Obama's Nuclear Summit

[buglerbilly]

In nuclear summit, Obama seeks global help in sanctioning Iran

By Mary Beth Sheridan and Scott Wilson

Washington Post Staff Writer

Tuesday, April 13, 2010

President Obama used an unprecedented summit on nuclear terrorism Monday to press global leaders to support further isolating Iran for its nuclear activities, and the White House said that China's leader had agreed to cooperate with tightening U.N. sanctions on the Islamic republic.

The Nuclear Security Summit is the first large meeting of world leaders focused on how to keep nuclear materials away from terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda. The event drew 36 heads of state and delegations from 10 other countries to the city, which became a blur of flashing police lights and speeding black convoys.

U.S. officials structured the summit to avoid controversial topics and achieve broad agreement on improving security at places where nuclear material is stored: military installations, civilian research reactors and other facilities. But, in bilateral meetings leading up to the event, Obama sought to send a message to Iran -- which denies it is developing a nuclear weapon -- that it must heed international efforts to restrain its nuclear program.

White House officials said Obama told Chinese President Hu Jintao in a 90-minute meeting Monday that passing new U.N. sanctions against Iran is urgent.

"The two presidents agreed that the two delegations should work on a sanctions resolution in New York, and that's what we're doing," said Jeffrey A. Bader, the National Security Council's senior director for Asian affairs. The Chinese, he said, "made clear that they are prepared to work with us."

Bader called the meeting "another sign of international unity on this issue."

China has backed three previous sanctions resolutions on Iran, and its support is crucial because it is one of five veto-wielding members of the Security Council. Ma Zhaoxu, a spokesman for the Chinese delegation, was more cautious about Monday's meeting, indicating that the two sides still differ on the elements of a sanctions resolution. Ma repeated the standard Chinese diplomatic formulation, saying that Hu told Obama he hoped that countries would "actively seek effective ways to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue through dialogue and negotiations."

Iran was not invited to the summit. Nor was North Korea, which quit the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003 and has twice tested a weapon. But with a flurry of meetings on the sidelines of the summit, "those countries not here are not out of the agenda. People will discuss how to manage them," Finnish President Tarja Halonen said in an interview.

The summit comes at a key moment on the diplomatic calendar. In addition to the looming sanctions effort at the United Nations, nearly 200 countries are scheduled next month to consider strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the pact that long checked the spread of weapons but is now in danger of collapse. Fortifying the treaty is at the heart of Obama's nuclear agenda.

Joshua Pollack, a nuclear expert, said Obama's meetings Sunday and Monday with some of the less prominent world leaders, such as those from Kazakhstan, Malaysia and Ukraine, reflected preparations for next month's treaty conference in New York.

At that meeting, "every member state has an equal vote, even the ones that don't often dominate the headlines . . . so there's a courtship aspect," he wrote on the blog ArmsControlWonk.

The summit, which will continue all day Tuesday, will focus on the dangers posed by al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups obtaining lightly guarded nuclear material.

Obama pledged during his campaign to lock down all "loose" nuclear material in four years -- a goal he says he is determined to pursue, despite a lack of progress in his first year.

The objective is to secure nuclear material in military installations, civilian research reactors and universities worldwide and to prevent smuggling. Experts say there is enough nuclear material in the world to make more than 120,000 nuclear weapons.

According to the State Department, the summit is the largest gathering of heads of state and government called by a U.S. leader since the United Nations was founded in 1945.

"I think it's an indication of how deeply concerned everybody should be with the possibilities of nuclear traffic," Obama told reporters, referring to the turnout. "And I think at the end of this we're going to see some very specific, concrete actions that each nation is taking that will make the world a little bit safer."

Obama opened the event with new pledges from countries to secure their material and discourage smuggling. Ukraine announced Monday that it will dispose of its stock of highly enriched uranium, a critical material used in nuclear weapons. The statement came after Obama met with President Viktor Yanukovych, their first encounter since the Ukrainian leader's February inauguration.

The former Soviet state has about 200 pounds of highly enriched uranium at its civilian research reactors, enough "to make several nuclear weapons," said White House press secretary Robert Gibbs. Ukraine's government has agreed to covert the reactors to low-enriched uranium, which is more difficult to weaponize.

Canada also said it will return its spent nuclear fuel to the United States. Those announcements came after Chile said it had given up its last 40 pounds of highly enriched uranium.

Obama also met Monday with Prime Minister Najib Razak of Malaysia. As a condition for Najib attending the summit, the Obama administration demanded that the Malaysian government adopt stricter import and export controls to prevent the country from being used as a transshipment point for smuggled nuclear materials and technology, officials said.

The White House said in a statement that Obama congratulated Najib on the legislation, and that the leaders will work together to strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty next month.

The two "agreed on the need for the international community to send a clear signal to Iran that while it has the right to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy, Iran should not use this right to develop nuclear weapons capability," the statement said.

Iran announced Sunday that it will hold its own summit on April 17 and 18, titled "Nuclear Energy for Everyone, Nuclear Arms for No One," according to the Arab-language broadcaster al-Jazeera.

A majority of Americans are not confident that the summit will make it more difficult for terrorists to get a hold of nuclear materials, according to a new Washington Post-ABC News pool.

The survey, conducted on the eve of the meeting, found that 40 percent of respondents thought the talks would result in tighter controls on nuclear materials, while 56 percent said they were not confident they would succeed in doing so.

Staff writer John Pomfret and polling director Jon Cohen contributed to this report.

[buglerbilly]

Nuclear terrorism: summit warned of growing danger

April 13, 2010 - 1:09PM

Ukraine has given up its bomb-grade uranium in a boost for US President Barack Obama's summit on securing the world's nuclear materials, as a US official warned of the "growing" risk of nuclear terrorism.

Mr Obama organised the 47-nation summit in Washington, the biggest hosted by a US leader since 1945, with the aim of securing loose materials in military and civilian stockpiles worldwide within four years.

The gesture from former Soviet republic Ukraine, site of the horrific 1986 Chernobyl nuclear power plant explosion, gave early impetus to the summit.

Newly inaugurated President Viktor Yanukovych told Mr Obama in a bilateral meeting that he would give up 90 kilograms of Ukraine's highly enriched uranium, the equivalent of several bombs, the White House said.

But Mr Obama's top terrorism adviser John Brennan warned that al-Qaeda's interest in nuclear weapons was "strong" and he warned the risk of nuclear terrorism was "real", "serious" and "growing".

Leaders from China, India, Pakistan, Russia and dozens of other countries converged on a heavily guarded conference centre for the two-day meeting.

The goal is to make sure that worldwide stocks of separated plutonium and enriched uranium are destroyed or accounted for and therefore unable to fall into the hands of militant groups.

Following Ukraine's pledge, Canada made a similar promise on its own smaller stockpile, as had Chile earlier.

On Tuesday, the United States and Russia were also to sign an accord on tidying up plutonium reserves. The deal spells out elimination of the countries' excess plutonium stores - enough "for several thousand nuclear weapons", the State Department said.

Overshadowing the conference was growing tension on Iran, which the United States and its allies accuse of covertly working on a nuclear weapon. Iran says it is pursuing only civilian power.

Mr Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao agreed their delegations would work together at the United Nations on a US-led push to impose sanctions against Iran, a US official said.

"They are prepared to work with us," said Jeff Bader, Mr Obama's top official responsible for East Asia on the National Security Council.

"The two presidents agreed the two delegations should work together on sanctions," Bader said.

Separately, Mr Obama also used his meeting with Mr Hu to urge China to adopt a more "market-oriented" exchange rate for the Chinese yuan, a senior US official said.

North Korea, which defied international pressure to produce a nuclear weapon, was also likely to loom over the summit. Neither the leaders of North Korea nor Iran attended.

Iran's envoy to the UN nuclear watchdog, Ali Asghar Soltanieh, accused Washington of being the "real" threat to global peace, given its large nuclear arsenal.

"The outcome of the Washington conference is already known. Any decision taken at the meeting is not binding on those countries who are not represented at the conference," Mr Soltanieh told ISNA news agency.

Another notable absentee from Washington was Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu who dropped plans to attend, reportedly because of concern that Islamic states planned to press for Israel to open its own nuclear facilities to international inspection.

Illustrating the dividing lines in the flashpoint Middle East, Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Abul Gheit said he hoped sanctions could be avoided against Iran, but that Israel should be pressured over its refusal to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Mr Obama told reporters that his consultations so far with world leaders had been "impressive".

"I think it's an indication of how deeply concerned everybody should be with the possibilities of nuclear traffic.

"I think at the end of this we're going to see some very specific, concrete actions that each nation is taking that will make the world a little bit safer."

Before the summit, he branded attempts by non-state groups to obtain nuclear devices "the biggest threat to US security, short-term, medium-term and long-term".

"This is something that could change the security landscape of this country and around the world for years to come," Mr Obama said on Sunday.

French President Nicolas Sarkozy agreed that keeping fissile material out of the hands of extremist groups was vital, but said he could not abandon his own nation's nuclear weapons program "on a unilateral basis, in a world as dangerous as the one in which we live today".

"I have inherited the legacy of the efforts made by my predecessors to build up France as a nuclear power. And I could not give up nuclear weapons if I wasn't sure the world was a stable and safe place," Mr Sarkozy told CBS News in Washington.

AFP

[buglerbilly]

Al-Qaida ‘Scammed’ in Its Quest for Nukes?

By Nathan Hodge April 13, 2010 | 11:32 am



In a press briefing yesterday, John Brennan, President Barack Obama’s adviser on Counterterrorism and Homeland Security, made an interesting claim: He said al-Qaida has been “scammed” in its efforts to obtain the material for building a nuclear device.

“There have been numerous reports over the years, over the past eight or nine years, about attempts throughout the world to obtain various types of purported material that is nuclear related,” he said. “We know that al-Qaida has been involved in a number of these efforts to acquire it. Fortunately, I think they’ve been scammed a number of times, but we know that they continued to pursue that.”

How, exactly, do you run a nuclear scam? Brennan hinted that it was a lucrative line of business for criminal groups in the former Soviet Union. “Sometimes they’re criminal gangs that have information that some material had come out from the, let’s say, the area of the former Soviet Union or some stockpiles and they will try to provide that material to other groups to sell,” he said. “As I said, a lot of it is scam, you know, red mercury, whatever else.”

As Danger Room’s Sharon Weinberger recently reported in Nature, “red mercury” (a fictional substance supposedly used in nuclear weapons) is one of the more common nuclear-smuggling scams. She quotes the former Soviet republic of Georgia’s top nuclear investigator, who cited the 2006 case of a Turkish citizen who tried to smuggle cesium-137 (a radioactive isotope that is used in cancer treatment) inside a red liquid and tried to pass it off as red mercury.

But there are also worries about criminals getting their hands on real stockpiles of fissile material. As part of the ongoing Nuclear Security Summit, the White House is touting a deal with Ukraine to eliminate its stockpiles of highly enriched uranium and convert its civilian nuclear reactors to run on low-enriched fuel. This is a so-called first-line-of-defense measure: eliminating or securing fissile materials at their source.

In countries like Georgia, the United States is also paying for a second line of defense: outfitting border-crossing facilities and ports with radiation-detection portals (pictured here) and other hardware to detect illicit nuclear materials obtained by traffickers. It’s only a partial solution, however. That detection equipment is only installed at legitimate border crossings, and can’t stop a smuggler who might be crossing a border illegally. In the case of Georgia, it can’t stop someone who may be crossing into a poorly controlled separatist republic.

In a speech this afternoon, Barack Obama is supposed to remind world leaders that actions speak louder than words when it comes to nuclear security. With world leaders crowding Washington for the summit, the capital is still under tight security: Danger Room’s D.C. bureau isn’t far from the Green Zone (aka the Washington Convention Center) and we can hear the helicopters buzzing overhead.

Photo: Nathan Hodge

Read More http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/04/al-qaeda-scammed-in-its-quest-for-nukes/#more-23656#ixzz0l2242wEA

[buglerbilly]

'Time Is of the Essence'

No terrorist has ever managed to detonate a nuclear device. Let's keep it that way.

BY DAVID E. HOFFMAN | APRIL 12, 2010 Foreign Policy magazine

It was a cold autumn in Russia in 1998. The country had recently defaulted on its debts and devalued the ruble, millions of bank depositors lost their savings, and the banks closed their doors. The economic crisis had also created a sense of uncertainty about nuclear security. Erik Engling, who had been working on the problem of loose fissile material for several years for the U.S. Energy Department in Washington, was attempting to visit as many of the Russian institutes with uranium as he possibly could that fall.

One day in early November, he arrived at the Institute for Theoretical and Experimental Physics, spread over 89 acres on a beautiful old estate in Moscow. The institute was one of the oldest in the Soviet Union's archipelago of nuclear research facilities. A large amount of weapons-grade uranium, enriched to 90 percent, was stored there inside in aluminum-clad canisters 6 inches long, which had been used for a heavy-water research reactor and physics experiments.

Earlier in the year, the United States had completed installation of new equipment at the institute to monitor and protect the uranium. The equipment was just one part of a multibillion-dollar effort by the U.S. government to secure the uranium and plutonium in Russia after the Soviet Union's collapse. On a day of bone-chilling cold, fighting exhaustion from weeks of work, Engling came face to face with a crisis the U.S. government had not expected: The guards had walked away from their posts. The new monitoring equipment was still there, but there was no one to operate it. "They're all gone; they've left; they've quit," Engling told me. "They haven't been paid, and they're not gonna get paid, and everyone knows they're not gonna get paid."

Looking around, Engling counted 32 people who were essential to keeping the facility operating and the uranium secure, including 12 guards.

He knew that it was foolish to put money in a bank account to pay them -- given the condition of the banks, it would disappear overnight. At midafternoon, he gathered several institute officials in the deputy director's office. "I was just desperate," he recalled.

Engling pulled $3,000 in cash out of his pocket, money he had been given for per-diem expenses on his trip. He asked the Russians: If he paid everyone $50 a month, would the guards remain on duty for three months until he could figure out something else? He gave the wad of cash to the deputy director, whom he trusted. Please, he implored all of them, remain on duty for three months. Can you promise me the guards will be back?

After the visit, Engling sent an urgent message to the Energy Department in Washington. Previously, the U.S. government had focused on protecting the uranium with monitoring equipment, but now, he warned, there was a whole new problem looming: a "human catastrophe." The guard forces at the institutes were paralyzed, with wages unpaid for two to four months, absenteeism, and lack of winter clothing, heat, and food.

"TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE," he wrote, all in capital letters to underscore the urgency.

In the years since then, much has been done to physically secure the loose nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union. But there are still risks of the unforeseen and undetected hole in the fence. A group of peace activists breached the fences of a Belgian base holding U.S. nuclear weapons this year and walked around for an hour before they were stopped by a lone guard.

These stories go to the heart of the problem of nuclear security to be taken up this week at the summit of 47 countries in Washington. Uranium and plutonium that could be used for a bomb is spread all over the world -- global stockpiles of highly enriched uranium are estimated to be 1,700 tons, and separated plutonium 550 tons. That's enough for about 200,000 nuclear weapons. Even without the knowledge to create a weapon that causes a nuclear explosion, a terrorist could manage to mix radiological material with conventional explosives to cause mass panic and economic disruption. Thus, simply keeping the fissile material safe is the most important single challenge of nuclear security.

But the reality today is that the rules, facilities, and people involved in nuclear security are vastly different across the globe. Even when the best locks and video monitors are in place, there can be threats -- such as the "human catastrophe" Engling described. Many nuclear bombs from the Cold War have been given better security, but less obvious risks remain in nooks and crannies where the fissile material is vulnerable to theft or diversion.

U.S. President Barack Obama has promised to complete the lockup of all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world in four years. But as Matthew Bunn, associate professor at Harvard University, noted at a recent news conference, "We are not yet today on a track" to meet the president's goal. Many countries neither see the problem as urgent nor have devoted the resources to dealing with it. Bunn is the author of the authoritative annual survey Securing the Bomb, the latest of which was released today.

It is not rocket science. The problems and methods are known. Here are the major areas of concern:

Consolidation

Since the Soviet Union's collapse, there has been a lot of work done in Russia and elsewhere to provide security upgrades to buildings that hold highly enriched uranium, plutonium, and nuclear weapons. Although about 200 buildings have undergone upgrades in physical security, a big problem in the former Soviet Union is that, so far, Moscow has not consolidated all nuclear material into a smaller number of facilities that would be easier and less expensive to protect. The uranium and plutonium is scattered across about 250 locations. (The United States did finance and build an impressive $309 million Fissile Material Storage Facility in Russia for the materials being extracted from dismantled weapons, however.)

Civilian HEU

Highly enriched uranium (HEU) continues to be used in research reactors and to produce medical isotopes around the world. By one estimate, nearly 800 kilograms are used annually. In many cases, the HEU could be replaced by low-enriched uranium, which cannot be used to make a nuclear weapon. The Energy Department's Global Threat Reduction Initiative was created to clean out this category of nuclear materials. The most recent operation, in February and March, extracted HEU from two reactors in Chile. But "political and economic obstacles continue to hamper efforts to achieve a global clean out of civilian HEU," according to the Fissile Materials Working Group. Some countries don't want to give up what they see as an asset for science or medicine.

Culture and Training

As the Engling story illustrates, the human factor is often critical. Threats exist from insiders who could leak or divert nuclear materials, as well as from outsiders. As Bunn wrote in the 2008 edition of Securing the Bomb: "If the upgraded security equipment the United States is helping countries put in place is all broken and unused in five years, U.S. security objectives will not be accomplished." It takes people to operate the equipment successfully, and over the long term the training and security culture has to be homegrown.

Security Standards

Although the United Nations has called on all countries to set "appropriate effective" standards for protecting nuclear materials, the reality is that no single gold standard exists for guarding nuclear materials. The standards have been left up to each national government to decide. Bunn suggests in his report that the United States attempt to build a common consensus about standards and then work to put them in place.

The Black Market

Aside from better locks on doors, much of the concern about nuclear security is how to catch the materials in transit -- being smuggled across borders or carried into a large city. Bunn points out that the amount of nuclear material needed for a bomb is small and difficult to detect. "Once such material has left the facility where it is supposed to be, it could be anywhere, and finding and recovering it poses an immense challenge." So the nuclear security problem must involve customs and security agencies to interdict the materials on the move.

Obama has declared that nuclear terrorism is the gravest threat facing the world. To date, there has never been a terrorist attack using a nuclear weapon or fissile material. This suggests that the window of opportunity to prevent such an attack is still open; there is time to lock up all the dangerous materials and ensure the number of nuclear terrorist incidents remains zero.

[buglerbilly]

The Logic and Limitations of the Nuclear Posture Review (excerpt)

(Source: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; issued April 27, 2010)

On April 6, the Department of Defense released its Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which sets forth the Obama Administration’s guidance on American nuclear policy, force structure, and doctrine. The report has been highly anticipated, due in large part to President Obama’s public commitment to the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world.

Four NPR decisions stand out. First, the NPR makes preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism key objectives of US nuclear policy, in addition to the traditional aim of deterring major attacks against the United States, its allies, and its interests overseas.

Second, the NPR reaffirms the administration’s commitment to decreasing the size of the US nuclear arsenal. According to the document, the reductions in nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles outlined in the New START Treaty signed with Russia are only a first step toward deeper cuts in the future.

Third, the NPR alters long-standing declaratory policy by pledging that the United States will not retaliate with nuclear weapons against any nonnuclear weapons state that abides by its Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) commitments, even if the attacker uses chemical or biological weapons. Instead, the United States will rely on the threat of conventional military retaliation and its growing ballistic missile defense capabilities to deter (or defend against) a chemical or biological attack.

Finally, the NPR rejects developing new nuclear warheads to replace the existing arsenal.

These four decisions are closely interrelated, and reflect a broader strategic calculation. Put simply, the NPR concludes that if the United States diminishes its reliance on nuclear weapons—by reducing the size of its arsenal, restricting the conditions under which it would use these weapons, and forgoing the construction of new warheads)—other nations are more likely to de-emphasize their own nuclear capabilities or abandon their nuclear ambitions. Should this happen, the dangers of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism can be reduced substantially, and an important step toward the abolition of nuclear weapons will have been taken.

Unfortunately, this perspective is based on a questionable analysis and flawed logic. (end of excerpt)

Click here for the full report (3 pages in PDF format) on the CSBA website.

http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/U.20100423.The_Logic_and_Limi/U.20100423.The_Logic_and_Limi.pdf

-ends-

[Riđđu]

U.S. says nuclear arsenal includes 5,113 warheads


By Arshad Mohammed and Phil Stewart

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The United States disclosed for the first time on Monday the current size of its nuclear arsenal, lifting the veil on once top-secret numbers in an effort to bolster non-proliferation efforts.

The Pentagon said it had a total of 5,113 warheads in its nuclear stockpile at the end of September, down 84 percent from a peak of 31,225 in 1967. The arsenal stood at 22,217 warheads when the Berlin Wall fell in 1989.

The figure includes warheads that are operationally deployed, kept in active reserve and held in inactive storage. But it does not include "several thousand" warheads that are now retired and awaiting dismantlement, the Pentagon said.

"The United States is showing that it is being increasingly transparent," a senior U.S. defense official told reporters at the Pentagon. "It's part of our commitment ... to set the stage for strength in non-proliferation and for further arms control."

The official declined to offer the Pentagon's estimate for Russia's arsenal and renewed calls for greater transparency by China, saying there was "little visibility" when it came to Beijing's nuclear program. The United States is also pushing for a new round of sanctions against Iran over its nuclear program.
By releasing the data during the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference, analysts said the United States was trying to show it is cutting its arsenal so as to help persuade other states to tighten the global non-proliferation regime.

"It is hugely important for the United States to be able to say, 'Look we are living up to our obligations under the NPT," said Hans Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists.

COULD IT BACKFIRE?

The disclosure comes less than a month after President Barack Obama unveiled a new policy restricting the U.S. use of nuclear weapons and signed a landmark arms reduction accord with Russia.
Obama, who won a Nobel Peace Prize in part for his vision of a nuclear free world, has also renounced the development of new atomic weapons.

Historically, the overall size of the arsenal has been kept secret to help prevent potential adversaries from using the information to more precisely neutralize U.S. nuclear forces. Still, analysts warned the disclosure could also negatively impact perceptions of the United States -- possibly dismaying other nations by demonstrating how many nuclear weapons it retains two decades after the Cold War ended.
"I think the states that are most concerned about nuclear disarmament will be more focused on the number that remain rather than the number (reduced)," said George Perkovich, director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

The Pentagon said from fiscal years 1994 through 2009, the United States dismantled 8,748 nuclear warheads. The Pentagon also declined to disclose the exact number of warheads awaiting dismantlement. It said more analysis needed to be done to make sure it did not impact U.S. national security. The United States aims to dismantle those warheads by the early part of the next decade, another U.S. official said, also briefing reporters on condition of anonymity.

[ARH v.3.1]

Does that include tactical weapons, or just strategic?

[buglerbilly]

Towards “Global Zero” – Really?

Comment by Dr. Ezio Bonsignore, Editor-in-Chief of MILITARY TECHNOLOGY

Whenever political figures, and most particularly in position of very great power and responsibility, put forward magniloquent statements about some visionary goals of theirs that would greatly benefit not only their respective countries but indeed mankind as a whole, sceptical outside observers can but remain baffled in trying to understand what exactly these politicians are up to. Are they completely sincere and honest, in both formulating these goals and pointing at the ways to them? Or, are they just indulging in some titillation of the domestic and internal public opinion by paying lip service to grandiose dreams of general disarmament and universal peace, while in reality they have not the slightest intention to set themselves and their nations along that particular road? Are they perhaps on the pursuit of some secret objectives, far remote from, when not diametrically opposite to, the propaganda claims of their official statements?

Many different answers and combinations thereof are conceivable, but it is abundantly clear that the worst and most alarming of all possible answers is this: our leaders do mean what they says, and are deeply committed towards eventually achieving the goals as announced – but these goals happen to be based on a terribly flawed appreciation of the real situation of our world, and implementing them would spread havoc and disaster.

The above situation now applies to President Obama’s stated vision of a world completely free of nuclear weapons, the so-called “Global Zero” options.

Now of course calls for nuclear weapons to be “de-invented” have been around since Hiroshima, and Barak Obama is certainly not the first Head of State, and not even the first US President, to at least apparently join the worldwide “ban the nukes” chorus and indeed position himself to lead it. However, attention must necessarily be focused on him because of his position at the helm of the main when not only superpower. I mean, even if all other 6,820,465,535 human beings on the face on Earth (as of 11:28 UTC, 12 May 2010) were to reach an unanimous consensus to the effect that all existing nuclear weapons shall be dismantled, President Obama’s “Well, I don’t think so” would be more than sufficient to bring the whole brouhaha to a sudden halt. And on the other hand, a deliberate push by President Obama towards universal nuclear disarmament would place the other declared and undeclared nuclear powers, all of which have (or still feel they have, make your choice) excellent reasons for wanting to maintain their respective arsenals, into a very difficult predicament indeed, and it might eventually force them into implementing exceedingly unpalatable decisions.

And so, the big question is what President Obama is up to? Because, make no mistake, he is up to something. Whether the President’s real goals actually correspond to the rosy presentations by his speechwriters, whether he is likely to reach them, and whether the US and the world would actually benefit from him doing so, are completely different and separate questions altogether. I don’t have any ready answers, and all I can offer is a tentative discussion and analysis of the various factors in the equation.

As a starting point, it is abundantly clear that the recent important moves by the US Administration in the field of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament – the formulation of a new Nuclear Posture Review (NPR); the signature of the New START Arms Reduction Treaty with Moscow; the organisation of a Nuclear Security Summit in Washington; and the hosting of the Review Conference on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in New York, which is still ongoing as these lines are being written – are all part of a single, coherent policy. While developments such as the NPR and New START are very important in themselves, their real significance and implications are better appreciated in relation with each other.

Nuclear Disarmament Basics

In diplomatic and foreign policy terms, the situation as regards nuclear disarmament would appear to be clear and simple enough.

Under the NPT, nuclear weapon states are formally committed towards vigorously pursing nuclear disarmament, with the aim of eventually completely eliminating their nuclear arsenals according to Article VI of the Treaty. In addition, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is expected to enter into force upon completion of the ratification process, and a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) is being negotiated.

NPT signatories that do not possess nuclear weapons (Non-Nuclear Weapons States, NNWS) have taken a commitment towards not trying to develop or acquire them. In exchange, they are allowed to rely on international commerce through the Nuclear Suppliers Group to pursue nuclear programmes for civil purposes, but in doing so are subject to verifications by the International Atomic Energy (IAEA). An Additional Protocol to the NPT is to further expand its comprehensive safeguards in terms of IAEA inspections. Most importantly, the NPT enshrines the NNWS’ right to not only acquire full mastery of the nuclear fuel enrichment process, but even scavenge spent fuel for plutonium – an original generous concession, which is however now showing its dangerous implications in the case of Iran.

Outside all of this remain the states that have not signed the NPT, and reject any form of international control or limitation on their nuclear activities for either civil or/and military purposes. It must be understood that such as position is perfectly legal according to the letter and spirit of international law. The NPT is a Treaty, not a diktat, and the decision as to whether or not join it is – at least ostensibly – fully voluntary and within each state’s freedom of choice. There is nothing within the NPT to suggest that states that refuse to sign it shall be sanctioned or punished in any way, much less so coerced into changing their mind. The only inherent penalty is the lack of access to the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

Needless to say, NPT signatories (including both nuclear and non-nuclear states) are fully entitled to regard four non-NPT nations (India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea) having since acquired nuclear arsenals as a negative development, and to shape their relationship with some or all of them according to this perception. But in line of principle, it remains that not signing the NPT (or even openly leaving it) and moving toward nuclear power status is technically not a violation of international obligations, and certainly not a crime.

It also happens that nuclear weapon states have so far shown a marked reluctance towards getting rid of their arms. The US and Russia have negotiated very significant mutual reductions in their respective nuclear arsenals, and after the end of the Cold War France and the UK also made some downwards adjustments. All of these developments, however, were based purely on national strategic considerations, and were not out of allegiance to the NPT disarmament pledge. Further, there is no sign of the nuclear powers moving towards implementing the 13 "practical steps" toward global nuclear disarmament, as agreed by consensus at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Accordingly, the perception that the NPT regime is basically but an instrument devised by the established nuclear powers to try and maintain a monopoly of nuclear weapons is gaining more and more credibility.

This overall situation has been putting considerable strain on some states inside the NPT non-nuclear weapons group, which feel themselves unjustly penalised for their continuing voluntary adherence to the Treaty’s clauses. These NNWS perceive their position as being increasingly squeezed between the established nuclear powers, which refuse to disarm, and non-signatory nations that are moving or have already moved towards nuclear power status. Such a perception is unfortunately further reinforced by some blatant cases of double when not triple standards. The Nuclear Suppliers Group’s exemption for India pushed by the United States to permits nuclear commerce with a state, that has not even formally accepted the disarmament obligations and commitments undertaken by the nuclear weapon states within the NPT, has effectively made a mockery of the Treaty. Meanwhile, a non-nuclear weapon state in the NPT, Iran, is scrutinised and penalised due to a programme suspected (but without proof) of being aimed at making it capable of producing nuclear weapons. Some NNWS have cited the lack of disarmament progress and the double standards as a justification for resisting any attempt to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, in particular by not signing and ratifying the Additional Protocol.

In pure theory, the only logical solution would appear to be the creation of a global system with one rule applying to all states, i.e. non-possession of nuclear weapons. Total and general nuclear disarmament has been the coveted dream of three generations of pacifists, and it appeal is undeniable. What is nearly always overlooked, though, is that such a regime would necessarily have to be compulsory and coercive, being strictly enforced through exceedingly intrusive verification of both non-proliferation and disarmament plus a very credible threat for the immediate use of massive force against any miscreant nation that would be seen as committing the heinous crime of apostasy. As regards bringing forward world’s peace, nuclear disarmament might thus actually produce far different results that many people think and hope.

The Evolving US Posture

The above situation as far as nuclear disarmament is concerned has been more or less in place for the past few decades, but it is now becoming the subject of renewed attention and action because of the evolving US posture as regards nuclear weapons. Ever since the end of the Cold War, the US has been relying less and less on possession of a nuclear arsenal for the pursuit of its global strategic and foreign policy objectives.

In today’s strategic scenarios, the US would certainly wish to maintain a robust and very credible nuclear deterrent against the possible prospect of a resurgent Russian superpower, as well as a balance for the meteoric rise of China and in a more distant perspective India. This, however, shall be achieved without getting entangled in unnecessary and wasteful nuclear weapons races. The New START Treaty fully meets this goal, the more so in that it includes a rather stringent verification regime.

It should also be appreciated that any mutual reduction in the deployed nuclear arsenals does automatically and effortlessly raise the strategic significance of whatever limited BMD network the US will eventually be able to put in place. This point was not missed by the Russians, who insisted for BMD limitation clauses to be included in the Treaty but were eventually forced to give up. Moscow did, however, append a statement to the effect that they reserve the right to unilaterally withdraw from New START should US BMD developments come to threaten the viability and credibility of their nuclear arsenal.

The US would certainly also wish to steer quite clear of any “no first use” pledge, and thus maintain its freedom of action in threatening the use of, and in extreme cases actually using, nuclear weapons against nuclear or non-nuclear states alike that would come to be seen as endangering vital American interests, or would actually engage (or becoming engaged against their will) in open hostilities against US forces. From this particular point of view, there could be very different readings of the actual meaning of the Obama administration’s Nuclear Posture Review. The stated policy whereby “The US will not retaliate with nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapons state that abides by its NPT commitments” is certainly to be welcomed, but it should not be missed that it explicitly exposes Iran, North Korea and any other nation that would dare following in the footsteps to the threat of a US nuclear attack. Plus, there is no indication of what policy the US intends to follow vis-à-vis states that refuse to be part of the NPT regime.

But beyond these core points, in a broader perspective the US is coming to regard the current confused and confusing nuclear maze – NPT nuclear weapons states that should disarm but don’t; non-NPT nuclear weapons states that do what they damn pleases (and in a couple of cases are actually rewarded by the US for doing so); NNWS “rogue” or suspected rogue nations that might or then might not be up to nefarious business; and a bulk of non-nuclear NPT countries that are getting increasingly restive in their voluntary straitjackets – as not conducive to its worldwide interests. Hence, the NPR’s identification of preventing nuclear proliferation is the key objective of US nuclear policy.

This goes well beyond the officially stated goal of preventing nuclear weapons from falling in the hands of terrorist organisations or/and fanatical states, that could not be deterred – a perceived threat whose real credibility could be the subject for some discussion. It also goes beyond the obvious interest, shared by the US along with all other established nuclear power states, towards preserving their coveted monopoly – if for no other reasons, then simply in view of the global status and influence it accrues. And it goes even beyond the North Korean example of how possession of even a very primitive nuclear arsenal would make Washington very weary about using military force against a state that crosses its path.

Rather, the key factor is that in the current global scenarios, the presence of several actual, potential or suspected nuclear weapons states around the globe is increasingly acting as an impediment to US foreign policy. This not only applies to nations that are hostile to the US or could eventually become a direct threat to its interests, but even to nations that are friendly or allied to the US. A most significant case in point is the Middle East and the situation created there by the presence of the undeclared Israeli nuclear arsenal.

For many years, the US (and in a broad sense, much of the rest of the world) did regard Israel’s nuclear deterrent as an exceedingly important factor to ensure that things would not go completely out of control there, and to enforce at least a degree of regional stability. Arab leaders, no matter their vociferous hostility towards Israel, know perfectly well that they would all be turned into radioactive ash well before even getting close to “throwing the Jews into the sea”, and this has been a very powerful element in ensuring that their actions remain inherently prudent and rational. But things now they are a-changing, as evidenced by the discussions at the ongoing NPT Review Conference.

Many non-nuclear weapon states have expressed frustration about the lack of progress on the establishment of a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East, and Egypt insists that it will not conclude the Additional Protocol until Israel joins the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state – which would imply withdrawing its undeclared nuclear arsenal in a verifiable manner, as South Africa did – and accedes to the notional NWFZ regime. In a more general posture, Egypt and other Arab states now openly indicate that they consider the possession of nuclear weapons by Israel as a major obstacle to bringing peace and security to the region.

A UN General Assembly resolution calling for a NWFZ in the Middle East was first introduced by Egypt and Iran in 1974, and a similar resolution has been adopted each year by consensus since 1980 – with no practical results. Today’s Arab piques would also remain of no significance whatsoever, it is were not for the fact that the US, backed by France and the UK, is apparently moving towards regarding a notional Middle East NWFZ as a positive development, and one that would support rather than hinder its foreign policy interests in the region. In the simplest terms, the US’ stand, prestige and influence across the Arab world would gain immensely if Washington were to be seen as having been instrumental in persuading Jerusalem to shed its nuclear arsenal. Thus, the Obama administration has officially stated it supports the goal of a Middle East NWFZ – albeit only in the context of a broader regional peace.

Needless to say, Israel perceives things under a slightly different light, and getting it to graciously comply would not be a very easy task – even though for Arab states to sign a Middle East NWFZ Agreement with Israel as co-signatory would automatically imply them accepting and recognising the Jewish state. It would certainly be preposterous to imagine that Washington would wish or be in a position to force Jerusalem’s hand. But, the fact remains that the two capitals are palpably no longer in synch with each other on this issue.

Add the Iranian factor. Washington is alarmed by the prospect that Iran might eventually “go nuclear” not because it would then become a threat to the US, and not even to Israel, but rather because if Teheran gets the bomb and declares itself a nuclear power, then the rest of the Middle East will soon follow. More broadly, even for Iran simply achieving its officially stated goal of mastery of the nuclear fuel enrichment process for civil energy applications would push every self-respecting Arab nation into wishing to do the same – after which, they would all become capable of developing and building nuclear weapons if they want to. For this reason, the Obama administration has been mounting a country-by-country campaign to go beyond the NPT and reach bilateral agreements, which will let Middle East countries develop nuclear power while relinquishing the right to make nuclear fuel. A first such deal has already been clinched with the UAE, and similar schemes are being negotiated with Bahrain, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

Very much the same considerations apply to Asia. The emergence of North Korea as a primitive nuclear power is an annoyance to the US not because Pyongyang represents a military or security threat, but rather because its possession of a few rudimentary bombs complicates Washington’s relations with both Tokyo and Seoul and might ultimately push them towards implementing steps, the US could not conceivably accept.

From NPT to “Global Zero”?

Given the above, it is a given that in the short term the Obama Administration would try and achieve a number of relatively modest but important objectives:

• Reinforcing the NPT by at least gaining universal acceptance for the Additional Protocol to the Comprehensive Security Obligations, and ideally by removing the right to control the fuel enrichment cycle and making signature of the Treaty as either a nuclear or a non-nuclear state, and thus acceptance of the relevant obligations and commitments, sort of a pre-requisite for being part of the international community;
• Having the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) ratified and put into force;
• Obtaining the signature and ratification by all states of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), with the accompanying goal of bringing all existing nuclear material in the world under a control regime within four years.

The first immediate further step beyond that would arguably be to leverage the strengthened global nuclear control regime to force Iran into giving up its nuclear ambitions, or at the very least into accepting exceedingly intrusive verification measures to ensure that an ostensibly civil nuclear programme does not derail towards the development and manufacture of nuclear weapons. The possible links between such an effort and the more distant goal of the eventual establishment of a Middle East NWFZ – perhaps through the first step of a regional nuclear tests-free zone (NTFZ) – remain to be seen. Parallel and similar manoeuvring is also to be expected as regards North Korea, and more in general any other potential nuclear rogue state.

Further beyond that, we enter a grey area of speculations and wild guesses.

It is certainly conceivable that the Obama Administration has come to the conclusion that the US would actually be better off, and in a much stronger strategic position, in a world where no nuclear weapons are allowed to exist. Indeed, given the geographic position of the US and its overwhelming superiority in conventional military forces and all the relevant technologies, the “Global Zero” option would effectively ensure that no individual nation or alliance thereof could ever come to represent a major, and indeed not even a minor threat to the US, or could force Washington into having to carefully ponder about the possible risks of its military or political actions – and all of this at no additional cost to the US.

But even should President Obama have identified “Global Zero” as a main strategic objective, the question remains of how he thinks he could get there. Pushing forward a strengthened NPT, CTBT and FMCT through an appropriate combination of persuasion and gentle arm twisting is not a herculean task, and even containing Iran and eventually bringing about a Middle East NWTZ might ultimately prove to be feasible. But convincing the existing nuclear powers to disarm, simply because Washington would like them to do so, would be a wholly different business.

President Obama could very easily rally the world’s public opinion around his vision, and thus put an enormous pressure on the nuclear capitals, that the governments there would find it increasingly difficult to withstand – at least in terms of being forced to pay lip service to the “noble goal” of nuclear disarmament. For instance, Moscow has already been led to state that “We believe that in future, under certain conditions, nuclear weapons may and should be eliminated”. But beyond that, Paris and London, Moscow and Beijing, New Delhi and Islamabad will all certainly hang to their cherished bombs for their dear life as long as they can.

An interesting pointer at the shape of things to come is being provided by the current fluid situation within NATO as regards the future of the US tactical nuclear weapons currently deployed in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and Turkey. The NPR did not announce any decision as to whether withdrawing or maintaining them, and rather indicated that this will be the subject for “future negotiations”. The European public opinion is now clamouring for an immediate withdrawal, even in the absence of any reciprocal agreement with Russia – but the involved governments and NATO as a whole have taken on a much more nuanced and prudent position, which indeed figures.

As for myself, I have mixed feelings about “Global Zero”. On the one hand, I am acutely aware of the presence of certain political figures and forces out there I most definitely would not wish to see getting close to anything even vaguely resembling a nuclear weapon. Further, I would rather die tomorrow than having to witness a war involving the use of nuclear weapons – including, just to stress the point, one that would not come to threaten the part of the world where I live.

Yet, at the same time if I consider the prospect of a world, where more and more states would be able to raise the “Don’t Tread on Me!” banner, and would thus be able to pursue their own goals and ways of life without any fear of being suddenly “liberated” by this or that “coalition of the willing”, or of having their internal problems being elevated to the status of a global opprobrium that justifies and indeed demands foreign armed intervention – well, in all frankness I’m not totally convinced that such would necessarily be a more dangerous, or if you wish a less just world than the one we are living into.

[buglerbilly]

At nuclear conference, U.S. expects little, gains little

By Mary Beth Sheridan
Washington Post staff writer

Monday, May 31, 2010

It didn't end in failure.

That was perhaps the best the U.S. government could boast about a month-long conference on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which ended Friday in New York.

President Obama has made a priority of strengthening the treaty, which is in danger of unraveling after decades of curtailing the spread of nuclear weapons. Much of his ambitious nuclear agenda has been undertaken with an eye toward demonstrating U.S. compliance with the pact.

The United States got few of the specific goals it sought at the conference, such as penalties for nations that secretly develop nuclear weapons, then quit the pact (think North Korea). Language calling on countries to allow tougher nuclear inspections was greatly watered down.

And the conference's final document singled out Israel's suspected nuclear program -- but not Iran's secret facilities, which many think are part of an effort to build an atomic bomb. Gen. James Jones, the U.S. national security adviser, blasted that absence as "deplorable."

U.S. officials said the conference's final "action plan" at least represented a commitment by 189 nations to stand by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The last review conference, in 2005, collapsed in failure, with many countries blaming the Bush administration.

"We've got the NPT back on track. There was so much criticism about 2005 . . . and a lot of doom and gloom about the treaty failing," said one U.S. official, who was not authorized to speak on the record. "We have to hold this treaty together."

The 40-year-old pact is built on a grand bargain: The original five nuclear powers promised to disarm gradually and all others foreswore the bomb. All treaty members were guaranteed access to nuclear energy, subject to the oversight of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

But the conference revealed the strains in the treaty. Non-nuclear countries complained bitterly that nuclear powers are not upholding their end of the bargain.

It was clear from the start that getting agreement would be difficult. The conference's final documents are reached by consensus, meaning that Iran, a treaty member, could block any initiatives. That explains why it wasn't named.

Israel, on the other hand, has not signed the treaty and did not attend the meetings.

"We did the most we could, considering the rules of the road," said Ellen O. Tauscher, the U.S. undersecretary for arms control.

Still, U.S. officials appeared frustrated that the Obama administration did not get more credit for its record. It has signed a new arms-reduction treaty with Russia, hosted a 47-nation summit on nuclear security and lessened the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. defense policy.

"The disarmament stuff Obama did, they just pocketed," said David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security. Non-nuclear countries, he said, "didn't give anything back."

Egypt's U.N. ambassador, Maged Abdel Aziz, who led the powerful 118-member non-aligned group, disagreed. He said non-nuclear countries ultimately dropped their demands for faster disarmament.

"We like Obama's ideas. We will make the first concessions," he said in an interview. "But we will see what is going to come."

His comments reflected skepticism among countries about how much Obama will achieve. The new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with Russia has not been ratified, and Obama faces an uphill battle in winning Senate approval of a separate pact banning nuclear tests worldwide.

Aziz said non-nuclear countries are still smarting over the George W. Bush administration's decision to sell civilian nuclear technology to India, which hasn't signed the nonproliferation treaty. Obama voted for that deal as a senator.

"If you say countries outside the treaty are going to get . . . even more benefits than countries inside the treaty, than what is the benefit for me to bind myself with more [nonproliferation] restrictions?" Aziz asked. U.S. officials said they would continue to pursue tougher nuclear controls in more favorable venues, such as the U.N. Security Council and the IAEA.

Even before the conference started, the Obama administration "trimmed their sails on what they expected to get out of it. The main thing at this point was not to undercut their agenda going forward," said Miles Pomper, a nuclear policy expert at the Monterey Institute of International Studies.

Not that the conference lacked for drama. Many diplomats expected the U.S. delegation would kill the final document because of the mention of Israel.

When the United States accepted it, the Iranian delegation was so surprised that it asked for a four-hour postponement of the final session so that members could call their government, diplomats said.

The Iranians finally agreed to the text, recommitting themselves -- at least verbally -- to the treaty's rules.

The adoption of a document "provides less excuse for people who would like this [treaty] to go off the tracks," the U.S. official said.

[buglerbilly]

Report says Burma is taking steps toward nuclear weapons program

By Joby Warrick
Washington Post Staff Writer

Friday, June 4, 2010

Just what we don't need, another bunch of nutters trying for the Bomb..................

Burma has begun secretly acquiring key components for a nuclear weapons program, including specialized equipment used to make uranium metal for nuclear bombs, according to a report that cites documents and photos from a Burmese army officer who recently fled the country.

The smuggled evidence shows Burma's military rulers taking concrete steps toward obtaining atomic weapons, according to an analysis co-written by an independent nuclear expert. But it also points to enormous gaps in Burmese technical know-how and suggests that the country is many years from developing an actual bomb.

The analysis, commissioned by the dissident group Democratic Voice of Burma, concludes with "high confidence" that Burma is seeking nuclear technology, and adds: "This technology is only for nuclear weapons and not for civilian use or nuclear power."

"The intent is clear, and that is a very disturbing matter for international agreements," said the report, co-authored by Robert E. Kelley, a retired senior U.N. nuclear inspector. Officials for the dissident group provided copies of the analysis to the broadcaster al-Jazeera, The Washington Post and a few other news outlets.

Hours before the report's release, Sen. James Webb (D-Va.) announced that he was canceling a trip to Burma, also known as Myanmar, to await the details. "It is unclear whether these allegations have substantive merit," Webb, who chairs a Senate Foreign Relations panel on East Asia, said in a statement released by his office. "[But] until there is further clarification on these matters, I believe it would be unwise and potentially counterproductive for me to visit Burma."

There have been numerous allegations in the past about secret nuclear activity by Burma's military rulers, accounts based largely on ambiguous satellite images and uncorroborated stories by defectors. But the new analysis is based on documents and hundreds of photos smuggled out of the country by Sai Thein Win, a Burmese major who says he visited key installations and attended meetings at which the new technology was demonstrated.

The trove of insider material was reviewed by Kelley, a U.S. citizen who served at two of the Energy Department's nuclear laboratories before becoming a senior inspector for the International Atomic Energy Agency. Kelley co-wrote the opposition group's report with Democratic Voice of Burma researcher Ali Fowle.

Among the images provided by the major are technical drawings of a device known as a bomb-reduction vessel, which is chiefly used in the making of uranium metal for fuel rods and nuclear-weapons components. The defector also released a document purporting to show a Burmese government official ordering production of the device, as well as photos of the finished vessel.

Other photographs show Burmese military officials and civilians posing beside a device known as a vacuum glove box, which also is used in the production of uranium metal. The defector describes ongoing efforts on various phases of a nuclear-weapons program, from uranium mining to work on advanced lasers used in uranium enrichment. Some of the machinery used in the Burmese program appears to have been of Western origin.

The report notes that the Burmese scientists appear to be struggling to master the technology and that some processes, such as laser enrichment, likely far exceed the capabilities of the impoverished, isolated country.

"Photographs could be faked," it says, "but there are so many and they are so consistent with other information and within themselves that they lead to a high degree of confidence that Burma is pursuing nuclear technology."

A Washington-based nuclear weapons analyst who reviewed the report said the conclusions about Burma's nuclear intentions appeared credible. "It's just too easy to hide a program like this," said Joshua H. Pollack, a consultant to the U.S. government.

[ARH v.3.1]

This raises a number of questions, assuming it is even possible for them to develop the weapons:

1. WTF will they do with them, other than sell them?
2. If they aren't going to try selling them, how will they deliver them?
3. How will they target them?
4. How will they secure the weapons?

I would have thought there are more practical concerns than trying to develop nuclear weapons...

[buglerbilly]

Egotism and paranoia have been the prime driving factors for the Myanmar regime for 40 years or more now.

They view everybody around them, primarily India and Thailand as inferior, and the West generally as suck-dick pussies for their failure to get them to adhere to any kind of remotely-democratic principles.

Having a Nuke will allow their ego's to run rampant while they try to subjugate their neghbours or at least, in the case of India, stop them from physically threatening them with a Nuke strike, a scenario so removed from reality as to be fantasy. They also, like the South American nut-job Chavez, believe possession of a Nuke or nukes stops the West (or anyone else) from physically attacking or coercing their Nation or more precisely their corrupt and genocidal regime(s).

[buglerbilly]

Myanmar Nukes Would Destabilize Region: U.S.

AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE

Published: 10 Jun 2010 18:06

WASHINGTON - Myanmar risks destabilizing Southeast Asia through its pursuit of weapons, although it is not yet clear whether the military regime is developing a nuclear program, a U.S. official said June 10.

A senior army defector, in a recent documentary broadcast on Al Jazeera television, said the junta has been seeking nuclear weapons and developing a secret network of underground tunnels with help from North Korea.

Scot Marciel, the State Department official in charge of Southeast Asia, said that the United States was still assessing the allegations about Myanmar - also known as Burma.

"I think there's two issues. One is whether there is some kind of serious nuclear program in Burma, which certainly would be tremendously destabilizing to the entire region," Marciel testified at a congressional hearing.

"There's also the Burmese acquisition of other military equipment - conventional - which also can affect regional stability," he said.

"We're looking at both of those questions very closely," said Marciel, the deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian affairs.

A senior Myanmar official last week told AFP that the accusations of a nuclear program were "groundless," without elaborating.

On a visit to Myanmar in May, Marciel's superior, Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell, expressed concern about a suspected arms shipment from

North Korea and sought assurances from the regime.

Senator Jim Webb, one of the most vocal U.S. advocates of engagement with Myanmar, abruptly canceled a visit to the country earlier this month due to the allegations of cooperation with North Korea.

Addressing the Asia Society on June 9, Webb said he was still waiting to learn more about the allegations but decided it would be counterproductive to visit Myanmar at the time the documentary was broadcast.

President Barack Obama's administration last year opened dialogue with Myanmar, concluding that the previous approach of isolating the regime had not borne fruit.

But the administration has voiced deep concern about elections later this year, which the opposition considers a sham to legitimize military rule.

[buglerbilly]

Myanmar denies allegations it is seeking nukes

(AP) – 1 day ago

YANGON, Myanmar — Myanmar has sent a letter to the U.N. nuclear agency insisting it has no current or future plan to develop a nuclear program in the isolated country's second denial this month after reports emerged it may be seeking an atomic weapon.

Myanmar's military government has denied similar allegations in the past, but suspicions have mounted recently that the impoverished Southeast Asian nation has embarked on a nuclear program.

Myanmar's envoy to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Win Tin, dismissed the allegations as "groundless and unfounded" in a letter sent Friday, according to a Saturday report in the New Light of Myanmar newspaper. The Foreign Ministry issued a denial on June 11.

"No activity related to uranium conversion, enrichment, reactor construction or operation has been carried out in the past, is ongoing or is planned for the future in Myanmar," the letter said, according to the newspaper which is a mouthpiece for the junta.

The letter was sent in response to one from the IAEA dated June 14 that asked Myanmar to outline any nuclear-related activities or ambitions, the newspaper said.

Earlier this month, the Norway-based Democratic Voice of Burma, a Myanmar exile news service, charged that the junta, aided by North Korea, is actively pursuing a nuclear weapons program with the aim of developing a bomb and long-range missiles.

It said its conclusions were based on a five-year study and revelations by a recent Myanmar army defector who smuggled out extensive files and photographs. The report also said that Myanmar is still far from producing a nuclear weapon.

Win Tin's letter noted that Myanmar is a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the agency's so-called safeguards agreement.

"As stated in the safeguards agreement, Myanmar will notify the agency if it plans to carry out any nuclear activities," the letter said.

Last month, U.N. experts monitoring sanctions imposed against North Korea over its nuclear and missile tests said their research indicated it was involved in banned nuclear and ballistic missile activities in Iran, Syria and Myanmar, which is also called Burma.

Documents that surfaced earlier showed that North Korea was helping Myanmar dig a series of underground facilities and develop missiles with a range of up to 1,860 miles (3,000 kilometers).

Copyright © 2010 The Associated Press. All rights reserved.

[buglerbilly]

Right Strikes Against START

By Michael A. Needham Monday, July 12th, 2010 11:20 am

As the Senate Armed Services Committee readies classified hearings for Wednesday this week on the technical verifiability of the new START treaty, the right wing of the Republican Party has come out swinging. The Heritage Foundation has created an independent group with the purpose of pressing their views on the treaty, Heritage Action for America, They contacted us last week about running an o-ed and here it is.

Senators John Kerry, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Richard Lugar, the committee’s top Republican, reacted swiftly last week when former Gov. Mitt Romney questioned the validity of their beloved nuclear treaty. Their reaction was to ridicule Romney, demonize his positions and reject any criticisms of the treaty outright. Unilaterally ending debate is not how decisions about American national security should be made.

These gentlemen must understand that New START is larger than any one person. When presented with crucial questions of security policy, egos must be set aside. The American people expect a serious debate over this issue and the importance of the New START treaty demands it. This week’s dueling op-eds made clear there is a genuine, and extremely serious, debate over the merits of New START.

Lost in the media frenzy is the fact that many noted and respected foreign policy observers have serious concerns with the treaty. Those concerns revolve around one simple question: does New START make America safer?

Policymakers need only to look at the comments from the Russians themselves. Yury Savenko, the First Deputy Chairman of the Duma Defense Committee has been quoted as saying that, “Whether the Americans want it or not, they, after adopting the New START treaty, will give us a breathing space that we can use to reform and modernize the country’s nuclear missile potential.” From a Russian perspective, the treaty allows them to increase the effectiveness of their nuclear arsenal.

Not only are the Russians excited about their modernization prospects, the treaty does not require any reductions in their tactical nuclear weapon arsenal. The Heritage Foundation’s James Carafano says, “If we were really serious about cutting nukes we would have stuck with the more drastic limits imposed by the original treaty. [T]he treaty does nothing to address tactical nuclear weapons, something the Russians have in vast supply. … Russia holds a 10:1 advantage in tactical nuclear weapons over the United States.”

Unfortunately, Senators Kerry and Lugar have swept aside these legitimate concerns that New START will enable Russia’s nuclear capabilities to exceed that of America’s.

Perhaps even more alarming is that the treaty actually undermines America’s defensive capabilities. As Russia’s strength grows, relative to our own, and the dual threats of North Korea and Iran go unaddressed, New START restricts America’s missile defense capabilities. According to Bob Joseph, the former Undersecretary for Arms Control at the State Department, the administration has shifted from saying there are ‘no limitations’ on missile defense to there are ‘no constraints on current and planned programs.’ Given President Obama’s already scaled back missile defense program, these statements demonstrate the administrations belief that development of robust missile defense is limited by this treaty.

The subtle shift in the Administration’s rhetoric is cause for concern. While the administration may be satisfied, New START vanquishes any hope for a robust, post-Obama defense shield.

A limited missile defense policy is also contrary to the goals of the treaty. The latest Nuclear Posture Review highlights the importance of missile defense in reducing our reliance on nuclear weapons. However, as Eric Edelman, former Undersecretary for Policy at the Department of Defense points out, “New START unfortunately introduces limits and obstacles to further development of precisely these means of defending the country.”

Thus, we are left more dependent on the obsolete strategy of deterrence.

A credible argument can be made that New START empowers Russia (and, by default, other nuclear countries) and weakens America. Yet, Senators Kerry and Lugar seem more interested in sullying the messenger.

Even the enforcement of the treaty is questionable, as the provisions are embarrassingly insufficient. Paula A. De Sutter, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Verification Compliance and Implementation stated that, “The Russians can do so much under this treaty to advance and expand their strategic forces … and our ability to determine whether or not they are doing that and whether it violates the treaty is very, very low.”

Additionally, the Bilateral Consultative Commission is able to change the treaty without further Senate approval, according to former Senator Jim Talent (R-MO), because the drafters never bothered to define what they are able to change.

Although Senators Lugar and Kerry are portrayed as serious foreign-policy thinkers, their responses to criticisms of New START were intended to cut off debate. America needs to have a straight-forward debate on the impact of New START.

Heritage Action for America is committed to giving Americans a desperately needed voice in this debate.

Michael A. Needham is CEO of Heritage Action for America, which launched an online petition drive to defeat New START.

Read more: http://www.dodbuzz.com/2010/07/12/right-strikes-against-start/#ixzz0tWLA0lr7

[buglerbilly]

Burma is working on nuclear weapons programme, experts claim

Burma is working on a nuclear weapons programme, experts have concluded, after its existence was exposed by leaked photographs.

By Alex Spillius in Washington and Damien McElroy

Published: 12:20AM BST 26 Jul 2010


An alleged nuclear factory to which the defector had access, near the capital, Naypyidaw, captured in a satellite image


Bomb reactors, vessels used in enriching uranium, from a picture leaked by a defector and taken inside the alleged factory

An alleged nuclear factory to which the defector had access, near the capital, Naypyidaw, captured in a satellite image Bomb reactors, vessels used in enriching uranium, from a picture leaked by a defector and taken inside the alleged factory
Intelligence monitoring of the country’s arms purchases from North Korea has been intensified as a result.

Satellite tracking and electronic surveillance in particular have been stepped up. Concerns over the regime’s attempts to develop a nuclear bomb prompted the US State Department to demand last week that the ruling junta disclose an inventory of its nuclear technology.

Secret documents and hundreds of photographs smuggled out of the country by a defector indicated that it was intent on developing nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. Jane’s Intelligence Review published a separate batch of photographs showing similar activities in buildings and behind security fences near the capital, Naypyidaw.

Fears that Burma had joined a clandestine nuclear network linking North Korea, Iran, Pakistan and Syria have been growing for some time, but there has not been hard evidence until now.

Sai Thein Win, the defector, is an army major who trained as a defence engineer and missile expert.

He said he had access to two secret nuclear facilities, including a “nuclear battalion” north of Mandalay, “charged with building up a nuclear weapons capability”.

Robert Kelley, an American former senior weapons inspector with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), said the evidence was the most compelling yet.

The photographs, which were passed to the Democratic Voice of Burma, part of the Burmese opposition, showed components built with German machine tools imported through Singapore, which Mr Kelley believed indicated “nefarious purposes”.

They included a fluidised bed reactor which is used to turn a powdered form of uranium into a gas which can then be enriched to weapons grade. “They are either trying to make reactor fuel which they could buy for nothing from another country, or they are trying to make a weapon clandestinely,” said Mr Kelley.

“There is just not much point doing that unless it is for a bomb.”

Intelligence agencies are seeking to provide the IAEA with proof of a clandestine programme in the hope of a formal inquiry. Regular shipments of rocket platforms and missile technology between North Korea and Burma, as well as other clandestine links, are under scrutiny.

“There are strong suspicions over the contents of shipments, including a delivery of rockets within the last month,” said one international nuclear expert.

Washington has told Burma’s ruling generals that “they have international obligations we expect them to heed”, a State Department official said. He said the Burmese relationship with North Korea was “something that we watch very, very carefully”.

Burma, which its generals have renamed Myanmar, has made clear its nuclear ambitions by agreeing terms with Russia for the sale of a light-water research reactor.

But the deal is on hold after the generals refused to update its “small quantities protocol” with the IAEA, which exempts it from regular inspections.

The Burmese government has dismissed the latest claims as “accusations based solely on the fabrications of deserters, fugitives and exiles”.

Mr Kelley, a veteran of inspections in Libya, Iraq and South Africa, said that the machines photographed by Win were all prototypes.

“The quality of workmanship is extremely poor and their expertise is poor. I am not saying that this is a nuclear weapons programme that is about to scare us tomorrow,” he said. “What I am saying is the intent to build nuclear weapons is much more clear now.” Burma has signed a memorandum of understanding with North Korea to build Scud missiles, a conventional medium-range weapon.

North Korea has also offered assistance with underground facilities and to develop missiles with a range of 1,860 miles. The US navy recently followed a North Korean freighter heading towards Burma with unknown cargo. The ship turned around and returned home.

[buglerbilly]

Clinton Urges Senate To Move on Nuke Treaty

By AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE

Published: 11 Aug 2010 12:01

WASHINGTON - U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on Aug. 11 urged the Senate to move quickly to pass the new U.S.-Russian nuclear arms reduction treaty when it resumes debate next month.

The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee last week delayed until mid-September its vote on approving the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), the successor to one that expired in December.

Committee chairman John Kerry's decision to give Democrats and Republicans more "time to review the underlying materials ... is a gesture of good faith and underscores the tradition of bipartisan support," Clinton told reporters.

"But when the Senate returns, they must act, because our national security is at risk," the chief U.S. diplomat said.

"There is an urgency to ratify this treaty because we currently lack verification measures with Russia, which only hurts our national security interests," she said.

"Our ability to know and understand changes in Russia's nuclear arsenal will erode without the treaty," she said, adding no inspectors have been in place since the former START treaty expired in December.

Clinton said she looked forward to working with senators over the next few weeks to move the treaty from committee to the full senate for a vote.

Committee approval would send the new START to the entire Senate, where 67 votes are needed for ratification, a process President Barack Obama has said he would like to see completed in 2010.

The delay in committee debate pushes the final debate on the treaty, a top White House priority, to the last stretch before November mid-term elections at a time when Republicans are eager to deny the president any major victories.

Obama's Democratic allies and their two independent allies control only 59 votes, meaning the treaty's backers will need to rally at least eight Republicans to approve the pact.

Some Republican senators have indicated they are inclined to back the pact but say they worry about the effects on the U.S. nuclear deterrent and that they want to energize work at national nuclear laboratories to ensure the safety and reliability of the U.S. arsenal.

Clinton said: "I'm confident about the prospects for ratification."

The new START, which President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed in a landmark ceremony in Prague in April, commits the two former Cold War foes to slashing their nuclear arsenals.

Each nation will be allowed a maximum of 1,550 deployed warheads, about 30 percent lower than a limit set in 2002. They are also restricted to 700 air, ground and submarine-launched nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles.

[buglerbilly]

Ares

A Defense Technology Blog

Global Zero? What's The Russian For "Fuhgeddaboutit"?

Posted by Bill Sweetman at 8/16/2010 7:10 AM CDT

Russian defense is as reliant as ever on nuclear weapons, if not more so, a senior Russian officer told Strategic Command's Deterrence Symposium in Omaha on August 12. "Russia is unable toi guarantee its security without nuclear weapons," RAdm Mikhail Chekmasov, head of the main operational directorate of the Russian general staff, told the meeting, "NATO is expanding closer to Russia's borders and has a significant advantage in conventional forces, particularly in long-range precision-guided munitions and cruise missiles."

"Russia will continue to depend on nuclear weapons until equality is reached in conventional arms," Chekmkasov continued, and warned that a "strategic non-nuclear weapon" - a reference to the US plans for a conventional Prompt Global Strike missile - "or the weaponization of space, could lead to a new arms race."

Omaha's other Russian speaker, Dr Sergey Rogov, director of the Institute of US and Canadian studies at the Russian Academy of Science, outlined other Russian concerns about arms control, including the New START treaty now awaiting ratification. One concern is "uploading" - the US has reduced its deployed ICBM and SLBM totals by converting multi-warhead missiles to single-warhead weapons, but this process can be reversed. "We cannot do this," Rogov says. "When the [R-36M2 ICBM] class retires in a few years, we won't have the throw weight."

Some Russian leaders and experts, Rogov included, also worry that the US will try to exempt the PGS system from arms control agreements on the grounds that the boost-glide weapon is not a ballistic missile. Conventional sea-launched cruise missiles are also seen as a serious threat, and Russia is closely watching the emergence of the SM-3 Block IIB ballistic missile interceptor

"We in Russia are not reducing our reliance on deterrence," Rogov said. "The arms control regime is always on the verge of collapse - CTBT is dead, Start I has expired, CFE is not alive and ABM is dead We would like to build a new structure for strategic stability".

[buglerbilly]

START expiration ends U.S. inspection of Russian nuclear bases

By Mary Beth Sheridan
Washington Post Staff Writer

Tuesday, August 17, 2010

For the first time in 15 years, U.S. officials have lost their ability to inspect Russian long-range nuclear bases, where they had become accustomed to peering into missile silos, counting warheads and whipping out tape measures to size up rockets.

The inspections had occurred every few weeks under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. But when START expired in December, the checks stopped.

Meanwhile, in an obscure, fluorescent-lighted State Department office staffed round-the-clock, a stream of messages from Russia about routine movements of its nuclear missiles and bombers has slowed to a trickle.

The Obama administration hopes the inspections and messages will soon resume under the New START agreement, which was signed by the two countries in April. But the pact is on hold in the Senate. If it faces long delays, or is voted down, the U.S. government will lose critical insight into Russia's nuclear forces, officials say.

"The problem of the breakdown of our verification, which lapsed December 5, is very serious and impacts our national security," Sen. Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.), one of the chamber's top nuclear experts, said in a recent hearing.

In months of debate over New START, there has been little focus on the implications of the lapse in nuclear checks. Instead, hearings have centered on such issues as whether the pact would inhibit U.S. missile defense.

"I thought we were just going to continue doing business as usual" as the replacement treaty was debated, Sen. Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.) said when a reporter noted the inspection cutoff.

The Obama administration has emphasized that New START will require the United States and Russia to reduce their nuclear arsenals. But many experts say the verification measures matter even more.

That's not because they think a nuclear attack is imminent. But even two decades after the end of the Cold War, Russia has about 2,500 deployed nukes capable of hitting the United States. U.S. officials like to keep an eye on them.

"Without the [new] treaty and its verification measures, the United States would have much less insight into Russian strategic forces, thereby requiring our military to plan based on worst-case assumptions," Jim Miller, a senior nuclear policy official in the Pentagon, testified last month. "This would be an expensive and potentially destabilizing approach."

Kyl and other Republicans say that before voting on a pact that reduces the nation's stockpiles, they want to ensure there is enough money to modernize the nuclear complex. They say they should not rush the treaty because the monitoring measures have expired.

"It's not an argument for voting before you know all the facts," said Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.).

For the Cold Warriors who plodded through arms-control talks back in the 1980s, getting inspectors onto the other guy's bases was a major breakthrough.

"It was the holy grail to get on-site inspections, boots on the ground in the Soviet Union," said Franklin Miller, who worked in arms control for more than two decades, ending up as special assistant to President George W. Bush.

Even without those inspections, the U.S. and Russian governments can still check on each other's forces by using reconnaissance satellites and radar. But those methods are not perfect.

For example, a satellite cannot peer into a Russian underground silo and see whether the missile inside is carrying one nuclear bomb or 10, officials say.

"One of our dirty little secrets is, when the [Berlin] Wall went down, the United States reoriented a lot of intelligence capacity away from the Soviet Union and Russia. To some fair degree . . . the IC [intelligence community] was relying on U.S. inspectors to be on the ground," Miller said.

The "boots on the ground" include people such as Phil Smith, a former Air Force crew chief for nuclear-tipped missiles. He has made about 20 inspection visits to Russian nuclear facilities.

"We have 15 years of experience under START, understanding where everything is. We've been through these sites multiple times," he said in an interview.

The U.S. teams typically arrive at Russian bases with only about a day's notice. Many of the inspectors' methods are surprisingly low-tech: They stretch tape measures along missiles and poke flashlights into trailers. The inspections allow each side to count nuclear weapons on a sampling of missiles, bombers or submarine launch tubes and look around one another's maintenance facilities and test ranges.

"If something is atypical . . . I will not be bashful about saying, 'Okay, we need to take a closer look at this one.' That's the kind of dynamic you have on the ground that you wouldn't have with a satellite," Smith said.

Inspectors check what they see against a database compiled by both sides with the numbers, characteristics and locations of their long-range nuclear weapons.

Until December, both sides updated that database constantly. Russia sent about 1,500 notifications a year to a special computer at the State Department's Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, where a "ding-dong" would signal an incoming message. ("It sounds like Avon calling," explained one technician.)

The messages, which the center distributed to U.S. security agencies, included information on upcoming inspections, the destruction of nuclear launchers and movement of nuclear-capable missiles and bombers.

"Now we don't get any of that information. We have less and less visibility into their status of forces," said Ned Williams, the director of the center. (Notifications of missile test launches have continued, to ensure that neither side mistakenly thinks a nuclear attack is underway.)

Few experts dispute the value of having inspections. But some critics have argued that New START is not as good as its predecessor.

The Obama administration "agreed to gut the monitoring and verification measures and limitations necessary to render it effectively verifiable," said Paula DeSutter, the assistant secretary of state for verification in the George W. Bush administration.

For example, she said, the Obama administration acquiesced to a Russian demand to exchange less telemetry -- the flight data from ballistic missile tests. That information helps U.S. officials understand the number of warheads the Russians will load onto their missiles. Under New START, the Russians are required to provide the data from only five tests, instead of all 10 or 12 they do annually.

U.S. officials say the change is not significant because, under the new treaty, they will be counting the number of warheads on missiles and not using estimates, as was the case before. They contend that the new treaty will help each side get a more accurate count by assigning an ID number to each warhead and launcher.

Although U.S. nuclear inspectors are not traveling to Russia these days, they are busy training, sometimes with mock "Russian" inspectors.

The idea, Smith said, is "to make sure when we're called upon to do this, we're ready to go."

[buglerbilly]

Kerry: No Nuclear Treaty Vote Before Elections

AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE

Published: 14 Sep 2010 15:00

WASHINGTON - The U.S. Senate should put off its final vote on a landmark nuclear arms control treaty until after November legislative elections, the senior U.S. lawmaker leading the ratification effort said Sept. 14.

"I think that to push it in the next week or two would be a mistake given the election," said Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman John Kerry, whose panel was set to vote on the pact on Sept. 16.

"Let's just get it out of the committee and hopefully set it up to do without any politics, without any election atmospherics, as a matter of national security when we come back in the lame duck," said the Democrat, referring to the legislative session after the elections.

Kerry warned colleagues reluctant to back the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) that Russia's lower house of parliament, the Duma, was watching how US lawmakers handle ratification of the accord.

"The Duma is waiting. (Russian) President (Dmitry) Medvedev said this to me personally, that they're waiting to see what happens here and how the treaty is treated in the United States," said Kerry. "We have to be sensitive to that."

Ratification requires 67 votes in the Senate. Democrats and their two independent allies hold 59 seats, meaning they cannot approve START without Republican support.

The top Republican on Kerry's committee, Senator Richard Lugar, worked over a six-week August break to craft a resolution addressing the party's main concerns - chiefly worries about the fate of US missile defense programs and plans for modernizing the existing U.S. arsenal.

The treaty - signed by Medvedev and U.S. President Barack Obama at an elaborate ceremony in Prague in April - restricts each nation to a maximum of 1,550 deployed warheads, a cut of about 30 percent from a limit set in 2002.

Vice President Joe Biden, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Defense Secretary Robert Gates have been working to win over wary Republicans "over the last weeks," said Kerry.

When the treaty finally reaches the senate floor for a full ratification vote, "it could be done in a matter of two days, it could be less, it might take three," the Massachusetts Democrat added, expressing confidence lawmakers would approve it.

"I think the record will be so clear and so extensive that most questions will have been answered."

[buglerbilly]

Bolton is STILL Wrong on Start

By Colin Clark Wednesday, September 15th, 2010 9:59 am



With the Senate likely to vote on the new START treaty this week, activists are eager to ensure every senator has what they think is the right information. John Bolton, former Bush administration honcho on arms controls, fired another salvo in the Wall Street Journal, arguing that the Obama administration is wrong to count converted boomers as nuclear assets. Dennis M. Gormley, a former intelligence professional who now teaches at the University of Pittsburg’s Ridgway Center, strikes back at Bolton here. arguing that the Joint Chiefs actually know what they are doing and that Bolton is wrong.

In yet another hollow attack on the Obama administration’s efforts to proceed successfully with Senate ratification of the New START treaty, John Bolton argues that by choosing to count formerly nuclear-armed launchers (land-based and submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers) that are converted to carry conventional weapons as if they were nuclear-armed, the U.S. will reduce its ability to project conventional power around the globe. In doing so, Bolton insults the professional judgment and integrity of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by insinuating that they bowed to White House pressure to live with such treaty strictures or else face adverse career consequences. Nothing could be further from the truth.

The key to achieving such power projection capabilities, Bolton argues, depends on a new concept called “conventional prompt global strike.” Some missing facts about this concept are in order. When the Air Force conceived of the global strike concept in the mid-1990s, it initially entailed the use of conventionally armed fighters and bombers, later joined by Navy Tomahawk cruise missiles. The concept became much more controversial when the Bush administration reportedly added a nuclear dimension to an otherwise modest conventional component. This was consistent with that administration’s 2002 Nuclear Posture Review, which conflated conventional and nuclear weapons as if they were of similar consequence.

Conventional prompt global strike became even more controversial when the Bush Pentagon proposed in 2006 to spend $500 million on replacing nuclear warheads on some Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles to achieve prompt (within one hour) strikes on high-priority targets, such a underground facilities, terrorists, or missile launchers. The danger, of course, is that these missiles might inadvertently appear to be the leading edge of a nuclear attack on Russian nuclear targets, with untold consequences. While John Bolton appears unconcerned about such a scenario, the bipartisan National Research Council (NRC) concluded in a report rendered before the 2008 election that “the ambiguity between nuclear and conventional payloads can never be totally resolved.”

The NRC did in fact endorse a highly circumscribed application for the conventionally armed Trident against a fleeting terrorist or rogue state target, which would involve no more than one to four such weapons. However, the Congress has remained adamant about refusing to fund for such a project.

Wisely, the Obama administration has instead turned to a land-based ballistic missile located separate from nuclear silo fields with a provision for inspection by Russia to allay any remaining concerns. Given the limited number of conventionally armed long-range ballistic missiles that would be required to deal with terrorist or rogue state missile launches, New START’s counting rules would have virtually no effect on maintaining ample nuclear strike capability under the treaty’s limit of 700 delivery vehicles and 1550 warheads.

Thus, Bolton’s so-called “birds in hand” (his assumption that were the 2002 Treaty of Moscow, which only covered limits on nuclear warheads, not launchers, to govern future decision-making on conventional prompt global strike, large numbers of U.S. launchers would be available for conventional use. But such a pipe dream is belied by the virtually unanimous rejection by Congress and defense specialists of converting large numbers of legacy nuclear systems due to their inherent warning ambiguity. So much for Bolton’s “birds in hand.”

What truly is at hand in regard to long-range conventional strike? Bolton neglects to mention that the U.S. Navy has converted four of its 18 Trident Ohio-class submarines, each of which can carry 154 Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles for a total of 616 missiles. The latest version of this missile features a two-way satellite data link that permits it to attack one of 16 preprogrammed targets or take new GPS coordinates to attack a fleeting target of opportunity.

If today’s subsonic Tomahawks are insufficiently “prompt,” the Navy is at work developing a supersonic cruise missile and has investigated a concept for a “sea-launched global strike missile,” while the Pentagon’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is working on the X-51 hypersonic cruise missile, designed to strike out to 600 miles in 10 minutes.

Moreover, the U.S. Navy is moving ahead with the carrier-based X-47B unmanned combat air vehicle-a high-performance aircraft without a pilot-that promises a novel form of networked drone warfare capable of dealing with the most challenging time-sensitive targets. During the 2006 war in Lebanon, Israeli forces struggled to find and attack Hezbollah’s ubiquitous short-range Katyusha rockets, which can be emplaced by one man in a matter of seconds.

However, Israeli air and ground forces effectively flooded the skies with UAVs networked together to provide loitering aircraft with precise targeting coordinates of medium– and long-range Hezbollah rocket launchers. Consequently, Israel destroyed between 80 and 90 percent of these longer-range rocket launchers (around 125), all within a time frame of between 45 and 60 seconds between detection and attack.

Thus, while future long-range conventional ballistic missiles will count under New START’s counting rules, the impact of employing only a small number of legacy nuclear delivery missiles is patently insignificant. There is no damaging trade-off between conventional and nuclear capabilities, as Bolton suggests. Truly global U.S. force projection capabilities are already unparalleled and destined to evolve even more so.

And perhaps the most important dimension of America’s conventional superiority is that a good portion of it is based in forward areas-unlike Bolton’s wish to see conventional prompt global strike based largely on U.S. territory. This provides lasting assurance to allies and friends that America’s robust conventional capabilities are confidently committed for both deterrence and war fighting.

Dennis M. Gormley is a Senior Research Fellow at the University of Pittsburg’s Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Security Studies. Gormley served on the panel assisting the Deputy Director of National Intelligence (Analysis) plan and implement the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations for improving intelligence integration. He served in the intelligence community for 10 years, including as head of foreign intelligence at the Army’s Harry Diamond Laboratories in Washington.

Read more: http://www.dodbuzz.com/2010/09/15/bolton-is-still-wrong-on-start/#ixzz0zbsaJbd3

[buglerbilly]

U.S.-Russia Arms Treaty Advances In Senate

By OLIVIER KNOX, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE

Published: 17 Sep 2010 12:18

WASHINGTON - President Obama urged the full U.S. Senate on Sept. 16 to approve a landmark nuclear treaty with Russia, after the pact won a key committee's crucial support despite stiff Republican opposition.

"I urge the full Senate to move forward quickly with a vote to approve this Treaty," Obama said after the Senate Foreign Relations Committee endorsed the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) by a 14-4 margin.

The panel's action sent the agreement to the full Senate for a final vote expected this year, but after the Nov. 2 mid-term elections, with the outcome uncertain because of Republican resistance.

"Ratification of this treaty will reinforce our cooperation with Russia on a range of issues, including one of our highest priorities - preventing the spread of nuclear weapons," Obama said.

The treaty - signed by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Obama at an elaborate ceremony in Prague in April - restricts each nation to a maximum of 1,550 deployed warheads, a cut of about 30 percent from a limit set in 2002.

The agreement, a top Obama foreign policy initiative, replaces a previous accord that lapsed in December 2009 and also requires ratification by Russia's lower house, the Duma.

"I personally believe we will have the votes to ratify this," said Democratic Sen. John Kerry, the committee's chairman, after the panel acted. "The stakes are enormous."

U.S. Senate ratification requires 67 votes. Democrats control 59 seats, and just three Republicans on Kerry's committee voted in favor of the accord, with four against.

"When we ratify this treaty, we limit Russia's nuclear arsenal, regain the ability to inspect their nuclear forces, and redouble international support for our nonproliferation efforts to counter the spread of nuclear weapons to rogue nations like Iran and North Korea," Kerry said.

Republicans have charged the accord could hamper U.S. missile defense plans - a charge denied by the Pentagon - have concerns about Russian implementation, and want assurances about plans to modernize the existing U.S. nuclear arsenal.

The panel approved by voice vote a resolution of ratification authored by its top Republican, Sen. Richard Lugar, to address those concerns, with Republican Sen. James Risch the sole "no."

Lugar said his resolution declared that the treaty "imposes no limitations on the development and the deployment of U.S. missile defenses" apart from forbidding the conversion of some existing launch mechanisms.

It also restated U.S. policy to deploy a missile defense system to thwart rogue launches as soon as technologically possible, and emphasized the importance of ensuring Russian compliance and modernizing the U.S. arsenal.

Lugar also highlighted that U.S. inspectors in Russia had been unable to do their jobs since the previous treaty lapsed, and stressed the need to have U.S. "boots on the ground" to verify compliance.

Risch said the U.S. intelligence community had provided "troubling" information recently to the Senate Intelligence Committee, but Kerry shot back that the community had also not changed its support of the treaty.

Lawmakers were tight-lipped about the details, but the top Republican on the Senate Intelligence Committee, Kit Bond, warned in a statement about "the treaty's lack of verification necessary to detect Russian cheating."

Asked if there were anything new given longstanding allegations of Russian non-compliance, Risch told reporters: "You haven't seen the same stuff I've seen," but would not elaborate.

Risch won committee approval of an amendment calling for modernizing the U.S. nuclear arsenal, even as the panel rejected several amendments that Kerry warned would have the effect of killing the treaty.

The panel also approved, after diluting it, an amendment from Republican Sen. Jim DeMint recommitting Washington to deploying a missile defense system - a proposal that has drawn frequent, angry opposition from Moscow.

DeMint was absent for the vote.

[buglerbilly]

US Approval of START Treaty Looks Shaky

November 10, 2010

Associated Press

WASHINGTON -- Senate approval of President Obama's nuclear arms treaty with Russia, which once looked close to a sure thing, is now in jeopardy.

The administration is scrambling to get enough Republican support in the Senate to ratify the New START treaty before the Democrats' majority shrinks by six in January. But Republicans have little incentive to give Obama a big political boost after leaving him reeling from their strong gains in last week's congressional elections.

A failure to win passage could trip up one of the administration's top foreign policy goals: improving relations with Russia. The treaty, signed in April by Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, has been the most tangible sign of success, and failure to get it ratified could be viewed as a rebuke in Moscow. It also would leave Obama's push for even greater restrictions on the world's nuclear arsenal in doubt.

Some Republicans have argued that the treaty would limit U.S. missile defense options and does not provide adequate procedures to verify that Russia is living up to its terms. Advocates dispute both charges.

The Obama administration is worried that ratification could slip out of reach if a vote were to be delayed. Ellen Tauscher, the undersecretary of state for arms control, said this week that the lame-duck session Congress will convene before most newly elected senators take their seats in January could be the administration's last shot.

"Our last opportunity to do it coming forward is in the lame duck," she said. "I think that, frankly, because of the way the numbers are working, it's the best opportunity to do it."

Republicans will gain one vote part of the way through the lame-duck session because they won a special election for Obama's former seat in Illinois. That will increase the GOP's Senate numbers temporarily to 42 in the 100-member chamber.

Since the election, senior administration officials, including Vice President Joe Biden and Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, have been pressing the case for ratification with Republican lawmakers. A long list of retired generals and senior statesmen from both parties have expressed support, arguing that that the treaty should be beyond politics.

But its best shot seems to lie in a political deal with one key Republican senator.

Republican Jon Kyl has wielded the most sway in his party on the issue. He has been negotiating with the administration for months and pinning support for the treaty to a boost in funding to modernize the U.S. stockpile of nuclear weapons. A number of his Republican colleagues have said they will follow his lead on the treaty. His approval could push support beyond the 67 votes the administration needs for ratification, although many Republicans still are likely to oppose it.

The administration has countered Kyl by warning that the lame-duck session also will be his last chance to get the money he is seeking for the nuclear stockpile because Democrats will not support him next year should the treaty fail.

The treaty would reduce the limit on strategic warheads to 1,550 for each country from the current ceiling of 2,200. It also would set up new procedures to allow both countries to inspect each other's arsenals to verify compliance.

Treaty advocates have been warning that the United States has not had nuclear inspectors in Russia since December, when a previous treaty expired. They say Republicans who have opposed the treaty are endangering national security by delaying the inspectors' return.

Arlen Jameson, a retired Air Force general and former deputy chief of the Strategic Air Command, says a long delay in returning U.S. inspectors could force the U.S. military and intelligence agencies to find other ways to monitor Russian nuclear forces. He said that would involve costly monitoring by satellites that would shift scarce intelligence resources from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

"The needs for overhead monitoring is already under great stress," he said. "The expense will not be transparent because it will be not made publicly available, but it will be enormous."

© Copyright 2010 Associated Press. All rights reserved.

[buglerbilly]

Obama pledges $4 billion more for nuke complex in bid to pass START, sources say

By Mary Beth Sheridan and Walter Pincus

Saturday, November 13, 2010; 12:01 AM

In a last-minute bid to save a nuclear arms treaty with Russia, the Obama administration has offered to spend $4 billion more over five years on the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, congressional sources said Friday.

President Obama has made passage of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or START, one of his top priorities for the lame-duck session starting next week. Officials worry that the pact could face long delays, or even fail, if it is put off until next year, when the Democrats' Senate majority will shrink.

Republicans have conditioned their support for the treaty on a big budget increase to fix up the country's aging weapons-production facilities.

Administration officials went to Capitol Hill on Friday and said the White House was prepared to add $4.1 billion for nuclear facilities, according to one congressional aide, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the talks were private. That is on top of a $10 billion increase the administration had already promised over the next decade.

Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) said that the meeting with his staff "went well" but that he needed to scrutinize the numbers further. He said he was unsure whether there was time in the lame-duck session to pass the treaty.

"I'm open, there's just a lot to accomplish. . . . People haven't had time to digest the details of what's happened" with the budget proposal, he said.

Corker said he was puzzled over why it took so long to come up with the extra funds.

"It's a head-scratcher. It's kind of like, where's everybody been for the last six or seven weeks?" he said.

Under the treaty, the United States and Russia would cut the number of long-range deployed nuclear weapons by up to 30 percent. Perhaps, more important, it would reinstate a system under which each country could check on each other's stockpiles.

That verification system lapsed when the first START treaty expired in December, and military officials are anxious to resume inspections.

The White House declined to confirm the added $4 billion offer. But a senior official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, noted that Vice President Biden had promised senators that the administration would revise its spending plan after they complained the first increase was insufficient.

Asked why it took so long to provide the new figures, the official said: "We are expediting a budget process that usually takes until Feb. 1."

[I]sheridanm@washpost.com pincusw@washpost.com

[buglerbilly]

Barack Obama confident on ratifying START treaty

US President Barack Obama said on Sunday he felt "reasonably good" about the chances of the Senate ratifying a major nuclear arms reduction pact with Russia this year.


The new START treaty would reduce the limit on strategic warheads to 1,550 for each country from the current ceiling of 2,200 Photo: EPA

10:48PM GMT 14 Nov 2010

The Obama administration has been locked in heated negotiations with Republican lawmakers over the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which slashes US and Russian nuclear arsenals.

"My hope and expectation is that given this is a good treaty, given it has the support of previous Republican senior government officials, we should be able to get it done," Mr Obama said aboard Air Force One as he flew home from a trip to Asia.

He noted Russia's co-operation with the United States on Iran sanctions and facilitating the transit of supplies into Afghanistan for US troops.

Mr Obama earlier met his Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev on the sidelines of a Pacific Rim summit in Japan on the last day of his Asia visit.

The new US Congress takes office in January, with Republicans set to take control of the House of Representatives and to add members to the Senate after making huge gains in recent elections.

The next two months are therefore known as a "lame duck" session, potentially slowing progress on pushing the deal forward amid fears Republicans will stall to press for more concessions.

Mr Obama said he felt "reasonably good about our prospects" for getting the treaty passed through lame duck session.

The START treaty, which was negotiated earlier this year to replace a similar treaty which expired at the end of December, faces stiff opposition in the United States amid fears it could hamper national missile defence plans.

The White House says ratifying the treaty is a vital national security priority, and failure to move on it would harm the "reset" in relations the Obama administration engineered between the two former Cold War foes.

Moscow said on Friday it hoped the outcome of the US midterm elections would not affect ties with Washington.

Under the US Constitution, treaties need the approval of two thirds of the Senate, meaning Mr Obama's Democratic allies will need to pick up considerable Republican support.

The treaty – signed by Mr Medvedev and Mr Obama at an elaborate ceremony in Prague in April – restricts each nation to a maximum of 1,550 deployed warheads, a cut of about 30 per cent from a limit set in 2002.

But a growing number of Republicans have voiced opposition, saying it would impede the US ability to set up missile defences against future potential threats such as Iran.

During his talks with Mr Medvedev, Mr Obama assured the Russian president that passing the treaty this year was a "top priority."

[buglerbilly]

U.S. JCS Chairman Makes Military’s Case for START Ratification

08:44 GMT, November 15, 2010

PALO ALTO, Calif. | The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Friday delivered the military argument for Senate ratification of the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and talked about the future of deterrence.

Speaking at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, Navy Adm. Mike Mullen said “the stars may have aligned” to pass the new START pact the United States negotiated with Russia.

“Deterrence today is tougher and more complex. More than one nation can now reach out and touch us with nuclear missiles,” Mullen said to a star-studded audience that included former secretaries of state George Shultz, Condoleezza Rice and Henry Kissinger, and former Defense Secretary William J. Perry. “Americans are potential targets of terrorism wherever they travel, and regional instability in several places around the globe could easily erupt into large-scale conflict.

“Yet, we have done precious little spadework to advance the theory of deterrence,” he continued, noting the lack of serious discussion on deterrence since the end of the Cold War. “It is as if we all breathed a collective sigh of relief when the Soviet Union collapsed and said to ourselves, ‘Well, I guess we don't need to worry about that anymore.’ We were wrong. The demands of deterrence evolve.”

The new treaty will help with the discussion, Mullen said, and the time is right. The stars are aligning for passage, he added.

“A flood of Soviet troops into Afghanistan dissolved support for SALT II in the United States, whereas the fall of the Berlin Wall and later the Soviet Union may well have hastened the signing and ratification of START,” Mullen said. “Today, we lack a similar treaty with Russia. In fact, we haven’t had one for almost a year now. But the arms buildup in the aftermath of SALT II’s disintegration highlights the necessity for some sort of understanding, some sort of verifiable reduction and monitoring regime.”

It is in the interest of both the United States and Russia to ratify this treaty, the chairman told the audience. From the military aspect, the new START treaty “allows us to retain a strong and flexible American nuclear deterrent,” Mullen said.

“It strengthens openness and transparency in our relationship with Russia,” he added.

The treaty also demonstrates America’s commitment to nuclear arms reductions, Mullen said. “I am convinced that New START - permitting us as it does 1,550 aggregate warheads and the freedom to create our own force posture within that limit – leaves us with more than enough nuclear deterrent capability for the world we live in,” he explained.

Mullen said he’s convinced the treaty preserves the nuclear triad and retains U.S. flexibility to continue deploying conventional global strike capabilities.

“I am also convinced that the verification regime is as stringent as it is transparent, and borne of more than 15 years of lessons learned under the original START treaty,” he said.

The new treaty provides for 18 inspections annually, and for sharing data concerning the numbers, locations and technical characteristics of systems subject to the treaty, the admiral noted.

“In other words, we’ll know a lot more about Russian systems and intentions than we do right now,” he said. “And as I have said many times, in many different contexts, in this fast-paced, flatter world of ours, information, and the trust it engenders, is every bit as much a deterrent as any weapon we deploy.”

Because he worries about “what I don’t know and what I can’t see,” Mullen said, the treaty’s inspection provisions are critical.

“So, I believe, and the rest of the military leadership in this country believes, that this treaty is essential to our future security,” said the chairman told the audience. “I believe it enhances and ensures that security. And I hope the Senate will ratify it quickly.”

----
Jim Garamone
American Forces Press Service

[buglerbilly]

Ares

A Defense Technology Blog

An End to New Start, or a proper Kickstart?

Posted by KristinMajcher at 11/16/2010 5:31 AM CST

The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (Start) has been the subject of a lot of mainstream media fodder over the weekend, but it nonetheless remains to be seen if the arms control measure will get the 67 votes it needs to pass in the "lame duck" Congress.

According to recent reports like this Associated Press story, President Barack Obama has offered up $4.1 billion more to modernize U.S. nuclear arsenal and laboratories for fiscal 2012 to 2016, on top of the $80 billion the administration previously proposed to modernize nuclear warheads and infrastructure over the course of 10 years.

But that kind of money would have to be appropriated year after year throughout this period, so his offer really remains just a suggestion that future Congresses would have to back up time and time again.

Although the $4.1 billion could be construed as a significant surge in funding, the negotiation isn't that big of a surprise. This is really Obama’s last chance to appease skeptical lawmakers such as Sen. John Kyl (R-Ariz.), a key player in garnering Republican support for the treaty. The administration has been promising for a while to invest in nuclear capabilities, but Kyl and others sensed hesitation and wanted to see the White House put its money where its mouth is.

Kyl has championed increased spending for modernization, and his opinion could be vital to the final Senate vote. However, the Arizona senator has not commented on the likelihood of this hypothetical surge in funding changing his mind to support New Start ratification.

The administration's last-ditch attempt for Republican support is nicely paired with today’s Washington Post op-ed from U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Defense Secretary Robert Gates, which reinforces what the duo has been saying all along: New Start is good for nuclear de-arming, a necessary step for better foreign relations between the U.S. and Russia, and at the very least it would allow U.S. inspectors to conduct 18 short-notice checks of Russian weapons every year and limit each country’s strategic warheads to 1,550 instead of the maximum 2,200 allowed under the 2002 Moscow Treaty.

Supporters of the treaty stress the immediate importance of in-person arsenal inspections, which ceased with the exipration of the last Start treaty in December 2009.

But even though New Start has strong support from U.S. policymakers, past and present, some conservative groups are still adamantly against the new treaty.

“No amount of money can obscure the treaty’s fatal flaws, including inadequate verification measures and limits on missile defense,” said Michael Needham, chief executive of the conservative think tank lobby group Heritage Action for America.

Heritage and others see any overt restraint on U.S. missile defenses to be undesirable, and they argue that in New Start America gives too much away to Russia, which does not face the same global military needs. The reference to inadequate verification refers to the lower amount of inspections compared with older Start practices.

But Daryl Kimball, head of the nonpartisan Arms Control Association, says he thinks Congress has already put enough into modernization funding and indicated that the possible new funds would be just another strain on taxpayers.

“If Kyl and the Republican leadership don’t take yes for an answer, it’s clear to me that the fragile consensus for higher funding for the weapons complex is going to fall apart,” he says

And proponents argue that the 18 inspections are enough considering the fact that Russian nuclear facilities have shrunk since the Cold War.

So readers, do you think more modernization money for the nuclear weapons complex could have important implications for the defense industry? Or should New Start be stopped?

[buglerbilly]

Kyl statement deals serious setback to Obama's push for START

By Mary Beth Sheridan and Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writers

Wednesday, November 17, 2010; 2:34 AM

One of President Obama's top foreign-policy goals suffered a potentially ruinous setback when the Senate's second-ranking Republican said the U.S. nuclear treaty with Russia should not be considered until next year.

The statement Tuesday by Sen. Jon Kyl (Ariz.) stunned the White House and Democrats, who scrambled to save the pact. It came just days after Obama declared that ratifying the treaty was his top foreign-policy priority for the lame-duck session of Congress.

The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) needs 67 votes to pass. Because of Democratic losses in the midterm elections, it would be harder to approve next year, requiring at least 14 Republican votes rather than nine now.

The administration will make a last-ditch effort Wednesday to appeal to Kyl, the Republicans' main negotiator, in a meeting including Vice President Biden, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, several officials said.

"Failure to pass the New START treaty this year would endanger our national security," Biden warned in a statement Tuesday.

Kyl's decision came despite an administration offer Friday to pour an extra $4.1 billion into modernization of the nation's nuclear complex. Because the treaty would reduce both sides' stockpiles of nuclear weapons, Republicans have insisted that the administration spend more money to ensure that existing U.S. weapons are well maintained.

Kyl's decision reflects a more assertive Republican stance following the midterm elections.

"The price [for getting the treaty] went up after the elections. Everyone should have known that," said Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center.

The New START treaty is the centerpiece of Obama's "reset" of relations with Russia - a policy that the administration credits with producing critical cooperation from Moscow on Iran and Afghanistan.

If the treaty were to fail, Obama's ability to negotiate other treaties would be damaged, foreign diplomats say.

New START reduces each side's deployed, long-range weapons from 2,200 to 1,550. More critically in the eyes of U.S. military leaders, it allows each side to inspect the other's nuclear forces, to ensure there is no hidden buildup. Such inspections stopped when an earlier treaty expired last year.

"Without ratification of this treaty, we will have no Americans on the ground to inspect Russia's nuclear activities . . . [and] less cooperation between the two nations that account for 90 percent of the world's nuclear weapons," Biden said.

Some key Republicans have said they are prepared to approve the treaty if there is stronger ratification language ensuring that it doesn't crimp U.S. missile defense, and if they are assured that existing American weapons will be maintained.

Democrats seemed unsure whether the delay amounted to a death knell for the treaty, but their leaders vowed to fight on.

"I do not believe the door is closed to considering New START during the lame-duck session," Sen. John F. Kerry (D-Mass.), head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said after talking to Kyl.

Kyl, in a statement released Tuesday morning, said he had told Senate Majority Leader Harry M. Reid (D-Nev.) that "I did not think" the treaty could be considered during the lame-duck session because of other congressional work "and the complex and unresolved issues related to START and modernization."

"I appreciate the recent effort by the administration to address some of the issues we have raised and I look forward to continuing to work with Senator Kerry" and the administration, Kyl said.

Senior U.S. officials said they found the statement jarring because Kyl had sent the administration questions Monday night about the extra $4.1 billion for the nuclear complex, which officials interpreted as a sign that a deal might be close.

Still, leading Republicans have cautioned in recent days that it would be difficult to set aside three days or more for a treaty during a session crowded with tax and budget issues.

And there have been growing calls by conservatives to hold off on START until next year. Former Alaska governor Sarah Palin has told newly elected Republican lawmakers not to "listen to desperate politically motivated arguments about the need for hasty consideration" of the treaty.

Sokolski said Democratic fears about ratifying the pact in the new Senate seemed overblown.

"Since when, if the leadership decides, does somebody have the votes to overwhelm the leadership? The tea party did well, but not that well," he said.

Five Republicans who are opposed to the treaty discussed their concerns in a report released last month by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

They said the treaty's limit of 700 deployed nuclear delivery systems was "a bad deal" because it required more U.S. than Russian reductions. They also said the 10-year funding proposed for modernizing the nuclear complex - a total of $84.1 billion - was "a good start" but did not meet the total need.

sheridanm@washpost.com pincusw@washpost.com

Staff writer Karen DeYoung contributed to this report.

[buglerbilly]

U.S. allies in Europe concerned about a possible failure of New START

By Mary Beth Sheridan
Washington Post Staff Writer

Sunday, November 21, 2010; 8:45 PM

President Obama's trip to Europe this past weekend has revealed a growing alarm among U.S. allies over the possible failure of a U.S.-Russia nuclear arms treaty, with many warning that it would hurt the West's efforts to deal with Iran and with Russian weapons near Eastern Europe.

Obama comes home from the NATO summit facing one of the most significant showdowns of his presidency: trying to win ratification of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) before the Senate adjourns in December.

Jon Kyl (Ariz), the second-ranking Republican senator, said last week he did not think there was time to bring it up during the current lame-duck session.

But Obama has forced the issue, reflecting Democrats' belief that if the treaty is pushed into next year, it could become a political issue for an emboldened Republican Party. The pact currently needs nine Republican votes to pass the full Senate but will need 14 next year.

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton emphasized Sunday that political leaders appealed for passage of the treaty during the NATO summit, including German Chancellor Angela Merkel, NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and leaders from Eastern and Central Europe.

"Now, why are they saying that? Not because they have a dog in the hunt between Republicans and Democrats in our country. It's because they know that this would be an important treaty for the continuing cooperation between Russia and the United States," she said on "Fox News Sunday."

Kyl, a frequent guest on Sunday talk shows, did not appear. He has said little publicly about the treaty in recent days, but he has continued to hold private talks with Democratic senators.

Not ratifying the treaty could be a deep blow to the U.S. "re-set" with Russia, according to U.S. and foreign officials. The warming relations with Russia have fed closer cooperation on Afghanistan and Iran, with Moscow supporting tougher U.N. sanctions on the latter and canceling the sale of S-300 anti-aircraft missiles to Tehran.

There is another reason that Europeans are worried: Without New START, it will be difficult to carry through on Obama's plans to hold follow-up talks on reducing the thousands of smaller Russian nuclear weapons within range of Eastern and Central Europe. Like its predecessor, signed in 1991, New START deals only with long-range weapons aimed at the United States.

"We see this treaty as a prologue, as an entrance to start talks about sub-strategical weaponry, which is much more even dangerous" than the bigger weapons, said Foreign Minister Audronius Azubalis of Lithuania at a news conference at which six foreign ministers appealed for approval of New START. "We who are living in Eastern Europe especially, know this."

The New START treaty would reduce by up to 30 percent the deployed, long-range warheads of both nuclear giants. It would also restart a system in which inspectors from each country monitor the other's stockpiles, to ensure there is no secret buildup.

For the first time in 15 years, the two nuclear giants are not directly checking on one other's arsenals because of the expiration of the first START treaty a year ago. That worries U.S. military officials; few foresee an immediate threat from Russia, but it remains the only country with sufficient nuclear firepower to destroy the United States.

"We haven't had what we had before, which is a level of transparency, a level of predictability, a level of certainty with the Russians," said Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on CNN's "State of the Union" Sunday.

The European calls for ratification come on top of an intense effort by the Obama administration to win the pact's approval. Past Republican secretaries of state Henry A. Kissinger and James A. Baker III joined former Democratic Cabinet members at the White House last week in a show of support.

Kyl, his party's de facto negotiator, has indicated he could give Republicans the green light to support the pact if the Obama administration came up with enough money to modernize the country's aging nuclear weapons labs.

The administration first promised a $10 billion increase over the $70 billion budget for the nuclear complex over the next decade. It sweetened its offer on Nov. 12 with another $4 billion.

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates bluntly warned on Sunday that the modernization program is "very much at risk" if the treaty is not approved.

But Kyl has begun to face pressure from the right, with the Heritage Foundation's grass-roots lobbying arm sending out direct-mail warnings in several states that New START "severely weakens our national security."

Republicans also say they are concerned about the treaty's language on missile defense. Its preamble mentions an "inter-relationship" between nuclear weapons and missile defense, which some Russian officials have indicated would limit U.S. development of its system.

The Obama administration has disputed that and has noted that the language is non-binding.

Some Republicans also question the significance of the treaty, saying it would do little to constrain a growing threat from Iran.

"I think it's a good thing to reduce those [nuclear] inventories. But anybody that alleges that a START treaty is going to affect the behavior of Iran or any other rogue nation in their desire to acquire nuclear weapons, that's just damn foolishness," said Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) at a conference organized by the Foreign Policy Initiative think tank.

Some diplomats and former U.S. officials argue the opposite.

The treaty does "reduce the level of nuclear weapons. It gives us street cred in this area to then appeal to others, or lean on others. . . . If we can't ratify this, then we just undermine our credibility," said Richard Haass, who held senior positions under President George H.W. Bush and President George W. Bush and now heads the Council on Foreign Relations.

At the NATO summit, reporters asked the foreign ministers who held a news conference on START whether the Obama administration had put them up to it.

Danish Foreign Minister Lene Espersen replied that it was her idea.

"I'm also the chairman of the Conservative Party in Denmark, which is the sister party of the Republican Party," she said. "So nobody will ever accuse me of being soft on security."

[amtp10f]

There is a very good article in the Fall edition of theAir and Space Power Journal (http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj10/fal10/2010_3.pdf) which puts forward a compelling argument for the US to resume nuclear testing (and design).

[buglerbilly]

The irrelevance of START

By Charles Krauthammer

Friday, November 26, 2010

It's a lame-duck session. Time is running out. Unemployment is high, the economy is dangerously weak and, with five weeks to go, no one knows what tax anyone will be paying on everything from income to dividends to death when the current rates expire Jan. 1. And what is the president demanding that Congress pass as "a top priority"? To what did he devote his latest weekly radio address? Ratification of his New START treaty.

Good grief. Even among national security concerns, New START is way down at the bottom of the list. From the naval treaties of the 1920s to this day, arms control has oscillated between mere symbolism at its best to major harm at its worst, with general uselessness being the norm.

The reason is obvious. The problem is never the weapon; it is the nature of the regime controlling the weapon. That's why no one stays up nights worrying about British nukes, while everyone worries about Iranian nukes.

In Soviet days, arms control at least could be justified as giving us something to talk about when there was nothing else to talk about, symbolically relieving tensions between mortal enemies. It could be argued that it at least had a soporific and therapeutic effect in the age of "the balance of terror."

But in post-Soviet days? The Russians are no longer an existential threat. A nuclear exchange between Washington and Moscow is inconceivable. What difference does it make how many nukes Russia builds? If they want to spend themselves into penury creating a bloated nuclear arsenal, be our guest.

President Obama insists that New START is important as a step toward his dream of a nuclear-free world. Where does one begin? A world without nukes would be the ultimate nightmare. We voluntarily disarm while the world's rogues and psychopaths develop nukes in secret. Just last week we found out about a hidden, unknown, highly advanced North Korean uranium enrichment facility. An ostensibly nuclear-free world would place these weapons in the hands of radical regimes that would not hesitate to use them - against a civilized world that would have given up its deterrent.

Moreover, Obama's idea that the great powers must reduce their weapons to set a moral example for the rest of the world to disarm is simply childish. Does anyone seriously believe that the mullahs in Iran or the thugs in Pyongyang will in any way be deflected from their pursuit of nukes by a reduction in the U.S. arsenal?

Obama's New START treaty is 90 percent useless and 10 percent problematic. One difficulty is that it restricts the number of delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons. But because some of these are dual-use, our ability to deliver long-range conventional weapons, a major U.S. strategic advantage, is constrained.

The second problem is the recurrence of language in the treaty preamble linking offensive to defensive nuclear weaponry. We have a huge lead over the rest of the world in missile defenses. Ever since the Reagan days, the Russians have been determined to undo this advantage. The New START treaty affirms the "interrelationship" between offense and defense. And Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has insisted that "the unchangeability of circumstances" - translation: no major advances in U.S. anti-missile deployment - is a condition of the entire treaty.

The worst thing about this treaty, however, is that it is simply a distraction. It gives the illusion of doing something about nuclear danger by addressing a non-problem, Russia, while doing nothing about the real problem - Iran and North Korea. The utter irrelevance of New START to nuclear safety was dramatically underscored last week by the revelation of that North Korean uranium enrichment plant, built with such sophistication that it left the former head of the Los Alamos National Laboratory "stunned." It could become the ultimate proliferation factory. Pyongyang is already a serial proliferator. It has nothing else to sell. Iran, Syria and al-Qaeda have the money to buy.

Iran's Islamic Republic lives to bring down the Great Satan. North Korea, nuclear-armed and in a succession crisis, has just shelled South Korean territory for the first time since the Korean armistice. Obama peddling New START is the guy looking for his wallet under the lamppost because that's where the light is good - even though he lost the wallet on the other side of town.

letters@charleskrauthammer.com

[buglerbilly]

Biden: START Key to Nuke Leadership

December 04, 2010

Military.com|by Bryant Jordan

Administration and Defense officials pitching the need for quick ratification of a new nuclear arms reduction treaty with Russia said yesterday the agreement doesn’t give Russia a nuclear edge over the United States.

Vice President Joe Biden, meeting with reporters in the White House Dec. 3, tried to bolster the administration’s position with the fact that seven former commanders of U.S. Strategic Command support the treaty along with national security officials dating as far back as the Nixon administration,.

“Now is not the time to walk away from this and to kick it off for another year. Now is the time to get this treaty passed,” he said.

The former nuclear commanders who have endorsed the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty include Marine Gen. James Cartwright, now vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and retired Air Force Generals Larry Welch, John Chain, Lee Butler, Eugene Habiger, and Bennie Davis, and retired Admirals Henry Chiles and James Ellis.

The treaty also has the backing of the current StratCom chief, Air Force Gen. Kevin Chilton.

The treaty has come under fire from some in the Senate, who say they need more time examine the agreement’s terms and want to put off a ratification vote until the new Congress convenes in January. Biden said there have already been 18 hearings on the treaty and that officials have responded to about 1,000 questions.

Jim Miller, principal deputy under secretary of defense for policy, rejected criticism that New START requires the U.S. to unilaterally reduce its number of missile launch vehicles below that of the Russians.

“We will make relatively modest reductions under the treaty,” he said. “The Russians start with fewer [vehicles and ICBMs] and so with respect to delivery vehicles they will probably have some reduction, but they will likely be below the limits of the treaty.”

Both sides will reduce the number of warheads, he said.

“We are going to retain a robust triad,” he said, referring to the nuclear force made up of land-based missiles, submarine-launched missiles and nuclear bombers. “We have all 14 of our … strategic submarines, we’ll continue to have up to 420 ICBMs, and we’ll continue the [60] bomber leg.”

All together, that accounts for about 720, and with the cap on warheads under the treaty being just 700, the U.S. will have to determine just how it wants to pare off the remaining 20, according to Miller.

“But that’s still a very robust triad,” he said.

Rose Gottenmoeller, assistant secretary of state with the bureau of arms control, verification and compliance, said the treaty sets the same 700-cap limit on warheads for both sides and limits deployed and non-deployed launchers to 800.

Notwithstanding moves by some in the Senate to push the vote off until next year, Biden said he was confident there are already enough votes on both sides of the aisle to approve the treaty.

He predicted the treaty would pass with at least 67 votes and maybe as many as 75.

“America has always led the efforts to reduce nuke dangers to ourselves and our allies,” Biden said. “Failure to adopt New START would be an abdication of American leadership and [would] materially damage our ability to address major security challenges, including key efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism, lock up dangerous nuclear materials and discourage additional states from pursuing their own nuclear capabilities.”

© Copyright 2010 Military.com. All rights reserved

[buglerbilly]

GOP Hopefuls Line Up Against Nuclear Treaty

December 09, 2010

Associated Press

More stupidity! My loathing of Politicians just increases with time. Representatives of the people? Kiss my arse! A bigger bunch of self-serving, arrogant, fart sniffing sycophants one will rarely find anywhere outside of politics...............:shakehead

WASHINGTON - Republicans weighing a White House bid fiercely oppose a new nuclear arms treaty with Russia and stand in stark contrast to two presidents, Democrat Barack Obama and Republican George H.W. Bush, on a critical foreign policy issue.

"It's an obsolete approach that's a holdover from the Cold War and a bilateral treaty without taking into account multilateral threats," former House Speaker Newt Gingrich said Wednesday, becoming the latest potential 2012 candidate to object to swift passage of the treaty without changes.

Gingrich joins Mitt Romney, Tim Pawlenty, John Thune and Sarah Palin - all outspoken critics of the pact. The bright line between would-be GOP challengers and the incumbent Democrat raises the likelihood that the New START treaty will become a 2012 issue and its success or failure will reverberate as the next presidential campaign takes shape.

On the treaty, potential candidates are to the right of several prominent Republicans, including former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Sen. Richard Lugar of Indiana, an arms control expert and the top GOP lawmaker on the Foreign Relations Committee.

Bush gave the treaty's prospects a potentially significant boost Wednesday, saying, "I urge the United States Senate to ratify the START treaty."

The likely candidates' far-right positions on a major national security issue may play well in the Republican primaries where conservatives dominate. But the stances could make the eventual GOP nominee's pitch harder come the general election, when swing voters will be critical.

Obama, conversely, is making moves that could appeal to independent voters.

He's working across the aisle with Republican leaders in Congress to ensure that before lawmakers leave Washington for the holidays, the Senate ratifies the treaty he signed with Russia in the spring. The president also has indicated that the treaty is a higher priority than other issues his Democratic base cares about, including immigration reform and allowing gays to openly serve in the military.

Republican presidential hopefuls have weighed in on the treaty as Obama put its ratification high on his wish list for Congress' lame-duck session.

Among their arguments against it: The treaty would limit missile defense as well as hamper the U.S. nuclear and conventional weapons programs while giving Russia too much leeway. Several have called for the White House to wait until the new Congress convenes in January, when the GOP boosts its numbers in the Senate. That will make it tougher for Obama to get the 67 Senate votes necessary for ratification.

"Why the hurry, Mr. President?" Romney, the former Massachusetts governor, asked last week in a Boston Globe column. "A treaty so critical to our national security deserves a careful, deliberative look by the men and women America has just elected."

South Dakota Sen. John Thune called START "a deeply flawed treaty that would have far-reaching consequences for America's national security." He, too, called Obama's insistence that it pass this year irresponsible.

And Minnesota Gov. Tim Pawlenty objects to the treaty in part because "it's premised on the dangerous and naive belief that cuts in our nuclear weapons will somehow discourage proliferation by other regimes, when in fact the exact opposite result is more likely."

Although no Republican has formally entered the race and the election is still two years away, potential candidates are seeking to demonstrate their foreign policy chops to prove they can preserve the GOP's perceived advantage on national security issues.

"This will be a big issue because as a consequence of this treaty, President Obama will continue to undermine missile defense," Gingrich said in an interview with The Associated Press.

Obama insists the New START treaty aimed at reducing nuclear weapons in the U.S. and Russia is a "national security imperative."

The treaty calls for the destruction of hundreds of old nuclear weapons, relics of the Cold War, and a system for each country to verify the other has reduced its stockpile as promised.

Polling shows the public is on Obama's side. A recent Associated Press-GfK poll found that two-thirds of Americans believe the Senate should ratify it. Besides a strong majority of Democrats, supporters include more than six in 10 Republicans.

The opening 2012 salvo on the matter arguably came in April, when Obama was in Prague to sign the treaty with Russia.

Palin, the former Alaska governor and 2008 vice presidential nominee, created a stir by criticizing Obama - and suggesting he was weak on nuclear defense - while he was overseas.

She expressed outrage over a provision that says the U.S. could launch a potentially devastating conventional military strike, but not a nuclear one, if a non-nuclear state were to use chemical or biological weapons against the U.S. or its allies. She likened Obama to a kid poised for a playground fight who said: "Go ahead, punch me in the face and I'm not going to retaliate. Go ahead and do what you want to with me."

That spurred an intercontinental tit for tat with Obama - and set the stage for more Republican hopefuls to object to the treaty.

© Copyright 2010 Associated Press. All rights reserved.

[buglerbilly]

In letter to Senate, Obama promises that New START treaty won't limit missile defense

By Mary Beth Sheridan
Washington Post Staff Writer

Sunday, December 19, 2010; 12:12 AM

President Obama issued a letter to the Senate on Sunday pledging to fully develop a U.S. missile defense system in Europe, as part of a final offensive to relieve concerns about the nuclear arms pact with Russia as it moves toward a final vote.

The letter reiterated administration policy but was an especially extensive and detailed statement on missile defense by the president. Parts of it were read aloud by Sen. John F. Kerry (D-Mass.) shortly before a vote on an amendment that could have killed the treaty. That amendment was defeated, 59 to 37.

Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.), who has been leaning toward supporting the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), took to the floor to welcome the president's letter. "A number of people on our side of the aisle have asked for it," he said.

Missile defense has emerged as the greatest point of contention over the treaty. Although the pact is focused on arms reductions and verification, its preamble briefly mentions an "interrelationship" between nuclear weapons and missile defense.

Russia has said it could withdraw from the pact if the U.S. missile defense system becomes ambitious enough to fend off its arsenal. U.S. officials say their intentions are more modest - a system aimed at countries such as Iran and North Korea.

Some Republicans worry that the missile defense language, although not legally binding, could give the Russians a pretext to pressure the U.S. government.

"In today's world, there are so many new and constantly evolving threats. The United States can't be limited" in deploying missile defenses, said Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.). He was one of the sponsors of the amendment to remove the language.

Trimming that, however, would send the treaty back to the negotiating table.

Obama said in the letter that New START "places no limitations on the development or deployment of our missile defense programs." The president said that he "will take every action available to me to support the deployment of all four phases" of a missile defense system in Europe.

Senators had questioned whether the White House might hold off on developing the last phase of the program, which would be aimed at stopping U.S.-bound Iranian missiles, for fear of antagonizing Russia.

Sen. Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.), who has led opposition to the treaty, dismissed the letter as a "last-ditch effort there to win votes, or preclude an amendment from passing."

Obama devoted his weekly radio address to the treaty, saying that it "isn't about winning a victory for an administration . . . it's about the safety and security of the United States of America."

[buglerbilly]

Top Senate Republican warns against pushing through START quickly

Mitch McConnell, the leader of the Republicans in the Senate, has come out against a nuclear arms treaty with Russia, warning Democrats not to rush through Barack Obama's foreign policy priority in the final days of Congress.


Mitch McConnell said many Republicans were just now getting deeply involved in the issue Photo: AP

11:14PM GMT 19 Dec 2010

Minority Leader Mitch McConnell made no prediction about the treaty's success or failure if it came to a vote, but he said many Republicans were just now getting deeply involved in the issue.

"Members are uneasy about it, don't feel thoroughly familiar with it, and I think we would have been a lot better off to take our time," Mr McConnell said. "Rushing it right before Christmas strikes me as trying to jam us. ... I think that was not the best way to get the support of people like me."

Senate debate was expected to resume on Sunday. Treaties require a two-thirds majority of those voting in the Senate, or 67 votes if all 100 senators vote.

Sens. Dick Durbin, the Democrats' No. 2 leader in the Senate, and John Kerry, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, said they believe they have the votes to ratify the treaty this year.

Durbin said Sunday would mark a fifth day of debate and that one Republican amendment had been considered on Saturday and that another would probably be offered on Sunday. "I think we need to bring this to a vote," he said.

Mr Obama and Dmitry Medvedev, the Russian president, signed the accord, known as Start, in April. It would limit each country's strategic nuclear warheads to 1,550, down from the current ceiling of 2,200. It would also establish a system for monitoring and verification. US weapons inspections ended a year ago with the expiration of a 1991 treaty.

Republicans focused on wording in the treaty's preamble that they contend would allow Russia to withdraw from the pact if the US develops a missile defence system in Europe. Democrats argued that the preamble reference to missile defence systems was non-binding and had no legal authority.

[buglerbilly]

US-Russia nuclear treaty on the cards after Senate vote

US Senate votes to end debate on ratification of Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, paving way for ratification itself

Ewen MacAskill in Washington guardian.co.uk, Tuesday 21 December 2010 21.11 GMT


John Kerry says the vote on Start means 'we are on the brink of writing the next chapter' in the history of dealing with nuclear weapons. Photograph: Alex Brandon/AP

Barack Obama is on the verge of securing his biggest foreign policy achievement so far after the US Senate voted today in favour of a US-Russian treaty to reduce nuclear arsenals.

The Senate vote by 67 to 28 was to limit debate on ratification of the treaty. It is expected to vote as early as today on ratification itself, which requires the support of two-thirds, or 67, of the members.

The scale of today's vote means passage is all but certain.

John Kerry, the Democratic chairman of the Senate foreign affairs committee, said: "Today's bipartisan vote clears a significant hurdle in the Senate. We are on the brink of writing the next chapter in the 40-year history of wrestling with the threat of nuclear weapons."

Ratification would fulfil a campaign pledge by Obama that he would work to reduce the number of nuclear weapons.

The new treaty, replacing one signed in 1991, lowers the size of the US and Russian nuclear weapons stockpiles, limiting warheads and launchers, and updates the verification process. It has a seven-year deadline for implementation.

The vote represents a sudden turnaround in Obama's fortunes after the low in early November when he presided over disastrous midterm Congressional elections in which the Republicans trounced the Democrats.

The present Congress, despite being labelled initially as a lame duck, has managed to reach agreement on three important issues within a matter of weeks: a bipartisan compromise on tax that will help stimulate the economy, repeal of the ban on gay people serving openly in the military and now, almost certainly, ratification of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (Start).

Although the Republican leader in the Senate, Mitch McConnell, on Sunday vowed to vote against ratification, saying it was being rushed through, many of his colleagues broke ranks today to vote with the Democrats.

Obama, in contrast with the seemingly aloof approach he has adopted in the past towards Congress, has been lobbying aggressively in favour of ratification. Yesterday, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, sent on a letter of support for ratification and today the defence secretary, Robert Gates, issued a similar statement.

Gates said: "The treaty will enhance strategic stability at lower numbers of nuclear weapons, provide a rigorous inspection regime including on-site access to Russian missile silos, strengthen our leadership role in stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and provide the necessary flexibility to structure our strategic nuclear forces to best meet national security interest."

The vice-president, Joe Biden, and Hillary Clinton, the secretary of state, also made a rare visit to the Capitol to lobby senators.

The balance tilted towards passage when a senior Republican senator, Lamar Alexander, came out in favour. "I will vote to ratify the New Start treaty between the United States and Russia because it leaves our country with enough nuclear warheads to blow any attacker to kingdom come and because the president has committed to an $85bn, 10-year plan to make sure that those weapons work," he told the Senate.

Eleven Republicans voted with all the Democrats present.

New Start is the successor to Start I and Start II, treaties signed over the past 20 years. Start III was the monicker for a failed attempt by Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin.

Under the New Start treaty, the maximum number of warheads held by the US and Russia will be 1,550 each, and the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles set at 700.

However, the rules contain a loophole. While each warhead on a ballistic missile is counted as one warhead, a heavy bomber is counted as carrying "one warhead" even though it may have (in the case of a US B-52) up to 20 of them.

Obama signed it in Prague in April with the Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev, the firmest sign of growing US-Russian relations. If the Senate had rejected or even significantly delayed ratification, it could have led to a sharp deterioration in relations.

The US and Russia between them possess more than 90% of the world's nuclear weapons.

[buglerbilly]

Senate Ratifies Nuke Pact With Russia

December 22, 2010

Associated Press

WASHINGTON - The Senate on Wednesday ratified an arms control treaty with Russia that reins in the nuclear weapons that could plunge the world into doomsday, giving President Barack Obama a major foreign policy win in Congress' waning hours.

Thirteen Republicans broke with their top two leaders and joined 56 Democrats and two independents in providing the necessary two-thirds vote to approve the treaty. The vote was 71-26.

The accord, which still must be approved by Russia, would restart onsite weapons inspections as successors to President Ronald Reagan embraced his edict of "trust, but verify."

Vice President Joe Biden presided over the Senate and announced the vote. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton observed the vote from the Senate floor. Both had lobbied furiously for the treaty's approval.

"The question is whether we move the world a little out of the dark shadow of nuclear nightmare," Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry, D-Mass., said to his colleagues moments before the historic tally.

Calling the treaty a national security imperative, Obama had pressed for its approval before a new, more Republican Congress assumes power in January.

The Obama administration has argued that the United States must show credibility in its improved relations with its former Cold War foe, and the treaty was critical to any rapprochement. The White House is counting on Russia to help pressure Iran over its nuclear ambitions.

The New START treaty, signed by Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in April, would limit each country's strategic nuclear warheads to 1,550, down from the current ceiling of 2,200. It also would establish a system for monitoring and verification. U.S. weapons inspections ended last year with the expiration of a 1991 treaty.

"START" stands for Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.

Obama overcame the opposition the Senate's top two Republicans - Minority Leader Mitch McConnell of Kentucky and Jon Kyl of Arizona, the GOP point man on the treaty.

Peeved by the Democrats' interruption of the eight days of treaty debate for other legislation, McConnell accused the White House of politicizing the process.

McConnell said national security was the main concern, "not some politician's desire to declare a political victory and hold a press conference before the first of the year."

The ratification was a turnaround for a treaty whose fate was uncertain just a month ago. Conservatives railed that the pact would limit U.S. options on missile defense, lacked sufficient procedures to verify Russia's adherence and deserved more time for consideration than the abbreviated postelection session.

Republican Sen. Mark Kirk of Illinois, who won Obama's Senate seat, dismissed the treaty for imposing "marginal reductions in the Russian arsenal."

The fierce opposition diminished quickly as former Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton, six former Republican secretaries of state and much of the nation's military and foreign policy experts called for the treaty's ratification.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Joint Chiefs of State Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen pressed for approval, with Mullen simply telling senators earlier this week, "the sooner, the better."

Weeks after Republicans routed Democrats at the polls - seizing control of the House and strengthening their numbers in the Senate - Obama has prevailed in securing overwhelming bipartisan approval of a tax deal with Republicans, getting repeal of the 17-year-old ban on openly gay military members and winning approval of the treaty.

The treaty capped a hefty yearlong record of legislation for the Democratic-controlled Congress and Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev. - a massive overhaul of the health care system, new financial regulations and a food safety bill as well as the postelection measures.

The treaty vote exposed divisions within the Republican Party that could stretch into the 2012 presidential and congressional elections. Obama got the treaty with the help of several GOP Senate moderates who split with possible White House hopefuls, some of the fiercest critics of the accord.

Former Massachusetts Gov. Mitt Romney opposed the pact; Sen. Scott Brown, R-Mass., who faces re-election in 2012, voted for it. Former Alaska Gov. Sarah Palin said the treaty was not in the country's interest; Sen. Lisa Murkowski, R-Alaska, backed it. Former House Speaker Newt Gingrich described it as an "obsolete approach that's a holdover from the Cold War;" Sen. Johnny Isakson, R-Ga., supported it.

© Copyright 2010 Associated Press. All rights reserved.

[buglerbilly]

Dmitry Medvedev welcomes US nuclear arms treaty

Russian president says country is ready to ratify the arms reduction pact with the US

Tom Parfitt in Moscow guardian.co.uk, Thursday 23 December 2010 18.53 GMT


Dmitry Medvedev, the Russian president, has welcomed New Start, the nuclear arms reduction treaty with the US. Photograph: Konstantin Zavrazhin/Getty Images

MPs in Russia could approve a new strategic arms reduction treaty with the US as early as tomorrow after President Dmitry Medvedev welcomed the pact.

The country's overwhelmingly pro-Kremlin parliament is likely to push the agreement through swiftly, despite doubts over Washington's desire to station a missile defence shield in Europe.

Medvedev's office said today he was "pleased to learn that the United States Senate has ratified the Start Treaty and expressed hope that the State Duma and the Federation Council [lower and upper houses of parliament] will be ready to consider this issue shortly and to ratify the document".

The US Senate voted 71 to 26 in favour of the treaty yesterday, despite expectations that Republican members might try to block its passage.

The speaker of the State Duma, Boris Gryzlov, said the Kremlin-controlled United Russia party, which dominates the chamber, was ready to approve the treaty at a parliamentary session scheduled tomorrow.

The speaker of the Federation Council, Sergei Mironov, said he could push it through the same day.

Under New Start, as the agreement is called, strategic nuclear warheads deployed by each country will be reduced to 1,550 within seven years. Deployed missile launchers would be cut to 700.

Mikhail Margelov, head of the Federation Council's foreign relations committee, said the treaty "represents a shift away from cold war mentality and demonstrates that Russia and the US are focused on achieving 21st-century global security".

Its ratification in both countries will be seen as step forward after a difficult period in bilateral relations since Medvedev and Barack Obama signed the treaty in Prague in April.

Two months after that meeting, the US exposed 10 Russian sleeper agents living in New York and Washington, although the fallout was partly defused when they were exchanged for four men jailed in Russia who had allegedly worked for western intelligence agencies.

Relations appeared to be warming last month when the Nato military alliance invited Russia to participate in a US-led missile defence system about which Moscow is deeply suspicious. But the thaw came under threat when WikiLeaks revealed US diplomatic cables suggesting Russia is a "mafia state".

Analysts say the treaty overrides such irritants, showing progress in the attempts to improve ties with Russia, which began after Obama came to power.

Sergei Rogov, head of the influential US and Canada Institute in Moscow, told the RIA Novosti news agency: "It is, of course, a positive step and it shows that the 're-set' in Russian-American relations is bringing real results, but the question now is, what next?"

Top of the agenda for the Kremlin will be hammering out details of its role in the missile defence project. Vladimir Putin, the prime minister, warned this month that Russia would be obliged to deploy "new strike forces" on its borders if talks with Nato over the system failed to show progress.

[buglerbilly]

New START: It’s in the Bag!


Obama, Medvedev sign documents on nuclear arms reduction in '09.

New START is in the bag but a lot of work remains to be done

08:34 GMT, January 27, 2011 The upper house of the Russian Parliament (Duma) earlier today approved the New START treaty signed by presidents Medvedev and Obama in Prague on April 8, 2010. This follows approval of the treaty by the U.S. Senate in December (see http://goo.gl/WtEBH) despite opposition from hard-liners.

The Russian approval was followed by optimistic statements by Mikhail Margelov, the chairman of the international affairs committee, who declared: “The arms race is a thing of the past. The disarmament race is taking its place.”

WHAT NOW?

Now that the treaty has been ratified by both countries, the next step will be an exchange of Instruments of Ratification, at which point the treaty formally enters into effect. When that happens, the Moscow Treaty from 2002 will expire. Within 45 days after entry into force, the two countries will have an initial exchange of data (an initial exchange of site diagrams occurred 45 days after the treaty was signed on April 8, 2010), and photographs of the strategic offensive arms covered by the treaty will be exchanged. After that the inspectors go to work.

NO IT DOESN’T

But the treaty does not, as the New York Times report mistakenly states, “require the United States and Russia to reduce their nuclear arsenals…to 1,550 warheads each, from between 1,700 and 2,200 now.” This is a misreporting that is frequent in the news media (see also RIA Novosti at http://goo.gl/anPUs). In fact, the treaty does not place any limits on the total size of their nuclear arsenals — in fact, it doesn’t require destruction of a single nuclear warhead. Rather, New START reduces the limit for how many of their strategic warheads the two countries may deploy on long-range delivery vehicles at any given time. Both countries may – and do – have thousands of other nuclear warheads that are not deployed or not counted.

Of the estimated 5,000 and 8,000 US and Russian, respectively, nuclear warheads in their military stockpiles, New START affects how 1,550 can be deployed on each side. How to deal with the remaining thousands of non-deployed and nonstrategic nuclear warheads is the focus of the next round of US-Russian nuclear arms control efforts (see http://goo.gl/sIcrn). In addition, both countries have thousands of additional retired but intact warheads awaiting dismantlement, for total estimated inventories of 8,500 US and 11,000 Russian warheads.

New START is in the bag but a lot of work remains to be done.

----
By Hans M. Kristensen

(Courtesy by Federation of American Scientists (FAS), First published at http://goo.gl/zuawT)

[buglerbilly]

New estimates put Pakistan's nuclear arsenal at more than 100

By Karen DeYoung
Washington Post Staff Writer

Monday, January 31, 2011; 12:49 AM

Pakistan's nuclear arsenal now totals more than 100 deployed weapons, a doubling of its stockpile over the past several years in one of the world's most unstable regions, according to estimates by nongovernment analysts.

The Pakistanis have significantly accelerated productionof uranium and plutonium for bombs and developed new weapons to deliver them. After years of approximate weapons parity, experts said, Pakistan has now edged ahead of India, its nuclear-armed rival.

An escalation of the arms race in South Asia poses a dilemmafor the Obama administration, which has worked to improve its economic, political and defense ties with India while seeking to deepen its relationship with Pakistan as a crucial component of its Afghanistan war strategy.

In politically fragile Pakistan, the administration is caught between fears of proliferation or possible terrorist attempts to seize nuclear materials and Pakistani suspicions that the United States aims to control or limit its weapons program and favors India.

Those suspicions were on public display last week at the opening session of U.N. disarmament talks in Geneva, where Pakistani Ambassador Zamir Akram accused the United States and other major powers of "double standards and discrimination" for pushing a global treaty banning all future production of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium.

Adoption of what is known as the "fissile materials cutoff treaty," a key element of President Obama's worldwide nonproliferation agenda, requires international consensus. Pakistan has long been the lone holdout.

While Pakistan has produced more nuclear-armed weapons, India is believed to have larger existing stockpiles of such fissile material for future weapons. That long-term Indian advantage, Pakistan has charged, was further enhanced by a 2008 U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation agreement. The administration has deflected Pakistan's demands for a similar deal.

Brig. Gen. Nazir Butt, defense attache at the Pakistani Embassy in Washington, said the number of Pakistan's weapons and the status of its production facilities were confidential.

"Pakistan lives in a tough neighborhood and will never be oblivious to its security needs," Butt said. "As a nuclear power, we are very confident of our deterrent capabilities."

But the administration's determination to bring the fissile materials ban to completion this year may compel it to confront more directly the issue of proliferation in South Asia. As U.S. arms negotiator Rose Gottemoeller told Bloomberg News at the U.N. conference Thursday: "Patience is running out."

Other nuclear powers have their own interests in the region. China, which sees India as a major regional competitor, has major investments in Pakistan and a commitment to supply it with at least two nuclear-energy reactors.

Russia has increased its cooperation with India and told Pakistan last week that it was "disturbed" about its arms buildup.

"It's a risky path, particularly for a government under pressure," Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov, fresh from a visit to Islamabad, said in remarks at the Nixon Center on Thursday.

Wary of upsetting Pakistan's always-fragile political balance, the White House rarely mentions the country's arsenal in public except to voice confidence in its strong internal safeguards, with warheads kept separate from delivery vehicles. But the level of U.S. concern was reflected during last month's White House war review, when Pakistan's nuclear security was set as one of two long-term strategy objectives there, along with the defeat of al-Qaeda, according to a senior administration official who spoke on the condition of anonymity.

A publicly released summary of the classified review document made no reference to the nuclear issue, and the White House deflected questions on grounds that it was an intelligence matter. This week, a spokesman said the administration would not respond to inquiries about the size of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.

National Security Council spokesman Tommy Vietor referred to Obama's assurance at last spring's Nuclear Security Summit that he felt "confident about Pakistan's security around its nuclear weapons program." Vietor noted that Obama has encouraged "all nations" to support negotiations on the fissile cutoff treaty.

"The administration is always trying to keep people from talking about this knowledgeably," said David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security and a leading analyst on the world's nuclear forces. "They're always trying to downplay" the numbers and insisting that "it's smaller than you think."

"It's hard to say how much the U.S. knows," said Hans M. Kristensen, director of the nuclear information project at the Federation of American Scientists and author of the annual global nuclear weapons inventory published in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. "Probably a fair amount. But it's a mixed bag - Pakistan is an ally, and they can't undercut it with a statement of concern in public."

Beyond intelligence on the ground, U.S. officials assess Pakistan's nuclear weapons program with the same tools used by the outside experts - satellite photos of nuclear-related installations, estimates of fissile-material production and weapons development, and publicly available statements and facts.

Four years ago, the Pakistani arsenal was estimated at 30 to 60 weapons.

"They have been expanding pretty rapidly," Albright said. Based on recently accelerated production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, "they could have more than doubled in that period," with current estimates of up to 110 weapons.

Kristensen said it was "not unreasonable" to say that Pakistan has now produced at least 100 weapons. Shaun Gregory, director of the Pakistan Security Research Unit at Britain's University of Bradford, put the number at between 100 and 110.

Some Pakistani officials have intimated they have even more. But just as the United States has a vested interest in publicly playing down the total, Pakistan sees advantage in "playing up the number of weapons they've got," Gregory said. "They're at a disadvantage with India with conventional forces," in terms of both weaponry and personnel.

Only three nuclear countries - Pakistan, India and Israel - have never signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. India is estimated to have 60 to 100 weapons; numbers are even less precise for Israel's undeclared program, estimated at up to 200. North Korea, which has conducted nuclear tests and is believed to have produced enough fissile material for at least a half-dozen bombs, withdrew from the treaty in 2003.

Those figures make Pakistan the world's fifth-largest nuclear power, ahead of "legal" powers France and Britain. The vast bulk of nuclear stockpiles are held by the United States and Russia, followed by China.

While Pakistan has no declared nuclear doctrine, it sees its arsenal as a deterrent to an attack by the Indian forces that are heavily deployed near its border. India has vowed no first use of nuclear weapons, but it depends on its second-strike capability to deter the Pakistanis.

The United States imposed nuclear-related sanctions on Pakistan and India after both countries conducted weapons tests in 1998, but lifted them shortly after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. With U.S. guidance and a $100 million assistance program, Pakistan moved to increase international confidence by overhauling its command and control structures.

Revelations in 2004 about an illegal international nuclear procurement network run by Pakistani nuclear official Abdul Qadeer Khan, which supplied nuclear materials to Libya, Iran and North Korea, led to further steps to improve security.

The 2008 agreement that permits India to purchase nuclear fuel for civilian purposes was a spur to Pakistani weapons production, experts said. Pakistan maintains that the treaty allows India to divert more of its own resources for military use.

As Pakistan sees India becoming a great power, "nuclear weapons become a very attractive psychological equalizer," said George Perkovich, vice president for studies and a nonproliferation specialist at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

The 1998 test date is a quasi-holiday in Pakistan, and the test site was once declared a national monument, part of the nuclear chest-thumping that, along with political instability, makes U.S. officials as nervous as the actual number of weapons.

In December 2008, Peter Lavoie, the U.S. national intelligence officer for South Asia, told NATO officials that "despite pending economic catastrophe, Pakistan is producing nuclear weapons at a faster rate than any other country in the world," according to a classified State Department cable released late last year by the Internet site WikiLeaks.

Publication of the document so angered Pakistan's army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, that he told journalists there that the Pakistani people believe that the "real aim of U.S. [war] strategy is to denuclearize Pakistan," according to local media reports.

In 2009, Congress passed a $7.5 billion aid package for Pakistan with the stipulation that the administration provide regular assessments of whether any of the money "directly or indirectly aided the expansion of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program."

While continuing to produce weapons-grade uranium at two sites, Pakistan has sharply increased its production of plutonium, allowing it to make lighter warheads for more mobile delivery systems. Its newest missile, the Shaheen II, has a range of 1,500 miles and is about to go into operational deployment, Kristensen said. Pakistan also has developed nuclear-capable land- and air-launched cruise missiles.

deyoungk@washpost.com

[buglerbilly]

Russia Ramps Up New 'Satan' Nuke After U.S. Talks Breakdown

By Carlo Munoz

Published: December 19, 2011



WASHINGTON: Russia is pressing ahead with a new nuclear missile which Moscow claims is a part of a renewed effort to bolster the country's missile defense systems.

This new intercontinental ballistic missile, nicknamed "Satan" by Western analysts, will sport a 100-ton warhead and replace the Voevoda-class missile in the Russian nuclear arsenal, according to recent news reports. This massive ICBM will take its place alongside the Yars, Topol-M and Bulava-class ballistic missiles sometime in 2015, according to Sergei Karakaev, head of Russia's Strategic Missile Forces. Development of the new ICBM will coincide with plans to revamp the country's missile silo complexes over the next decade, Karakaev told Russian media. Moscow's decision to accelerate work on the new "Satan"-class ICBM was directly tied to recently failed missile defense negotiations between Russia and the United States.

Russian president Dimitri Medvedev broke off negotiations with the White House in November on the administration's plan to set up a missile shield in Europe. The European Phased Adaptive Approach plan is a network of sea and land-based missile launchers designed to counter missile strikes from Iran. Cooperation with Russia is integral to making the missile shield work. But Moscow claims the U.S. could not guarantee American missiles would not be used to take out Russian targets. "Russia does not stand against the U.S. missile defense system. Russia stands against the creation of the missile defense system, which would be directly aimed against Russia," Karakaev said. That impasse forced Medvedev to walk away from the deal and begin work on its own super nuke.

But Washington's unwillingness to hand over classified missile defense secrets to their Russian counterparts was the real deal breaker between the former Cold War rivals, according to one key GOP lawmaker. Sen Mark Kirk told AOL Defense last week that Russia could not be trusted with America's most sensitive missile defense technologies. The country's well-established ties with Iran would virtually guarantee any secrets handed to the Russians would make their way to Tehran, Kirk said. That kind of cooperation would hand Tehran exactly what they need to deter the European missile shield, courtesy of their friends in Moscow.

The State Department and the Pentagon remain committed to bringing the Russians back to the negotiating table. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Martin Dempsey said the U.S. is determined to find "common ground" with Russia on the proposed missile shield. Dempsey would not comment on what proposals American negotiators were offering to entice Russia back to the negotiating table since those proposals are constantly in flux. The upside to that, he noted, is that negotiators on both sides are in "constant contact" to get a deal done, he said.