be, Chinese military commanders need to know where to aim it -- especially since a near miss with a conventional warhead has pretty much the same military value as missing by a hundred miles. So how exactly is the PLA supposed to find U.S. carriers, when they are constantly moving and actively excluding hostile forces from their immediate vicinity?

The answer is that it can't. "Four and a half acres of sovereign U.S. territory" -- the way carrier proponents often describe flattops -- may sound like a huge target, but in fact it is a mere speck in the vast expanses of the Western Pacific. For example, the modestly-sized South China Sea that Beijing keeps trying to claim for itself contains over a million square miles of water, in which a carrier can easily hide. And that's only a small part of the East Asia littoral.

I calculated a decade ago that to acquire continuous target-quality information for the entire South China Sea, the PLA would need over a hundred low-earth-orbit reconnaissance satellites moving in three parallel tracks. At the moment, China only has a handful of such satellites, and as a result most of the time its overhead sensors aren't anywhere near areas of interest. It also has over-the-horizon radars and roaming submarines, plus a fleet of reconnaissance aircraft, but these do not add up to the seamless targeting network the PLA would need to track and attack a U.S. carrier.

The Navy is currently investing in upgrades to its Aegis combat system and other defensive equipment aimed at dealing with maneuvering warheads such as the Dong Feng would carry. These defensive measures will likely come to fruition long before Beijing has a reliable way of targeting our carriers. In addition, the Navy has numerous kinetic and non-kinetic strike options that could be used to rapidly degrade whatever surveillance network the PLA has assembled if the threat of an attack against U.S. carriers were deemed serious enough. And then there are all the passive "signature management" measures the Navy might undertake to foil the tracking efforts of the PLA using remote sensors. Frankly, the U.S. Navy has so many options for negating Chinese antiship capabilities that I can only conclude the alarmists aren't conversant with U.S. military preparations to be so worried about the nascent Dong Feng.

Of course, losing even one aircraft carrier would be a huge blow to the American psyche. But the American response would be so devastating that Beijing would soon regret its boldness. The value of a trillion dollars in Chinese currency reserves would evaporate overnight. China's access to the world's richest export market would end. Its information networks would largely cease functioning. Its sea-based supply lines to Persian Gulf oil and Australian minerals would be severed. And all that could happen even before U.S. bombs began falling on Chinese territory. So while we can't be absolutely certain that China's leaders won't someday be foolish enough to attack a U.S. aircraft carrier, we can be pretty damned sure that they would soon realize they had made a big mistake.

by Loren B. Thompson, Ph.D.

-ends-

[buglerbilly]

China to Test-Fire New Anti-Ship Missile

China will test its new the Dong Feng 21D anti-ship ballistic missile, the country's state media said Friday. There is speculation that Beijing is responding to the U.S. deployment of the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier George Washington to the West Sea and the South China Sea to join naval exercises with Korea and Vietnam, which China considers too close for comfort.

Internet China National Radio said the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation will soon test-fire "a weapon under an important state weapons project."

Although it did not specify what this project was, it carried a photo of a Dong Feng 21C medium-range ballistic missile, the same series as the Dong Feng 21D, and an artist's drawing of such missiles attacking an American aircraft carrier.


An artist's impression of Chinese missiles attacking a U.S. aircraft carrier /Courtesy of China National Radio

China has neither confirmed nor denied reports by U.S. and European media that it finished developing the Dong Feng 21D and would test-fire it this year. Diplomats in Beijing speculate that the announcement is a warning to the U.S. over its dispatch of the aircraft carrier.

The Dong Feng 21D is a medium-range ballistic missile with a range of 1,300-1,800 km and is capable of carrying six warheads weighing up to 450 kg. It is being described as an "aircraft carrier killer" because it can sink the ship instantly as it penetrates the ship's outer hull and explodes inside the carrier.

Hong Kong's Wen Wei Po daily ran a headline story the same day that said, "If China attacks a U.S. aircraft carrier with a Dong Feng 21, the U.S. will counterattack with a nuclear weapon," citing an unnamed U.S. admiral.

[buglerbilly]

Luvverly piccie! Pity its still a fantasy...............:razz

[Milne Bay]

Lovely artwork.
Eight Aegis cruisers - and so cleverly deployed!
I guess all their radars were turned off as well.
Heh heh

[Gubler, A.]

Its hard to find any sense in commentary about the Chinese Ballistic Anti Ship Missile. Obviously to have any sort of practical capability it needs terminal homing, most likely radar homing (sorry Lozza, another wasted article). Not impossible to do, the US had a radar seeker in the nose of the Pershing II in the 1970s. But even if the Chinese achieve such capability the US Navy has at least a 10 year head start in fielding Ballistic Missile Defence and already has the anti DF21 high volume of fires BMD capability ready to go (SBMSE). So if anything the Chinese are playing catch up to the US defences.

[Tim]

Lovely artwork.
Eight Aegis cruisers - and so cleverly deployed!
I guess all their radars were turned off as well.
Heh heh

And the missiles are apparently so potent that they travelled back in time to hit a carrier with Tomcats on deck...

[Weasel]

Luvverly piccie! Pity its still a fantasy...............:razz

And it's not very accurate.. at least every re-entry vehicle I have seen looks like a streak of light and there is no presence of a black burn.

Big meteors on the other hand look "dirty", more like the artwork, but even then the smoke trail is multi colored and rarely sooty black.

(sniff)

cheers

w

[Gubler, A.]

Isn't this a scene from the Transformers movie?

LOL, it is too... Transformers 2: Revenge of the DF21

This


Then this



Man Hollywood loves to thump Supercarriers.

[buglerbilly]

ROFLMAO! What a joke...........

[Deks]

Isn't this a scene from the Transformers movie?

I'm glad someone else picked up on this! :)

[Gubler, A.]

I'm glad someone else picked up on this! :)

It took Weasel talking about the smoky re-entry. Not that I've seen Transformers 2 but I do remember being bombarded with the advert.

[buglerbilly]

Chinese Carrier progress pics...............



Lots more here.........

http://china-defense.blogspot.com/2010/08/chinese-aircraft-carrier-photos-early.html

[buglerbilly]

First Chinese aircraft carrier nears completion

From: The Times November 20, 2010 12:00AM

CHINA'S first aircraft carrier, built on the hull of an abandoned Soviet warship, is nearing completion, according to Western analysts.

The arrival of China as a member of the carrier club would be the most potent symbol of the country's burgeoning military power, even if its first model is based on a rehashed version of a warship that was never finished by its original owners. The Soviet Union collapsed before work could be completed.

The Varyag is expected to make its maiden voyage next year or 2012. "Photos regularly reveal an increasing tempo of work on the Varyag," Richard Fisher, an authority on the Chinese military at the International Assessment and Strategy Centre in Alexandria, Virginia, said yesterday.

"The island (control tower) is being much modified and a new Chinese radar system has been installed. We know little about its engine but it appears work has been proceeding on that as well."

The 300m warship was bought from Ukraine, which had acquired ownership when the Soviet Union was dismantled, and in 1998 it put the ship up for auction. China bought it for $US20 million and it was expected that the vessel would be turned into a casino.

For decades, China had disavowed any ambition to build aircraft carriers, but in more recent years, as the nation's economy has been transformed and Beijing has adopted a more muscular approach on the world stage, military officials have acknowledged the possession of a carrier fleet is crucial for the country's status.

It is likely the Varyag will be used as a training platform. It is believed China is planning to have multiple carriers by 2020.

Beijing is also ramping up production of unmanned aerial vehicles in an apparent bid to catch up with the leaders US and Israel in developing technology that is considered the future of military aviation.

[buglerbilly]

Is China (Finally) Building an Aircraft Carrier?

By Spencer Ackerman December 17, 2010 | 1:59 pm | Categories: China



It’s an article of faith in naval circles that China will inevitably emerge as one of the world’s great maritime powers. But a secret plan by a Chinese government agency suggests that Beijing is taking a major seafaring step forward.

Japan’s Asahi Shimbun cites a report from the State Oceanic Administration saying that China will complete construction of its first aircraft carrier by 2014, something the government never previously admitted. Constructed primarily at Shanghai, the carrier is supposed to displace between 50,000 and 60,000 tons. And it’s part of an even larger effort by the People’s Liberation Army Navy to “build itself up as a maritime power” during the next decade: a nuclear powered carrier is supposed to be completed by 2020. All of that should be taken with a grain of salt, but navy experts generally consider building a carrier to be well within Chinese capabilities.

The U.S. military has little visibility into the plans of its Chinese counterparts. Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently urged the creation of a regularized military channel between the two nations to reduce ambiguities. Defense Secretary Robert Gates is heading to China next month for the first in a series of top-level U.S.-Chinese official visits scheduled for 2011.

One measurement of the visitations’ success, from the U.S. perspective, will be for China to be more open about its plans. The State Oceanic Administration, Asahi reports, says that the military decided in secret last year to build up to a “mid-level maritime power” by 2020, able to “counter challenges and threats at sea,” a goal the carriers would certainly support. Elements within the military argued for keeping the carrier-building secret, so as not to spawn a wave of speculation in the region about a Chinese threat.

China got more assertive at sea this year, sending its destroyers, frigates and subs throughout eastern Pacific waters and demonstrating complex missions like mid-air refueling by its naval pilots. The U.S.’s goal is to maintain universal maritime access throughout Asia, something it fears Chinese naval might could restrict.

Naval analyst Raymond Pritchett isn’t so concerned about the first Chinese aircraft carrier, figuring it to be long overdue. Given the health of China’s shipbuilding industry, Pritchett forecasts that over the next five years, “we can expect steady construction of conventional and nuclear submarines, more coastal combat vessels, a large block of maritime patrol vessels, steady construction of frigate sized surface combatants, steady construction of amphibious vessels, and now steady construction of aircraft carriers.”

Matching China ship-for-ship would be a “losing proposition,” Pritchett continues, advising instead to inject “some serious focus onto our larger surface combatant force and finding ways to responsibly add value to our national aircraft carrier, amphibious vessel, and littoral combat ship investments.” And then there’s always the ship-killers.

Photo: China Daily

[buglerbilly]

China speeds plans to launch aircraft carrier: sources

By Benjamin Kang Lim

BEIJING | Thu Dec 23, 2010 4:08am EST

BEIJING (Reuters) - China may be ready to launch its first aircraft carrier in 2011, Chinese military and political sources said on Thursday, a year ahead of U.S. military analysts' expectations.

Analysts expect China to use its first operational aircraft carrier to ensure the security of its oil supply route through the Indian Ocean and near the disputed Spratly Islands, but full capability is still some years away.

"The period around July 1 next year to celebrate the (Chinese Communist) Party's birthday is one window (for launch)," one source with ties to the leadership told Reuters, requesting anonymity because the carrier programme is one of China's most closely guarded secrets.

The Defense Ministry spokesman's office declined to comment.

The possible launch next year of the ex-Soviet aircraft carrier 'Varyag' for training, and testing technology, will be one step toward building an operating aircraft carrier group, analysts said.

The U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence estimates the Varyag will be launched as a training platform by 2012, and China will have an operational domestically built carrier after 2015.

Andrew Erickson and Andrew Wilson of the U.S. Naval College wrote that it was "conceivable that carrier-relevant research, development, and even production ... could proceed with a rapidity that might surprise Western analysts."

China, which would be the third Asian country to have a carrier after India and Thailand, needs hardware, software and pilot training.

"The acquisition of a carrier doesn't equate to the acquisition of a capability -- the ability to use it effectively -- the latter involving a process that can take decades," said Robert Karniol, a veteran defense analyst based in Canada.

The 300-meter (1,000-foot) Varyag is undergoing refit at a state-run shipyard in northeastern city Dalian, sources said.

A Chinese firm bought the then-engineless Varyag from Ukraine in 1998 for $20 million, planning to convert it to a floating casino in Macau, but the Chinese military then bought the vessel.

Chinese air force pilots have yet to master takeoffs and landings from carriers. They have been undergoing training, but have far fewer flying hours than their U.S. peers.

"They must realize that their learning curve will be costly in terms of blood and treasure," Erickson and Wilson wrote.

"The Varyag will allow us to familiarize ourselves with aircraft carrier tactics of war," one Chinese military source said.

The United States and China's neighbors are nervous about how China could use its growing navy, and speeding up preparations for an aircraft carrier group could add to those jitters.

"Just the prospect of China building aircraft carriers has already made neighbors uneasy," former Taiwan deputy defense minister Lin Chong-Pin said in an interview.

China has refused to rule out the use of force to unify with Taiwan, a self-ruled island over which Beijing claims sovereignty. Tensions between the two sides have eased in recent years.

In March, China announced a 7.5 percent increase in its 2010 military budget to about $78.6 billion. But Washington suspects Chinese spending to be double that figure.

China is seeking to buy ship-borne Su-33 jets from Russia and is working on a variant of its own J-10.

The Varyag will be based in the southern province of Hainan.

(Additional reporting by Sabrina Mao; Editing by Chris Buckley and Daniel Magnowski)

[buglerbilly]

China’s Anti-Ship Missiles Aren’t Effective Yet, U.S. Navy Says

January 04, 2011, 4:51 AM EST

By Tony Capaccio

Jan. 4 (Bloomberg) -- China doesn’t yet have the capability to use its new anti-ship missiles effectively against U.S. aircraft carriers and other warships, according to U.S. Navy analysts.

While the Chinese have deployed an early version of the world’s first anti-ship ballistic missile system, U.S. naval intelligence officials downplay the near-term impact, since China’s military hasn’t conducted a full-scale test or established an operational unit for the missiles.

China has a “workable design” for an anti-ship missile but “it is unknown to us and probably the Chinese as to how effective the missile will be without a full-scale test,” the Navy’s Office of Naval Operations for Information Dominance, which includes Navy intelligence, said in a statement yesterday to Bloomberg News.

The statement confirms and adds context to remarks last month by Admiral Robert Willard, the head of U.S. Pacific Command, to the Japanese newspaper Asahi Shimbun that China has acquired an “initial operational capability.”

Neither the Navy statement nor Willard speculated on when China might have an effective system.

China does have advanced, sea-skimming anti-ship cruise missiles. Ballistic missiles are different in that they descend from space and therefore are harder to defend against.

Chinese advances in military technology are drawing close scrutiny and concern from the Pentagon, particularly when they may jeopardize the dominance of U.S. naval forces in the Pacific region.

Pacific Power

Defense Secretary Robert Gates said in a Sept. 16 speech that China’s “investments in anti-ship weaponry and ballistic missiles could threaten America’s primary way to project power and help allies in the Pacific -- particularly our forward bases and carrier strike groups.” Gates is scheduled to visit China next week.

Five of the U.S. Navy’s 11 carriers are based in the Pacific and operate freely in international waters near China. Their mission includes defending Taiwan should China seek to exercise by force its claim to the island democracy, which it considers a breakaway province.

Members of the new Republican majority in the U.S. House of Representatives are also likely to scrutinize the missile program’s status as they advocate a more muscular approach toward China, offering a potential boost to defense contractors, such as Lockheed Martin Corp. and Raytheon Co., that make sea- based missile defense systems.

Congressional Debate Anticipated

Byron Callan, a defense policy analyst with Capital Alpha Partners LLC, a Washington-based research group, told investors in a Jan. 3 note that news of the missiles’ deployment likely will fuel a congressional debate on defense spending priorities.

The DF-21D missile, with a range of almost 900 miles (1,500 kilometer), would be fired from mobile, land-based launchers and is “specifically designed to defeat U.S. carrier strike groups,” the Office of Naval Intelligence reported last year.

The missiles are intended for launch to a general location where their guidance systems take over and spot carriers for attack with warheads intended to neutralize the ships’ threat by destroying aircraft on decks, launching gear and control towers.

The remarks by Willard and the statement by the Navy on the DF-21D status go further than the Pentagon did in its latest annual report on China’s military, released in August.

The 2010 report included a sketch of the notional flight profile of the new missile. It gave no indication that the missile had reached, or was close to, an initial combat capability.

U.S. Concerns

A senior Pentagon official who briefed reporters on the report August 16 said the U.S. “continued to be concerned” about the missile’s development.

Among the “roadblocks” China faced was “integrating” the missile system with China’s command, control, intelligence and reconnaissance systems, said the official, who spoke at a background briefing on condition of anonymity.

“They still have a ways to go before they manage to get that integrated so that they have an operational and effective system,” the official said.

China is developing an over-the-horizon radar network to spot U.S. ships at great distances from its mainland, and its navy since 2000 has tripled to 36 from 12 the number of vessels carrying anti-ship weapons, Scott Bray, the Office of Naval Intelligence’s senior officer for intelligence on China, said in an e-mail to Bloomberg last year.

Chinese Satellites

The Navy statement yesterday said China now “likely has the space-based intelligence and ground processing necessary to support employment. China operates a wide spectrum of satellites which can provide useful targeting within its maritime region.”

Before launch, the missile also could receive targeting coordinates from non-space intelligence and reconnaissance such as aircraft, drones, fishing boats and over-the-horizon radar, the Navy said.

Unlike traditional radar, which fires radio waves off objects straight ahead, over-the-horizon radar bounces signals off the ionosphere, the uppermost layer of the atmosphere, which can pick up objects at greater distances.

--Editors: Terry Atlas, Leslie Hoffecker.

To contact the reporters on this story: Tony Capaccio in Washington at acapaccio@bloomberg.net

To contact the editor responsible for this story: Mark Silva at msilva34@bloomberg.net

[buglerbilly]

China Has Plans For Five Carriers

Jan 5, 2011

By Richard D. Fisher, Jr.
Alexandria, Va.



China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is assembling the production and basing capacity to make its aircraft carrier program one of Asia’s largest military endeavors.

A plausible near-term projection for China’s aircraft carrier ambitions was revealed in two 2009 articles in Japan’s Asahi Shimbun newspaper, which featured rare access to Chinese military and shipbuilding sources. The sources noted that China would first build two non-nuclear medium-sized carriers similar to the 50,000-ton ex-Soviet/Ukrainian Project 1143.5 carrier Varyag being rebuilt in Dalian Harbor. These carriers would start initial construction in 2009. Beginning in 2020 or soon after, two 60,000-plus-ton nuclear-powered carriers would follow, based on plans for the Soviet-designed but never built Project 1143.7 Ulyanovsk class.

This would mean a likely fleet of five carriers by the 2020s, including Varyag, which entered a phase of accelerated reconstruction in 2009. Work surrounding this carrier is also serving to create the development and production infrastructure for future carriers. Since mid-2005, Varyag’s reconstruction has been documented by images from Chinese military fans on dozens of web pages.

In April 2009, Varyag was moved from its Dalian berth to a nearby drydock. Surrounding the drydock are large ship-component construction hangars, from which the next carriers may emerge. By April 2010, the ship was berthed outside the drydock. Since the move the hull has undergone degaussing, likely in preparation for the now-visible outfitting of a new naval electronics suite. This suite will include four arrays for Chinese-developed naval phased-array radar and new rotating-array radar. Emplacements for the electronic warfare suite are visible.

A “Sinicized” model of a Varyag-like carrier, built in 2003 by students at Harbin Technology Institute, which does carrier development work, indicated it would carry a heavy fixed armament of YJ-63 long-range antiship cruise missiles, vertically launched medium-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and Type 730 30-mm. close-in weapon systems (CIWS). Last November, however, Internet imagery indicated it might carry a lighter weapons suite. It will be the lead platform for the short-range FL-3000N SAM, similar to Raytheon’s SeaRAM, though it carries 24 missiles. The imagery shows that Varyag will carry four FL-3000N launchers and at least two Type-730 30-mm. CIWS.

Varyag’s air wing is becoming visible. Chinese Internet sources reported that the first flight of the Shenyang Aircraft Corp.’s copy of the Sukhoi Su-33 was in August 2009, and by early 2010 Internet imagery and a video confirmed Shenyang had copied the Su-33. Since 2005 Russian sourceshave insisted to this writer that China could not copy the Su-33, as it was a radical modification of the Su-27SK design. By 2009, these sources anticipated China would purchase an upgraded Su-33 as it developed its own version with a Chinese-designed WS-10A turbofan. In 2010, an Asian source said the PLA might not be pleased with its Su-33 copy, and would consider buying the Sukhoi-built version. Since 2005, negotiations have been held up over Russia’s insistence that China buy a profitable number, around 40.

It is now expected that Shenyang will perfect its Su-33 copy, which will feature the latest Chinese-designed active phased-array radar, and new 5th-generation air-to-air missiles and long-range antiship missiles, such as an air-launched version of the YJ-63, with a range of 600-plus km. (373 mi.). Varyag may start its service with a multirole fighter more capable in some respects than the Boeing F/A-18E/F.

In 2010, Internet images appeared of a new airborne early-warning and control radar array of the size needed for a carrier aircraft. This followed a 2005 partial image of a turboprop-powered AEW&C. In October 2009, Internet images emerged of possibly retractable AEW&C radar on a Chinese Z-8 helicopter, which may form part of the initial air wing.

The PLA is also building escort ships for its carrier fleet. In the autumn of 2009 it appeared that two Chinese shipyards were building two new destroyer classes, but their configurations and equipment are not apparent. The PLA is expected to build up to 18 modern Type-065A air-defense frigates. Two new Type-093 nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) have been built, and a more capable Type-095 SSN is expected.

When it enters service around 2015, the Varyag and its sisters, plus escorts, may be located at a recently constructed naval base near Sanya on Hainan Island.

FYJS Internet Photo

[buglerbilly]

Russian sold secrets for China’s first carrier

Ukraine sends him to prison

By Reuben F. Johnson
The Washington Times

8:46 p.m., Monday, February 14, 2011

KIEV | Ukrainian authorities have imposed a six-year prison term on a Russian man convicted of spying for China who was assigned to steal military secrets for Beijing’s program to build and operate aircraft carriers.

The Russian national, Aleksandr Yermakov, was blocked from attempting to transfer to China classified data that would have significantly accelerated the Chinese army‘s effort to field its own operational aircraft carrier, according to reports in the Ukrainian newspaper Segodnya and other news outlets.

China's military announced last year that it had begun construction of its first aircraft carrier, confirming Pentagon and U.S. intelligence reports that Beijing was seeking the power-projection platform that requires highly skilled pilots who can take off and land from the relatively short space of a carrier deck at sea.

U.S. and defense and intelligence officials said China‘s deployment of an aircraft carrier would pose significant problems for U.S. plans to defend democratic Taiwan if the communist mainland were to use force to retake the island, which broke away after China‘s civil war.

“It not only extends the range of Chinese strike aircraft that would take out [Taiwanese] military installations, but it also would complicate U.S. Navy assistance of the [Republic of China‘s] defense if the mainland should attack,” said a naval officer and Chinese carrier program specialist assigned to the Pentagon.

China‘s intelligence service directed Yermakov to steal classified information about Ukraine‘s Land-based Naval Aviation Testing and Training Complex, or NITKA, its Russian acronym, according to reports.

The facility is in the Crimea near the city of Saki and was built when Ukraine was a part of the Soviet Union. It remains the only training complex of its kind in the world.

The NITKA base is vital for states that operate one of the Russian-designed carriers equipped with ski-ramp takeoff decks, instead of the flat decks used on U.S. and French aircraft carriers.

The only two ski-jump carriers are the Russian navy‘s Admiral Kuznetsov and its sister ship, the Varyag, acquired by China from Ukraine in 1998 and initially announced in China for use as a floating casino. Russia continues training its pilots in Ukraine while building a similar facility in the Krasnodarsky Krai region of Russia that is expected to be completed in 2012.

Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) took the unusual step of going public regarding Yermakov‘s spying activities on behalf of China and his long-term association with Chinese intelligence. A counterintelligence officer who spoke to news outlets and who was identified only as “Oleg N” stated that Yermakov was assisted by his 35-year-old son.

Yermakov‘s son, also named Aleksandr, registered “an off-shore zoned company that provided services in the sphere of arms deliveries. The profile of the company was the providing a full spectrum of military-technical, testing methods and design information based on the initiatives of received orders,” said the SBU counterintelligence officer.

Arms-trading firms registered in Cyprus often are used as intermediaries for selling weapons and defense technology from Ukraine. These companies then interact on behalf of customer nations with the Ukrainian state-run arms export monopoly, Ukrspetsexport.

Yermakov‘s activities as a source of military and defense industrial information to China lasted about 10 years. During that period, he functioned as a talent scout for a Chinese weapons industry known widely in Western intelligence and security circles for illicit acquisition of defense-related technology in the former Soviet Union.

“At the request of his Beijing comrades, he had identified former military personnel, defense industry specialists from Russia, Ukraine and other nations of the … [former Soviet Union] to travel to [China] to participate in scientific seminars and symposiums, which were organized under the guise of tourist excursions. For each one of these ‘tourists’ Yermakov received up to $1,500,” said the SBU.

China has been recruiting former Soviet military specialists since the fall of the Soviet Union, and Russian and Ukrainian authorities have tolerated the practice.

However, collecting classified and commercially proprietary information on NITKA was strictly illegal espionage, and the payoff for Yermakov was considerably greater than his long-running “tourist” business.

Chinese intelligence promised to pay the Russian father-son team “$1 million for the delivery of documentation on this training facility and its operations in the form of drawings, digital photos, information on flash drives,” the SBU said. As preparation for the operation “Yermakov‘s son made several trips to the [People's Republic of China] where he visited People’s Liberation Army Navy facilities and met with their representatives.”

The SBU and diplomatic sources told Segodnya, the Ukrainian newspaper, that in addition to “digital data, drawings, and construction documents, the Russian duo had prepared some 1,500 pages of documents to hand over to Chinese intelligence.” This information had a value “to the national interests of Ukraine in the hundreds of millions of dollars.”

China’s navy acquired the Varyag from the Ukrainian Nikolayev shipyards in 1998 for $20 million using a Chinese tourism company as a cover for the sale.

The original Chinese buyers promised that the ship would be turned into a casino and entertainment complex to be moored at the former Portuguese enclave of Macau, but the ship eventually was moved to China‘s Dalian shipyards, where it has been undergoing a refit for several years.

Chinese military officials have been quoted in China‘s state-run press as saying they plan to create a carrier-naval aviation capability; but “the Chinese need their own NITKA” for training their own carrier pilots, according to Ukrainian news reports, “and they have already begun building their own complex.”

U.S. intelligence officials said the first indications of China‘s plan for building aircraft carriers were land-based short takeoff and landing drills going back a decade.

The Chinese are building a massive carrier pilot training base at Xingcheng, in the northeastern province of Liaoning. Other facilities for training of carrier personnel and engineering support specialists have been built in Xian, Shanxi province. The Xingcheng facility has features that duplicate the design of NITKA in Ukraine.

© Copyright 2011 The Washington Times, LLC

[buglerbilly]

Chinese PLA Navy Less Assertive: U.S. Admiral

AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE

Published: 12 Apr 2011 15:14

Oh no they are no longer aggressive! Floppsy Bunny will be disappointed...........

WASHINGTON - A top U.S. officer said April 12 that the People's Liberation Army's Navy has adopted a less aggressive stance in the Pacific in recent months after protests from Washington and other nations in the region.

Adm. Robert Willard, head of U.S. Pacific Command, told senators the trend since January represented a "positive" step after mounting tension over territorial disputes in the South China Sea and elsewhere.

"There has been a retrenchment a bit by the Chinese navy, such that while we continue to experience their shadowing of some our ships that are operating in some of these waters, we have not seen the same level of assertiveness in 2011 that we witnessed in 2010," Willard told the Senate Armed Services Committee.

The admiral said he was heartened by the development as U.S. military relations have resumed with China and "perhaps we can make an advancement in that regard."

Willard said China's more conciliatory outlook had followed "very strong statements" by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Defense Secretary Robert Gates over Beijing's actions in the region.

President Obama's administration has argued that the U.S. Navy and other countries have a right to operate in the South China Sea under international law, despite Beijing's insistence on an "economic exclusion zone."

Gates and Clinton have called on China to join in a regional effort to resolve territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

Willard said that there was no doubt that China "aims to have great influence over that maritime space, and especially over the contested areas that they've laid claim to in both the South China Sea and the East China Sea."

China has claimed mineral rights around the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, and argued that foreign navies cannot sail through the area without Beijing's permission.

In September, Japan and China clashed over the disputed Senkaku Islands, known as the Diaoyu Islands in China.

Willard also told lawmakers that China's plans to deploy an aircraft carrier will have an effect on the balance of power in the region.

He said it would take some time before the aircraft carrier, an old Soviet ship that has been refurbished, is fully operational after a period of testing.

"But I think as a symbol, the feedback that we receive in our dialogue throughout the region is that the regional partners regard this step by the Chinese in the midst of what has otherwise been a remarkable growth in their military capability as significant," he said.

China's spending on new weapons has caused concern abroad but Beijing says its military is only focused on defending the country's territory.

The Chinese army is hugely secretive about its defense programs, which benefit from a big military budget boosted by the nation's runaway economic growth.

[buglerbilly]

Chinese carrier 'a symbolic threat'

Viola Gienger and Tony Capaccio

April 13, 2011 - 9:08AM .


Former Soviet-era aircraft carrier Varyag being refurbished by China.

China's reconstruction of a Soviet-era aircraft carrier, while not a concern to the US, is raising alarms in the region as a symbol of the Asian nation's military expansion, US Navy Admiral Robert Willard says.

China's state news agency, Xinhua, posted photos of the carrier, the Varyag, on a website last week. In a photo caption, Xinhua cited the military analysis magazine Kanwa Asian Defense Review in Canada as saying the ship will set sail this year. The timeline tracks with an estimate made two years ago by the US Office of Naval Intelligence.

Willard, the top US military commander in the Asia-Pacific region, said he was "not concerned" by the project. The carrier sat pier-side for years as China considered making it a tourist attraction before the reconstruction began, Admiral Willard said.

"We do expect that they will achieve what they are asserting, which is that perhaps this year it may go to sea," Admiral Willard, who heads the US Pacific Command, said. "That's a long way from developing an aircraft carrier capability."

Still, China's overall military expansion magnifies the symbolic effect, Admiral Willard told the Senate Armed Services Committee at a hearing yesterday.

"Based on the feedback that we received from our partners and allies in the Pacific, I think the change in perception by the region will be significant," he said.

Chinese leaders have talked for decades of plans to acquire what they call "aircraft mother ships" as part of their military modernisation.

Such a fleet would expand China's power in the region and enhance its influence in territorial disputes with Japan, South Korea, Vietnam and the Philippines.

The US expects that China, the world's second-biggest economy, will try to build its own carrier at some point, Admiral Willard said.

"This is a significant choice that they're making to develop an aircraft carrier capability," said Admiral Willard, 60, whose command is based in Hawaii and covers 36 nations and about half the earth's surface.

"This is their first refit of a boat to give them the very beginning of that, so we'll watch over it with interest."

The refurbished aircraft carrier may serve as a test-and-evaluation platform. There must be "a long period of training and development and eventual exercising preceding any operational capability," Willard told the committee.

"There's a lot that goes into aircraft carrier operations," Admiral Willard said. "We would expect that at some point in time, they'll attempt to marry some semblance of an air wing to it."

The Obama administration has pushed for more openness from China, the biggest foreign holder of US Treasuries, over its military intentions, especially as it develops the capacity to restrict US access to sea lanes.

"What we are striving to do is develop a constructive partner in China," Admiral Willard said.

Still, "they have developed a ballistic missile capability" and "most of those missiles are aimed in the direction of Taiwan. That is very formidable".

The missile inventory has the capability to reach allies and "has the region concerned," he said.

The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission said in its 2010 report that China's non-nuclear missiles have "the capability to attack" and close down five of six major U.S. Air Force bases in South Korea and Japan.

Bloomberg

[buglerbilly]

Shilang Sails Soon

(Source: Forecast International; issued April 19, 2011)

BEIJING --- After nearly nine years of refurbishing work, the ex-Russian aircraft carrier Shilang will soon be carrying out her sea trials for the Chinese Navy. Originally built in a Ukrainian shipyard as a member of the Project 1143.5 class named Varyag, the carrier was purchased as a derelict hulk in 1998 for about $20 million. The carrier is now named in honor of the Qing Dynasty admiral who conquered what is now known as Taiwan in 1681. There probably is a message in that.

The entry to service of the Shilang will mark a major change in the operational profile of the Chinese People's Liberation Forces Navy. This profile will take some time to mature, because Chinese pilots have no experience taking off from and landing aircraft on carriers and will require several years of at-sea experience before they become fully capable of routine operations. However, one carrier does not make for a convincing capability, so it is unlikely the Shilang will be the last of her kind.

This is where a mystery creeps in. The designation for the reconstruction work on the Shilang is Project 089. In 2008, the Chinese purchased four sets of arrester equipment as used on the Project 1143.5 carriers Varyag and Kuznetsov. One set was installed on the Shilang, the second on the Wuhan "carrier in the cornfield" test facility. The third and fourth sets appear to have been assigned to two additional Project 089 ships, on which first metal has already been cut.

The problem is that a second designation for a Chinese carrier program, Project 085, has appeared and is associated with the reconstruction of the Varyag. The most likely rationale for the designation is that the Chinese see the ski-jump-equipped Project 089 class ships as being an interim solution aimed as much at gaining experience in the construction of aircraft carriers and developing expertise in their operations as providing a full organic aircraft capability. A catapult-equipped version of the design may well be seen as the preferred operational solution.

The original Project 1143.5 design was actually intended to have catapults, but the Russian catapult development effort was a failure, and the switch to a ski-jump was a last-minute accommodation of this abortive development. So, provided the Chinese can succeed where the Russians failed and develop an effective catapult, there should be no great problem in modifying the Project 1143.5 design back to catapult configuration. This could well be Project 085.

-ends-

[McFriday]

"A catapult-equipped version of the design may well be seen as the preferred operational solution."

The engineering team from the Shanghai Mag-lev Train project should be able to come up with something useful in this area, no?

Cheers,
Mac

[Unicorn]

The Chinese see a major naval platform that will allow them to force the US offshore for long enough to allow them to try and recapture Taiwan.

Captains of Los Angeles, Seawolf and Virginia class subs see a Navy Cross waiting to happen.

.

[buglerbilly]

:abovelol :abovelol :abovelol

[buglerbilly]

China's Aircraft Carrier: Some Observations

(Source: India Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses; issued April 21, 2011)

If international relations are driven by perceptions of relative strengths and weaknesses, then power projection matters the most. Power, as understood in modern statecraft, is contingent on a country’s willingness to project its capacity if not its intent. China’s initial testing of its stealth aircraft J20 in January 2011 and the recent showcasing of its aircraft carrier – formerly the Varyag and now Shi Lang – signify its growing military capability.

In late 2008, Chinese officials had stated that aircraft carriers reflected a nation's comprehensive power. Thus, China’s intentions in developing this vital strategic asset are amply clear. For some time now, China has been working towards developing a blue water navy with the strategic vision of “safeguarding territory, development of national economy and overseas interests.” Recent developments testify to the fact that China sees the need to project and protect its interest beyond its coastal Exclusive Economic Zone. The first aircraft carrier will be a treated as a learning curve; China will induct indigenous carriers into the PLA navy (PLAN) between 2015 and 2020.

The first part of this commentary focuses on the present status of China’s first carrier and the phases of carrier introduction into the PLA navy. The second part identifies the drivers behind the PLAN’s carrier programme and the influence that a carrier force can provide in various maritime areas.

The Chinese ‘Eugene Ely’ Waits

At 3.16 pm on November 14, 1910, Eugene Ely took off in a 50 HP Curtiss pusher biplane from a temporary flight deck built on the US light cruiser Birmingham and added a new dimension to naval operations. China’s first carrier launch will, similarly, introduce a new dimension to the Chinese navy’s prowess and signal a paradigm change in the strategic philosophy of the Asia Pacific region.

The world is focussed on the aircraft carrier Varyag procured by China from the Ukraine and undergoing refurbishment since 2002 at Dalian. The carrier is expected to be named Shi Lang after the Qing dynasty admiral who conquered present-day Taiwan in 1681. This renaming is perhaps clear evidence of China’s intent and its ambition to extend its reach and capabilities in the maritime domain. Reports indicate that the installation of phased array radars and weapon fit would make this carrier a more independent platform compared to its US counterparts which rely on AEGIS-type guided missile ships for protection.

In November 2008 the director of the ministry of national defence, foreign affairs office, Major General Qian Lihua, had stated that: “the question is not whether you have an aircraft carrier, but what you do with your aircraft carrier.”

The second part of the statement makes the intent amply clear. The answer to the first part is still under a cloud as the exact status of the Shi Lang’s refurbishment and the state of training of the crew are unknown. An aircraft carrier is introduced into a navy in three phases.

First, is the procurement and/or construction. Carriers can be constructed or refurbished in a planned time frame provided that the funds and equipment are readily available.

Second, is the creation of the expertise required to operate a carrier. This training takes time, money and may be lives, especially when a nation with no prior experience attempts it on its own.

Third, is the change in the operating tactics and doctrines. This takes time as the tactics have to be rehearsed and assessed as part of computer-simulated war games before being exercised in the maritime environment and promulgated as a doctrine. The first part is in progress and reports indicate that sea trials are likely to commence this year. The second phase, most probably ground training, is also likely to have commenced given that a concrete mock-up of the carrier has been constructed at the Wuhan Naval Research Facilities complete with ski ramp, deck markings, island superstructure and a few aircraft. This can be counted as the first part of the second phase. The latter part of the second phase could commence with flight trials at sea. It is possible that the third phase may begin during the final stages of the second phase.

A successful accomplishment of the laid down time lines will enable China to meet its deadline of inducting indigenous carriers by 2020 and thus achieve a multidimensional maritime capability by including airspace in its operating sphere.

Drivers Behind the Desire

It is worthwhile to explore the intentions behind the Chinese desire - bordering on desperation - for a blue water capability and specifically aircraft carriers. When Admiral Li Yin spoke of China’s maritime strategy as comprising of three components: "ocean security, ocean development interests, and how to deal with the problems of disputes in peripheral oceans,” he was more than clear about the role of PLAN in achieving China’s security objectives.

-- Taiwan: Beyond doubt, preventing Taiwan from moving towards formal independence remains China’s top priority. Given that the US fully supports Taiwan and has a disproportionate technological advantage, China is unlikely to attack first in case of a Taiwanese move towards formal independence. China meanwhile will continue to maintain its capability to deter Taiwan from taking any such step. Perception and projection remain keys in this situation. A recently released White Paper on defence stated that the armed forces are: “tasked to oppose and contain the separatist forces for ‘Taiwan independence’.” In that sense, induction and deployment of the carrier would help expand China’s air defence capabilities, which, in turn, would enhance the outreach of its amphibious warfare capacity and thus push US forces outwards in case of a stand-off. Through such steps, China is likely to shape the situation in its favour.3

-- East and South China Sea Disputes: An aircraft carrier is likely to enhance China’s ability to exert pressure on the neighbourhood. A carrier-centric Chinese fleet would certainly force the US to reassess its strategy in a conflict or high tension scenario. This would be another area where the projection effect of the carrier would matter more than its actual capacity.

-- Sea Lanes of Communication: China’s ‘Malacca Dilemma’ makes a strong navy imperative for protecting the vital sea lanes of communication so critical for energy and trade transit. Although the blocking of sea lanes will be difficult and will have limited impact in any case, even so China would want to avoid such a possibility. Therefore, to that extent, the PLAN would play a major role in safeguarding China’s maritime rights and interests.

-- Beyond the Malacca Straits: A carrier force operating in the open sea areas beyond the Malacca Straits will add punch to the Chinese Navy’s attributes of reach, sustenance, versatility and the ability to influence events both at sea and ashore. These maritime increments could pave the way for a possible expeditionary force capability and also accord China the ability to engage nations whose navies operate in the IOR either on an equal footing or from levels a few notches higher than hitherto.

Until the first Chinese ‘Eugene Ely’ takes off from the deck of the Shi Lang, the world, especially the Asia Pacific region, can only wait and watch how the Chinese game plan unfolds.

-ends-

[buglerbilly]

High-resolution photos of Chinese J-15 carrier-borne fighter

Posted in Uncategorized on April 25th, 2011

[ARH v.3.1]

Tis no photo to be seen...

[Unicorn]

Indeed, tis very stealthy.

.

[tiddles]

Tis virtually invisible.
Tiddles

[ARH v.3.1]

We need some of these to counter it or we will be screwed!

[buglerbilly]

Whinging Bitches!

It's been corrected...........:big

Here it is again, just in case you're too goddamned lazy to go back one page.............


High-resolution photos of Chinese J-15 carrier-borne fighter

Posted in Uncategorized on April 25th, 2011

[ADMk2]

[QUOTE=buglerbilly;16119]High-resolution photos of Chinese J-15 carrier-borne fighter

The J-15? Bruce from Family Guy says it best...

[buglerbilly]

Taipei Times

Tue, Apr 26, 2011 　

PRC aircraft carrier could set sail this year: NSB

By Rich Chang / Staff Reporter, with CNA

The head of the National Security Bureau (NSB) yesterday said China’s first aircraft carrier would likely start training exercises at sea toward the end of this year.

Bureau Director Tsai Der-sheng (蔡得勝) told a meeting of the the legislature’s National Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee that while the aircraft carrier — an old carrier purchased from Ukraine in 1998, which has undergone refurbishing work in Dalian since 2002 — would commence training operations around that time, it should be noted that the vessel also has combat capabilities.

Tsai’s comment was in response to a question by Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Legislator Lin Yu-fang (林郁方) on whether the aircraft carrier was solely for training or if it could play a combat role.

Tsai said the Chinese were also developing combat aircraft based on Russian models capable of landing in and taking off from aircraft carriers.

On rumors that Beijing could rename the Varyag, “Shi Lang,” after the Qing Dynasty admiral who conquered what is now known as Taiwan in 1681, Tsai said if this was the case, then the political implications would be obvious.

Lin told the meeting the impact of China’s first aircraft -carrier would be most felt in the South China Sea, which would compel countries in the region to strengthen their military deployment in the sea.

As Taiping Island (太平島) is very far from Taiwan, any military dispute occurring there would make it difficult for Taiwan to have the upper hand militarily.

Lin also asked Tsai to comment on the impact of a downsizing of the Republic of China military police, which usually ensures security during residential elections.

Tsai said plans by the Ministry of National Defense to cut 1,000 military police personnel and reassign 2,500 to other units would, in the long term, affect security details.

Tsai also confirmed that a new generation of secure cellphones developed by a Taiwanese firm for bureau officials would enter service tomorrow.

The most important function of the cellphone was its ability to keep calls confidential, Tsai said, adding that the tracking function has been disabled and though the cellphone does have a camera function, it is usually turned off.

The new secure cellphone has an encoded chip that enables the deletion of classified data and turns the phone into a normal unsecured cellphone if abnormal activity is detected, a bureau official said.

[buglerbilly]

More on the "we-are-doomed" new Naval fighter from China............

Ares

A Defense Technology Blog

New Chinese, Ship-Based, Heavy Fighter Readied For Flight Tests

Posted by David A. Fulghum at 4/26/2011 9:09 AM CDT

Beijing is revealing pictures of its indigenously built J-15 Flying Shark design that is intended to populate the decks of its first aircraft carrier.



It comes equipped with large surface area wings (for extra lift at low speeds) that fold (for a small footprint on a crowded aircraft carrier deck), reinforced landing gear (for high, sink-rate landings), a tailhook (for arrested landing on short carrier decks) and a light blue paint scheme to signal its role in the People's Liberation Army’s Navy. Small canards on the nose also are to help lower the landing speed and the tail cone has been shortened to avoid ramp strikes.

The heavy shipborne fighter will be yet another piece in the foundation of a ship-based force that can project power at sea, far from China’s shore defenses. They are expected to be first based on the former Russian Varyag aircraft carrier. The first pictures were taken at Shenyang Aircraft Industry Corp.’s No. 112 factory. The aircraft is considered roughly in the single-seat F/A-18C Hornet class of aircraft. U.S. industry has already moved on 4.5 generation designs such as the F/A-18E and F/A-18F Super Hornets and the EA-18G Growler electronic attack aircraft.

The design, based on the Sukhoi Su-33 features exterior missile rails and a wide-angle holographic heads-up display similar to those on the company’s J-11 fighter. There are competing claims about the aircraft’s capability. Russian’s Ria Novosti news service called in inferior to the Su-33, but Chinese officials say the Su-33’s avionics are obsolete, so they have installed locally made sensors, displays and weaponry. The aircraft is based structurally on the Su-33 with avionics – including an advanced anti-ship radar – from the J-11B program. Deployment of the aircraft is expected no earlier than 2016.

Analyst and aircraft watchers in China say the maiden flight of the aircraft was made Aug. 31, 2009. The first takeoff from a simulated ski-jump was conducted on May 6, 2010. The program began after a Su-33 prototype was acquired from Ukraine in 2001. China offered to buy Su-33s from Russia as recently as 2009 .

A Ukrainian court convicted a Russian man in Feb. of conspiring to give the Chinese details of a Crimean air base that had been used to train Su-33 pilots to take off from a carrier’s ski-jump ramp, says the New York Times. In Huludao, a navy installation on China’s northeast coast, workers are said to have built a rough clone of the Crimea test center, complete with a ski ramp for short takeoffs.

Taiwan intelligence officials say the aircraft carrier – thought by analysts to be slated for training role – could make its first voyage by the end of the year. The warship has been docked in China's eastern Dalian harbour where it has undergone extensive refurbishing work since 2002.

Credit: Zhang Xinliang

[buglerbilly]

There is a video of this plane here on Trimble's DEWPOINT Blog.....................

http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/the-dewline/2011/04/video-chinas-j-15-goes-viral-b.html

[buglerbilly]

Photos: Second J-15 spotted flying

Posted in Uncategorized on April 27th, 2011

A second Shenyang J-15 carrier-borne fighter was spotted flying at the No. 112 aircraft factory on Apr. 26. This aircraft is yet to be painted.

[buglerbilly]

Photo: Interior of FL-3000N CIWS

Posted in Uncategorized on April 28th, 2011

Someone forgot to close the door.



RAM equivalent, fire-and-forget missile system............

[buglerbilly]

Photo: Varyag gets first phased array radar antenna

Posted in Uncategorized on April 29th, 2011

A phase array radar antenna, similar to the ones installed on Type 052C destroyers, has been placed on Varyag’s island.

[buglerbilly]

Photo: Wind tunnel model of Chinese Hawkeye

This looks like it may be the carrier-borne AEW aircraft............a copy of the HAWKEYE, similar if not a rip-off same.......?



A very poor photo of the same..........

[buglerbilly]

On-going Update of what's happening with the former Varyag carrier now in China..............

Photo: Varyag gets all 4 phase array radar antennas

Posted in Uncategorized on May 17th, 2011

Varyag now has all four of its phase array radar antennas installed. The last antenna was installed on May 16.

[Unicorn]

The real worry is that the Chinese Politburo and the PLA command actually start to believe their own PR about forcing the USN to back away and try for a move on Taiwan.

That would be bad, as the USN would be forward deployed given that it would be almost impossible to try something like that from a standing start, allowing the US's orbital imagery to spot the preparations.

The Chinese try it anyway, believing that their threat of anti-ship ballistic missiles will keep the US Navy at a safe distance, and guess wrong.

If they actually started shooting at the US Navy, well all bets are off.

Besides, it's believed that the Taiwanese may have weapons of mass destruction, in the face of a major invasion and as a last resort, the Taiwanese high command may decide to use them.

Surely no one is foolish enough to risk the use of WMD?.

[buglerbilly]

Varyag unveils first Type 730 CWIS

Posted in Uncategorized on May 18th, 2011

Covers for the Type 730 CWIS on board Varyag have been taken off.

[buglerbilly]

Putting Eyes on China’s Carrier

By David Axe

May 19, 2011

To outfit its new aircraft carrier Shi Lang, due to enter service this year or next, the Chinese navy is going to need a balanced air wing mixing aircraft optimized for aerial combat, bombing, anti-submarine warfare, rescue, resupply and, finally, airborne radar early warning (AEW) and electronic warfare.

The latter is one of the most sophisticated and difficult to master aerial missions—and one of the most important. Without a powerful airborne radar and radar detectors Shi Lang and her J-15 and J-10 fighters will be essentially blind, capable of seeing only as far as their own radars allow. For the ship, the horizon restricts radar range. The fighters are constrained by the size of their radomes, which place hard limits on the abilities of an aerial radar.

China has always known it needed a carrier-borne AEW aircraft, but until this month, it seemed Beijing was considering only the most conservative options. A single leaked photo changed all that.

The world's major navies take different approaches to AEW. Only the world's top carrier operators, the Americans and French, use large, fixed-wing planes: the US-built E-2 Hawkeye. Smaller navies, such as Russia's, Italy's and Britain's, use helicopters carrying radars in underslung or ramp-mounted fixtures. The E-2 is bigger and higher-flying than any helicopter, so can see farther with its radar—reportedly up to 400 miles for the latest E-2D just entering US Navy service.

The first reports of Chinese naval AEW development focused on rumours regarding Russian-made Ka-31 choppers or a modified version of the Chinese Z-8 helicopter. In April this year, a Z-8 was photographed in the gray paintjob of the People's Liberation Army Navy—a strong indication the PLAN had picked that chopper over its Russian rival.

But another photo posted to Chinese forums in May hinted at a fixed-wing naval AEW aircraft. The grainy photo, reportedly taken at Xian, seems to show a plane with a distinctive dome-shaped radar housing atop its fuselage.

The Chinese air force has long experimented with large cargo planes modified for AEW, and today is testing several Il-76 freighters with top-mounted, round radomes, as well as a medium-size Y-8 cargo plane with a file-shaped radome. Neither design would fit on Shi Lang.

But a plane similar in dimensions to the 23-ton E-2 just might. Indeed, the alleged Chinese naval AEW plane could be an unauthorized copy of the E-2, as both planes share a rare tail configuration with four vertical stabilizers.

Of course, the E-2's four-tail arrangement is dictated by the odd airflow around the large radome. If the Chinese plane's radome is similarly obstructive, the tail layout would naturally echo the E-2's, without the PLAN aircraft necessarily being a direct copy.

In any event, if the Xian photo indeed shows a naval radar plane, then Shi Lang will be a much more capable vessel than originally projected.

[Unicorn]

China flags closer defence cooperation

Mark Dodd From: The Australian May 27, 2011 5:31PM

BEIJING has foreshadowed closer defence cooperation with Australia to help assuage Canberra's concerns about China's rapid military modernisation, its Ambassador Chen Yuming said today.

Speaking at a Canberra University national security seminar, Ambassador Chen Yuming strongly defended Beijing's military build-up, a strategy he described as consistent with the country's rapid economic development.

Western concerns about Beijing's military expansion are unjustified, Mr Chen said.

It was "unworthy" and "unnecessary" for the "outside world" to have concerns about Chinese military development, he said.

The assurances follow high-level visits by senior communist party figures to Australia, and Julia Gillard's first visit to China as Prime Minister, where she flagged closer military ties with the Asian superpower.

In a candid admission, Mr Chen said more could be done to better explain Beijing's military strategy to concerned countries in the region.

"That is why we need to further enhance our communications and dialogue with Australia and other countries in order to further strengthen our political and security mutual trust," he said.

Military cooperation with Australia was aimed at building better trust between the two countries and "challenges in the region".

"Between our two militaries and defence departments we have seen frequent military visits and personnel exchanges.

"We will continue to have such cooperation in various areas between the two sides and last year we have seen exchange visits of our navy ships.

"We will continue to strengthen military exchanges between China and Australia because we believe that this is a very important and useful way to further enhance mutual trust and build on friendly cooperation," the ambassador said.

Closer defence cooperation between Australia and China would lead to better bilateral cooperation in other areas, including common challenges like natural disasters, terrorism and climate change, he added.

[buglerbilly]

Building a carrier responsibly

By Shen Dingli

China.org.cn, May 29, 2011

There is some debate over whether China will build an aircraft carrier in the future.

According to the Western media, China's State Oceanic Administration (SOA) issued a report in May 2010 on China's maritime development admitting that the government had approved a plan a year ago to build an aircraft carrier, though no confirmation could be found on the official SOA website.

It is becoming increasingly difficult for an aircraft carrier to defend itself. This is so due to the development of anti-carrier weapons systems. The modern strike warplane is stealthier than ever, avoiding radar detection. The modern attack submarine is also increasingly harder to detect as it becomes quieter. Though anti-stealth technology is getting more sophisticated, state-of-the-art missile attack capabilities are also on the rise, especially ultra-sonic, low-flying stealth missiles launched.

Therefore, aircraft carriers have become less relevant to interstate relations among major powers than they used to be. The U.S. navy is more concerned about China's near-sea area-denial capacity through missile deterrence. In the same vein, China's nascent aircraft carrier, the former Varyag, which could be revamped and refitted as Beijing's first such surface platform, is also unable to defend itself in a conflict with another major power.

So what is the rationale to develop an indefensible carrier? Apparently, no single weapon is by design absolutely self-defensible. There is no absolutely secure tank or aircraft yet, and possibly never will be. No stealth warplane or warship would be completely defensible forever. As defense technology advances, offensive technology will also develop. There is a permanent tug-of-war between defense and offense, with neither side gaining the upper hand.

In terms of war, a carrier force presents lesser powers with a formidable threat wherever air dominance and suppression are at issue. In turn, such an advantage translates into political benefits. As long as there exist overlapping claims of interest, stakeholders will need to back their political and economic positions with military strength. By no means would this assure China sets the terms for negotiation, but at least it would assure that it would not come to the bargaining table under some other country's terms.

Even among the major powers, a carrier force would assure that China could retain a range of effective policy options. In an ever co-dependent world, it is hard to foresee significant military confrontation between major powers, but it is also hard to guarantee that there is no conflict of interests between them. One would not forget that in the mid-1990s, the U.S. dispatched two aircraft carriers to the Taiwan Straits, in order to restrict Chinese mainland's policy choices vis-à-vis the challenge from the pro-independence force in Taiwan. It is hard to preclude that such a coercive exercise in power politics will not recur in the future. Therefore, by building an aircraft carrier, China would help Beijing to back its legitimate political objectives. China wants peace, but it believes that peace must be sustained by sovereignty and fairness rather than foreign coercion.

Can China afford a carrier? For quite some time, there have been arguments that building a carrier could be too expensive. That might have been true in the past, but the situation is changing. Even if building a carrier would cost tens of billions of U.S. dollars, the People's Liberation Army could still afford to build a few with its budget this year. As the process of building the carrier force could stretch over a decade or longer, the annual share of defense spending could be as low as a few percentage of the present budget, or even smaller a few years later as the defense budget grows. China's defense budget more than quadrupled in 2000s. Certainly, China's armed forces would like to save its resources for the most needed items, but a carrier project will be a part of its targeted list.

To conclude, one doesn't need to build a weapons system until it is guaranteed to be defensible. And there is no reason that China could not afford an aircraft carrier or two. Acquiring the carrier capacity would allow China more chances to establish its sovereignty and independent foreign policy. Of course, there are two challenges ahead: Does China have the technical competence needed to attain the carrier force? And how will its neighbors see the move? For the former, history has repeatedly vindicated the notion that the right technology will seldom be at one's disposal without first attempting to develop it independently. For the latter, China needs to present its carrier force as a way to assure the stability of the region, strengthening its security rather than bullying smaller neighbors.

The author is a columnist with China.org.cn For more information please visit http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/node_7082361.htm

Opinion articles reflect the views of their authors, not necessarily those of China.org.cn.

[buglerbilly]

Relax: China’s First Aircraft Carrier is a Piece of Junk

By David Axe June 1, 2011 | 11:14 am



Her new guns are installed. Her light-gray paint job has dried. Her airplanes are flying and her engines are turning. Thirteen years after she was purchased from Ukraine half-complete and lacking engines, the Chinese navy’s very first aircraft carrier is ready to set sail from Dalian shipyard in northeast China. The former Soviet carrier Varyag, renamed Shi Lang in Chinese service, could begin sea trials this summer.

Just how worried should the world be?

The answer depends on who you ask. To China’s closest neighbors, the prospect of a carrier speeding heavily-armed Chinese jet fighters across the world’s oceans is an alarming one. But the U.S. Navy, the world’s leading carrier power and arguably the Chinese navy’s biggest rival, seems oddly unaffected.

There are good reasons for the Pentagon’s calm. For starters, Shi Lang, pictured above, could be strictly a training carrier, meant to pave the way for bigger, more capable carriers years or decades in the future.

But even if she is meant for combat, there’s probably little reason to fear Shi Lang. A close study of the 990-foot-long vessel — plus the warships and airplanes she’ll sail with — reveals a modestly-sized carrier lacking many of the elements that make U.S. flattops so powerful.

When Shi Lang finally gets underway in coming months, she will boost the ability of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to patrol airspace over contested sea zones, provided they’re not too far from the Chinese mainland. And more to the point, she’ll look good doing it. “I think the change in perception by the region will be significant,” Adm. Robert Willard, commander of U.S. Pacific forces, told the Senate in April.

Willard said he is “not concerned” about the ship’s military impact.



Carrier Census

Shi Lang will sail into a Pacific Ocean teaming with carriers. First, there are the American carriers: five nuclear-powered supercarriers home-ported in California, Washington and Japan, plus six assault ships in California and Japan. Between them, the American carriers displace no less than 700,000 tons and can carry 600 aircraft. “Our Navy can carry twice as many aircraft at sea as all the rest of the world combined,” outgoing U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates pointed out last year.

(In comparison, the Chinese flattop displaces just 60,000 tons and carrying no more than 40 planes and choppers.)

Japan’s got two 18,000-ton assault ships, plus another on the way. Today they carry just a few helicopters, but it’s possible the ships will eventually embark vertical-landing F-35B stealth fighters. The same applies to South Korea’s four planned 14,000-ton carriers and the two 30,000-ton Australian flattops still under construction.

Thailand’s 12,000-ton Chari Naruebet is an outlier: too small for more than a handful of aircraft, but nevertheless capable of carrying the country’s ancient, vertical-landing Harrier jets.

India and Russia both operate full-fledged carriers with jet fighters aboard. Russia’s Admiral Kuznetsov is actually Shi Lang’s older sister. Her dozen Su-33 fighters are just rustier versions of the Chinese J-15. Lately, Kuznetsov has spent most of her time in the Mediterranean. India’s 30,000-ton Viraat and her 30 Harriers and choppers tend to stick to the Indian Ocean.

Of the 22 flattops already plying the Pacific or coming soon, none belongs to a country that China can consider a close ally. Today it’s not uncommon to see American carriers sailing in mixed formations with carriers from Japan, South Korea, Thailand and India. Beijing can only dream of assembling that kind of international sea power, with or without Shi Lang.



Empty Nest

A carrier is only as potent as her air wing, a fact the Pentagon appreciates. That’s why the U.S. Navy spends an average of $15 billion a year on new airplanes — about the same as the Air Force. Today, a Navy supercarrier sails with a 70-strong air wing. F/A-18 fighters, EA-6B or EA-18G radar-jamming planes, E-2 radar planes, C-2 cargo-haulers and H-60 helicopters are all part of the mix. The aircraft work as a team, patrolling, tracking and attacking targets below, on and above the surface and moving people and supplies to and from the carrier.

Shi Lang will not possess anything close to that mix of aircraft and capabilities. China’s J-15 naval fighter, pictured above, is a rough analogue of the F-18, but with a shorter range, less sophisticated sensors and fewer weapons options. The Ka-28 helicopter hunts submarines like the H-60 does.

But that’s it. The PLAN doesn’t have radar-jamming jets, carrier-based airlifters or fixed-wing radar planes. Rumors of a Chinese copy of the E-2 seem unfounded, for an E-2 would require a steam-powered catapult to boost it into the air, and Shi Lang lacks even that basic equipment. To fill that huge gap in Shi Lang’s air wing, China is testing a Z-8 helicopter fitted with a radar. But such a set-up offers only a fraction of the E-2’s range and endurance.

The disparity will only increase in the next decade, as the U.S. Navy finally deploys jet-powered killer drones, early versions of which are already undergoing testing in the California desert.



Defenseless

The same limitations apply to Shi Lang’s escorts.

To protect its $10 billion carriers and their air wings from aerial attack, the U.S. Navy assigns several of its 83 destroyers and cruisers to sail alongside each flattop. The escorting warships boast super-sophisticated Aegis radars and carry 100 or more Surface-to-Air Missiles per ship. An American carrier battle group possesses more high-powered radars and at-sea missiles than most other countries’ entire naval fleets.

The Chinese navy has just two destroyers that come close to matching America’s Aegis warships, although more are under construction. The Type 052C destroyer, pictured above, carries half as many missiles as a U.S. destroyer, and its radar is unlikely to match the Aegis’ ability to closely track scores of targets simultaneously. On the surface, Shi Lang will be all but defenseless, by U.S. standards.

Underwater, the situation is even worse. American carriers travel with an unseen companion: at least one nuclear-powered attack submarine. The sub’s job is to patrol ahead of the carrier, screening for hostile warships — especially other submarines. After all, submarines are the world’s most lethal ship-killers.

The PLAN has two Type 093 submarines capable of long-range patrols. Again, that’s too few for carrier-escort duty in addition to the other missions likely assigned to the Chinese attack-submarine force. But the bigger problem is communications. To coordinate surface ships and submarines, the Americans and other advanced navies rely on a mix of Very Low Frequency radios installed aboard special aircraft, plus higher-frequency radios for talking from ship to sub.

China hasn’t perfected that system. “Due to the limitations of submarine communications technology, the PLAN currently can only exercise relatively limited tactical control over its submarines,” Garth Heckler, Ed Francis and James Mulvenon wrote in the 2007 book China’s Future Nuclear Submarine Force.

For that reason, Shi Lang probably cannot rely on Chinese submarines for protection from other submarines. That realization evoked a rather pointed comment from National War College professor Bernard Cole. “As a former Navy man, I’d love to see them [the Chinese] build a fleet of aircraft carriers which, increasingly, are just good sub targets,” Cole said.



Potemkin Carrier

Leaving aside her modest size compared to American carriers, her incomplete air wing and escort force and the fact that she’ll sail without the company of allied flattops, Shi Lang could be even less of a threat than her striking appearance implies. Shi Lang’s greatest potential weakness could be under her skin, in her Ukrainian-supplied engines.

Powerplants — that is, jet engines for airplanes, turbines for ships — are some of the most complex, expensive and potentially troublesome components of any weapon system. Just ask the designers of the Pentagon’s F-35 stealth fighter and the U.S. Navy’s San Antonio-class amphibious ships. Both have been nearly sidelined by engine woes.

China has struggled for years to design and build adequate powerplants for its ships and aircraft. Although Chinese aerospace firms are increasingly adept at manufacturing airframes, they still have not mastered motors. That’s why the new WZ-10 attack helicopter was delayed nearly a decade, and why there appear to be two different prototypes for the J-20 stealth fighter. One flies with reliable Russian-made AL-31F engines; the other apparently uses a less trustworthy Chinese design, the WS-10A.

For Shi Lang, China reportedly purchased turbines from Ukraine. Though surely superior to any ship engines China could have produced on its own, the Ukrainian models might still be unreliable by Western standards. Russia’s Kuznetsov, also fitted with Ukrainian turbines, has long suffered propulsion problems that have forced her to spend most of her 30-year career tied to a pier for maintenance. When she does sail, a large tugboat usually tags along, just in case the carrier breaks down.

If Shi Lang is anything like her sister, she could turn out to be a naval version of the mythical “Potemkin village” — an impressive facade over a rickety interior.

“As China’s interests expand globally, the Chinese navy needs to go further outbound, and an aircraft carrier is needed,” said Arthur Ding, from National Chengchi University in Taiwan. If so, China might have to wait for the carrier after the potentially hollow Shi Lang.

Photos: PLAN, Chinese Internet, U.S. Navy

[buglerbilly]

8 June 2011 Last updated at 12:06 GMT

China aircraft carrier confirmed by general

The 300m (990ft) carrier, under construction in Dalian, is thought to be nearly finished.

[Dear me Beeb! Pics have been published for months if not years showing the reno under way and where it is on a weekly basis............]

The head of China's General Staff of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has confirmed that China's first aircraft carrier is under construction.

Gen Chen Bingde refused to say when the carrier - a remodelled Soviet-era vessel, the Varyag - would be ready.

A member of his staff said the carrier would pose no threat to other nations.

The 300m (990ft) carrier, which is being built in the north-east port of Dalian, has been one of China's worst-kept secrets, analysts say.

Gen Chen made his comments to the Chinese-language Hong Kong Commercial Daily newspaper.

The PLA - the largest army in the world - is hugely secretive about its defence programme.

The carrier was constructed in the 1980s for the Soviet navy but was never completed. When the Soviet Union collapsed, the rusting hull of the Varyag sat in dockyards in Ukraine.

A Chinese company with links to the PLA bought the Varyag claiming it wanted to turn it into a floating casino in Macau.

The carrier is thought to be nearly finished, and is expected to begin sea trials later this year.

But the BBC's Michael Bristow in Beijing says that does not mean it will then be ready to undertake operational duties.

Learning how to operate it - and fly planes off it - will take a few more years to master, our correspondent says.

Lt Gen Qi Jianguo, assistant chief of the general staff, told the Hong Kong Commercial Daily that even after the aircraft carrier was deployed, it would "definitely not sail to other countries' territorial waters".

"All of the great nations in the world own aircraft carriers - they are symbols of a great nation," he was quoted as saying.

Lt Gen Qi said China had always followed a "defensive" principle for its military strategy.

"It would have been better for us if we acted sooner in understanding the oceans and mapping out our blue-water capabilities earlier.

"We are now facing heavy pressure in the oceans whether in the South China Sea, East China Sea, Yellow Sea or the Taiwan Straits," he said.

China is engaged in maritime border disputes with several countries - including Vietnam and the Philippines.

The US, which has 11 fully-capable carrier strike groups, has also expressed concern about its rising naval ambitions.

The PLA has invested heavily in submarines. It is believed to be close to deploying the world's first "carrier-killer" ballistic missile designed to sink aircraft carriers while they are manoeuvring at sea up to 1,500km offshore, and it is building its own stealth fighter aircraft along with advanced carrier-based aircraft built from Russian designs.

All of these can target US bases, US ships and US carriers in Asia.

India is another emerging power pursuing a similar path - with an ex-Soviet carrier being modified for the Indian Navy, and work already under way on a first home-built vessel as well.

Over time, these developments will affect the maritime balance of power in Asia, says the BBC's defence and security correspondent Nick Childs.

China says other countries have nothing to fear, but its recent assertive diplomatic and military muscle-flexing has created waves in the region, he says.

[buglerbilly]

China's First Aircraft Carrier To Begin Sea Trials

AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE

Published: 21 Jun 2011 08:56

HONG KONG - China's first aircraft carrier - a remodeled Soviet-era vessel - will go on sea trials next week, a report said June 21, amid escalating tensions in the South China Sea.

China's top military official reportedly confirmed earlier this month that Beijing is building a huge aircraft carrier, the first acknowledgement of the ship's existence from China's secretive defense program.

The Hong Kong Commercial Daily, which broke the story of the vessel's confirmation, quoted unnamed military sources saying the carrier will go on sea trials on July 1 but will not be officially launched until October 2012.

The sources said the test has been expedited in view of rising tensions in the South China Sea - home to two potentially oil-rich archipelagos, the Paracels and Spratlys - in recent weeks.

China's military "hopes it will show the strength of the Chinese maritime forces to deter other nations, which are eyeing the South China Sea, in order to calm tensions," the sources said.

They added that the sea trial date was also picked to celebrate the 90th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party but noted that factors such as weather could affect the planned test run.

China's military did not immediately respond to an AFP request for comment.

Tensions between Beijing and other rival claimants to the strategically vital South China Sea have heightened recently.

China has claimed mineral rights around the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea and argued that foreign navies cannot sail through the area without Beijing's permission.

In September, Japan and China also clashed over the disputed Senkaku Islands, known as the Diaoyu Islands in China, located in the East China Sea.

But Chinese officials have previously said that its first aircraft carrier would not pose a threat to other nations, in accordance with Beijing's defensive military strategy.

The Chinese aircraft carrier plan was confirmed when the chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army, Chen Bingde, confirmed the ship's existence in an interview with the Hong Kong paper.

He said the 990-foot former Soviet carrier, originally called the Varyag, was being overhauled. The ship is currently based in the northeast port of Dalian.

An expert on China's military has reportedly said the carrier would be used for training and as a model for a future indigenously-built ship.

The Varyag was originally built for the Soviet navy but construction was interrupted by the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

The PLA - the largest army in the world - is hugely secretive about its defense programs, which benefit from a large military budget boosted by the nation's runaway economic growth.

[buglerbilly]

China’s J-15 No Game Changer

By Gabe Collins & Andrew Erickson

June 23, 2011



Following is a guest entry from Gabe Collins and Andrew Erickson, co-founders of China Sign Post.

Gen. Chen Bingde, Chief of Staff of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), has reportedly said that, for the first time, a Chinese ‘aircraft carrier is under construction.’ China is also already preparing the refitted ski-jump carrier Varyag, purchased from Ukraine in 1998, to go to sea.

Given these developments, it seems a good time to look at the first carrier-based aircraft that China will employ: the new J-15 ‘Flying Shark’ carrier-based heavy fighter-bomber.

As currently configured, the J-15 is no ‘great leap forward,’ but is nevertheless triggering concern in the region because it indicates rapid improvement in Chinese naval aviation, and suggests Chinese determination to extend its regional blue water presence. The J-15’s initial role will be linked to, and limited by, its first operational platform: a ‘starter carrier’ to project a bit of power, confer prestige on a rising great power, and master basic procedures.

What’s Happening Now?

On April 24, 2011, Chinese Internet sources posted new photos of a J-15 sitting outside a hangar at the No. 112 Factory of Shenyang Aircraft Corporation airfield.

The J-15, which has an airframe closely resembling that of the Russian Su-33, boasts more advanced, indigenously made avionics, including a shortened tailcone, an arresting hook, and strengthened landing gear.

The lack of a second seat in the J-15 suggests that the PLA believes its electronics suite is sufficiently integrated and automated to require only one person to operate it, which is normal practice for carrier aircraft.

Given China’s low baseline in naval aviation, any progress could make a big difference. The J-15’s potential for long-range missions and heavy payloads, however, is negated by Varyag’s ski-jump deck and China’s lack of refuelling capabilities. For now, it would seem to be dependent on land-based tankers, at least until China develops or acquires catapults.

As for potential mission applications, the J-15 is a large aircraft and likely has a normal take-off weight similar to that of the United States’ now-retired F-14 Tomcat. If the J-15’s avionics suite can support a ground attack mission, it will have two primary uses in a future Chinese carrier group, with a third role of providing air cover as necessary during future operations to protect and/or evacuate Chinese citizens threatened by violence overseas.

If properly equipped, supported, and employed—and these are significant ‘ifs’—the J-15 could affect the regional military balance substantially. If China is able to eventually employ an effective indigenous active electronically scanned array radar in the J-15, this would offer it stealth and high jamming-resistance, and the potential ability to track and engage cruise missiles. While too many variables remain at this time to determine precisely how the J-15 will contribute to China’s military capabilities, its very existence suggests for the first time the possibility of China developing serious maritime aviation capabilities—a prospect that would have regional implications. In fact, there’s already a substantial likelihood that the J-15’s existence will prompt China’s maritime neighbours, in particular Japan, to purchase additional late-generation fighter aircraft.

Possible J-15 missions

While the Flying Shark’s capabilities remain uncertain, its potential is significant. If deployed effectively, it could offer China new options for combat air patrol (CAP) and maritime strike.

Design Factors

The basic design features high internal fuel capacity and allows for a substantial operational radius. Even with the reduction in fuel and weapons loadout imposed by a ski-jump launch, it’s probable that a J-15’s combat radius could extend as far as 700 kilometres from the carrier, particularly if the buddy tanking capability is included. The J-15 will likely be able to carry China’s PL-12 air-to-air missile, adding an additional 100 kilometres to its reach out range.

When the J-15 is deployed, it could help push potential foes much further away from a Chinese carrier. Organic fighter cover would be vital for maritime security missions located far enough from land to preclude land-based air support. In a close-in fight, the J-15, given its favourable thrust-to-weight ratio and low wing loading, could be a dangerous foe.

Maritime Strike/Anti-Ship Missions

If armed and able to launch successfully with advanced missiles, carrier-based J-15s could credibly hold surface platforms within 500 kilometres of the Chinese carrier group at risk. Existing Chinese surface combatants and submarines pose a very serious threat to surface vessels, but they take much longer to move into firing positions and thus can be more easily accounted for by planners and air defence personnel.

The time taken for a J-15 strike package to cover several hundred kilometres – only a few minutes – would also give Chinese commanders much greater tactical flexibility.

One creative way in which the PLA might attempt to the impact of deck aviation in a regional conflict would be to ‘lily pad’ by launching a number of fully loaded J-15s from coastal airbases, aerially refuel them in protected airspace, and subsequently use the carrier for aeroplane recovery after the first-strike mission.

Regardless of the J-15’s specific capabilities, however, it’s likely to be limited severely by the deck aviation platform from which it operates – the ski-jump. A ski-jump design imposes significant restrictions in terms of allowing an aircraft to approach maximum take-off weight. It also requires the carrier to depend on helicopters to provide airborne early warning (AEW) – a major problem given that helicopters are one of the PLAN’s greatest areas of weakness. As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers, therefore, it’s unclear how much the air group on the carrier will contribute to the overall ISR picture.

Another key limitation is that ski-jump carriers can’t operate tankers, whose aerial refuelling is essential for extending naval aircraft range. Thus, even if China had three carriers in the fleet, up from zero today, PLAN Aviation would still be a primarily land-based air force.

For these reasons, Chinese ski-jump carriers simply can’t be used in any of the combat roles that US Navy carriers have performed.

Issues and Challenges

1) Development or acquisition of catapult launches. Ski-jump launches are highly restrictive, and effectively limit China to operations inside the range of its handful of land-based large tanker aircraft, thus excluding the entire strategic zone between the straits of Hormuz and Malacca.

2) Landing gear. A related question concerns the plane’s ability to absorb the impact of landing. Mistakes or faulty equipment can cause major damage to the aircraft and kill or injure those on deck.

3) AEW and tanker support is needed to function at maximum combat effectiveness. China would need to negotiate access agreements of some type to deploy tankers to support any possible future operations outside the region.

4) China needs to build advanced air-launched Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles to compensate for range restrictions induced by lower fuel payloads during ski-jump operations.

5) China still faces huge challenges improving reliability and safety standards, and has yet to demonstrate top-tier indigenous production capabilities in aero engine development.

6) How many J-15s will PLAN Aviation acquire? Deploying a carrier with a full component of highly capable fighters sends a very different strategic message than deploying one outfitted primarily with helicopters.

7) Assuming that the J-10 can be turned into a successful carrier fighter, will China promote a follow-on version of the slightly-navalised variant of its already developed J-10 fighter? There’s little evidence of this as yet.

So what does all this ultimately mean? While a new step for China and an important indicator, the J-15 is limited in capability; its launch platform even more so. The key issues here are the range and payload, which are both constrained significantly by a ski-jump.

To obtain significantly extended range it’s necessary to use large tankers, which the US Air Force employs extensively, but China lacks. The limitations on number of aircraft carried and the take-off weight limits of ski-jump launched aircraft mean that Chinese planners would be faced with a very difficult choice – attack at longer ranges with a greatly reduced strike package, or bring the carrier in close to get more aircraft on target and expose the entire carrier group to greater risk.

While a first-generation Chinese carrier would not represent a threat to US ships and facilities in the way that the United States uses carriers, it could nevertheless be employed to provide significantly increased air defence to a group of surface ships in order to get them within firing range of a US carrier group or a key US base.

In addition, while a Chinese carrier group would be no match in a head-to-head confrontation with the US Navy, the very existence of a Chinese carrier capability would potentially exert significant pressure on China’s neighbours to settle maritime disputes in ways favourable to China.

One should therefore not necessarily interpret this development as aimed at a specific goal, but rather view J-15’s development as part of a long-term PLAN Aviation effort to ‘dip its toe’ in the water in order to build more robust capabilities in the long run.

Andrew Erickson is an associate professor at the US Naval War College and fellow in the Princeton-Harvard China and the World Programme. Gabe Collins is a commodity and security specialist focused on China and Russia. This is an edited and abridged version of a longer analysis.

The full version can be read here.

http://www.chinasignpost.com/2011/06/flying-shark%E2%80%9D-gaining-altitude-how-might-new-j-15-strike-fighter-improve-china%E2%80%99s-maritime-air-warfare-ability/

[buglerbilly]

Chinese Navy Mission Reveals Secret Drone

By David Axe June 27, 2011 | 9:00 am



It was another big reveal in a long history of them. Six months after the Chinese air force let the first photos of its new stealth fighter leak online, Beijing’s military has “accidentally” showed off another secretive weapon system: a small drone, apparently used to scout ahead of China’s fast-growing fleet of warships.

Details of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle — gleaned entirely from a snapshot (.pdf) taken by a Japanese navy patrol plane last week — are sketchy, at best. But the new UAV certainly represents a step forward in China’s development of American-style spy drones.

The drone (pictured above) appears to be small, possibly no more than a dozen feet in length. Since it was spotted far from land in the company of Chinese warships, it’s likely that the flying robot is launched from the helicopter flight deck of a frigate or destroyer — though the exact methods of launch and recovery remain unclear. (U.S. naval drones use catapults or take off vertically.) The UAV’s apparent small size implies a limited range and basic sensors, particularly given China’s problems building robots and advanced military electronics.

The circumstances of the pilotless plane’s revelation could offer hints about its role. Early this month, the Chinese navy sailed 11 warships through international waters between two Japanese islands. The two-week deployment — a new, semi-annual tradition for the rapidly-expanding Chinese navy — was probably meant as a display of strength, and included target practice for the ships’ crews.

It just so happens, a drone is an excellent way to spot targets for long-range gunfire and missiles — especially for a navy that lacks the ultra-high-tech satellites the U.S. Navy takes for granted. And what could be more impressive for foreign audiences than “accidentally” letting the Japanese photograph the new UAV in action?

For all that, the Chinese ‘bot could be fairly dated technology. Considering where the drone was spotted — at sea, and above warships — and its apparent size, it’s probably a rough analogue to the U.S. Navy’s RQ-2 Pioneer. During its heyday in 1991, that drone helped the battleship USS Missouri aim its massive, 16-inch guns at Iraqi shore targets. Today, the Pioneer has been superseded in American service by far more sophisticated ship-launched drones.

Which is to say: yes, the Chinese have a new UAV, and it’s pretty cool. But publicly launching a flying robot from the deck of a warship for the first time just means the People’s Liberation Army Navy is finally catching up to the where the U.S. Navy was … 20 years ago.

Photo: Japanese navy

[buglerbilly]

China’s carrier: ‘A highly vulnerable extravagance’

By Philip Ewing Monday, June 27th, 2011 4:30 pm



Defense analyst Daniel Goure doesn’t buy the storyline that China’s aircraft carrier, said to be getting ready to sail for sea trials, spells doom and irrelevance for American power in the Pacific. Instead, he writes, it’s a huge vanity project, a kind of national sports car of questionable practicality and potentially high vulnerability . There’s a precedent for this, Goure argues — the Soviet Navy, of which China’s carrier Shi Lang was originally supposed to be a part:


It appears that the [People’s Liberation Army] did not just buy an ex-Soviet era aircraft carrier but, more significantly, it has bought into a Soviet era vision of a rising world power requiring a blue water Navy. In the process, the Soviet Union wasted enormous resources creating naval forces that were virtually irrelevant both politically and militarily. China, like the Soviet Union/Russia, is a continental power. Even with a growing economy Beijing will not have the resources to build both effective land and air force and a blue water navy.

Moreover, deploying an aircraft carrier even with a complement of strike aircraft is not the same thing as having an operationally effective carrier strike group. The PLA Navy will have to develop the capability to provide 360 degree air and missile defense, fleet ASW, underway replenishment and air/sea coordination. Where is the Chinese navy’s equivalent of the Aegis air/missile defense system, E-2D airborne surveillance and C2 or the Los Angeles class SSN?

The reality is that the U.S. Navy should welcome the Chinese effort to create its own blue water navy. The U.S. Navy has a seventy year history of being able to engage and destroy hostile surface fleets. The name Shi Lang could also be translated as “big fat target.”

This is a bit of revisionist history — if we were to jump in the time machine and go back to say, 1984, you might be hard pressed to find a U.S. naval officer who’d brush off the Soviet fleet as “irrelevant.” And you could make the case that Goure is missing the point: The Shi Lang and its potential siblings aren’t being built to fight the U.S. Navy, at least not yet. They’re being built to project power among China’s weaker neighbors in the Western Pacific, just as American carrier strike groups have spent most of modern naval history intimidating or attacking weaker militaries around the world.

As we’ve written before, Adm. Hyman Rickover himself admitted that his nuclear-powered aircraft carriers would only last “about two days” in a full-scale war with the Soviets, whose admirals probably could give the flattops’ exact locations in their sleep. (Much as American commanders always will have a very good idea about the whereabouts of the Shi Lang, if they don’t already.) But carriers have continued to serve around the world because they’re so useful for so many other jobs besides full-scale war, and that kind of gunboat versatility is precisely what China wants.

What do you think?

Read more: http://www.dodbuzz.com/2011/06/27/chinas-carrier-a-highly-vulnerable-extravagance/#ixzz1QWTeygr5
DoDBuzz.com

[Unicorn]

A bit more revisionist history here as well. The comment "As we’ve written before, Adm. Hyman Rickover himself admitted that his nuclear-powered aircraft carriers would only last “about two days” in a full-scale war with the Soviets" needs to be seen in the context that Rickover was a submarine admiral who wanted the US to build more nuke boats at the expense of fewer carriers.

As we are all aware, the US Navy's subs have basically been reduced to intel platforms and cruise missile platorms since 1988, while the carriers have remained integral to the United State's response to every major crisis in the last 50 years.

.

[buglerbilly]

At last, some commonsense in an article on countering China, IF the need ever arises....................not sure about the choice of the Armidales tho but for illustration? What the hey.......

A Small-Ship Strategy for Countering China

Posted on July 1, 2011


Armidales. Australian MoD photo.

by DAVID AXE

After more than a decade in rework, China’s first aircraft carrier should set sail from the port of Dalian in northeast China any day now. The former Soviet carrier Varyag, reportedly named Shi Lang, is a potent symbol of the People Liberation Army’s intention, and potential, to control the western Pacific.

Some analysts see China’s fast-growing navy and air force as direct threats to U.S. interests in the Pacific. “China’s military modernization is focused on anti-access and area capabilities that can only be directed against the United States,” wrote Daniel Goure, from the Washington, D.C.-based Lexington Institute. “These capabilities include anti-ship ballistic missiles, advanced strike aircraft, so-called ‘triple-digit’ surface-to-air missiles, cyber attack, long-range and space-based sensors and space denial … weapons.”

What exactly should the United States do about it?

To date, the Pentagon has attempted to counter each of China’s new capabilities with a capability of its own. China is developing anti-ship ballistic missiles, so the U.S. is building a fleet of warships capable of shooting down the missiles. China has new surface-to-air missiles, so America is working on robotic decoys and a new stealth bomber. And so on.

But one professor at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School advised a more focused approach. “We do not need an anti-access capability against China,” Wayne Hughes wrote in prepared remarks for a February speech. “We need a sea-denial capability of our own that comes with U. S. Navy sea control.”

“We won’t invade China, so ground forces don’t play,” Hughes added. “We won’t conduct a first nuclear strike. We should not adopt an air-sea strike plan against the mainland, because that is a sure way to start World War IV; but insofar as possible and affordable, we must demonstrate survivable air-sea strike capability to respond to the remote but ugly possibility of a Chinese first strike. We need only enough access to threaten a war at sea that destroys Chinese trade and curtails energy imports.”

In other words, to balance China, the U.S. Navy and Air Force need only be capable of thwarting Chinese attempts to utterly dominate the western Pacific, while holding at risk the Chinese commercial trade that lies at the heart of Chinese strategy. That’s not the same as the U.S. itself completely controlling and defending the western Pacific.

A fleet optimized for countering China would, in Hughes’ view, “consist of small maritime interdiction vessels covered by big, blue-water ships sufficient to execute a distant blockade, and many submarines to threaten destruction of all Chinese warships and commercial vessels in the China Seas.”

The submarine component of this fleet is arguably already in place, with Congress purchasing new Virginia-class attack boats at a rate of two annually starting next year. (Hughes did advocate adding small, diesel-powered submarines to the mix.) But assembling a fleet of “small maritime interdiction vessels” would require the Navy to rethink its current approach to surface warfare.

Today, the Navy builds only large surface warships. The smallest surface combatant under construction in the U.S. is the lightly-armed, 3,000-ton Littoral Combat Ship. Cost is proportional to displacement, so with its roughly $15 billion-a-year shipbuilding budget, the Navy can afford to maintain a long-term force of only 120 Littoral Combat Ships, cruisers and destroyers.

Hughes argued that a single anti-ship missile is usually adequate to defeat most warships, regardless of their size. For that reason, he insists, it’s better to buy “offensively potent warships distributed in mutually supporting task groups such that the fleet can afford the loss of some of them and their people while they destroy the enemy and gain access close to land for the projection of national power.

“These smaller, more single-purpose warships are the capital ships of a 21st-century fleet.”

In a 2009 planning exercise with fellow faculty, Hughes described the vessels that would comprise his ideal fleet. By diverting just 10 percent of the shipbuilding budget to new, small warships, Hughes claimed the Navy could afford to expand the fleet from today’s 280 hulls to 650.

The sharp end of the new fleet would be 30 coastal combatants equivalent to the 650-ton Swedish Visby class of missile corvettes complemented by 160 even smaller patrol vessels similar to Australia’s 250-ton Armidales. A large flotilla of minesweepers, sub-hunters and supply ships would support the corvettes, while 10 light aircraft carriers each embarking 20 jump jets would provide air cover.

While the submarines and interdiction vessels complicate Chinese naval movements and threaten sea trade, the U.S. legacy fleet of large surface combatants would presumably remain deeper at sea, shielding the interdictors from flank attacks and standing ready to deliver additional air or missile power — or Marines — once the waters are clear of enemy threats.

“No strategy is fool-proof but the Chinese are no fools, so it’s a good bet that a war-at-sea strategy, not an access strategy, is the best one to influence China, sustain our Asian alliances, and keep the competition peaceful,” Hughes wrote.

[buglerbilly]

China’s Carrier Jet Trainer



In case ya’ll didn’t see this earlier, it’s a snapshot of China’s new carrier jet trainer dubbed the JT-9 that China Defense Blog spotted on the PLA Daily website. Yup, building this trainer is a serious step toward qualifying pilots to fly off China’s soon-to-be complete aircraft carrier Shi Lang. The PLAN intends to use that ship to figure out how to operate an aircraft carrier — one of the world’s most complex and powerful weapon systems — successfully.

ere’s a great broken English translation of what the little jet is designed to do from the Chinese site:

“This type of fighter trainer will be mainly used by the pilots of the ship-based fighters to conduct simulated take-off and landing training on carrier deck.”

These simulated take-offs and landings are probably being done at several mock-ups of the Shi Lang’s flight deck — complete with arrestor cables and a ski jump ramp — reported to exist in China. Once pilots learn the basics of flying off a carrier, they’ll likely move on to the J-15— an upgraded Chinese version of Russia’s Sukhoi Su-33 naval fighter.



Read more: http://defensetech.org/#ixzz1QuxKlzYY
Defense.org

[buglerbilly]

China refitting aircraft carrier body for research, training

English.news.cn 2011-07-27 15:37:33


Spokesman of China's Defense Ministry Geng Yansheng speaks on a press conference in Beijing, capital of China, July 27, 2011. China's Defense Ministry said on Wednesday that the country is making use of an imported aircraft carrier body for refitting to be used for scientific research, experiment and training. (Xinhua/Li Gang)

BEIJING, July 27 (Xinhua) -- China's Defense Ministry said on Wednesday that the country is making use of an imported aircraft carrier body for refitting to be used for scientific research, experiment and training.

Geng Yansheng, spokesman of the ministry, made the remarks at a regular press conference. It was the first time for China to officially confirm it is in pursuit of an aircraft carrier program.

"The warship has no problem with sailing since it has been docked in the sea, and the time for its maiden experimental voyage depends on the schedule of the refit," said Senior Colonel Geng.

"As an important part of the whole research and training program, training for carrier-borne aircraft pilots is also in progress," he said.

The spokesman said that the pursuit of an aircraft carrier program would not change Chinese navy's strategy of inshore defense.

The vessel was an empty aircraft carrier shell bought from Ukraine which disarmed it and removed its engines.

The carrier's original builder, the Soviet Union, named the warship Varyag yet failed to complete its construction before it collapsed in 1989.

[tiddles]

I suppose they have to start somewhere, but IMO this thing is a bit of a non event ,in fact this whole thing has a bit of an Indian feel to it. Anyway to me it shows that even China is capable of Defence procurement stuffups. Interesting looking ship but Russia did not exactly develop a successful class of Aircraft Carriers.
Tiddles

[buglerbilly]

China boosts naval power with carrier program: sources

By Ben Blanchard and Benjamin Lim

BEIJING | Wed Jul 27, 2011 6:11pm EDT

BEIJING (Reuters) - China is building two aircraft carriers as part of a military modernization program that is causing concern among other Asian countries, sources said on Wednesday.

President Hu Jintao has made the navy a keystone of China's defense upgrade, and the carriers will be among the most visible signs of its rising military prowess.

China is ramping up its military spending as the United States considers cutting its defense budget, although Washington still far outspends China on security and is much more technologically advanced.

"Two aircraft carriers are being built at the Jiangnan shipyard in Shanghai," a source with ties to China's Communist Party leadership told Reuters, requesting anonymity because he was not authorized to talk about the program.

China's Defense Ministry has confirmed the existence of one carrier, a former Soviet vessel that was bought from Ukraine in 1998 and was once destined to become a floating casino.

That vessel, the Shi Lang, will be used for training and research purposes, ministry spokesman Geng Yansheng said, seeking to reassure other countries that China would stick to its defensive military policy.

But he said it had a right to protect its extensive maritime territory and coast.

"This is the sacred responsibility of China's armed forces," Geng said in a statement.

"Building a carrier is extremely complex. We are currently refitting an old aircraft carrier, to be used for research and testing."

"An aircraft carrier is a weapons platform; it can be used for offensive or defensive purposes. It can also be used to maintain global peace and for rescue and relief work," he added.

Geng gave no timetable for starting sea trials but said pilots were being trained to operate from the carrier.

Sources with ties to the Communist Party and the military said that the ship would likely be based in the southern island province of Hainan, which sits atop the trade lanes of the sensitive South China Sea.

China has been flexing its muscles more aggressively in those waters, where a territorial dispute with Taiwan and several nearby countries, including Vietnam and the Philippines, has festered for years.

Geng said the timing "had nothing to do" with the tension there though the message will be clear to many in Asia.

"China can now project its power to even further away from its coastline," said Alexander Huang, professor of strategic studies at Taiwan's Tamkang University.

"That will have significant security implications to forces operating in the Western Pacific, including the U.S., Japan and Australia, so this is a watershed development."

The carrier will add to regional concerns about China's military modernization and arms build-up. Defense spending is rising fast and Beijing continues to test new high-tech equipment, including a stealth fighter.

"China's next moves have to be watched carefully, or there eventually could be a negative impact on maritime safety in Asia," said Yoshihiko Yamada, a professor at Japan's Tokai University.

Xinhua news agency said it was the first time the government had confirmed it was pursuing a carrier program.

PENTAGON DOWNPLAYS PROGRAM

The Pentagon declined to say whether it had intelligence confirming the Reuters report but noted that China has publicly acknowledged the existence of one carrier and its intention to build more.

Pentagon spokesman Colonel Dave Lapan, however, downplayed any immediate leaps that could be expected from China's carrier program.

U.S. officials pointed to a U.S. Navy intelligence estimate that China would still have only "very limited" aircraft carrier proficiency and capability by 2020, even if its carrier program proceeded as expected.

The top U.S. Navy intelligence officer earlier this year told reporters he believed China wanted to start fielding multiple aircraft carriers over the next decade, with the goal of becoming a global naval power capable of projecting power around the world by mid-century.

The official said it would take years for China's navy to learn how to integrate flight deck operations and attain the sophistication needed to use them effectively.

Security analyst Dean Cheng of the Heritage Foundation in Washington said the new carriers squared with a 2011 Pentagon report but also raised many questions.

"Will they be smallish ones like the Shi Lang, with some 30 aircraft? Or USS Midway-sized aircraft carriers, with an airgroup of around 60 aircraft? Or a Forrestal/Kitty Hawk-class with an airgroup of 80-90 aircraft?," he said, referring to China's training vessel and major American carriers.

The old Soviet carrier's refitting has been one of China's worst-kept military secrets. Pictures of it sitting in Dalian harbor have circulated on Chinese websites for months, and it has been widely discussed in state media.

China would be the third Asian country to have a carrier after India and Thailand, but it will take time before it can go to sea in Asian waters that have largely been the domain of the U.S. Navy since World War Two.

"It will be a long while before China develops a fully-fledged carrier capability, it will take a long time to train the necessary crews ... it may be up to decade until China has carrier capability," said Tim Huxley, director for defense and military analysis at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in Singapore.

Beijing's rationale for having an aircraft carrier is more than just about modernizing a navy whose most notable engagements of the past few years have been territorial skirmishes in the South China Sea with other smaller nations.

Sending naval vessels further afield, to the waters off Somalia to fight pirates, and through the southern Japanese islands, has also partly been about ensuring trade routes are protected.

China frets about the powerful U.S. military presence close to its shores, in particular U.S. bases in Japan and South Korea, and Washington's close but unofficial ties with Taiwan, the self-ruled island Beijing claims as its own.

"Aircraft carriers are essential for China primarily to defend its territory and territorial waters and bring a semblance of parity among the world's big powers," Wang Baokun, a defense studies professor at Beijing's Renmin University, wrote in the China Daily earlier this month.

(Additional reporting by Daniel Magnowski in Singapore, Kiyoshi Takenaka in Tokyo, Christine Lu in Taipei and Phil Stewart and Paul Eckert in Washington; Editing by Angus MacSwan and Paul Simao)

[buglerbilly]

Chinese General: Country Needs 3 Carriers

AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE

Published: 30 Jul 2011 09:10

BEIJING - China needs at least three aircraft carriers to defend its interests, a general said, days after the state media broadcast footage of its first carrier in a rare public mention of the project.

"If we consider our neighbors - India will have three aircraft carriers by 2014 and Japan will have three carriers by 2014," Gen. Luo Yuan, a senior researcher with the Academy of Military Sciences, was quoted as saying by Beijing News.

"So I think the number [for China] should not be less than three so we can defend our rights and our maritime interests effectively."

His comments, published July 29, came after China sought to downplay the capability of its first aircraft carrier, saying July 27 the vessel would be used for training and "research."

Beijing believes that the three Japanese carriers it referred to, built for helicopter operations, could eventually be converted into full aircraft carriers.

China recently confirmed it was revamping an old Soviet ship to be its first carrier, a project that has added to regional worries over the country's fast military expansion and growing assertiveness on territorial issues.

"We are currently refitting the body of an old aircraft carrier, and will use it for scientific research, experiments and training," defense ministry spokesman Geng Yansheng told a news briefing.

Asked whether the carrier's addition to China's military arsenal would significantly raise the country's military capability, Geng said only that to "overrate or underrate the carrier's role are both incorrect."

The United States has welcomed China's mention of the carrier, calling it a step toward better transparency between the Pacific powers.

China's People's Liberation Army - the largest armed force in the world - is extremely secretive about its defense programs, which benefit from a huge and expanding military budget boosted by the nation's runaway economic growth. The PLA also operates the country's navy.

[buglerbilly]

Latest picture from Dalian

August 4th, 2011

Getting closer to commissioning but still a way to go.............a lot has been said about the engines/power plant being fired up (smoke out of the funnel) but that could still mean months before anything else happens.............

[buglerbilly]

China Builds Fleet of Small Warships While U.S. Drifts

By David Axe August 4, 2011 | 1:00 pm



Ten years ago, the U.S. Navy set about building a new class of small, cheap, numerous Littoral Combat Ships meant to dominate dangerous coastal waters. But after a decade of politics and design-by-committee, the LCS has turned out to be anything but small, cheap and numerous. LCS is the “wrong ship at the wrong time,” retired Navy Cmdr. John Patch wrote.

On the other side of the Pacific, the Navy’s biggest maritime rival, faced with the same requirement for small, cheap, numerous ships, quickly produced exactly that. The result is the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s triple-hull Type 022 missile boat, a “thoroughbred ship-killer,” according to Patch.

To some observers, the PLAN missile boat — or, more to the point, packs of these boats — poses yet another major Chinese threat to U.S. power in the Pacific. Eighty-three Type 022s firing more than 640 anti-ship missiles in quick salvos represent a “serious cause for concern,” according to retired Navy Cmdr. George Root.

To others, the diminutive Type 022s look like mere juicy targets for American helicopters and submarines. They cite the extremely poor combat record of small-missiles boats doing battle with larger vessels and aircraft.

One thing is indisputable. The Type 022 is “a potential success story on how to field small combatants,” Patch wrote. Its merits in combat remain to be seen, but at least the ship exists to perform a combat role. The same cannot be said of the huge fleet of LCSs the U.S. Navy thought it would have by now.



Seven-Year Sprint

In just seven years, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy has built 83 of the 400-ton Type 022s at an estimated cost of $40 million per ship. And production continues at a high rate in several shipyards. The U.S. Navy, by comparison, has finished just two LCS in the same span of time, each at a cost of more than $600 million.

The Chinese ships sport eight anti-ship missiles apiece plus defensive guns and surface-to-air missiles. The American vessels, lightly armed in their own right, are designed to accommodate “plug-and-play” weapons kits, none of which are complete.

To some critics, even 83 Type 022s are so much fodder for submarines and air power. Small missile-armed boats have fared very poorly in major naval battles — so poorly that the late naval historian Antony Preston said they were “among the world’s worst warship designs since 1860,” according to Navy Undersecretary Bob Work.

Work, back when he was a mere analyst at the Washington, D.C., Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, summarized the experiences of Iranian and Iraqi “Fast Attack Craft” in combat with U.S. and allied forces in 1988 and 1991. “U.S./coalition forces: 40 FACs destroyed, 2 disabled; enemy: 0 U.S. or friendly forces hit, much less sunk.”

“This data suggests the weakness in focusing in on a simple fleet-on-fleet salvo model in modern naval combat,” Work wrote, “primarily because the preferred method of engaging enemy surface targets is now through asymmetric attacks (e.g., aircraft and submarine attacks against surface vessels).”

In other words, it doesn’t matter how many missile boats you build, if your opponent can bring submarines and missile-armed aircraft to bear against them.



Double-Edged Sword

For China, that reality cuts both ways. Considering China’s limited anti-submarine skills and equipment, “U.S. submarines can currently operate freely in Chinese coastal waters,” according to MIT analyst Owen Cote, Jr. But with more and more advanced jet fighters and surface-to-air missiles entering Chinese service, the United States cannot take for granted that its own aircraft can operate safely near the Chinese coast.

Nor could the LCS take on the Type 022 in direct combat and count on winning. The LCS lacks major air defenses and cannot, on its own, defend against large numbers of incoming missiles. Similarly, the U.S. vessel does not carry long-range anti-ship missiles for use against craft like the Type 022.

But a head-to-head comparison of LCSs and Type 022 as warships is not really useful, as neither is specifically intended to fight the other. In wartime, the Type 022s would likely prowl China’s coastal zone as far afield as the Philippine Sea, unleashing missile barrages against American aircraft carriers and their escorting destroyers.

LCS, meanwhile, would be trawling for enemy mines and submarines under the defensive umbrella of nearby destroyers and carriers — maybe. Truth is, no one has quite figured out what LCS is really for.

In any event, what really matters is that Beijing set out to build a large number of small warships, quickly and at low cost — and succeeded. Washington tried the same thing, and failed, big-time.

The dictatorial Chinese government and its command economy are ideally suited to building simple weapons in bulk, albeit at the risk of poor quality control. But that’s not the only explanation for China’s small-ship-building success.

The biggest reason is that China started with a requirement for a small ship, and stuck to it. The U.S. Navy allowed its undisciplined design committees to gradually corrupt and complicate the original concept for the LCS, undermining any hope of building ships cheap or fast.

That would probably come as no surprise to Dan Ward, an Air Force officer and advocate of building smaller weapons, faster.

“I think the real culprit is our fascination with complexity, viewing it as a sign of sophistication,” said Ward. China apparently does not share the same fascination.

That’s the real reason Beijing has the coastal warship fleet America only wishes it had.

Photos: PLAN, U.S. Navy

[Unicorn]

One is basically a small missile boat with as very limited range and subject to severe sea condition limitations, the other is capable of operating just about anywhere autonomously and in most sea states.

I am on the record as being no fan of the LCS, but this comparison is insipid.

.

[buglerbilly]

Quite, the potential of LCS is huge and could be rapidly realised as long as they "park" the idea of Mission Modules as a nice-to-have rather than a cause d'etre need-to-have.............they have one major priority with LCS and that is sort out the VLS missiles system for land/coastal waters attack............dump RAM its insignificant for most purposes and provdes a peripheral AAW system at best..............a 25mm CIWS "may" be better but a 40mm Bofors Mark 3 or 4 would be a better choice in my opinion.

The Chinese vessel is a dash-and-shoot, calm water vessel..........the 30mm rotary cannon looks good in the second pic BUT its range is useless in extreme as its anti-missile capability without a major fire control/AAW radar/system backing it up which the warship doesn't have at the moment.

I'd beat the crap out of the Chinese vessels by swarming them with Wolf Packs of armed UAV's from the LCS.

[McFriday]

One is basically a small missile boat with as very limited range and subject to severe sea condition limitations, the other is capable of operating just about anywhere autonomously and in most sea states.

I am on the record as being no fan of the LCS, but this comparison is insipid.

.

Perhaps the type 022 are more analogous to the WW2 PT boats than the LCS?

Mac

[Unicorn]

Agreed, but the comparison in the article was with the LCS.

Even then it doesnt stack up as the modern radar capabilities make small FACs far more detectable and killable than the German S Boats or Allied MTBs/MGBs or PT boats were.

.

[McFriday]

Agreed, but the comparison in the article was with the LCS.

Even then it doesnt stack up as the modern radar capabilities make small FACs far more detectable and killable than the German S Boats or Allied MTBs/MGBs or PT boats were.

.

Unicorn,
I am agreeing with you and realised the comparison in the article was a very poor one, I simply offered what I think is a better analogy for the 022 class of boat and its potential use.

I am in no doubt that you are fully aware the PT/MTB/MGB boats were used in a multitude of tasks in the littorals other than directly, singly engaging larger surface combatants. It was this wider use comparison I had in mind when recalling the PTs value and employment. Not a direct comparison but conceptual.

A quick comparison of similarity of concept that influenced me:

PTs et al: For surface combat they were cheap, fast, heavily armed, surprise attack, ambush pack predators. Small crew, light AA. Simple radar. Hit and run. They were also expendable in the grand scheme.

Type 022: Clearly these types of boats are not open water combatants, too vulnerable, so they must hide in close, in ambush as above. Ambush predators are very vulnerable once their cover's blown and as you say the advances in radar etc. make hiding very difficult but maybe not yet impossible?

Perhaps loosing a salvo of the 022s missiles may result in its own sinking but then one has to kill all the missiles as well, if the chips are down they're expendable mobile launchers just as many claimed the PTs were.

Having said all that, China says they're for 'patrolling' the South China Sea but anywhere the water is shallow and the shoreline offers concealment boats of this type would still be a nuisance, especially with a small eye in the sky helping.

To say they're more detectable than WW2 is unarguable, low profile was then their best defence against the primitive radars that couldn't handle backscatter, even the Allies couldn't detect BBs on occasion. Radar, ECM and knowledge has improved on both sides now hasn't it? Would that make the 022s comparatively more or less survivable than WW2 boats were in every situation? I don't know and wasn't positing that comparison.

Smaller targets are now, as you say more, "killable" [provided you have the weapons to hand] but as my analogy was not to survivability but general purpose I thought it workable.

Cheers,
Mac

[Zen9]

Quite, the potential of LCS is huge and could be rapidly realised as long as they "park" the idea of Mission Modules as a nice-to-have rather than a cause d'etre need-to-have.............they have one major priority with LCS and that is sort out the VLS missiles system for land/coastal waters attack............dump RAM its insignificant for most purposes and provdes a peripheral AAW system at best..............a 25mm CIWS "may" be better but a 40mm Bofors Mark 3 or 4 would be a better choice in my opinion.

Now thats an interesting perspective Bug. So if your'll forgive me I'd like to hear a little explanation on this, as it intrigues me.

What I hear from the yanks is the mission modules maketh the ship. So I'd love to hear why you think thats not worth it.

Then theres the oh so mighty SeaRAM, whats wrong with this, when I hear its so much more reliable and cheaper than anything we (in the UK) can produce or indeed the likes of VLS-MICA or Umkoto?
Is it down to being a missile based system?

40mm Bofores, why'd you choose that?

[buglerbilly]

The Mission Modules don't make the ship for the simple fact the Mission modules don't exist in working form.

WHY they don't exist is a whole separate question and I have a less-than-complimentary view of why that is. Think "milking the cash cow" and you get somewhere near my view.

For a start, neither mine warfare nor subsea warfare modularised packages existed. None, nada and nowhere.

The least-techincally challenging should have been the mine warfare set-up yet even here almost nothing of worth actually commissioned. This may well be, in my opinion, because the USN has zip worthwhile knowledge or experience with mine warfare outside of helo-borne MCM; they should have contracted in UK or German expertise & equipment in this area as the latter are leaps and bounds ahead of the USN.

The subsea warfare package based, it appears, on UUV's is high risk as a full-developmental item NOT a commissioned existing item even in partial pieces. The helo borne ASW aspect is well known and will exist whether UAV's are used as well or not so no problems there. Putting tube-launched torpedoes on board ala International LCS would be a start for the warship itself.

Since the cancellation of NETFIRES, the LCS are bereft of any sensible land attack/small vessel attack capability BUT there are systems available in Israel at least that could reasonably substitute and/or provide an Interim solution. Range is the key with some of these alternatives as in lack thereof, possibly? IF you can achieve a 2 x 5 x 5 cell arrangement then you hae a pretty much ideal laod in my opinion. More will always be better............NETFIRES had a 3 x 15 cell arrangement. GRIFFIN has been mentioned in some quarters but I view this as a joke as it currently stands, too small, too short a range and another developmental missile system NOT a MOTS.............

Quad-stack ESSM could achieve a 2 x 4-cell arrangement then you ened up with 32 x ESSM. Do I want ESSM or Sea Ram? Guess (in one go) what the answer is going to be?

If you look at this image from above Austal's LCS, you can see the three areas potentially nominated for VLS, one behind the main gun and two either side of the funnel/exhausts......................



How you mix-up ESSM with the Attack missile depends on system depth and space in all three locations but one presumes that ESSM would go behind the main gun and the rest besides the stacks.

Existing space behind the main gun...................looks like you'd get more than 2 x 4-cell in there?


As I have already said Sea Ram gets kicked into tounch if you ESSM and the new BAE Bofors 40mm Mk 4 in particular looks like a great replacement and with current smart ammo gives you AAM capability as well as ASuW capability. IF the hangar can take the weight etc, I'd put two 40mm Mk 4's on there one in each rear corner. How many Mk4's can you buy for each Sea Ram? My guess would be 2-3 at least, and numbers count.

I'd also be adding in .50cal RWS not manual versions, crew numbers are small enough and an RWS doesn't necessarily need an adjacent crew member for anything other than ammo replenishment. IF you can also fit 2 x 25-mm Mk 38 Mod 2 Naval Gun Systems then so much the better.

My 2 cents worth................

[buglerbilly]

China's 1st Aircraft Carrier in Sea Trial: Report

AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE

Published: 9 Aug 2011 19:36

BEIJING - China's first aircraft carrier left its shipyard in the northeast to start its first sea trial on Aug. 9, the state news agency Xinhua said.

The revamped old Soviet ship's sea trial was in line with the schedule of the carrier's refitting project and would not take long, the news agency said, quoting military sources.

After returning from the trial, the carrier will continue its refit and test work, the report said.

Beijing last month sought to downplay the capability of its first aircraft carrier, saying the vessel would be used for training and "research", amid concerns over the country's military build-up.

The project has added to regional worries over the country's fast military expansion and growing assertiveness on territorial issues.

It also comes amid heightened tensions over a number of maritime territorial disputes involving China, notably in the South China Sea, which is believed to be rich in oil and gas and is claimed by several countries.

The issue has heated up recently with run-ins between China and fellow claimants Vietnam and the Philippines, sparking concern among its neighboring countries and the United States.

[buglerbilly]

China's Refitted Aircraft Carrier Platform Sets Sail for First Sea Trials

(Source: Xinhuanet; issued Aug. 10, 2011)

DALIAN, China --- China's refitted aircraft carrier platform left its shipyard at Dalian Port in northeast China's Liaoning Province on Wednesday morning to set sail for its first sea trial.

Military sources said that the trial is in line with the carrier's refitting schedule and will not take a long time. Refitting work will continue after the vessel has returned to the port.

The carrier was originally built by the former Soviet Union, which failed to complete the ship's construction before collapsing in 1991. The still-unnamed aircraft carrier was an empty shell when it was sold to Ukraine. Ukraine later disarmed it and removed its engines before selling it to China.

It is still unknown where or for how long the carrier's first sea trial will last.

The Liaoning Provincial Maritime Safety Administration publicized a notice restricting navigation in waters off the Dalian coast, saying that vessels are forbidden from traveling through an area of sea 13.25 nautical miles wide and 22 nautical miles long in the northern Yellow Sea and Liaodong Bay from Aug. 10 to 14.

Military enthusiasts and tourists flocked to Dalian in hope to view the refitted carrier days before it set sail. However, a dense fog prevented many people from seeing the vessel.

"It isn't a big deal for China to have an aircraft carrier. It is in the state's interest," said Tan Changbin, a tourist from southwest China's Sichuan Province, adding he was personally interested in seeing the ship.

Military enthusiast Lu Gang believes the carrier carries more symbolic significance than anything else.

"It is very complicated to refit an aircraft carrier. It is a challenge to upgrade the country's industrial manufacturing ability," he said.

Xu Jian, a retired navy officer, said China's international status implies that the country deserves to have its own aircraft carrier.

"Even countries like India and Thailand have carriers, let alone America and Russia. Why can't China?" he asked.

Zhou Xiangling, a researcher with the Dalian Institute of Modern History, said the carrier's trip signifies a new era for China's navy, an era that will put an emphasis on scientific research and training.

"It implies that China is able to make new contributions to maintaining global marine safety and peace," he said.

The Chinese navy is made up of three separate fleets: the Beihai Fleet, the Donghai Fleet and the Nanhai Fleet. Each fleet has its own support bases, flotillas, maritime garrison commands, aviation divisions and marine brigades.

Senior Colonel Geng Yansheng, a spokesman from the Defense Ministry, said earlier this year that China will never change the defensive nature of its national defense policy.

While conducting escort operations in the Gulf of Aden and waters near Somalia, the Chinese navy protected Chinese and foreign vessels alike, Geng said. (ends)

Chinese Aircraft Carrier Begins First Sea Trial

(Source: Voice of America; issued August 10, 2011)

China's first aircraft carrier steamed out of Dalian harbor for a sea trial Wednesday, providing a burst of national pride for China's people but a source of concern for many of its neighbors.

The short voyage by the refitted Ukrainian carrier ends weeks of speculation about the date of the vessel's initial sea trial. A defense Ministry statement said the carrier, formerly known as the Varyag, would soon return to harbor for continued refit and test work.

Chinese officials have downplayed the significance of the carrier, saying it will be used for scientific research, experiments and training. But the ship has become a symbol of China's rising military power at a time of tension with several of its neighbors over competing maritime claims in the East and South China seas.

For Chinese, the long anticipated launch has sparked a wave of interest in aircraft carriers. The official Xinhua news agency on Wednesday carried photos of other nations' carriers in a front-page space normally reserved for publicity shots of Hollywood starlets.

A day earlier it featured photos of another Soviet-era carrier which is being converted to a hotel in the port city of Tianjin, near Beijing.

The sea trial had been widely expected to take place on July 1 to coincide with the 90th anniversary of the founding of China's Communist Party. But Wednesday's brief defense ministry statement said the timing is in line with the schedule of the refit and will “not take a long time.”

The stripped-down hull of the Varyag was purchased from Ukraine and towed to a shipyard in Dalian in 1998. China is expected to use knowledge gained from the process to build at least three more carriers.

Ministry spokesmen say that despite its carrier program, China remains committed to a naval strategy of defending its own shores. But some of China's neighbors worry the new vessel could be deployed as part of a battle group to project Chinese power in disputed areas including the South China Sea.

The ministry has also said the process of training pilots how to fly planes off an aircraft carrier is “in progress.”

-ends-

[buglerbilly]

Chinese Begin Carrier Sea Trials, Long Way to Go

Aug 10, 2011

By Bradley Perrett perrett@aviationweek.com, Chris Buckley/Reuters
BEIJING,

China has joined the aircraft carrier club, with the ex-Soviet ship Varyag beginning its sea trials Aug. 10.

The long-awaited debut of the vessel marks a step forward in China’s long-term plan to build a carrier force that can project power in the Asian region, where seas are spanned by busy shipping lanes and thorny territorial disputes.

The ship, completed at the northern port of Dalian after its hull was bought from Ukraine, will be used mainly for training pilots and deck crews, the Chinese military says.

Before it can undertake even that auxiliary role, the Varyag needs to be run through its paces to confirm its performance as a ship, especially in regard to the operation of its machinery. The first trial voyage is unlikely to be adventurous; the Associated Press reports that the maritime authority covering the Dalian district has cordoned off a small section of sea near the port until Aug. 14.

The flight deck is configured with a ski jump for short takeoffs and an angled runway for arrested recoveries.

The Chinese navy is still small in proportion to its responsibilities, the government said in a statement issued through the official Xinhua information service. “But it will be a lengthy process from the sea test to the shaping of combat prowess,” the statement said, adding that the world must accept the reality that the country is developing carrier aviation.

“Among the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, China is the last one possessing an aircraft carrier platform. The possession of the vessel is vital to China, as the country has vast territorial waters, which induces grave responsibility of protection,” the government said. “China has more than 18,000 kilometers of coast line and 3 million square kilometers of territorial waters.”

In keeping with a common line in state propaganda and the widespread sensitivities of Chinese people, the government also invoked history in justifying the development of a carrier force: “From the Opium War in 1840 to the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, China suffered more than 470 offenses and invasions that came from the seas.”

Although often reported to have been refitted or refurbished in China, Varyag was incomplete when it was acquired in 1998, supposedly as a tourist attraction. “Varyag” is its Russian name. The ship will be renamed on commissioning, state television says.

“Its symbolic significance outweighs its practical significance,” Ni Lexiong, an expert on Chinese maritime policy at the Shanghai University of Political Science and Law, told Reuters.

“We’re already a maritime power, and so we need an appropriate force, whether that’s aircraft carriers or battleships, just like the United States or the British empire did,” he said.

“An aircraft carrier is the mark of major powers,” Pan Chunli, a 29-year-old information technology technician in Beijing told Reuters. “China has grown dramatically. The whole world should take a fresh look at China, viewing it as a rising power that has the ability to defend its rights and territory.”

Chinese navy Rear Adm. (ret.) Yin Zhuo told state-run television that his country intended to build an air carrier group, but the task would be long and difficult.

“As for forming a carrier group, I think that will take at least 10 years,” he told a Chinese television broadcast on the carrier launch.

If Beijing is serious about having a viable carrier strike group, however, it will need three carriers, according to Ashley Townshend at the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Sydney, who spoke to Reuters in an interview before the debut of the vessel.

China also would have to develop support ships and aircraft for any carrier group, Townshend said.

In China’s neighborhood, India and Thailand already have aircraft carriers and Australia has ordered two multipurpose carriers. The U.S. operates 11 carriers.

Before the launch, a Pentagon spokesman played down the likelihood of any immediate leaps from China’s carrier program. U.S. experts on the Chinese navy agreed.

“A newlywed couple wants a ‘starter home;’ a new great power wants a ‘starter carrier,’” Andrew Erickson of the U.S. Naval War College and Gabriel Collins, a security analyst, wrote in a note about the carrier launch. “China’s ‘starter carrier’ is of very limited military utility and will primarily serve to confer prestige on a rising great power, to help the military master basic procedures and to project a bit of power.”

© 2011 Thomson Reuters.

[buglerbilly]

U.S. Asks China to Explain Need for Carrier

AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE

Published: 10 Aug 2011 15:44

China's response? "Fuck off round eyes, you go stick head up ass!" :pbbbt :doh :rofl :rofl

WASHINGTON - The United States said Aug. 10 it would like China to explain why it needs an aircraft carrier amid broader U.S. concerns about Beijing's lack of transparency over its military aims.

"We would welcome any kind of explanation that China would like to give for needing this kind of equipment," State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland told reporters when asked whether the carrier would raise regional tensions.

"This is part of our larger concern that China is not as transparent as other countries. It's not as transparent as the United States about its military acquisitions, about its military budget," she said.

"And we'd like to have the kind of open, transparent relationship in military-to-military affairs," Nuland said.

"In our military-to-military relations with many countries around the world, we have the kind of bilateral dialogue where we can get quite specific about the equipment that we have and its intended purposes and its intended movements," she said.

But China and the United States are "not at that level of transparency" to which the two nations aspire, Nuland added.

The comments came hours after China's first aircraft carrier embarked on its inaugural sea trial, a move likely to stoke concerns about the nation's military expansion and growing territorial assertiveness.

Beijing only recently confirmed it was revamping an old Soviet ship to be its first carrier and has sought to play down the vessel's capability, saying it will mainly be used for training and "research."

[buglerbilly]

China's Refitted Aircraft Carrier Sets Sail for First Sea Trial

(Source: Chinese Central Government; issued August 10, 2011)

China's first aircraft carrier set out on a low-profile sea trial Wednesday, its first journey under the Chinese flag. The vessel was swaddled in mist as it departed the port of Dalian, which had narrowly escaped tropical storm Muifa Monday.

Military sources said that the trial is in line with the carrier's refitting schedule and will not take a long time. Refitting work will continue after the vessel has returned to the port.

The People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy behemoth is a former Soviet Navy aircraft carrier, which has been totally refitted for its new role as a platform for research and training.

"Anyhow, it's an object of pride," said a shipbuilding worker who identified his surname as Zhang, who worked on the ship's hull, stayed up all night to watch the carrier begin its first sea trial.

The carrier departed from the Dalian shipyard where workers have been refurbishing the ship. Dalian is some 80 nautical miles north of the sea battlefield where 117 years ago the first modern Chinese navy fleet was ferociously bombarded and later vanquished by the Japanese navy.

It is still unknown where or for how long the carrier's first sea trial will last.

The Liaoning Provincial Maritime Safety Administration publicized a notice restricting navigation in waters off the Dalian coast, saying that vessels are forbidden from traveling through an area of sea 13.25 nautical miles wide and 22 nautical miles long in the northern Yellow Sea and Liaodong Bay from Aug. 10 to 14.

The ship, formerly named Varyag, is an Admiral Kuznetsov Class aircraft carrier that is 304.5 meters long and 37 meters wide, with a displacement of 58,500 metric tons. Construction on the vessel was started by the Soviet Union in 1985. It was completed in 1992 except for its electronic components.

After the Soviet Union broke up in 1991, Ukraine took over the ship. In 1998, the vessel was bought by a Macao casino company in open bidding. Since March 2002, it has quietly berthed in the port of Dalian with its hull and deck painted PLA Navy grey. After arriving in Dalian, images of the ship were spread across the Internet.

The Chinese Defense Ministry responded slowly to speculation about China having an aircraft carrier despite widespread dissemination of snapshots of the ship. On July 27, the Ministry confirmed China's aircraft carrier program, while emphasizing the carrier was only intended for "scientific research, experiment and training."

Currently, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, Spain, Italy, India, Brazil and Thailand, operate a total of 21 active-service aircraft carriers.

Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force currently has two 18,000-metric ton Hyuga-class helicopter carriers, although the warships are classified by Japan as "helicopter destroyers."

Compared with countries who had decades of experience of operating aircraft carriers, China is really a green hand, said Cao Weidong, a researcher with the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy's Academic Research Institute.

Naval strategist Yin Zhuo said in an interview with Xinhua, "It usually takes at least ten years to build up a strike group centered on an aircraft carrier, which is just an initial step for shaping marine defense capacity."

Senior Colonel Chen Zhou, a war theorist working for a key PLA think tank, said he didn't believe development of aircraft carrier battle groups means China is making a shift in its naval strategy from offshore defense to anywhere else.

"Even well before the unveiling of the first aircraft carrier," Chen said, "China did not hide its intention to improve its navy, which is still quite weak in defense capability."

MORE SYMBOLIC SIGNIFICANCE

Amid rumors the ship was preparing to go to sea, swarms of spectators -- not all military fans -- flew to Dalian this week to get a view of the conventionally fueled ship, as well as participate in a summer beer fest in the city. Global journalists, including at least one crew from Japan, also gathered nearby to do interviews or shoot footage of China's first aircraft carrier.

Now that China is the world's second largest economy and is playing a more active role in multinational diplomacy, the pick of a disarmed Russian vessel as China's first aircraft carrier seems somewhat low-key.

"It isn't a big deal for China to have an aircraft carrier. It is in the state's interest," said Tan Changbin, a tourist from southwest China's Sichuan Province.

Military enthusiast Lu Gang who came to Dalian to see the carrier said he believed the carrier carries more symbolic significance than anything else.

"It is very complicated to refit an aircraft carrier. It is a challenge to upgrade the country's industrial manufacturing ability," he said.

China became the world's No.1 shipbuilding country in terms of vessel's tonnage in 2010, surpassing Japan and the Republic of Korea.

Xu Jian, a retired navy officer, said China's international status implies that the country deserves to have its own aircraft carrier.

"Even countries like India and Thailand have carriers, let alone America and Russia. Why can't China?" he asked.

Zhou Xiangling, a researcher with the Dalian Institute of Modern History, said the carrier's sea trial signifies a new era for China's navy.

"It implies that China is able to make new contributions to maintaining global maritime safety and peace," he said.

To fuel its fast growing economy, China is increasingly reliant on natural resources imported through maritime transport routes from overseas.

While conducting escort operations in the Gulf of Aden and waters near Somalia since the end of 2008, warships of the PLA Navy have protected thousands of Chinese and foreign civilian vessels alike.

The Chinese navy is made up of three separate fleets: the Beihai Fleet, the Donghai Fleet and the Nanhai Fleet. Each fleet has its own support bases, flotillas, maritime garrison commands, aviation divisions and marine brigades.

NO EXCESSIVE WORRIES"

The Pentagon welcomed the PLA's public mention of its first aircraft carrier, calling it a step toward better transparency between the Pacific powers.

In July, the PLA invited U.S. Navy Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, to visit a submarine base and a battle unit of the Second Artillery Force, which is charged with handling China's nuclear stockpile.

Kent Calder, a veteran China hand at the Johns Hopkins University, said in an email interview with Xinhua, "I have thought for many years that China would develop aircraft carriers due to the rising importance of energy sea-lanes to the Middle East."

"That does not in itself, however, represent a surprising or major change in the strategic equation (in Asia Pacific), particular with the United States," Calder said.

Sun Zhe, a Beijing-based Tsinghua University international relations professor, said the aircraft carrier would be no more than "the first step for future development."

The Voice of Russia once speculated that two home-grown Chinese aircraft carriers might be built at a Shanghai shipyard. A recent Kanwa Defense Review article said Shanghai-based Bao Steel is able to manufacture the corrosion-resistant steel needed for an aircraft carrier.

At a joint press briefing with Admiral Mullen on July 11, General Chen Bingde, chief of the PLA General Staff, said China has not yet decided how many aircraft carriers the country is going to build.

Still, some neighboring countries have expressed concern over the ever-increasing strength of the Chinese armed forces. Japan's most recent defense white paper noted the growing "assertiveness" of China's military buildup.

"A major Chinese decision to move forward with a blue-water navy including aircraft carriers would encourage a deepening of Japanese concerns, since the sea-lanes through the South China Sea are vital to Japan's energy security," Calder said.

Arguing that such concerns are unnecessary, Senior Colonel Chen said, "The PLA defense philosophy rules out possibilities of preemptive strikes."

"We will not attack unless we are attacked; we will counterattack if we are attacked," he said.

Senior Colonel Geng Yansheng, the ministry's spokesman, said that China's carrier program will not change the defensive nature of its national defense policy.

With vast territory and a long-time farming culture, China has long had a land-locked mindset. Even with over 18,000 kilometers of coastline, imperial dynasties long banned maritime commerce for fear it would threaten China's largely self-sufficient economy and rigid social fabric.

The devastating defeat in 1895 of the Qing Dynasty's well-funded Beiyang Navy to Japanese naval fleets awakened Chinese politicians. Even the most sophisticated ironclad vessels bought from Germany and Britain did not stop the Japanese attacks, which ultimately resulted in a humiliating bilateral treaty.

From the Opium War in 1840 to the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, China suffered more than 470 offenses and invasions that came from the seas.

Two other decommissioned aircraft carriers have also been bought for use in China. However, the Soviet-made Minsk and Kiev, were remolded into big recreational facilities and tourist attractions, with Western-style restaurants, Russian dance shows, night clubs and guest rooms.

"The objective of the current Kiev carrier theme park is to enhance visitors' awareness of national defense and world peace," said Liu Weidong, deputy general manager of the Tianjin Binhai Aircraft Carrier Theme Park.

According to Liu, tens of thousands of tourists from China and abroad visited the theme park each year, which is stationed at a dock about 80 kilometers east to downtown Tianjin.

Liu Bing, a 32-year-old visitor to the Kiev theme park with six family members, told Xinhua that he believed the rifetted carrier in Dalian is just a starting step for China.

"The carrier will show China is a peace-loving country, which is the last among the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council to possess an aircraft carrier," he said. Enditem

-ends-

[buglerbilly]

Is China’s Aircraft Carrier a Threat to U.S. Interests?


Chinese Shi Lang aircraft carrier under construction.

CSIS provides answers to key questions on China's new aircraft carrier

08:02 GMT, August 12, 2011 On August 10, 2011, China’s first aircraft carrier set sail from Dalian Port on its maiden voyage. Announcing the sailing, China’s Defense Ministry stated that the inaugural sea trial would be brief; some Hong Kong media have estimated the trial would last 15 days. The Liaoning Provincial Maritime Safety Administration issued a notice restricting vessels from traveling through an area between the northern Yellow Sea and Liaodong Bay from August 10 to 14. The unusually public announcement of the carrier’s sea trial stands in contrast to the secretive test flight of China’s first stealth fighter jet last January and its test of an antisatellite weapon in January 2007, and was welcomed by the Pentagon as a sign of greater transparency by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

The carrier, formerly called the Varyag, is a Soviet-era platform that China purchased from Ukraine without the engines, rudder, and much of the operating systems. The vessel was transported to Dalian in 2002 and began refitting. Despite widespread speculation and intelligence about the budding Chinese aircraft carrier program, China kept mum about developments until June 2011, when the chief of the General Staff of the PLA, Chen Bingde, confirmed China’s first carrier was under construction in an interview with the Hong Kong Commercial Daily. Chinese media have proposed that the ship be dubbed the Shi Lang, after a Qing dynasty admiral who conquered the Kingdom of Tungning (i.e., Taiwan) in 1681. There have as yet been no official statements from either the government or the military regarding the carrier’s name.


Q1: Why is China deploying an aircraft carrier?

A1: The acquisition of an aircraft carrier is driven in part by China’s desire for international prestige. The United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, Spain, Italy, India, Brazil, and Thailand operate a total of 21 active-service aircraft carriers (the United States alone operates 11). An aircraft carrier is widely viewed by Chinese as a symbol of national power and prestige. PLA officers often remind foreigners that China is the only permanent member of the UN Security Council without a carrier.

At the same time, however, the procurement of the carrier is a consequence of an improved continental threat environment that has imposed constraints on China’s ability to develop sea power. It also represents expanded Chinese national interests created by deeper integration into the global economy. In the past decade, China’s trade dependence doubled from 40 percent in 2000 to 73 percent during the 2006–2008 period, with more than 80 percent of that trade carried by ship. Moreover, acquisition of a carrier will better enable the PLA to implement Hu Jintao’s 2004 “New Historic Missions” and respond to demands to undertake a range of nontraditional security operations.


Q2: What are the aircraft carrier’s capabilities?

A2: The ex-Varyag is an Admiral Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier, measuring roughly 304.5 meters long and 37 meters wide. The vessel has a displacement of 58,500 metric tons and can travel at speeds of 32 knots (37 miles per hour). Engines, generators and defense systems, including the Type 1030 CIWS (close-in weapon system) and the FL-3000N missile system, were added to the vessel in Dalian. As designed, it could be armed with 8 AK-630 AA (antiaircraft) guns, 8 CADS-N-1 Kashtan CIWS, 12 P-700 Granit SSM (surface-to-surface missiles), 18 8-cell 3K95 Kinzhal SAM VLS (surface-to-air missiles, vertical-launch system), and the RBU-12000 UDAV-1 ASW (antisubmarine warfare) rocket launcher. Also as designed, the carrier could carry 26 fixed-wing aircraft (likely the Shenyang J-15) and 24 helicopters.

The carrier is fitted with a “ski jump” ramp rather than the catapult used by U.S. carriers. The carrier’s smaller size and ramp greatly reduces the number of aircraft it can carry and how many it can operate at any one time. Additionally, in order to take off, the fighters will carry lighter payloads and less fuel, greatly limiting their firepower and range of operations. Chinese Defense Ministry spokesman Geng Yansheng stated that the ex-Varyag will be used for “scientific research, experiment and training.” Indeed, the carrier may not be well-suited to combat, but it will give China the opportunity to train sailors and pilots in aircraft carrier operations. Mastering the challenges of operating, defending, and maintaining a carrier, as well as a possible accompanying carrier task force, will take at least a decade.


Q3: How many carriers is China building, and for what missions might they be used?

A3: China is reportedly already building at least one if not two indigenous aircraft carriers, which are likely to be deployed over the next 15 years. At a July 11 press briefing, General Chen Bingde stated that no official decision had been made on how many carriers will be built. Experts have suggested that China would need at least three carriers for effective power projection.

The missions for which China might use aircraft carriers remain unclear. Rather than seek to replicate U.S. naval strategy and operations, the PLAN is more likely to develop a limited power-projection capability that enhances China’s ability to defend its regional interests; to protect expanding overseas interests; to perform nontraditional security missions such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, counterpiracy, noncombatant evacuation, antiterrorism peacekeeping operations, crisis response, and military diplomacy; and to demonstrate international responsibility.


Q4: Do China’s aircraft carrier ambitions pose a threat to the United States and its friends and allies?

A4: Even after the ex-Varyag is fully operational, it is widely acknowledged that a lone, obsolete aircraft carrier has limited use militarily. The main functions in the near term will be to enhance China’s national prestige, provide personnel training, and conduct military diplomacy. The political impact of the carrier’s deployment will be potentially far greater, however. China’s neighbors, many of which are increasingly anxious about China’s military modernization and willingness to flex its muscles in disputed waters, are worried that a carrier will provide China with additional means to project power from its coastline. It will likely reinforce ongoing efforts by many regional countries to shore up their own capabilities.

In the South China Sea, where China competes with others over territorial claims, countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines are already ramping up their sea defense capabilities through greater military cooperation with the United States and procurement of new platforms to bolster their ability to defend their claims.
___
By Bonnie S. Glaser, Brittany Billingsley*
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

(This article was first published at: http://goo.gl/5CcDH; Image: Google Maps)

* Bonnie Glaser is a senior fellow with the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Brittany Billingsley is a research associate with the CSIS Freeman Chair.

[buglerbilly]

Varyag returns from first sea trial

Posted in Uncategorized on August 14th, 2011

Varyag returned from its first sea trial on Aug. 14 around 11:30a.m. local time. A number of reporters were spotted on the ship.

[buglerbilly]

Chinese Press Sees Limited Military Purpose for New Aircraft Carrier

A Chinese Army publication says China's first aircraft carrier has a military purpose after all, though only to deal with territorial disputes. The claim is markedly different from the Chinese Defense Ministry's, which has said the carrier is meant for "scientific research and training" and would take more than a decade to become combat ready.

The Chinese government is apparently mindful that neighboring countries see the carrier,which was remodeled from an old Soviet Varyag, as a boost to China's muscle in the region but seems unsure how to placate them.

Guo Jianyue of the People's Liberation Army Daily, in an online article Thursday, said, "Why did we build it if we don't have the courage and willingness to use the aircraft carrier to handle territorial disputes? It is reasonable to use it or other warships to handle disputes if there is a need." China is involved in territorial disputes with Japan, Vietnam and other countries in the South China and East China seas.

englishnews@chosun.com / Aug. 15, 2011 11:40 KST

[buglerbilly]

What Carrier Means In China Military Plans

Aug 16, 2011

By Bradley Perrett
Beijing



The Chinese military is either confident that it can already win a battle in the Taiwan Strait, or it is confident that it can keep winning the budget battles back in Beijing.

With the ex-Soviet carrier Varyag now mobile near the northern port of Dalian, China has joined the aircraft carrier club. And in completing the ship, with its limited use in narrow waters, the country has left behind one of the guiding principles of its defense acquisitions—that the first priority after nuclear deterrence is subjugating Taiwan.

Partly for that reason, the long-awaited appearance of the 67,500-ton vessel, symbolic of the country’s rising economic and military strength, has stoked anxieties across Asia as far as India. Beijing’s response: Other countries should just get used to the fact that China is developing carrier aviation.

As if to underline the doubtful value of an aircraft carrier in an attempt to force Taiwanese reunification with the mainland, a Hsiung Feng III missile was promoted as a “carrier killer” at the Taipei Aerospace and Defense Technology Exhibition just as the Varyag headed to sea for the first time (see p. 26).

The ship, which will soon get a Chinese name and is officially earmarked for training pilots and deck crews, left Dalian on Aug. 10 for its sea trials, in which the builder will show that the ship meets specifications.

The investment in Varyag shows that the Chinese military is moving beyond its decades-old obsession with seizing Taiwan, says security researcher Ashley Townshend of the Lowy Institute in Sydney. “An aircraft carrier does not seem to be necessary for that,” he says, noting the land-based firepower that China can bring to bear on the island. “This means there is less focus,” he says.

So the carrier program could mean that China thinks it already has the pieces in place to secure the strait and bring Taiwan to heel. The alternative, which seems more likely, is that while the armed forces reckon much more military power is needed to force Taiwanese reunification—and to persuade the U.S. to keep out of the fight—they expect that future funding will be enough to do that and more.

Completing Varyag is unlikely to be just a one-time divergence from the focus on Taiwan, since three carriers will probably be needed to ensure that one is always available, Townshend argues. Reports of China building carriers from scratch have appeared from time to time over the years. The Washington Times *cited unnamed U.S. defense officials this month as saying that construction of a Varyag-like carrier had begun.

Varyag’s long-awaited appearance raises two questions that have been asked repeatedly since China towed the hull to the shipyard at Dalian in 2002 with the evident intent of using it, somehow, to introduce fixed-wing aviation at sea. When will China have an operational carrier, usable as a fighting ship, and not just as a training ship? And why does China want carrier aviation anyway?

“When the ship will be operational is anyone’s guess,” says Townshend. It depends a lot on what level of competence the Chinese will demand before regarding the ship as deployable, he points out.

Taking a stab, analyst Richard Bitzinger of Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University says: “It will probably be at least five years before there’s an operational capability.”

There is a strong clue that the Chinese navy does not expect to take too long in learning the notoriously difficult and dangerous business of efficiently operating fixed-wing aircraft at sea. For many years while Varyag was in dockyard hands, it was unclear how much effort would be spent on the ship, and how far it would be transformed from the empty hull that Chinese businessmen bought from Ukraine in 1998. It was conceivable, for example, that Varyag might have been made only structurally fit for service as a moored hull that pilots and deck crews could practice on. Or it might have been cheaply fitted with a modest powerplant and not much else, confining it to training excursions.

But as the ship runs its trials, it is evident that the navy has gone for the whole box and dice. Varyag has been fitted for combat—with self-defense surface-to-air missile launchers, a profusion of domes that must cover antennas for communications systems and sensors and, most notably, a phased-array radar. To integrate those systems, a capable command system must be installed deep in the hull. It seems unlikely that a navy that expected to take, say, 10 years to prepare the ship for combat would spend so heavily now on such costly equipment, especially since better systems would be available later.

It is also clear that China has not skimped on propulsion. Thick exhaust from the funnel during engine tests indicates that Varyag is not fitted with the gas turbines that Western and Japanese navies now routinely use for fast ships—and yet the exhaust color is too light for diesel propulsion, a heavy but inexpensive and efficient choice commonly made for ships of moderate speed. Diesels were an alternative that Chinese builders, expert in merchant ship construction, could easily have executed had the navy not wanted much speed, says U.S. Naval War College Prof. Andrew Erickson.

So the installation—reportedly built with Ukrainian help—is evidently a powerful steam-turbine plant, matched to the high-speed lines of the hull. Varyag’s sister ship, the Russian Kuznetsov, has a 147,000-kw (197,000-hp) steam-turbine plant that propels the ship at about 30 kt., compared with the 25-plus kt. officially stated for the two otherwise comparable ships that Britain is building. U.S. carriers are capable of more than 30 kt.

Erickson stresses the value of speed to a ship that, like Varyag, has a deck configuration requiring aircraft to use the mode of operation known as short takeoff but arrested recovery (Stobar). “Given the limitations of Stobar on aircraft weight, the more wind over the deck the better,” he says.

The Stobar configuration uses a ski jump instead of catapults. One of many British inventions that have made aircraft carriers workable, the ski jump effectively extends the flight deck into the air ahead of the ship. As aircraft hurtle off the ramp, they are not fast enough to fly, but their upward trajectory gives them time to accelerate before hitting the water. The energy from a catapult, however, allows greater weight—and therefore payload-radius.

The combat aircraft that will eventually appear on the Varyag will be the J-15, a Flanker version similar to, and maybe reverse engineered from, the Russian Su-33 naval fighter. Adapted for ski-jump takeoffs, it features canard wings and complex trailing-edge surfaces (AW&ST May 9, p. 35).

Like Kuznetsov, the operational Varyag may carry 40 or so aircraft, compared with more than 60 on U.S. carriers. The flight decks of the 102,000-ton U.S. Nimitz class ships measure 333 X 77 meters (1,092 X 252 ft.), compared with Kuznetsov’s 305 X 70 meters.

Limited payload-radius and other shortcomings would put Varyag at a disadvantage in action against a U.S. carrier, but such a battle must be the last thing on the mind of the Chinese navy. It seems likely that China expects to deploy its carriers in much the same way that the U.S. Navy, whatever its hot-war plans, has actually deployed its flat-tops during the past 60 years: as power-projection tools against enemies that could not hope to sink the huge ships, surrounded as they are by anti-air and anti-submarine escorts.

While Varyag and follow-on carriers would be helpful in intimidating rivals to China’s claims on the South China Sea, analysts Erickson, Bitzinger and Townshend agree that the most likely reason for China to build aircraft carriers is probably not far from the vague justification that the country is offering: Lots of other nations have them.

Aircraft carriers have proven useful to other countries. Moreover, China is a rising power, with a long view of history. It will want carrier aviation eventually, so it might as well start working on it. The reasoning is that “a rich nation should have strong armed forces,” says Bitzinger, who also thinks the ships would have some role against Taiwan.

Image Credit: Feature China/Newscom

Photo: Feature China/Newscom

[buglerbilly]

Pics of the Carrer at-sea.............

[JimWH]

And now for the fun part: let's see it operating some aircraft!

[McFriday]

And now for the fun part: let's see it operating some aircraft!

Yes, there a lots of interesting things to watch for especially if one doesn't care about being called mad and I don't. LOL

Steam turbine...steam cat nooo they couldn't do that, its too difficult.

Mag-lev technology acquired at a huge cost for just rail yeees....emals cat nooo they couldn't do that, its too different and difficult.

There are many brilliant, determined, world class Chinese engineers and academics 'over there' who are not restricted to established Western 'boxes' in their thought processes. They would derive a great deal of satisfaction from making something or idea work that the West had discarded for one reason or another.

I definitely do not underestimate the Chinese, nor automatically assume everything they produce is some kind of lesser quality 'knock-off" like so many observers on other sites and media. Neither do I think they're supermen.

If they choose to stick to STOBAR in future ships and want full loads they'll need to assist the launch and I think they're capable of doing it. A lot depends on what config. their next carrier is as to whether it's worth developing at all, either way they'll need assisted launch mechanisms.

Yes, we'll all have plenty of interesting things to watch over the next few years and the aircraft may come much sooner than later.

Cheers,
Mac

[Gubler, A.]

There are many brilliant, determined, world class Chinese engineers and academics 'over there' who are not restricted to established Western 'boxes' in their thought processes. They would derive a great deal of satisfaction from making something or idea work that the West had discarded for one reason or another.

Sure they can, but whatever they do has to be DONE. And DOING things takes a lot of time and effort. A lot of people seem to think the Chinese just wave a magic wand shapped like a 1,000 Chinese engineers and presto new capability is born overnight. It took them 10 years to rebuild this ship so it can sail out to sea and back. To develop an operational carrier capability will probably take just as long. The Russians have been playing around with their carrier for 20 years and arguably still don't have anything near the operational capability of a US carrier.

[buglerbilly]

From one of the blogs........no point in showing you the article as its in Chinese, presumably Mandarin?

Varyag to enter service on Aug. 1 2012, dispatch to South China Sea

Posted in Uncategorized on August 18th, 2011

China’s first aircraft carrier will enter service with the PLA Navy on Aug. 1 next year and the ship is to deploy to South China Sea.

Enter Service means all sorts of stuff. What it doesn't mean is a fully commissioned Flat-top with an active and fully commissioned Air Group as Abe has noted above..........I read this as meaning the Hull can go to sea for more than a day or three........

[McFriday]

McFriday posted:-
"I definitely do not underestimate the Chinese, nor automatically assume everything they produce is some kind of lesser quality 'knock-off" like so many observers on other sites and media. Neither do I think they're supermen."

Abraham,
I've quoted the next para. to the one you chose to reveal a more complete view of my opinion of Chinese ability. The bold I just added.

If your "just saying" and used my para as a general intro. OK. No response necessary.

If your referring to my post content...

I really only disagree on one point, the direct comparison with the Russian time frame isn't applicable IMO.

No need to disagree on a comparison to a USN carrier, I would never make that direct comparison. Worlds apart.

I happen to agree with your view on wand waving people, see bold text above.

I agree with you that many people assign the Chinese some kind of mystical power, I do not.
I do however have first hand knowledge of many Chinese at a social and professional level and maintain a very high opinion of their [collective and individual] capabilities. I respect the work ethic I have seen displayed by those people.

Agree that it took China 10 years to rebuild Varyag, how long would it have taken us, with no help from the USN?

Agree also that steaming to and from a port does not a carrier make, however it's a start that many Sinophobes thought beyond them.

I don't think that the Chinese have been sitting still for the 10 years of this build either, which is why I suggest the aircraft will arrive sooner than later.

You're right, a new capability can't be "born overnight", they're not inventing carrier ops. but using a proven capability for the first time themselves. Learning and adapting, yes, inventing no.

Yes, this will take time to master but the learning curve to basic ops will be shorter [I think] than if they were the pioneers and those pioneers have generated a wealth of data, even in the unclassified arenas.

Cheers Abe,

Mac

[Unicorn]

A quote from a US carrier commander back in the days when the Soviet Navy was getting ready to commission the Kuznetsov, before the wall fell.

"It took us several decades and a lot of lives learning how to operate aircraft at sea safely, and that was the days of slower, prop aircraft. The Sov's are trying to learn using fast jets on a small carrier.

I wish them well but they are going to lose a lot of people before they can consider themselves even basically proficient at fixed-wing carrier operations. Round the clock operations in almost any weather, well, that's something we have to work hard at to stay proficient at, it's several decades and a couple of really bad accidents away for the Russians".

The Russians had taken the intermediate step of VSTOL ops before graduating to CTOL, the Chinese don't even have that experience, so their learning curve will be both steep and bloody.

.

[buglerbilly]

KJ-200 in service with PLA Navy

Posted in Uncategorized on August 18th, 2011

Apparently the KJ-200 AEW&C is now in service with the PLA Navy as well, to differentiate it from the PLAAF version, the small vertical stabilizers at the tip of the horizontal tailplane is painted in navy colors.

[Xinhui]

Greetings all --

One of the recent developments that seen ignored by many is the enlargement of the PLAN's LDP fleet. Richard fisher wrote something on it in aviation week and that was it. The second boat is undergo sea trials. Pennant No 999(Jinggang Shan), third boat is u/c with the fourth planned. That said, the PLAN still a baby when it comes to power projection, they still learn to use their new toys. The 071 LPD seems to be a successful design -- it was deployed to the Gulf of Aden last year for a period of three months. (along with its LCAC)

[McFriday]

Xinhui,

Welcome to T5C.

Cheers,
Mac

[Xinhui]

thanks Mac.

was here long time ago before the forum software upgrade

[buglerbilly]

This is reported in some quarters as a new Stealth Frigate BUT it has a number of problems for me not least the fact I beleve it is a MODEL then photoshopped....................never mind the fact Shanghai Hobby are listed as owner of the image!

[Xinhui]

http://china-defense.blogspot.com/2011/09/could-this-be-bangladesh-navys-large.html

An update on the proposed patrol craft sales to Bangladesh
According to Israyet of BMF, the new craft will have the following specs.


New missile craft of 600 ton displacement

- Pakistan Navy is to procure two built in China and a third built in Pakistan (PN calls it a corvette)
- Bangladesh Navy has ordered two to be built in China, while 5 of 250 ton displacement are being built in Bangladesh Navy's own dockyard (BN calls it a large missile craft)

Specs:

1 x Chinese AK-176M 76.2 mm, 4 x 2 C-802A anti-ship missiles, 2 x 6-cell RDC-32 ASW rocket launchers, 2 x CIWS.

Artist's impression.


Blog entry from April 12th, 2010.

China set to build for Bangladesh large patrol craft with modern missiles


http://www.app.com.pk/en_/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=100443&Itemid=2

DHAKA, Apr 11 (APP): Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Sunday unveiled her government’s massive plan to build Bangladesh Navy as a “deterrent force” by incorporating naval bases and submarine facilities by 2019 towards building a three-dimensional naval force by 2021.

In this connection, she pointed to precious Chinese assistance and said China will build for Bangladesh a large patrol craft (LPC) with two modern missiles. She said, the Chinese government has agreed to provide two modern frigates to Bangladesh Navy with helicopters. She expressed the hope that the new frigates would be incorporated in the Bangladesh Navy fleet soon.

[buglerbilly]

So THAT is what the model on the proceeding post is supposed to be......................hmmmmmmmmmm

[buglerbilly]

Navy Driving China's Military Expansion

By GUILLAUME KLEIN, Agence France-Presse

Published: 25 Sep 2011 10:49

SHANGHAI - China's navy is playing an important role in the country's drive to become a world military power, with the recent trials of its first aircraft carrier underlining the scale of Beijing's naval ambitions.


Chinese sailors stand onboard a frigate berthed in Shanghai. The Chinese navy is playing a key role in Beijing's move to become a major global military power, as demonstrated by the recent release of the first Chinese aircraft carrier. (Guillame Klein / AFP)

China has become increasingly assertive on the high seas and the carrier's first outing last month sparked jitters in the United States and Japan, which said the move would have a "big impact" on the region.

The People's Liberation Army (PLA) - the largest armed force in the world - is primarily a land force. But the navy is playing an increasing role as Beijing grows more assertive about its territorial claims, notably in the East China Sea and South China Sea.

On a rare visit on board the Anqing, a missile frigate at the Eastern Fleet base in Ningbo, south of Shanghai, journalists were accompanied by a group of officers as soldiers looked on impassively.

The officers were giving little away and the ship appeared to serve as a museum piece as much as a warship.

"As a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, China must take greater responsibility in world affairs," Capt. Wei Hua, chief of staff of the Shanghai naval base, told the visiting journalists.

"We have some 18,000 kilometres of coastline and over three million square kilometers of maritime area. It is therefore very important to build a powerful navy to protect the country and its interests."

Taiwan, which has been self-governed since the end of a civil war in 1949 but which China still regards as part of its territory, remains key to Beijing's defense strategy, but is far from its only interest.

Beijing lays claim to swathes of the South China Sea which are also claimed by its smaller neighbors, and must also secure supply routes and new sources of raw materials to fuel its booming economy.

"Beijing intends to bring the (South) China Sea, which it regards as its backyard, firmly within its sphere of influence," said one international defense expert.

Since 2007, at the request of President Hu Jintao, the navy has held a permanent seat on the Central Military Commission, China's powerful supreme military authority.

And now the navy is looking further afield - it already participates in the fight against Somali pirates in the Indian Ocean.

"In the same way that the country is developing, the Chinese navy is growing," said Wei.

The 2.3-million-member PLA is extremely secretive about its defense programs, which benefit from a huge and expanding military budget boosted by the nation's runaway economic growth.

Last month, the Pentagon warned in an annual report to Congress on China's military of an increasing focus on naval power and said Beijing had invested in high-tech weaponry that would extend its reach in the Pacific and beyond.

China has ramped up efforts to produce anti-ship missiles that could knock out aircraft carriers, improved targeting radar, expanded its fleet of nuclear-powered submarines and warships and made advances in satellite technology and cyber warfare, it said.

PLA expert Arthur Ding has said owning an aircraft carrier is a prestige issue for China.

"As China's interests expand globally, the Chinese navy needs to go further outbound, and an aircraft carrier is needed," he said.

Last month's first sea trials by the former Soviet hull, bought in the 1990s from Ukraine and then completely renovated and equipped in China, was seen as an indicator of Beijing's ambitions.

But questioned about the carrier, the Chinese military remained vague about its intended role.

The ship "can play a role in disasters in China or in neighboring countries, like what the US did after the earthquake in Japan" in March, said Captain Wei.

"This is a reasonable move, many countries have aircraft carriers, such as India. This program is not aimed against someone."

One of the experts interviewed by AFP also downplayed any threat.

The aircraft carrier is "probably a simple training platform. And it will be a number of years before the Chinese actually have a carrier battle group," he said.

[buglerbilly]

China’s Overhyped Sub Threat

October 20, 2011



Beijing’s submarine fleet is not as big or powerful as US military planners once feared. Have its blue-water ambitions been overstated?

By David Axe

It was the US Navy’s biggest jolt in years. On October 26, 2006, a Chinese Song-class attack submarine quietly surfaced within nine miles of the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk as the 80,000-ton-diplacement vessel sailed on a training exercise in the East China Sea between Japan and Taiwan.

The Song-class vessel, displacing 2,200 tons, was close enough to hit the Kitty Hawk with one of its 18 homing torpedoes. None of the carrier’s roughly dozen escorting warships detected the Song until it breached the surface.

The Song’s provocative appearance was, for the Americans, ‘as big a shock as the Russians launching Sputnik,’ one NATO official told Britain’s Daily Mail newspaper, referring to the Soviet Union’s launch of the first-ever space satellite in 1957. ‘This could well have escalated into something that was very unforeseen,’ said Adm. Bill Fallon, then commander of US Pacific forces.

The incident underscored the then explosive growth of the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s undersea force, as well as Beijing’s apparent intention to wrestle the Western Pacific away from the once-dominant US Navy. ‘The Chinese are building a credible submarine force which will make it very difficult for the US Navy to maintain sea control dominance in or near coastal waters off of China,’ warned Rear Adm. Hank McKinney, former commander of the US Pacific Fleet’s submarine force.

Of particular concern to American defence officials was the projected introduction, over the coming decade, of up to 20 new nuclear-powered attack submarines, known as ‘SSNs,’ that are an order of magnitude more capable than the Song class. ‘The acquisition of increasing numbers of SSNs would give it (the PLAN) the ability to contest US naval forces farther from China’s shores,’ Thomas Mahnken wrote in China's Future Nuclear Submarine Force, edited by Naval War College professor Andrew Erickson and published in 2007.

Yet nearly five years later, McKinney’s and Mahnken’s alarm has been proved false. The PLAN still possesses a tiny number of nuclear-powered submarines. The Songs and other short-range diesel boats remain the backbone of China’s undersea force. Beijing’s production of new submarines has declined andthe PLAN’s overall undersea fleet is likely to contract in coming years. ‘I don't think they know whether they want to make the full-up commitment it would take to do this (submarine) thing right,’ Owen Cote, Jr., an analyst at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, says of the Chinese.

Meanwhile, the US Navy and its Pacific allies have crafted plans to stabilize or even grow their own submarine fleets. In 2006, Western observers feared the undersea balance of power in the Pacific would tilt. In a sense, they were right. It has tilted – back towards the United States and its allies.

How that happened speaks volumes about China’s evolution as a regional power.

Crunching the Numbers

In early 2011, the PLAN possessed ‘more than 60 submarines,’ according to the Pentagon’s Congressionally-mandated annual report on Chinese military capabilities.

That force included five nuclear-powered attack submarines: three of the 1980s-vintage Type 091 Han-class SSNs that are rapidly reaching the ends of their service lives, plus two Type 093 Shang-class boats. The next-generation Type 095 SSN is due to enter service around 2015, according to Pentagon estimates.

The PLAN's diesel-sub fleet is much larger than the nuclear fleet: more than 50 in all, including 13 Songs, four of the newer Type 041 Yuan class, plus a dozen Russian-made Kilos. Obsolete Romeo- and Ming-class vessels round out the total for diesel boats.

Four or five experimental ballistic-missile submarines or ‘boomers’ – all but one of them nuclear-powered – comprise the remainder of the PLAN undersea force. By comparison, in 2011 the US Navy possessed 53 attack submarines, four guided-missile submarines and 14 ballistic-missile boats: 71 in all.

Just five years ago, US analysts predicted the Chinese submarine fleet would outnumber the American sub fleet by 2011. Writing in China's Future Nuclear Submarine Force, Richard Fisher of the International Assessment and Strategy Center predicted the PLAN would have around 74 boats in 2010 –a figure at least a dozen higher than the real, current total.

Something happened between 2006 and 2011 that changed the calculus for the PLAN submarine force – and by extension for China’s regional aspirations. Actually three things happened: China stopped importing submarines, while also putting the brakes on domestic sub production; and the US Navy successfully doubled its submarine production.

Moscow factored in the former changes. The purchase of a dozen Russian Kilos helped to boost the PLAN’s acquisition rate for submarines in 2005 and 2006. In both of those years, Beijing added seven submarines to its fleet, including seven Kilos overall.

But Russia is unlikely to resume supporting such a high rate of Chinese submarine acquisition, as Beijing is a potential strategic rival to Moscow – and since the Russian Navy’s own sub force is steadily declining to long-term levels of just a dozen each nuclear attack, nuclear ballistic-missile and diesel-attack boats. ‘There are powerful incentives for Russia to keep China just below its future submarine capabilities,’ Fisher noted.

With an end to Russian imports, China must build all its own submarines. But here, too, Beijing relies on Russian assistance. As late as 2003, ‘Russia continued to be the main supplier of technology and equipment to India’s and China’s naval nuclear propulsion programs,’ the US Central Intelligence Agency reported.

The high rate of Chinese sub procurement in 2005 and 2006 justifiably drew the attention of Western analysts. But by using those years as their baseline, analysts often projected PLAN sub force levels that were unrealistically high.

From 2007 on, China acquired only domestically-built submarines, meaning the growth of the PLAN undersea force was constrained by the not inconsiderable limitations of the Chinese arms industry, which can’t function without Russian-provided engines and electronics – and which, even at the best of times, struggles with safety and quality control.

A possible case in point: in early August, there were unconfirmed reports that a Type 094 boomer leaked radiation during work on its electronic systems in the port of Dalian, apparently prompting the PLAN to cordon off the area and crack down on media coverage of the alleged incident.

With the Kilo purchase complete, Beijing added just two boats in 2007, none in 2008 and two each in 2009 and 2010. It appears that, barring a major reversal of the current trend, the PLAN will acquire no more than two submarines a year over the medium term.

That’s the same submarine production rate as in the United States – though only recently. In the early 2000s, Washington purchased just one submarine a year, on average. A cost-savings initiative launched in 2005 drove the price of the current Virginia-class attack submarine down to around $2 billion apiece, allowing the US Navy to purchase two Virginias annually starting this year.

US-built submarines traditionally last up to 35 years, versus fewer than 30 for lower-quality, Chinese-built boats. With similar pre-existing force levels and identical production rates, the US undersea fleet will level off at a higher level than the Chinese fleet will.

‘Excluding the 12 Kilos purchased from Russia, the total number of domestically produced submarines placed into service between 1995 and 2007 is 30, or an average of about 1.9 per year,’ wrote Ronald O’Rourke from the US Congressional Research Service. ‘This average rate of domestic production, if sustained indefinitely, would eventually result in a steady-state force of domestically produced submarines of about 38 to 56 boats of all kinds, again assuming an average submarine life of 20 to 30 years.’

And that’s being optimistic. ‘It’s possible that the greater resources required to produce nuclear-powered boats might result in a reduction in the overall submarine production rate,’ O’Rourke wrote. ‘If so, and if such a reduced overall rate were sustained indefinitely, it would eventually result in a smaller steady-state submarine force of all kinds.’

According to current Pentagon projections through 2040, the US submarine fleet should never dip below 51 boats, with a peak of 73 in 2013 and 2014. And all of those boats are nukes – a not insignificant distinction.

Sub versus Sub

Even under the most favourable projections, the PLAN will possess just a handful of nuclear-powered attack submarines at a time over coming decades. China’s SSN fleet could actually decline in the short term, as the three ancient Type 091s are likely to leave service before an equal number of Type 095s are ready.

That matters because only nuclear-powered submarines, with their high endurance, are capable of true ‘blue-water’ operations far from shore bases. It’s for that reason that all of the US Navy’s submarines are nuclear-powered: Washington’s global military presence demands it.

To project power beyond its own coastal waters, Beijing needs nuke boats. The fact that China isn't building large numbers of SSNs reflects either a lack of serious interest in a true, global naval presence – or an inability to back up grand military ambitions with working hardware.

China is left with an undersea fleet composed mostly of diesel attack submarines, which by virtue of their short range tend to be defensive in nature. ‘Current Chinese diesel submarines rarely deploy outside the first island chain (west of the Philippines) and essentially never deploy beyond the second (east of the Philippines),’ Cote wrote. ‘Nor would these submarines be well-suited for extended deployments into the Pacific or Indian Oceans because of range and crew habitability constraints.’

Even as defensive weapons, China’s diesel submarines lack flexibility. For one, ‘the PLA has only a limited capacity to communicate with submarines at sea,’ according to the Pentagon’s annual China report. Moreover, the PLAN’s subs are optimized for attacking surface targets such as US aircraft carriers. Lacking the most sophisticated sensors and weapons, they’re far less useful for hunting US submarines. ‘China has very limited (Anti-Submarine Warfare) capabilities and US submarines are the most difficult ASW target in the world,’ Cote wrote.

‘Thus, China would have difficulty preventing US submarines from operating in its shallow coastal waters,’ Cote continued. That’s important because one of the American subs’ main tasks is to destroy enemy submarines. China’s undersea fleet cannot prevent the United States’ undersea fleet from hunting it down in its own home waters.

Considering the imbalance between large, sophisticated, ASW-optimized US submarines and their smaller, less flexible, surface-attack-focused Chinese rivals, a census of the two nations’ undersea boats can create a false impression of near parity: 60 Chinese subs versus 70 US ones. But if the American vessels can hunt the Chinese vessels almost with impunity, it almost doesn’t matter how many submarines Beijing possesses.

Even if numbers really did matter, the trends aren’t in China’s favour. Beijing might match the United States in submarine production rates, but it can’t possibly keep up with the combined sub acquisitions of Washington and its closest Pacific allies. Japan is in the process of adding six diesel attack boats to its current force of 16. Australia aims to double its fleet of six diesel boats. South Korea is also doubling its six-strong undersea fleet. Two years ago, Vietnam purchased six Kilos from Russia.

The Song submarine’s surprise appearance alongside the USS Kitty Hawk helped stoke fears of Chinese undersea dominance that were further fuelled by a brief surge in PLAN sub acquisition. Today, with more US and allied submarines entering service and fewer Chinese boats on the slipways, those fears – and the policies and assumptions they produced – warrant reconsideration. China isn’t building a world-class, globally-deploying submarine force. It’s building a mostly defensive, regional undersea force – and a smaller one than once predicted.

[buglerbilly]

Aircraft Carrier Sails from Port for New Test

(Source: China Daily Online; posted Nov. 30, 2011)


State media report that China’s aircraft carrier has sailed on its second sea trials, which may include aircraft operations for the first time. (TV screen grab)

BEIJING --- China's aircraft carrier left port on Tuesday for a second round of sea trials, which are likely to include test flights from the refitted vessel.

"Carrier-borne aircraft will possibly take off and land on the vessel for the first time, as these moves cannot be done in dockside tests," said Yin Zhuo, a retired navy rear admiral and military expert.

He said an important component of the trial will be to test the steel cables used to catch the aircraft and decelerate them upon landing. The cables can bring an aircraft from going 300 km/h to a full stop in just a short distance.

Catapults may also be tested to see whether they can help propel various types of aircraft into the air.

"Of course, another task is to test communication between the carrier and aircraft, and whether the navigation system will lead the aircraft to their designated locations," Yin added.

Media reports have claimed that the deck-based J-15 fighter will be deployed on the carrier, but this has not been confirmed by the military.

The Ministry of National Defense said in a statement that the steam-powered aircraft carrier has completed all refitting and testing work as scheduled after its first sea trial in mid-August, and was heading back out to sea for additional scientific research and experiments.

The carrier was originally meant for the Soviet navy, but the construction on it was halted as the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. Engineers in the Ukraine disarmed it and removed its engines before selling it to China in 1998.

The vessel, an Admiral Kuznetsov class aircraft carrier measuring 304.5 meters long, and having a displacement of 58,500 tons, has been refitted for research and training in China.

Shi Yinhong, an expert on international affairs at Renmin University of China, said the announcement of the vessel's second sea trial is mainly aimed at letting the Chinese people know how preparations for the carrier are going.

"The people are very interested in the carrier, and the military is telling them about its new achievements during its lengthy preparation," he said.

China will be the last permanent member of the United Nations Security Council to operate a fully functioning carrier once the vessel is delivered to the navy of the People's Liberation Army.

The United States, Britain, France, Russia, Spain, Italy, India, Brazil and Thailand operate 21 active aircraft carriers. The US alone has 11.

(ends)

China Confirms Aim for Aircraft Carrier's Sea Trial

(Source: People's Daily Online; posted November 30, 2011)

BEIJING --- China on Tuesday confirmed its purpose for the second sea trial of its aircraft carrier, saying China will always be an important force in maintaining regional peace.

At a daily press briefing yesterday in Beijing, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei made the statement in response to a question regarding the purpose for the second sea trial of the nation's aircraft carrier.

"China remains committed to the path of peaceful development and upholds a defense policy that is defensive in nature," Hong said. "China will always be an important force in maintaining regional peace."

Hong stated that China's refitted aircraft carrier began its second sea trial on Tuesday for technical research and experiments.

The carrier is the former Soviet Varyag, which was incomplete at the time Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. Ukraine disarmed it and removed its engines before selling it to China.

The still-unnamed aircraft carrier was dispatched on its first five-day sea trials in August following years of refurbishment.

-ends-

[buglerbilly]

China's Hu to PLA Navy: Be Ready for Combat

By ROBERT SAIGET, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE

Published: 6 Dec 2011 16:15

More bombast................:blah

BEIJING - Chinese President Hu Jintao on Dec. 6 urged the People's Liberation Army Navy to prepare for military combat, amid growing regional tensions over maritime disputes and a U.S. campaign to assert itself as a Pacific power.

The PLA Navy should "accelerate its transformation and modernization in a sturdy way, and make extended preparations for military combat in order to make greater contributions to safeguard national security," he said.

Addressing the powerful Central Military Commission, Hu said: "Our work must closely encircle the main theme of national defense and military building."

His comments, which were posted in a statement on a government website, come as the United States and Beijing's neighbors have expressed concerns over its naval ambitions, particularly in the South China Sea.

Several Asian nations have competing claims over parts of the South China Sea, believed to encompass huge oil and gas reserves, while China claims it all. One-third of global seaborne trade passes through the region.

Vietnam and the Philippines have accused Chinese forces of increasing aggression there.

In a translation of Hu's comments, the official Xinhua news agency quoted the president as saying China's navy should "make extended preparations for warfare."

The Pentagon however downplayed Hu's speech, saying that Beijing had the right to develop its military, although it should do so transparently.

"They have a right to develop military capabilities and to plan, just as we do," said Pentagon spokesman George Little, but he added: "We have repeatedly called for transparency from the Chinese and that's part of the relationship we're continuing to build with the Chinese military."

Said another Pentagon spokesman, Navy Capt. John Kirby: "Nobody's looking for a scrap here. Certainly we wouldn't begrudge any other nation the opportunity, the right to develop naval forces to be ready. Our naval forces are ready and they'll stay ready."

"We want to see stronger military-to-military ties with China and we want to see greater transparency," State Department spokesman Mark Toner said. "That helps answer questions we might have about Chinese intentions."

Hu's announcement comes in the wake of trips to Asia by several senior U.S. officials, including President Obama, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

U.S. undersecretary of defense Michelle Flournoy is due to meet in Beijing with her Chinese counterparts on Dec. 7 for military-to-military talks.

Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao last month warned against interference by "external forces" in regional territorial disputes including those in the South China Sea.

China said late last month it would conduct naval exercises in the Pacific Ocean, after Obama, who has dubbed himself America's first Pacific president, said the U.S. would deploy up to 2,500 Marines to Australia.

China's People's Liberation Army, the largest military in the world, is primarily a land force, but its Navy is playing an increasingly important role as Beijing grows more assertive about its territorial claims.

Earlier this year, the Pentagon warned that Beijing was increasingly focused on its naval power and had invested in high-tech weaponry that would extend its reach in the Pacific and beyond.

China's first aircraft carrier began its second sea trial last week after undergoing refurbishments and testing, the government said.

The 990-foot (300-metre) ship, a refitted former Soviet carrier, underwent five days of trials in August that sparked international concern about China's widening naval reach.

Beijing only confirmed this year that it was revamping the old Soviet ship and has repeatedly insisted that the carrier poses no threat to its neighbors, and will be used mainly for training and research purposes.

But the August sea trials were met with concern from regional powers including Japan and the United States, which called on Beijing to explain why it needs an aircraft carrier.

China, which publicly announced about 50 separate naval exercises in the seas off its coast over the past two years - usually after the event - says its military is only focused on defending the country's territory.

[buglerbilly]

What Will China’s Carrier Be Used For?



U.S. Naval War College professor Andrew Erickson has just come out with another interesting analysis of China’s new aircraft carrier, noting that the ship, equipped with advanced radars and defensive weapons doesn’t sound remotely like a true training carrier. Instead, it will likely serve as the blueprint for a fleet of ships designed to deploy Chinese fighter jets all over the resource-rich South China Sea and the Yellow Sea.

From his latest piece written for the war college, titled, Beijing’s Starter Carrier and Future Steps:


While ex-Varyag’s capabilities clearly represent a “work in progress,” it is not just a “training carrier” per se, as USS Lexington (AVT 16) was in the last decades of its storied career. Its hardware does not need to be upgraded radically for operational service; it already possesses a Dragon Eye phased-array radar, a new point-defense missile system, and a new close-in weapon system. The Dragon Eye can reportedly track up to a hundred targets while engaging fifty simultaneously, detect targets out to sixty-five nautical miles (120 kilometers), and track targets out to 48.6 nautical miles (ninety kilometers). Together, no matter how it is portrayed officially, these factors make it more than a training ship and rather a modestly capable warship.

Now, the ship is already undergoing sea trials following an extensive refit and modernization by China (Erickson’s report has some fascinating details as to what this may have involved). We have also seen a Z-8 helo landing on the ships deck. We all know that China is likely going to use the ship to figure out how to operate a fleet of aircraft carriers based on its design.

Erickson however also points out that the ski jump design of the ship reveals what it, and any future Chinese carriers using a ski jump, will be used for operationally; to provide air defense over Chinese ships operating in its “Near Seas” — a swath of water extending throughout the South China Sea and Yellow Sea to the borders of Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Malaysia.


Ex-Varyag itself is smaller than American carriers (roughly sixty-five thousand tons vice a hundred thousand—see the table). Also, instead of the catapult used by American carriers to launch planes into the air, China’s new carrier features a “ski jump,” a bow ramp that helps aircraft take off. Without catapults ex-Varyag will likely be unable to launch the heavier aircraft needed for ground strikes, intelligence collection, or midair refueling—relegating the ship primarily to extending air cover beyond China’s shores. This largely accords with Chinese writings on the utility of carriers, which emphasize their importance in providing air cover for naval operations. The “extended air cover” role indicated by the technical aspects of ex-Var yag generally conforms to Admiral Liu’s conception of Near Seas defense.

He goes on to say that the inclusion of a ski jump (or a catapult system capable of launching heavier planes) on future Chinese carriers will be a very good indication of what China intends to use its carriers for in the long-term:


Li Jie says ex-Var yag will be a viable weapons system, albeit with much less operational capability than its American peers. He acknowledges that ski-jump carriers cannot launch aircraft that are as heavy, carrying as much fuel or weaponry, or do so at the same high rates as can a CATOBAR ship.

In fact, Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo calls ex-Varyag’s use of a ski jump a “mistake” because it precludes the ability to launch AEW aircraft. Accordingly, and as noted, China’s second domestic (and third operational, after ex-Var yag) hull is likely to offer truer indications of where China is heading with carrier design.

Click here to read the entire report.

http://www.andrewerickson.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Erickson-Denmark-Collins_Beijings-Starter-Carrier_NWCR_2012-Winter.pdf

Read more: http://defensetech.org/2011/12/06/what-will-chinas-carrier-be-used-for/#ixzz1fnxUMMxK
Defense.org

[buglerbilly]

The Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs released a report [PDF] on the Chinese Navy’s capabilities and roles that concludes the PLAN is extending its reach and has initiated a serious C4ISR effort.

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docUploaded/Chinese%20Navy%20Saunders%20Yung.pdf

[buglerbilly]

Photos Show China’s Carrier Steaming Under Own Power



Here’s something we haven’t seen before. China’s first aircraft carrier, the ex-Soviet Varyag, steaming under its own power in the open seas. This satellite photo was taken by the group Digital Globe during the ship’s nearly two week-long cruise that ended last weekend.

This is a pretty significant development. until now, we’ve only seen her moving under the accompaniment of tugs. If all went well during this recent trip, I’d expect to see the Chinese conduct limited flight tests from her decks on one of her upcoming cruises. Heck, we’ve already seen a Z-8 chopper operating from ex-Varyag’s deck while she sat in port.

Lcick throuhg the jump to read an exerpt fomr Naval War College professor Andrew Erickson’s report on what shipboard tech PLAN officials were likely testing during the cruise.

From Erickson’s report titled Beijing’s Starter Carrier and Future Steps:


Ex-Var yag is currently undergoing a series of predelivery tests and modifications by Dalian Naval Shipyard and the Chinese defense industry, including trials in a rectangular area off Dalian, within China’s territorial waters.

This has been an incremental process.

First, under PLAN supervision, the shipyard checked all major systems and equipment (main propulsion, auxiliary, damage control, deck, electrical, interior environmental safety protection, navigation, and spares) to ensure that the carrier’s hardware met contract requirements for sea trials. Testing of the engines, for instance, explained the appearance of smoke at the pier. Then, several days before the first sea trials, design and construction teams continued to work while PLAN personnel rehearsed the task of getting the ship under way as realistically as possible and made preparations.

The PLAN is apparently satisfied now with the quality of the ship’s refurbishment; China’s defense industry and its oversight organizations have been restructured to address previous concerns about inadequacies in development and production of military systems. Following completion of the test and trial program, there will be a ceremony to name the vessel, and it will be commissioned and accepted into PLAN service. The crew members can then leave the auxiliary vessel (hull number 88), currently being used to house them and to serve as a base for their training, and take up residence on board the carrier itself.

Read more: http://defensetech.org/2011/12/14/sat-photos-show-chinas-carrier-steaming-under-own-power/#ixzz1gYnJ5Rbi
Defense.org

[buglerbilly]

Chinese Carrier Photographed During Sea Trials

AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE

Published: 15 Dec 2011 10:38

WASHINGTON - A satellite image of China's first aircraft carrier has been captured while the vessel was undergoing sea trials in the Yellow Sea, a U.S. company said on its website Dec. 15.

The 300-meter (990-foot) ship, a refitted former Soviet carrier, was photographed on December 8, said Colorado-based DigitalGlobe Inc., and an analyst from the company spotted it when reviewing images five days later.

The Beijing government said earlier this month that the carrier had started its second sea trial after undergoing refurbishment and testing.

The ship underwent five days of trials in August that sparked international concern about China's widening naval reach amid growing regional tensions over maritime disputes and a U.S. campaign to assert itself as a Pacific power.

The South China Sea, which is believed to be rich in oil and gas and is claimed by several countries, has dominated such disputes involving China, leading to run-ins with rival claimants including Vietnam and the Philippines.

Chinese President Hu Jintao on December 7 urged the navy to "accelerate its transformation and modernization" and "make extended preparations for military combat" to safeguard national security.

Beijing only confirmed this year that it was revamping the Soviet ship, the Varyag, and has repeatedly insisted that the carrier poses no threat to its neighbors and will be used mainly for training and research purposes.

But the August sea trials were met with concern from regional powers including Japan and the United States, which called on Beijing to explain why it needs an aircraft carrier.

China only provided the first official acknowledgment of the carrier in June when Chen Bingde, the nation's top military official, gave an interview to a Hong Kong newspaper.

The Chinese have yet to announce a name for the ship, which is commonly referred to by its old Soviet name. Although some media have used the name Shi Lang - a 17th century admiral who led a Chinese conquest of Taiwan - Chinese media often omit a name reference.

Coincidentally, the Varyag's sistership, the Russian carrier Admiral Kuznetsov, is also at sea - the first time both ships have been under way on their own power at the same time.

The Kuznetsov left its Northern Fleet base in Murmansk earlier this month for a three-month cruise to the eastern Mediterranean, where it may call at the Syrian port of Tartus. The carrier was reported off Scotland earlier this week. ■

Staff writer Christopher P. Cavas contributed to this report.

[buglerbilly]

Chinese Navy Weapons Ambitions

By David Axe

December 20, 2011



The new phase of Chinese naval development could include even more new weapons and sensors than the previous phase, if the recent launch of another specialized testing ship is any indication.

Last month, the PLA Navy launched “Ship 893,” its third new weapons trials vessel since 2005. Trials ships are equipped with systems to track and analyze new missiles and sensors during testing.

The People’s Liberation Army develops and builds weapons in five-year cycles, the most recent of which began in late 2010. The 2006-2010 cycle heavily emphasized new ships, including new frigates and destroyers and a refurbished Soviet-made aircraft carrier.

The current cycle, which ends around 2015, could focus more on “subsystems” such as radars, weapons and what’s known as “Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconaissance,” or “C4ISR” – the development of which requires extensive trials. “The greatest support for PLAN modernization comes from the launching of the 893 test ship,” says “Feng,” an independent analyst and contributor to the Information Dissemination blog.

The growth in the test-ship fleet “would indicate [China] has a lot of naval subsystems under development,” Feng wrote in a blog entry.

Exactly what kinds of subsystems the PLAN might develop in the coming years is a matter of speculation, but it’s possible to make educated guesses based on the Chinese navy’s major capability shortfalls. “China’s navy continues to exhibit limitations or weaknesses in several areas, including...C4ISR systems [and] anti-air warfare,” the Congressional Research Service reports.

Based on these weaknesses, Ship 893 could be used to test out new air-search radars and surface-to-air missiles, plus related radio datalinks. The goal would be to develop naval air defenses closer in capability to the U.S. Navy’s vaunted Aegis system.

Image credit: U.S. Navy

[buglerbilly]

China’s Noisy Subs Get Busier — And Easier to Track

By David Axe Email Author December 27, 2011 | 6:30 am



The military’s latest secret assessment of China’s rapidly modernizing submarines has good news and bad news for the U.S. Navy. On one hand, the roughly 60 submarines in the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) fleet are spending more and more time on combat-ready patrols — signaling China’s increasing naval competence and growing seriousness about influencing the western Pacific Ocean.

On the other hand, the flurry of undersea activity gives American forces more opportunities to tail and examine Chinese subs. And U.S. analysts discovered a silver lining in the gathering strategic storm clouds. Chinese submarines are a hell of a lot noisier than anyone expected. The sound you hear is the Pacific balance of power tipping in Washington’s favor.

As recently as 2007, China’s diesel-powered subs and a handful of nuclear-propelled models managed just a few patrols per year, combined. Two years before that, none of Beijing’s undersea boats went on patrol. For years, the majority of PLAN submarines remained tied up at naval bases, sidelined by mechanical problems and a shortage of adequately trained crews.

As long as the PLAN’s submarines were idle, the U.S. Navy’s spy planes, surveillance ships and snooping subs had few opportunities to assess China’s undersea capabilities — and, most importantly, how much noise the Chinese generate while submerged and moving. Navies can use passive sonars to track submarines by the sounds they make. The louder a vessel, the easier it is to detect. And destroy.

With little information to go on, American intelligence officials had to guess. In cases like that, “you guess conservatively,” a respected U.S.-based naval analyst tells Danger Room on the condition of anonymity. The conservative estimates placed the latest PLAN subs roughly a decade behind the state-of-art for Russian submarines — and potentially 20 years behind U.S. undersea technology.

Now Chinese subs are patrolling more frequently. “Within the last year or two the Chinese have begun to deploy diesel boats more frequently into places like the Philippine Sea,” the analyst reveals. More and better data is flowing in from U.S. forces. With that data, the Navy conducted a fresh assessment of PLAN submarines. The unnamed analyst attended a classified briefing based on the assessment.

The assessment’s biggest surprise: Leaving aside the PLAN’s dozen imported Russian subs, new Chinese submarines can be detected at what’s known as the “first convergence zone,” a ring approximately 25 miles from an undersea vessel where outward-traveling sound waves pack close together.

During the Cold War, the U.S. Navy would arrange its own submarines in lines where each boat was 25 miles from the next, forming a sort of net to catch Soviet subs. With the introduction of the latest generation of quiet Russian diesel subs in the 1990s, the Americans thought that convergence-zone detection was no longer possible. But the Navy’s just discovered that China’s homemade subs are even louder than 20-year-old Russian boats. “Apparently they [U.S. subs] are making first convergence zone detections and holding them,” the analyst reports.

Assuming the Chinese stay with their current sub designs, American submarines should be capable of swiftly defeating Chinese boats in any potential future shooting war — helping clear the way for U.S. aircraft carriers to strike Chinese land targets. Combined with a slowdown in Chinese sub production, and the recent doubling of America’s submarine build-rate, the noise revelation could lead to a radical recalculation of the Pacific balance of power.

The U.S. Navy had a comfortable technological lead over the PLAN even before the increased Chinese sub activity fueled the recent intelligence coup. Now that lead has gotten even wider. And noisier.

Photo: Via Sinodefence.com

[buglerbilly]

Photos: China’s New/Used Aircraft Carrier Ain’t Scary

By Spencer Ackerman Email Author December 28, 2011 | 6:30 am

STRATFOR video here (at source): http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/12/china-aircraft-carrier-photos/#more-68060

When China launched the maiden voyage of its first aircraft carrier in August, it had a lot of eyes on it. Some were from way, way up in the heavens — specifically, DigitalGlobe’s satellites. They provide the clearest pictures yet of China’s much-heralded floating toy, and make it seem less than meets the eye.

Truth be told, the Shi Lang isn’t actually new-new. It’s more like the aircraft carrier equivalent of buying a used car. China purchased the Varyag, a Kuznetsov-class carrier from Ukraine, refurbished it, and set it to sea as Shi Lang, intending to show the world it was a first-class naval power.

And there’s something to that: Very few countries have a full-sized aircraft carrier at all. (The U.S. Navy has 10.) But the Shi Lang isn’t exactly state of the art. It carries mediocre aircraft and accompanies unimpressive ships. And DigitalGlobe’s satellites find that Shi Lang also “appears to lack the P-700 Granit surface-to-surface missiles that were part of the original Kuznetzov designs,” as Stratfor analyst Rodger Baker puts it.

Translation: sure, the Shi Lang is merely supposed to be a training ship, but it’s conspicuous that the first Chinese aircraft carrier can’t defend itself from seaborne threats.

The Shi Lang is probably best thought of as a starter aircraft carrier. Who knows what weaponry its next carrier — the one it’s building, not purchasing — will possess. And it can’t just be one new carrier, Baker says: “It will be years before China has the three hulls needed for minimum ability to keep one on station at all times.”

And after those ships get built, the hard work really begins. It’ll take a generation or more to train an officer corps capable of running complex naval operations. It’s for that reason that the Navy’s former chief didn’t sweat the Chinese naval buildup; nor is the Pentagon’s most recent report on China’s military particularly alarming.

But it’s not all underwhelming news for the Shi Lang. The exterior may not be so threatening. Inside? Pure funk.

[buglerbilly]

China's aircraft carrier conducting sea trials

English.news.cn 2011-12-28 19:28:12

BEIJING, Dec. 28 (Xinhua) -- China's aircraft carrier is underway carrying out scientific testing, a spokesman with the Ministry of National Defense said Wednesday.

Spokesman Yang Yujun said at a press briefing that after attaining objectives during its previous sea trials, the vessel is now carrying out follow-up scientific testing as planned.

Yang said the scientific research and testing will be a long process, and relevant scientific testing and training at sea will continue in the future.

The spokesman denied a report that Russia refused to sell aircraft carrier arrester wires to China, which delayed the aircraft carrier's launch. "The report was entirely groundless," Yang said.

He said China's armed forces adhere to the principle of independent innovation in the development of weapons and equipment.

"The main equipment for our aircraft carrier, including the arrester wires, were developed and converted on our own," he said.

The aircraft carrier was originally built by the former Soviet Union. It was not yet complete when the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991. Ukraine disarmed it and removed its engines before selling it to China.

The vessel, measuring 304.5 meters long and 37 meters wide with a displacement of 58,500 metric tons, has been completely refitted for its new role as a research and training platform for China.

In recent years, the PLA Navy has been modernizing the level of its comprehensive combat power, and it has been actively promoting the holistic transformation of the navy structure, Yang said.

But Yang said it should be stressed that the strategy of China's inshore defense policy has not changed.

He said the Navy undertakes the tasks to defend national security at sea, safeguard sovereignty over territorial waters, and protect maritime rights and interests.

Currently, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, Spain, Italy, India, Brazil and Thailand operate a total of 21 active-service aircraft carriers.

[buglerbilly]

MND confirms Chinese missile tests

EVIDENCE?Chinese state media have reported that a fisherman in Shandong had accidentally retrieved wreckage from what may have been a missile booster

By J. Michael Cole / Staff Reporter



The Ministry of National Defense confirmed yesterday that China had test-fired Julang-2 (JL-2) -submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) before the New Year.

Chinese military bulletin boards recently lit up with reports that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy might have test fired as many as six JL-2 SLBMs near Dalian in -Liaoning Province, China.

At least two submarines in China’s Northern Fleet are known to operate out of Xiaopingdao -Submarine Base close to Dalian.

China plans to introduce up to five Type 094, or Jin-class, -second-generation nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) armed with JL-2 missiles. Each Type 094 submarine can carry as many as 12 missiles.

The JL-2, designed by China Aerospace Science and Industry Corp’s 4th Academy, is a solid-propellant derivative of the Dong Feng 31 (DF-31) intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).

The JL-2, one of China’s three long-range strategic -missiles, has a maximum range estimated at 8,000km and can carry a -thermonuclear warhead with a yield ranging from 25 kilotons to 1,000 kilotons, or about 80 times the force of the nuclear device dropped on Hiroshima in 1945.

Contacted for comment yesterday, Ministry of National Defense spokesman Colonel David Lo (羅紹和) said the military was aware that China had tested the JL-2 and would pay close attention to further development of the missile.

Lo’s comments were the first official confirmation by Taiwan’s military that the PLA Navy had carried out the missile test, less than three weeks before Taiwanese head for the polls on Saturday.

So far official Chinese media and the Chinese military have not confirmed rumors of the exercise. Missile tests carried out by the PLA in March 1996 to pressure Taiwanese as they headed into their first direct presidential election in the nation’s history are generally believed to have backfired on China and boosted support for then-president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝).

However, the state-owned Chinese-language Global Times -reported yesterday that a Chinese fisherman in Shandong Province had retrieved cylindrical wreckage from what appeared to be a missile booster, which could provide confirmation of the SLBM test.

Rick Fisher, a senior fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center in Washington, told the Washington Times last week that the tests would clearly demonstrate that after several years of development and delays, the PLA Navy is now able to launch submarine-based ballistic missiles “at a near wartime frequency.”

“If these reports are true, then the [Type] 094 submarine is ready for the PLA version of deterrence patrols, which could commence this year,” he said.

“This number of successful tests would also indicate that the PLA has, at long last, resolved whatever issues were preventing this missile from achieving ‘operational’ status,” the paper quoted him as saying.

The US Department of Defense’s annual report on the PLA stated that once it is deployed, the Type 094/JL-2 combination would constitute China’s first real sea-based deterrent, a capability that could give Beijing the means to discourage the US from intervening on behalf of Taiwan.

Additional reporting by Rich Chang