F-35 in all it's Variations

[buglerbilly]

NavAir Offers F-​​18 Ammo Amid JSF Woes

By Colin Clark

Tuesday, January 12th, 2010 2:17 pm

Congressional aides are beginning to wonder if the Navy should buy the carrier version of the Joint Strike Fighter, in light of the program’s rising price tag and its higher flight costs.

“I’m growing more and more convinced that the Navy variant of the F-​​35 might not be worth buying. The program is sliding further and further to the right, as costs increase. When we have an 80 percent solution in active production, and significantly cheaper, the F-​​35C looks like a great candidate for cancellation,” said one congressional aide. “Gates has talked about choosing 75 percent solutions over expensive ‘exquisite’ systems and this is a perfect candidate.”

For its part, the Navy, already worried it won’t have enough planes for its carrier fleet, has briefed senior Pentagon leaders that the Joint Strike Fighter program “will have a significant impact on naval aviation affordability in the FYDP and beyond.”

A source who follows JSF closely quoted portions of the NavAir study, “Joint Programs TOC Affordability.” A congressional aide who has seen the report confirmed the information. The study was briefed to DoD leaders earlier this month;

The source said that the study finds “the cost to operate and support the F-​​35 (all variants) will be $442 billion or more depending on additional costs for integration on ships and currently unforeseen development costs. This estimate is in FY 2002 program baseline dollars; the current dollar cost will be significantly higher. The production and development costs are cited, by the JET II, to be $217 and $46 billion respectively (2002 $), thereby making total program ownership cost to be $704 billion, or more, in 2002 dollars,:” according to this source.

That would put operating costs of the F-​​35 B and C versions some 40 percent higher “than the cost to operate the existing (larger) fleet of F-​​18A-​​Ds and AV-​​8s. Cost per flight hour of the combined F-​​18A-​​D and AV-​​8 fleets is estimated to be about $19,000 per hour; F-​​35B/​C cost per flight hour is estimated to be about $31,000,” the source said. “These higher and growing operating costs are certainly typical for a new generation aircraft, but the revelation of these estimates at this relatively early point in the program would seem to demonstrate some real and growing concern that the highly complex F-​​35 is anything but ‘affordable.’”

An industry source noted that the chief of Naval operations “has been very interested across the force in terms of total operating costs. It is significant that this study addresses this.” The industry source said that Super Hornet flying hour costs are about $5,000 an hour.

A second congressional aide raised some questions about the study’s methodology, saying that “the worker level people, when asked about the assumptions by an assistant secretary in the Navy, didn’t have real good answers to that question. So while some of the numbers are very specific, the assumptions are not.” But this aide, who follows both programs, agreed that the NavAir study was a good argument for the F-​​18. “But yes, if they are looking for tails versus presumed better capability for more money and given the budget crunch and need for more ships they have HUGE problems,” the aide said.

The source who provided the study results noted that it “shows nothing for F-​​18E/​F flight hour costs, which makes me suspicious.”

While Congress may not be ready to cancel the carrier version of the F-​​35, the industry source noted that support for the F-​​18 “has been gaining momentum in the Congress really over the last three years,” largely to address what has been identified as a shortfall in the number of planes available. “Each year more and more language has been written noting Congress’ concern with the shortfall as well as questioning what the Navy and DoD are going to do about it.”

Most interestingly, this source said the Navy is looking over the long term for a sixth generation aircraft, one with “increased range, increased persistence, increased speed and increased payload.” The F-​​35 is, of course, a fifth generation fighter.

[ADMk2]

I agree. I think the USN SHOULD sh*can the F-35C and allow L-M to concentrate on F-35A and F-35B.

To cover this loss, allow Navy to buy updated F/A-18E/F aircraft (Boeing would love to do a Block III variant with the right funding to fix the fundamental range and performance issues of the design over the longer term) to fill the majority of their air combat aircraft needs. This would allow GE to remain in the fighter engine market with evolved F414 designs, Boeing to remain in the fighter market with an improved product and would allow the program to kill the "alternate engine" once and for all and devote these funds to ramping up the development program and getting to the operational Block variants of the aircraft (Block IV/V and beyond) quicker.

Allow the Navy to get into the LO fighter game by operating a smaller number of F-35B aircraft off their carriers, in tandem with USMC, to provide USN with LO strike and air defence capabilities and replace the remainder of their legacy Hornets in the meantime. The USN could then devote it's energies towards UCAV long ranged LO strike aircraft and a 6th Gen fighter to completely replace the Hornet/Super Hornet series over time.

[buglerbilly]

MoD to slash jet fighter orders as it struggles to save aircraft programme

• Defence chiefs decide UK cannot afford current plan
• Cost of 140 US-built planes has risen by £25m each

Richard Norton-Taylor guardian.co.uk,

Tuesday 12 January 2010 22.30 GMT

The F35 Joint Strike Fighters' price has risen from £37m each four years ago to £62m now.

Defence chiefs are preparing drastic cuts to the number of American stealth aircraft planned for the RAF and the Royal Navy's proposed new carriers, the Guardian has learned.

They will be among the first casualties, with existing squadrons of Harrier and Tornado jets, of a huge shift in military spending being considered by ministers, officials and military advisers.

As they head towards their biggest and most painful shakeup since the second world war, a consensus has emerged among the top brass that they can not afford the 140 American Joint Strike Fighters (JSF) they have been seeking.

The JSF, or F35 as it is now called, has been subject to costly delays and the estimated price has soared from £37m each four years ago to more than £62m today.

One compromise would be for the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to halve its order from 140 planes to 70.

There is also a growing view that Britain will not be able to afford to build the two large aircraft carriers, already delayed, let alone the planes due to fly from them.

"The carriers are under real threat. There will certainly be a big reduction in JSF numbers," a well-placed military source told the Guardian.

"The carriers are about more fast jets. They are very hard to justify," added a defence official, referring to a growing consensus that the RAF already has too many fast jets.

If the order was halved, it would probably be split so that there was a short take-off and vertical landing (Stovl) version for the carriers, and a conventional version based at RAF ground stations.

Among other options being considered are: downsizing the second carrier to a much cheaper platform for helicopters, marine commandos, and unmanned drones; building both carriers but selling one, perhaps to India; and equipping them with cheaper catapult-launched aircraft.

No decisions will be made until after the general election. However, there is a consensus developing in the MoD that Britain simply cannot afford existing plans to build two large carriers in a project which, if the JSF planes are included, would cost an estimated £25bn.

The view is that it is extremely difficult to justify at a time when troops in Afghanistan are being deprived of helicopters and surveillance systems – including unmanned drones – which provide badly needed intelligence about what insurgents and suspected terrorists are up to.

The two proposed carriers, the Queen Elizabeth, due to go into service in 2016, and the Prince of Wales, due to follow in 2018, are already £1bn over the original estimated cost of £3.9bn. This excludes the cost of any aircraft flying from them.

The money spent on carriers and their jets is even more difficult to justify, say critics, at a time when the navy is getting six new frigates at £1bn apiece and a replacement for the Trident nuclear ballistic missile system, which ministers say could cost £20bn while admitting they do not know what the final figure will be.

A decision on the proposed new Trident submarine's basic design contract – due last September – has been put back. "Further time has been required to ensure that we take decisions based on robust information," the defence secretary, Bob Ainsworth, told MPs before Christmas.

The final cost of Trident could amount to £97bn over the system's 30-year life, according to Greenpeace. The MoD has not challenged the figures.

What is likely to be a debate with much blood on the carpet was triggered last autumn by General Sir David Richards, soon after he became head of the army. "We cannot go back to operating as we might have done even 10 years ago when it was still tanks, fast jets, and fleet escorts that dominated the doctrine of our three services," he said. "The lexicon of today is non-kinetic effects teams [carrying out 'hearts and minds' operations], counter-IED [improvised explosive devices], information dominance, counter-piracy, and cyber attack and defence."

Richards warned that even large states such as China and Russia could adopt unconventional tactics rather than preparing for fighting with missiles and fixed formations of troops and armour. "Attacks are likely to be delivered semi-anonymously through cyberspace or the use of guerrillas and Hezbollah-style proxies," he said.

The First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope, and Sir Stephen Dalton, the head of the RAF, have publicly challenged Richards's argument, saying it is dangerous to assume the days of "state against state" warfare are over.

However, all agree that the defence budget is under unprecedented pressure. Malcolm Chalmers, professorial fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, estimates the MoD will have to cut its budget by up to 15%, and possibly more, by 2016. If future cuts fall disproportionately on capital projects then the MoD could be one of the hardest-hit departments after the general election, whoever wins it.

The annual defence budget is about £35bn, not including the cost of operations in Afghanistan, which are running at about £4bn a year and are paid for out of the Treasury's contingency fund.

[buglerbilly]

Gates Sacks Stealth Jet Chief, Blasts ‘Troubling Record’ of Crucial Plane

By Noah Shachtman February 1, 2010 | 1:45 pm

If the Pentagon doesn’t get its Joint Strike Fighter just right, the U.S. military is screwed. Which is why its a such serious, serious problem this stealthy, all-purpose jet has had such a “troubling performance record,” according to Defense Secretary Robert Gates. Things have gone so wrong that Gates just announced he’s sacking the head of the star-crossed, nearly $350 billion program and is withholding hundreds of millions of dollars in performance fees to JSF-maker Lockheed Martin. “When things go wrong, people will be held accountable,” Gates told reporters.

The Air Force, the Marines, and the Navy are all counting on the stealthy F-35 Joint Strike Fighter to serve as its aircraft of the future, replacing everything from the A-10 to the F-16 to the F/A-18. It’s meant to knock out the most advanced missile sites, spot the most elusive terrorists, and win dogfights with the most sophisticated jets from Russia or China — all at a fraction of the price of the much-ballyhooed F-22 Raptor. Gates calls it the “backbone” of “American air superiority.” Without the promise of the JSF, Gates would’ve never convinced Congress to stop production of the Raptor, the Air Force’s most advanced dogfighter. By the time the program ends, there are supposed to be more than 2,400 of the planes in the American inventory, flying off of aircraft carriers, taking off from a conventional runway, or zipping straight up into the sky.

That is, if the JSF program works as planned. So far, that performance has “not been what it should” Gates said. Total costs have ballooned by more than 45% since the program’s inception. According to some reports, the stealth jet isn’t even that stealthy. Its engines run the risk of burning holes in the decks of the ships its supposed to lift off from. Final tests for the plane could be pushed back until as late as 2016, a two-year delay.

For all these troubles — and more — Gates has fired the JSF program manager, two-star Major General David Heinz. In his place, he’ll install a three-star officer. Gates will hold back $614 million in performance awards to Lockheed Martin — a withholding the defense contractor won’t fight.

The Pentagon will spend $11 billion on the JSF next year, buying 43 planes. That’s about as much as this year’s F-35 purchase. But the program will be restructured, adding 13 more months of research and testing. Gates told the Pentagon press corps that he’s now confident the program will be able to go forward. “There are no insurmountable problems, technological or otherwise,” he said. But such assurances have been made before.

[Gubler, A.]

Here's a more of an actual report about the change at F-35 HQ rather than the opinion piece above:

F-35 Chief Fired, Money Withheld From Lockheed
By michael hoffman , defensenews.com
Published: 1 Feb 2010 15:22

U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates fired the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program manager Feb. 1, saying someone must be held accountable for the program's delays and cost overruns.

News of the dismissal of U.S. Marine Corps Maj. Gen. David R. Heinz came at the beginning of a media briefing about the fiscal 2011 defense budget, released a short time earlier. The proposed budget, which must be approved by Congress, includes $10.7 billion for 43 F-35s.

"To now move forward in this program in a realistic way, one cannot absorb the additional costs that we have in this program and the delays without people being held accountable," Gates told reporters at the briefing, televised live on The Pentagon Channel. "If I have set one tone here at the Department of Defense - when things go wrong, people will be held accountable."

Gates did not name a replacement for Heinz but did say he will upgrade the position from a two-star billet to a three-star billet. A Pentagon spokesman did not know if the program's deputy manager, U.S. Air Force Maj. Gen. C.D. Moore, will take over in an acting role.

In addition to firing Hines, Gates announced the Defense Department is withholding $614 million in performance fees from the F-35's lead maker, Lockheed Martin. The company will not oppose the action, he said.

Late last year, an internal Pentagon report showed the new stealth fighter was so far behind schedule that DoD would have to spend as much as $16.6 billion to get its largest weapons program back on track. At that time, Pentagon acquisitions chief Ashton Carter told Lockheed Martin officials that the company would have to help pay the cost overruns.

The Annual Report of the Pentagon's Director of Operation Test and Evaluation, released in January, showed the F-35 program flew only 16 of the 168 test flights scheduled for 2009. The test flights could not be flown due to delays in aircraft deliveries, which set the program back another year.

ENDS

Its unfortunate for Heinz who before a year ago was only running the F-35 production line side and not the development program. But moving the PEO from a newly minted 2 star position to a 3 star is good news for the program.

[buglerbilly]

DATE:02/02/10

SOURCE:Flight InternationalSINGAPORE 2010: Lockheed may deliver more F-35s than DOD buys

By Stephen Trimble

Although the Department of Defense has announced slashing four F-35 jets and firing the government's programme manager, Lockheed Martin says it could deliver more aircraft in 2013 than the military pays for to keep unit costs from spiralling upwards.

The DOD may allow Lockheed the "opportunity" to deliver more F-35s than specifically on contract, says George Standridge, Lockheed vice president for business development, told Flightglobal at the Singapore airshow.

Under this scenario, Lockheed would continue to build jets based on prices set in the 2007 selected acquisition report. Meanwhile, the DOD has decided to fund the programme based on higher cost projections set by the second annual review by the Joint Estimating Team. For the same price, Lockheed may be able to deliver more than 43 jets.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates acknowledged that possibility when he announced the budget cuts in a briefing at the Pentagon on 1 February. Gates described the Fiscal 2011 budget request as seeking a "buy of 43 aircraft and possibly more, depending on contractor performance".

Gates also announced that F-35 programme executive officer Brig Gen David Heinz will be replaced by three-star general. Before his dismissal, Heinz had actually been selected for promotion to major general, so Gates' move elevates the position's standing from two-star rank to three-star rank.

Asked if Lockheed also anticipates a change of leadership, Standridge did not give a direct reply. But he acknowledged that Lockheed accepts that the DOD will hold the company accountable for its performance. For his part, Gates announced that he will withhold $614 million in performance fees from Lockheed. "The taxpayers should not have to bear the entire burden of getting the [F-35] programme back on track," Gates says.

The procurement cuts increase the pressure on Lockheed to keep reducing unit costs for the F-35, especially as foreign partners are expected to start buying jets within the next two years.

Meanwhile, Lockheed also confirms that Singapore has started receiving classified briefings on the F-35. Singapore and Israel are both security cooperation partners on the programme.

[buglerbilly]

Ares

A Defense Technology Blog

New F-35 Manager Undecided -- USAF and Navy Battle

Posted by David A. Fulghum at 2/2/2010 9:00 AM CST

A major surprise to come out of the Fiscal 2011 budget request was a change in the Pentagon’s management of the delay-plagued F-35 program.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced the change but not the new executive. That’s because it has yet to be picked. The naming has been delayed while the Air Force and Navy battle over the new three-star slot.

The post was originally a one-star slot, the current program executive is Marine Corps Maj. Gen. Gary Heinz and his so-far unnamed replacement will be a three-star.

A battle went on over the last week to see if the replacement would again be from the Navy or if the Air Force would move into the new three-star slot. Two USAF names in circulation were Lt. Gen. Mark Shackelford, Military. Dep to the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for acquisition chief, a former program lead on the F-22 program; and Maj. Gen. C.D. Moore, the JSF program’s current deputy who is also an F-22 veteran.

But multiple officials with insight into the selection process say that while there is no selectee yet, it will be someone from the Navy or Marine Corps.


David A. Fulghum wrote:
Early word this morning is that the Navy is vetting Rear Adm. Venlet for the F-35 three-star job. Here's some bio material on the ex-Marine.
Rear Admiral Douglas J. Venlet is a former enlisted Marine. He graduated from Michigan State University in 1982 receiving a bachelors degree in Political Science. He also attended the U.S. Naval War College earning a masters degree in national security and strategic studies, and is a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College. Venlet served at sea in USS Clifton Sprague (FFG-16), USS Stark (FFG-31) and USS Fox (CG-33). He was executive officer aboard USS Mobile Bay (CG-53), and commanded USS Wadsworth (FFG-9) and USS Chosin (CG-65). Both ships under his command were awarded a total of three Battle Efficiency awards, and Chosin was awarded the Spokane Trophy for warfighting excellence.

Ashore, he was assigned as a cryptologic officer at the Naval Communication Station Rota, Spain; as an instructor of Combat Systems at Surface Warfare Division Officer School; as speechwriter and executive assistant to Commander, Naval Surface Force Pacific Fleet; as the Asia/Pacific regional manager at the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization; as an executive assistant to the Director of the Navy Staff; as deputy executive secretary of the National Security Council in the Executive Office of the President; as a fellow with the Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group; and as the branch head for Strategic Concepts, Strategy and Policy Division (N5SP), Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

2/2/2010 9:51 AM CST

[Tim]

Graham Thompson of MBDA talks about ASRAAM/Meteor integration for the F-35. Originally posted on the DEW line, many thanks to SpudmanWP for uploading the video to youtube (does he post here?)

[buglerbilly]

Pentagon Official Confirms 1-Year Delay For JSF

By JOHN REED

Published: 16 Feb 2010 16:10

Pentagon officials on Feb. 16 confirmed Deputy Defense Secretary Bill Lynn's announcement one day prior that the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program will be delayed by about one year.


The Pentagon confirmed delay of the F-35, shown above, one day after a noteworthy speech in Australia by its No. 2 official. (CHERIE CULLEN / U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE)

The Pentagon's No. 2 official said this week that the jet's development schedule would slip between 12 months and 13 months despite an aggressive restructuring of the program that was announced earlier this month.

"The development was originally projected to last an additional 30 months; we think with the additional test aircraft it will be closer to a delay of about 12 or 13 months, but I can't give you the cost numbers," The Australian newspaper quoted Lynn as saying during a speech at a shipyard in South Australia. He did not say if this would affect the delivery timeline for the JSF.

The delay is due to the integration of additional test aircraft that were mandated under the restructuring, which also extended system development and design (SDD) until 2015, according to a Pentagon official.

"That is a true statement, the driver on this is the test aircraft," the official said Feb. 16. "The driver on this whole thing, about a year, is due to the additional test aircraft."

Like Lynn, the official would not comment on how this will affect the delivery schedule for the plane. The U.S. Marine Corps is set to get its first F-35s in 2012, with the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy scheduled to receive their jets in 2013 and 2014, respectively.

On Feb. 1, Steve O'Bryan, Lockheed's vice president for F-35 business development, told reporters that while the jet's flight tests are roughly six months behind schedule, the company will deliver the plane in time to meet the Marines' initial operating capability date of 2012.

"I think you'll see that we're going to deliver all the SDD jets by the end of this year and get them in flight test," O'Bryan said.

Under the Pentagon's restructuring that was announced Feb. 1, Defense Secretary Robert Gates ordered an additional test jet and $2.8 billion be put into the extended F-35 SDD, withheld more than $600 million in performance fees from Lockheed, cut planes from F-35 acquisition coffers and fired Marine Corps Maj. Gen. David Heinz, the Pentagon's F-35 program manager.

The Defense Department is requesting $10.7 billion in its 2011 budget to continue development on the F-35 and purchase 43 of the planes.

[Exsandgroper]

Top-gun fighter in a spin Cameron Stewart, Associate editor From: The Australian February 19, 2010 12:00AM

Cost blow-outs, delays and doubts over the Joint Strike Fighter's capabilities are causing concern in the defence community here and in the US

MILITARY chiefs in Canberra were unamused when US Defence Secretary Robert Gates publicly savaged the performance of the Joint Strike Fighter project early this month.

Gates's candid and unexpected outburst, in which he cited the fighter's "troubling performance record" stood in stark contrast to almost everything the Australian Defence Force and the federal government have told Australians about the new warplane.

"[Gates] must have come as a bit of a shock to them," says Hugh White, a former deputy defence secretary and professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University.

"The project is starting to look distinctly pear-shaped. The [Australian] government and the air force have talked it up too far."

There is no defence project in this country that enjoys such a sacred-cow status as the $16 billion plan to purchase 100 JSFs, or F-35 fighters, to form the rump of Australia's future air force.

At the senior levels of the Defence Department, the F-35 remains the chosen aircraft and, as one military insider told The Australian this week: "To question the F-35 inside the Defence Department is a dangerous career move."

In other words, there is a disturbing vacuum of critical analysis and alternative viewpoints.

"I don't think they [Defence officials] are seriously contemplating any other options," says Andrew Davies, of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

Both the Defence Department and the government maintain a determined firewall of silence about setbacks in the $300bn US-led project and frequently deploy aggressive spin to portray the troubled project in the kindest possible light.

Even when Gates sacked the head of the project this month because it was beset by cost overruns and delays, Defence tried to spin it into good news, issuing a press release saying it "welcomes the decisive action by the US government to reduce risk in the F-35 program".

"Take a look at that press release," says Davies.

"It welcomed the restructuring of the program. Why is the third major restructuring in eight years greeted with applause?"

No amount of spin can hide the fact Gates believes there are serious problems with the F-35, which is already years behind schedule and nearly 50 per cent above its originally estimated cost.

His comments raise questions about why there is not a more honest policy debate in this country about the implications for Australia of an increasingly troubled F-35 program.

"I think the JSF will be a disappointment," White says.

"It will be more expensive than we expected, it will perform worse that we hoped and it will be later than expected.

" But it may still be the best plane for Australia; I am not convinced it is the wrong aeroplane."

The Howard government controversially chose the F-35 in 2002, when the plane was still on the drawing board, with virtually no serious analysis of other warplanes. It was a gamble the government took on the basis that the promised features of the "fifth generation" F-35, including stealth, range, payload, land strike and air defence, provided a better overall capability than other existing "fourth generation" fighters already in service, such as the F-15e, Typhoon, Rafale and Gripen.

Another attraction was the promise that the F-35 would be cheaper than the other options in the long term because the US was building about 2500 of the planes for its own military, providing an economy of scale in purchase costs and maintenance.

As The New York Times said this month: "The Joint Strike Fighter was supposed to be the program that broke the mould, proof that the Pentagon could build something affordable, dependable and without much drama.

"But rather than being the Chevrolet of the skies, as it was once billed, the fighter plane has turned into the Pentagon's biggest budget-buster."

The risk for Australia is that the F-35 is an ambitious hi-tech, futuristic project that is very vulnerable to setbacks.

Eight years on, those risks have come to haunt the project and have raised concerns that the F-35 -- which Australia initially hoped to receive in 2012 -- may not be in operational service with the RAAF until the early 2020s.

The RAAF expects to introduce its first operational squadron of F-35s in 2018-19, with three squadrons, or 72 aircraft, in service by 2021.

During the past eight years, White says, the Defence Department and the government have "clung to unrealistic expectations" that the JSF will somehow "defy gravity" and be better, cheaper and deadlier than all other fighters.

Increasingly the F-35 project is looking like a re-run of the F-111 strike bomber story.

Prime minister Robert Menzies ordered the developmental plane in 1963, only to see it delivered many years late and more than four times the original cost.

The F-35, which is being developed by about 7000 people at Lockheed Martin's headquarters in Fort Worth, Texas, has suffered serious problems with its weight, software and stealth technology, causing blow-outs in its production schedules and costs.

Some critics fear the final result will be a warplane that is unable to match it with other new warplanes, including the Russian Sukhoi PAK FA being developed for the Russian air force to compete with the F-35.

Only five test-flight F-35 planes have flown and the test-flight program is at least six months behind schedule.

Less than one-third of all planned flights in the past three years have actually taken place.

But while there is a disturbing disconnect between the Australian government's rhetoric about the F-35 program and the reality, this does not mean that the F-35, when it does finally arrive, will not be a potent and highly effective plane for Australia, just as the F-111 was.

ASPI's Davies says that while the program is experiencing some serious setbacks, these are not yet any worse than those experienced by similar large military equipment programs in the past.

"In terms of historical programs, it is now sitting about where you would expect it to be," he says.

"But it is also similar in relation to costs, which is disappointing for a program which was sold as being cheaper."

The RAAF, which has pushed the F-35 strongly for the past eight years, is concerned about the potential for further delays. The RAAF's existing frontline fighter fleet is in transition, with the F-111 ageing strike bombers due to be retired at the end of this year.

A squadron of F/A-18 Super Hornets is due to arrive in 2010-11 to offset the loss of the F-111s. But the other half of Australia's fighter force -- the F/A-18 Hornets -- is also ageing fast and it will be an expensive struggle to keep them in the air in sufficient numbers until the F-35 arrives in 2018.

If the F-35 is delayed further -- which is probable -- then the government will face some difficult choices about its future air force.

One option would be to purchase a second squadron of Super Hornets, but that is unpopular with Defence chiefs who remain sunnily optimistic that the F-35 program will get back on track.

In November last year, Australia became the first of the eight international partner countries in the F-35 project to commit to buying the fighter, ordering 14 F-35s, with a decision on the size of the second batch to be made in 2012.

The aim of this staggered purchase was to buy most of the RAAF's F-35s later in the production cycle to drive down costs.

But White is concerned that there is not enough flexibility in this plan and that Australia is failing to keep its options open.

"Just because the government says it is buying the JSF does not mean it should not keep [future purchases] under review," he says.

"The government needs to do something [that] no one has done in this entire process and that is to make a serious judgment about what it wants air combat to do in the period 2020 to 2040.

"Given what we know about JSF now and about other options, does the JSF remain the most cost-effective solution? But nobody wants to answer these types of questions. There is no capacity or desire to undertake such a detailed, painful and potentially politically inconvenient study."

The F-35 will be the nation's largest defence purchase, yet there is virtually no informed debate about it among decision-makers in Canberra. The Liberals, having chosen the plane back in 2002, are reluctant to question it, while Labor, which endorsed the F-35 after it won office in 2007, is also tethered to the program.

The government's continued confidence in the F-35 program reflects the fact the US simply cannot afford for the plane to fail. Gates has already cancelled the only viable alternative -- the highly capable but highly expensive F-22 -- leaving the US Air Force heavily reliant on the F-35.

Gates knows this, which is why he is venting his anger so openly at those responsible for failures in the F-35 program.

"When things go wrong, people will be held accountable,' Gates said bluntly as he announced the sacking this month of the head of the F-35 program, David Heinz.

As The New York Times editorialised: "This insistence on accountability would be considered normal in most private businesses. But it is virtually unheard of in the cosy world of military procurement."

For Australia, the F-35 has been a bizarre love story.

It was sold to the government off the drawing board in 2002 by slick arms salesmen from Lockheed Martin, who convinced then defence minister Robert Hill to abandon a proper tender competition to choose the RAAF's next-generation fighter.

In the years since, the project has sputtered and puffed its way forward, missing deadlines and posting only modest achievements to date.

Gates has recognised that this is not good enough.

Perhaps it is time for the Australian government also to take a more critical view of the F-35 and keep studying other options, just in case.


Cheers

[Gubler, A.]

Top-gun fighter in a spin Cameron Stewart, Associate editor From: The Australian February 19, 2010 12:00AM

Cost blow-outs, delays and doubts over the Joint Strike Fighter's capabilities are causing concern in the defence community here and in the US


A feedback loop between a reporter and a commentator... No facts needed...

[Exsandgroper]

Scientists warned defence department against Joint Strike Fighter
Cameron Stewart From: The Australian February 25, 2010 12:00AM

Defence study warned that the new Joint Strike Fighter would be a high-risk venture for Australia, admitting that the plane had weaknesses, including poor engine thrust that made it difficult to dodge missiles.
The blunt criticisms of the warplane contained in the study by Defence scientists in 2000 have never been aired publicly by the government.

But the Defence Science and Technology Organisation study, obtained by The Australian, was far more critical of the other fighter jet options available to Australia if it did not choose the JSF.

The document uses highly undiplomatic language to trash the performance of the warplanes used by Australia's closest allies.

The DSTO study, described as a "first-cut analysis" of Australia's future fighter needs, was written two years before the Howard government signed up to the US-led JSF program in 2002, abandoning the tender process and stunning aircraft manufacturers.

Titled "A Preliminary Assessment of Inhabited Platforms for AIR6000" and written by the DSTO's Graeme Murray and David Carr, the study is significant because it is one of only a handful of studies that looked at alternatives to the JSF.

The government plans to buy 100 JSFs for $16 billion in what will be the largest Australian defence purchase in history.

The DSTO report, written at a time when the JSF existed only on paper, said that if Australia signed on to the JSF program, it would be doing so without knowing the plane's final capability and costs.

"JSF has present serious shortfalls in engine performance and incomplete sensor-fusion capability," the DSTO said.

"The aircraft lacks engine thrust in the baseline configuration due to the high weight, affecting the use of manoeuvrability to defeat missile attack."

It also warned of hi-tech risks in the program because of tight schedule and cost targets, but it gave the plane strong marks for its stealth, range, payload and its "all weather, 24-hour lethality".

It said the JSF would not be cheaper to acquire than other fighters, but would be cheaper to maintain and service.

The study favours the JSF over other options and is blunt about the shortcomings of Australia's other fighter options. It describes the US F-16 used by the US Air Force as having a weak airframe and poor stealth.

"Old airframe lacks agility to outmanoeuvre missiles and has a small internal fuel capacity," the DSTO said of the F-16.

It said Europe's Typhoon fighter had limited strike capability and was unreliable.

"Present (strike) capability is lacking due to limited sensors and weapons carrying capability," it said of the Typhoon.

"Low reliability will mean high costs to operate."

It said Sweden's Gripen fighter had poor stealth, an underdeveloped electronic warfare system and payload and range limitations.

The DSTO found that the earlier version of the F/A-18E Super Hornet -- not the Block II version that has since been purchased by Australia -- was underpowered, lacked endurance and "risks being shot from behind with a radar-guided missile".

The US F-15E lacked stealth while France's Rafale had an unreliable and weak engine.

"The F-15E is good now, but not likely to be defensible in the expected electronic warfare environment in the 2010 timeframe," the DSTO said. "Rafale has short-term shortfalls in engine and radar performance."

The DSTO said the F-22 fighter -- the production of which was recently cancelled by US Defence Secretary Robert Gates -- had limited strike capability and was very expensive.

Despite these criticisms, the study recommended narrowing Australia's choice of a new fighter jet to only three: the JSF, the American F-15E and the French Rafale.

Cheers

[McDethWivFries]

Interesting...

[Gubler, A.]

Starts with:


Scientists warned defence department against Joint Strike Fighter

And then says:


The study favours the JSF over other options and is blunt about the shortcomings of Australia's other fighter options.

Hello!!!

Anyone home at the Australian???

“against” does not mean the same thing as “favours”!!!

[buglerbilly]

Skelton Disses Gates’ F136 Study

By Colin Clark Thursday, February 25th, 2010 12:38 pm

The chairman of the House Armed Services Committee called Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ principal arguments against the F136 “short-​​sighted” and largely dismissed them.

Skelton, who was joined by the leadership of his committee in asking Gates for the s-​​called “business case” study, issued this statement:

“Yesterday, I was finally provided with a copy of the ‘business case’ upon which Secretary Gates based his decision to oppose the development of the competitive engine for the F-​​35. While the committee is still reviewing the analysis, it appears that the Department’s approach focuses on near-​​term costs to the exclusion of what the committee sees as the long-​​term benefits of this program. The costs of the second engine in the next few years must be balanced against the fact that life-​​cycle costs of having two engines are comparable to having only one. The Department’s analysis does not consider the risk that a single engine would present not only to our fighter force, but to our national security, given that the F-​​35 will account for 95 percent of our nation’s fighter fleet. With this program, as with all others, we cannot use near-​​sighted vision when long-​​term security is at stake. I look forward to continuing the dialogue on this program with my colleagues and the Department of Defense. But I remain unconvinced that terminating the alternate engine program makes sense.”

Rep. Norm Dicks, chair of the HAC-​​D, will probably have the next word in this debate.

[buglerbilly]

Ares

A Defense Technology Blog

New Doc: Biz Case Analysis for Killing F136

Posted by Amy Butler at 2/26/2010 4:03 PM CST

In a Feb. 24 report, the Defense Dept.'s CAPE director, Christine Fox, outlines the department position on terminating the F136.

This report was long-sought by lawmakers, who have been adding funding for F136 back into the budget since February 2006 (when the Fiscal 2007 first deleted money for F136). The total Congressional add is about $1.3 billon since the Pentagon walked away from the program.

This copy is incomplete. Other pieces of the report were deemed proprietary or for official use only.

Also, you'll see some points included from Hill staffers -- including that the decision lacked inclusion of non calculable factors, including the risk of a grounding if an engine problem crops up and a back up isn't ready.

Bottom line -- even the Pentagon acknowledges that two engines or one is cost neutral.

[buglerbilly]

'Data deluge day' for F-35

By Stephen Trimble on March 2, 2010 1:22 AM

You probably thought when Secretary of Defense Bob Gates killed the Lockheed Martin F-22 last year, it was a good thing for the F-35. I'm not so sure anymore. I think Gates simply shifted everyone's target. As the MOST EXPENSIVE WEAPONS PROGRAM IN HISTORY, Lockheed's F-35 program, with its nearly $11 BILLION ANNUAL PRICE TAG (and that's only the US-funded portion), faces F-22-like scrutiny, but now with an unprecedented level of public disclosure.

I spent most of my day reading the 25 reports posted by the Defense Contracts Management Agency (DCMA), an unexpectedly public archive that tramples all over the proprietary secrecy usually reserved for aerospace assembly lines.

The DCMA's disclosure is an extraordinary and unprecedented gesture. Sure, many pages are redacted, but, even so, I do not believe that a major weapons program has ever faced this level of exposure.

How do we interpret all of this data? Carefully.

DCMA reports, by their nature, have to be a bit unfair. DCMA's auditors aren't looking to provide a balanced perspective. The monthly action reports are about finding problems -- and fixing them. That said, the DCMA reports show the F-35 has been having more problems than even some of its critics realized, and they haven't been getting fixed either. It will take me another day or two to process all of it.

Meanwhile, the F-35 data dump keeps rolling.

Ashton Carter's office has released an acquisition decision memorandum on the F-35 that postpones full-rate production 13 months. It adds another year of low-rate production, plus adds four jets to the flight test program, including one new carrier variant and three converted low-rate production aircraft.

Last, but not least, a scathingly critical report on the F-35 program has appeared in Holland. Johan Boeder, a software entrepreneur who tracks the global F-35 supply chain on Saturdays and evenings, has posted an English-language briefing on the F-35. Boeder first presented the brief two weeks ago before the standing defence committee of the Dutch Parliament. His findings are worth reading.

http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/the-dewline/

[buglerbilly]

Ares

A Defense Technology Blog

CEOs, Armaments Directors to Meet in Ft. Worth on JSF

Posted by Amy Butler at 3/2/2010 12:21 PM CST

The armaments directors of eight partner nations and the United States (Ashton Carter) are meeting this week with the CEOs of top partners building the Joint Strike Fighter.

The event is one of two CEO conferences expected in 2010; there are usually two per year. This one is set to be held at Lockheed Martin's final assembly facility in Fort Worth, Texas.

The top CEOs will include those from Lockheed Martin, BAE and Northrop Grumman on the airframe side as well as those from Pratt & Whitney, General Electric and Rolls Royce on the engine side.

This is sure to be a lively meeting. It is taking place in the midst of a restructuring of the development program. And, Pentagon leaders seem to be concluding that the dreaded Nunn McCurdy 50% cost breach is inevitable -- triggering a mandatory review of alternatives. I'm sure the partners want to know how much their airplanes will cost just like we do in the U.S.

Air Force Secretary Michael Donley says no alternatives exist ... but I wonder if F-22 advocates won't dig up their arguments for keeping that line open.

Also likely to be a discussion is what happens with the F136, which Defense Secretary Robert Gates has vowed to kill or propose a veto over. The United Kingdom wants it, and some other nations may opt for it if it is offered. The 2006 MOU with partner nations includes language indicating the two engines would be available, so it is a logical question if the partners feel stiffed by the U.S. backing out on it.

Also, partners are likely to discuss the impact of the delayed testing schedule and production on their in service dates.

[buglerbilly]

DoD Memo Formalizes F-35 Program Overhaul

By JOHN REED

The Pentagon's top weapons buyer late last week formalized the restructuring to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, extending the plane's test phase to 2015 and delaying the start of its full production by 13 months to November of that year.

In a separate event, U.S. Air Force Secretary Michael Donley today told reporters today that the service is delaying its initial operational capability date for the JSF to 2015, two years after the service originally planed to field its first operational F-35 squadron.

In a three-page acquisition decision memorandum (ADM) published Feb. 24, Ashton Carter outlined the U.S. Defense Department's rationale behind the retooling of the F-35 program that saw the government program manager for the program fired, cut production buys of the aircraft and extended its development phase to 2015.

The restructuring was done after numerous analyses by the Pentagon's Joint Estimating Team (JET) and other groups led Defense Secretary Robert Gates to believe that the program was going to breach the Nunn-McCurdy statute capping per-unit cost growth on major weapons.

Gates' restructuring of the program - as well as an ongoing DoD-wide F-35 program review that began in November - were done with the Pentagon thinking "as though" the program had breached the statute, according to the ADM.

"While the JET II was only an estimate, the Review was undertaken as though the JSF program was in Nunn-McCurdy breach," said the memo, first reported by the Web site DoDBuzz. A copy was obtained by Defense News.

Carter expects the Pentagon to receive 122 fewer F-35s over the next five years than it had planned last year, the memo said.

"No fundamental technology or manufacturing problems were discovered in the Review," the memo said.

The ADM formally orders the JSF program to extend system development and design to 2015, delay the start of full-rate production to later that year, add four test jets to SDD, add $2.8 billion to the test phase of the program and withhold $614 million in performance award fees from Lockheed Martin.

Gates announced the retooling during a Feb. 1 news conference at the Pentagon where he unveiled the department's budget.

All of this is being done in an effort to get the program back on track after Pentagon estimates predicted that the program was up to 30 months behind schedule. Defense Department officials have said that, even with the restructuring, the F-35 will still be 13 months late.

The ADM also allows for the purchase of additional F-35s using any excess money in the program's budget should Lockheed and the government program office be able to "execute program development and or deliver aircraft at lower costs."

The document describes 2010 as a critical year for the F-35 with the "completion of hundreds of test flights, commencement of flight testing at Eglin [Air Force Base, Fla.,] and other key milestones planned."

The Navy is also considering slipping its initial operational capability date for the plane, and along with the Air Forces, is eyeing extending the service lives of its existing fighters.

This comes after a number of monthly progress reports written by the Defense Contract Management Agency from late 2009 show the program to have experienced a number of hiccups at Lockheed's Fort Worth, Texas, F-35 production facility.

These reports, released by the Center for Defense Information (CDI), show that between July and November of last year, the F-35 production line was being "cannibalized" to support the test program and that low-rate initial production delivery schedule for the plane was an average of 80 days late and that F-35 parts were arriving late from the suppliers 25 percent of the time. Later in the fall, the program experienced a quality verification stand-down, which focused on software issues with the aircraft, according to CDI.

[buglerbilly]

Carter To Brief F-35 Partners on Program Changes

By JOHN T. BENNETT

Published: 2 Mar 2010 17:29

U.S. defense acquisition chief Ashton Carter will huddle March 4 with other military procurement chiefs about Pentagon plans to restructure the multination F-35 fighter program, a Pentagon official says.


A Joint Strike Fighter test aircraft banks over the flightline at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla. (SENIOR AIRMAN JULIANNE SHOWALTER / U.S. AIR FORCE)

The high-level session will take place at prime contractor Lockheed Martin's F-35 production facility in Fort Worth, Texas, the official said.

During the "CEOs conference," as two sources called it, Carter will brief "his counterparts" from the eight nations that are Washington's official partners on the fifth-generation fighter effort, according to the Pentagon official.

Lockheed Martin spokesman Christian Geisel said the international meeting has been on the books since last April. Such sessions are held annually, he said.

Carter is set to explain to the other defense procurement chiefs in detail how the Pentagon has restructured the F-35 program, the official said. Also expected to be a part of the agenda is how DoD intends to revamp the program's annual budget, as well as details about Washington's adjusted yearly buy rate.

The United Kingdom is considered a "level one" partner on the effort, while Italy and the Netherlands are "level two partners," according to a Lockheed Martin fact sheet.

Australia, Canada, Denmark, Norway and Turkey are listed on the fact sheet as "level three" partners," and Israel and Singapore are "foreign military sales participants."

Senior Pentagon brass late last year began a comprehensive relook at the program after an internal DoD study group estimated additional F-35 cost growth and schedule slips were coming.

That soup-to-nuts review, led by Carter, spanned several months and culminated with changes to the program's budget, buy rate and overall schedule.

The F-35 is slated to constitute the bulk of the U.S. military's future fighter arsenal. The U.S. Air Force, Navy and Marines are each set to buy various models of the Lockheed-made warplane.

Attendees will "include Department of Defense, and U.S. industrial leaders and the senior leadership of international partner-country governments, militaries, and industries to receive the latest update of F-35 program status and to address any JSF program-related issues," Geisel said. "The attendee list, which will include officials from the U.S. services, "has been consistent from year to year," he added.

"Lockheed Martin and the JSF Program Office will present several joint program-update briefings on a variety of topics," Geisel said.

[buglerbilly]

F-35 jet program likely to cost more and face delays, Air Force chief says

By Dana Hedgpeth
Washington Post Staff Writer

Wednesday, March 3, 2010

Air Force Secretary Michael Donley said Tuesday that the Pentagon's plan for the service to use top-of-the-line fighter jets will probably cost more than originally expected and be delayed by two years.

The Joint Strike Fighter, also known as the F-35 Lightning II, is the Pentagon's most expensive weapons system and has been touted as an integral part of the military's approach to waging war in the skies in the future. The costly program involves buying aircraft for the Air Force, the Marine Corps and the Navy, plus nine U.S. allies. But building the fighter jets has been difficult, with billions of dollars in cost overruns and performance problems that Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates recently described as "troubling."

Donley told reporters Tuesday that he thought "we are going to have a slip" on the F-35 program and that the planes would probably not be ready for the Air Force until 2015. The jets were expected to be available in 2013.

The Pentagon declined to say whether there might also be delays in the F-35 program for the Marines and Navy, which are expected to use the jets starting in 2012 and 2015, respectively.

A month ago, Gates said he would fire Marine Maj. Gen. David R. Heinz, the executive officer in charge of the Joint Strike Fighter's development, and withhold $614 million from the contractor, Lockheed Martin of Bethesda.

The Obama administration is asking Congress to provide $11.4 billion overall for the Joint Strike Fighter program next year, including $8.4 billion to buy 43 planes.

Gates said in February that he believed there were "no insurmountable problems, technological or otherwise, with the F-35. . . . We are in a position to move forward with this program in a realistic way."

But the Air Force secretary's update suggests problems with the F-35 may be more severe than Pentagon officials had anticipated, industry analysts said.

"The secretary of defense reluctantly supports this program because he has no alternative," said Mackenzie Eaglen, an analyst at the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank.

"The [Joint Strike Fighter] is like a sweater. . . . You pull any thread, like pushing back on full-rate production, and things can fall apart very quickly," she said. "A delayed start date will have a ripple effect of steadily increasing the average age of the Air Force's inventory."

In a statement, Lockheed Martin said that it remains "fully-committed to the F-35 program" and that it was working toward stabilizing "cost and affordability -- and to fielding the aircraft on time."

Pentagon officials said they are in the process of restructuring the program, which involves international partners, including Britain, Italy, Turkey, Canada, Norway and Australia. Defense Department officials have been briefing legislators on Capitol Hill, industry officials and other governments on the program.

Richard Aboulafia, a vice president and defense industry analyst at the Teal Group in Fairfax County, said the cost to build the plane is now expected to be $65 million to $70 million apiece -- not counting the research and development cost. He called the growing price tag "concerning."

"This aircraft was supposed to help the military's three services replace their aging fleets," he said. "This was going to solve everyone's problems and be competitive on export markets. But with a $70 million price, you're jeopardizing both assumptions."

[Milne Bay]

RAAF relies on buffer in latest JSF delay

* Cameron Stewart and Mark Dodd
* From: The Australian
* March 04, 2010 12:00AM


THE troubled Joint Strike Fighter program has suffered another blow, with the US Air Force revealing that production problems will delay the entry of the plane into its fleet for a further two years.

The news raises fresh doubts about whether the JSF will be delivered to Australia on schedule, with the new fighter due to be handed over to the RAAF for testing in 2014, becoming operational in 2018.

US Air Force Secretary Michael Donley said he thought there would be further slippages in the $US300 million ($331m) JSF program, which meant the warplanes were unlikely to be operational for the USAF until 2015, rather than 2013 as had been planned. A Defence spokesman said yesterday that Australia still had a "buffer" in its JSF schedule, which meant it would not be affected by the USAF announcement. "If the USAF Initial Operational Capability (IOC) date is deferred from 2013 to 2015, Australia retains considerable schedule buffer as IOC for the RAAF is planned for 2018.



This allows additional time for the JSF to mature before it enters RAAF service."

Australia cannot afford further delays to the JSF because the plane which the JSF will replace, the F/A-18 hornet, is ageing and will need to be retired by 2018. The USAF's announcement of a two-year delay reflects the recent problems in the JSF program revealed by US Defence Secretary Robert Gates.

"I do think we're going to have a slip in the schedule," Mr Donley said in Washington, adding that the Pentagon needed to increase pressure on the plane's maker, Lockheed Martin. "We want to hold the contractors' feet to the fire," he said. "We want to incentivise them to make good on the promises they made earlier and deliver on schedule."

Lockheed Martin said it was working towards stabilising "cost and affordability . . . and to fielding the aircraft on time".

Earlier this week more problems were revealed in the JSF program in US government documents. The Defence Contract Management Agency documents show that as recently as last November nine test flight aircraft were more than eight months behind schedule.

According to the documents, obtained by the Fort Worth Star-Telegram newspaper, the "initial production" aircraft, to be delivered and flying this year, are running months behind schedule and are falling further behind each month.

Last month, Mr Gates publicly savaged the performance of the JSF program, citing the fighter's "troubling performance record".

Mr Gates sacked the head of the project because it was beset with cost overruns and delays, and demanded greater accountability from the whole program team. Problems with the aircraft's weight, software integration and other complex development issues have caused the fighter to be years late and nearly 50 per cent above its original estimated cost. Despite the development problems, the RAAF remains confident the JSF will be the best plane for Australia's future fighter fleet. "Our requirement is for a cutting-edge fifth-generation aircraft that provides both fighter and strike roles," air force chief Air Marshal Mark Binskin said.

[buglerbilly]

Lockheed to Speed Development of Joint Strike Fighter

(Source: U.S Department of Defense; issued March 4, 2010)

(See note at bottom)

WASHINGTON --- Defense Department leaders and Lockheed Martin executives explained to international partners changes that have been made in the Joint Strike Fighter program.

Ashton B. Carter, the department’s undersecretary for acquisition, technology and logistics, and Robert Stevens, chief operating officer for Lockheed Martin, the prime contractor for the program, explained what measures Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates has taken to right the program.

A department study of the program completed in October found the development phase of the revolutionary aircraft had slipped by 30 months. Gates has made changes that will reduce the slippage to 13 months, Carter said during a phone interview from Dallas today.

Carter was able to report to the partners that the Joint Strike Fighter program now has a realistic plan and “not a blindly optimistic one” or a “fatalistic one.”

The undersecretary also said the study identified management measures to improve performance over the coming years. “I want to emphasize that this process of independent review and aggressive management to specific milestones will continue,” he said.

Carter emphasized that the review turned up no fundamental technological or manufacturing problems with the JSF program and no failure to make military capabilities. He reiterated that the Joint Strike Fighter will be the backbone of collective air superiority for the next generation.

The report showed the JSF program was taking longer and costing more than either the government development office or the contractor had predicted, Carter said. “This schedule and cost trend was unacceptable for the taxpayers of the U.S. and for the other eight nations,” he said. “The schedule slip was estimated at 30 months in the development program. The cost of the airplanes had grown since 2002 and that for a variety of reasons the JSF program would breach the Nunn-McCurdy threshold.”

The Nunn-McCurdy law requires that Congress be notified of a cost growth of more than 15 percent in a program. It also calls for cancellation of programs for which total cost grew by more than 25 percent over the original estimate.

“We didn’t wait for the Nunn-McCurdy paperwork to play out,” the undersecretary said. “We began to review and restructure the JSF program as though it were already in Nunn-McCurdy breach and the results of that review and restructuring were subsequently described by Gates.”

Gates announced the restructuring of the JSF program – the most expensive acquisition in U.S. military history – in early February. The objective is to restore the schedule in the development program.

“We assessed that this was feasible and was possible to reduce the slip in the development program from 30 months to 13 months and that we could realistically plan on that basis provided we took some immediate management steps,” Carter said.

That means procuring one more carrier variant aircraft and additional regular aircraft to conduct flight testing “with the idea of hastening the completion of the program,” he said.

The changes also call for development of aircraft software capability.

“All of these steps were directed in the restructuring and that’s the first steps in the effort to buy back some of the slips in the development program,” Carter said.

The defense secretary did not believe it was reasonable for the customers to bear all the costs of those actions, and decided DoD would withhold $614 million of the award fee from the contract, Carter said. “We will be adjusting contract structures in the future to align contractor performance to what we need,” he said.

The restructuring allows for contractors to adopt a more realistic schedule and production ramp, and gives Lockheed Martin and subcontractors every opportunity “to accelerate production and make affordable aircraft, faster,” he said.

(EDITOR’S NOTE: The flavour of the week in Pentagon and Lockheed statements on the JSF is that nothing is “fundamentally” wrong with the program.

If that is true, how did it manage to run more than 20% over cost, and over 30 months late compared to a schedule that has already been revised three times?

Explanations may surface during unplanned hearings on the program that the Senate Armed Services Committee is scheduling for next week.)

-ends-

[buglerbilly]

As a matter of procedure I now post very little by Mr Sweetman as I believe him to be an ass especially on anything to do with F-35 BUT this article is interesting..............

Ares

A Defense Technology Blog

JSF Engine "Competition" Story Rises From The Grave

Posted by Bill Sweetman at 3/10/2010 10:32 AM CST

Catching Consultola-specialist Dr Loren Thompson in one of his loose arguments is beginning to feel a bit unsporting, like hunting kittens with a suppressed FN P90.

Not that there's anything wrong with that.

Thompson's latest venture is an impassioned assault on the F136 alternate engine for the Joint Strike Fighter, in the course of which he states:

http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/bottom-line-on-the-alternate-engine-a-waste-of-money?a=1&c=1129


GE lost a series of competitions in the early stages of the F-35 program to rival Pratt & Whitney, because Pratt was offering a more mature design based on the successful engine built for the F-22 fighter. Unwilling to accept that setback, GE organized congressional support for its alternative...

I thought that we had buried this argument a year ago, with a stake rammed through its heart. But since it's clearly a zombie, let's take a razor-honed garden shovel to the back of its mendacious head.

Once again: The government never conducted an engine competition for the JSF. The three primes going into the JSF prototype stage, in 1995-96, made their own engine choices for the prototypes only, but time and cost constraints effectively mandated engines based on the P&W F119. And since all three prototype proposals used the F119, engine competition was not a factor in the government's down-select in 1996.

And if you go to the original post, you'll find links to contemporary government statements (here and here) showing that a leader-follower dual-engine strategy for systems development and demonstration was adopted from the start of the program -- and also noting that P&W itself has uttered the same mis-statements about non-existent competitions.

Why is the F135 lobby so desperate? One possibility: they need to get the alternate engine dead and buried before they stick the Pentagon with the real bill for the engine.

The F135 is already well over budget, as this document shows:


From Navy BA-5, FY2011

The total cost today is $7.3 billion versus a $4.8 billion then-year contract signed in 2001 -- a $2.5 billion overshoot and higher than the $1.9 billion overrun reported last year. In fact, the F135 overrun is about the same as than the SDD bill for the F136. But wait, there's more.

In early 2007, before the F135/F136 fight reached anything like today's pitch, Pratt & Whitney was briefing openly on a two-step uprate program for the F135, as I reported in Jane's IDR at the time:


The JSF team has already developed a two-stage plan for boosting F135 thrust after service entry. It is divided into two spirals, synchronised to the engine maintenance lifetime : Spiral 1 is due to be ready in 2014-15 and Spiral 2 in 2020-22. Each offers about a 2,000-pound thrust boost... The first step could involve a redesigned low-pressure turbine which would be lighter and would use less cooling air. The second step – which would be ready as the engines of the first F-35Bs reach their overhaul life limits - would involve a higher-airflow core, a major redesign of the engine.

This uprating program - also reported on, at the time, by Graham Warwick - has not been talked about much since then, but continues under the XTE68 technology development effort.

http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2007/05/01/213594/military-engines-power-surge.html

The question is whether the F136 can deliver 5 or 10 per cent more thrust with less rework. GE has intimated that it can -- not because GE engineers are miracle-workers, but because the engine's design was frozen after the 2004 weight crisis.

If the power is needed -- and the UK has repeatedly said that the service-entry thrust is marginal -- that would make a big difference to the life-cycle cost comparisons between the two engines. But if the F136 is killed off, it will be too late.

[Weasel]

Lockheed to Speed Development of Joint Strike Fighter

(Source: U.S Department of Defense; issued March 4, 2010)

(See note at bottom)

WASHINGTON --- Defense Department leaders and Lockheed Martin executives explained to international partners changes that have been made in the Joint Strike Fighter program.

Ashton B. Carter, the department’s undersecretary for acquisition, technology and logistics, and Robert Stevens, chief operating officer for Lockheed Martin, the prime contractor for the program, explained what measures Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates has taken to right the program.

A department study of the program completed in October found the development phase of the revolutionary aircraft had slipped by 30 months. Gates has made changes that will reduce the slippage to 13 months, Carter said during a phone interview from Dallas today.

Carter was able to report to the partners that the Joint Strike Fighter program now has a realistic plan and “not a blindly optimistic one” or a “fatalistic one.”

The undersecretary also said the study identified management measures to improve performance over the coming years. “I want to emphasize that this process of independent review and aggressive management to specific milestones will continue,” he said.

Carter emphasized that the review turned up no fundamental technological or manufacturing problems with the JSF program and no failure to make military capabilities. He reiterated that the Joint Strike Fighter will be the backbone of collective air superiority for the next generation.

The report showed the JSF program was taking longer and costing more than either the government development office or the contractor had predicted, Carter said. “This schedule and cost trend was unacceptable for the taxpayers of the U.S. and for the other eight nations,” he said. “The schedule slip was estimated at 30 months in the development program. The cost of the airplanes had grown since 2002 and that for a variety of reasons the JSF program would breach the Nunn-McCurdy threshold.”

The Nunn-McCurdy law requires that Congress be notified of a cost growth of more than 15 percent in a program. It also calls for cancellation of programs for which total cost grew by more than 25 percent over the original estimate.

“We didn’t wait for the Nunn-McCurdy paperwork to play out,” the undersecretary said. “We began to review and restructure the JSF program as though it were already in Nunn-McCurdy breach and the results of that review and restructuring were subsequently described by Gates.”

Gates announced the restructuring of the JSF program – the most expensive acquisition in U.S. military history – in early February. The objective is to restore the schedule in the development program.

“We assessed that this was feasible and was possible to reduce the slip in the development program from 30 months to 13 months and that we could realistically plan on that basis provided we took some immediate management steps,” Carter said.

That means procuring one more carrier variant aircraft and additional regular aircraft to conduct flight testing “with the idea of hastening the completion of the program,” he said.

The changes also call for development of aircraft software capability.

“All of these steps were directed in the restructuring and that’s the first steps in the effort to buy back some of the slips in the development program,” Carter said.

The defense secretary did not believe it was reasonable for the customers to bear all the costs of those actions, and decided DoD would withhold $614 million of the award fee from the contract, Carter said. “We will be adjusting contract structures in the future to align contractor performance to what we need,” he said.

The restructuring allows for contractors to adopt a more realistic schedule and production ramp, and gives Lockheed Martin and subcontractors every opportunity “to accelerate production and make affordable aircraft, faster,” he said.

(EDITOR’S NOTE: The flavour of the week in Pentagon and Lockheed statements on the JSF is that nothing is “fundamentally” wrong with the program.

If that is true, how did it manage to run more than 20% over cost, and over 30 months late compared to a schedule that has already been revised three times?

Explanations may surface during unplanned hearings on the program that the Senate Armed Services Committee is scheduling for next week.)

-ends-

Trouble is that in 500 big budget programs that DoD has conducted in recent history, I think you might find four (4) that have either been on budget or on time.

So next time when you meet a retired 3 star with the creds of keeping a program on budget and on time... bow and grovel.. They are rare beasts.

This comes back to (I think) what people are really ticked off about. It is not the fact that any one program is over budget, as the public has faith in American know-how to get the task done. It is that the defense industry complex that President Eisenhower spoke of, is no longer interested in producing a product. Or more is the point they are interested in producing products but the products are not the products that the government want to buy. Their products are "programs" and not what the program is intended to produce.

ergo LM's products are programs , not "platforms".

And they are not alone. In fact it is the norm industry wide in this post-Rummy era.

As to the GAO whom congress look to in a heart beat. They are not much better than the contractors themselves having drunk the cool aid before moving into government.

This will all shake down and life will go on, but this apparent industry malaise highlights the importance (and power) of the US constitution. People often cite "checks and balances", well it is in the constitution that disastrous industrial epidemics like we are seeing in the defense industry have a high probablity of being filtered out and eventually self corrected. It is not a perfect document but that list of assumptions by which we live gives the USA a good 60% chance of getting whatever it encounters, "right".


cheers

w

ps and what was bill sweetman's point? I missed it.

[buglerbilly]

ps and what was bill sweetman's point? I missed it.

He doesn't like Loren Thompson.

[buglerbilly]

Super Stealth Plane Breaks Through Cost Barrier

By Nathan Hodge March 11, 2010 | 3:01 pm



The Senate Armed Services Committee held a hearing today on the future of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, and things are not looking pretty for the next-generation stealth aircraft. It’s likely the Air Force will have to declare the program has soared past a key cost-containment barrier, in addition to being more than two years behind schedule.

The Air Force will have to declare a Nunn-McCurdy breach, which could force a serious restructuring of the program, according to a Reuters story quoting Pentagon acquisition chief Ashton Carter.

A new Government Accountability Office report, issued today, puts it in simple numbers. “Total estimated acquisition costs have increased $46 billion (.pdf) and development extended 2 ½ years, compared to the program baseline approved in 2007,” the report states.

The cost per plane has risen dramatically as well: The unit cost has ballooned to $112 million per aircraft. When the “system development” phase began in October 2001, the cost was reckoned at $69 million per plane.

Aerospace journalist Bill Sweetman, who was live-blogging the hearing at Ares, notes that the average procurement cost has spiked 18 percent, just within the past three years. Poking fun at some old talking points from manufacturer Lockheed Martin, he writes: “Maybe Lockheed Martin will stop using silly numbers in public now.”

The cost figures are particularly important, considering that the F-35 was supposed to be a relatively affordable jet that would serve as the backbone of military aviation for decades to come. Michigan Sen. Carl Levin, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, made it clear that legislators were losing patience with the program.

“This raises great concern, not only about the potential for a Nunn-McCurdy breach now, but for continuing problems with the JSF program,” he said in a statement. “This Committee has been a strong supporter of the JSF program from the beginning. However, people should not conclude that we will be willing to continue that strong support without regard to increased costs coming from poor program management, or from a lack of focus on affordability. We cannot sacrifice other important acquisitions in the DOD investment portfolio to pay for this capability.”

Read More http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/#ixzz0hvK6PpAX

Read More http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/#ixzz0hvK6SbHZ

[buglerbilly]

DoD: F-35 to Breach Nunn-McCurdy Limits by 50%

By JOHN REED

Published: 11 Mar 2010 11:00

The F-35 Lightning II strike fighter program will breach the Nunn-McCurdy limits with a cost growth of more than 50 percent from the original 2001 program baseline, said a top Pentagon program evaluator.

Formal declaration of the breach will occur on April 1. (MC2 D. KEITH SIMMONS / NAVY) Christine Fox, director of DoD's Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office, told lawmakers March 11 that the formal declaration of the breach will occur on April 1.

She said the Pentagon has known of this since October. That's one month earlier than had previously been reported.

DoD's latest estimates predict that each of the jets slated to be purchased will carry a price tag of between $80 million and $95 million in 2002 dollars. That's $95 million and $113 million in 2009 dollars, respectively.

In 2001, the DoD pegged the cost per Joint Strike Fighter at $50.2 million apiece for 2,852 jets. The Pentagon updated that estimate to $69.2 million in 2007 for a planned order of 2,443 jets.

The Pentagon expects to have a final estimate on the plane's cost ready in early June, when it completes the Nunn-McCurdy re-certification package, Fox told the Senate Armed Services committee during a hearing.

Fox compared the F-35 program to earlier Pentagon aircraft that ultimately produced planes that are "valuable to DoD," such as the C-17 and the F-22. She noted that F-22 "repeatedly failed to meet key performance, schedule, and cost goals throughout its development program," yet Lockheed Martin was ultimately able to produce "a capable aircraft."

Ashton Carter, defense undersecretary for acquisition, technology, and logistics, said at the hearing that the Initial Operational Capability dates for the U.S. Air Force and Navy F-35 have been shifted to 2016, a three- and two-year delay respectively. The Marine Corps date remains 2012, he said.

The Marine aircraft will use Block 2 software, whereas the Navy and Air Force jets will use the Block 3 version.

Carter said Air Force Secretary Michael Donley would inform Congress of the breach within days.

[buglerbilly]

US will drive tough bargain on tanker deal: Gates

(AFP) – 16 hours ago

AT US MILITARY BASE IN SOUTHWEST ASIA — US Defence Secretary Robert Gates said on Thursday the Pentagon will drive a hard bargain with Boeing on a contract for a new aerial refuelling tanker after Airbus parent EADS dropped out of the competition.

"I wish that we had had a competition. I wish both companies had stayed in it," Gates said.

But he said that "we will certainly be sharpening our pencil when it comes to negotiating a contract with Boeing", the sole bidder for the troubled tanker aircraft project.

He said he saw no reason why the decision by EADS and partner Northrop Grumman to bow out would cause any further delays to "the long delayed" programme.

Gates made his remarks to members of the 380th Air Expeditionary Wing -- which carries out surveillance and air refuelling missions for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq -- at a US military base in Southwest Asia, en route for talks in Abu Dhabi.

The Pentagon chief defended the terms of the competition, saying the request for proposals had been "fair and balanced."

US aerospace giant Boeing is poised to win the 35 billion dollar (26 billion euro) contract to build the new refuelling tanker plane for the US Air Force after Northrop and European partner EADS dropped their joint offer.

European officials and EADS, which owns French-based planemaker Airbus, charged that the Pentagon altered bidding rules for the contract in order to favour Boeing's all-American offer over the European bid.

The European Commission has protested and a German minister has accused the United States of protectionism, warning that Berlin will take up the issue at the political level and at the World Trade Organisation.

Copyright © 2010 AFP. All rights reserved.

[buglerbilly]

Pratt F-35 engine cost overrun up by $600 mln

WASHINGTON, March 10 (Reuters) -

The cost overrun on the main engine for the Lockheed Martin Corp (LMT.N) F-35 fighter jet has grown by $600 million over the past year, despite tough cost-cutting measures by engine maker Pratt & Whitney, a unit of United Technologies Corp (UTX.N), a Navy document shows.

The total cost to complete the Pratt F135 engine is now estimated to be $7.28 billion -- $2.5 billion more than the $4.8 billion initially projected for the engine, according to the document, which was first reported by Aviation Week magazine on its website on Wednesday.

That is an increase of $600 million from the $1.9 billion cost overrun that was reported last year by the House Armed Services Committee.

Pratt spokeswoman Erin Dick said she was not familiar with the new number, and emphasized that the company's aggressive cost-cutting measures were taking effect.

Pratt also offered the Pentagon a double-digit percentage reduction in engine cost in its latest contract proposal.

Pentagon acquisition chief Ashton Carter had expressed concerns about cost growth on the Pratt engine last year, but endorsed Pratt's efforts to cut costs in a memo to F-35 international partners dated February 24, a copy of which was obtained by Reuters.

Carter said a special independent "Joint Assessment Team" he appointed concluded that projected cost growth on the engine could be reduced significantly by investing in affordability measures and through a renewed commitment by Pratt.

"We believe the contractor can realistically achieve its stated cost reduction goals but will continue to monitor its progress," Carter wrote in the memo.

Congressional aides said they are awaiting additional data on the cost of the engine when the Pentagon sends lawmakers an annual report on acquisition costs on April 1.

But several aides said the latest briefing they received on the F-35 program revealed continued cost growth on the main engine, a development they described as "problematic."

Carter is implementing a major restructuring of the overall F-35 program, including adding $2.8 billion more to the development phase of the program and slowing down the expected ramp up in production.

He is due to testify at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on the F-35 program on Thursday that was requested by Senator John McCain.

McCain's dogged investigation of wasteful Pentagon programs has led to major acquisition reforms in recent years.

News of the continued cost growth comes just as the Pentagon is redoubling its efforts to cancel an alternate engine for the F-35 fighter that was initiated by Congress as a hedge against problems with a single engine.

Lawmakers defied a presidential veto to fund the second engine built by General Electric Co (GE.N) and Rolls Royce last year and say they're ready to fight the Pentagon and White House to maintain the program again this year.

A recent Pentagon analysis said it would cost $2.9 billion over six years to complete work on the GE-Rolls engine, but GE and Rolls-Royce say they need just $900 million to complete the development program and $400 million more for tooling.

The Pentagon analysis also concluded that the longer term "life cycle" costs of having two engines were comparable to having only one, although it did not foresee any savings.

Reporting by Andrea Shalal-Esa; Editing by Gary Hill

[buglerbilly]

Joint Strike Fighter Faces Critical Period

(Source: U.S Department of Defense; issued March 11, 2010)

WASHINGTON --- Contracting for the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter, touted as the future backbone of U.S. air superiority, must be brought in line with budget realities to make the aircraft affordable again, a defense official said today.

Key manufacturing and testing milestones are expected for the fighter between now and 2011, Ashton B. Carter, undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics, told the Senate Armed Services Committee.

“The next two years will be critical ones for the Joint Strike Fighter,” Carter said, “with the delivery of test aircraft, … completion and analysis of hundreds of test flights, and commencement of flight training.”

Pentagon and defense industry officials made efforts last week to explain adjustments made in the wake of a Defense Department study last year that found the development phase of the revolutionary aircraft had slipped by 30 months. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates took measures to reduce the lag time to 13 months, officials said.

Early last month, Gates announced the restructuring of the program -- the most expensive acquisition in U.S. military history -- with the objective of restoring the development program schedule.

Carter, in a phone interview last week, said he was able to report to program partners, including the prime contractor Lockheed Martin, that Gates’ modifications provided the program a realistic plan instead of one that was “blindly optimistic” or “fatalistic.”

The stealthy, supersonic F-35 will replace a wide range of aging fighter and strike aircraft for the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps and eight international partners.

The Defense Department report showed the program was taking longer and costing more than either the government’s development office or the contractor had predicted, said Carter, who emphasized that the review turned up no major technological or manufacturing problems.

“This schedule and cost trend was unacceptable for the taxpayers of the U.S. and for the other eight nations,” he said in the interview last week. “The schedule slip was estimated at 30 months in the development program. The cost of the airplanes had grown since 2002, and for a variety of reasons, the JSF program would breach the Nunn-McCurdy threshold.”

The Nunn-McCurdy law requires that Congress be notified of a cost growth of more than 15 percent in a program. It also calls for cancellation of programs for which total cost grew by more than 25 percent over the original estimate.

“We didn’t wait for the Nunn-McCurdy paperwork to play out,” Carter said. “We began to review and restructure the JSF program as though it were already in Nunn-McCurdy breach, and the results of that review and restructuring were subsequently described by Gates.”

Carter reiterated to lawmakers today that reports last showed the program failed to meet expectations, and described management measures put in place to increase oversight of the program.

“Studies conducted over the past year indicate that the JSF program fell short of expectations and must be restored to affordability and a stable schedule,” he told senators.

Gates elevated the position of the JSF program executive to three-star rank, which Carter said reflected a need for experienced and vigorous management. The executive primarily will focus on three phases of the contract life: the developmental test program, the ramp-up to full production and Nunn-McCurdy cost concerns.

“I pledge that we will keep this committee fully and promptly informed of this program’s progress. We will also keep our international partners fully and promptly informed,” Carter said. “The program will benefit from the fresh eyes and experienced managerial hand of a three-star program executive officer.”

-ends-

[Weasel]

He doesn't like Loren Thompson.
oh...


I thought Loren Thompson posted here occassionally? :P

cheers

w

[buglerbilly]

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program

(Source: Australian Department of Defence; issued March 12, 2010)

The Minister for Defence, Senator John Faulkner, today confirmed that the Government remains confident the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is the right choice for the Australian Defence Force’s next-generation air combat capability, and will enable the Australian Defence Force to maintain its strategic air combat capability advantage out to 2030.

Responding to the recent developments in the JSF program, Senator Faulkner noted that the JSF program would produce over 3,000 aircraft for United States (US) Services and international partners. Senator Faulkner said, “As with all highly complex and cutting edge projects, risks are to be expected.”

“As I said on 2 February 2010, the Australian Government’s staged acquisition strategy for the JSF includes significant cost and schedule buffers to deal with project risks which will ensure initial operational capability in 2018 is met.”

“Defence will continue to maintain close and regular contact with the US to ensure the success of this vital project.”

As a result of the latest US JSF cost update, US Defense Under Secretary Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Dr Ashton Carter has told the United States Senate Armed Services Committee that he expected the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program to experience a Nunn-McCurdy funding breach.

Nunn-McCurdy is US legislation which requires Congressional review of major projects when growth in an acquisition program’s cost estimates exceeds specific thresholds. In the case of the JSF Program, the Nunn-McCurdy breach involves growth in estimated costs for the program exceeding 50 per cent since 2002.

The thorough review now required will be a continuation of the restructuring process announced by Secretary Gates on 1 February 2010 in expectation of a Nunn-McCurdy breach.

Senator Faulkner discussed JSF progress – including the implications of a potential Nunn-McCurdy breach – with US Deputy Secretary for Defense William Lynn in Canberra on 16 February 2010. Senator Faulkner said, “While risks remain, Deputy Secretary Lynn assured me that the US is fully committed to making the JSF program succeed.”

Senator Faulkner also said, “The JSF Program Office advises that no significant implications are expected for the JSF Partner countries as a result of the Nunn-McCurdy breach due to the restructuring action which has already been taken in the US.

“The adoption of a more conservative budgeting approach by the US Department of Defense for the JSF Program – particularly for early aircraft where cost risk is highest – is a sound management approach for such a large and complex project.

“Australian Defence planning has always adopted a cautious approach to JSF cost estimates by factoring in significant amounts of contingency funds to deal with cost risks,” Senator Faulkner said.


(EDITOR’S NOTE: This reaction to yesterday’s JSF hearing by the Senate Armed Forces Committee, added to Faulkner’s nonchalant reaction to the Feb. 1 announcement of the JSF’s restructuring, will inevitably cast some doubt as to whether the minister fully understands the program’s current situation, and its implications for the future.)

-ends-

[buglerbilly]

oh...
I thought Loren Thompson posted here occassionally? :P

cheers

w

Walt Disney posts here occasionally as well and the F*#kers been dead for years...............

[buglerbilly]

Navy, Marine Corps Leaders Stick to JSF Message

By christopher p. cavas

Published: 12 Mar 2010 07:04

The top officers of the Navy and Marine Corps declared their continued support for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program March 11 despite program delays and the news that the cost of the new planes will top $100 million apiece.

"We are very excited about the arrival of JSF," Marine Corps commandant Gen. James Conway said, while acknowledging development problems with the aircraft. "While we're hearing some somber things about the JSF, heat and noise [signatures] are in the general range of the legacy aircraft" the JSF will replace.

Conway noted that three F-35B short take-off or vertical landing (STOVL) development aircraft are now in tests at the Patuxent River Naval Air Station in Maryland. "I believe we're within one or two test flights of vertical launch," he said.

Navy Secretary Ray Mabus, testifying with Conway and chief of naval operations Adm. Gary Roughead before the House Appropriations Defense subcommittee, said the recent restructuring of the JSF program, "will have the effect of getting the program on the path of where it should be," with the aircraft's initial operating capability (IOC) date holding at 2012 for the Marine Corps, and 2014 for the Navy's carrier version.

"Our focus is still on making our first JSF squadron deployment in 2016," Roughead said. "The adjustments we've made will enhance that probability."

Roughead again firmly declared an alternative, second-source engine for the strike fighter is not necessary.

"We do not desire an alternative engine," he said, pointing out that all other Navy aircraft have engines from only one source. "We want to be as compact [on an aircraft carrier] as we can."

The hearing was the first Navy hearing for new defense subcommittee chairman Rep. Norm Dicks, D-Wash., who was named to the post on Wednesday, replacing Rep. John Murtha, D-Pa., who died last month.

[buglerbilly]

Navy acknowledges schedule for F-35 fighter is slipping

By Megan Scully Congress

Daily March 12, 2010

Widespread schedule delays on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program have forced Navy officials to push back the date the aircraft carrier-based version of the planes will be ready for operational use from December 2014 to January 2016, Chief of Naval Operations Gary Roughead said Thursday.

As late as last week, Roughead had hoped to maintain the 2014 date for the milestone dubbed initial operational capability, or IOC, despite plans within the Air Force to delay its portion of the program by more than two years.

But on Thursday, the four-star admiral said he had reviewed a Pentagon acquisition document detailing changes to the program, including the addition of 13 months to the F-35's development phase. Roughead said he concluded that a 13-month delay for the Navy aircraft's IOC was unavoidable.

Still, Roughead said he hopes the joint program office overseeing the F-35 effort will be able to turn the program around quickly and the Navy can recover some of the time that was lost.

The Navy has long been scheduled to receive the planes last, after the Air Force and Marine Corps get their versions.

"I'm hopeful that because we're third in line, maybe it's not a full 13 months," Roughead said after a hearing before the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee.

Roughead asserted that the delay should not affect the Navy's plans to deploy the F-35s, which were not scheduled to head to sea on a carrier until late 2016.

"I'm going to watch it like a hawk. I'm going to pay very, very close attention to it," Roughead said. "But we're setting up to still be able to deploy onboard the [USS] Carl Vinson in December of [20]16."

For fiscal 2011, the Pentagon is requesting $8.7 billion in procurement funding to buy 43 F-35s, plus $2.3 billion for continued research and development and $535 million for spare parts.

All told, the three services will buy more than 2,400 F-35s to replace aging F-16s, F-18s, AV-8s and A-10s, making the F-35 the largest program on the Pentagon's books.

Air Force Secretary Michael Donley announced last week that his service had moved its IOC date from fiscal 2013 to late 2015. But the service has pushed the milestone into 2016, Pentagon acquisition chief Ashton Carter told the Senate Armed Services Committee Thursday.

An Air Force spokesman said Air Combat Command made the decision to move the IOC into 2016 based on continued analysis of the restructured program.

For its part, the Marine Corps, the first service to receive the fighters, plans to stick to its 2012 date for operational use, Commandant James Conway told the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee Thursday. The service has not modernized its fighter fleet in more than a decade.

"We are very excited about the arrival of the Joint Strike Fighter," Conway said. "We're hanging onto that 2012 IOC for our aircraft," he later added.

[Gubler, A.]

If you want to know what's going on with the F-35 this interview is well worth reading in full:

Presenter: Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Ashton Carter March 12, 2010


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

DOD News Briefing with Ashton Carter from the Pentagon


STAFF: Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for joining us again this afternoon. It's my pleasure to introduce to you the undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Dr. Ash Carter, who will spend a little bit of time this afternoon talking to you about the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program.



Sir?



MR. CARTER: Very good. Thank you. And delighted that you're all here. I do apologize for the delay in this. Something came up at whatever it was, 11:00, when this was scheduled, and I know some of you got yo-yod back and forth, and I do apologize for that, because I know it's Friday.



The purpose of this is to revisit some of the points that I made yesterday before the Senate Armed Services Committee regarding the restructuring of the Joint Strike Fighter program that Secretary Gates directed on the basis of the various estimates and analyses that were done in the fall and the department-wide review which I led over the last few months and which led to the decisions that he made and that he announced in connection with the FY '11 budget decision.



So in that sense, yesterday there was nothing new relative to that. But that was our first opportunity to appear before the Congress and kind of lay it out in detail. So let me kind of revisit some of the main points of the restructuring. And then I'll take questions.



And I'll do that as I did yesterday in the hearing, by addressing the three phases of the program: namely the development phase, the ramp-up to the transition from development to production and the ramp- up to full production and then full production, and the actions taken in each of those three phases.



For the development phase, the secretary directed three actions to reduce the overall duration of the development program. That duration had been lengthening with time, for reasons I'll go into in a moment. And in order to reduce that span of time, he directed three actions.



The first was the procurement of another aircraft, a carrier variant aircraft, to add to the test program.



That's another resource to get through the various test points that constitute the flight-test program. So it's not hard to understand that if you have more aircraft to do a certain number of tests, you'll get through them faster. That's an investment worth making, because you -- (pause) -- bring back the program's schedule, and you keep a lot of people doing flight testing for a shorter period of time.



Secondly, he directed the loan of three aircraft that would be in the operational test program to the developmental test program for the same reason: to hasten developmental tests.



And finally, he directed the creation of another software integration capability, which was intended to forestall the possibility that if you -- if you -- as we intend to do with the first two actions -- compress the developmental flight-test program, then you -- and you -- that is, bring back the schedule -- then you have to say, well, by the time you're done, you've finished up your testing there, is the software going to be done? We wanted to make sure the answer to that was yes.



And so those are the three actions that Secretary Gates directed to correct the schedule of the development program, and that's not to say that we were able to restore it to what it had been projected to be by the program office and the contractor, but we got some of the way back. And that's where the famous 30 months and 13 months comes in.



The secretary believed -- and this is a principle that's important -- that the investments needed to get back the development schedule oughtn't to be made solely by the taxpayer; that the responsibility for that should be shared -- and it is being shared -- with the contractor.



That's where the $614 million withheld fee comes in.



So with those actions, the -- we have restored some of the schedule erosion that was occurring the development program and reduced the risk in the development program, and saved the taxpayer money that they shouldn't have to spend and get to the next phase, and that's the transition to production, which is always a difficult -- historically difficult transition to make for aircraft programs.



And there we had another independent review done. That's the so- called independent manufacturing review team report. That report was commissioned by my office. And they just looked at the workings of the assembly line in Fort Worth, and they identified a number of steps that would be needed in order to guarantee that that assembly line could ramp up its production in the way that was originally planned.



So we identified those steps that needed to be taken to make sure we could ramp up production as quickly as possible. The secretary judged that the independent estimate of the ramp rate was the realistic one, and therefore we should plan for a later -- because the development program was a little bit later -- and a flatter, just -- that is, less risky -- ramp.



That means fewer jets produced in the early years, in the interests of a more predictable and more stable achievement of full rate production. So there will be fewer aircraft produced over the FYDP [future years defense program].



But the objective there is to reach full rate production in a predictable, stable way, and that was the secretary's decision in that regard, and additionally to require that in the contracts that cover that ramp that we transition from a cost-plus structure to a fixed- price structure.



He directed that also, that in order to ensure discipline in the transition, from development to production. Then we get out to full rate production itself, where we're going to buy a large number of aircraft for the -- our three services. And we have a number of international partners who are also counting upon this important aircraft.



And for the production phase, the secretary viewed the independent cost estimate as realistic. And that estimate projects a breach of the Nunn-McCurdy threshold for the entire buy of Joint Strike -- Joint Strike Fighter aircraft.



As I said yesterday, that is a disappointing fact, but it is a fact that is a fact of life at this point.



And he recognized that and put in place a number of measures to try to cap and control that cost, which include the fixed-price contracting that I described, a "should cost" effort, which is an analysis independently by us of what the Joint Strike Fighter should cost so that we have our own estimate of that and not just the contractor's estimate of that, and the -- and the implementation of the steps we are taking, which have -- we've identified also through the so-called Joint Assessment Team to control and reduce the costs of the engine, which were one of the things that was increasing the cost of the overall aircraft.



So just to take it from the top -- but I know some of that's technical, and Friday afternoon, I hope your eyes aren't glazing over, but this is the stuff of aircraft programs. And in the development phase, in the ramp-up to production and in full-rate production, in each of those areas we have done an assessment of where the program stood. We wanted to be realistic and candid but also managerially smart about how we address each of those three phases.



The secretary took actions in each of those phases and on the basis of that -- what we judge now to be a realistic, not optimistic, not pessimistic, realistic program, plan and schedule to plan on that basis and to put the management mechanisms in place that he had defined to ensure that, going forward, the program performs better than it's been performing over the last couple of years.



So that in a nutshell is what Secretary Gates directed back as part of the budget process.



Yesterday was our first chance to get in front of our committees and explain that. It was not new news to us. It wasn't -- it's not good news to explain a Nunn-McCurdy breach. It was not new news to us; it was the news that we first began to confront back in November and we began to do -- to act as though we were already in a Nunn- McCurdy breach -- which we weren't -- but to identify and take the managerial steps that you would need to take if you were in a Nunn- McCurdy breach. So that kind of in a nutshell is what I said yesterday.



And now I'm available for questions.



Q I'm wondering if you could just -- to take a step back and look at this -- try to explain it to the average taxpayer. You have a program that in 2001 was estimated to cost about $50 million a jet; now it's at as much as 113 million (dollars) per jet. You can account for inflation in there, but that's an astronomical increase. How do you explain that to just, you know, the average person without an acquisition background or legal background? How does that happen, and how do you keep it from happening again?



MR. CARTER: First of all, just to get the numbers straight, you do need to take account of inflation there. So I -- the -- what Christine Fox said yesterday was that the -- what was a $50 million aircraft, integrated over the entire buy in 2002, had grown to an 80 (million dollars) to $95 million aircraft in those year dollars of -- I didn't mean to correct you. I'm just saying that's what the facts are.



How do you justify that? Nobody wants to pay more than they were told they should have to pay, so that's poor performance.



And what -- and Secretary Gates has, I think, made it pretty clear how he feels about poor performance in acquisition systems. That's why he took the steps that he did that I'm describing to you.



They don't make that any better. They try to get it under control, and get back to a(n) affordable aircraft and to a story that we can tell that won't be different five years and 10 years from now.



So we are trying to be realistic now. Obviously, a realistic story has not been in people's minds for the last couple of years because this is a -- the picture that we came to see in November we had some indication of last year, but then it persisted for another year. And we had to say, hey, wait a minute, this -- there's a real issue here.



So that's an explanation. It's not -- I'm sorry?



Q I mean, is this wishful thinking that people think that it would cost less? Is it blatant lying? Is it entirely the contractors? Or, I mean, what's the Defense Department's role in this?



MR. CARTER: No, I think it's -- I think some of it is it's fact of life in terms of things are more complicated than people imagined they were going to be, and an unwillingness to recognize that things were getting more expensive and slipping behind uncontrollably. You can't control costs, you can't control schedule if you're being unrealistic about costs and schedule. And now, we're trying to be realistic about the cost and schedule. That puts us in a better position to manage.



Q There was some bipartisan anger about that yesterday. If Congress comes back and decides it doesn't want to fund the full -- the 2,100 planes and cuts back to, say, 1,5(00) or some other smaller number, that's going to increase the cost per plane, is it not? And is it -- is it possible, even with cutbacks, to truly reduce the total amount of the program?



MR. CARTER: There are -- there are more aircraft, by the way, than 2,100, just -- we'll get you the specific numbers. And I know we'll get this checked for you afterwards, but the number is 2,443 for the United States and 730 for the international partners over the entire lifetime of the buy.



I think that most of the customers are going to recognize that the -- a slip in time and a slower ramp up to full-rate production is -- doesn't mean that their aircraft aren't going to be there when they need them. And so I think most of the customers are going to stay with the Joint Strike Fighter program because of its capabilities.



And I don't think that -- our services are clear about what their requirements are. And I think that when we have the program on a realistic plan that everybody can see going forward, then Congress, as well as the military departments here and the international partners, will stay with their plan, which is to equip their fleets with this aircraft.



Q Mr. Secretary, you just said you think that most are going to stay with the Joint Strike Fighter program because of its capabilities. Do you understand that some are reviewing and reconsidering their plans to purchase?



MR. CARTER: The international partners have been reconsidering their plans for the Joint Strike Fighter right along. All of them have a dynamic situation budgetarily, strategically and so forth. And so that is a -- they're all have been reassessing their needs right along.



But I think that, as I said, that the capability of the aircraft is there, and it will be the best fifth-generation aircraft. We will emphasize its affordability, which was a critical feature for all those partners when they first decided to buy the Joint Strike Fighter. And we'll try to deliver to them what they wanted.



Q Now, Israel's not coming along as quickly as the United States had expected based on Israel's --



MR. CARTER: I don't know that it's not as quickly as the United States has expected. I mean, that's -- again, that's -- this is their decision-making, and their decision-making will evolve as they look at their needs and -- and we -- they are -- I can't tell you what the Israelis are thinking about it. They are obviously interested in the Joint Strike Fighter. I think that's a good thing for them. But we don't have any particular expectations of them.



Q Sir, Dr. Carter, you talk about the slower, flatter ramp up, but the aircraft will be there when people need them. What, at this point, is -- you know, how long does it take to get to maximum sustained rate of production, and what is that rate?





MR. CARTER: I tried to -- I gave that yesterday in terms of both -- and you have to be very specific about what exactly the -- what the question is. I gave the dates of first delivery of aircraft to our services yesterday and I gave the projected IOCs [initial operating capability]. It's in my written statement. And those are our projected dates on the basis of the restructured program that I've described and the actions that Secretary Gates has taken. So it's all laid out there.



Q To deal with the enormous number of fighters that are aging out, we have to get to a sufficiently high sustained rate over the 30- year life of the program. Does that rate come down? We get to it later, but is that --



MR. CARTER: No, it ramps up to the -- to exactly the same rate. It's just a little bit slower in getting up to that, just to be a little more careful.



And by the way, we hope to get to the original ramp rate, just we're being -- trying to be very realistic and we're projecting the -- if you like, the mid range of the estimates. This is an estimate about the future. And we'd like to do better than that. So we may be able to climb up that ramp faster. Obviously, we'd like to climb up it as fast as we can, but that depends on the stability of the assembly line, and that's something that we're working on making happen as fast as possible.



Q We don't reach that max rate, sir, in the current FYDP, do we? We do -- it's up somewhere in --



MR. CARTER: No, we don't. No, we don't.



Q Do you know what year that is, sir?



MR. CARTER: I can get that for you. It's a little bit outside of the FYDP. It's not that long in the future, but if you ramp up -- and that plateau has not changed at all. It's just the rate at which we get there.



Q I'm curious about fixed-price contracting. That's been a real push of yours. Going to fixed price potentially in LRIP [low rate initial production] 5 --



MR. CARTER: Mm-hmm.



Q -- what leads you to believe that Lockheed's operation will be stable enough to go fixed price? And what will protect the government from a potential change that might come from the government that would renegotiate the entire contract, thus nullifying the fixed- price leverage?



MR. CARTER: This is -- as always true in a fixed-price, there's a challenge for the contractor, which is to get control over the line and the stability of the line so that they can price its performance, recognizing that if they price it too low they will pay the extra, and the government to know what it wants. We know that. We're in a position to be specific about the configurations of the aircraft that we want in LRIP 5, to take your question.



So we're prepared on our side to be specific, and we're not going to change that. And I explained yesterday we haven't changed the combat capabilities of this airplane or not. There were not technological issues that caused us to believe we couldn't have all the military capability.



So the configuration of the airplane isn't changed -- hasn't changed, and we can specify exactly what we want in LRIP 5. And then it'll be up to the -- our industrial partner, as is always in a fixed- price environment, to specify the -- specify the price.



Q So the --



MR. CARTER: It's a good discipline to have to specify a price.



Q Okay. And so the changes up to now -- like, for example, the -- I think it was like a 50 percent overage in labor rates, the issue with the part fitting that you discussed, were those the kinds of things that would be on the contractor to pay for under a fixed- price situation?



MR. CARTER: Yes.



Q Okay. So the government would not have had to pick up the tab for those?



MR. CARTER: No. No.



Q Okay.



MR. CARTER: But that was done in the early stage of the program in a cost type of contract, in which all of those -- the cost of making those adjustments -- which are perfectly understandable, but cost money -- fell to the government --



Q And then finally, on --



MR. CARTER: -- except for that part of it which is now in the withheld fee.



Q Okay. And then finally, on fixed price, when you, Secretary Donley and Secretary Lynn spoke to us about the tanker, there was a discussion about going fixed price and what would happen if there was only one contractor, which seems now to be more then hypothetical; it may very well be a reality. There were some options that you gentlemen alluded to, but you didn't want to discuss it because it was hypothetical at the time.



MR. CARTER: Still don't. I don't have anymore to add on that -- on that -- on that today.



Q (Laughs.)



MR. CARTER: Yeah.



Q Mr. Secretary, producibility has been a big part of Lockheed's selling point on the JSF.



You talked a lot about basic problems with parts, quality control. Are you concerned that, as has happened with a lot of space programs and some of our others in the last few years, that Lockheed may not have a good grasp on its suppliers -- good enough to ensure that producibility?



MR. CARTER: That has not been a major problem recently. That's always a problem, and was early on in the airframe.



Remember, there's more than one airframe contractor, by the way. You keep singling out Lockheed Martin, but BAE and Northrop Grumman are an important part of the airframe. So it's a team.



Early on there were late-to-need parts issues, which is not uncommon, but not something you want to have a lot of. I think that particular problem has been dealt with very aggressively by the contractor team down in Fort Worth, and is in a much better place than it was, say, a couple of years ago.



In the F-135 engine, the supply chain has been an issue as well, another thing being worked on.



Q So at this point you're confident that the contractors have --



MR. CARTER: Yeah, I think that particular problem has been worked very aggressively and is in a much better place than it was, say, a couple years ago.



Q A couple questions.



One, out of the $614 million, you keep bringing this up that it's sharing the risk, accountability. How is it sharing the risk if they are having the opportunity to win it all back down the line?



MR. CARTER: Win some of it back. Well, that's an incentive for them to meet all of the targets, and so that's perfectly appropriate. It's reasonable for us to withhold that part of the fee which will be used for the remedial measures that I described: the new aircraft and the software integration line.



Q Okay.



MR. CARTER: But beyond that, they will have an opportunity to win back parts of that fee if, but only if, a very specific set of milestones are hit on schedule.



And that's the way fees are supposed to be awarded. They're not supposed to be awarded willy nilly. They're supposed to be awarded in return for specific performance. And that is not -- just not in -- just in this program, but in other programs, always been the case. And it is something we're going to insist upon.



Q That's fair. That's a fair -- a good point. But how much of that 614 (million dollars) will be --



MR. CARTER: I can't tell you that now because that's part of contract issues.



Q One of the big issues yesterday was trying to get a baseline on which to judge the delays. Going back to the way we were in October 2001, can you, as clearly as -- when was SDD [system development and demonstration] supposed to end? What were the IOC dates? When was milestone 3, uh C supposed to --



MR. CARTER: I'm going to refer you to CAPE [Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation office] for that, for the specific programmatic history, which they have. And they can lay out all of that for you: what was said and thought at every moment going back to the birth of the program, which actually goes back to 1995, what actually happened, and then we are projecting now --



Q Right.



MR. CARTER: -- which we believe to be realistic.



Again, I hope -- we hope to do better than that plan, but that's a realistic plan. They can take you through all that.



Q Did you authorize them to create -- (inaudible)?



MR. CARTER: Yeah, I don't think there's any problem. They are the keepers of all that data. It's perfectly realistic; they prepared -- (inaudible).



Q One final -- on cost, the current SAR [selection acquisition reports] has it, the whole program, at $298 billion in then-year dollars. What is the current estimate today going forward?



MR. CARTER: Again, I'm going to -- I'm going to ask CAPE to answer that question, just to make sure that all the numbers are internally consistent.



Q Okay. It would be useful to get that early next week if you can.



MR. CARTER: I think -- I think there's no problem doing that.



But again, they have all these numbers. I just don't want to mislead you. They are the keepers of those numbers. And it's all complicated; it depends on what year dollars you're using.



Q I know. Thank you.



MR. CARTER: And so I don't want to confuse you.



Yes.



Q Yeah, but, I mean, they were asked that question yesterday about the overall cost of the program and didn't have the figures then. Why is it so difficult to come up with --



MR. CARTER: Well, let me say, the one -- the number that was asked about was not the production of the aircraft. It was something called total ownership cost, the lifecycle cost, decades in the future, to own the aircraft, okay?



That assessment is being done. It's perfectly reasonable that it's not done yet. This is something -- this is a number that doesn't become operational for -- until the aircraft becomes operational. So we -- that is, the cost estimators -- have been focusing on the development program, the ramp to production and full-rate production.



So it's hardly surprising that that analysis hadn't been completed -- hasn't been completed yet. It's not germane to decisions -- managerial decisions we're taking now. This is something in the future. CAPE is doing that analysis, and that'll be part of the overall Nunn-McCurdy process.



We try to do total ownership costs for all our programs. Obviously, there's a certain amount of -- that's a(n) art of estimation because you're looking at the distant future.



Obviously, there's a certain amount -- that's an art, an estimation, because you're looking at the distant future. But those numbers will be -- will be provided.



Q And just -- I know we're talking about Joint Strike Fighter here, but I just was hoping to ask one about the tanker program to see, you know, what your plans are for possibly accelerating an --



MR. CARTER: I really don't have -- say the same answer before -- I don't have anything new to -- new to tell you on that. We will tell you as we proceed with the tanker solicitation, but that's not -- I don't have anything new for you today.



Yeah.



Q Dr. Carter, this is a -- you know, a fifth-generation fighter, a lot of new capabilities. It's not just airframe, engine, but there are a lot of avionics, sensors, the EW [electronic warfare] systems. How much of the problem so far is strictly -- I mean, is this problem strictly the aircraft and the airframe development so far? What about these sensors or the EW systems? Is that part of the delay, or is -- has that not developed yet?



MR. CARTER: It's a -- some of everything. Most of the drivers of the schedule issues that we've been discussing and that are so central, the SDD schedule issues, have been associated with the airframe assembly. But in the overall cost, for example, as I mentioned earlier, the engine has been an issue.



Q Speaking of the engine, yesterday Christine Fox [director, CAPE] told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the latest analysis showed that the second engine would -- there was a business case that showed that it would break even for taxpayers. And Chairman Levin said he was more convinced than ever of the wisdom of going ahead with a second engine.



What's your latest thinking on the pros and cons?



MR. CARTER: Well, first of all, I encourage you to read that business case.



Q Yeah, they told us that it was not available because it includes proprietary information --



MR. CARTER: I don't believe that's the case, so we will get you -- there -- I'm sure there are versions of it that do contain proprietary information, but I believe that the business case -- the essential case, which has certainly been made available to Congress -- can be made available to you as well.



I'll tell you what -- kind of what the essence of it is. I don't do these estimates -- Ms. Fox's office does these estimates -- but I -- I'm a consumer of them, as is the secretary. And the comparison you need to make in your mind is of a -- the program -- the F135 program to a hypothetical program in which you pay the up-front cost to develop an additional engine, to create the manufacturing capability for a second engine, to create the sustainment base for a second engine, to nurse that second engine along so that it catches up with the first engine and competes, and then you have a -- from that point on, a hypothesized competition between those two engines: Which competition -- question -- will it pay back all the money of buying two of everything?



And that's the analysis that Ms. Fox referred to. And if the -- and what she was saying was that if you do that analysis, you can -- you can hypothesize a competition out in the future in which some of the savings, even all of those expenditures, are recouped in the future.



But we judge that that -- that that analysis, that competitive analysis, is based on some very optimistic assumptions, optimistic assumptions that we don't think it is reasonable to accept -- for example, the assumption that -- just to take one very important one -- that the buyers of the engines would accept, in any given lot, whatever engine won.



Well, the Navy's -- well, you have two engines, so -- and you're competing them against each other. And so the economic theory is that whichever engine wins in a given year -- is doing better, is being more economically produced -- that's the one you'll buy.



Now -- but the Navy, just to take one example of a customer, doesn't want to buy this engine that year and that engine the next year. They want to have one engine. Certain of our international partners would not -- would probably have an engine that they wanted. So that's not a free and open competition. That's a series of directed buys.



And that's not what economic theory is all about. And so you look at the economic theory that is reflected in that hypothesized competition, and it -- it looks like, guess what, the facts aren't going to fit the theory.



Q But has this latest analysis changed the calculation that led the department --



MR. CARTER: No, none of the things -- none of the numbers have changed. People have been confused about the numbers. That's why I encourage you to get the business case. It's -- what is it, is it 2.5 billion (dollars) or 2.9 billion (dollars)?



And the reason people have trouble with those numbers is that they're doing apples and oranges. The number that -- one of the numbers that you'll find in that analysis is the $2.9 billion over the FYDP. And some people say, "Well, wait a minute, I remember some other number from some other time." Well, they were probably thinking of another kind of number, which is the number for just the development of the engine. Some people have been confused by that. But the development of the engine is not the only expense of having a second engine, as I explained. There are four elements to it.



So, you know, this isn't something to guess about. And it -- you have to do an apples-to-apples comparison. The business case does an apples-to-apples comparison. And it's not a good apple to only look at the development program when you're assessing the process.



Q I take your point. But the bottom line here is the question whether the department will continue to recommend a presidential veto of any defense spending bill that includes funding for a second engine.



MR. CARTER: That's what the secretary of Defense has said.



Q But the latest analysis suggests that it's not as open-and- shut a case as the department had presented previously.



MR. CARTER: Well, the latest analysis is as I described, and as you can read when you obtain it, which is that the hypothesized competition, the case for a second engine, hypothesizes or makes such optimistic assumptions about a theoretical working of competition. Then we give the reasons why we don't actually think that's what would happen. That's not our experience in these situations. It's not our historical experience.



Q (inaudible.)



MR. CARTER: And so you'd be paying a great deal of real money, that you can really see, up front, for a hypothesized savings in the past. We owe it to the taxpayer to take a hard look at how hypothetical are those hypothesized savings.



We have, and we've judged that they are hypothetical. And therefore we owe it to the taxpayer not to fall into the trap of spending real money up front for hypothesized savings in the past. It's an analytical judgment. It's analytical judgment. But to have a point of view on it, you have to have done the analysis, and we have, and that's available for people to look at and assess.



Q When can we get that? How can we get that?



MR. CARTER: I'll -- immediately after this meeting -- and it's -- again, I repeat, it's been provided to the Congress in some detail. And it is what it is. It's an analytical case. It's all there is to it, how it's the best way to spend the taxpayers' money to get engines for the Joint Strike Fighter. And you have to do the work to have an opinion.



Yeah.



Q Secretary Carter, the topic of lowballing or buying in came up yesterday during the hearing. And I think you said something to the effect -- when asked if Lockheed had bought in -- something to the effect of this is a pattern that would match that, which indicated that there might be some indication that Lockheed then lowballed.



MR. CARTER: I don't have any indication that anybody bought in 10, 15 years ago. The point is there that -- isn't to write history. The point is that one of the things we know we need to guard against in defense programs is -- and it's not contractors; it's everybody -- is kidding ourselves about what something's going to cost, because it's easier to believe that it'll be cheap, for all of us, not just for contractors, but for the government side as well.



We have to have the discipline not to fall into that trap.



That's what independent cost estimation is about. That's why the process that led the secretary to the restructuring he directed was important. It's an independent set of eyes, independent of those involved in the program, looking at it and saying, "Hey, wait a minute. What is this really going to cost? Let's look at how it's actually been going over the last two years, not how we said it was going to go. Let's look at how much things are actually costing, not what we thought they might cost."



Because things change, and -- (inaudible) -- but you have to be honest and realistic as you go along. And I -- it's a very healthy process, and it -- obviously, it is painful, but it's a healthy process and it is the one that led -- let him take the managerial steps he did, which will do the program good in the end.



Q I realize the $614 million withhold was a punishment -- (inaudible) -- to Lockheed, but the way that performance is tracked through the CPAR [contractor performance assessment report] for future work. Has their CPAR been dinged appropriately?



MR. CARTER: It's not -- it's not -- it's not -- it's not punishment. It's sharing the consequences of a failure to perform.



Q Okay. Well, but moving forward, how is their performance rating going to be affected by this situation that we're in today with the JSF? It potentially could affect, you know, future UAV work, future bomber work, that sort of thing.



MR. CARTER: The actions that we take with respect to the fee on this particular contract do not contractually spill over onto any other contracts.



I will say that we do -- we also look at -- in general, at overhead rates and that sort of thing, but it -- that doesn't spill over from one contract to another.



STAFF: We have time for one more.



Q You've used the word "realistic" several times in this briefing. Can you realistically -- the Department of Defense, can it realistically promise the taxpayers that the price increases for this program have stopped, barring inflation?



MR. CARTER: That's what realism is supposed to be. It's not a guarantee of -- that the estimate is correct. The estimate has -- is a projection. That is what we believe we can tell you is our most realistic estimate we have.



We'd like to do better than the estimate. We'd like to do better than the estimate. So realism means, I'm going to try to tell you as best I can what I think will happen. Would I like to do better than the estimate? Of course, I would. Will we be managing to do better? Yes.



I don't project -- I don't do a realistic projection and then say, I'll live that no matter what -- that future. I'd like to live a better future. That's what management is all about.



So we hope to do better than the CAPE estimate.



Q Speaking of realism, you talked about IOCs slipping yesterday. And each service has their own definition. The Marine Corps IOC hasn't changed. It's still 2012.



Yet the end of initial operational test and evaluation has slipped like four years. That's the test phase that says what --



MR. CARTER: There are different variants of the different aircraft. So as you follow IOCs, you have to dig into each one. The Marine Corps variant is different from the Air Force and Navy variants.



What they're looking for in the capabilities of the aircraft -- this is not new. This has been true right along. Each service has its own definition of IOC.



Q Right. You don't think the Marine Corps IOC should change, given that the main testing is going to --



MR. CARTER: It's not the matter that I think the Marine Corps IOC ought to change. The Marine Corps assessed on the basis of the restructured program --



Q They did.



MR. CARTER: Absolutely.



Their IOC, and they're in very different circumstances than the other two services.



And you -- we can go into that detail. You're welcome to go into it with the Marine Corps. But there's no disconnect there. They have their definition of IOC, and the other services have their -- and they're all based upon the restructured program.



Q (inaudible) -- how capable would the plane be --



MR. CARTER: The variant that the Marine Corps are starting with is less capable; has always been. That's what they want.



Q One last point --



MR. CARTER: It's not -- it's not a one-size-fits-all --



Q Sir, one compelling thing that is out there. Are you --



STAFF: Wait one second. We're going to take one more question --



Q Have the services changed their definition of IOC?



MR. CARTER: I'm sorry?



Q Like, has the Marine Corps then changed its definition of IOC?



MR. CARTER: No, I don't think the Marine Corps has changed their definition of IOC at all. They clarify things from time to time. Now, the Marine Corps have been very steady in the kind of aircraft they want. And we can provide you with that information about how the various services define their IOCs. There's no mystery there. But they are all different.



Q But are they different now than they were before the restructure?



MR. CARTER: No, some of them have clarified. I say "clarified," but not in any way related to the restructuring. But as the program goes on and it comes -- kind of comes more to the date at which you're actually going to deploy, you think about exactly what you -- how you want to stand it up, and so -- so they clarify their definition. And I'm sure they probably will continue to do so as they get closer to IOC.



They're the user of the airplane; they get to decide how they want to field the airplane. What we are trying to do is deliver them the airplane. So we show them when we will deliver them airplanes, when we can deliver them airplanes, and then they decide, on the basis of that, how they want to operate the airplanes, how they want to begin operating their airplane. So there are two parts to this IOC equation.



Q Sir, a lot of anger coming from Europe over what some European leaders have portrayed as a contest that was skewed from the start against the Northrop EADS variant.



MR. CARTER: I think Secretary Lynn addressed this point.



Q Yes.



MR. CARTER: I've read those press --



Q (inaudible)



MR. CARTER: I've read those press -- well, let me tell you what I'm going to say first, and then you can ask the question -- the press reports. And I just want to reiterate what he said, which is that we value the contribution of European industry to the choices we can make as a department. We welcome that. There is no protectionism going on and so forth. It's important to us. It's -- the wider technology base and the wider industrial base is good for the Department of Defense. Our position on that is completely clear.



Q And having said that, are you considering possible extension of the bidding deadline to allow EADS to put together a new team, if necessary, if it wanted to bid now that Northrop has pulled out?



MR. CARTER: We don't have a(n) indication of any additional bidders for the tanker. We're happy to have competition. We've said that right along, that we welcome competition in the tanker solicitation. And the deputy made it very clear the other day that no one should interpret this as having -- as a statement about the -- how welcome European industry is in our competition.



Q But will you extend the deadline to allow them to bid?



STAFF: Thank you.

[buglerbilly]

Pratt defends cost-cutting measures on F-35 engine

WASHINGTON, March 12 (Reuters) - Pratt & Whitney, a unit of United Technologies Corp (UTX.N), said on Friday its "war on costs" was driving production spending on its F135 engine for the F-35 fighter jet lower and the company had experienced no additional increases in the engine's development program.

A Navy document leaked this week put the total cost of the F135 engine development program at $7.28 billion, $2.5 billion above the $4.8 billion initially projected for the program. That would be $600 million more than the $1.9 billion in cost increases already disclosed on the Pratt engine.

But Pratt spokeswoman Erin Dick said the company had not seen any additional overruns on the program.

"I can unequivocally say that our costs are coming down; that there are currently no additional overruns associated with the development of the F135 engine and the government has expressed confidence in our cost reduction strategy going forward," Dick told Reuters.

The added costs stemmed from a 13-month delay on the overall F-35 development program and Pratt's need for additional flight tests, which would add personnel costs and other overhead, said one source familiar with the program, who was not authorized to speak on the record.

The delay is part of a major restructuring of the Lockheed Martin Corp (LMT.N) F-35 program.

"There is no $600 million surprise or overrun or anything like that in the program at this point," said the source.

Pratt offered the Pentagon an 11 percent reduction in engine cost in its latest contract proposal, with further reductions of around 10 percent due to take effect in each of three following years, which would result in a 40 percent cut in the cost of the production engines, said the source.

Pentagon acquisition chief Ashton Carter had expressed concern about growing costs on the Pratt engine last year, but endorsed Pratt's efforts to cut spending in a memo to F-35 international partners dated Feb. 24.

Carter said a special independent "Joint Assessment Team" concluded projected cost growth on the engine could be reduced significantly by investing in affordability measures and through a renewed commitment by Pratt.

The Navy memo also showed an increase in the cost of a second engine built by General Electric Co (GE.N) and Rolls Royce, which the Pentagon wants to cancel.

The memo put the total cost of the GE-Rolls engine program at $2.1 billion, but did not include any funding for the program in fiscal year 2011.

A recent Pentagon analysis said it would cost $2.9 billion over six years to complete work on the GE-Rolls engine, but GE and Rolls-Royce say they need just $900 million to complete the development program and $400 million more for tooling. (Reporting by Andrea Shalal-Esa; editing by Andre Grenon)

[buglerbilly]

U.S. Official Announces Plans to Curb JSF Program’s Cost



07:22 GMT, March 15, 2010 WASHINGTON | The Defense Department will require a shift to a fixed-price contract in its negotiations with Lockheed Martin for the initial production phase of the F-35 Lightning II joint strike fighter, a defense official said here today in a briefing at the Pentagon.

The department also will conduct an internal analysis of what the full production cost should be to better negotiate with the contractor, said Ashton B. Carter, undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics.

Taken together, Carter said, these measures will reduce costs of a program that has met with significant production delays and cost overruns since its inception in October 2001.

“It did not seem reasonable that the taxpayer should bear the entire cost of this failure of the program to meet expectations,” Carter said.

The joint strike fighter-- the most expensive acquisition in U.S. military history -- will replace a wide range of aging fighter and strike aircraft for the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps and eight international partners. The F-35 is the “the heart of the future of our tactical combat aviation,” Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said in a visit to a Lockheed factory in August. “The importance of this aircraft cannot be overstated.”

The U.S. military ordered a total of 2,443 jets, with an additional 730 purchased by the eight other countries. Initially projected to cost around $50 million per aircraft, the current estimate is about $80 million to $95 million each, in inflation-adjusted dollars.

These two new initiatives come on top of Gates’ announcement last month that he was withholding $614 million in performance fees from the contractor due to the program’s setbacks.

With today’s announcements, the department is moving away from a cost-plus arrangement, which reimburses companies for their expenses in addition to providing an extra payment to guarantee them a profit. Instead, in switching to a fixed-price structure, the department and the contractor will set the price beforehand, and the final payment will not depend on the total amount of time or resources expended to complete the project.

“[The secretary] directed that in order to ensure discipline in the transition from development to production,” Carter said.

The director of defense procurement and acquisition policy will conduct the “should-cost” analysis for the final production rollout of the F-35 aircraft. Carter stressed that it’s important for the department to have its own estimate of what the program’s cost should be to better determine a negotiated price, rather than relying solely on the contractor’s figures.

“We will be looking at the cost structure of [the joint strike fighter] in all its aspects – assembly, parts supplies, staffing, overheads and indirect costs, cash flows, contract structures, fees, and lifecycle costs,” Carter said in a prepared statement before the Senate Armed Services committee yesterday.

Taking immediate steps to save costs is particularly necessary, not only to benefit the taxpayer, but also because the program is in jeopardy of crossing the Nunn-McCurdy threshold, a law that requires that Congress be notified of a cost growth of more than 15 percent in a program. Nunn-McCurdy also calls for cancellation of programs for which total cost grew by more than 25 percent over the original estimate.

Rather than wait for the program to cross the Nunn-McCurdy line, the defense officials began to review and restructure it as though it was already in Nunn-McCurdy breach, Carter explained.

Carter said he understands that these new initiatives will not be easy for Lockheed and its subcontractors to accommodate, but he underscored that these decisions are crucial to moving the program forward in a way that is acceptable to the military and the American public.

“The emphasis must be on restoring a key aspect of this airplane when the JSF program was first launched: affordability,” he told Congress.

----
Jordan Reimer
American Forces Press Service

[Unicorn]

If you want to see some of the supposedly 'informed' comments by pissants who claim to 'know' that the F35 is doomed, you should check out some of the commentary outside the sanctuary of T5C.

Try this one over on Crikey.... http://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking/2010/03/12/memo-defence-come-clean-now-on-jsf-debacle/

OMFG

[Weasel]

If you want to see some of the supposedly 'informed' comments by pissants who claim to 'know' that the F35 is doomed, you should check out some of the commentary outside the sanctuary of T5C.

Try this one over on Crikey.... http://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking/2010/03/12/memo-defence-come-clean-now-on-jsf-debacle/

OMFG
I did take a look. I'm a little bemused as to why this is such a big deal as it is only a 20 billion USD program. Eight years ago yes, but with the recent meltdown, NO. We have Trillions (thats 1000's of Billions) being spent with little to show for it, 20 Billion is chicken feed.

There also have been no indicators that suggest LM will not be able to deliver the F-35. It is just a question of cost. This is a game (as I have said ad nauseum) that the US defense industry complex play on a daily basis. Get the program, expand the "profitability". They all do it, but in this case they stretched the envelope a little too far in the early stages of the program and created an "alarming" blowout. So now we are faced with the GOOD resolution of restructuring the program.

Remember, Nunn-McCurdy is set at an astonishing 115%. This is extremely low considering most projects reach 125% and that is even when they have met GAO approved standards in their System Engineering Life Cycle and have spent at least 10% of the project on pre-positioning activities or "planning".

I think this flare up will be a great boon to the Defense industry in the long run. My hope is that it will expose deficiencies all round (especially within GAO) and actually lead to realistic proposals and less "competitions" that nurture and foster these unrealistic cost predictions.

If (for example) you insist on having a fly-off between Boeing and LM, keep both going longer so that you can gain predictive production metrics. This reduces risk and creates a positive vector that helps maintain budget reality.

It is why I was so happy to see the PAK FA fly. What a blessed relief as it acts in a similar fashion in which the above example would. It calls LM to account. Why? Because the environment the F-35 lives in is truly a global environment. So even though another platform is built in another country it has similar cost-benefit effect because it will be in the same global market environment.

This is what LM seem to fail to understand. They will get it sooner or later...But the market or rather "Market Forces" have caught up with them. Its no longer about merger and acquisition to gain a false sense of international consortium (ala BAe). It is about performing.

In the larger sense, Bae, Eades and other European defense contractors got this early, because they had too. Their parent nation's defense budgets were too small.

There is more to that train of thought, but I will leave it there for now.

cheers

w

[Chunder]

Had a look too. I was somewhat bemused with the F-111 entering into the debate (groan) Someone apparently forgot to tell him the F-111 experienced the same problems. With the same arguments :http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=--1fXwEDLQ4

I suppose Mr W. took exception to the fella calling the USN irrelevant. I felt like burying my head in the sand at that point

Though I suppose this is ground trodden over and over again. APA are public domain paraphernalia paedophiles. Places like T5C are hard to find, and morons like me when they find the place generally don't survive long.

Without battling trolls I suppose it's as higher profile as it ever wants to be? (I see there are a few posters on crikey going into bat that look like they are T5C'rs or close to it)

Perhaps T5C needs a cartoonist?

[buglerbilly]

NavAir Admiral Tapped To Run JSF Program

Staff report

Published: 16 Mar 2010 17:06

A three-star U.S. Navy admiral has been nominated to take over the troubled Joint Strike Fighter program, the Pentagon announced March 16.

Vice Adm. David Venlet, who runs Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, Md., was nominated to lead the joint program office that is developing the F-35 Lightning II, the most expensive procurement program in Pentagon history.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates fired the previous program manager, Marine Maj. Gen. David Heinz, in February.

Venlet, a former F-14 Tomcat pilot, has engineering degrees from the Naval Academy and the Naval Postgraduate School. He is also former test pilot at the Naval Air Test Center in Maryland.

The F-35 program and its lead contractor, Lockheed Martin, have been criticized in recent months for cost overruns and schedule delays.

The Pentagon plans to purchase more than 2,400 F-35s for use in the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps.

[buglerbilly]

No. 206-10
March 16, 2010

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Flag Officer Announcement


Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates announced today that the President has made the following nomination:

Navy Vice Adm. David J. Venlet has been nominated for reappointment to the rank of vice admiral and assignment as director, Joint Strike Fighter program, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Arlington, Va. Venlet is currently serving as commander, Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Md.

[McDethWivFries]

i had to stop . . . was getting a headache reading all that bs . . .

[Gubler, A.]

i had to stop . . . was getting a headache reading all that bs . . .

Well Crikey isn't exactly known for being a source of major defence understanding.

[Gubler, A.]

Navy Vice Adm. David J. Venlet has been nominated for reappointment to the rank of vice admiral and assignment as director, Joint Strike Fighter program, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Arlington, Va. Venlet is currently serving as commander, Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Md.

Well it doesn't get bigger than appointing the head of NAVAIR to run JSFPO.

[buglerbilly]

F-35 Hovers for First Time

By christopher p. cavas

Published: 17 Mar 2010 18:21

Hanging about 150 feet in the air, the F-35B short-takeoff, vertical-landing (STOVL) stealth fighter hovered at zero airspeed for the first time March 17.


The F-35B hovers over a landing field at Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Md. (Lockheed Martin)

"The aircraft hovered for about 96 seconds," said Chris Geisel, a spokesman for Lockheed Martin. "It then went up and down and turned right and left to check maneuverability before coming in for a slow 70 knot landing."

Graham Tomlinson, F-35 lead STOVL pilot, slowed the aircraft in flight from 200 knots, first to 60 knots, then to zero.

The tests are being conducted at Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Md. The hover flight took place on the second of four flights, or sorties, on March 17, each flight demonstrating different aspects of the jet's maneuverability, vertical thrust, stability and control. The fourth sortie featured a short takeoff in STOVL mode, Geisel said, where the aircraft took off at 100 knots while using less than 1,000 feet of runway.

Next up in the test program, Geisel said, is a vertical landing.

The F-35B is being developed for use by the U.S. Marine Corps, where it will replace the aging fleet of AV-8B Harrier II jump jets. The aircraft is intended to operate from ships and unimproved or short airfields on land.

[Unicorn]

Without battling trolls I suppose it's as higher profile as it ever wants to be? (I see there are a few posters on crikey going into bat that look like they are T5C'rs or close to it)

You could assume that :)

Unicorn

[Exsandgroper]

From the Australian

Jump-jet F-35 makes vertical landing
A LOCKHEED Martin Corp F-35 fighter aircraft has landed vertically for the first time in a rare bright spot in the Pentagon's priciest arms purchase program, troubled by cost increases and delays.

Test pilot Graham Tomlinson, in a radar-evading F-35B, hovered for a minute then descended to what he called a 30m square pad at Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Maryland, the company said.

The landing demonstrated the ability to operate from a very small area at sea or on shore, Lockheed said.

Mr Tomlinson began the roughly 14-minute flight with an 80-knot short takeoff.

The Marine Corps is due to start using the jump-jet version in December 2012.

A conventional F-35 is in early production for the US Air Force and the Navy will get a model that lands on aircraft carriers.

The United States is scheduled to buy more than 2400 of the supersonic fighters, the backbone of its air combat fleet for coming decades.

Affordability was supposed to be a hallmark of the aircraft, which is also being built for eight overseas partners - including Australia - and other projected foreign buyers, including all those now flying Lockheed's F-16 fighter.

The F-35's average cost has soared 60 per cent to 90 per cent in real terms beyond what was projected in 2001, when development began, Pentagon officials told Congress last week.

The Air Force and Navy versions are now due to be ready for combat as much as four years after the Marines' F-35B.

Designed primarily to attack ground targets, the aircraft in the test was powered by a single engine built by the Pratt & Whitney unit of United Technologies Corp.

Cheers

[buglerbilly]

Ares

A Defense Technology Blog

Mine's a GT - Pilot's View of first F-35B VL

Posted by Graham Warwick at 3/18/2010 3:07 PM CDT

BAE Systems' Graham Tomlinson, aka "GT", lead test pilot for the STOVL F-35B, says that, with today's first vertical landing, the flight-test team has "joined the dots" on everything the US Marine Corps (and the UK and Italy) need to operate the aircraft: from short take-off, conversion to conventional flight then back to STOVL mode, to vertical landing.


Photos: Lockheed Martin

But on a phone-in press conference following the flight, GT was careful to point out that, so far, the line joining those dots is only "a soda straw...We've covered the whole gamut of STOVL operation, but only in a narrow part of the envelope." This early in the test program they are flying the F-35B with "velvet gloves" and the next task is to "expand the envelope and fly more aggressively, more carefree", he says.



For the first vertical landing, because what would happen when it entered ground effect was unknown, the aircraft was flown light to ensure there was a good thrust margin, says GT. "But we didn't see any ground effect. That was miracle, and unexpected." When the aircraft descended below 20ft and entered the fountain effect from the engine, lift-fan and roll-post exhaust flows, GT says he "felt very light cobblestones, far lower than in other [STOVL] aircraft."

Tomlinson had just come from the post-flight debrief, where he says "the loads, thermal, air-data and control-law guys were all smiling." There were no signs of ground effect in the engine or thrust data, he says. Lockheed has previously said that the cool flow from the lift fan acts like a dam, preventing hot gases from the main engine being re-ingested through the inlets.

Today's flight began with an 80kt short take-off, 20kt slower than yesterday's first-ever STO. GT says the take-off was "absolutely solid, and acceleration was excellent" under the influence of 40,000lb-plus of thrust from the engine and lift fan. Rotation was just 6-8sec after brake release, he says.

And GT says the data from today's vertical landing shows the F-35B is on track to achieve the predicted bringback payload of around 5,000lb in unexpended weapons and fuel reserves.

[Weasel]

It has got to be hard for the F-35 is-a-dud crowd to see it moving so easily from one stage to the next. Great move by LM as well. Hats off to them as the next logical question is a cost comparison between the existing STOVL platform (AV8B) and the F-35. Even if the F-35 gets to 150 million USD per copy you are going to be hard pressed to claim the F-35 does not enhance the USMC's combat capability over and above 150 Million USD worth of AV8B platforms.

AV8B pilots are the most humble fighter jocks you are ever going to meet. Simply because every time they strap on the harrier, they are not sure if they are coming home.

cheers

w

[Gubler, A.]

Its going to be face omlete time in a big way in the next few years for the clown club hanger ons. So let them keep whisking away at their eggs over Nunn-McMudry; little real impact and more fun for everyone else when those words come back in egg face shot form.

[buglerbilly]

Australia Unruffled By F-35 Delays

By GREGOR FERGUSON

Published: 19 Mar 2010 16:50

SYDNEY - Australia's minister for defense, Sen. John Faulkner, is unruffled by the latest cost and schedule difficulties afflicting the Joint Strike Fighter program. And senior defense officials in Canberra say they believe that Australia's plans to acquire up to 100 F-35A Lightning II aircraft aren't much affected by the JSF project's cost overruns.

That's because of budget and schedule buffers built into the Royal Australian Air Force's New Air Combat Capability (NACC) program, which is buying the planes, he said.

A senior defense official in Canberra said March 18 that Australia's budget for the program, and the timing of its orders, are based on the NACC program office's own independent estimates of the JSF program's cost and schedule. These take into account the estimates from the Joint Program Office in Washington and from Lockheed Martin, the JSF's prime contractor, but they include a contingency margin, he said.

So the NACC program office's conservative estimates mean that Australia doesn't really need to take any action or change any of its plans as a result of the JSF program's Nunn-McCurdy breach.

In a March 12 statement, Faulkner stood by the F-35A, calling it the right choice for the RAAF, and saying that it will enable the Australian Defence Force to keep "a strategic air combat capability advantage" until 2030.

"As with all highly complex and cutting-edge projects, risks are to be expected," Faulkner said. "The Australian government's staged acquisition strategy for the JSF includes significant cost and schedule buffers to deal with project risks which will ensure initial operational capability in 2018 is met."

The F-35s will replace the RAAF's 24 F-111C strike aircraft, which are due to retire at the end of this year, and its 71 "classic" F/A-18 Hornet fighters.

Sources declined to discuss the purchasing plans of other JSF partner nations. But a senior official said that if a partner nation withdraws from the JSF production program, it can't count on maintaining its existing workshare in the project, and the other partners would be very unhappy at the prospect of other nations enjoying the industry benefits of the JSF program without actually buying the aircraft themselves.

In November, Australia became the first of the eight JSF partner nations to order the warplane, announcing a 3.2 billion Australian dollar ($2.9 billion) purchase of 14 F-35As, along with initial training and support infrastructure. These are the first of 72 aircraft the RAAF plans to purchase under a combined Phase 2A and 2B of the NACC project, code-named Air 6000.

Those first 14 jets will be delivered beginning in 2014, with 10 remaining in the United States for training and operational testing and four F-35s scheduled to reach Australia in 2017. The RAAF plans to declare Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in 2018, and its third squadron will be operational in 2020-21.

"Approval of the next batch of aircraft and all necessary support and enabling capabilities, sufficient to establish three operational squadrons, will be considered in 2012," said Faulkner's deputy, Greg Combet, the defense materiel, personnel and science minister.

On March 18, Combet told students and faculty at Australia's Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies, at the Australian Defence College in Canberra, "This will fulfill our [2009 Defence] white paper commitment to acquire three operational squadrons comprising not fewer than 72 aircraft."

According to senior RAAF sources, Phase 2C of Project Air 6000 will acquire the balance of the F-35s, bringing the total up to 100. Funding approval for this is scheduled for the latter part of the next decade.

However, the RAAF's original schedule for Project Air 6000 stated an IOC of 2015. On that basis, the service's "classic" F/A-18 Hornets, which recently have been upgraded, were scheduled to retire by 2018.

Last year, a program to replace their center fuselage sections was cancelled at a saving of some 400 million Australian dollars because the aircraft had sufficient service life remaining until 2018. But if they are now required to serve a further two years, some of them may require a center barrel replacement to ensure their structural integrity.

Meanwhile, as a hedge against delays in the JSF program in 2007, Australia's then-defense minister, Brendan Nelson, announced a 6 billion Australian dollar order for 24 F/A-18F Super Hornets. The first four of the two-seat warplanes are due to arrive at the RAAF's Amberley base, near Brisbane, at the end of this month, where they will replace the service's aging F-111C strike aircraft.

The Super Hornets are intended to serve for 10 years before being sold back to the U.S. Navy, replaced in turn by the final batch of F-35s under Phase 2C of Project Air 6000.

[buglerbilly]

GAO Proposals on F-35 Parallel Pentagon Steps

By JOHN REED

Published: 19 Mar 2010 17:59

A Government Accountability Office (GAO) report released March 19 examining the cost growth and schedule delays afflicting the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter agrees with the steps the Pentagon has already begun to take to get the program back on track.

The 54-page report first calls for the Defense Department to implement a top-to-bottom review of program costs - from the jet's inception throughout its operational life - so that it can accurately budget for the plane. Pentagon acquisition chief Ashton Carter announced March 11 that such a move was already underway and would be completed by June.

The GAO goes on to recommend that the Pentagon "reassess warfighter requirements and, if necessary, defer some compatibilities to future increments" of the jet. Pentagon officials agreed with the GAO's findings in the report's comments section, noting how U.S. operators of the jet are reviewing their initial operational capability (IOC) dates for the F-35.

Carter announced that the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy have indeed slipped their IOC dates for the jet to 2016, a delay of three years for the Air Force and two years for the Navy.

The report urges DoD to explain to lawmakers how it plans to mitigate future cost hikes in the program and what are the merits of using a cost-reimbursable - often known as cost-plus - contract structure versus fixed-price contracts for early buys of the jet. DoD also should explain how the Pentagon plans to transition from cost-plus contracts to a fixed-price structure, the report says.

The Defense Department responded by saying cost-reimbursable contracts for early jets "provide the best balance of cost and risk," adding that it plans to move toward "fixed-price incentive contracts as soon as possible and earlier than expected."

[Deks]

The Super Hornets are intended to serve for 10 years before being sold back to the U.S. Navy...

First time I've read that, did I miss something ?

[Chunder]

Meanwhile, as a hedge against delays in the JSF program in 2007, Australia's then-defense minister, Brendan Nelson, announced a 6 billion Australian dollar order for 24 F/A-18F Super Hornets. The first four of the two-seat warplanes are due to arrive at the RAAF's Amberley base, near Brisbane, at the end of this month, where they will replace the service's aging F-111C strike aircraft.

Bullshit.

The F-111 was never going to optimistically reach the in service entry date of the JSF under the most optimistic timetables and still be a threat to any one with credibility.

It's called biting the bullet.

[Unicorn]

Gregor Ferguson often allows facts to get in the way of a good story, this however is not one of those occasions.

[Gubler, A.]

From memory the original pre-Super Hornet schedule was to have 6 Sqn stop F-111G operations in 2010 and move to America to take up the first Block I or II F-35s by 2012 as a training unit. 1 Sqn was to convert from the F-111C in 2010-12 to F/A-18As made surplus by one of the Hornet squadrons starting to convert to F-35. 1 Sqn was to provide the back up capability with Hornets while the rest of ACG converted to F-35. Pretty much the same thing as is happening now and 77/79 Sqn provided with the Miro and 2 Sqn with the Canberra when the F-111 and Hornets were acquired..

[buglerbilly]

UPDATE 1-US F-35 fighter fleet's price may be double forecast

By Jim Wolf

WASHINGTON, March 19 (Reuters) - The estimated total cost of Lockheed Martin Corp's (LMT.N) F-35 fighter jets being bought by the Pentagon may be nearly twice as high as originally forecast, the U.S. Defense Department said Friday.

The bill for 2,443 F-35s is currently estimated at $278 billion to $329 billion, up from the $197 billion projected when the development program began in October 2001, taking into account inflation, a one-page Pentagon F-35 "unit cost" report said.

The percentage hike per aircraft is even higher than for the fleet overall because the Pentagon now plans to buy 409 fewer F-35s than the 2,852 it originally planned.

The single-seat, single-engine F-35 is built to evade detection by radar. Also known as the Joint Strike Fighter, it is the Pentagon's costliest arms procurement program.

Three highly common models are being built for the U.S. Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy as well as eight international partners and other prospective foreign buyers.

The eight U.S. co-development partners are Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, Canada, Australia, Denmark and Norway.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates fired the Pentagon's F-35 program manager in February. He also added 13 months and $2.8 billion to the development phase plus four more test aircraft.

The Government Accountability Office, in a report to Congress Friday, said the latest Pentagon steps should "improve outcomes and provide more realistic cost and schedule estimates."

But further cost growth and schedule extensions are likely, the Congress's non-partisan audit and investigative arm said.

Lockheed Martin, the Pentagon's No. 1 supplier by sales, said it had no insight into how the Pentagon established its estimate averaging up to $112 million per F-35. That figure was up from a baseline projection of $59 million in real, inflation-adjusted terms.

"We expect the average unit cost of the F-35 to be far below that number," Christian Geisel, a company spokesman said, replying in an email.

[Unicorn]

Latest, as posted to Crikey (they do seem to like feeding APA over there, despite the best efforts of a few of us to piss on them from a great height). Mind you, anyone who quotes Bill Sweetman as an authority....

JSF-the truth about that rushed $3.2 billion commitment?
March 21, 2010 – 8:32 pm, by Ben Sandilands
There is a fascinating insight into why Defence Minister John Faulkner’s advisors may have been so keen for him to commit $3.2 billion to the JSF project last November contained in this passage in the GAO or Government Accountability Office report into the fiasco published last week.

Get it. Faulkner was conned into promising $3.2 billion upfront for 14 completely useless, undefined, and definitely undeliverable by 2014 initial low rate production F-35s because Lockheed Martin is running a project with the capacity to swallow a very large fraction of US and western allied GDP .

And it isn’t anywhere near to delivering the air power superiority that is promised either, in a world where the changing nature of the threat in our region would make it irrelevant even if it did work as promised.

Flashback to Faulkner’s words, or rather those written for him, about how spending this incredible amount of money on an initial batch of F-35s would enable us to better assess their costs?

Give us a break. Are we getting our money back if they prove too costly? Or are we just shoving cash into the program up front because it badly needs the loot before it gets closed down or substantially slashed?

Back in January when the head of the JSF project was fired for incompetency it was revealed that the jets Australia had signed up for aren’t defined as doing anything. They have no firm capabilities. We’ve bought something that even the US government can’t work out what it will actually do, because it’s capabilities are undefined and unknown. Faulkner has no way of knowing whether the first JSF’s we get will be 1% relevant to the product we want because it will at least have decals in common, or 50% relevant. How dumb is this?

Faulkner must ask himself, who was it who urged this on me, and what did they then know about this program that has only recently been disclosed in a US procurement audit in January and now in the GAO report as being in serious if not terminal difficulties.

Defence has gone deadly quiet about the JSF program and the con-job on the Minister for these initial production units since the GAO report was released last week.

Perhaps the defence bureaucrats who one might reasonably conclude have been masquerading as Lockheed Martin marketing assistants and apologists, have digested it and come to the same conclusion as Bill Sweetman on Aviation Week’s The Ares Blog, who says:

“The good news for the JSF program in the March 20 GAO report – combined with the other numbers released in March – is that the program is no longer at risk of failure. The bad news is that it has already failed.”

But can someone please explain why voices of dissent on this program like Air Power Australia, or former senior Canberra bureaucrat Erik Peacock, have been so accurate, and the defence establishment almost totally wrong in every single thing they ever said about this project?

Why is failure so ingrained in the defence establishment. Why can’t we get submarines right, why can’t we get helicopters right? Is it because good people get trapped in an administrative culture that tries to call winners too far in advance and then gets enmeshed in group think, where the investment in a solution becomes so large so quickly that contrary voices or changes in technologies or the recogition of changed circumstances have to be suppressed? Is it because foreign policy or trade imperatives have excessive leverage over prudent acquisition? Or do we just engage our money faster than our brains?

Whatever the reason, we face a crushing financial burden to support a failing project, or if Sweetman is right, some very serious writeoffs and fresh investments in an alternative solution, whatever that proves to be.

http://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking/2010/03/21/jsf-the-truth-about-that-rushed-3-2-billion-commitment/

[Chunder]

From unicorns link in the comments section


abarker
Posted March 22, 2010 at 10:25 am | Permalink

If we get the F22, can we get the version that transforms into the evil robot?


*chokes on dinner*

[Weasel]

From unicorns link in the comments section



*chokes on dinner*

It is a decepticon... not a robot...

Even I know that and I must be the least coolest Dad in the school.

cheers

w

[buglerbilly]

UPDATE 1-Gates: Lopsided F-35 costs "drove me nuts"

* Pentagon declines to name the contractor involved

* Gates not referring to a Lockheed Martin plant (Adds Gates veto threat over second engine, C-17)

By Jim Wolf

WASHINGTON, March 24 (Reuters) - U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said he was driven "nuts" by the revelation that taxpayers were funding 70 percent of the overhead at a plant involved in the increasingly expensive F-35 fighter jet, even though the work used only 6 percent of the floor space.

The lopsided overhead charge "just drove me nuts" when it was revealed at a briefing, Gates told the House of Representatives Appropriations subcommittee on defense on Wednesday. "I think we can fix that," Gates added.

Although Lockheed Martin Corp (LMT.N) is the primary F-35, contractor with overall responsibility for the program, Gates was not referring to a Lockheed plant, said Geoff Morrell, the Pentagon press secretary.

Citing what he called proprietary concerns, Morrell declined to identify the company in question.

Lockheed's chief subcontractors on the program include Northrop Grumman Corp (NOC.N) and BAE Systems Plc (BAES.L).

Two separate, interchangeable F-35 engines are under development, one built by United Technologies Corp's (UTX.N) Pratt & Whitney unit and another by a team made up of General Electric (GE.N) and Rolls-Royce Group Plc (RR.L).

At an estimated $300 billion-plus, the F-35 is the Pentagon's costliest arms purchase.

Gates also vowed anew to urge a presidential veto of any legislation that funds the GE-Rolls Royce alternate engine or more Boeing (BA.N) C-17 cargo aircraft.

Lawmakers have kept both programs going for years despite Pentagon efforts to end them in a belt-tightening move.

"I am fully aware of the political pressure to continue building C-17s and to proceed with an alternate engine for the F-35, so let me be very clear," Gates told lawmakers. "I will strongly recommend that the president veto any legislation that sustains the unnecessary continuation of these two programs."

"NOT GOING WELL"

Gates fired his F-35 program manager in February and withheld $615 million in Lockheed's potential award fees as part of a restructuring.

He also added 13 months and $2.8 billion to the plane's development phase and slowed its transition to full production to cap the cost of potential design tweaks.

Michael Sullivan, the top expert on the F-35 at Congress's nonpartisan Government Accountability Office, told lawmakers that an "awful lot of design changes" were being carried out now on the factory floor.

Lockheed is "still having trouble learning how to build" the aircraft, he said. "That's not going well."

Gates tied the program's problems to administration and management, not technology or capabilities.

"The Joint Strike Fighter will do everything the military services need it to do, and it will become the backbone of U.S. air combat for the next generation," he said.

The program is projected to cost more than $300 billion over the next two decades for 2,443 planes in three different models for the U.S. Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps.

Affordability was supposed to be a hallmark of the F-35, which is also being built for eight overseas partners and other projected foreign buyers, including all those now flying the F-16, the world's most widely deployed fighter.

One of those partners, Denmark, said on Wednesday it was postponing a decision on buying new fighter jets, saying it could keep flying its F-16s for two to four years longer. [ID:nLDE62N2K8] (Reporting by Jim Wolf; Editing by Tim Dobbyn and Ted Kerr)

[buglerbilly]

Marine Corps' Future F-35B Joint Strike Fighter Makes First Vertical Landing

(Source: US Marine Corps; issued March 25, 2010)

MARINE CORPS AIR STATION YUMA, Ariz. --- The next chapter of Marine Corps aviation history opened March 18, 2010, as the F-35B Joint Strike Fighter descended to its first vertical landing at a Maryland test site.

The plane, which is slated to replace all Marine Corps combat jets including Yuma’s Harriers, hovered in place for a minute before riding 41,000 pounds of thrust from its single engine to the runway 150 feet below.

“Having the F-35B perform its first vertical landing underscores the reality of the Marine Corps achieving its goal of an all (short takeoff/vertical landing) force,” said Lt. Gen. George J. Trautman III, deputy commandant for aviation.

Reaching the milestone in the plane’s development confirmed the F-35B is able to land in confined areas on land and on ships, which the Marine Corps is banking on.

“Being able to operate and land virtually anywhere, the STOVL JSF is a unique fixed-wing aircraft that can deploy, co-locate, train and fight with Marine ground forces while operating from a wider range of bases ashore and afloat than any other (tactical air) platform,” said Trautman.

Despite delays and budget overages within the JSF program, the Marine Corps is marching forward to prepare to reach an initial operating capability of 29 planes by December 2012, according to a statement released by Headquarters Marine Corps on March 18. (see below—Ed.)

Ten of those planes would make up the first operational squadron, Marine Fighter/Attack Squadron 332, which could be based here once the Secretary of the Navy decides on the final basing plans. That decision isn’t expected until December and not until after the Yuma community has another opportunity in June to scrutinize the final environmental impact statement on basing here.

On April 2, the Corps will activate a new squadron to train future JSF pilots and maintainers beginning this fall. Marine Fighter/Attack Training Squadron 501 will officially stand up as part of the Joint Integrated Training Center located at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida, according to Headquarters Marine Corps.

On top of Yuma’s proposed planes, the training squadron would operate 15 aircraft, while another four F-35Bs would be based with an operational test and evaluation detachment at Edwards Air Force Base in California.

One way the Marine Corps is keeping its 2012 deadline, while the Navy and Air Force have backslid a year to 2016, is to receive a scaled-down version of the aircraft that could go to combat but would need to be upgraded in the future to expand its capabilities, Trautman told Inside The Navy in an article released March 22.

Still, the economy version of the plane “far exceeds the capabilities of any airplane flying in the Department of the Navy today,” he said.

While the STOVL test was successful, testers will continue evaluations with increasingly stressful tests of the aircraft to ensure it works in combat, said Doug Pearson, Lockheed Martin’s vice president of F-35 testing.

Currently, three F-35Bs continue to be evaluated at the Naval Air Station in Patuxent River, Md.

“Today’s vertical landing onto a 95-foot square pad showed that we have the thrust and the control to maneuver accurately both in free air and in the descent through ground effect,” said Graham Tomlinson, the F-35B’s pilot.

Further testing will include flying with different weight loads and ordnance, firing various weapons and evaluating integrated mission systems before working up to shipboard operations, reported Lockheed Martin, the JSF’s manufacturer.

The first plane arrived in Maryland on Nov. 15, 2009, with the other two arriving in December and February. In total, five F-35Bs will be delivered to Patuxent River.

The F-35B passed the first test of its STOVL propulsion system Jan. 7, successfully using the system for 14 minutes at an altitude of 5,000 feet.

Derived from a common design, developed together and using the same sustainment infrastructure worldwide, three F-35 variants will replace at least 13 types of aircraft for 11 nations initially, making it the most cost-effective fighter program in history, according to Lockheed Martin.

The Air Force will receive the F-35A variant, which will provide conventional takeoff and landing capabilities. The Navy will receive the F-35C, designed for carrier launches and duty at sea.

Compared to the Marine Corps’ current tactical fixed-wing squadrons, the JSF can carry more ordnance with greater range than the F/A-18 Hornet, operate from austere environments like the AV-8B Harrier, and possess electronic warfare technology and capability like the EA-6B Prowler, according to Headquarters Marine Corps.

(ends)

JSF F-35B Performs First Vertical Landing

(Source: US Marine Corps; issued March 18, 2010)

HEADQUARTERS MARINE CORPS, Washington, D.C. --- The Marine Corps moved closer today to adding the Joint Strike Fighter F-35B STOVL (Short Take-Off Vertical Landing) variant to its arsenal. The test plane, BF-1, rode more than 41,000 pounds of thrust to a vertical landing for the first time, confirming its required ability to land in confined areas both ashore and afloat.

"Having the F-35B perform its first vertical landing underscores the reality of the Marine Corps achieving its goal of an all STOVL force," said Lt. Gen. George J. Trautman III, Deputy Commandant for Aviation. "Being able to operate and land virtually anywhere, the STOVL JSF is a unique fixed wing aircraft that can deploy, co-locate, train and fight with Marine ground forces while operating from a wider range of bases ashore and afloat than any other TacAir platform."

BF-1 lifted off at 80 knots using less than 1000 feet of runway from Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Md., at 1:09 EST. About 13 minutes into the flight; the pilot positioned the aircraft 150 feet above the airfield, where he brought the F-35 to a hover and then descended to the runway. BF-1 is one of three F-35B STOVL jets currently undergoing flight trials at the Patuxent River test site.

On April 2, 2010, Marine Fighter/Attack Training Squadron - 501 (VMFAT-501) will officially stand up as part of the Joint Integrated Training Center located at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. The work being done at Patuxent River will enable the Marine Corps to start training Marine pilots and maintainers during the fall of 2010.

The Marine Corps anticipates reaching JSF F-35B initial operational capability (IOC) in December 2012. IOC assets will include the first F-35B training squadron of 15 aircraft in VMFAT-501 at Eglin AFB, an operational test and evaluation detachment of 4 aircraft at Edwards AFB, and VMFA-332, the Corps' first operational squadron of 10 aircraft at MCAS Yuma. TheVMFA-332 aircraft will be equipped, manned and trained to execute Marine missions and deploy ashore or afloat.

The STOVL F-35B Lightning II is scheduled to replace three different variants of USMC combat aircraft (F/A-18, AV-8B and EA-6B). This 5th generation multi-role fighter has significant advantages over the Marine Corps' current tactical fixed-wing squadrons and will dramatically amplify strategic agility, vastly enhance operational flexibility and capabilities, provide tactical adaptability for basing options ashore and afloat, and reduce aviation training and maintenance costs across the Corps.

The STOVL JSF will carry more ordnance with greater range than the F/A-18 Hornet, operate from austere expeditionary environments like the AV-8B Harrier, and ultimately possess electronic warfare technology similar to the EA-6B Prowler.

-ends-

[buglerbilly]

Joint Strike Fighter: Significant Challenges and Decisions Ahead

(Source: Government Accountability Office; issued March 25, 2010)

In this March 24 testimony before the Subcommittees on Air and Land Forces and Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, GAO’s Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management Michael Sullivan recaps the status of the Joint Strike Fighter programs and details some of its more serious problems.

He also offers a more detailed analysis of the case for developing the program’s alternate engine, and concludes that it would be a cost-effective investment. This is the GAO’s summary of Sullivan’s testimony:

The JSF program continues to struggle with increased costs and slowed progress--negative outcomes that were foreseeable as events have unfolded over several years.

Total estimated acquisition costs have increased $46 billion and development extended 2 1/2 more years, compared to the approved program baseline approved in 2007. Aircraft unit costs will likely exceed the thresholds established by the statutory provision referred to as Nunn McCurdy and may require DOD to recertify the need for the JSF to Congress.

The program is at risk for not delivering aircraft quantities and capabilities on time. Dates for achieving initial operational capabilities may have to be extended or some requirements deferred to future upgrades.

DOD leadership is taking some positive steps that should reduce risk and provide more realistic cost and schedule estimates. Officials increased time and funding for system development, added four aircraft to the flight test program, and reduced near-term procurement quantities. If effectively implemented, these actions should improve future program outcomes.

Currently, however, manufacturing JSF test aircraft continues to take more time, money, and effort than budgeted, hampering the development flight test program. Slowed by late aircraft deliveries and low productivity, the flight test program only completed 10 percent of the sorties planned during 2009. Although restructuring actions should help, there is still substantial overlap of development, test, and production activities while DOD continues to invest in large quantities of production aircraft before variant designs are proven and performance verified.

Under the current plan, DOD may procure as many as 307 aircraft at a total estimated cost of $58.2 billion before development flight testing is completed.

Our updated analysis on engine costs shows that, without competition, an estimated $62.5 billion will be needed over the remainder of the F135 primary engine effort to cover costs for completing system development, procuring 2,443 engines, production support, and sustainment. Additional investment of between $4.5 billion to $5.7 billion may be required should the department continue competition.

Under certain assumptions, the additional costs of continuing the F136 alternate engine program could be recouped if competition were to generate approximately 10.1 to 12.6 percent savings over the life of the program. Air Force data on the first 4 years of competition for engines on the F-16 aircraft projected they would recoup at least that much. Actual savings will ultimately depend on factors such as the number of aircraft actually purchased, the ratio of engines awarded to each contractor, and when the competition begins.

Competition may also provide non-quantifiable benefits with respect to better contractor responsiveness, technical innovation and improved operational readiness

Click here for the full testimony (19 pages in PDF format) on the GAO website.

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10478t.pdf

-ends-

[buglerbilly]

Pentagon rejects two-engine option for F-35

By Caitlin Harrington

26 March 2010

The US Department of Defense (DoD) has said that there is still no valid business case for buying two different engines for the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter, despite concerns raised by lawmakers and a new government audit indicating potential benefits.

The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) reiterated in 24 March congressional testimony that buying both the Pratt & Whitney F135 and General Electric (GE) Rolls-Royce F136 engines may prove financially feasible and also provide non-financial benefits, such as better contractor responsiveness.

The costs of opening two separate production lines "could be recouped if competition were to generate approximately 10.1 to 12.6 per cent savings over the life of the programme", Michael Sullivan, the GAO's director of acquisition and sourcing management, said in written testimony submitted to the House Armed Services subcommittees on Air and Land Forces and Seapower and Expeditionary Forces.

However, Ashton Carter, the Pentagon's top acquisition official, said the DoD remains opposed to buying two engines; while acknowledging that competition may drive down costs in the long-term, he insisted the short-term costs are too high.

179 of 508 words

Copyright © IHS (Global) Limited, 2010

[buglerbilly]

Faulkner gives upbeat JSF assessment

March 29, 2010 - 2:40PM

AAP

Defence Minister John Faulkner has provided an upbeat assessment of the troubled Joint Strike Fighter project despite acknowledging it has its problems.

But the problems should be resolved in time for the aircraft to enter Australian operational service by 2018, he said.

Senator Faulkner, addressing the RAAF Air Power Conference in Canberra on Monday, said the government welcomed recent decisive US government action to keep the project on track.

The Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning JSF is an advanced stealthy multi-role combat aircraft that will be the mainstay of US and allied air forces to around mid-century.

Australia will acquire up to 100 aircraft with the first entering service in 2018.

Senator Faulkner said the project had experienced cost and schedule issues - rising costs and delays - during the past couple of years but it had made significant progress.

The short takeoff and vertical landing variant, not being acquired by Australia, had successfully completed its first takeoff and vertical landing.

"I can report that ground structural testing has also been progressing very well with ground test aircraft completing testing at about three times the rate of earlier aircraft programs," he said.

"Testing of the stealth performance of the aircraft is also progressing well, meeting predictions based on new technologies that will significantly reduce the time and cost of maintaining stealth capabilities."

Senator Faulkner said all JSF sensors were performing well in the labs and on test aircraft and would soon fly on the first JSF avionics test aircraft.

"And by the end of 2010, the 19 test aircraft already on contract should be delivered to the flight test sites," he said.

The arrival of the RAAF's first five of 24 F/A-18F Super Hornets last Friday would allow retirement of elderly F-111 strike bombers at the end of this year.

Super Hornets were ordered by the previous Howard government as a bridging capability in event of delay in arrival of JSF.

The aircraft would greatly enhance Australia's air combat capability but it was the JSF that represented the next generation of Australian air power, Senator Faulkner said.

© 2010 AAP

[Glenn Levick]

Australia will acquire up to 100 aircraft with the first entering service in 2018.

Slightly better than the 2020 date stated in one of the Super Hornet arrival stories on TV recently.

[buglerbilly]

F136 Reaches Full Thrust In Afterburner Test

Mar 26, 2010



By Guy Norris
Cincinnati

Away from the funding furor in Washington over the F136 alternate engine for the Joint Strike Fighter, the General Electric/Rolls-Royce development team is pushing ahead with full performance tests after running the production-configuration engine in maximum afterburner for the first time.

The milestone was achieved on Engine 006, the first of six system development and demonstration (SDD) production-standard F136s due to be run by the end of 2010, and it clears the engine for unrestricted afterburner operation, says the team. Performance, durability, operability and control data from the tests provide the basis for initial flight release in 2011 of the F-35 conventional-takeoff-and-landing (CTOL) version.

“The plan is to have more than 1,000 hr. on the latest SDD configuration,” says GE/Rolls-Royce Fighter Engine Team President Al DiLibero. “This will be a tri-variant configuration, and we’re confident we’re in a good position to meet the aircraft specification.” Although the focus is on tests for the F-35A conventional variant engine, GE/Rolls-Royce says the work also lays the foundation for trials later this year that will support tests of the short-takeoff-and-vertical-landing (Stovl) version.

“Make no mistake about it, 2010 is the year of execution. What we are doing on Engine 006 will pave the way for the rest of the program,” says DiLibero. Tests also proved changes to the instrumentation, which failed in its original configuration and twice interrupted initial ground runs of the first SDD engine last year.

The configuration also includes revisions to clearances in the No. 4 bearing and strengthened attachments on the diffuser splitter between the combustion chamber and turbine inlet, both due to findings of the initial SDD tests. The beefed-up bolts in the combustor/diffuser/nozzle assembly were added after borescope inspections revealed that a loose unit caused turbine blade impact damage during runs of Engine 005 last October.

With all the improvements in place, DiLibero says Engine 006 test results so far indicate performance and durability is exceeding design expectations and turbine inlet temperatures are cooler than planned. “So that’s more margin for durability, or power,” he adds. GE/Rolls-Royce declines to comment on the top thrust levels achieved in maximum afterburner, but the team previously said it anticipated an estimated 5% margin over the F-35’s baseline Pratt & Whitney F135 powerplant.

“Both engine developers are working to the same specifications, and our customer has made it clear it is not in anybody’s interests to be over. However, we’re on firm ground by saying we have margin,” says F136 marketing manager Tim Morison. GE/Rolls-Royce says the additional thrust may be particularly valuable for increasing weapons bring-back capability and hover performance for the F-35B Stovl version. “We think the three-stage low-pressure turbine is what drives the margin in Stovl,” Morison says.

Tests of Engine 006 are being run in GE’s altitude test facility in Evendale, Ohio, which simulates inlet conditions at both high altitude and high Mach numbers. For full afterburner tests, the engine was connected to the common exhaust system designed to accommodate both the F135 and the F136. One test of the engine, which incorporates a radial augmenter design derived from the F414 and F110-129-132, included running at maximum afterburner for more than 60 sec., the team says.

Preparations are also underway to add the next two test engines that together will help qualify several key technologies, including the F136’s counter-rotating vaneless turbine configuration and lightweight ceramic matrix composite vanes. Next in line is Engine 005, which will be used for both performance and operability tests at Arnold Engineering Development Center (AEDC) in Tullahoma, Tenn., this summer. The engine is currently being built up and will be checked out at GE’s Evendale site before shipping to AEDC in the second quarter. Aeromechanical testing will be undertaken in mid-year using the second build of Engine 004.

“Engines 005 and 007 will be piggybacking off each other for operability and performance software tests,” says *DiLibero. Engine 008 will be used throughout the second half of 2010 for CTOL accelerated mission testing in the Evendale altitude test facility, while Engine 009 is expected to run in the fourth quarter as part of a series of ingestion and vibration tests. A second build of Engine 006 will be used for the start of Stovl tests late in the year, DiLibero says.

“We have funding in fiscal year 2010, and we’ve had to work with the funding available,” says DiLibero, noting that the current test plan “supports the whole CTOL initial flight release in 2011.” The target for first flight of a F136-powered F-35 is December 2011, while the first flight of the Stovl version is planned for about a year later, with initial service release anticipated at the end of 2013.

DiLibero, the architect of last year’s surprise fixed-price contract offer for engines in low-rate initial production (LRIP) Lot 5, says that despite the continuing funding uncertainty, “we feel confident in what we can do, and what we can deliver. We’re willing to take on that risk.”

The proposal, which effectively brings forward by two years the date by which the F136 could be competed on the F-35, covers a fixed-price proposal for the initial 21 engines in LRIP Lot 5 instead of the original cost-plus contract of the directed buy plan for Lots 5 and 6. As currently envisioned, the aircraft in Lot 7 are the first F-35s that would be competed with both engines.

“With the restructuring of the program, we’ve got to look at how that comes out. However, we still feel confident in what we offered up last year,” says DiLibero. “All we want to do is have an opportunity to compete, and we’re so close to completing development of this program.”

GE/Rolls-Royce estimates $1.3 billion will be needed to finish the effort in the next five years, including all tooling and associated infrastructure. Of this, it says less than $1 billion is needed to complete development, versus almost $3 billion spent to date. “The bottom line is we’re still focused on what we need to deliver and on engine testing,” DiLibero says.

Photo: GE/Rolls-Royce

[buglerbilly]

How Much Will Each F-35 Cost? (excerpt)

(Source: Center for Defense Information; issued March 30, 2010)

In two hearings in the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Ashton Carter and his Director for Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation Christine Fox presented new unit cost estimates for the F-35. Those estimates are extremely optimistic (and very incomplete).

Incomplete because the $114 million to $135 million “Average Procurement Unit Cost” (APUC) Carter and Fox announced, in “then-year” dollars, to buy 2,443 aircraft does not include the research, development, test and evaluation for the F-35. Their current estimate of the additional development costs is about $60 billion (to add to the current estimate of $278 to $329 billion to produce 2,443 F -35s). Including development would add about $25 million to the cost of each aircraft, making the Carter-Fox total program unit cost vary from $139 million to $160 million.

It may be that Carter and Fox are unwilling to testify to a total program unit cost because they are unwilling to inflict further “sticker shock.” Presumably, the official, more complete numbers will be made available later in April when the Defense Department releases its new Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), now about 18 months overdue. What Carter and Fox thought they had to gain by delaying the more complete revelation does not merit speculation; their existing (and truncated) production unit cost estimates have little to do with unfolding realities.

The 2011 budget request for the F-35 plans to buy 43 aircraft for $8.654 billion in procurement funding. That makes for a production unit cost for the 2011 buy of $201 million per F-35. In his March 24 testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, Carter stated that the unit cost “will decrease significantly” from this level as purchases increase and production processes “optimize.” This is consistent with conventional wisdom that there exists a “learning curve” for aircraft production that progressively shrinks unit cost steadily as production proceeds. Thus, Carter and Fox argue, F-35 unit production costs will come down from the currently unsettlingly high number of $201 million each down to the $114 to $135 million band.

The last 50 years of actual DOD aircraft cost history, especially of “stealth” aircraft, do not treat the Carter-Fox estimates, and the prevailing conventional wisdom, very politely, however. The absence of any such progressive “learning curve” in unit cost has been thoroughly demonstrated by the analysis of Chuck Spinney, using actual procurement data. In the case of the F-35, we can test the likelihood and amount of “learning curve” reduction in the unit cost by comparing the F-35 at this point in its program history to its closest aircraft relative, the F-22.

F-35 unit cost, just for the procurement side of the ledger, is far more likely to stay around $200 million per copy, or go up, than it is to reduce to the not particularly affordable costs Carter and Fox now predict.

It also worth remembering that the $200-plus million unit cost anticipated here is incomplete. An accurate sticker price includes the total cost of development, testing, facilities and other factors amortized across the ultimate size of the fleet. With the fleet size shrinking by some currently unknown, but very substantial, factor, the unit cost for the total program is sure to grow to even more horrifying levels.

Whatever that final unit cost may ultimately be, to predict it now will surely be met with gales of derisive laughter from the advocates of this ongoing disaster -- gales that will last only until the actual bill arrives on their doorstep. (end of excerpt)

Click here for the full article (HTML format) on the CDI website.

http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?DocumentID=4596&from_page=../index.cfm

-ends-

[buglerbilly]

Italy Pressuring U.S., Lockheed Over JSF Work

Apr 1, 2010



By Andy Nativi

GENOA, Italy — The Italian ministry of defense is increasing the pressure on both the U.S. government and F-35 Joint Strike Fighter prime contractor Lockheed Martin to win better terms for technology transfer and local industry involvement.

Guido Crosetto, the undersecretary of defense charged with crafting the deal, says he is confident negotiations will conclude “within two to three months.” During hearings before an Italian defense committee, Crosetto said bluntly that so far the ministry is not at all satisfied with the level of Italian participation in the program, which is “not adequate [considering] the investments that Italy has made and is willing to sustain in the future.”

Italian industry, in particular the defense electronics industry, is far from happy, although the situation is better in the aerostructures area thanks to the agreements signed by Lockheed and Alenia Aeronautica, mainly involving wing design and production.

To increase the pressure, Crosetto has blocked work from starting at the Cameri air force base, where the FACO (final assembly and check out) facility is to be built. The FACO is expected to build at least the Italian and, eventually, Dutch aircraft, but could expand its assembly activities to deal with other international customers. Furthermore, the FACO is to be used to support the F-35 fleet for its operational life, spanning 40 years. Crosetto says that both the U.S. government and Lockheed are now more willing to allow the Italian FACO to support the F-35 of other “European users.”

Crosetto says Italy deserves to be fully recognized as a JSF partner and not just a customer, and he also hinted that if the Italian requests are not met the program will have to be brought back to Parliament for further scrutiny.

Crosetto maintains there is a substantial potential for Italian industry to be active in the program: around 30 aerospace and electronic companies of all sizes could be involved, and the “potential” value of Lockheed work they would compete for is estimated to be $11.2 billion, as well as $2.4 billion from Pratt & Whitney and $4.2 billion from General Electric/Rolls-Royce.

Italy committed $10 million in 1999 for the early phases of the program, $1 billion in 2002 for the system design and development phase and then another $900 million for production and support for the life of the program (known as production sustainment and follow-on development, or PSFD). Italy also is planning to spend up to €605 million ($815 million) to build the FACO and €13 billion to acquire and provide logistic support for up to 130 F-35s. For FY 2010, €207.6 million has been earmarked.

Italy’s potential requirement at the moment stands at 131 F-35s, including 22 short-takeoff-and-vertical-landing (Stovl) F-35Bs for the navy and a mix of 109 conventional F-35As and Bs for the air force. But the high cost of the F-35B is putting budget pressure on air force plans.

Nonetheless, Italian defense officials consider the F-35 acquisition one of their highest-priority programs. The navy has no alternative to replace its force of AV-8B Harrier II Stovl aircraft. The air force is willing to replace the AMX fighter bomber first and then at least part of its Tornado fleet with the F-35.

The air force is urgently trying to assess what extra costs may stem from F-35 delays, recently acknowledged by the Pentagon, since it will be forced to keep its current fighter-bomber fleet in service longer. And having two fighter-bomber types is logistically and operationally complicated and very costly. In addition, the number of upgrades that the AMX and Tornado are slated to receive could increase if they are to remain in active duty for substantially longer. However, some internal trade-off studies call for retiring the AMXs on their original schedule.

So far the issue of the increased F-35 costs has not been officially tackled by the defense ministry or the parliament, but this is sure to be a hot topic when Italy finally signs production orders, when overall procurement numbers could be affected or procurement rates diluted.

Photo: DoD

[buglerbilly]

CRS: Alt-Engine Could Reduce U.S. F-35 Buy

By JOHN REED

Published: 2 Apr 2010 16:07

Continued funding for the F136 alternate engine for the F-35 Lightning II fighter jet is likely to reduce the number of jets the Pentagon can buy unless the program receives more money, according to a March 22 report by the Congressional Research Service.

"If alternate engine funds are allocated within the existing F-35 budget lines, other F-35 activities must be curtailed in favor of the alternate engine program," says the report, titled "F-35 Alternative Engine Programs: Background and Issues for Congress."

The report cites U.S. Marine Corps Maj. Gen. David Heinz, a former manager of the Joint Strike Fighter program, as saying that keeping the alternative engine program alive could force the Pentagon to cut 80 jets from the planned U.S. order of 2,443.

The report also warns against simply increasing the amount of money in the JSF program in order to buy the General Electric-Rolls Royce F136.

"Increasing the F-35 top line to account for the effects of increased alternate engine funding without" a similar increase in the Pentagon's total budget "would force the transfer for funds from other defense programs to the F-35," it says.

The Pentagon zeroed funding for the F136 in its 2011 budget request, but lawmakers continue to fight for the production of the second engine, arguing that the competition will improve contractor performance and provide a safety net against problems with the Pratt & Whitney F135 engine.

Pentagon officials have said numerous times that the second engine would be a distraction to a program already beset with delays and cost overruns. They say there is no financial justification for buying a second engine.

[Weasel]

CRS: Alt-Engine Could Reduce U.S. F-35 Buy

By JOHN REED

Published: 2 Apr 2010 16:07

Continued funding for the F136 alternate engine for the F-35 Lightning II fighter jet is likely to reduce the number of jets the Pentagon can buy unless the program receives more money, according to a March 22 report by the Congressional Research Service.

"If alternate engine funds are allocated within the existing F-35 budget lines, other F-35 activities must be curtailed in favor of the alternate engine program," says the report, titled "F-35 Alternative Engine Programs: Background and Issues for Congress."

The report cites U.S. Marine Corps Maj. Gen. David Heinz, a former manager of the Joint Strike Fighter program, as saying that keeping the alternative engine program alive could force the Pentagon to cut 80 jets from the planned U.S. order of 2,443.

The report also warns against simply increasing the amount of money in the JSF program in order to buy the General Electric-Rolls Royce F136.

"Increasing the F-35 top line to account for the effects of increased alternate engine funding without" a similar increase in the Pentagon's total budget "would force the transfer for funds from other defense programs to the F-35," it says.

The Pentagon zeroed funding for the F136 in its 2011 budget request, but lawmakers continue to fight for the production of the second engine, arguing that the competition will improve contractor performance and provide a safety net against problems with the Pratt & Whitney F135 engine.

Pentagon officials have said numerous times that the second engine would be a distraction to a program already beset with delays and cost overruns. They say there is no financial justification for buying a second engine.

Now this is interesting. Special interest groups were running a campaign last year with billboards all over the Washington DC Metro saying a similar thing.

With a multitude of "extra" f-35 silhouhetes the Government could buy if they canned the alternative engine... And now congress has produced a "report" basically plagurizing the "end the f-136 media blitz"

Don't you love beltway politiking?

cheers

w

[buglerbilly]

Ares

A Defense Technology Blog

First Mission-System Test F-35 Flies

Posted by Graham Warwick at 4/7/2010 1:33 PM CDT

The first F-35 Joint Strike Fighter equipped with the mission system - radar, electro-optical sensors, electronic warfare, comm/nav/ident etc - has flown today (Apr. 7) at Fort Worth. Aircraft BF-4 is also the fourth short take-off and vertical landing F-35 to have flown.


Photo: Lockheed Martin

BF-4 completed a 54min sortie with test pilot David Nelson at the controls. The aircraft is loaded with the initial Block 0.5 version of the mission-system software, which provides air-to-air search and synthetic-apterure radar modes, IFF, integrated UHF/VHF radios, radar warning receiver, and GPS/INS navigation.

The mission system installed for the initial flight includes the APG-81 active electronically scanned array radar, EW system, integrated CNI, integrated core processor and the pilot's helmet-mounted display. The electro-optical targeting sensor and 360-deg EO distributed aperture system will be added later.

[buglerbilly]

Cost Estimate for F-35 to Soar, Pentagon Says (excerpt)

(Source: Ft. Worth Star-Telegram; issued April 6, 2010)

Defense Department officials have told Congress that the already ballooning costs of the F-35 joint strike fighter are likely to soar much higher when new estimates are completed in the summer.

In the Selected Acquisition Report for the F-35, a detailed document sent to Congress on Thursday, the Pentagon said it expects that cost studies now under way will produce estimates dramatically higher than those used in recent months to prepare the 2011 defense budget request.

Based on figures in the document, the average cost of one F-35 -- $62 million when the program was launched in 2002 -- could rise to $115.5 million, not counting inflation, by the time all 2,457 planes that the U.S. plans to buy are built.

Including inflation, the government now expects each F-35 to cost an average of $133.6 million. But even that figure could swell to more than $150 million when revised estimates are completed in June.(Emphasis added—Ed.)

The report was obtained by the online news service InsideDefense.com, which reported it in a story posted on its Web site Wednesday. The Star-Telegram obtained its own copy of the report.

It shows that Pentagon officials now estimate that the average cost of one F-35 has risen 57 percent before accounting for inflation. It predicts that the next round of estimates could show an increase of up to 87 percent, again before inflation.

Further cost increases, coming on top of a wave of recent revelations about rising costs and lengthy delays on the part of contractor Lockheed Martin in getting planes built, will give additional ammunition to defense spending critics in general and F-35 critics in particular. They could also further delay purchasing decisions of potential foreign buyers, who are already nervous about the rising costs.

"The sticker shock for the F-35 is just now beginning to sink in; more sticker shock is to come as future revelations and developments continue to drive up the unit cost," said Winslow Wheeler, director of the Straus Military Reform Project at the Center for Defense Information and a former Senate committee staff member.

But Lockheed Martin spokesman Chris Geisel said in an e-mailed statement: "We can foresee no scenario in which F-35 unit costs are even close to the projections ... cited in the Inside Defense article." (end of excerpt)

-ends-

[buglerbilly]

The original article...........


An F-35B on a test flight.

Cost estimate for F-35 to soar, Pentagon says

Posted Tuesday, Apr. 06, 2010

By BOB COX

rcox@star-telegram.com

Defense Department officials have told Congress that the already ballooning costs of the F-35 joint strike fighter are likely to soar much higher when new estimates are completed in the summer.

In the Selected Acquisition Report for the F-35, a detailed document sent to Congress on Thursday, the Pentagon said it expects that cost studies now under way will produce estimates dramatically higher than those used in recent months to prepare the 2011 defense budget request.

Based on figures in the document, the average cost of one F-35 -- $62 million when the program was launched in 2002 -- could rise to $115.5 million, not counting inflation, by the time all 2,457 planes that the U.S. plans to buy are built.

Including inflation, the government now expects each F-35 to cost an average of $133.6 million. But even that figure could swell to more than $150 million when revised estimates are completed in June.

The report was obtained by the online news service InsideDefense.com, which reported it in a story posted on its Web site Wednesday. The Star-Telegram obtained its own copy of the report.

It shows that Pentagon officials now estimate that the average cost of one F-35 has risen 57 percent before accounting for inflation. It predicts that the next round of estimates could show an increase of up to 87 percent, again before inflation.

Further cost increases, coming on top of a wave of recent revelations about rising costs and lengthy delays on the part of contractor Lockheed Martin in getting planes built, will give additional ammunition to defense spending critics in general and F-35 critics in particular. They could also further delay purchasing decisions of potential foreign buyers, who are already nervous about the rising costs.

"The sticker shock for the F-35 is just now beginning to sink in; more sticker shock is to come as future revelations and developments continue to drive up the unit cost," said Winslow Wheeler, director of the Straus Military Reform Project at the Center for Defense Information and a former Senate committee staff member.

But Lockheed Martin spokesman Chris Geisel said in an e-mailed statement: "We can foresee no scenario in which F-35 unit costs are even close to the projections ... cited in the Inside Defense article."

The F-35 program has been the subject of much scrutiny and internal analysis since Pentagon officials conceded late last year that earlier, more optimistic predictions of costs and progress were hopelessly out of date and unrealistic.

The latest cost analysis indicates that the figures Pentagon officials used in preparing the 2011 budget and submitted to Congress still understate the likely cost of building the F-35s that are planned for the Air Force, Marines and Navy.

The new analysis says the Pentagon's earlier report was developed largely using cost projections by the F-35 Joint Program Office, which works directly with Lockheed and has consistently been too optimistic.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates said Feb. 1 that he had replaced the F-35 program office manager, Marine Gen. David Heinz, after reviewing the cost estimates for the 2011 budget.

In the report submitted to Congress, the average cost of an F-35 was estimated at $97.1 million before inflation, a 57 percent increase over the original estimate.

The total cost of the program was originally estimated at $178 billion. The latest estimate puts that figure at $328.25 billion, including inflation projections. That number was made public last week.

But language in the full report indicates that figure could rise by $40 billion to $50 billion.

When the public cost figures were released last week, Wheeler said they would prove optimistic. He said the projections in the detailed report are worse than he expected.

Geisel said the actual cost of building airplanes is now trending lower than expected. "We believe the final price per aircraft will be well below the independent estimates the government has adopted."

BOB COX, 817-390-7723

Read more: http://www.star-telegram.com/2010/04/06/2094443/cost-estimate-for-f-35-to-soar.html#ixzz0kVokDeq8

[buglerbilly]

Dutch Wait To Clarify JSF Stance

Apr 8, 2010

By Robert Wall

LONDON — The way forward for the Netherlands on the specific structure of its F-35 Joint Strike Fighter involvement is not expected to crystallize until midyear.

With a caretaker government operating in the country and the Pentagon in the midst of restructuring the F-35 program, Dutch Defense State Secretary Jack de Vries signaled to lawmakers that a number of issues will remain in flux for several months. Chief among those is determining the actual average procurement unit cost and the life-cycle costs projected for the F-35.

De Vries told legislators to expect an update around June, when new figures will emerge as the U.S. completes its update on the projected average procurement unit cost linked to the Nunn-McCurdy recertification process. That review is now underway and could result in a higher unit cost estimate than the $93 million to $112 million unit price (in 2010 dollars) used in the planning baseline in the Pentagon’s April 1 selected acquisition reports.

The new program plan also could affect when the Netherlands starts buying production F-35s. An initial program schedule called for those purchases to begin slowly in 2012, with the first two of 85 eventual units to be put on contract.

Also up in the air is the Dutch plan to buy two Initial Operational Test & Evaluation (IOT&E) aircraft. The first already has been ordered and is due for delivery next year. Given the political situation in the Netherlands, the Dutch government is holding off on buying the second IOT&E asset.

De Vries also confirmed to lawmakers that there is an option for the Netherlands to dispose of the first IOT&E aircraft already ordered, although that would come at a still-undetermined cost.

[buglerbilly]

DATE:08/04/10

SOURCE:Flight International

Lockheed rejects Pentagon's cost estimates for F-35

By Stephen Trimble

Lockheed Martin has reached a key F-35 Joint Strike Fighter first flight milestone - and struck back at Department of Defense budget estimates warning that the much-delayed programme is heading for per-aircraft procurement costs of nearly double original estimates.

A year late, short take-off vertical landing test aircraft BF-4 made its first, 45min flight on 7 April. The flight was also the first for the F-35's full suite of advanced sensors.

But that milestone came against a background of Pentagon cost estimates released in February showing average F-35 procurement will grow by as much as 90%, and a US Navy study showing estimates for total ownership costs had tripled since contract award in 2001.

The disclosures triggered a mandatory review under the Nunn-McCurdy Law, which requires the DoD to restructure the programme or terminate the contract. Changes already announced include reducing the five-year production plan by as many as 120 aircraft, to 2,443.

Lockheed has hit back at a DoD budgeting philosophy based on recent legislative changes that allow budgeters to use more conservative assumptions: "Lockheed Martin and its partners are confident that the actual aircraft costs negotiated with the government in the future will be substantially lower than [these] estimates".

Moreover, Lockheed notes that the first three lots of low-rate initial production (LRIP) have been signed within the DoD's 2007 budget projections. The fourth LRIP deal should continue that trend after it is signed in May, it says, adding: "While the government is adopting the independent estimates for budgeting, it is holding industry to much lower cost targets."

However, the company did not respond to a question asking it to reveal its own long-term cost projections for the F-35.

Although the LRIP contracts have been delivered within budget, the F-35 programme has faced previous cost overruns and costly schedule delays. A weight problem discovered in 2004 forced Lockheed to redesign the F-35B short take-off and vertical landing variant, which doubled the cost of the development phase and added two years.

Since then, the flight-test programme has also remained behind schedule, with only 3% of flight tests scheduled in fiscal year 2010 completed during the first five months. Lockheed also acknowledges that aircraft deliveries have been delayed by about six months.

The US government's newer, more conservative projections assume that the DoD will buy a total of 2,443 F-35s. If that number is reduced further, the projected average cost per aircraft will increase even more.

[buglerbilly]

DATE:13/04/10

SOURCE:Flight International

Comment: Perception, reality and the F-35

Lost amid reports of up to a 90% cost overrun for the F-35 programme is the curious fact that Lockheed Martin is so far delivering low-rate initial production aircraft under budget.

So, why is there a nearly 90%-and-widening cost estimate spread between the Department of Defense and Lockheed?

The reason is a new law that allows the DoD to set long-term budgets based on independent - and generally more conservative - cost assessments. So the F-35 cost overrun has been based on fresh assumptions, not on new facts.

Anticipating a massive cost overrun, the DoD has slashed up to 120 aircraft from the five-year production plan. Perception is creating its own reality, as production cutbacks are guaranteed to increase unit costs.

But Lockheed's optimism is also contradicted by its performance. Deliveries of developmental aircraft have come more than a year late. Flight tests are hundreds of sorties behind schedule. At some point, that has to catch up to Lockheed's cost accounting.

Underlying the DoD's conservative assumptions is another concern: Lockheed has to sell 2,443 jets to the USA and more than 700 to foreign partners for the sums to add up.

As perception and reality continue to mingle on this programme, that is a very optimistic assumption.

[Gubler, A.]

Looks like Peter Goon from Air Power Australia has gone a bit off the deep end at ARES blog:

http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp?plckController=Blog&plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&newspaperUserId=27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7&plckPostId=Blog%3a27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post%3a6ea2489b-ce2a-47a3-9987-15f06ca13904&plckScript=blogScript&plckElementId=blogDest

He posts openly as Horde and also was under alias as DamaclesIam until he posted a signed letter under DamaclesIam that is...

[buglerbilly]

Hilarious discussions about ethics from that prat...............and anonymity...........:shakehead

[buglerbilly]

Docs Say F-35B Too Hot, Noisy

By Colin Clark from DoD Buzz

Wednesday, April 14th, 2010 3:44 pm

When the Marine Corps commandant says equipment he is buying for his people works and is safe, we listen. So when Gen. James Conway told us the vertical takeoff version of the Joint Strike Fighter was not too hot to damage carriers or amphibious ships and was not too loud to harm crews or communities, we listened. So did some folks on Capitol Hill and they questioned whether the Marine leadership was singing too sweet a song.

Testing documents obtained by DoD Buzz, said by congressional sources to be the most recent available, raise serious questions about the effects of heat and noise from the F-35B on pilots and ships’ crews, on ship decks and on critical flight equipment.

For example, an operational assessment of the JSF says that heat from the STOVL version may result in “severe F-35 operating restrictions and or costly facility upgrades, repairs or both.” The OT-IID report says “thermal management” will “increase the number of sorties required to prepare an operational unit for deployment during summer months” at most American bases. Overall, it rates basing as red: “unlikely to meet criteria — significant shortfall.”

Another document, a briefing chart rating the plane’s systems, rates as “red” flight operations noise “below deck and island structure” and “on the flight.” Direct exhaust “deck personnel burns” are rated red, as is “personnel blow down” and “off-gassing.” On top of that, the non-skid coating is rated red, as is the impact of the plane’s power systems on “spotting” and the plane’s outwash “on spotting of adjacent aircraft.”

A congressional aide was biting in his reaction to Conway’s assurances that the plane was marginally hotter than the AV-8B Harrier and about as loud as existing planes.

“AV-8B and F-35B temperatures might be the same, but so far they haven’t shown anyone their data; plus, you have to look at it from the perspective of total kinetic energy of the engine thrust. AV-8B has a thrust rating of 23,000lbs, whereas an F-35B thrust rating is 41,000lbs. He’s comparing a cigar torch lighter to a blow torch. Additionally, he’s got other thermal issues he needs to worry about as well, like overheating avionics and cockpit temperatures,” the aide said.

The testing report says that “continued cycling” of the engine for carrier takeoff raises “serious issues” because a pilot’s backup oxygen supply is depleted when the integrated power package (IPP) is disengaged to give the plane more thrust. Cutting off the IPP also means there is “potential that overheating of the radar and avionics may result.” On top of all that, temperatures inside the cockpit on the ground and in low altitude, high-speed fly “will be high,” more than 90 degrees even during a day when the mercury hits 59 degrees outside. That could “hamper pilot performance” during such missions.

The congressional aide then went on to noise. “As for the noise issue, the concern is not in the aircraft flying pattern, the noise concern is for those onboard ship, both above and below deck that are going to have issues. If none of this is a concern, why is the risk matrix still red after developmental testing mitigations are removed?” the aide asked.

We showed the documents to Winslow Wheeler, a top defense analyst at Washington’s Center for Defense Information. “The documentation makes extremely clear that the Navy and Marine Corps know they have a problem on their hands. But they don’t know the dimension of the problem and they don’t know how to address it. But the problem is very clear,” he said.

The congressional staff who spoke said they were concerned that the Marines are unwilling to address what could be fundamental problems for the fifth-generation STOVL plane and, one said, “are purposely disingenuous in their misrepresentation of facts.”

"Congressional Sources" could mean anybody and anything and a lot of this is regurgitation of what is already known...........the heat of equipment on-board is a problem for all modern Fighter aircraft, the heat from the exhaust is a vessel-to-vessel problem that requires MINOR modification of materials used for decks etc NOT a major problem, ditto noise........

[Unicorn]

US military backs F-35, draws line on more F/A-18s
Tue Apr 13, 2010 7:40pm EDT

* US Navy sees F/A-18 production shutdown starting in 2013
* Sen. Lieberman unhappy with work on fighter shortfall
* Missouri senator blasts move to end F/A-18 production (Recasts first paragraph, adds comments from Missouri senator, Marine Corps general)

By Andrea Shalal-Esa

WASHINGTON, April 13 (Reuters) - Top U.S. Air Force and Navy officials backed the Lockheed Martin Corp (LMT.N) F-35 fighter jet and said they had no plans to buy more Boeing Co (BA.N) F/A-18 fighters despite the skyrocketing cost of the F-35 program and delays in deliveries of test aircraft.

Officials from both services, grilled by members of the Senate Armed Services Committee on Tuesday about the F-35, said they believed a major restructuring had put the program back on track. But they stressed that they were monitoring the program carefully.

Senator Joseph Lieberman, who heads the committee's airland subcommittee, said he was troubled by news that the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter was facing projected cost increases of more than 50 percent and worried that delays in the program could widen projected shortfalls for both service's fighter forces.

"The JSF is the cornerstone of tactical aviation modernization for each of our services. Excessive cost growth in this program is bound to hurt American air power in the years ahead," Lieberman said.

Missouri Republican Senator Kit Bond, who serves on the Senate Appropriations Committee, blasted defense officials for insisting on shutting down production of the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet beginning in 2013, given mounting problems with what he called the "Joint Strike Failure."

"It just makes no sense," Bond told Reuters. "Today's comments reflect the Pentagon's willingness to turn a blind eye to the looming threat to America's air combat power and America's defense industrial base."

Boeing operates a major manufacturing facility in St. Louis, Missouri.

Vice Admiral David Architzel, principal military deputy for acquisition for the Navy, told the hearing the services had made an "unequivocal" commitment to the F-35 program and considered it essential for replacing aging fighters.

He said a looming tactical fighter aircraft shortfall was "manageable" and predicted it could be managed to peak at about 100 aircraft in 2018 -- far below the 177-aircraft gap initially forecast -- by extending the life of existing planes.

The U.S. government's fiscal 2011 begins Oct. 1.

Lieberman said the Navy fighter shortfall could be closer to 267 aircraft and questioned the Navy's view that it could narrow the gap by reducing squadron size, conducting service life extensions, and cutting aircraft time in maintenance.

"I'm not satisfied that the steps taken are sufficient," he said, noting the Air Force faced similar challenges.

But Navy officials steadfastly rejected more purchases of Boeing Super Hornets beyond the 515 already planned.

Marine Corps Lieutenant General George Trautman said the intention had always been to begin shutting down the F/A-18 line in fiscal 2013, with the final shutdown due in 2015.

He said the size of the projected shortfall fluctuated because so much depended on the front end assumptions .

"You can manipulate the front end almost any way that you want to manipulate it, in order to have the number come out to any specific number that you want," he said. "It's almost impossible to predict, frankly, eight years from now specifically how many shortfall airplanes we're going to have, even if the ramp on JSFs stay precisely as we think it's going to occur today. And that's doubtful."

Trautman told reporters after the hearing that comments on the end of the Boeing fighter line did not take into account any foreign arms sales the company might make.

Senator Bond said the Pentagon's statements about shutting down the Boeing F/A-18 line could jeopardize billions of dollars of potential revenue and tens of thousands of U.S. jobs at stake in the foreign fighter competitions involving the F/A-18.

At the same time, he said the F-35's problems were already causing some foreign partners on that program to take another look at the Boeing fighter, particularly because of concerns he said he was hearing about the F-35's ability to operate off a carrier.

Admiral Architzel, asked about reports that the F-35 was breaking cables on aircraft carriers, said that was "definitely a rumor," since the F-35 had not yet been tested on a carrier.

Boeing spokesman Philip Carder said Boeing had delivered more than 420 Super Hornets to the Navy on time or ahead of schedule, and all on budget. He said current plans called for production for the Navy to continue through 2015.

"Additional domestic or international orders would extend production and maintain the industrial base, which is a critical national asset, well beyond 2015," Carder said.

The Navy officials said they continued to explore the possibility of a multiyear procurement agreement with Defense Secretary Robert Gates to buy 124 F/A-18E/F and EA-18G planes from fiscal 2010 through fiscal 2013.

Senate aides said Pentagon cost estimators disagreed with Boeing about the expected savings from a multiyear deal.

Air Force and Navy officials also rejected continued funding for a second engine for the F-35 that is being built by General Electric Co (GE.N) and Britain's Rolls-Royce (RR.L).

They said spending an additional $2.9 billion on the second engine program would divert resources from other key programs.

The Navy said the Pentagon's Joint Assessment Team set up to review cost growth on the F-35's primary engine, built by United Technologies Corp (UTX.N) unit Pratt & Whitney, found that Pratt's cost-cutting plan was achievable.

It said Pratt's current proposal for a fourth lot of F135 engines showed that the engine maker had begun to reduce costs in line with the Pentagon assessment. (Reporting by Andrea Shalal-Esa; Editing by Tim Dobbyn and Steve Orlofsky)

[Gubler, A.]

Australia working on jets payments

March 30, 2010
AAP

Australia won't have to pay more for the Joint Strike Fighters (JSF) it has on order despite US estimates that the cost of each aircraft will exceed $100 million.

The federal government will purchase up to 100 of the aircraft - with the first entering service in 2018 - at a price tag of $75 million each.

Australia was not paying its full share of development costs and only planned to acquire the conventional takeoff and landing variant, head of the Defence Materiel Organisation Stephen Gumley told a Senate hearing on Tuesday.

"Because we are buying the cheapest of the three variants our average prices is a little less."

The Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning JSF is an advanced stealthy multi-role combat aircraft that will be the mainstay of US and allied air forces to around mid-century.

The program has encountered problems with delay and rising costs.

Air Vice Marshal John Harvey, head of the project to acquire JSF, said Australia had its own JSF cost and schedule estimates and had never budgeted on the basis of the original 2001 US cost estimates.

Australia had examined the US figures, analysed how the prices of other aircraft projects had inflated and assessed the key factors which drove up costs.

"We put all those together and we always had quite a higher estimate than the US estimate for our provisions," he said.

"Then we explicitly carry contingency on top of that for unknown risks."

The price per aircraft had been estimated in 2008 at $75 million at an exchange rate of 0.92.

Those numbers still held good," Air Vice Marshal Harvey.

"We have done our projections out to the future and the recent assessments don't change our assessments of what we will pay four our aircraft.

"Things will change a little over time but above that we have contingency as well but it is a figure we have confidence in."

[Gubler, A.]

This is from the Joint Committee on Defence, etc that meet on 30 March to review the annual report. It confirms the rumours from industry about how significantly lower the price of the first 14 F-35As was to the hype about cost.

CHAIR—There being no opening comments, I thought for the purposes of today’s hearings it
might be most useful if we go through the major project issues first and then some personnel
issues, followed by operation and estate matters. I understand the Chief of Defence Force and
secretary will be here this afternoon. There may be some matters discussed this morning that will
have some carryover to the chief or the secretary at that time. But I appreciate that we have
before us senior representatives who are involved in the major projects activity.

I think, for structural procedural purposes, we might try and do it project by project. We have
before us the Defence annual report 2008-09, including the Defence Materiel Organisation
volume, as well as the Australian National Audit Office review of the DMO Major Projects
Report 2008-09. Can I commence perhaps with the Joint Strike Fighter? We have got a list of
items. The committee had the benefit of a private briefing in respect of scheduling and cost
matters, and I think it would be desirable for some of that material, perhaps more of that
material, to be on the public record. In making that point, I might just observe that in the United
States Dr Ashton Carter, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics, gave evidence to the Senate Armed Services Committee a couple of weeks ago in
which he made this comment:

This means that the average price of a JSF aircraft as estimated by the JET—the overall cost of the program averaged
over all the years of production divided by the number of aircraft—would be more than 50% higher (in inflation-adjusted
dollars) than it was projected to be back in 2001 when the program began.

Can you advise us of your assessment and interpretation of that and what it means for the costs
that we are likely to incur.

Dr Gumley—Chair, yes, the information given by Dr Carter is correct. If you look at the total
cost of the program, which includes the engineering and development costs of the aeroplane, and
divide it by the quantities, it has gone up by about 50 per cent in real terms since the program
started. It is important to recognise, though, that in that you are amortising the development of
the aircraft, and Australia does not pay its proportionate share of that. So our average cost per
aircraft is lower than the US average cost on that basis.

CHAIR—Is that the same type of aircraft? Because the US are doing three variants.
Dr Gumley—Yes. Of course we have also got to have a look at the three types of aircraft, so
it is a very complicated mix. Australia is buying only the conventional take-off and landing
version. In that mix that Dr Carter was referring to, you also have the more expensive carrier
versions and the more expensive again short take-off and landing versions. So Dr Carter made
that comment giving the average price for the US, but because we are buying the cheapest of the
three variants, the CTOLs, our average price is a little less.

Air Vice Marshal Harvey—Chair, as Dr Gumley said, those statements by Dr Carter are
correct. There is one key point of differentiation, though, and that is that I would like to separate
the New Air Combat Capability project, which is our project, from the core Joint Strike Fighter
project. They are the average costs, as Dr Gumley said, across all three types, including all the
development costs and all the broader project costs. We step outside the JSF program and, as the
minister has said, we have cost and schedule buffers and our own cost projections. We were
never budgeting on that original 2001 cost estimate that the US started back in 2001.

CHAIR—It might be useful if you could, for the record and for the benefit of the committee,
elaborate on how that costing was based on a different methodology, in that our initial costing
included other factors to arrive at a higher initial estimate than the base figure that the US is
using.

Air Vice Marshal Harvey—That is correct. We look at the annual reports that the US
program office delivers to congress, called selected acquisition reports, and they started as early
as 2001. Every year we look at those reports as the basis for our estimates. We have looked at the
trend in those prices year by year. We have also done our own analysis on the history of aircraft
projects and how price has tracked over time. We did some sensitivity analysis on the key drivers
for the cost of that. We put all those things together and we always had quite a higher estimate
than the US estimate for our own provisions for a project. Then we explicitly carry contingency
on top of that for unknown risks as well.

Dr Gumley—Chair, that is a very important point that has just been made. The American
system and the Australian system, up until last year, costed major programs differently. The
Americans tend not to use contingency in their project costs. We have always traditionally used
contingency in our project estimates. So, because major projects do increase in cost, what we do
at the beginning of a project, like we have in the NACC project, is estimate a contingency, and it
gets burnt down bit by bit as things happen to projects. The Americans tend to report their
project increases year by year.

CHAIR—So when you factor in all those considerations and you look at the testimony given
in the US Senate a couple of weeks ago referring to, on their estimates, a 50 per cent higher in
real terms figure, what does that mean for your best estimate now of the cost to Australia?
Air Vice Marshal Harvey—Back in 2008 Dr Gumley gave an estimate of the price to the
Senate.

CHAIR—To this subcommittee as well—to both committees, I believe, in the Senate and
here.

Air Vice Marshal Harvey—I will just make sure we get the reference right. The expected
price to pay for the average of our 100 aircraft fleet was A$75 million in 2008 dollars at a 0.92
exchange rate. That was an expected price, and we carry contingency above that as the aircraft
only component of that. So we have to be careful with the numbers, because the numbers quoted
there by Dr Carter cover the total project cost, which is aircraft, broader project costs, plus the
development cost as well. Those numbers still hold good. We have done our projections out to
the future, and the recent assessments do not change our assessments of what we will pay for our
aircraft.

CHAIR—So that earlier testimony that has been given in different places in this parliament,
before this subcommittee amongst others, that you just referred to for aircraft only cost is still
your best estimate? We are still in that range?

Air Vice Marshal Harvey—At the time it was stated as the expected price to pay, and that
has not changed now. Things will change a little over time but above that we have contingency
as well, so it is a figure we have confidence in.

CHAIR—Based on what we know now, given the most recent evidence and reviews that have
been conducted in the United States, that is still an accurate figure?

Air Vice Marshal Harvey—That is right, and we have provision above that amount.

Senator FORSHAW—Are you able to say here what the contingency is as a percentage?

Air Vice Marshal Harvey—We tend not to say specific amounts, because there are some
commercial factors. It is a significant proportion of the total price. We are not talking one or two
per cent; we are talking a significant amount.

Senator FORSHAW—I appreciate it.

CHAIR—How much were the additional costs that do not go to the actual aircraft—that is,
the bits that make it work and usable—the cause of the higher cost estimated by the United
States most recently?

Air Vice Marshal Harvey—They contribute in part because some of those are what they call
parametric estimates. If the estimated cost of the aircraft goes up, the estimated costs for spares
et cetera go up in parallel. So that is part of it, and again we did our own assessment of those
elements of the cost. But, again, the increased estimate of the cost is not just because something
has changed in the program. There are a lot of external factors, because we are projecting out to
at least 2034. We are looking at labour rates, material costs and a whole range of factors that
affect that. It does flow across the broader project, but, again, we apply our sensitivity analysis to
those factors as well.

Dr Gumley—A lot of the public debate on this subject has been because different people use
different definitions of cost. We would not want to be seen to be misleading anyone about the
numbers we quote. In previous testimony we have talked about the five or six different levels of
price. When we just now quoted those figures we were talking about the cheapest possible price,
which is the recurring fly-away price for a CTOL aircraft. Other people will talk about the average
procurement cost, which includes the amortised R&D in engineering, and that is significantly higher.
As we have talked about several times before, there are about five steps up in price depending on
what you include.

CHAIR—I appreciate that and thank you. In fact, in years past, that was certainly a thorn in
my paw. I think we have now at least got a baseline from your earlier testimony that provides—
on that fly-away unit price—an apple to compare an apple with, which is what we have been
doing so far today. If I am wrong, please correct me. It does raise the question: are those other—
and there is that wonderful graph that sets out four or five different accepted calculations of that
aircraft cost—estimates publicly available? Can you place them before the subcommittee either
at an open hearing or in a closed session?

Dr Gumley—The average procurement unit cost is Dr Carter’s testimony to US congress and
so that number is on the public record, and it is has grown proportionally faster than the cheapest
cost we have talked about, which is a recurring flyaway cost, because the R&D and the
engineering cost, what we call the STD phase, has got more expensive. So that part of the
project, when amortised by the total production build, has got more expensive.

CHAIR—I was actually going to come to that, because along with the cost blow-out referred
to in the US testimony there has been a slippage in the schedule. Secretary Gates has set about
doing a number of things to try and rectify that, which has involved some additional costs being
borne upfront for the STD aspects of the program. Does that bring with it additional costs for us
in that system development and demonstration phase?

Air Vice Marshal Harvey—Secretary Gates has stated that the US were going to put an
additional US$2.8 billion into the project to essentially build an additional test aircraft and an
additional software test line and to cover the extra time involved in the 13-month extension to
the test program. So there is no request from the US for us to contribute to that.

CHAIR—Okay. So the US is going to bear the full cost of that?

Air Vice Marshal Harvey—That is right.

CHAIR—My understanding is that they are shoving some of that onto the contractors.
Air Vice Marshal Harvey—What has happened is that Secretary Gates announced they were
withholding $614 million, I think, of potential award fee from Lockheed Martin. So they have
held that back. The position is that they will have the opportunity to win some of that back if
they perform to the chief cost and schedule.

CHAIR—Okay. I was not aware of the latter part. I did not think they would be benevolent
enough just to absorb $600 million worth of costs, so I thought some of it might be coming our
way. But there is a structure in place for them to actually get that money back if they perform.

Dr Gumley—Yes, but only if they perform.

CHAIR—I think there would be a lot of people who would say that is not an unreasonable
bargain. Can I just make one other observation. Typically at these sessions we raise criticisms—
and I have probably done it more than anyone else by talking about the GAO report and other
very critical comments. I should also place on the record that I noticed that in that same
testimony by Dr Carter this comment was made:

None of these reviews—
and there are a number of them that are the subject of the evidence—
discovered fundamental technological or manufacturing problems with the JSF program, or any change in the aircraft’s
projected military capabilities—

which is good news. Does our own assessment concur with that? Firstly, we would make our
own assessment of that, presumably. We have got people actively engaged in the program, so we
do not necessarily just accept every bit of assessment that is made there. Have we satisfied
ourselves that that is an accurate assessment of capability?

Air Vice Marshal Harvey—We continue to review the capability of the JSF, as it is
contracted to be delivered against likely threats, and our assessment of that has not changed. We
believe it can do the job for a considerable time into the future, but we note that we will have to
continue the upgrade program, which is built into the program, and continue to deliver new
weapons as they come into service, and the DCP has provision for those.

CHAIR—Okay. I have been monopolising the conversation here. Are there other questions on
the JSF that any of my colleagues wish to raise?

Senator FORSHAW—There is an article in the Australian Financial Review today—have
you seen it?

Air Vice Marshal Harvey—I have seen something relating to Senator Faulkner’s comments
yesterday.

Senator FORSHAW—Yes. Today is the 30th, isn’t it? I will just quote a paragraph—it is
from an article by John Kerin:
Senator Faulkner announced in November that Australia would purchase the first 14 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters at a cost
of $3.2 billion for delivery from 2014. Defence sources suggested Australia had paid too much—a price tag approaching
$148 million for each aircraft.
Do you have a comment about that?

Air Vice Marshal Harvey—If I can clarify, the $3.2 billion is then-year dollars, so it does
take inflation into account—

Senator FORSHAW—I am more interested in the $148 million per aircraft.

Air Vice Marshal Harvey—I am not sure where that number came from, because it is not a
correct number.

Senator FORSHAW—It came from Defence sources, according to John Kerin.

Air Vice Marshal Harvey—Well!

Senator FORSHAW—I am giving you the opportunity to comment, given your evidence a
moment ago.

Air Vice Marshal Harvey—I am not sure where that number came from. It does not relate to
anything that I am aware of, specifically in terms of aircraft. As I was saying, the $3.2 billion is
then-year dollars. If you pull it back to now-year dollars, it includes a large amount of
contingency, and approximately half of that is non-aircraft costs. It does take into account the
fact that the first aircraft have a higher cost than later aircraft. But the $148 million does not
mean anything to me.

Senator FORSHAW—It is a lot more than your $75 million, and appreciate that we are not
necessarily talking about apples and apples. It might be apples and apple strudel or something.

Dr Gumley—And the $75 million figure has no relationship to that number at all, because it
is in 2008 dollars and we are talking about then-year dollars. The reason we put that figure on
the table was so that, forever, there is a benchmark we can measure against. But for any figure
you see in a newspaper or in a submission, you really need to do the maths to come back to that
baseline figure.

Senator FORSHAW—Okay. Thank you. We will wait with interest to see what is in
tomorrow’s Australian.

Mr OAKESHOTT—My question is along similar lines to Senator Forshaw, in the spirit of an
opportunity to respond. If not in a paper today, I read in a news article recently—and I will give
you the same opportunity when the Collins class issue comes up, because both were rolled into
the same article—an allegation that the JSF was a political decision from the highest office in
2004 rather than a request from Defence. I am not going to ask you, on the politics, to respond,
but I would have thought that in all of this the exercise is maximum value for money, which
would be maximum operational and strategic outcomes. With regard to JSF, it is in that context
that I would give you the opportunity to affirm or reaffirm that these are providing maximum
value for money because they are providing maximum strategic and operational outcomes.

Air Vice Marshal Harvey—Perhaps I could step through the history and go back to 2002,
when the then government decided to join as a partner in the Joint Strike Fighter project, at a
cost of $US150 million. That was to join the partnership to get benefits associated with that, but
that was not a decision to buy the aircraft. Even back in 2006, at first pass, that was a decision to
join the next phase of the project. It was still not a decision to acquire the aircraft. The first
decision to acquire the first 14 aircraft did not occur until November last year. But all those
decisions were based on the assessment that JSF could do the job and do it in the most costeffective
way. I do not know what the 2004 date would refer to.

Mr FITZGIBBON—Could I just say on that: I suppose one might seek to go back to the time
when Australia became a partner in the project. Would that be partly the answer to that question,
or is that even prior to that date?

Air Vice Marshal Harvey—The time we decided to be a partner was in 2002, but again it
was not an acquisition decision; there were benefits in being a partner, to allow us to make
decisions subsequently.

CHAIR—The variant we are getting is most closely based on the US Air Force variant. I
understand their initial operating capability is now planned for 2016.

Dr Gumley—That is the most recent testimony from the secretary to the air force, yes.

CHAIR—How does that with our plans for acquiring what we need?

Dr Gumley—We are over two years behind the US. We were expecting IOC to be declared in
2018; they are in 2016. We are intentionally staying behind the US program in this because there
is not always an advantage in going first.

CHAIR—I think from previous evidence there would be a few members of the committee
here who would agree with that.

Dr Gumley—An additional point is that there is a question of money. The early aircraft are
more expensive. Lockheed is burning down the experience curve, or the learning curve, and so
there is an advantage to saving money and being a couple of years behind as well.

CHAIR—Do any of my colleagues have any other questions on the JSF?

Mr BALDWIN—Could I ask, for clarity: how are we relative to our original agreed time line
for acquisition?

Air Vice Marshal Harvey—We had planning numbers in the past, even as far back as the
2000 white paper. But in terms of a hard decision that only occurred once we made a decision to
acquire aircraft, in November last year, which was aligned with 2018. Prior to that we had
planning numbers but we had no hard IOC date.

Mr BALDWIN—From the original intended acquisition date, how far behind are we now?

Air Vice Marshal Harvey—It is a matter of how far back you go. Originally, back in the
2000 white paper, we were starting to look at some aircraft—we were looking at the classic
Hornets back in those days—as early as 2012, but that was before we had even joined the JSF
program. As you know, things changed back in 2006 when we decided to retire the F111s early,
which brought the Super Hornets in, which allowed us more time to replace the classic Hornets.
It has been part of the total air combat system, so there is no simple answer. The dates have
certainly adjusted but taking into account those changing circumstances—the F111s going out
and the Super Hornets coming in. But we had in the past looked at as early as 2015 for those
aircraft.

Mr BALDWIN—What is the current date anticipated for delivery of the first of the JSF
aircraft into Australia?

Air Vice Marshal Harvey—As announced in November last year, at second pass approval for
the first 14 aircraft, the plan is to achieve initial operational capability, with the first squadron
ready for deployed operations, towards the end of 2018. To achieve that, we are looking at
acquiring our first two aircraft for training in 2014. The initial aircraft will stay in the US for
training and then the last four of those 14 will come out to Australia in 2017 to do our Australia
specific operational tests.

Mr BALDWIN—Has there been any consideration about moving further down the
acquisition time line to make sure that we do not repeat the errors that occurred when we
acquired the F111, where we were in a rush to get them into Australia, had a bit of a fly around
and then had to ground them and get an interim aircraft whilst there was further development
and testing of the aircraft?

Dr Gumley—What we are doing at the moment is having a really good look at the classic
Hornets—how long they are going to last for and whether we need to do some preventative
maintenance in the next few years to make sure they can last out to 2020. It all becomes an
equation. Let us be clear: aircraft are coming off the Lockheed production line now. They are
coming out at about one a month at the moment, or something of that order.

Air Vice Marshal Harvey—Next year I think they will start to go to one a month.

Dr Gumley—Next year is one a month and then it moves to one a week a couple of years
after that. So the aeroplanes are starting to come off the production line. Remember that
Lockheed have got to get it up to one a day—one per working day—within about five years, so
they have got a big ramp-up of production. So the question of availability of aircraft (1) goes to
cost—the earlier you buy, the more it costs you—and (2) goes to slots, or which ones on the
production line a particular customer can buy. All the countries are looking at the age of their
current fleets. All of the partner countries have combat aircraft at the moment, and they are
ageing, so we have got an optimisation question to look at between the cost of keeping the
classic Hornets going and the cost of buying Joint Strike Fighters either ahead or behind
particular dates. Those business cases are being worked on during 2010 so that we will have a
much better piece of advice to offer government early next year.

Mr BALDWIN—You just raised the issue of the classic F18 and the cost of extending the
life. I thought you had just been through that with the 10 or 11 barrel replacements, which were
going to give you the extended life capability that you required until the introduction of the JSF.
Are you now saying to us that you need to re-evaluate the rest of the fleet for further delays in
the delivery of the JSF?

Dr Gumley—I will hand to Air Vice Marshal Thorne to handle that question.

Air Vice Marshal Thorne—The centre barrel program is largely complete. We have done
seven of the planned 10 aircraft. Although at one stage we planned to do up to 49 centre barrels,
we have been able to do some modelling and testing through DSTO and Air Force to confirm
and be comfortable with safety factors around just doing 10 centre barrels. Through to a life of
2018 through 2020, we are quite confident that we will not need to do further centre barrel work
for fatigue reasons. The reason we are quite confident about that is that, currently, our fleet
leaders are at about 4½ thousand flying hours. If you compare that with the US, flying their
A/B/C/D classic Hornets, they have about 61 per cent beyond 6,000 hours and about 12 percent
beyond 8,000 hours, so we are well off that lead. There are some issues. I am talking fatigue
now, and centre barrel was all about achieving life of type by dealing with fatigue. Hornet,
because of the environment and whatnot, also encounters corrosion issues. There will need to be
some further work done to address corrosion on the Super Hornet. We are investigating that at
the moment. We can perhaps invest some of the savings from centre barrel in corrosion
management on the classic Hornet to achieve 2020.

Mr BALDWIN—So you feel comfortable that you will be able to extend the life, if required?
If the JSF contract, for a variety of reasons, was to blow out by another two years, you could
extend the classic Hornets to make sure that we cover the capability gap?

Air Vice Marshal Thorne—Yes, we are confident. There is never, ever a drop-dead date with
aircraft. As the aircraft get older, and given that we are so far behind the fleet leaders—and we
had a senior partnering board meeting on Hornet last week where Navy were talking about
operating some aircraft up to and perhaps even exceeding 10,000 hours, so we are quite
confident of achieving that—obviously, as you fly them longer, you need to invest more, and you
are heading up the bathtub curve there. But the investment would be manageable.

Mr BALDWIN—I guess the question that I am leading to is that, given we just bought a
squadron of Super Hornets, you do not see that if there is a delay in delivery or technology
meeting the requirements through the JSF there will be a need to rush in and grab another
squadron of Super Hornets to fill the capability gap?

Dr Gumley—No, we do not see that. We see that either through another small Hornet upgrade
project to look at corrosion or through the sustainment budget—there are two ways of doing it—
we would look after our classic Hornets to cover the life we need. But it is an economic question
out there too, because every aircraft as it ages gets more expensive per year to maintain. So it
does become a repair or buy decision as to when you actually switch over. So I am confident one
way or another we will get there. At this stage I do not see any need to buy any more Super
Hornets.

Mr BALDWIN—I am sure that you have done the what-if scenarios and economic
modelling. If the introduction of the JSF into the Australian Air Force were to be delayed, what
would be the cost-benefit of actually acquiring another squadron of Super Hornets, to have those
up and operational if you were to not spend the money on the classic F18s? Where would your
financial position be if you did not upgrade the classic F18s and you delayed or if there were an
inadvertent delay in acquiring the Super Hornets?

Air Vice Marshal Harvey—We have looked at those scenarios in the past. The Chief of Air
Force would say the aim is to go to an all fifth-generation fleet for the future, to deal with the
future threats. The aim to get to a single fleet is the most economical long-term outcome as well.
So the model we have done suggests transitioning to the all fifth-generation fleet is the most
economical way to go to the future. So we keep looking at it. You have the bathtub curve at the
front end with the early JSFs and a bathtub curve at the back end with the late classic Hornets.
As you know, the government agreed to a staged approval approach in late 2009, and we will go
back in 2012 for the decision on the bulk of the aircraft. But the aim is to go to a single fifthgeneration
fleet, and that is seen as the most cost-effective way for the long term.

Mr BALDWIN—But if you look at block supplies—and I go back to block 1 of the Super
Hornet as against block 2 of the Super Hornet—you cannot retrofit equipment back to the block
1 Super Hornets. Are we going to be faced with the same situation in the JSF where we have
block 1, block 1(b), block 1(c) and then towards the back end perhaps block 3, 4 or 5—whatever
the number is? Are we going to be able to retrofit back through to the first of the line we are
acquiring to make sure that we have common capability and, importantly, commonality in parts
for carrying the spares? You just said to me that the best thing is to have one aircraft and one line
of parts.

Air Vice Marshal Harvey—Within the JSF development program there are three blocks of
capability that come along. The hardware basically freezes at block 1, so block 2 and block 3 are
purely software upgrades. The plan beyond that is another block every two years. The vast
majority of that is in software. But about every four years you might do some minor hardware
change, which would flow back through the fleet. But the plan is to keep all aircraft throughout
the fleet at the same block standard, primarily through software but also through some hardware
upgrades throughout their life. So that is the plan. I am sure things will change through time. We
will have to do a bit more on the hardware side. But the aim now with the systems is that the
hardware largely stay the same, and major changes are at software. One of the benefits we get is
that we pay three per cent of the cost of those development upgrades as a partner in the program
but get 100 per cent of the benefits.

Dr Gumley—It is inevitable with any combat aircraft that the black boxes in them will
change over their 30-year life, and you build that into the cost of maintaining a combat fleet.

Mr BALDWIN—But, as I understand it, with the Super Hornet it was not a black box
upgrade between block 1 and block 2; it was more an engineering upgrade and that is why the
retrofitting back to block 1 of the equipment in block 2 cannot occur.

Air Vice Marshal Thorne—That is true. You need to understand that the block 1 to block 2
Super Hornet was not representative of what normally happens with air combat fleets either. The
introduction of the Super Hornet was a unique program in that, through an ECP process,
essentially they increased the size of the aircraft by 30 per cent and increased its payload, range
and a whole range of things. To some extent that was block 1 and then the upgrade to block 2
was a fairly radical refit on that. In fact, block 2 largely took the avionics fit from the
unsuccessful Boeing JSF bid and introduced that to the Super Hornet. It was not really
representative of the kinds of block upgrades that you will see. In fact, the future with Super
Hornet will be very similar to what Air Vice Marshal Harvey just described: each two years we
would expect to see a mainly software dump go into the aircraft and possibly every three or four
years some minor hardware changes, but in the main the same sort of philosophy.

CHAIR—I make an observation rather than ask a question. I suspect that, if the government
down the track, whoever it might be, were to acquire a significant number of Super Hornets—
one of the scenarios Mr Baldwin suggested—there would be some concern that would encourage
a future government not to buy as many fifth-generation aircraft, having already acquired a
larger number of Super Hornets. I suspect that is somewhere in the back of the minds of a range
of people engaged in these decisions as well.

[ADMk2]

AF-1 Completes Final Finishes, Scheduled to Return to Flight

FORT WORTH, Texas, April 13th, 2010 -- AF-1, the first optimized Lockheed Martin [NYSE: LMT] F-35A Lightning II conventional takeoff and landing test plane, rolls out of the F-35 Final Finishes Facility sporting a new hand-painted fin flash on its vertical stabilizers. While at the facility, the plane also received highly accurate robot-applied coatings. The stealth jet flew twice before entering an intensive period of ground testing, and is preparing for its return to flight and ferry to the Edwards Air Force Base, Calif. test site.

So much for the "AF-1 hasn't flown because L-M can't program manage" crowd...

It looks sweet too...

[Gubler, A.]

AVM Harvey says, "As I was saying, the AUD 3.2 billion is then-year dollars. If you pull it back to now-year dollars, it includes a large amount of contingency, and approximately half of that is non-aircraft costs."

So the then-year dollar price of the first 14 F-35As for the RAAF is roughly under AUD 100 million per aircraft (probably flyway cost) That is based on an application of 10% ("significant figure") contingency and the ~50% non aircraft costs (spares, specific support equipment, new weapons, facilities upgrades etc). Factoring in inflation is a bit harder but the first two F-35As will have to be paid for in 2012 to ensure 2014 delivery followed by four in 2013 and eight in 2014 (based on the original RAAF F-35A production ramp up schedule). This would mean with 4% per annum inflation a 2008 base-year dollar price of the first 14 F-35As of around AUD 80 million. Which considering they are F-35As from the more expensive earlier batches would strongly support the AUD 75 million average procurement cost.

[Weasel]

Docs Say F-35B Too Hot, Noisy


For example, an operational assessment of the JSF says that heat from the STOVL version may result in “severe F-35 operating restrictions and or costly facility upgrades, repairs or both.” The OT-IID report says “thermal management” will “increase the number of sorties required to prepare an operational unit for deployment during summer months” at most American bases. Overall, it rates basing as red: “unlikely to meet criteria — significant shortfall.”

Another document, a briefing chart rating the plane’s systems, rates as “red” flight operations noise “below deck and island structure” and “on the flight.” Direct exhaust “deck personnel burns” are rated red, as is “personnel blow down” and “off-gassing.” On top of that, the non-skid coating is rated red, as is the impact of the plane’s power systems on “spotting” and the plane’s outwash “on spotting of adjacent aircraft.”

A congressional aide was biting in his reaction to Conway’s assurances that the plane was marginally hotter than the AV-8B Harrier and about as loud as existing planes.

“AV-8B and F-35B temperatures might be the same, but so far they haven’t shown anyone their data; plus, you have to look at it from the perspective of total kinetic energy of the engine thrust. AV-8B has a thrust rating of 23,000lbs, whereas an F-35B thrust rating is 41,000lbs. He’s comparing a cigar torch lighter to a blow torch. Additionally, he’s got other thermal issues he needs to worry about as well, like overheating avionics and cockpit temperatures,” the aide said.

The testing report says that “continued cycling” of the engine for carrier takeoff raises “serious issues” because a pilot’s backup oxygen supply is depleted when the integrated power package (IPP) is disengaged to give the plane more thrust. Cutting off the IPP also means there is “potential that overheating of the radar and avionics may result.” On top of all that, temperatures inside the cockpit on the ground and in low altitude, high-speed fly “will be high,” more than 90 degrees even during a day when the mercury hits 59 degrees outside. That could “hamper pilot performance” during such missions.

The congressional aide then went on to noise. “As for the noise issue, the concern is not in the aircraft flying pattern, the noise concern is for those onboard ship, both above and below deck that are going to have issues. If none of this is a concern, why is the risk matrix still red after developmental testing mitigations are removed?” the aide asked.

We showed the documents to Winslow Wheeler, a top defense analyst at Washington’s Center for Defense Information. “The documentation makes extremely clear that the Navy and Marine Corps know they have a problem on their hands. But they don’t know the dimension of the problem and they don’t know how to address it. But the problem is very clear,” he said.

The congressional staff who spoke said they were concerned that the Marines are unwilling to address what could be fundamental problems for the fifth-generation STOVL plane and, one said, “are purposely disingenuous in their misrepresentation of facts.”

"Congressional Sources" could mean anybody and anything and a lot of this is regurgitation of what is already known...........the heat of equipment on-board is a problem for all modern Fighter aircraft, the heat from the exhaust is a vessel-to-vessel problem that requires MINOR modification of materials used for decks etc NOT a major problem, ditto noise........

This is easy to solve. You use Alumina

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aluminium_oxide

While wiki says its melting point is 2072, I thought it was 2063 (???) Maybe they have better stuff than me? Anyway, Alumina has a low enough or adequate thermal conductivity to resist the low temperatures they are talking about and it is sticky, so therefore easy to spray on to the deck. Oh and its cheap.

If you want to get fancy you can apply it to a metal mesh and actually armor the deck, but now you are going to have to make sure your vertical C of G is still good to go.

The reason you would spray it on, is to act as a noise ablative as spraying creates a closed cell structure with voids. i.e. cavities

For all you guys in Oz who fight wild fires.... yes, its a good idea to spray your shiny red fire truck with alumina... helmets too.

The only down side of it is abrasion to aircraft tires and being an oxide it will want to absorb radar energy... (unless it is hot)... so you will lose some of your reduced RCS when engaged in VTOL recovery operations.. But then again, won't the F-35 be all ugly and stuff in the landing phase anyway?

cheers

w

[buglerbilly]

DATE:16/04/10

SOURCE:Flight International

US lawmakers push for back-up plans after F-35 cost increases

By Stephen Trimble

As cost estimates for the Lockheed Martin F-35 continue rising, some US lawmakers are pushing military officials to increase spending on fourth-generation fighters as a back-up.

Senator Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut says he considers the F-35 a "really extraordinary aircraft", but is concerned about the military's projected tactical aircraft shortfalls.

"There will certainly be pressure to sustain the fourth generation and improvement of aircraft because the fifth generation is coming on more slowly and more expensively than we hoped for," Lieberman told a Senate hearing on the tactical aircraft budget on 13 April.

The US Navy has projected a 243-aircraft shortfall by 2017 and the US Air Force estimates a fighter gap of 800 aircraft after 2020.

Lieberman says the military should invest in a "combination of fourth and fifth generation [fighters] to keep us where we want to be". His concerns were echoed by Illinois Senator Roland Burris, who expressed his doubts in a question to the panel of military officers assembled for the hearing.

"What is the back-up plan in case we get to the point where the software won't really do what the engineers or all of the planners have anticipated and we run into a problem then of trying to scale back or make adjustments?" Burris asked.

Lt Gen George Trautman, deputy commandant for aviation for the US Marine Corps, suggests that the tactical aircraft shortfall may actually be less than currently projected. "It's almost impossible to predict, frankly, eight years from now specifically how many shortfall airplanes we're going to have, even if the ramp on [F-35s] stays precisely as we think it's going to occur today," he says. "And that's doubtful. Lockheed has been incentivised to beat the ramp that's laid out now, and they think that they can give us more [F-35s] between now and [2018]."

Senator Saxby Chambliss, an ardent Lockheed F-22 supporter, however, challenged Trautman's positive outlook on the F-35's future, pointedly questioning the progress achieved so far by the USMC's short take-off and vertical landing F-35B.

"I think you've tested your variant on the F-35 and I don't know what kind of confidence you have in that variant right now, but that's probably going to continue to be an issue," Chambliss says.

Meanwhile, navy and air force officials are starting to consider back-up strategies to compensate for the F-35 delays acknowledged so far. The USN is working on plans to upgrade parts of its Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fleet with 9,000h and 10,000h service life. Meanwhile, the USAF has started assessing a new structural upgrade for the its Lockheed F-16 Block 40/42 and 50/52 fleets.

It remains clear that officials from both services still consider the F-35 their most important budget priority for tactical aviation.

"We absolutely need the requirements brought by the fifth generation of the [F-35]," says Vice Adm David Architzel, a principal deputy for the USN's acquisition office. "And so we are committed to that as we go forward."

[ADMk2]

AF-1 is back flying again and has flown 3 times since it's upgrade and shiny new paint...

[buglerbilly]

DATE:27/04/10

SOURCE:Flight International

Israeli JSF talks end with stalemate

By Arie Egozi

Two recent rounds of US/Israeli talks about the sale of Lockheed Martin F-35s to the Israeli air force have ended with the same gap that has so far prevented the signature of a letter of agreement.

The talks are to resume in May, with Israeli sources saying that "more time and goodwill is needed before an agreement can be signed".

Discussions have centred on major issues, including the extent to which Israel will be allowed to install its own electronic warfare systems in the stealth fighter, and the extent of industrial co-operation for its companies.

The Israeli air force is also objecting to a plan to send systems or complete aircraft to a European support centre, most probably in Italy.

These matters and others will be discussed during the next round of talks, says the defence ministry. "There are some issues to be discussed and there is an effort to reach an agreement . This will take time."

A so-called Security Cooperation Participant on the Joint Strike Fighter project, Israel is expected to sign an initial deal to acquire around 20 conventional take-off and landing F-35As.

[buglerbilly]

GE, Rolls Again Pitch Fixed-Price Deal For Alternative JSF Engine

By JOHN REED

Published: 27 Apr 2010 09:21

General Electric and Rolls-Royce have once again pitched the Pentagon on a fixed price contract for roughly 150 of their F136 engines, a move designed to save the Pentagon $1 billion in the next five years.


GE officials said last fall that the JSF main engine, being developed by Pratt & Whitney, was nearly $2 billion over budget. (GE AVIATION)

The proposal, GE officials said, is meant to counter the Defense Department's justification for again cutting funding for the F136, the alternate engine for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

The Pentagon "talks about it being a difficult description" to cut F136 funding largely based on the assumption that the DoD won't save any money by pursuing an alternative to Pratt & Whitney's F135 engine, Russ Sparks, vice president of military strategy for GE's aviation division, said during an April 26 interview.

GE and Rolls-Royce approached the F-35 program office with the offer last week and are awaiting a response, Sparks said.

Recent estimates by the DoD's office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) "could only make [the price of buying two engines versus one] break even with the assumptions that they have," Sparks said.

"If we can change that calculation by a billion dollars, then it goes from break even to a billion dollars" in savings, he said.

CAPE estimates that about $2.9 billion in development work remains to be done on the F136.

GE and Rolls-Royce are banking on the hopes that the Pentagon's choice to exclude their engine from the program is a short-term budget choice.

By moving the program from break even to outright savings, the team hopes to motivate the Pentagon to go ahead with a competition between the F135 and F136 for the engines on the sixth-batch Low Rate Initial Production F-35s that should be delivered in 2014.

The engines would be purchased in 2012 and delivered starting in 2013, according to Sparks, who said that this is a five-year jump start over when the F-35 engine program is slated to move to the fixed price contracting phase.

Government Accountability Office estimates have predicted that competition between the two F-35 engine makers could lead to long term savings of up to 20 percent for the $100 billion engine program.

GE and Rolls-Royce say about $500 million of the proposed savings in a fixed-price deal would come from the companies beating Pentagon cost estimates. Another $500 million in savings would come from the increased pressure on Pratt & Whitney to perform if the Pentagon decides to go ahead with the fixed price competition for the 150 engines, Sparks said.

A fixed-price competition would pressure the competing engine-makers to perform better and reduce the financial risk to the Pentagon, Sparks said.

The companies made a similar overture to the Pentagon in September. That plan went nowhere after the Pentagon again refused to request additional funds to buy the engine in its 2011 budget request.

Pentagon officials insist that the second engine program is a luxury they can't afford during a period of tight budgeting. U.S. Air Force Secretary Michael Donley has even described the alternate engine as "another rock on top of" the beleaguered F-35 program.

"It's a close-enough call that we cannot see the benefits of considerable remaining investment in the second engine," such as a new logistics tail and remaining development work, Donley said during a Feb. 23 U.S. House Armed Services Committee hearing.

Lawmakers are keen to fund the second engine, with Congress inserting F136 development funding into the Pentagon's budget for the last several years. They argue that the competition will result in better engines and better prices for the engines.

[buglerbilly]

DATE:28/04/10

SOURCE:Flight International

GE, Rolls sweeten offer on F-35 alternate engine price

By Stephen Trimble

A transatlantic team has sweetened its price offer to the US Department of Defense seeking to keep alive a threatened alternate engine for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

In September, the General Electric-Rolls Royce Fighter Engine Team offered to deliver 21 F136 engines in Fiscal 2013 at a fixed price, converting the contract from a cost-plus structure years ahead of schedule.

The team now is offering to keep slashing prices for engines delivered in FY2014 and FY2015. A total of $1 billion of cost savings could be achieved if Pratt & Whitney responds by slashing their costs, says Jean Lydon-Rogers, chairman of the Fighter Engine Team.

"We think competition is the best answer," adds John Rice, president and CEO of GE Technology Infrastructure.

Pratt & Whitney, which offers the primary F135 engine, quickly responded to the announcement. The company challenged their rival's claim about which programme proposed to slash prices first.

"Pratt & Whitney welcomes others to the fixed price solution which we offered to the DoD more than a year ago," the company says in a statement. "This belated offer and its timing, coming just prior to Congressional consideration, is simply a distraction."

The DOD has been trying to cancel the F136 alternate engine for five years, but the Fighter Engine Team's allies in Congress have restored funding to continue development and launch the first two years of low-rate initial production.

Although GE is several years behind P&W's F135, the company plans to deliver six test engines by the end of the year and is currently 70% complete with the development.

But DOD officials believe the extra cost to complete the F136 programme is not worth it. A recent cost study pegged the projected cost to complete development and enter full-rate production at $2.9 billion.

GE and Rolls, however, dispute the government's analysis, projecting the maximum cost to complete the F136 at $1.8 billion.

So far, the DOD has not responded to the Fighter Engine Team's original proposal in September, nor the updated proposal.

Lydon-Rogers acknowledges the latest pricing proposal contains two loopholes. The fixed price contract would have to be renegotiated if the government changes the specification for engine performance or the pace of engine deliveries over the next five years, she says.

[buglerbilly]

DATE:28/04/10

SOURCE:Flight International

ATK gains new work on F-35 structures

By Stephen Trimble

Alliant Techsystems (ATK) will continue building skins and start supplying inlet ducts for the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter under two new contracts valued at $250 million.

Worth $240 million, the first deal involves providing composite skins for the F-35's upper and lower wing-box and engine nacelles. The agreement includes 390 aircraft ordered during low rate initial production lots four to eight.

Meanwhile, Lockheed's centre fuselage supplier, Northrop Grumman, has selected ATK to begin supplying composite inlet ducts for F-35s under a $10 million contract. Follow-on orders for full-rate production, beginning in 2016, could be worth $40 million more.

The Lockheed-led industry team is building hundreds of F-35s even as the flight-test phase continues through 2016.

The programme includes three variants, including the conventional take-off and landing F-35A for the US Air Force, short take-off and vertical landing F-35B for the US Marine Corps and the F-35C carrier variant for the US Navy.

ATK's contract for composite skins applies only to the F-35A and F-35B models. Chief executive Mark De Young says the JSF programme is a "cornerstone of ATK's growth strategy" in the aerospace business.

[ADMk2]

Another nice pic...

[gf a.k.a. ROBOPIMP]

you have to give it to the yanks, they certainly know how to finish off bodywork. be it classic rods or jets. :)

[buglerbilly]

How real is F136 fixed-price offer?

By Stephen Trimble on April 28, 2010 2:55 PM

I'm paid to be a professional skeptic. When General Electric/Rolls-Royce announced a fixed-price deal for the F136 [pictured above], my radar starts looking for the loopholes.

As I wrote in my news article yesterday, the GE/Rolls Fighter Engine Team, to their credit, acknowledged their offer came with two strings attached. If the Department of Defense changes either the production rate or the performance specification for the engine, the team's offer is null and void.

Sorry, I can't let that go.

Click on the jump to read my email exchange on this issue this morning with GE/Rolls........


To: McLaren, George H
Subject: RE: new F136 photo
Thanks George. Beautiful pic.
I do want to raise a big question that's been at the back of my mind since yesterday morning.
The question, and I'm going to be brutally candid, is: Is there any evidence that this offer is not just a meaningless PR stunt?
To be more specific, if the offer can be voided by a change in specification or a change in the ramp rate over the next five years, isn't it basically a meaningless gesture?
The risks to the F-35 specification and schedule are fairly obvious. Only about 3% of flight tests are complete, so the spec remains a fairly open and unproven question. Further cost increases are already being mentioned as part of the Nunn-McCurdy recertification, which could change the ramp rate. Even if the F-35 sails through flight test and budget reviews perfectly over the next five years, there could be huge swings in defense spending itself during that period that could have a huge impact on F-35 production rates.


To: Trimble, Stephen (RBI-UK)
Subject: RE: new F136 photo

Steve - fair question. Our answer is a definitive: NO.

Unlike some people who talk about fixed prices, "oh yeah, we asked about that too", we have spent months preparing this proposal. We've pushed and pushed our supply chain to keep costs down so it would be valid, and crunched and re-crunched numbers to make it work. As you heard on the call, this had to be vetted through the highest levels of both companies, in a brutal and honest review process by people who are dead serious about numbers. In the end, we submitted a formal, legally binding, written offer from our contracts officer to the JPO contracts office. It has real, binding, solid numbers on price. They go DOWN, not UP, each year. We stand behind those numbers.

There are a couple of caveats: the Government owns the design, and has approved our design through the CDR process that concluded in 2008. So we are diligently working and building engines to the government-approved specs.

If the Government comes back two years from now and says, we changed our minds - we want a 48,000 lb thrust engine, well, that's a pretty significant wrench in the works. It simply wouldn't be prudent for us to leave any potential future changes wide open at the government's discretion, which would be extremely expensive to change at that point. Same thing on ramp numbers - we're on track to build 90 engines in LRIP8. We can make these prices work at those numbers and that ramp rate.

If the government comes back and says, well, only build 10, it totally changes the economics of the process. Our offer is, we'll sell this many engines you wanted in your plan, for this price, but if you alter the number, we need to talk about it.

Both of those changes - specs and numbers - would be entirely outside of our control. We can't write blank checks. That would not be prudent business decision making.

On the other hand, look at how the competitor has performed. Think they could have lived with this offer two or three years ago? They have been having 40-50 percent price jumps, partially due to test failures because their engine didn't work right, partially due to production issues, both under their responsibility. Cost Plus - government eats the cost.

Remember, under our formal offer, our prices go DOWN, not up 50 percent.

Bottom line, we're dead serious about this, it is real.

[Deks]

Sorry, I can't let that go.

Personally I find their position to be completely logical and reasonable. If nothing else, the F-136 under this plan provides a stable alternative to the F-135 in the event of cost blow-out. It also forces (for better or worse) the F-35 team / USG to commit to the specs that they've provided, which will prevent additional costs to both partner nations and GE/RR; and if there are additional costs, they're not going to be borne by anyone but them.

I hope we'll see this contract taken up. :)

[ADMk2]

And this is an interesting thing for Australia. Because we have opted to acquire early airframes, we have locked ourselves in to acquiring P&W F135 engines for the first batch simply because the F136 simply won't be available in time for our initial batch of airframes, however it will be for our future batches. Given Australia's long and successful use of GE fighter engines, can anyone see Australia operating both engine types, perhaps as a strategic hedge?

[Chunder]

Unless the engine has structural commonality with the rest of the family (I.E layout applicable tooling) then it really isn't an issue. Airlines rarely make decisions based on brand loyalty when it comes to engines, it's a pure financial equation more or less (Engines are much of a muchness) The Support you get from GE/RR/P&W/EA are all superb, leaving it a sentimental question of attachment as to whether you stay with the manufacturer or not. One thing that it does remind me of it the 787 offering the GEnX engine as the sole supplier for the airframe by agreement with Boeing. It took all of about a year for that to change.

[Weasel]

And this is an interesting thing for Australia. Because we have opted to acquire early airframes, we have locked ourselves in to acquiring P&W F135 engines for the first batch simply because the F136 simply won't be available in time for our initial batch of airframes, however it will be for our future batches. Given Australia's long and successful use of GE fighter engines, can anyone see Australia operating both engine types, perhaps as a strategic hedge?

Ah ha! Therein lies one of the strange anomolies within Australian politics, or rather Defense. There seems to be an interesting relationship between servants of the nation or states within the nation and their perception of what they actually do and the perception of the government (who are also servants) and what they think defense is and actually does...

For example: Defense and everything in it is or are servants of the Nation. But I get the funny feeling that people funding this Australian body don't see Defense as servants. Some try to see them as a corporation or ask for things like "Best Business Practices". This is an oxymoron if you apply it to a service (service= servants).

A service like Defense is there to help other parts of the nation run better. So it would follow, that if you have a good defense, then the rest of the nation is able to run more freely (security, liberty, etc, etc).

so "yes", having 2 engines is actually better for defense, not unlike having multiple platforms to meet a desired mission, which I think we discused as a thought experiment in the AFV section...

If you have platforms that have similar components, but in this case different powerplants, then that makes that platform a lower operational risk and therefore on average able to respond better to deployment at short notice. It does, however reduce the force's ability to maintain that same readiness in the long term, unless you regularly rotate the platforms with the different engines. If you do that then you increase the operational readiness of the deployed "force" as you have new engines with unused parts or parts with low hours and no old-but-refurbished parts sneaking into the planned maintenance stream.

If the deployment goes on then old-but-refurbished parts can be introduced into the platforms in a safe environment when they are rotated back to Australia.

As an aside it gives me the heebee geebees to hear (or read here) SG of NATO saying things like "transformation" and so on or quoting US Generals as saying "Vision without resources is hallucination". What a total chump. This from a guy who is a servant of one of the greatest democracies the world has ever seen? Resources are people and people elect the President. So to have vision and deliver on a "vision" all you need in the USA is people. It means said General is (in fact) deluded or being totally misquoted and coming back to "transformation"... That is rummy word-speak that has been disproved.


cheers


w

[buglerbilly]

USAF, Lockheed Wrangle Over JSF LRIP 4 Price

May 1, 2010



By Amy Butler

FORT WORTH — The U.S. Air Force and Lockheed Martin—prime contractor for the single-engine, stealthy F-35—are in the midst of negotiations for low-rate initial production (LRIP) Lot 4, with price a key sticking point in the negotiations.

Pentagon acquisition chief Ashton Carter last month declared a 57% cost overrun to the per-unit price of an F-35, triggering a Nunn-McCurdy review of the program. Though it is expected to be recertified to continue development by early June, Lockheed Martin is in a peculiar situation. The company is battling the perception of a major cost spike brought on by the adjusted baseline figure from the Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation (CAPE) group at the Pentagon. But at the same time, company officials are trying to keep the price as high as possible in LRIP 4 negotiations with the Air Force.

David Van Buren, acting assistant secretary of the Air Force for acquisition, is handling contract negotiations for the government. The Air Force is asking for 20% below the pricing projected by Lockheed Martin, according to Tom Burbage, executive vice president of F-35 program integration, who spoke last week with AVIATION WEEK here. And that figure is 20% lower than the CAPE pricing predictions, he adds.

Burbage says that in October, the company (in the midst of the restructuring announced last month) proposed pricing based on the 2007 program office estimate; officials declined to specify the figure. They say they expect an average per-unit price (without engines) for the conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) variant at high production rates to be about $49.5 million in LRIP 8 or beyond. LRIP 4, however, will carry a significantly higher per-unit price because these are early model production aircraft.

In accordance with the push by Carter to lock in fixed-price contracts as early as possible in a program’s cycle, Air Force officials are exploring whether any fixed-price elements can be included in the forthcoming LRIP 4 contract. Options range from a full firm fixed-price deal to locking in a fixed price for the CTOL variant (which accounts for the lion’s share of the buy) or agreeing upon a fixed-price, incentive-fee structure. This would set a price, but allow for a government/contractor risk-sharing model if overages occur. Lockheed Martin officials are not interested yet in going to a firm fixed-price contract for LRIP 4, but concede it is likely to be unavoidable for LRIP 5.

Van Buren’s office declined to discuss the negotiations in detail, but said “the government is seeking a fair and reasonable price.”

Still, the company’s unwillingness to commit to a firm, fixed price for LRIP 4 has gotten the attention of some in Congress. As Lockheed officials brief staffers on Capitol Hill, some remain skeptical of the contractor’s low pricing estimates. “Prove it. Sign up to a lower cost on a fixed-price contract,” one Hill aide says. “Given their track record, they don’t have much leverage to make these claims.”

Ultimately, it could be skepticism in Congress that could prove most perilous to the program. If Congress reduces the buy in Fiscal 2011 from 43 by 10 or more, as some House defense authorizers are considering, the lower quantity will again push the per-unit price up. This could be the program’s entry into the acquisition “death spiral,” where repeatedly reduced production quantities beget higher pricing.

Credit: Lockheed Martin

[buglerbilly]

Ares

A Defense Technology Blog

F-35: Change at the Top

Posted by Graham Warwick at 5/3/2010 12:03 PM CDT

Some of you have been expecting it - calling for it, even - and now Lockheed Martin has made a change to its F-35 leadership, but not because of the program's well-publicized problems, it says. Dan Crowley, one of the program's two executive vice president/general managers, has been been promoted to the newly created position of chief operating officer of the Aeronautics sector.

Crowley, who has been the evp/gm responsible for day-to-day operations of the F-35 program since May 2005, will be replaced by Larry Lawson, evp/gm of the F-22 program. Tom Burbage, the F-35 evp/gm charged with holding together all the international and industry partnerships on which the program is built, is staying in place and will be "responsible for coordinating all Lockheed Martin corporate resources to ensure F-35 program success".

Lockheed says the leadership change has "absolutely nothing" to do with the F-35's cost and schedule issues and was planned "months ago". That doesn't quite gel with CEO Bob Stevens' assurance in March that he had no plans to remove Crowley from the program. But Lockheed argues this is the "ideal time" to make the transition as F-35 ground and flight test is finally picking up pace.

As evidence of progress, the company says the program logged 27 flights in April, making it the busiest month so far. That took it to 60 flights so far this year and 197 in total - still not a lot to show for a program that has been in flight test for more than three years. Amy Butler reports Lockheed's target is 395 test sorties this year, which seems doable but still leaves almost 4,500 to go.

As LM Aero's COO, Crowley will have responsibility for operations across all of the sector's programs, including the winding-down F-22 and ramping-up C-130J, but he will also stay involved with the F-35. Lawson. meanwhile, comes to the program with a track record of having pushed down costs over the F-22's final batches.

[buglerbilly]

Australian Technology and Innovation for JSF

(Source: Australian Department of Defence; issued May 3, 2010)

Greg Combet, Minister for Defence Materiel and Science, today opened the fourth Australian JSF Technology & Innovation Conference in Melbourne.

“The conference will allow over 200 of Australia’s leading academic, technical and industry innovators to explore opportunities to be involved in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program, now and into the future” said Mr Combet

“The JSF Program offers immense opportunities for Australian industry potentially creating several thousand long-term jobs, whether it is through the development of new markets or the chance to enter into global supply chains.”

“For example, the potential for Australia to become a global supplier of titanium and titanium components for the aerospace sector is one area being considered by the conference,

“Opportunities for Australian Small to Medium Enterprises to win work in global supply chains of large primes and their second and third tier suppliers are also being explored.

“These opportunities do often present challenges for local industry as the upfront investment is significant to improve capability and increase capacity.

“To help overcome these challenges the Government is working with the JSF prime contractors to develop long-term agreements with Australian companies so that the industry has the confidence to make the necessary investments to win this work.

“I am also pleased to announce that $8.5 million of funding had been approved by the Government to help industry overcome early investment challenges.”

“This support will be targeted at technological developments that will enhance Australian involvement in the program, investments that will increase the opportunities for small Australian companies to become involved and also encourage innovation by Australian industry which has applications for JSF follow-on development.”

“This targeted support – along with support from other government programs – is particularly important as the focus shifts to greater engagement in JSF production, sustainment and follow-on development,” said Minister Combet.

Mr Combet also congratulated the 28 Australian companies that have already won work in the face of stiff international competition on the JSF Program.

-ends-

[buglerbilly]

DATE:04/05/10

SOURCE:Flight International

Australia pushes Lockheed to allocate more JSF work

By Leithen Francis

Australia's minister for defence materiel and science, Greg Combet, has called on Lockheed Martin to give Australian companies more work in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) programme, while ensuring that programme costs remain on track.

"Australia, like other JSF partner countries, is seeking an affordable solution, but also wants a good outcome for local industry, given the large investment we are making," says Combet.

"To date, 28 Australian companies have won work on the JSF programme, valued at more than A$200 million [$185 million]," Combet told a JSF industry conference in Melbourne, Victoria on 3 May.

"This work has primarily been in the initial design and production of test aircraft."

However, Combet says that "while there has been active engagement with Australian industry in many areas of the programme, progress in some areas has been slower than expected. Further work is required here, and I stressed these issues to Lockheed Martin when I visited Fort Worth last year."

Lockheed "must search deep and hard among all partner countries, including Australia, to ensure compatibility and affordability goals are met" on the F-35, he adds.

To assist Australian companies with research and development work required to win more involvement on the programme, the Australian government is providing A$8.5 million in additional funding.

"While we are yet to allocate these funds, they will be devoted to relatively small investments that have a large pay-off for Australian industry," Combet says.

The government is already assisting some Australian companies, such as Brisbane-based Ferra Engineering, which has signed two memoranda of understanding with Lockheed to manufacture components for the JSF.

The government is working with Ferra Engineering, CAST CRC and Lockheed on the development of laser-assisted machining of titanium parts, he adds.

Other examples of work that Australia has won includes Goodrich Customer Services in Sydney, which has secured a contract to make the uplock actuators for the JSF's weapons bay doors.

Perth-based Quickstep has also signed a memorandum of understanding to manufacture lower side skins, maintenance access panels, fuel tank covers, lower skin and in-board weapons bay doors for the JSF.

[buglerbilly]

Carter: No Case for 2nd JSF Engine

By CHRISTOPHER P. CAVAS

Published: 4 May 2010 15:35

The guy's an idiot to say there is no case, of course there is a case. This is a funding problem NOT a lack of requirement problem.........

The Pentagon's top acquisition official again tried to shoot down the case for a second engine for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), which many in Congress are urging as a cost-control move.


Pentagon acquisition chief Ashton Carter said affordability is key to the success of the Joint Strike Fighter program. (TOM BROWN / STAFF)

"There is not a good analytical case that the upfront costs of the second engine would be paid back," Ashton Carter told an audience May 4 in Washington at the Sea-Air-Space symposium sponsored by the Navy League of the United States.

The engine issue has emerged as one of the most contentious concerns in debate over the fiscal 2011 budget request. The Pentagon wants to stick with the Pratt & Whitney F135 engine for the new aircraft, while Congress has repeatedly directed the Pentagon to include the F136 engine, made by General Electric and Rolls-Royce, for reliability and to compete with the first engine on cost.

"The key to success" in the JSF program "must be affordability," Carter said.

He pointed out that when a Pentagon analysis last fall showed that JSF costs were growing, he and Defense Secretary Robert Gates changed the program's schedule, appointed a new program leader and adjusted its budget.

Additionally, they "insisted that we and our industrial partners restore affordability to the program," Carter said.

[buglerbilly]

Marine Corps Dismisses Worries About F-35, Sticks with 2012 Date for Operational Debut

(Source: Lexington Institute; issued May 4, 2010)

(© Lexington Institute; reproduced by permission)

Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen. James Amos told defense trade publication Inside the Navy last month that his service has no plans to delay fielding of the F-35 fighter despite the fact that the development plan is 13 months behind schedule.

In fact, the Marine Corps is so confident that its short-takeoff-vertical-landing (STOVL) version of the plane will debut on time that it hasn't even drawn up contingency plans to deal with the possibility of problems. This is in marked contrast to the Air Force and Navy, which have deferred the initial operational capability of their planes several years due to a lengthening development cycle.

Prime contractor Lockheed Martin has repeatedly complained that reports about delays and cost increases in the F-35 program are exaggerated, and has secured a commitment from the defense department to "buy back" some of the planes deleted from early production plans if it comes in below government cost estimates.

That won't be hard to do, because the contractor has consistently priced its planes below Pentagon cost estimates in the first three production lots. Negotiations on the fourth production lot should be completed this month, with the final price likely to be about 25% below what the Pentagon's Cost Assessment & Program Evaluation (CAPE) office has predicted.

The Marine Corps is under some pressure to field the F-35 as soon as possible, because unlike the Navy it elected to forgo the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet, and as a result its air fleet is quite old. That decision was based on its conviction that future expeditionary warfare would favor airframes with vertical agility such as the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor and the short-takeoff-vertical-landing variant of F-35.

However, the decision to stick with a 2012 initial operational capability for F-35 inevitably raises questions about why other services chose to wait several more years for their planes. Inside the Navy suggested that part of the explanation might be that the Marine variant is less capable, but in fact its vertical lift fan and vectored thrust make the propulsion system considerably more complex than what is found on Air Force and Navy versions.

So maybe what's happening here is that the Marine Corps is making a statement about what shape the F-35 program is really in. Gen. Amos was quoted praising the Lockheed Martin production line and expressing confidence that the planes would deliver on time. He is not the only source for such optimism. Even the 2009 Selected Acquisition Report on F-35 that generated so many negative headlines concerning costs said that the planes were meeting all of their key performance parameters, were passing tests with flying colors, and were establishing new standards for quality.

The rising cost estimates turn out to be based mainly on data from other programs, whose relevance to future F-35 pricing is problematic. In any event, the Marine Corps is determined to start operating its F-35s in two years, and then we shall see whether all the costly adjustments recently made in the program were even necessary.

-ends-

[buglerbilly]

DATE:06/05/10

SOURCE:Flight International

Lockheed's new F-35 leader to face familiar challenges

By Stephen Trimble

When Lockheed Martin executive Larry Lawson assumes control of F-35 operations and manufacturing on 7 June, the F-22 programme manager since 2004 will confront a familiar set of challenges, but on an even grander scale.

Lockheed announced on 3 May that Lawson will succeed F-35 executive vice-president and general manager Dan Crowley, who is promoted to chief operating officer for the aeronautics sector amid a Congressionally mandated review over projected cost overruns and delays.

"It's an ideal time to transition leadership as we prepare for rapid growth," says Ralph Heath, executive vice-president of Lockheed's aeronautics sector.

Crowley's F-35 staff is negotiating prices for the fourth annual lot of low-rate initial production, with pressure rising to convert as much of the contract from cost-plus to fixed-price as possible.

By the time Lawson assumes control, Lockheed is likely to have a signed contract that converts prices for at least the F-35A conventional take-off and landing variant to the fixed-price format, where the contractors assume most of the risk for cost overruns.

Eventually, Lawson will face pressure by the US Department of Defense to convert the entire contract to fixed-price in the fifth annual LRIP contract, which will be negotiated next year.

More immediately, Lawson will face fresh Congressional scrutiny after the DoD completes a mandatory recertification review triggered by projected cost overruns over the programme's lifetime of between 57% and 89%.

Lawson inherits the F-35 at nearly the same period of its history as the F-22 stood in 2004. As he moved from managing Lockheed's weapons business to the Raptor programme, the company was also negotiating the fifth low of low-rate production.

A few weeks after Lawson assumed control, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld approved a recommendation to reduce the F-22 programme from about 270 aircraft to 179. Lawson worked to stabilise manufacturing costs while the F-22's allies in the US Air Force and Congress attempted to overturn the decision. In 2009, however, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates decided to halt F-22 production after 187 aircraft.

To avoid further production cuts on the F-35, Lawson again must stabilise production costs and increase the pace of flight testing. As he sorts out day-to-day managerial tasks behind the scenes, Tom Burbage, executive vice-president and general manager for F-35 integration, will continue to be Lockheed's most visible spokesman to the public and liaison to international partners.

Lawson will be replaced on the F-22 programme by George Schultz, who has served as deputy general manager since November 2008.

[buglerbilly]

F136 Team In Bid To Jump-Start Competition

May 7, 2010



By Graham Warwick
Washington

General Electric and Rolls-Royce are pinning hopes of saving the F136 from cancellation on an extended offer of fixed prices on early production engines. The proposal bids to offset projected costs to complete development used by the Pentagon to justify canceling the second engine for the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

With half the savings expected to come from price reductions on the F136, and half from Pratt & Whitney matching the offer with competitive prices for its F135, the GE/Rolls Fighter Engine Team (FET) believes the proposal will save $1 billion over the next five years before head-to-head competition is planned to begin.

The claimed savings are intended to offset the $2.9-billion cost to complete development and begin production of the F136 projected by the Defense Department’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) group and used to justify zeroing funding for the F136 in its Fiscal 2011 budget request.

GE/Rolls does not agree with the CAPE analysis, estimating it will take $1.8 billion to complete F136 development and tool up for production, says FET Chairman Jean Lydon-Rodgers. Fixed prices shift to industry the risk that manufacturing costs will not come down the learning curve as fast as planned, she says.

Making its fifth consecutive attempt to cancel the second engine, the Pentagon is not impressed with the new offer. “The [Defense] secretary does not believe the JSF needs an extra engine. Period,” says Geoff Morrell, Pentagon press secretary. “We simply can’t afford to buy two of everything.”

But the new offer is aimed squarely at Congress, which for the second year faces the threat of a presidential budget veto if it adds funding for the F136. The threat was defused last year by finding the money from outside the JSF budget, but the rhetoric has stepped up this year.

The timing is crucial. In updating the cost analysis conducted in 2007, the CAPE says the business case for a second engine has improved to break-even as a result of the “sunk costs” for F136 development during the past three years. That leaves the CAPE’s disputed $2.9-billion estimate of the cost to completion as the hurdle to be overcome.

“This offer will take $1 billion out of the first five years and turn the business case from neutral to very positive. This is a way through the short-term cost pressures to get to the long-term benefit,” says GE Aviation President and CEO David Joyce, noting the Government Accountability Office projects savings from competitive procurement of close to 20% over the program’s life.

Part of the CAPE’s higher estimate comes from its assumption that Pratt’s learning curve will suffer if it builds fewer engines as a result of competitive procurement. “We don’t believe learning curves are an entitlement,” says Joyce, noting that GE and Rolls already assume that risk in their commercial engine programs.

GE/Rolls offered a fixed price for Fiscal 2011 engine procurement last September, and the new proposal extends this to 2012, with progressively lower prices in 2013 and 2014. The offer covers about 150 low-rate initial production F136s planned for procurement before 2015, when head-to-head competition is scheduled to begin.

Pratt says it was first to offer to submit a fixed-price proposal, in early spring of last year, but that the JSF Program Office (JPO) declined, saying it wanted to stick with its cost-plus acquisition strategy for early production engines. “Since then, we have continued to make that offer available to the JPO,” the company says.

GE/Rolls says it has submitted to the JPO a formal “offer to do business,” with legally binding fixed prices for three years of F136 procurement. The original offer is no longer an option, the team says, as the JPO has reduced expected procurement in 2011 to only a small number of engines.

[Gubler, A.]

Another victim of APAitist:

Aviation Week suspends Bill Sweetman from F-35 story

http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/the-dewline/2010/05/aviation-week-suspends-bill-sw.html

[buglerbilly]

But Sweetman himself would tell you he approaches F-35 coverage unlike other journalists. I see my role as simply to report the facts offered by both critics and supporters, allowing my readers to draw their own conclusions. Sweetman approaches F-35 coverage from the standpoint of an analyst who has empirically concluded the program is a flop. That position is always going to create a tension with his traditional role as journalist.

He's not been presenting a balanced view about anything to do with the F-35 programme for months if not years and the fact he quotes APA as a source borders on farce............some of the other comments by other people in the Comments section about "journalistic integrity" would be hilarious IF people didn't seriously believe them! :big

[Gubler, A.]

Another nice pic...

Here's AF-2 which is showing what will probably be the standard operational markings with space on the tail for user serial codes and national roundel under the cockpit.

[Deks]

Reading through this:

http://www.rand.org/pubs/notes/2007/N3618.pdf

Basically it's a risk management study concerning the development of the F110-GE-100 and subsequent F100-PW-220. There are certainly comparisons that can be drawn to F-135/136 'competition' that we're seeing today.

For those that don't feel like reading (though the summary is pretty brief) the competition arised from USAF dissatisfation with the F100-PW-100. GE created another engine (F101X) based on it's production engine for the B1 which addressed all the USAF concerns with the F100. Subsequently, the USAF funded development of the F110 and also provided funding or the F100-PW-220 (which apparently PW was uninterested in when they had the monopoly position).

The upshot of the whole thing was the USAF got two high-performing engines, and the competition made contractor performance a non-issue - if one were to not perform, the next buy of engines would go to the competition.

Interestingly, a similar situation occurred with the Saudi's more recently. Poorly performing engines, PW not being interested in remedies, and the end result being that they ended up going with the GE engine. Article here (http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp?plckController=Blog&plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&newspaperUserId=27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7&plckPostId=Blog:27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post:c577616c-6be4-4f7f-aedf-e40e371d409f&plckScript=blogScript&plckElementId=blogDest). That particular article was framed in the same vein as this post, apologies if it's been posted before though.

There are differences between then and now though: namely that both the F135 & F136 are developmentall engines and not without risk. GE/RR offering a fixed-price contract would seem to mitigate that as far as USG/Partner nations are concerned though.

[buglerbilly]

USAF Forms New Joint F-35 EW Squadron

May 12, 2010



By David A. Fulghum
Ft. Washington, Md.

A long-running Pentagon quandary—over who conducts airborne electronic warfare, how offensive electronic-attack capabilities should be strengthened and when or what permission is needed to launch tactical cyber-attacks—now has a venue for resolution.

For months, Defense Secretary Robert Gates has been pushing for reinvigoration and unification of the Pentagon’s electronic warfare and attack (EW/EA) efforts and simultaneously ensuring that funding is available to each of the services. The latest signal that a true transformation is building momentum is the U.S. Air Force activation of the 513th Electronic Warfare (EW) Sqdn. at Eglin AFB, Fla., to meet needs of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

Half of the Air Combat Command unit’s staff of 130 will be USAF personnel and half Navy and Marine Corps specialists. Command will rotate among the services. Navy officials at Washington’s Navy League Convention last week said the move is more than just laying the EW groundwork for the Joint Strike Fighter. It is expected to become the focus of a single operation to create the software, algorithms and waveforms needed to field a coordinated, cross-service set of electronic tools that can combat enemy radars, missiles and networks through information manipulation, disruption of command and control, anti-electronic attacks and jamming.

Creation of the squadron, part of the 53rd Wing at Eglin, comes just as the Air Force has begun equipping its F-15Cs with new long-range active, electronically scanned array (AESA) radars (AW&ST April 26, p. 45). The advanced AESAs operate at 2-3 times the range of conventional radar and also serve as powerful weapons for airborne electronic attack (AEA) when coupled with a techniques generator that produces unique waveforms and algorithms.

The Navy’s Next Generation Jammer is also expected to play a major role in joint services’ AEA planning, and various versions will be carried by the F-35 (AW&ST April 26, p. 50; March 29, p. 61). AESA radars with similar capabilities also equip the F-22 Raptor, EA-18G Growler and the F/A-18E/F Super Hornets. It will go on all models of the F-35, and the JSF is expected to serve, in the long term, as a stealthier version of the Growler. All of those aircraft will need similar software, architecture and a steady diet of upgrades to meet new threats. The NGJ also would ensure that they can fly in mixed service and mixed platform attacks and exchange data fast enough to be tactically relevant.

“The unit also will test F-35 EW capability in the new U.S. Reprogramming Lab, currently under construction with a projected completion date this summer, followed by hardware delivery in spring 2011,” says the 513th’s first commander, Air Force Lt. Col. Tim Welde. “Our engineers are currently developing threat models and fifth-generation mission data; our technicians are undergoing maintenance training as well as prepping the lab.”

The squadron is expected to draw heavily on EW technology, tactics, threat analyses and attack techniques honed by the Navy in the last two decades.

“I don’t know that [the centralization of EW] has been formalized,” says Navy Capt. Mark Darrah, program manager for the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and EA-18G Growler. “But I know those [AESA-equipped fighter] units are standing up with very specific training requirements. We’ve had AESA for some time and we know how it works. The technology is the same. It makes good sense that we do that [in a joint environment].”

Meanwhile, the Navy is conducting an aggressive upgrade program to increase the AEA capabilities of its EA-18G Growlers that would eventually transfer to the F-35. Until then, it also will dedicate 26 Growlers to squadrons that support USAF Air Expeditionary Forces.

The new Growler EA and Super Hornet strike platforms are being designed to operate with “every other platform,” Darrah says. In particular, he says, “we are working closely with the Joint Strike Fighter program to develop complementary combinations” of stealthy and non-stealthy aircraft for combat.

The Air Force is following a similar path in pairing its non-stealthy, AESA-equipped F-15Cs, for the non-penetrating, “stand-in” jamming role, with the stealthy F-22, so the latter can remain electronically silent to avoid detection.

Tests of the Growler’s APG-79 AESA radar have validated that it can detect large targets at at least twice the distance of a mechanically scanned radar and three times the range for small targets, says Darrah.

A partial list of new capabilities includes full-spectrum EA, network-centric operations, interference cancellation and digital radio frequency memory jamming, Darrah says. The last refers to a standard EW tactic that captures an incoming radar signal, alters it to change the intended target’s speed, range, altitude and signatures, and sends it back to the emitter (probably a radar) with the false information. Interference correlation is the Growler’s unique capability that allows it to jam and communicate at the same time.

Sophisticated data and communications connectivity on the Growler and Super Hornet allows them to pass long-range AESA identification and targeting data to aircraft that do not have the advanced radar, Darrah says. That avoids the prohibition against aircraft firing at targets they cannot identify in beyond-visual-range engagements. Wider field-of-view night vision in a new helmet enables Super Hornet crews to designate targets and pass them to strike aircraft through a machine-to-machine interface at greater speed and with more accuracy. Expectations are that about 80% of precision target mensuration is to be conducted onboard the aircraft for a distributed targeting capability.

Connectivity to unmanned and remotely piloted aircraft is also part of the development road map, as is precise geo-location of emitters for electronic surveillance and attack.

Darrah describes the program office as “very, very busy” with a catalog of improvements and upgrades that are individually progressing well, but that offer a huge challenge for “integrating at the right time” to match technology maturation, operational need, funding and reconfigurations of the aircraft.

Credit: Lockheed Martin

[buglerbilly]

House Seapower Panel Approves 2nd F-35 Engine

By JOHN REED

Published: 13 May 2010 14:49

Despite the Pentagon's continued resistance to developing a second engine for the F-35 Lightning II strike fighter, the U.S. House Armed Services Committee' seapower panel subcommittee markup of the 2011 defense authorization legislation again authorizes the Pentagon to move ahead.

The move "reaffirms the subcommittee's commitment to the alternate engine program as the best insurance against spiraling development costs and contractor responsiveness for the primary engine," said subcommittee chairman Rep. Gene Taylor, D-Miss., during the subcommittee's May 13 mark up of the bill on Capitol Hill. Taylor said the continued development of the F136 will not reduce the Pentagon's requested budget for the F-35.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates has repeatedly threatened to recommend a veto for any legislation mandating that the DoD move ahead with the F-35 alternate engine.

Earlier this spring, Air Force Secretary Michael Donley said the alternate engine would be "another rock on top of" the troubled JSF program, which the Pentagon is trying to get back on budget and on schedule.

Taylor said adding an alternate engine would add no cost to the program and "at best will save tens of millions of dollars by lowered procurement costs in a competitive environment."

In their markup, panel lawmakers also added $547 million to the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps' request for aviation programs, authorized a total of $18.5 billion.

The legislation also contains "technical corrections" that allow the Navy to proceed with a multiyear buy of 124 F/A-18EF Super Hornets and E/A-18G Growlers. The markup also permits the Navy to use any unexpected savings from the multiyear to buy even more Super Hornets.

The markup "clarifies the intent of Congress" for the Navy to buy the jets "due to the Navy's being unable to meet the guidance in last year's" defense legislation authorizing the sea service to buy the jets, Taylor said.

[buglerbilly]

Air and Land Forces Subcommittee Opening Statement on Markup

(Source: House of Representatives Armed Services Committee; issued May 14, 2010)

WASHINGTON --- The following is the Opening Statement by Chairman Adam Smith (D-Wash.) before the Air and Land Forces Subcommittee of the HASC (House Armed Services Committee) concerning the markup of H.R. 5136, the FY11 National Defense Authorization Act:

"The proposed mark gives first priority to readiness - by providing equipment needed to support our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, providing response capability to meet natural disasters or crisis response here at home, and by addressing the most urgent needs of the services.

“Our proposed legislation for HR 5136 would:

“- Require the Department of Defense to budget for the F-35 competitive engine, beginning in fiscal year 2012. - Limit the obligation of funds in fiscal year 2011 for development of the F-35 aircraft to 75 percent until the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics certifies that all funds for development and procurement of the F-35 competitive propulsion system have been obligated.

“- Limit obligation of funds to 30 F-35 aircraft until certain conditions are met and certified to by either the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics or the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, as delineated in the legislation.

"The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter request this year is for nearly $11 billion and 42 F-35s and one additional F-35A in the supplemental request, as an F-15E combat loss replacement aircraft.

"The Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force plan to procure variants of the F-35 with a total projected acquisition cost of well over $300 billion and a life-cycle cost of over a trillion dollars. Thirty F-35s were authorized and appropriated for this year, fiscal year 2010. Only three of the 14 test aircraft planned for the F-35 program have been delivered. Only 10 percent of the planned test flights last year were flown. Funding for a total of 58 production aircraft has been provided by Congress, beginning in 2006; no production aircraft have been delivered. The first two deliveries are projected for late this year, nearly a year later than last projected. The F-35 program recently experienced a Nunn-McCurdy cost breach, which has a 50 percent cost increase threshold. Development and production problems with the F-35 program recently resulted in the Department of Defense restructuring the program, with development and completion of testing being further delayed.

"Over the next five years, Congress will be asked to approve the production of over 500 aircraft before testing is complete or a full-rate production decision is made. Under the current F-35 procurement schedule, Congress will also be asked, in 2015, to approve the highest annual rate of production for the F-35 program, for 2016, before the full-rate production decision that same year. Senior Department of Defense officials testified this year that 'Unprecedented' research and development and procurement concurrency still exists in the program. As a result, significant cost risk still exists in buying large quantities of aircraft with only 3 percent of the flight testing complete.

"The Title I provision recommended in the mark would require that in order obligate funding over and above the 30 F-35 aircraft approved for production in fiscal year 2010, the Pentagon will be required to meet its projections for specific program milestones and objectives the Pentagon currently says the F-35 program will meet.

"Regarding the competitive, alternate engine for the F-35, the F-35 competitive engine has been a part of the F-35 acquisition strategy since 1996. The engine acquisition strategy was planned such that the competitive engine systems development and demonstration would begin approximately four years after the system development and demonstration for the baseline F-35 engine. The committee has always believed that whatever development challenges the F-35 program might have, that to be a balanced program, competition needed to be an element of the engine acquisition program. The committee has believed that competition in the F-35 engine program helps ensure against the operational risk of up to 95 percent of the entire U.S. tactical fighter fleet being grounded due to an engine problem.

"The former Pentagon F-35 program manager also believed that operational risk was a consideration in the F-35 engine program and last year stated, 'I believe part of the debate that has to occur and is occurring is, is there an operational risk that we are accepting by having just one engine manufactured? ... I simply think we focus too much on the discussion about cost benefit and not operational risk benefit.' Competition has been demonstrated to help limit cost growth in acquisition programs, including as the first alternate engine program did for the F-15, F-16 and F-14. And competition has also been demonstrated to motivate contractor responsiveness, technical innovation, and improve engine maintainability, reliability, and durability. Under the Pentagon's F-35 plan, over $100 billion will be spent on 2,500 to 3,000 engines. That does not include F-35 partner nation requirements or Foreign Military Sales. The production of the F-35 is planned for the next 25 years. Since 1996, the committee has said that the F-35 engine should not be sole-sourced, to reduce operational risk and accrue the benefits of competition.

"The Pentagon funded the F-35 competitive engine from 1996 until 2006, when in the fiscal year 2007 budget request the competitive engine was omitted from the request. Surprisingly, later that same year the Deputy Secretary of Defense signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the other eight international partners that the F-35 program would include development and procurement of the F136 competitive engine. That MoU still stands.(Emphasis added—Ed.) The only funding for the F-35 competitive engine that has been provided the last four years has been funding provided by Congress, at 80 percent of the required level to fully execute the competitive engine program. In addition, $70 million of the funds authorized and appropriated in fiscal years 2009 and 2010 remains obligated even though the former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics testified before our subcommittee that all authorized and appropriated funds for the competitive engine would be obligated.

"The proposed mark funds the competitive engine program at $485 million, 50 percent each, in this subcommittee's and the Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee marks.

"In other recommended legislation, the subcommittee would also limit the Secretary of Defense from taking any action to procure more than two brigade sets of Early Infantry Brigade Combat Team Increment One equipment, unless otherwise waived due to urgent operational needs. The Early Infantry Brigade Combat Team component projects have been troubled by testing shortcomings and high unit costs.

"A Government Accountability Office witness and the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation testified on March 10 regarding the numerous reliability, maintainability, and effectiveness issues with the Early Infantry Brigade Combat Team Increment One equipment. Concerns were raised regarding the Increment One unmanned aerial vehicle; the non-line-of-sight launch system, which was recently recommended for cancellation by the Army; the unattended ground sensors; the network integration kits; and the small unmanned ground vehicles.

“As a consequence of the concerns raised by the GAO and the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, and the fact that significant prior-year funds are available to the EIBCT program, the recommended mark reduces funding for EIBCT by a total of $891 million of the $2.2 billion requested.

"The remaining $1.4 billion the mark provides for the Early Brigade Infantry Combat Brigade Increment One, in addition to last year's funding, is more than sufficient to provide for all testing in fiscal year 2011 and to field two brigade sets of equipment.

"Additional provisions you have been provided in the markup package include:
--Army Battlefield Plans and Programs
--Biometrics Programs
--Databases for Counter Improvised Explosive Device Initiatives
--Body Armor,
--Future Tank Fired Munitions
--Documentation for the Ground Combat Vehicle Program
--Program Elements for the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle

"Regarding budget issues, the mark includes:
--An additional $700 million for National Guard and Reserve equipment;
--An additional $290 million in Army-designated unfunded requirements; and
--An additional $60 million for Air Force-designated unfunded requirements.

"Our mark reflects the objective of balancing the health and capability of the current force with the needs of future capabilities. I believe that this mark supports the priorities of the Committee."

-ends-

[buglerbilly]

Air Force to Reduce Projected JSF Noise Footprint

(Source: Australian Department of Defence: issued May 17, 2010)

The Joint Strike Fighter’s projected use of Salt Ash Air Weapons range will be halved in a move to decrease the impact of aircraft noise on local homes, the Deputy Chief of Air Force has announced.

Air Vice-Marshal (AVM) Geoff Brown said the Defence Department had completed its review into the way JSF will use the range and the news was good for nearby communities.

“Through this review of our proposed JSF training activities we have assessed that we can make a significant difference to levels of aircraft noise near the range which will in turn refine the Australian Noise Exposure Forecast in that area,” AVM Brown said.

“RAAF Williamtown has long been part of the Hunter region. Air Force has worked with the Port Stephens Council and the local community to find a way to decrease the noise footprint of the JSF, while still achieving essential training. The decreased usage by JSF of Salt Ash Range will be balanced by increasing use of training simulation.”

The new noise map, which will eventually amend the existing 2025 Australian Noise Exposure Forecast (ANEF), will be made public in the coming weeks to coincide with the release of Port Stephens Council’s draft Development Control Plan.

The current iteration of ANEF 2025 – released on 23 Oct 2009 - classified parts of Medowie, Salt Ash, Oyster Cove and Swan Bay as exposed to aircraft noise, which had implications for planning and development.

AVM Brown said reducing JSF’s proposed use of the range would bring the noise contours back closer to the previous ANEF 2012 and ensure the future of the range as an essential training environment for Air Force.

“By no means are we closing the range as Air Force will need to retain it for its Lead-In Fighter training capability, currently the Hawk,” AVM Brown said.

“This review outcome doesn’t change the noise contours in other parts of Port Stephens, where we have no room to move on our requirement to get aircraft into and out of the Williamtown base.

“However, it does greatly improve the circumstance of communities in the immediate vicinity of the range and decreases the planning challenges for Port Stephens Council.”

-ends-

[buglerbilly]

Ares

A Defense Technology Blog

Lockheed Gives a Peek at New JSF Stealth Material Concept

Posted by Amy Butler at 5/17/2010 12:30 PM CDT

It is called "fiber mat," and Tom Burbage, executive vice president of F-35 program integration for Lockheed Martin says it is "the single, biggest technological breakthrough we've had on this program."

He says that a new process to blend stealth qualities into composite material avoided the need for stealthy appliqués and coatings. Using a new process, Lockheed officials are curing the stealthy, fiber mat substance into the composite skin of the aircraft, according to Burbage. It “makes this airplane extremely rugged. You literally have to damage the airplane to reduce the signature,” he said in an interview with Aviation Week in Fort Worth. This top-fiber mat surface takes the place of metallic paint that was used on earlier stealthy aircraft designs.

The composite skin of the F-35 actually contains this layer of fiber mat, and it can help carry structural loads in the aircraft, Burbage adds.

Lockheed Martin declined to provide further details on fiber mat because they are classified. But the disclosure of this new substance comes at a time when Lockheed Martin officials are arguing that maintenance costs for the F-35 will be lower than anticipated by operators.

What do you think: Does this new disclosure change the dynamic of the F-35 sustainment cost debate?

The linked article..........

New Stealth Concept Could Affect JSF Cost

May 17, 2010



By Amy Butler

FORT WORTH — As the debate rages about Joint Strike Fighter life-cycle cost, Lockheed Martin officials are raising a previously unheard point to bolster their low-price claims — a new low-observability (LO) substance called fiber mat.

Lockheed officials avoided the need to use stealthy appliqués and coatings by curing the substance into the composite skin of the aircraft, according to Tom Burbage, executive vice president of F-35 program integration for the company. It “makes this airplane extremely rugged. You literally have to damage the airplane to reduce the signature,” he said in an interview with AVIATION WEEK. This top-fiber mat surface takes the place of metallic paint that was used on earlier stealthy aircraft designs.

The composite skin of the F-35 actually contains this layer of fiber mat, and it can help carry structural loads in the aircraft, Burbage adds. The F-35 is about 42% composite by weight, Burbage says, compared to the F-22 at 22% and the F-16 at 2%.

Lockheed Martin declined to provide further details on fiber mat because they are classified. But the disclosure of this new substance comes at a time when Lockheed Martin officials are arguing that maintenance costs for the F-35 will be lower than anticipated by operators.

Officials at the Pentagon are required to complete their life-cycle cost estimates for the Joint Strike Fighter by the end of the month to certify that the $328-billion program can move forward despite a major cost spike. However, this has been an issue of controversy. A U.S. Naval Air Systems Command study recently stated that 65 years of sustainment for the single-engine stealthy fighter could cost about $442 billion (in Fiscal 2002 dollars) more than planned.

U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Norton Schwartz said in an interview this week with AVIATION WEEK that he feels maintenance numbers for the conventional takeoff and landing version are “manageable,” but he did not provide a number. A sustainment cost for all three variants is needed to proceed with Nunn-McCurdy certification after the 57% cost overrun.

Amid this debate, Lockheed Martin continues to claim that sustainment costs for F-35 will actually be lower than its predecessors. But the company’s argument faces the same challenge as its assertion that the Pentagon Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office’s development and production estimates are inflated. Fundamentally, company officials say, Pentagon estimates on both points rely too much on data from legacy aircraft.

Schwartz, who represents the service that will eventually operate the preponderance of the Pentagon’s F-35 fleet, appears unsympathetic to Lockheed’s complaints about the estimates. “This is a show-me situation for the government, the program office and the contractor,” he says. “Notwithstanding what they think of the estimate, that is what we budgeted to. If they want to sell more airplanes, there is a clear path ahead.”

Credit: Lockheed Martin

[buglerbilly]

Lockheed Martin F-35 Fighters Arrive Together At Edwards AFB


Two Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II stealth fighters, known as AF-1 and AF-2, fly side-by-side during a May 11 test flight near Fort Worth, Texas, in preparation for the fighters’ ferry flight to Edwards Air Force Base, Calif., on May 17. (Photo by David Drais, Lockheed Martin)

EDWARDS AIR FORCE BASE, Calif., May 17th, 2010 -- Two Lockheed Martin [NYSE: LMT] F-35A Lightning II stealth fighters flew nonstop from their final-assembly site in Fort Worth, Texas, to Edwards Air Force Base, Calif., today, signaling a further expansion of F-35 flight test operations. The arrival is the first in a series that will increase the Edwards F-35 test fleet to at least eight aircraft.

U.S. Air Force Test Pilot Lt. Col. Hank “Hog” Griffiths and Lockheed Martin Chief Test Pilot Jon Beesley flew the jets, known as AF-1 and AF-2, nonstop in the first multi-ship, long-range F-35 flight.

“The ferry flight went very smoothly, and reflects how the Air Force and Lockheed Martin will work cooperatively as we enter long-term F-35 testing at Edwards,” Beesley said. During the jets’ deployment to Edwards, the F-35s will undergo ground- and flight-test activities for propulsion, aerial refueling, logistical support, weapons integration and flight-envelope expansion.

“Through rigorous flight testing we are developing dominant and lethal 5th generation fighter capability for America and her allies,” said Doug Pearson, Lockheed Martin vice president of F-35 test and verification. “This historic moment at Edwards Air Force Base begins the planned expansion of F-35 flight test to a third permanent operating location. Lockheed Martin F-35A flight testing is a highly integrated partnership with the United States Air Force.” Three F-35s are currently undergoing flight trials at Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Md., the primary test site for the F-35B short takeoff/ vertical landing variant and the F-35C carrier variant. F-35s have conducted more than 200 test flights, with six additional test aircraft scheduled to begin flying and deploying to the two test sites this year.

The F-35A conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) variant – designed to meet U.S. Air Force requirements – is also the primary export version of the Lightning II. The air forces of Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, Canada, Australia, Denmark and Norway will employ the F-35A.

F-35 test aircraft are supported by the F-35 Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) and managed by the Lockheed Martin F-35 Sustainment Operations Center in Fort Worth. ALIS is the worldwide support system reporting and recording the prognostics and health of all F-35s around the globe to ensure mission readiness.

The F-35 Lightning II is a 5th generation fighter, combining advanced stealth with fighter speed and agility, fully fused sensor information, network-enabled operations, advanced sustainment, and lower operational and support costs. Lockheed Martin is developing the F-35 with its principal industrial partners, Northrop Grumman and BAE Systems. Two separate, interchangeable F-35 engines are under development: the Pratt & Whitney F135 and the GE Rolls-Royce Fighter Engine Team F136.

Headquartered in Bethesda, Md., Lockheed Martin is a global security company that employs about 136,000 people worldwide and is principally engaged in the research, design, development, manufacture, integration and sustainment of advanced technology systems, products and services. The Corporation reported 2009 sales of $45.2 billion.

[buglerbilly]

DATE:18/05/10

SOURCE:Flight International

Joint Strike Fighter catalyst for policy change in Japan

By Leithen Francis

Japan is to decide before the end of the year whether to ease military aircraft restrictions. The government will reveal whether it will allow local manufacturers to be involved in international joint development of military aircraft, and permit the export of Japanese military aircraft.

For decades Japan has had an export ban on military equipment, with the policy also blocking its companies from being industrial partners in international defence programmes, such as the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The major exception to the rule is Japan's export of missile technology to its major ally, the USA.

The office of the prime minister has established a panel of top officials that will release the National Defence Programme Guidelines (NDPG) and the Mid-Term Defence Programme by year-end, say ministry of defence officials.

Japan's policy stance towards military aircraft exports and international joint development of military equipment will be contained in the NDPG, say the officials.

Defence ministry officials and industry sources in Japan say the reason the government is considering easing the restrictions is because local defence manufacturers such as Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Kawasaki Heavy Industries have been lobbying it.

Japan needs to change its policy because all the current top programmes are international joint development efforts, says a top executive at one of Japan's major defence manufacturers. The executive cites as examples the F-35 and the Eurofighter programmes.

Unless the government policy is eased, Japan will be unable to gain access to leading technologies, says the executive.

Japan has also developed its own military aircraft such as the Kawasaki XP-1 maritime patrol aircraft and the ShinMaywa search and rescue aircraft.

The policy change could mean that aircraft such as these may be exported in the future, although the general consensus among industry and government sources is the future policy is really about getting Japanese manufacturers involved in international joint development.

The government is becoming open to the idea of joint development because the defence budget is constrained and the current approach - of having licensed production in Japan - is proving to be too costly, the industry and government sources say.

Last year, the government cancelled an order for Boeing AH-64D Apache attack helicopters, citing the high cost. The helicopters were to be built under licence by Fuji Heavy Industries, which is now suing the government over the cancelled order.

The move to ease restrictions comes as the defence ministry prepares to release a request for proposals for 40-50 fighters to replace some of its ageing McDonnell Douglas F-4s.

Lockheed plans to put forward its F-35, while BAE Systems is leading the campaign for the multinational Eurofighter consortium.

As for the issue of exporting Japanese military aircraft, officials say the defence ministry established a committee a few weeks ago to look at commercialisation of military aircraft.

Some local manufacturers are already moving in this direction. ShinMaywa, for example, has developed a concept for a civil firefighting variant of its military SAR amphibious aircraft and is actively marketing it.

[Deks]

It is called "fiber mat," and Tom Burbage, executive vice president of F-35 program integration for Lockheed Martin says it is "the single, biggest technological breakthrough we've had on this program."

He says that a new process to blend stealth qualities into composite material avoided the need for stealthy appliqués and coatings. Using a new process, Lockheed officials are curing the stealthy, fiber mat substance into the composite skin of the aircraft, according to Burbage. It “makes this airplane extremely rugged. You literally have to damage the airplane to reduce the signature,” he said in an interview with Aviation Week in Fort Worth. This top-fiber mat surface takes the place of metallic paint that was used on earlier stealthy aircraft designs.

The composite skin of the F-35 actually contains this layer of fiber mat, and it can help carry structural loads in the aircraft, Burbage adds.

I had actually wondered about this, sounds like a win from all sides :)

[Deks]

More funding for F136 :)

By JOHN REED
Published: 14 May 2010 10:40
Two U.S. House Armed Services subcommittees on May 13 pumped $485 million into the alternative engine program for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) despite Pentagon objections to the program.

The Armed Services air-land and seapower subcommittees made the funding changes during their mark-ups of the 2011 defense authorization bill.

The air-land subcommittee also restricted the number of F-35s the Pentagon is allowed to buy to 30 fighter jets, until the troubled program can meet certain requirements laid out in a deal between the Defense Department and prime contractor Lockheed Martin as part of February's restructuring. The effort is designed to overcome a two-year slip in the F-35's development schedule and predictions of massive cost overruns, said Rep. Adam Smith, D-Wash., the air-land subcommittee chairman.

"We authorized 30 [F-35s] no question, and we authorized the other 12" jets the Pentagon requested in the 2011 budget with a caveat, Smith told reporters May 13. "We have 11 different" development goals that the Pentagon and Lockheed have committed to meeting before money can be released for the remaining 12 jets.

"They have to hit those [11 goals] that they have absolutely guaranteed that they are going to meet" under the terms of the F-35 program's restructuring, Smith said.

He cited the program's numerous cost overruns and development delays as the impetus behind the 30-aircraft restriction.

Meanwhile, Smith defended the move to fund the Rolls Royce–GE alternative engine, known as the F136, claiming that competition will lower costs and improve engine quality, as well as provide a hedge against any problems with the current Pratt & Whitney-built engine, known as the F135.

"We continue to push forward, and I do not agree with" Defense Secretary Robert Gates' notion that the second engine will not provide enough savings to make buying the F136 worthwhile, Smith told reporters when asked about the Pentagon's threat to oppose legislation mandating the F136 engine.

The Pentagon has "set a price on what they think this will cost that exceeds previous estimates; we have asked for an explanation of the difference between the two; we still have not received it," Smith said. "I'm still trying to have the conversation with the Pentagon as to why they feel as strongly as they do."

Rep. Gene Taylor, D-Miss., chairman of the seapower subcommittee, said funding the second engine "reaffirms the subcommittee's commitment to the alternate engine program as the best insurance against spiraling development costs and contractor responsiveness for the primary engine" during his subcommittee's May 13 mark-up. Taylor said the continued development of the F136 will not reduce the Pentagon's requested budget for the F-35 aircraft.

Earlier this spring, Air Force Secretary Michael Donley said the alternative engine would be "another rock on top of" the troubled JSF program, which the Pentagon is trying to get back on budget and on schedule.

Taylor said that adding an alternative engine would add no cost to the program and "at best will save tens of millions of dollars by lowered procurement costs in a competitive environment."

In their mark-up, seapower panel lawmakers also added $547 million to the Navy and Marine Corps' request for aviation programs, authorizing $18.5 billion.

The legislation contains "technical corrections" that allow the Navy to proceed with a multiyear buy of 124 F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fighters and E/A-18G Growler electronic warfare aircraft. The mark-up also permits the Navy to use any unexpected savings from the multiyear buy to purchase even more Super Hornets.

Taylor did not elaborate on what those corrections are.

The markup "clarifies the intent of Congress" for the Navy to buy the jets "due to the Navy's being unable to meet the guidance in last year's" defense legislation authorizing the sea service to buy the jets, Taylor said.

[buglerbilly]

HASC OKs F-35 Alternate-Engine Funds

By JOHN REED

Published: 19 May 2010 15:36

U.S. lawmakers are moving ahead with their pledge to fund the F136 alternate engine for the F-35 Lightning II fighter jet, inserting funding in the House Armed Services Committee's markup of the 2011 defense authorization bill.

Made by a GE/Rolls-Royce team, the engine would compete with Pratt & Whitney's F135.

Rep. Roscoe Bartlett, R-Md., said May 19 during the markup that "competition is warranted and critical and costs nothing more, according to the GAO."

F136 supporters on Capitol Hill say competition could save millions of dollars by driving engine costs down and ensuring high quality from the engine-makers.

GE officials lauded the committee's move.

"Given the enormity of the JSF program, competing engines on the aircraft is the best way to put the acquisition reform act into action," said David Joyce, CEO of GE Aviation. "With the growing concern over cost overruns in defense programs, competition continues to be the best cost-control mechanism."

The Pentagon is fighting the idea, saying an alternate engine will save no money and that it is a distraction for the troubled F-35 program. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has said he will recommend that President Obama veto the bill if it has alt-engine funds.

In addition to funding development work on the engine, the markup orders the Pentagon to budget for the engine in 2012.

The markup also takes a step to force DoD to actually use the funds authorized for F136 development by limiting F-35 development funds in 2011 "to 75 percent until the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics certifies that all funds for development and procurement of the F-35 competitive propulsion system have been obligated," Air Land subcommittee chairman, Rep. Adam Smith, D-Wash., said.

The legislation also contains language inserted into the bill by the subcommittee last week limiting the number of F-35s the Pentagon can buy next year to 30 jets until the program meets certain milestones toward getting back on schedule and budget, according to Smith.

[buglerbilly]

DATE:20/05/10

SOURCE:Flight International

Congress threatens to slash F-35 procurement

By Stephen Trimble

The US Congress has opened debate on the fiscal year 2011 defence budget by sending a clear and unprecedented warning to the Lockheed Martin F-35 programme.

For the first time, a major legislative committee approved a bill that would slash F-35 funding if the programme fails to achieve a reduced set of cost and schedule goals this year.

HR 5136, a bill to authorise defence spending, threatens to reduce the F-35's development budget by 25% and slash overall FY2011 procurement from 43 to 31 aircraft, if Lockheed fails to achieve certain goals, such as completing 394 test flights in FY2010. Production in FY2011 has already been trimmed from 48 to 43 aircraft.

Lockheed had completed 60 flight tests as of 1 May, two more than scheduled. Over the next five months, Lockheed must average nearly 42 flights a month as the test fleet expands from seven to 13 aircraft by the end of the year.

"They have to meet the milestones in terms of testing and delivering aircraft to make sure that they stay on that timeline," says Adam Smith, chairman of the House AirLand subcommittee.

The language, however, must survive several more steps in the legislative process before it becomes law. Following its passage by the House Armed Services Committee this month, the authorisation bill now goes before the full House of Representatives. Meanwhile, the Senate Armed Services Committee will start work on its version of the FY2011 defence authorisation bill in the week beginning the 23 May. Appropriations committees in both house of Congress also have yet to debate the F-35 issue.

But the new clause changes the tone of the F-35 debate in Congress.

Since contract award in October 2001, the F-35 programme has faced repeated setbacks, including a costly redesign in 2004 and a major restructuring in February.

Until this year, however, Congress has consistently supported the programme's budget requests, allocating nearly $57 billion for F-35 development and production through FY2010. The FY2011 budget request, if approved, would raise F-35 spending to almost $68 billion, or more than has been spent on development and procurement for all 188 F-22s.

At the same time, Lockheed officials have spoken confidently about their ability to meet reduced schedule targets. The Department of Defense, for instance, earlier this year reduced the number of scheduled flight tests in FY2010 from 1,243 to 394.

[buglerbilly]

Pentagon Contract Announcement

(Source: U.S Department of Defense; issued May 19, 2010)

-- Lockheed Martin Corp., Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., Fort Worth, Texas, is being awarded an $85,499,548 modification to a previously awarded cost-plus-incentive / award-fee contract (N00019-07-C-0097) in support of the Joint Strike Fighter air system low-rate initial production (LRIP) Lot II.

This modification provides for the procurement of the additional special tooling and special test equipment required under LRIP II to meet the anticipated production ramp. Work will be performed in Ft. Worth, Texas (35 percent); El Segundo, Calif. (24 percent); Lancashire, United Kingdom (17 percent); Turin, Italy (4.5 percent); and at various continental U.S. locations (19.2 percent) and locations outside the continental U.S. (0.3 percent).

Work is expected to be completed in April 2012. Contract funds in the amount of $25,786,266 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year.

The Naval Air Systems command, Patuxent River, Md., is the contracting activity.

-- Lockheed Martin Corp., Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., Fort Worth, Texas, is being awarded a $58,000,000 modification to the previously awarded cost-plus-incentive-fee contract (N00019-08-C-0028) for technical services required to meet production ramp rates in support of the Joint Strike Fighter air system low-rate initial production Lot III aircraft.

Work will be performed in El Segundo, Calif. (55 percent); Lancashire, United Kingdom (18 percent); Fort Worth, Texas (12.6 percent); and various continental U.S. locations (13.5 percent) and locations outside the continental U.S. (0.9 percent).

Work is expected to be completed in January 2011. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year.

The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Md., is the contracting activity.

-ends-

[buglerbilly]

U.S. House Armed Services Committee Moves to Preserve Competition for JSF Propulsion

(Source: GE Aviation; issued May 19, 2010)

EVENDALE, Ohio --- The full U.S. House Armed Services Committee (HASC) today led the charge for defense acquisition reform by voting on a National Defense Authorization Bill that includes $485 million in continued funding for the GE/Rolls-Royce F136 engine for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).

By authorizing funding in fiscal year 2011 for the F136 – the competing JSF engine already more than 70 percent through its development – the Committee strongly endorsed an annual, head-to-head competition to the F-35 propulsion system, which avoids a decades-long, $100 billion engine monopoly being handed to a sole-source provider.

HASC Subcommittee Chairman Adam Smith (D-Washington) today emphasized that “the Pentagon’s own study on F-35 engine options indicated it would cost no more to reduce operational risk and achieve the benefits of a competitive engine program, than to fund a sole source engine program.”

Ranking HASC member Rep. Roscoe Bartlett (R-Maryland) said today he was pleased the bill included “funding necessary to continue development for an alternate engine for the Joint Strike Fighter. Competition is warranted and critical and costs nothing more according to the Government Accountability Office (GAO).”

The GAO recently estimated that competition between the two F-35 engine makers could lead to long-term savings of up to 21 percent for the $100 billion engine program.

For 15 years, a bipartisan Congress has supported and funded the GE/Rolls-Royce engine to preserve competition on the largest weapons procurement program in history. Competing engines have been an integral component of the JSF program from its inception, and competitive behavior has proven to control costs.

Today’s Congressional action is also consistent with the mandate of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, signed by President Obama, which calls for competition throughout the life cycle of major weapon systems programs – including funding of competing sources. Competition, a consistent theme in the Reform Act, is highlighted 20 times.

“We applaud the HASC action today,” said David Joyce, president and CEO of GE Aviation. “Given the enormity of the JSF program, competing engines on the aircraft is the best way to put the acquisition reform act into action. With the growing concern over cost overruns in defense programs, competition continues to be the best cost-control mechanism.”

The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program creates the perfect opportunity - a multi-role aircraft replacing numerous tactical fighter aircraft, with potential production for the U.S. Air Force, Navy, Marines and international customers to reach 5,000 to 6,000 aircraft over 30 years.

The Pratt & Whitney F135 development for JSF is estimated to grow 50 percent beyond its original contract, from $4.8 billion to $7.3 billion, according to a recent report from the GAO, adding, “F135 engine development cost increases primarily resulted from higher costs for labor and materials, supplier problems, and the rework needed to correct deficiencies with an engine blade during re-design.”

The GE-Rolls Royce F136 engine is a product of the best technology from two world-leading propulsion companies. The GE Rolls-Royce Fighter Engine Team has designed the only engine specifically developed for the F-35 aircraft, offering extra temperature margin and affordable growth. F136 engine development is being led at GE Aviation in Evendale, Ohio (Cincinnati suburb), and at Rolls-Royce in Indianapolis, Indiana.

The F-35 is a 5th-generation, multi-role aircraft designed to replace the AV-8B Harrier, A-10, F-16, F/A-18 Hornet and the United Kingdom’s Harrier GR.7 and Sea Harrier, all of which are currently powered by GE or Rolls-Royce.

-ends-

[Deks]

wow


The markup also takes a step to force DoD to actually use the funds authorized for F136 development by limiting F-35 development funds in 2011 "to 75 percent until the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics certifies that all funds for development and procurement of the F-35 competitive propulsion system have been obligated," Air Land subcommittee chairman, Rep. Adam Smith, D-Wash., said.

[buglerbilly]

Gates renews veto threat over F-35 engine
(AFP) – 4 hours ago

WASHINGTON — US Defense Secretary Robert Gates on Thursday renewed threats of a presidential veto if Congress funds a second engine for the F-35 fighter jet or additional cargo aircraft.

The House Armed Services Committee defied the Pentagon this week, adding extra money in the 2011 defense budget for an alternative engine for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).

Some Republican lawmakers have also called for adding funds for more C-17 planes, ignoring recommendations from Gates and Air Force commanders.

The defense secretary said he would urge President Barack Obama to veto a bill that provides for a "costly and unnecessary" second engine for the Joint Strike Fighter, that imposes overly strict conditions on the program or funds additional C-17 transport planes.

"I will strongly recommend that the president veto such legislation," said Gates, saying he had issued similar warnings "repeatedly."

"Let me be clear. I believe the defense budget process should no longer be characterized by business as usual within this building or outside of it," he told a news conference.

The Pentagon has been at odds with Congress for four years over the alternative engine, which is manufactured by General Electric and Rolls-Royce, with lawmakers arguing it would allow for more competition and save money in the long term.

The Pentagon wants to stick with an engine made by Pratt and Whitney of United Technologies, saying a second engine is impractical and could further delay an already troubled program.

In February, Gates sacked the general in charge of the F-35 program and said he would withhold funds from the lead contractor, Lockheed Martin, over a series of cost overruns and delays.

Gates has held up the Joint Strike Fighter as the future of US warplanes, after having pushed through an end to the costly F-22 Raptor, despite opposition from some lawmakers.

His warning to Congress on Thursday came days after he unveiled an effort to "reform" the Pentagon by slashing overhead and bureaucratic costs to free up money for more urgent needs.

Gates wants to cut about two percent of overhead costs in the 2012 budget, or up to 15 billion dollars a year, but said he still favors modest growth in overall defense spending.

Previous defense secretaries have tried but often failed to change the way the Pentagon operates.

Admiral Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said at the same press conference that military leaders supported Gates' plans.

He said Gates had already shown he was able to cut weapons programs that many thought were politically untouchable.

"I also just wouldn't underestimate his ability to do this," Mullen said.

Copyright © 2010 AFP. All rights reserved.

[buglerbilly]

Dutch Parliament Votes to Cancel First JSF Aircraft

(Source: defense-aerospace.com; issued May-21, 2010)

(By Dutch JSF analyst Johan Boeder; edited by defense-aerospace.com)

THE HAGUE, Netherlands --- The Dutch Parliament’s Lower House voted yesterday to cancel the order for the first F-35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft, and to stop Dutch participation in the program’s Initial Operational Test and Evaluation phase.

It also voted to direct the defense ministry to begin anew the Request for Proposal and the complete evaluation of the F-16 replacement program, for which a final decision is due in 2012.

The basis for yesterday’s vote is that the price estimates provided by Lockheed Martin in response to the original Request for Information of 2002, and the Supplemental Request for Information of 2008, are unreliable, as confirmed by the late 2009 reports of the US Joint Estimate Team and US Government Accountability Office.

The motion was proposed by the Labour Party, and was supported by the Socialist Party (SP), Green Left, the right-wing PVV (Freedom Party of Geert Wilders), the Liberal Democrats D66 and the Party for the Animals. The resolution passed with a majority of 79 votes to 71 votes.

If implemented, Parliament’s decision means that The Netherlands would cancel acquisition of the first F-35A aircraft from the Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) 3 batch, ordered in May 2009 with a special clause calling for its cost to be paid back if Parliament voted against funding a second aircraft in 2010. Also, there will be no contract for a second F-35A aircraft from the LRIP 4; the pre-payment for related long-lead items has to paid back, and the participation in the Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (MOU signed in May 2008) will be ended. It does not, however, mean that the Netherlands will necessarily pull out of the program, although that is the outcome favored by the Labour Party.

However, the vote was dismissed by Minister of Defence Eimert van Middelkoop as Labour Party “election rhetoric” in the run-up to the June 9 general election. The Netherlands are governed by a caretaker government since the Cabinet lost a confidence vote in February on whether to continue the controversial military deployment in Afghanistan.

“The issue will be discussed in Cabinet, possibly today,” MoD spokesman Otte Beeksma told defense-aerospace.com. But he said that, in a May 20 statement, van Middlekoop said he was neither willing nor able to act on Parliament’s vote as in his opinion the government’s caretaker status means it cannot take any irreversible decision before the election. He added that any decision will be taken by the new government, noting that there will also be a new Parliament that might take a different position.

However Labour MP Angelien Eijsink said that it would be irresponsible to continue with the JSF program given information that has been available for months about delays, the Nunn-McCurdy cost breach, the delay of the IOT&E by 2 years until 2015, and poor progress in flight testing. She mentioned that the Parliament was still waiting for the promised, guaranteed price of the LRIP4 plane, while promised data about noise levels is still not available, and this is an important issue in a densely populated country like The Netherlands. Finally, the industrial business case for JSF participation has failed because of the lack of orders, of much lower than anticipated in 2002, and poor international contracts for the F-35 aircraft.

The Labour Party wants to continue Dutch participation in the F-35’s System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase, as signed in the 2002 Memorandum of Understanding on SDD. Other parties including SP, Green Left, D66 and PVV want to end the SDD participation.

In 2002, The Netherlands signed a MOU for a Level 2 participation in the SDD phase, and invested US$ 800 million in the project. Christian Democratic Party (CDA) and Liberal-conservatives (VVD) and the Christian Union (CU) were seriously irritated by the Labour Party’s position, and were prepared to wait until the missing information on prices and noise levels became available. (ends)

Labour Drops Support for Joint Strike Fighter Jet

(Source: Dutch News; issued May 20, 2010)

The Labour party (PvdA) has dropped its support for the Joint Strike Fighter jet project and will not support Dutch involvement in the test phase of the project, MP Angelien Eijsink said during a parliamentary debate on the JSF on Thursday.

Labour supported the purchase of one test jet while part of the coalition last year but says delays, uncertainty over the price and the noise factor make it irresponsible to continue, news agency ANP reports.

Dropping out of the trials will still cost the taxpayer EUR 20m, defence minister Eimert van Middelkoop said, adding that this figure could alter.

Last year's cabinet disagreement over the JSF led to the decision to buy one test plane and take a decision on a second after the next election.

Labour's support is crucial to the project - without it there is no parliamentary majority in favour.

The JSF is supposed to replace the aging fleet of F-16s.

-ends-

[buglerbilly]

New JSF Noise Map Released

(Source: Australian Department of Defence; issued May 21, 2010)

The Department of Defence has publicly released its draft Australian Noise Exposure Concept 2025 map.

The draft map outlines the significant decrease of the forecast noise footprint from the Joint Strike Fighter at Salt Ash Air Weapons Range compared with the initial Australia Noise Exposure Forecast 2025 map released late last year.

Deputy Chief of Air Force, Air Vice-Marshal (AVM) Geoff Brown, said the redrafted map put most of Oyster Cove, Medowie and Swan Bay outside the 20-25 contour. The new map can be viewed at http://www.defence.gov.au/id/anef_williamtown.htm.

The Joint Strike Fighter Public Environment Report process, a public consultation process undertaken by Defence starting in October 2009, provided invaluable feedback regarding the impact of the Australian Noise Exposure Forecast (ANEF) 2025.

“Air Force has listened to community concerns regarding aircraft noise from the JSF and has decided to halve the new jet’s use of Salt Ash Air Weapons Range to minimise the impact as much as possible,” AVM Brown said.

“We are grateful for the feedback and professional approach of Port Stephens Council throughout the process of reviewing the JSF’s use of the range and for the Council’s patience in working through challenges this has presented to them.”

The new map is being factored into the preparation of the Council’s draft development control plan and draft local environmental plan which is proposed to go on public exhibition next month.

Port Stephens Council Group Manager Sustainable Planning, David Broyd, said this had been an extremely complex issue for Council to deal with.

“We certainly appreciate the level of concern in the community regarding aircraft noise and have worked very hard to help provide a better outcome for residents,” he said.

“Council is very pleased that the Department of Defence has earmarked a significant decrease in its noise footprint. We also understand the importance of the RAAF Base in Williamtown and are supportive of its ongoing role in Port Stephens.”

The ANEC 2025 map, which is a draft, is likely to be finalised as the Australian Noise Exposure Forecast in the coming months.

AVM Brown said the move to decrease forecast noise footprint was an important step by Air Force to ensure the ongoing use of the range as an essential training asset for future generations of fighter pilots while minimising the impact on the local community.

-ends-

[buglerbilly]

Ares

A Defense Technology Blog

F-35's Tough Summer Heats Up

Posted by Graham Warwick at 5/21/2010 12:43 PM CDT

The Dutch parliament's vote to cancel the Netherlands' order for the first of two test F-35s, and not buy the second - which so far is just a vote, as a general election is due on June 9 - ends a tough week for the JSF program. As expected, the program's poor performance has brought down upon it the full scrutiny of Congress, the House Armed Services Committee voting to tie release of FY2011 funding to meeting test and production milestones - and funding the second engine.


Photo: US Air Force

The HASC's vote to limit procurement to 30 of the 43 requested aircraft until its conditions are met raises the spectre of the "death spiral" that ultimately drove F-22 production down to just 187 aircraft. According to defense secretary Robert Gates "the detailed proposals they have imposed on the overall JSF program would make it essentially unexecutable and impose unacceptable schedule and budget costs."

Those conditions are:

1 - limit obligation of FY11 funds for development and test to 75% until the DoD certifies all funds provided for development of the second engine have been obligated (the HASC added $485 million to fund the second engine in FY11)

2 - limit procurement funds to 30 aircraft unless:

- the second engine is fully funded (see above);
- all 12 flight-test aircraft have been delivered to their test locations (planned by the third quarter 2010);
- initial service release has been granted for the STOVL F135 engine (planned for the fourth quarter 2010;
- industrial facility and tooling capacity can support production of at least 42 aircraft in FY11;
- Block 1 mission-system software is released and in flight test (planned to fly first in the CATBird, at the end of May);
- the first two low-rate initial production F-35As have been accepted for delivery (planned by year-end);
- advanced procurement funds provided in FY09 and FY10 for the F136 second engine have been obligated;
- Lockheed Martin's earned-value management system has been certified as compliant;
- the first F-35C carrier variant has flown (planned for June) and the CTOL low-observable signature flight-test has been conducted and met or exceeded threshold requirements;
- the 394 test flights scheduled for 2010 have been completed, and 95% of the 3,772 test points accomplished;
- six F136s are available for testing and not less than 1,000 test hours have been completed.

That's a lot of conditions, but they seem fair, if tough. Some of them are tied to Lockheed delivering on its promises to deliver flyable aircraft, others on the Pentagon spending money it hasn't asked for and doesn't want to spend. Gates, unsurprisingly, has vowed to ask President Obama to veto any FY11 budget that includes the second engine or "directs changes that seriously disrupt the JSF program".

And meanwhile, in a move that is sure to stoke debate over the F-35's capabilities, a US intelligence official told Congress on Thursday that China is expected to have a fifth-generation fighter by 2018, earlier than previous forecasts. Three more congressional committees still have to mark up the budget - then the differences have to be reconciled. The F-35's summer promises to be heated indeed.

[buglerbilly]

Prolonged Uncertainty Likely For Dutch On JSF

May 24, 2010

By Robert Wall

LONDON — The state of flux concerning the Netherlands’ involvement in the Lockheed Martin Joint Strike Fighter program is expected to last several more months.

The lower house of the Dutch parliament has narrowly voted to cancel the purchase of an F-35 initial operational test and evaluation aircraft, but the caretaker government now in place is refusing to follow suit and wants the decision left to the new government.

General elections in the Netherlands are planned for June 9. But industry officials warn the situation could remain unresolved for several months as new coalition agreements are worked out. Those could drag into September.

The F-35 purchase has been politically contentious in the Netherlands for some time, with left-leaning parties trying to quash the deal. The debate has become more heated in recent weeks owing to the F-35’s schedule and cost overruns.

In a series of three votes, the left coalition May 20 voted to force the government to cancel the purchase of the aircraft that was ordered last year and is due for delivery next year — the Netherlands was going to buy a second, but the contract had not been placed yet.

The parliament also required the government to consider other aircraft for its F-16 replacement and not to take any major program decisions. The key vote, on the cancellation, passed by 79 to 71.

Program supporters believe the decision to call the vote despite a prior agreement within parliament not to do so is viewed as an effort by the left-leaning parties to mobilize their political base in advance of elections.

What the actual effect of the vote will be is still not clear. A defense ministry official says the government says it is refusing to adhere to the legislators’ demand and will not cancel the contract.

The Netherlands has been operating with a caretaker government since February, when the coalition in power at the time split over a dispute on continued involvement in Afghanistan.

The defense ministry official says the decision on what to do about JSF should be left to the new government and parliament, which also will be reshaped by the June elections.

According to a prepared statement, Lockheed says it is “currently monitoring the Dutch election... The way forward for the Netherlands on the specific structure of its F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program is not expected to crystallize until after the formation of the new government coalition, which will depend on the outcome of the elections and talks between the leading parties.”

The current government had urged lawmakers to hold off on any decision until more detailed JSF cost figures were available and the effect on the costs to the Netherlands were fully understood. The Dutch military was looking to start buying operational F-35s starting in 2012 — having last year slipped the decision two years already — with a total purchase of 85 units planned.

“The situation is confusing,” one military official says.

The Netherlands has a representative involved in contractual talks between the U.S. and Lockheed for the fourth low-rate production lot, under which the second aircraft would be purchased.

[buglerbilly]

'Joint Strike Fighter’ Really 3 Different Jets, Pentagon Says

By Noah Shachtman May 24, 2010 | 3:39 pm



A new JSF airframe without its wheels, wouldn't be any sublimimal messages about a "broken" project now would there.....?

The idea was to build a single jet that could take off from a runway, roar from an aircraft carrier — or just lift straight up into the sky. Sure, there’d be small differences in the three “variants” of the Joint Strike Fighter. But the common parts would far, far outweigh them — allowing the Defense Department to buy thousands of the planes at tag-sale prices.

At least, that was the plan. And that was what JSF-maker Lockheed Martin promised: three planes sharing 80 percent of their parts. But the Defense Department no longer believes it. An influential Pentagon team now says that the aircraft “being developed by the F-35 program [may] have as little as 25 percent in common,” Inside Defense reports. Production costs once estimated at $59 million per plane today are looking more like $112 million. R&D costs have gone up another 40 percent, lifting the total price to $323 or so billion for 2,443 fighters.

In April, the Pentagon told Congress that “the total price could swell to as much as $388 billion this summer,” Inside Defense notes. A central explanation for the cost hike: ”less airframe commonality than originally envisioned.”

The bad news keeps coming for the F-35 program, the biggest and costliest in Pentagon history. Last week, the House Armed Services Committee said it would only provide the cash for 30 of the 43 jets planned for next fiscal year under certain conditions - some reasonable, others less so. First, the panel wants the Defense Department to speed up the JSF’s slo-mo schedule of test-flights. According to the committee, “Only 3 of the 14 test aircraft planned for the F-35 program have been delivered. Only 10% of the planned test flights last year were flown.” But the panel also wants the Pentagon spend $485 million on an alternate engine for the JSF that no one in the military seems to want or need. As if this program wasn’t complicated and pricey enough already.

[Photo: DoD]

Read More http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/05/joint-strike-fighter-really-3-different-planes-pentagon-says/#more-25166#ixzz0otu7PkA3

[buglerbilly]

GE, Rolls: F-35 Engine Foe Waging Disinformation Campaign

By JOHN T. BENNETT

Published: 24 May 2010 15:08

The manufacturers of a second F-35 fighter power plant have offered a window into their intense congressional lobbying effort to ensure the F136 engine is funded in fiscal 2011: Move the media and legislative focus from its program to the F-35's primary engine and its prime contractor, Pratt & Whitney.

The argument the General Electric-Rolls team is making on Capitol Hill is that the so-called "alternate engine" program is performing well and is affordable, while the development effort on Pratt's F135 engine is substantially over budget and likely to go further into the red in coming years, officials from the two companies said in a May 24 morning session with reporters.

David Joyce, GE Aviation's president and CEO, said he "is amazed there is so much information" being dispensed by Pratt & Whitney to cloud what he said were F135 cost overruns of more than $2 billion.

Joyce said Pratt officials have been using "diversionary tactics" to shift the public and private debates about the F-35 engine situation from their own program.

Asked for a response, Pratt & Whitney officials said in a mid-afternoon statement that the F135 engine is "working very well."

"GE continues to cite ongoing cost and technical problems on the F135 that simply do not exist," the statement said. "In reality, it's the performance of the F136 extra engine that the government is concerned about."

James Guyette of Rolls-Royce said Pratt already has spent $7.3 billion to develop its engine, while GE and Rolls have spent "$3 billion plus $1 billion to go" on their model.

Joyce and Guyette spoke to reporters just days after the House Armed Services Committee defied the Pentagon by funding the GE-Rolls engine in its version of fiscal 2011 defense authorization legislation. GE-Rolls officials are fighting an effort to overturn the panel's proposal on the House floor.

They said Pentagon has overspent on the primary power plant and predicted that even more will be needed in additional F135 development work.

They said GE-Rolls' latest plans would bring "$20 billion in savings" to the F-35 engine program.

They also said that people who say that the F136 would create jobs in the United Kingdom, not in the United States, were putting up a "smoke screen."

Another key part of the lobbying message will focus on Pratt as the F-35 fleet's sole engine provider. Joyce and Guyette said this will create an unwise "monopoly," which "would not be in the nation's interest."

The duo acknowledged other U.S. military aviation programs have featured just one engine maker. The difference, they said, is the size, dollar-wise, of the F-35 engine program.

Pratt shot back at that claim, noting it is the lone engine supplier "on numerous military aircraft like the F-18, the Black Hawk helicopter, the Apache helicopter and the A-10, none of which has an extra engine.

"The bottom line is that the Department of Defense does not want or need the extra engine, which will cost at least an additional $2.9B in taxpayers' money and will have an adverse impact on the U.S. industrial base and our troops," according to the Pratt & Whitney statement. "In addition, the DoD does not believe there is any benefit to further competition."

F136 officials also will be lobbying lawmakers and congressional aides about a plan they recently pitched to Pentagon officials that would allow the military to buy the alternative engine under a fixed-price contract.

Guyette said the message will be this: A F-136 fixed-price arrangement "shifts some of the risk to us," while buying only Pratt power plants would cost DoD - and taxpayers - substantially more each year.

GE and Rolls are angling for a head-to-head matchup with the Pratt engine.

"We want an opportunity to compete," Guyette said. GE-Rolls wants the Pentagon to ultimately hold yearly competitions between the two power plants.

The officials also called a recent internal Pentagon analysis that said the F136 engine would cost $2.9 billion more than now projected "overstated."

[buglerbilly]

DATE:25/05/10

SOURCE:Flight International

Comment: F-35: it's not for children

From this point forward, the F-35 programme starts growing up, or it begins falling apart.

That is the only way to interpret the move last week by the House Armed Services Committee, which for the first time has proposed to restrict F-35 funds if the Lockheed Martin-led industry team fails to meet schedule and cost targets.

If Lockheed fails to deliver aircraft on time this year, or misses test goals, Congress could slash development funding by 25% and procurement funding by nearly one-third.

The rule could devastate the programme or, maybe, be the motivation lacking for so long within the F-35 programme to deliver aircraft on time and on price.

Until now, the programme's cost-plus contract structure seems to have bred a culture of non-performance. An entire year of flight testing was lost because Lockheed failed to deliver flight-test aircraft on time.

But the House committee has not acted punitively nor is it setting up the F-35 programme for failure. The performance targets are based on a restructured schedule that reduced Lockheed's flight-test target in fiscal year 2010 from 1,243 sorties to 394. According to Lockheed's own executives, that is an achievable target.

Whether one likes it or not, the F-35 is the most critical combat aircraft programme in the world today. Let's hope Lockheed gets the message - and grows up.

[buglerbilly]

USAF Disputes Navy F-35 Cost Projections

May 25, 2010



By Amy Butler

Langley AFB, Va. – USAF Air Combat Command chief Gen. William Fraser says he does not agree with the Navy’s projections that the F-35 will cost more to maintain than previously expected.

Officials at Naval Air Systems Command (Navair) have predicted a higher cost for operating the system over 65 years than has the Joint Strike Fighter’s joint program office (JPO), which is managing procurement of the triservice, nine-nation aircraft. The Navair study recently stated that 65 years of sustainment for the single-engine stealthy fighter could cost about $442 billion (Fiscal 2002 dollars) more than planned.

“We don’t agree with the Navy numbers,” Fraser said during a May 20 interview with AVIATION WEEK. “Based on everything that I’m seeing, I have confidence right now in the other numbers [from the JPO], and not necessarily the Navy numbers.”

The Navy will operate the carrier version while the Marine Corps will use the short-takeoff-and-vertical-landing (Stovl) version.

The Air Force is expected to operate the preponderance of the U.S. fleet; it is planning to buy 1,763 of the conventional-takeoff-and-landing aircraft. Fraser says he is holding firm on the 1,763 requirement; recently the Air Force chief of staff, Gen. Norton Schwartz, said he expected to buy “more than 1,500” of the fighters. This was seen by some as him backing off of the long-standing 1,763 requirement.

“We have not changed our requirement here at ACC,” Fraser says. He says he has not been asked to produce any contingency plans should the number shrink. This would most likely happen due to affordability problems. If the Pentagon’s predictions are true and the per-unit cost goes up about 57%, buying a full complement of F-35s could be untenable in the current fiscal environment.

Fraser also says he is optimistic about recent progress in the F-35 development program, which has fallen under greater scrutiny due to a low-sortie production rate and delayed deliveries of test aircraft by prime contractor Lockheed Martin. “The predictive models that we are seeing on what we are going to be able to get out of each of the test points are better than – I think – some of the things we’ve seen in the past,” Fraser says. “The modeling has gotten better and … we are meeting those [predictions], and we are seeing what we had expected out of it.”

Lockheed officials say that by June all 20 of the flight- and ground-test aircraft will be off of the company’s production line in Fort Worth, Texas. By year’s end, 395 flight test sorties are required, which would bring the program’s total to about 58. This is slightly more than the 5,000 sorties planned for the entire test program of all three variants (Aerospace DAILY, May 4).

Credit: DoD

[buglerbilly]

2 U.S. Reps Want To Strip F-35 Alt-engine Funds

By JOHN T. BENNETT

Published: 25 May 2010 15:33

Two U.S. House lawmakers this week will propose stripping from a 2011 defense spending bill nearly $500 million for a second F-35 engine and use the funds to buy National Guard and Reserve gear, according to a congressional source.

Democratic Reps. Earl Blumenauer of Oregon and John Larson of Connecticut plan to introduce an amendment to the House Armed Services Committee's version of defense authorization legislation that would cut the $485 million the panel last week approved for the F136 engine. GE and Rolls-Royce are building the so-called "alternative engine."

U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates and President Barack Obama "have repeatedly called for the elimination of this wasteful program, and Gates has suggested that the president could veto the [2011] DoD authorization bill should the funding remain," the source said.

"At a time when the National Guard and Reserve component face a $42.5 billion equipment shortage, this funding is critical to support the Guard's needs," the source said.

The primary power plant for the F-35 fleet is being built by Pratt & Whitney, which is based in Larson's state.

The House panel's version of the 2011 authorization bill is slated to hit the House floor this week.

The Pentagon - bridging the George W. Bush and Obama administrations - has for years attempted to kill the alternative engine effort. Each time, Congress has kept it alive.

GE-Rolls officials and other F136 proponents say keeping alive two F-35 engines will save money in the long run, transfer risk away from the government, and provide a hedge against a problem with the primary power plant. On May 24, GE-Rolls officials again lobbied for a chance to compete annually against the Pratt engine, part of a broader lobbying push on Capitol Hill this week.

The source said Blumenauer and Larson have been "working the phones" in recent days to drum up support for their coming amendment, but did not say whether the duo believes they have enough votes to pass it.

[buglerbilly]

First F136 Death Blow Near?

By Colin Clark Tuesday, May 25th, 2010 6:59 pm

An important congressional supporter of the second engine for the Joint Strike fighter is “pessimistic” about the coming House floor vote on whether the engine should be funded in the House defense authorization bill. The reason for the supporter’s pessimism is simple: the majority of House lawmakers know little about defense issues and the issues surrounding the F135, made by Pratt, and the F136, made by General Electric and Rolls Royce, are highly complex. So the vote will rest largely on coalitions, the interests of major donors and constituents and horse trading — not on the merits of the issue.

The House vote on an amendment killing the F136 General Electric/Rolls Royce alternate engine program is expected Thursday. Democratic Rep. John Larson of Connecticut, where Pratt and Whitney is based, will sponsor the amendment that would strip F-136 funding from the main defense policy bill. Larson, the son of a Pratt employee, has told some in the House that he is under intense union pressure to act against the General Electric and Rolls Royce engine.

There are important tells to watch for. “A key will be how the amendment is structured — either a straight up or down, or packaged with other budget items to further confuse and mislead a very complex issue,” said GE spokesman Rick Kennedy in an email.

He also said that there is some effective lobbying going on by “A large body of Congressional members, including HASC leaders and others, such as Steve Driehaus…” They are, he said, These people are, he said, “doing a remarkable job of clarifying the real issues in this debate.”

After the House casts its votes on the defense policy bill, all eyes will move to the House Appropriations defense subcommittee, now headed by Rep. Norm Dicks of Washington. The views of Dicks, who may rise to the chairmanship of the whole committee when current chair Rep. David Obey of Michigan departs, on the F-136 are not well known. So far, the best indications are that he is willing to listen to the case for the F136 but he is not thought to be a stalwart supporter, as was his predecessor, the late Rep. Jack Murtha.

Until Thursday’s vote, GE and Rolls Royce are pulling out every stop to meet senior congressional leaders and to count heads. Senior company leaders were not optimistic yesterday about securing a meeting with House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, but they and their colleagues are calling and emailing everyone they can find. As anyone who has worked on the Hill can tell you, working the halls to influence lawmakers can be effective for a small number of lawmakers, but it is highly inefficient.

Pratt & Whitney, eyes firmly on Capitol Hill as the House nears its floor vote, will tell the country tomorrow that it is delivering the first set of production F135 engines for the Joint Strike Fighter to the military. That will mark an important shift to the program. While it can easily be downplayed, the movement of a program from test to production requires the government to certify that the builder has satisfied a wide range of technical milestones.

Pratt has delivered 29 test engines.

Pratt has scheduled a press breakfast for tomorrow, featuring Dave Hess, company president, Warren Boley, military engines president and Bill Begert, VP of military business development and aftermarket services.

Meanwhile, the Congressional Research Service has produced an excellent summary of the issues facing Congress as the House readies for the vote. The report concisely reproduces the principal arguments of most sides in the political and programmatic engine war and is excellent reading for anyone trying to think clearly about what will be at least a $62 billion investment for the country.

Read more: http://www.dodbuzz.com/2010/05/25/first-f136-death-blow-near/#ixzz0p0JuNcsW

[buglerbilly]

Rust and Roll For F-22; HASC Watches JSF



By Colin Clark Wednesday, May 26th, 2010 11:38 am

Rust is not something the average person thinks much about when it comes to designing high-tech weapons. But several years ago I reported on a major missile test defense test that was ruined because a part rusted that helped hold the missile in place before liftoff. And in February the entire F-22 fleet was grounded “due to poorly designed drainage in the cockpit.” The affected parts were ejection seat rods. Congress is worried that similar problems could afflict the Joint Strike Fighter and has requested a report about lessons learned from the F-22’s experience.

Regardless of how lowly rust might seem at first glance, it is a huge problem for the military, costing about $20 billion each year. According to the House Armed Services Committee, roughly $7 billion of that rust is preventable. So, the committee, doing its job of congressional oversight, wants to substantially increase the budget of a little known Pentagon entity, the Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight, to improve the military’s ability to stop rust from crippling major weapons systems.

“The Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight has a proven record of successfully reducing corrosion costs, with a 50-to-1 return on investment on the 169 programs that have been implemented through it,” the HASC says in the summary of its bill. So the committee is increasing the office’s budget to a paltry $10.8 million, up from a tiny request of $3.6 million. Doing the math, that should result in a return of $540 million to the taxpayer. Kudos to Daniel Dunmire, director of Corrosion Policy and Oversight.

Of course, there’s usually a rub, and there is a little one this time. The HASC says that it has not yet gotten a “congressionally directed report” from Dunmire about those lessons learned from the F-22’s rust problems: “The Committee notes that it has yet to receive the congressionally directed report from the Director of Corrosion Policy and Oversight assessing the corrosion control lessons learned from the F-22 Raptor fleet—which was grounded in February 2010 for corrosion on ejection seat rods due to poorly designed drainage in the cockpit—as they apply to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program.”

We hear little evidence of congressional irritation and expect the prospect of a bulging purse will only encourage OSD to cough up the report forthwith. Dunmire, who responded promptly to our inquiry about when the report would be done, said it should be ready by August.

Read more: http://www.dodbuzz.com/2010/05/26/rust-and-roll-for-f-22-hasc-watches-jsf/#ixzz0p6DzSnz6

[buglerbilly]

Ares

A Defense Technology Blog

White House on F136 Veto: Really, We Mean It

Posted by Michael Bruno at 5/27/2010 6:19 PM CDT

Nothing gets the point across like underlining your words - and that is precisely what the White House did today in issuing its veto threat over the alternate engine for the F-35. From the Statement of Administration Policy today:


F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Extra Engine: The Administration strongly objects to the addition of $485 million for the extra engine program and to associated legislative provisions that limit the obligation of overall JSF development funding to 75 percent of the amount authorized until the funds for FY 2011 have been obligated for the extra engine program, require the Secretary to ensure that each budget in the Future Years Defense Plan include, and expend, sufficient funding to continue the program, and designate the F135 and F136 engine development and procurement programs as major subprograms. As Secretary Gates has noted, even after factoring in Congress’ additional funding, the extra engine would still require a further investment of $2.4 billion before it could be considered as a viable extra engine for the JSF program. The Department does not believe that this cost will ever be recovered in a hypothesized competition or that the funds should be diverted from important defense needs. The current engine is performing well with more than 13,000 ground test and 200 flight test hours. If the final bill presented to the President includes funding or a legislative direction to continue an extra engine program, the President's senior advisors would recommend a veto.

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program: The Administration strongly objects to provisions of the bill which could limit the procurement of the 42 aircraft requested in the President’s FY 2011 Budget. The onerous restrictions impose unacceptable schedule and budget risks on the JSF program. While the Department believes the restructured development schedule is achievable, failure to achieve any one of the criteria would affect the procurement decision with significant impact on unit cost, production ramp, and TACAIR force structure. The Department's F-35 procurement request is in line with independent manufacturing studies, risk review recommendations, and the FY11 request reflects an optimized production. If the final bill presented to the President contains provisions that would seriously disrupt the F-35 program, the President’s senior advisors would recommend a veto.

The Statement came as the House was debating the Fiscal 2011 defense authorization bill, in which the House Armed Services Committee strongly recommended $485 million toward the GE-RR F136 engine. Rep. Chellie Pingrell (D-Maine) has offered an amendment to divert the funds elsewhere, following the White House's and Pentagon's wishes, but as of 7:20 p.m. EDT the House still had not recorded a vote on the proposal. A voice vote on Pingrell's amendment was decided in favor of F136 proponents, but that was set aside for the recorded vote.

During afternoon floor debate, the conversation was spirited, albeit predictable. “Competition works,” declared Rep. Adam Smith (D-Wash.), “being penny wise and pound foolish doesn’t.”

“I guess competition in this town means buying two of everything with taxpayers’ money,” Rep. John Larson (D-Conn.) fired back. “If we can’t cut spending here, where can we cut it?”

[buglerbilly]

Amendment Would Use Alt-Engine Funds to Shrink Deficit

By JOHN T. BENNETT

Published: 27 May 2010 15:50

The U.S. House Rules Committee has revamped a proposal to strip funds intended for the second F-35 engine from Pentagon authorization legislation, proposing to shift nearly $500 million to deficit-reduction measures.

Democratic Reps. Earl Blumenauer of Oregon and John Larson of Connecticut earlier this week introduced an amendment to the House Armed Services Committee's version of defense authorization legislation that would cut the $485 million the panel last week approved for the F136 engine. GE and Rolls-Royce are building the so-called "alternative engine."

Initially, the duo's amendment would have transferred $285 million to purchase National Guard and Reserve equipment, a congressional source said May 27. The source added Blumenauer and Larson are concerned by a Guard and Reserve equipment shortfall totaling more than $40 million.

But the Rules Committee rejected that plan, rewriting the amendment to propose using all $485 million the Armed Services Committee authorized be spent in fiscal 2011 for the second engine to relieve the nation's federal budget deficit.

According to the White House, the budget deficit for fiscal 2009 was $1.4 trillion. The Obama administration has predicted the deficit will approach $1.6 trillion in fiscal 2010. The deficit was at $454.8 billion in fiscal 2008.

The change came hours before the Obama administration released its first National Security Strategy that gives ample focus on reviving the U.S. economy, including reducing the deficit.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, speaking May 27 in Washington about the new NSS, called the massive federal deficit a threat to U.S. security policies.

"We cannot sustain this level of deficit financing and debt without losing our influence, without being constrained about the tough decisions we have to make," Clinton said.

The primary power plant for the F-35 fleet is being built by Pratt & Whitney, which is based in Larson's state.

The Pentagon - dating back to the George W. Bush administration - has for years attempted to kill the alternative engine effort. Each time, Congress has given it new life.

GE-Rolls officials and other F136 proponents say keeping alive two F-35 engines will save money in the long run, transfer risk away from the government, and provide a hedge against a problem with the primary power plant. On May 24, GE-Rolls officials again lobbied for a chance to compete annually against the Pratt engine.

[Deks]

I'm still amazed they're trying to kill it considering the reasons why they dual source F100/F110's for the F15/6.

[Gubler, A.]

I'm still amazed they're trying to kill it considering the reasons why they dual source F100/F110's for the F15/6.

Money!!! Cutting the F136 will enable the US to cut by a third its budget deficit! There was never any plan to dual source engines for the F-15 and F-16. Events transpired that made an alternate engine a good idea – events which haven’t transpired for the F135 – and an existing engine was available for modification – which is not the case with the F136. If in 10 years time the F135 is not meeting reliability goals then maybe funding F136 development will be a good idea. But at this time now all it is doing is spending money the USA and the F-35 project just does not have

[tiddles]

Money!!! Cutting the F136 will enable the US to cut by a third its budget deficit! There was never any plan to dual source engines for the F-15 and F-16. Events transpired that made an alternate engine a good idea – events which haven’t transpired for the F135 – and an existing engine was available for modification – which is not the case with the F136. If in 10 years time the F135 is not meeting reliability goals then maybe funding F136 development will be a good idea. But at this time now all it is doing is spending money the USA and the F-35 project just does not have
I agree with your comments re F136 except that saving $485 million will not cut the U.S. deficet of $1.4 trillion by one third,in fact quite a lot less but my maths is not up to calculating it.
Tiddles

[Weasel]

I agree with your comments re F136 except that saving $485 million will not cut the U.S. deficet of $1.4 trillion by one third,in fact quite a lot less but my maths is not up to calculating it.
Tiddles

Hey, take it easy on the old guy... Even Matt Damon gets the deficit math wrong too.

Billion = 1000,000,000

Trillion = 1000,000,000,000

Always gives you a bit of a shock when you actually write it down, eh?

1600,000,000,000 USD deficit.... so drop 6 zeroes and you get 485 over 1600,000 = 0.000 ...something something very small

Guess we have to start somewhere. lol

cheers

w

[ADMk2]

I agree with your comments re F136 except that saving $485 million will not cut the U.S. deficet of $1.4 trillion by one third,in fact quite a lot less but my maths is not up to calculating it.
Tiddles

I think they Abe is referring to the fact that it might "only" take $435m to finish developing the F136, but then there are acquisition and support costs too... If you added these together, they might make more of a dint in the US budgetary issues...

[Deks]

Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me. Be interesting to see how it plays out, personally I just don't see how PW can be trusted with a monopoly contract.

[buglerbilly]

JSF F136 Engine Could Survive Another Year

May 28, 2010



By Michael Bruno michael_bruno@aviationweek.com, Graham Warwick graham_warwick@aviationweek.com
Washington,

The General Electric/Rolls-Royce F136 engine for the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter appears increasingly likely to survive at least one more year after a slew of Capitol Hill developments created a scenario where the Obama administration’s veto threat may fall victim to other priorities.

Democratic-led votes by the House and a key Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) on May 27 pushing repeal of the so-called “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy in the military over homosexuality suddenly lined up that administration priority against any veto threats previously levied over defense acquisitions.

The votes come as lawmakers prepare Fiscal 2011 defense authorization legislation, a highly popular policy bill made even more politically important this summer as Congress faces November elections that are expected to challenge Democratic control of one, if not both, chambers.

Meanwhile, the whole House is now on record, literally, in defense of its Armed Services Committee’s $485-million authorization of the F136. The House voted 231-193 against an amendment to the defense bill there that would have diverted F136 funds elsewhere, thus establishing a majority already willing to vote against a possible veto.

At the same time, the corresponding Senate committee’s chairman let it be known that he again supports having dueling engines and was “very encouraged” by the House. Senate Armed Services Chairman Carl Levin (D-Mich.) told reporters on May 28 that while his panel took no action on F136 in its May 26-27 markup of the defense bill, he expects it to be a major issue by the time authorizers hash out a compromise of the two chambers’ bills, and that he would like the F136 to continue. “It makes sense to have that competition,” he said.

Asked about the White House and Pentagon veto recommendation over the F136, Levin instead played up the comprehensive and otherwise popular provisions of the annual defense measure, like a 1.4% across-the-board pay raise for all members of the uniformed services. “It’s difficult for me to believe the president won’t look at the entire bill, rather than just one provision,” said Levin, who has been an SASC leader for years.

Besides the second engine, Levin said he aims to fence JSF funding as the House did. As with the F136, the SASC took no action in its markup on fencing funds, but Levin indicated he expects Senate floor or congressional conference efforts to that effect.

Elsewhere in JSF developments, the third and so far final version—the U.S. Navy’s F-35C carrier variant—should fly by early next week at Lockheed Martin’s Fort Worth plant.

The first mission-systems test F-35, aircraft BF-4, has returned to flight, and the 737-based Cooperative Avionics Test Bed has begun flying with the latest Block 1 mission-system software and all sensors except the electro-optical distributed aperture system, which will be added later this year. Block 1 is to begin flying in the F-35 before year-end.

Credit: Lockheed Martin

[buglerbilly]

House Votes For F-35, Defies Obama Veto Threat

AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE

Published: 28 May 2010 10:45

WASHINGTON - The U.S. House of Representatives has defied the threat of a presidential veto by voting to fund a second engine for the F-35 fighter jet or additional cargo aircraft.

The House vote late May 27 to provide $485 million next year for the alternative engine for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) came after the lower chamber's Armed Services Committee approved the extra money in the 2011 defense budget, over the recommendations from Defense Secretary Robert Gates.

"We don't want nor need the extra engine, but this is just one step in a long journey and Secretary Gates is committed to staying engaged in this process... including if necessary ultimately recommending President Obama veto this legislation," Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell said after the vote.

Gates said last week that he would urge Obama to veto a bill that provides for a "costly and unnecessary" second engine for the jet, adding he had issued similar warnings "repeatedly."

The Pentagon has been at odds with Congress for four years over the alternative engine, which is manufactured by General Electric and Rolls-Royce, with lawmakers arguing it would allow for more competition and save money in the long term.

The Pentagon wants to stick with an engine made by Pratt and Whitney of United Technologies, saying a second engine is impractical and could further delay an already troubled program.

In February, Gates sacked the general in charge of the F-35 program and said he would withhold funds from the lead contractor, Lockheed Martin, over a series of cost overruns and delays.

[Gubler, A.]

I agree with your comments re F136 except that saving $485 million will not cut the U.S. deficet of $1.4 trillion by one third,in fact quite a lot less but my maths is not up to calculating it.
Tiddles

I thought it was only 1.4 billion! My brain could not read an annual deficit of a trillion... Anyway half a billion is a lot to spend in a year on an engine you don’t need.

[Gubler, A.]

Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me. Be interesting to see how it plays out, personally I just don't see how PW can be trusted with a monopoly contract.

Why trust them with any contract? When it comes to bad performance P&W are why down the list of other contractors. Lockheed's Forth Worth plant has not delivered an aircraft on schedule to spec ever! B-36, B-58, F-102, F-111, F-16, A-12 and now F-35 have all had significant difficulties. At some point in time you have to do business with someone based on a reasonable assessment of their capability to perform. P&W have delivered a few good new engines since the F100 troubles.

[buglerbilly]

CBO report examines possible JSF cuts

By Andrew Tilghman - Staff writer

Posted : Friday May 28, 2010 14:37:47 EDT

Should the Navy cut back its commitment to the F-35 Lightning II and spend its money on new F/A-18 Super Hornets? That’s a question addressed head on in a new report from the Congressional Budget Office.

Navy officials have been dodging that question for months, saying only they are “committed” to the Joint Strike Fighter program.

The proposal floated by the CBO Friday includes cutting the Navy and Marine Corps F-35 commitment from 680 planes to 587, or 93 planes. That money could be used to expand the Navy’s less-expensive Super Hornet program of record from today’s 515 to 641, the CBO suggested.

The CBO report laid out several options for closing the Navy’s “fighter gap,” a term for the projected shortfall in carrier-based jets between older Hornets and the JSFs’ arrival. The option of reducing the F-35 commitment was one of four in the report, which drew no firm conclusions about which one was best or most cost effective.

The CBO report is designed to inform lawmakers on Capitol Hill about the details and options for naval aviation. It is not a Navy policy document.

Rear Adm. Michael Manazir, the head of naval aviation programs at the Pentagon, told reporters on May 24 that the Navy is fully committed to the F-35 program. He declined to discuss possible plans to expand the Super Hornet’s program of record.

Dropping the Navy’s F-35C carrier variant is an increasingly popular option on Capitol Hill. Those sentiments have intensified since the Navy acknowledged that the F-35C will not be ready for operations until early 2016 rather than the previous target date of late 2014.

“Folks may force them to buy Super Hornets and take away from the JSF,” one Hill staffer recently told Navy Times. “I think our frustration is that, ‘OK, you guys keep hanging your hat on JSF and JSF keeps moving to the right.”

Many military experts fear that a reduction in the Navy’s planned purchase of F-35s from Lockheed Martin will drive up the per-plane cost of the aircraft and threaten its future viability for the Air Force, Marine Corps and international partners.

[buglerbilly]

Strategies for Maintaining the Navy’s and Marine Corps’ Inventories of Fighter Aircraft

(Source: Congressional Budget Office; issued May 28, 2010)

(All dollar values are expressed in FY 2010 dollars)

The United States Navy and Marine Corps operate a fleet of more than 1,100 tactical fighter aircraft that provide air-to-air and air-to-ground combat capabilities. Those aircraft include Hornets (F/A-18A, B, C, and D), Super Hornets (F/A-18E and F), and Harriers (AV-8B); within the next few years, a new and more advanced aircraft—the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)—will start being added to the fleet.

Although current plans call for the purchase of about 700 new fighter aircraft over the next 15 years, the Department of the Navy is projecting that purchases planned for the next 5 to 10 years will be unable to keep pace with the retirement of today’s Hornets as they reach the limit of their service life. In a report released today, CBO compares four alternatives for maintaining the Navy’s and Marine Corps’ fighter inventories.

The alternatives discussed in the report consist of different combinations of three approaches. One approach involves extending the service life of Hornets by up to 600 flight hours (roughly two additional years) beyond the current 8,000-hour limit by modifying and inspecting those aircraft in the high-flight-hour (HFH) program (comprising a series of structural repairs and more-frequent inspections).

A second approach would implement a service-life extension program (SLEP) of more-extensive modifications, which would enable Hornets to reach 10,000 flight hours, and the third would purchase more Super Hornets than current plans call for.

Some HFH modifications have already been done, and Super Hornets are still in production—but research and planning for the Hornet SLEP is not expected to be complete until 2014 (the Navy has indicated that it may begin SLEP modifications on some aircraft as early as 2012).

Of the four alternatives that CBO analyzed, the first two are limited to extending the service life of existing Hornets. They are generally consistent with various plans the Navy has proposed or is considering:

-- Alternative 1: Execute the HFH program on the 509 Hornets suitable for those modifications;

-- Alternative 2: Execute the HFH program on 220 Hornets and the more-extensive SLEP on 289 Hornets.

The third and fourth alternatives would combine some service-life extensions for Hornets with changes in planned purchases of new aircraft:

-- Alternative 3: Implement the HFH program in the same way that Alternative 1 would, but also increase purchases of Super Hornets by 126 aircraft (beyond the planned total of 515) and decrease purchases of Joint Strike Fighters by 93 aircraft between 2018 and 2023;

-- Alternative 4: Modify 509 aircraft through the HFH process and purchase 126 additional Super Hornets, as in Alternative 3, but do not reduce purchases of JSF aircraft.

CBO measured the increase in inventory offered by those alternatives and the funding that each would require relative to a base case under which the service life of Hornets would not be extended and additional aircraft would not be purchased.

CBO found that Alternative 1 would increase the Navy’s and Marine Corps’ fighter inventory by an average of 66 aircraft over the 2011–2025 period; Alternative 2 would add an average of 106 aircraft to the inventory; Alternative 3—an average of 128; and alternative 4—an average of 148.

Relative to the cost of the base case in which none of the three approaches are undertaken, the cost of Alternative 1 would be about $2.2 billion higher (in fiscal year 2010 dollars). Alternative 1 has the lowest total cost of the alternatives examined by CBO, but it provides the smallest increase in inventory.

Alternative 2 would provide the largest increase in inventory that can be achieved with the HFH and SLEP modifications currently being considered—but at a cost of about $7.7 billion, it would be more than twice as costly as Alternative 1 when measured per increment of additional service.

Alternative 3 would provide larger increases in inventory than would Alternatives 1 and 2. Moreover, each additional Super Hornet provided under Alternative 3 would offer improved performance (a more-capable radar, longer range, and the ability to carry more weapons) than would a SLEP Hornet.

The reduction in JSF purchases would result in fewer of the most advanced aircraft after 2020. At about $3.8 billion to $4.8 billion higher than the cost of the base case, the total cost of Alternative 3 would fall between the costs of Alternatives 1 and 2. In the near term, however, the cost would be substantially higher than for Alternatives 1 or 2 because the savings from reducing JSF purchases would not offset the cost of new Super Hornet purchases until after 2017.

Alternative 4 would provide the largest increase in inventory before 2025 and would also provide increased inventory well beyond 2025, because additional purchases of Super Hornets would not be offset by fewer purchases of JSFs. The advantages of new aircraft provided in Alternative 4 would come at a cost of $12 billion to $13 billion more than under the base case (nearly all of which would be incurred in the next five years). Alternative 4 would be the most expensive per increment of additional service provided between 2011 and 2025.

CBO did not evaluate whether the inventories that would be realized under the various alternatives would be sufficient to meet the Navy’s and Marine Corps’ operational needs. Further, if additional delays were experienced with the JSF program, the inventories realized under all four alternatives would be lower, and any corresponding shortfall would be larger.

This report was prepared by David Arthur of CBO’s National Security Division.

Click here for the full report (20 pages in PDF format) on the CBO website.

http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/112xx/doc11279/05-27-FighterInventories.pdf

-ends-

[Deks]

At some point in time you have to do business with someone based on a reasonable assessment of their capability to perform.

I suppose that's a fair point too. I guess we'll all see what happens :)

[buglerbilly]

Ares

A Defense Technology Blog

The Great Engine Misinformation War

Posted by Graham Warwick at 6/1/2010 10:23 AM CDT

Amid votes and veto threats, the battle over the second engine for the Joint Strike Fighter looks set to continue for a few more months and could spill over into next year and the Fiscal 2012 defense budget. As more politicians get drawn into the debate, each side is accusing the other of spreading misinformation about their engine's cost, performance and even right to exist.

I thought I would take a shot at cutting through some of the misinformation to lay out the arguments for and against competitive engine procurement as clearly as I can see them.

COSTS ARE OUT OF CONTROL

Pratt & Whitney signed a $4.8 billion contract in September 2001 to develop the F135. Today the Pentagon's estimate of the cost to complete development is $7.3 billion. GE says it will cost $4 billion to develop the F136; the Pentagon estimates it will cost a total of $5.9 billion to get the engine into competitive procurement. Those are the numbers being bandied around, but where do they come from?

There have been two major cost increases on F135 development. The first came in 2004, when Lockheed had to redesign the F-35 to reduce the weight of the STOVL variant to meet requirements. The F135 was redesigned to increase thrust and reduce weight, pushing the development cost up to $5.9 billion. Then, in 2008, Pratt had to redesign the third-stage turbine, and Rolls the lift fan, which resulted in a $800 million overspend, taking development cost to the $6.7 billion currently under contract.

The remaining $600 million is a Pentagon planning number, an estimate of the additional cost involved in supporting the 13-month extension of F-35 development under the restructured program. The extra work content has not been specified or negotiated yet, but will not involve changes to the engine, according to Pratt.

The $6.7 billion under contract covers development of the F135; the common hardware, including augmentor duct and exhaust nozzle, for both the F135 and F136; and the lift system, for use with both engines. Of the total, $1.6 billion has gone to Rolls-Royce to develop the lift system for the STOVL F-35. Lift-system integration is included in Pratt's $5.1 billion, and the integrated propulsion and flight control software logic will be provided to GE/Rolls for the F136.

GE/Rolls, meanwhile, has received $3 billion since 1996 for the F136 and says another $1 billion is needed to complete development. If the cost of tooling and other production preparations are included, this becomes $1.8 billion - $1.1 billion below the Pentagon's estimate of the cost to get to competitive procurement. GE/Rolls says the difference is mainly in the Pentagon's assumption that F135 prices will increase because of loss of learning as Pratt builds fewer engines.

GE/Rolls maintains fixed-price contracts for early production engines will eliminate that loss of learning. The Pentagon says its estimates already assume GE/Rolls will be able to match Pratt's prices even though the F136 program is running five years behind the F135. That assumption is based on "a very accelerated learning curve" that will be "extremely difficult to achieve", argues the Pentagon.

Pratt says it has a plan agreed with the Pentagon to meet the price target - for an F135 to cost the same as an F119 despite being bigger and heavier - by the 250th engine. The company argues GE/Rolls will have to beat that "very aggressive" price goal by $1-2 million to offset the $2.9 billion and make the business case for a second engine break even. GE/Rolls says its fixed-price offer will take the business case from break-even to positive.

Verdict: Factor out the STOVL-related impacts that GE/Rolls avoided by being later, and the two engines will cost about the same to develop. It's down to GE/Rolls to prove they can beat Pratt's production prices.


THERE WAS A COMPETITION

GE/Rolls says there wasn't a competition to power the F-35; P&W says there was. The truth, now acknowledged by the Pentagon, is there was never a government-sponsored competition to power Lockheed's F-35. But history shows engine competitions are an exception, and not an entitlement.

To recap what you already know about engine "competitions", here's how the last few US fighter programs have gone:

F-14 and F-15 - P&W was selected competitively in 1970 to develop the F100 for the F-15 and F401 for the F-14. The Navy cancelled the F401 after unsatisfactory flight testing, but a decade later re-engined the F-14 with GE's F110 - without a competition.

F-16 and F-18 - the single-engined YF-16 was designed around the F-15's F100 engine; the twin-engined YF-17 around GE's YJ101. All F-16A/Bs and the first block of C/Ds were powered by F100s. A second engine was developed for the F-16 because of problems with the F100, and competitive procurement of F100s and F110s began with Block 30/32. GE says 70% of all F-16C/Ds are F110-powered.

The YF-17, meanwhile, evolved into the F/A-18 and the YJ101 into the F404 - without a competition. The Hornet was later scaled up to the F/A-18E/F, and its engine to the F414. In the late 1980s, P&W was qualified as a second source of the F404, but the Navy cancelled competitive procurement saying it wasn't justified by the planned quantities.

F-22 - GE and P&W developed and flew competing engines - the YF120 and YF119, respectively - on both the YF-22 and YF-23 during the Advanced Tactical Fighter fly-off. Both aircraft teams offered both engines - the US Air Force picked the F-22 and F119.

F-35 - Several engines were studied in the initial phases of what became the Joint Strike Fighter program, but when it came to building concept demonstrator aircraft the teams were directed to use the only suitable engine available - Pratt's F119. While this led to both Boeing and Lockheed Martin proposing JSF designs powered by F119 derivatives, the Pentagon planned for competitive engine procurement from the outset and funded work on the F136 in parallel with development of the F-35 and F135.

The plan was to complete development of the F-35 with the F135 as its powerplant, as the F-16 had with the F100, then introduce competition. That changed in 2006, when the Pentagon decided it could no longer afford a second engine. Congress kept the F136 alive by adding money each year, but only 80% of what was required, forcing GE/Rolls to focus resources on the CTOL engine to stay on track to fly in the F-35 in 2011.

Verdict: There wasn't a competition, but there was a strategy. Changing that strategy put the Pentagon on ground that is difficult to defend.

TWO ENGINES REDUCE OPERATIONAL RISK

This would be a good argument were it not for the fact that 100% of the US Air Force's combat-coded F-16C/Ds are powered by GE's F110, and 100% of the USAF's F-15s are powered by P&W's F100 - despite the availability of competing engines. All US Navy and Marine Corps F/A-18A/B/C/Ds are powered by GE's F404 and all F/A-18E/Fs by GE's F414. Having two engine types reduces the risk that a problem will ground the entire fleet, but operators have not seen it as essential.

The Marines have said they want only one engine across their STOVL F-35B fleet, and the Navy has said it does not want to support two engine types on any one aircraft carrier. So when it comes the reduced operational risk of a mixed fleet, only the US Air Force looks likely to benefit - but it is the biggest customer, with plans to buy 1,763 CTOL F-35As (55% of the 9 partner nations' planned total).

But the JSF program started out with a dual-engine strategy because nine partner nations planned to neck down from nine aircraft types to just one, and a second engine mitigated risk. A single engine, therefore, increases risk.

Verdict: It's hard to argue with a customer who no longer wants competition when the operators have historically not made engine diversity a priority.

THE F135 ISN'T UP TO THE JOB

GE/Rolls hints darkly there will be more cost growth to come before development of Pratt's F135 is complete, but is not specific on why or how it will have to be "modified or redesigned". Pratt points out the CTOL F135 has completed development and is in production and the STOVL engine will follow by year-end.

The truth is both engines will undergo further development through their lives. GE/Rolls' unelaborated claims against the F135 are based on its belief the F136 has greater potential for growth. Designed later, the F136 has a larger core than the F135. The F136 pumps more air, while the F135 runs hotter, but for now they produce the same thrust because that is set by the area of the exhaust nozzle, which is common to both engines (and is developed by Pratt).

If a need for more thrust emerges with later blocks of F-35, GE/Rolls will be able to take advantage of F136's larger core and greater airflow (up to the +10% limit of the F-35's inlets). Pratt will have to run the F135's smaller core at higher temperatures. The argument against running hotter is it shortens engine component life; the argument against a larger core pumping more air is it makes the engine (and aircraft) heavier.

Pratt will run a demonstrator engine this year that will produce 5% more thrust from significantly increased turbine temperatures. This engine is being built under the VAATE research initiative, and not the F-35 program, but the components developed will be retrofittable to the F135. Meanwhile interchangeability, a key JSF requirement, could become an issue with growth engines, as a hotter F135 competes with a heavier F136. Additionally, extra thrust will not help the STOVL F-35B unless the lift fan is also uprated - not considered an easy task.

Verdict: Irrelevant - but only for as long as commonality and interchangeability remove performance from the competitive equation.

COMPETITION SUPPORTS THE INDUSTRIAL BASE

Marshalling the facts to make the case for this is tougher than it seems, because fighter engines do not exist in isolation. It is true that, when F-15, F-16 and F/A-18E/F production ends, Pratt's F135 would remain the sole US fighter engine in production. But GE and Rolls would still have their commercial engine businesses, which increasingly provide the technology base for military engines.

GE and Rolls, but not Pratt, are working to demonstrate adaptive engines for future military aircraft under the US Air Force-led ADVENT research program. Rolls will ground-test a complete engine in 2013; GE will demonstrate an adaptive fan and advanced core. The follow-on AD-HEETE program will combine the ADVENT low-pressure system with a high-performance core using commercial engine technology.

Meanwhile, both GE and Pratt use essentially the same supplier base for 85% of their engines, so the industrial-base issue is not production jobs but combat-engine design skills. With only a small role on ADVENT, Pratt could be leapfrogged by GE and/or Rolls when it comes to powering the next-generation bomber or sixth-generation combat aircraft (manned and/or unmanned). But GE/Rolls could face a long wait for those promised new programs.

Verdict: The competitive issue is maintaining design skills in prime contractors, not sustaining production jobs in congressional districts.

[buglerbilly]

Ares

A Defense Technology Blog

JSF Carrier Variant Taxi Test Photo

Posted by Michael Bruno at 6/1/2010 4:53 PM CDT

Aviation Week secured this photograph of Lockheed Martin's CF-01, the prototype of the carrier version of the Joint Strike Fighter, conducting its high-speed taxi test May 28. The test is one of the last boxes to check before the aircraft can try to fly for the first time.


Credit: Carl Richards, Fort Worth, Texas

One of our resident JSF experts, Graham Warwick, was just pointing out to me the bigger wing and V tails necessary for flattop ops. Also, notice the tail hook compartment. And does anyone else perceive a Harrier-like bulge in the cockpit, especially compared with earlier variants?

BTW, check out Graham's excellent post on the engine debate here and chime in with your own observations.

[buglerbilly]

Lockheed F-35’s Projected Cost Now $382 Billion, Up 65 Percent

June 01, 2010, 4:21 PM EDT

By Tony Capaccio

And I wonder what parameters they used this time, 150% contingencies? 250%?..............

June 1 (Bloomberg) -- The projected cost of Lockheed Martin Corp.’s F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the most expensive U.S. weapons program, is now $382 billion, 65 percent higher than the $232 billion estimated when the program started in 2002, according to a government official.

This projection from independent Pentagon analysts is being sent to Congress today.

The Pentagon’s cost-analysis office reports that the price per plane -- including research, development and construction costs -- is now $112.4 million, the official said. That’s about 81 percent over the original estimate of $62 million.

The production cost alone of each plane is estimated at $92.4 million, almost 85 percent higher than the $50 million projected when the program began in 2002, the Pentagon will tell Congress.

The F-35 is the U.S. military’s next-generation fighter. Designed for missions that include bombing and air-to-air combat, it will be used by the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps. It will replace such aircraft as the F-16, A-10 and Harrier that are flown by the Marines and the U.K.

The program is already four years behind schedule on key milestones, including completing the development phase and combat testing, beginning full-scale production and then declaring the first Air Force and Navy units ready for combat.

The delays and cost growth are the consequence of a major wing redesign, inefficient production, testing problems and slow deliveries from suppliers, according to findings by Lockheed, congressional auditors and Pentagon officials.

Based on History

The cost group’s estimate is more pessimistic than that of the program office or Lockheed Martin because it’s based heavily on historical data from other aircraft programs such as the Boeing F-18 and Lockheed Martin F-22.

The estimate of $382 billion released today comes only two months after the Pentagon’s program office pegged the cost at $328 billion.

This new projection was compiled to comply with a 1982 law that demands an assessment of any weapons program that exceeds its original projected cost by 50 percent.

The Pentagon must also certify to Congress the program is vital to national security. That certification accompanies the new cost analysis, Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman told reporters earlier today.

He said that the F-35 certification was expected because the Pentagon signaled its support when it reorganized the program in February. The Pentagon extended the current development phase, delayed the purchase of 122 aircraft until after 2015 and added money for additional testing.

--Editors: Bill Schmick, Bob Drummond.

[Gubler, A.]

One of our resident JSF experts, Graham Warwick, was just pointing out to me the bigger wing and V tails necessary for flattop ops. Also, notice the tail hook compartment. And does anyone else perceive a Harrier-like bulge in the cockpit, especially compared with earlier variants?

Good thing they're using experts to provide commentary!

Ahh any carrier aircraft needs to have excellent over nose visibility so it can land accurately on the flight deck. So it should be no surprise that the F-35C has its cockpit raised to improve over nose visibility.

[buglerbilly]

Pentagon: Total F-35 Price Tag Could Reach $382 Billion

By JOHN T. BENNETT

Published: 1 Jun 2010 20:13

Senior Pentagon officials on June 1 announced the F-35 fighter and five other major weapon systems have surpassed a legal cost threshold, while also criticizing the review process that triggers the "Nunn-McCurdy breaches."

The Defense Department told lawmakers the F-35 fighter program could cost as much as $382.4 billion, with each Lightning II model coming with a $92.4 million price tag, according to DoD budget documents.

Those cost estimates assume the program continues down the current path, which officials told reporters they are working to avoid. One senior Pentagon official – who declined to point to a specific cost target - said efforts already are under way to move the overall cost of the F-35 program "as close as possible" back toward substantially smaller estimates crafted in 2002.

The Defense Department sent the new estimates to Congress after determining the program had breached the so-called Nunn-McCurdy statute, which requires the Pentagon to notify Congress when major defense programs experience substantial cost growth.

The $92.4 million per-model estimate is what defense officials refer to as a "cradle-to-grave" projection, meaning spanning each fighter jet's entire life, the senior official said.

The Pentagon restructured the F-35 program just several months ago after internal DoD cost estimates showed the tri-service, international fighter initiative's price tag had grown more than expected – and more than the joint program office claimed. This formal congressional notification, the senior official said, is merely a reflection of the same growth – "the paperwork has caught up to that."

Why the bigger price tag? There are several primary drivers. One is the Navy several years ago reduced the number of F-35s it will buy. A second is a more difficult development process, which required additional years – and thus, became more expensive. The senior official said the program "will continue to struggle" with keeping the development phase on track, in part because the technology on the short take-off and landing variant is so complicated.

A DoD summary of the F-35 breach calls higher than projected "contractor labor and overhead rates and fees" the "single largest contributor to cost growth."

The senior official said the new F-35 program management has been ordered to pare these costs because "I do not think that the department should have to incur those costs."

As for the projected $382.4 billion overall price of the program, the senior official said the hope is "the taxpayers never have to pay that bill."

Meanwhile, a senior Lockheed official said the company was very pleased with the results of the recent restructuring and reiterated the company's stance that it does not expect the program to cost anywhere near the Pentagon's $382 billion estimate.

"I cannot foresee any scenario where those numbers become a reality," the official said.

Instead, the official said he expects the next batch of 32 production jets, known as "low-rate initial production lot 4," to cost more than 20 percent less than that projection. The previous batch of production aircraft also cost about 20 percent below the Pentagon's per-jet projections.

Lockheed officials have said previous Pentagon F-35 estimates have relied too heavily on data from older fighter programs, such as the F-22 Raptor and F/A-18EF Super Hornet.

Also breaching the cost growth threshold was the Navy's truncated DDG 1000 destroyer program. Costs grew from $20 billion to just over $22 billion, DoD said. The senior official pegged this growth to the Navy opting to buy three instead of 10, which drives up unit costs.

As part of the Nunn-McCurdy process, DoD officials have ordered the destroyer program to strike the "Volume Searching Radar hardware from the ship baseline design … in order to reduce cost for the program," according to a department fact sheet. The Navy has been ordered to shift the program's initial operating capability date back one year, to 2016, and alter testing and evaluation requirements.

The Air Force-led Wideband Gapfiller satellite program also experienced a breach, the result of a break in production (between satellites 6 and 7), and the subsequent production re-start costs when the service opted to build two additional WGS orbiters (satellites 7 and 8). The cost grew from around $3 billion to just over $3.5 billion. The officials said Pentagon officials are mulling future satellite communications needs, leaving open the door to buying additional WGS satellites.

The Army's Apache Block III program also made the list of over-budget programs. The initial intent was to overhaul 634 existing helicopters, but 56 "new build" birds were tacked on to meet war demands. The revamped helos saw cost growth of $9.9 billion to $12 billion; the new aircraft costs went from $2 billion in 2006 to $2.3 billion. The department has split the "AB3" program into two parts – one focused on the new helicopters and another for the upgrades ones – which has resulted in "a more conservative set of estimating assumptions." Both are slated for a milestone C review this summer.

Another Army program made the list: the Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasures/Common Missile Warning System, designed to take out infrared homing surface-to-air missile attacks on helicopters. The ATIC effort's costs grew from $900 million in 2003 to $1 billion; the CMWs portion's estimated price swelled from $3.1 billion in 2003 to $3.5 billion. The causes were "technological immaturity and unrealistic performance expectations," according to a DoD fact sheet.

Further, the Navy's Remote Minehunting System breached the cost growth threshold primarily because of "the result of lower than planned procurement quantities, unrealistic estimating, and failure to adequately address reliability issues," according to DoD. Costs grew from $1.2 billion in 2006 to $1.4 billion.

Each of the six programs avoided termination because Pentagon acquisition executive Ashton Carter deemed each essential to U.S. national security, which is required by the Nunn-McCurdy statute.

But is the Nunn-McCurdy process worth it? The senior official said the Pentagon is working on cost estimates of how much the Pentagon puts into the Nunn-McCurdy process. Some DoD brass wonder "whether the Nunn-McCurdy process is in Nunn-McCurdy," the senior official quipped.

Another DoD official said that estimation should be completed in several weeks.

The senior official said Pentagon leaders want to use the new Performance Assessments and Root Cause Analysis (PARCA) office to perform a similar function. PARCA has established by 2009 defense acquisition reform legislation, but Congress allowed the Pentagon to craft its charter.

In December, Carter signed a memo outlining how PARCA would work.

Its members would spring into action upon request by the defense secretary, DoD acquisition chief, a service secretary or a DoD agency director, according to the Dec. 9 memorandum.

The group would perform one of two kinds of analyses on major acquisition programs: * A performance assessment, which would "evaluate the cost, schedule, and performance of the program, relative to current metrics, performance requirements, and baseline parameters," the memo said. "The assessments shall determine the extent to which the level of program cost, schedule, and performance relative to established metrics is likely to result in the timely delivery of a level of capability to the war fighter."

* A root-cause analysis, which would examine the "underlying causes for shortcomings in cost, schedule and performance." It would also determine whether program shortcomings were due in part to "unrealistic performance expectations; unrealistic cost and schedule plans; immature technologies; and excessive manufacturing or integration risk," the memo said.

Both kinds of analyses would look at whether problems were caused by "unanticipated design, engineering, manufacturing, or integration issues arising during program performance; changes in procurement quantities; inadequate program funding or funding instability; [or] poor performance by government or contractor personnel responsible for program management," the memo said.

One defense analyst said the re-certification of the F-35 program was a done deal, showing the Nunn McCurdy process might not be working.

"Certification of F-35 is no big surprise because three of the defense department's four military services are counting on getting it, and there is no evidence of major design or engineering problems," Loren Thompson of the Lexington Institute wrote in a June 1 blog post. "But doesn't it make you wonder what the point of these costly reviews are, when even programs the department has targeted for termination are certified as complying with Nunn-McCurdy criteria for continuance?"

John Reed and Kate Brannen contributed to this report.

[Deks]

Good thing they're using experts to provide commentary!

Ahh any carrier aircraft needs to have excellent over nose visibility so it can land accurately on the flight deck. So it should be no surprise that the F-35C has its cockpit raised to improve over nose visibility.

My memory must be decieving me. I'd thought the F-35 had cameras all over the place which would have negated this. Here we go:


The most intriguing passive sensor on the F-35 is the Northrop distributed aperture system (DAS). This has six staring uncooled infrared sensors located around the aircraft to provide a spherical view of the world surrounding the F-35. The IR imagery is presented in the pilot's helmet-mounted display and allows him to "see through" the aircraft. Imagery can also be presented on the main 20 x 8in (50 x 20cm) cockpit display. DAS and HMD combine to eliminate the need for night vision goggles.

Perhaps it's not good enough to make a landing by - depth perception etc.

[Gubler, A.]

My memory must be decieving me. I'd thought the F-35 had cameras all over the place which would have negated this. Here we go:

And are those cameras part of a carrier landing system? Nope. There is a lot more capability in EODAS than is being used on the full SDD F-35 (Block III). Could it be developed to provide a heads down carrier landing system for the pilot? Sure. Could the F-35C be fitted with an automatic - hands off - carrier landing system? Sure. Is it? No. So the pilot still needs to be able to see the deck in a nose up attitude.

[buglerbilly]

Lockheed Wary Of F-35 Engine Battle Impact

Jun 3, 2010



By Graham Warwick, Michael Bruno
Washington, Washington

A high-stakes test of U.S. defense contractors’ willingness to defy their customer and apply political pressure to safeguard their programs is unfolding here.

While key congressional votes late last week threatened to determine the fate of the alternate engine for the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the bitter battle between General Electric and Pratt & Whitney is likely to continue until Congress finalizes the Fiscal 2011 defense budget.

As industrial giants GE and United Technologies, Pratt’s parent company, expended substantial political capital to secure congressional support for their programs, the manufacturers accused each other of spreading misinformation on the perfo