ASPI report calls for expanded defence infrastructure in Australia's north-west

[Mercator]

From The West Australian:


Report Seeks North-West Military Boost
http://au.news.yahoo.com/thewest/a/-/breaking/7009045/report-seeks-north-west-military-boost

A major naval base should be established near Karratha and RAAF runways across the North-West upgraded as part of a wider plan to boost Australia's military power in the Indian Ocean, a major strategic think-tank has argues.

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute, in a report released yesterday, said an upgraded defence presence was necessary to protect new deep-sea oil and gas developments, prevent boat people from as far as Africa and even provide security to the new cities proposed by Premier Colin Barnett.

Report authors Sam Bateman and Anthony Bergin said with a range of issues emerging across the Indian Ocean region, from energy supplies to piracy, Australia had to increase its attention on the region.

While increasing its presence in a range of Indian Ocean diplomatic organisations, the Government also needed to lift its defence presence in WA.

"The Australian Defence Force should plan to markedly increase its presence along the west coast of Australia between Perth and Darwin," they said.

That presence would include a naval operating base of at least the size of that in Darwin and Cairns probably at Karratha or at Beagle Bay.

The authors also back a lift in the number of military exercises in the region and greater use through the RAAF "bare bases" at Curtin and Learmonth.

A major North-West naval base would enable much larger vessels to patrol the regions and extend the amount of time they can spend at sea.

ASPI not only sees a border protection issue in the region but a sovereignty risk facing Australia, from possible illegal fishers around the Cocos Islands to attacks on oil and gas infrastructure.

"Australia is certain to face an increased need for sovereignty and border protection further offshore in the Indian Ocean," the authors noted.

"It's over 3000km from Perth to Darwin and there must be questions about the reaction time of the ADF if, for example, it has to respond to an offshore contingency in the Pilbara region."

Apart from the security benefits, the authors believe the increased defence role in the area would bring social and economic benefits, particularly to local Aboriginal populations.

ASPI is critical of the way governments continue to focus on the Pacific and Southern oceans at the expense of the Indian Ocean where India, China and the US - plus oil states in the Middle East - have major presences.

It believes the WA Government should create an Indian Ocean ministerial position to focus its attention on the region.

Foreign Minister Stephen Smith said the Government was focusing more on the Indian Ocean and its nations.

"The presence of large and growing naval powers, as well as trans-national security issues, including piracy, requires that we put the Indian Ocean alongside the Pacific Ocean at the heart of our maritime strategy and defence planning," he said.

[Gubler, A.]

Sounds more like increased *police* presence in the NW rather than the ADF... Though Perth remains a far better location for that Mechanised Brigade stuck in Darwin.

[Mercator]

Do we really need to do this? I'm sceptical.

On aviation, it's been a few years since I have visited the bare bases in the West, but in general, they were more than adequate for anything short of major war. Indeed many of them had serious bunkers and what not which is far beyond what is needed for piracy, and anything else on that front could easily be installed in a timeframe less than that you would anticipate for a major war. Runway length? Also good as far as I can recall. The only thing I remember as posing any serious challenge was provisioning and resupply of large-scale fuel supplies (Pitch Black quantities). But that was a sourcing and throughput problem, not so much a stockpiling issue. You can build big arse fuel tanks, but you can't put fuel in them and let them sit there (in layman's terms it goes off). If you recall the big push last year by the Orions to do extra patrols while the patrol boats were off-line, it seemed to go well enough. They are thirsty aircraft to operate, but not unmanageable for a short-term push. If more fuel than that is needed, you don't need bigger infrastructure, you need more fuel tankers in the form of road, rail or sea services and access to refineries. The infrastructure to receive the fuel is already there, you've just got to transport it.

On the naval side of the equation, again I think this is a little overwrought. Commercial infrastructure for large-scale oil, gas and mining operations is already there and growing. These are big ships. I'm no expert, but to my non-naval eyes the port infrastructure is even bigger than that which you get in Darwin. Refuelling and re-provisioning a frigate should be easy in comparison. For patrol boats it should be even easier still. And let's face it, in the face of piracy concerns, the military response would be more patrol boat sorties. Unless these guys are anticipating major war, doesn't the region already have more than enough commercial infrastructure to support frigate/patrol boat operations?

[Mercator]

Maybe the focus on infrastructure in that newspaper article was a bit of a red herring. Here's a column by the report's authors. It reads like they just want a greater presence which could in part be satisfied by making more frequent use of existing infrastructure rather than building much in the way of new stuff. Which is fine until you think about what that really means. Should we move annual naval exercises from Perth or Darwin to Cocos Island just maintain an extra presence? Should we go all the way to India and then not do the real training we require because that would be too sensitive? Don't MPA and patrol boats already maintain a heavy presence in the north-west looking for illegal entry vessels? How could we do much more? And aren't the Navy frigate crews already pissed at the amount of time they spent floating around up there doing patrols instead of doing regular training. Shouldn't we just pay the Australian cricket team to throw a few matches in India's favour and leave it at that? Questions, questions...


We must look west to the Indian Ocean, and opportunity
Sam Bateman and Anthony Bergin in The Australian

THE Indian Ocean, the world's third-largest body of water, is where key geopolitical differences might play out this century. It's the major energy and international trade maritime highway, particularly for the booming economies of Asia.

We should be a pre-eminent country in the Indian Ocean region. Australia is the largest Indian Ocean state as measured by the extent of our maritime claims. But Australia has been treading water when it comes to advancing our interests in the Indian Ocean.

Much of the world's trade in energy crosses the Indian Ocean. Regional wars and crises, particularly in the Gulf region, have led to a new era of external involvement. This is now reinforced by energy politics, the outbreak of piracy around the Horn of Africa, and the emergence of China as a new and powerful regional player.

A new maritime great game is emerging in the Indian Ocean, as strategic competition between India and China becomes evident. Each has fears of being contained by the other-in China's case, because India is supported by Japan and the US. But India sees itself as potentially sandwiched between an increased Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean and its long and partly disputed land boundary with China to the north.

Meanwhile, the US continues to dominate the Indian Ocean strategically and militarily. India promotes itself as the dominant regional power of the region. It's obsessed by China's entry into the Indian Ocean and is making great use of its navy to spread power and influence.

The Indian Ocean and the emerging maritime great game command more attention from Australia. Threats and risks in the Indian Ocean region include interstate or intrastate conflict, maritime terrorism, piracy, people-smuggling and illegal fishing as well as concerns like climate change, transnational crime, marine natural hazards and energy, food, and environmental security.

The Indian Ocean is part of our ocean neighbourhood, and there are significant economic, security and environmental benefits in finding common ground with our neighbours.

The greatest challenges to our protection of our offshore sovereignty and sovereign rights lie in the Indian Ocean. About one-third of our exports emanate from Western Australia, and large offshore developments under way off the west and northwest of the continent will be a key to our future prosperity.

We need to work harder on critical infrastructure protection on the west coast. The Australian Defence Force should plan to markedly increase its presence along that coast between Perth and Darwin. This should involve establishing a naval operating base in the northwest, increasing the frequency of military exercises in the region and making greater use of Air Force bare bases at Curtin and Learmonth.

As Australia seeks to increase its strategic footprint in the Indian Ocean, the airfield and secure anchorages at the Cocos Islands offer large benefits. However, the ADF currently makes relatively little use of those facilities. More regular air and surface patrols should be undertaken around Cocos.

The Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Co-operation, or IORARC, is the only regional forum at present for regional co-operation, but is fairly ineffective. Australia could assist in efforts that India plans to lead to give it more purpose.

However, our principal focus should be on the development of practical co-operation and dialogue within the eastern Indian Ocean. Natural hazard mitigation, people-smuggling, (refugees may use favourable weather conditions to travel directly to Australia from South Asia, or even from Africa), humanitarian assistance and disaster relief should be the focus of our efforts to promote co-operation. Fisheries management and marine scientific research should receive greater attention as part of our region-wide efforts. Based on our sound relationship with Indonesia, we should begin an early dialogue with Jakarta on Indian Ocean matters.

At a national level, we need to improve our policy co-ordination arrangements for the Indian Ocean region. Western Australia might consider appointing a Minister for the Indian Ocean.

Australia should increase its strategic presence in the Indian Ocean region through more proactive regional relations and a wide spectrum of increased activity in the region.

To start the ball rolling, the Australian government could sponsor an Indian Ocean Conference in Perth. This would be an important building block for Australian initiatives and for actions by the region as a whole. The agenda for the conference should include energy issues, ocean management, and marine scientific research.

Australia's policies towards the Indian Ocean have been relatively opaque and spasmodic. We should bring the Indian Ocean into the mainstream of our foreign and security policies. Australia is a three-ocean country. We have a unified policy approach for the Pacific and for the Southern Ocean. We need a Look West policy.

Sam Bateman and Anthony Bergin are the co-authors of Our Western Front: Australia and the Indian Ocean, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, to be launched today by Foreign Minister Stephen Smith

[Gubler, A.]

Apart from some throw away lines about India and China there is no evidence of any increase in military threat to the NW coast. India and China's zone of contention is Burma and the MEAO to East Asia trade routes which are north west of Indonesia not Australia. Besides neither Navy has demonstrated the ability to operate as far away from their port infrastructure as NW Australia is from South India or Burma.

The concerns are all civil para-military. More border protection and more infrastructure security. While the ADF has a role in border protection its part of the mix which should be addressed in the context of BPC. Sea borne threats of a non military nature (piracy, terrorism) in this area is even less of a problem now than it was a year or two ago after the Sri Lankan Navy cleaned out the Tamil Tiger fleet from the Java Trench area.

Also the significant increase in infrastructure to support the resource efforts in the NW coast provide infrastructure to support border protection. This isn’t a case of New Guinea in the 1930s.

[buglerbilly]

Being heavily involved with the Resources Industries, when I decide to work for 9 months or so, there are substantial new barges (LST's to you) and other infrastructure expansion currently and rapidly being developed and put in place, more than enough to support any Military or Police expansion as needs require it.............this includes significant fuel storage expansion in certain locations.

[battlensign]

Sounds more like increased *police* presence in the NW rather than the ADF... Though Perth remains a far better location for that Mechanised Brigade stuck in Darwin.

Why is that?

With the amphib units all on the East Coast, the indications are that the strategic planners are of the belief that the Darwin boys get picked up and then they head North(ish). What would be the advantage of Perth? Am I missing something, or is this a recruitment and training thing?

Intrigued.

Brett.

[Raven22]

There is a problem with retention in Darwin, but the biggest problem by far is that the training areas can't be used for half the year because of the wet season. All those fancy armoured vehicles get cycone prepped in November, and can't really be used again until April when the training areas dry out. The alternative is spending huge amounts of money transporting vehicles down to Cultana. During the dry season the training areas are great (well, great for training - they are shitholes for anything else) but its not an ideal state of affairs.

The same problem exists in Townsville, but because it is a light brigade the problem isn't as bad. Sucks for my unit though.

[battlensign]

Thanks for that Raven, there are definately issues with having 1bde in Darwin. However, I got the impression Abe may have been thinking of something else that was particularly cunning from a strategy point of view......or I may have simply mis-read what he was saying..... :P

Brett.

[Gubler, A.]

Thanks for that Raven, there are definately issues with having 1bde in Darwin. However, I got the impression Abe may have been thinking of something else that was particularly cunning from a strategy point of view......or I may have simply mis-read what he was saying..... :P

You miss read. I've been saying things like what Raven said for the past five years. APIN is a terrible failure for the Army's sustainment and strategicly. 1 Bde played little or no role in INTERFET and is unlikely to do so in any future SEA deployment. The advantage of Perth is its a go to place in Australia. Its up there with SEQ as a place people want to live. If you want to retain people in the Army let them live in a place they will like and be able to develop a family and so on. This is crucial for the junior leaders who have suffered the most in the retention crisis.

[Raven22]

1 Bde played little or no role in INTERFET and is unlikely to do so in any future SEA deployment.

I think 5/7 RAR and C Sqn 2 Cav Regt would disagree with you there. Whether or not they play a part in future SEA deployments will depend on the scenario. If they need a particularly pointy stick to do the job, then they will go to 1 Bde. If they just need a few guys wearing camouflage, then the online battalion of 3 Bde is welcome to it.


The advantage of Perth is its a go to place in Australia. Its up there with SEQ as a place people want to live. If you want to retain people in the Army let them live in a place they will like and be able to develop a family and so on. This is crucial for the junior leaders who have suffered the most in the retention crisis.

I don't think Perth would be a great location for a mech bde either. While it is a nice place to live (although personally I think the retention benefits of this are overrated), it would only increase the dislocation from the rest of the Army from that already experienced in Darwin. Large joint and combined exercises are always going to be conducted in Queensland, and transporting vehicles from Perth is going to be harder and more expensive than that already experienced in Darwin. You'd end up with a well trained mech brigade but no one else in the country getting to play with their equipment, which is pretty much the opposite of what we're going for.

It's pretty much a moot point anyway - 1 Bde main is not going to move from Darwin. There have been some proposals as part of the ground manoeuvre FMR to base tanks in Adelaide for access to training areas (either as a stand alone tank Regiment or part of an ACR), but personally I think nothing will change.

[Gubler, A.]

I think 5/7 RAR and C Sqn 2 Cav Regt would disagree with you there. Whether or not they play a part in future SEA deployments will depend on the scenario. If they need a particularly pointy stick to do the job, then they will go to 1 Bde. If they just need a few guys wearing camouflage, then the online battalion of 3 Bde is welcome to it.

Of course but what I meant was in terms of the geographic location. All of the inital deployment came from Townsville and the ODF (don't mention RESFOR!). Also the primary logistics support came from facilities in Darwin not Palmerston. As for the reinforcing by 5/7 and 2 Cav they could have come from anywhere in Australia. The location of 1 Bde in the NT did not make INTERFET more achievable.

Army Presence In the North (APIN) is crazy in terms of *defending* noth Australia from some invasion. There is no threat, real or imagined and if there was they wouldn't waste their time with the Darwin area. APIN causes all sorts of problems including training, retention and the extra cost of sustaining the presence. It has to be one of the top five failed government initiatives of 20th century.

But like Rav. I agree not much will happen. Too much vested political interest and cost associated in fixing things. However APISA is offering a subtle way out of the APIN mess. I wouldn't be surprised within the next 10 years if all of 8/12 Mdm Regt (when equipped with SPH) and 1 Armd Regt move to Adelaide so they can actually train all year round.

[battlensign]

You miss read. I've been saying things like what Raven said for the past five years. APIN is a terrible failure for the Army's sustainment and strategicly. 1 Bde played little or no role in INTERFET and is unlikely to do so in any future SEA deployment. The advantage of Perth is its a go to place in Australia. Its up there with SEQ as a place people want to live. If you want to retain people in the Army let them live in a place they will like and be able to develop a family and so on. This is crucial for the junior leaders who have suffered the most in the retention crisis.

Oops, sorry. If APIN is such a negative (seems like all are agreed on this), what about fully placing 1bde in SA. Turn SA, in defence terms, into the Australian version of Texas. Surely the rail-links would enable the development, along with a third mech/infantry battalion, of a Ready Mech Battle Group based in Darwin on a rotating basis. It could be Raven's 1bde RBG. How desirable a location is Adelaide et al likely to be? Sufficient to negate the perceptions of Darwin?

Brett.

[Gubler, A.]

Oops, sorry. If APIN is such a negative (seems like all are agreed on this), what about fully placing 1bde in SA. Turn SA, in defence terms, into the Australian version of Texas. Surely the rail-links would enable the development, along with a third mech/infantry battalion, of a Ready Mech Battle Group based in Darwin on a rotating basis. It could be Raven's 1bde RBG. How desirable a location is Adelaide et al likely to be? Sufficient to negate the perceptions of Darwin?

Its not a bad idea. Just reverse the force structure plan between Darwin and Adelaide. I'm not sure if a rotating structure is the way to go for a ready MBG. But certainly maintaining one out of three in Darwin and the other two in Adelaide seems a better idea for sustain and providing a amphib battle group for pick up by the LHDs.

The SA Govt put a lot of sweeteners for the troops into the APISA deal including cheap loans for house buying. I'm sure that would be popular. Adelaide is also potentially the best location for the ADF's new basic pilot training system. Also 1 Avn Regt would be able to fly all year round without being grounded by Cyclones.

Of course cynics would say the primary reason to both the ALP and LP/NP Govts of having 1 Bde in Darwin is to boost the population of the NT...

[Raven22]

Adelaide would be a suitable place to base the whole of 1 Bde (except the fact that it is the most boring cty on the planet). Its still a fair way from the rest of the Army, but it has year round access to training areas, enough housing and jobs and good rail-links to places they might need to go. Again, the biggest sticking point is the hundreds of millions of dollars that have been sunk into developing Robertson Barracks (a great base) and the rest of the infrastructure in Darwin. It wouldn't necessarilly be unachievable but it would take a ballsy political decision.

There is no real need for a mech RBG imo either. To my mind the entire concept of the RBG is an anachronism and out of touch with the force generation cycle. The idea is we have three Bdes that have a 12-month force generation rotation, where they cycle from reset, to readying, to ready. The terms should be pretty self explanatory. This cycle should make resource allocation and generating training outcomes easy, but there is (at least) two problems. One is the 8-month rotation of deployed forces. This means each bde must generation force elements for deployement in a 2-year cycle, instead of the 3-year cycle of the force generation plan. The other problem, only really a problem in 3 Bde, is the requirement to maintain the RCT, RBG and now ACT. In the future the requirement for a ready amphibious group will complicate matters even more. This means that 3 Bde, while it is theoretically supposed to be on a 3-year force generation cycle, must generate deployed force elements every 2-years, and maintain the RCT/RBG and ACT at all times anyway. It makes the whole cycle meaningless.

We can't fix the first problem unless we deploy force elements for 12 months instead of 8 (which isn't going to happen and probably shouldn't unless we dramatically increase numbers overseas) but the second problem can be fixed. Get rid of the RCT/RBG in its current form, and simply require each brigade to maintain the required force elements on the required notice to move as part of the normal force generation cycle. 3 Bde isn't the only brigade that can be rapidly deployable. Niche capabilities like the ACT and in the future the ready ambhibious group complicate things, but the exact requirements for those still hasn't been worked out yet.

[Gubler, A.]

Robertson Barracks could always be reused as an unauthorised arrivals detention camp... Seems to be a growth business.

[Raven22]

Nah, just let them live in Palmerston. They might add a bit of class to the place...

[Gubler, A.]

This means that 3 Bde, while it is theoretically supposed to be on a 3-year force generation cycle, must generate deployed force elements every 2-years, and maintain the RCT/RBG and ACT at all times anyway. It makes the whole cycle meaningless.

The RCT/RBG is just a remanent of the old ODF days when 3 Bde had this role because it was the only formation in the field army staffed at full strength and kept at any kind of readiness. Obviously this is no longer the case.


Get rid of the RCT/RBG in its current form, and simply require each brigade to maintain the required force elements on the required notice to move as part of the normal force generation cycle. 3 Bde isn't the only brigade that can be rapidly deployable. Niche capabilities like the ACT and in the future the ready ambhibious group complicate things, but the exact requirements for those still hasn't been worked out yet.

Yep. Spread the load and align to the Adaptive Army force generation cycle.

ACT within 3RAR is simply a case of service politics. The capability of rapid airborne deployment is rightly one to be held within SOCOMD-A. They would be given the mission if it was needed anyway. 3RAR have just clung to this to retain their paratrooper identity even though it is in part one of the reasons the battalion has been so dysfunctional. No surprise they were able to wheedle out of it after Lt.Gen. Leahy was retired.

Ready amphibious grouping is a tough issue because of the need to take on capabilities held only in 10 FSB. The solution is to base 10 FSB with the LHDs in a single joint amphibious base. So they can put to sea with all they need and then proceed to where-ever the RCT/RBG is for pickup and deployment.

[Raven22]

The current plan is to have a standing amphibious ready group (or something) that is completely separate from the RBG. From what I understand the CoA actually wants a company group permanently embarked on the LHDs, but personally I think that is unachievable. What will probably happen is a rotation system where a battalion will be essentially the amphibious ready battalion and responsible for maintaining the amphibious skill sets for a couple of years before rotation to another battalion. Of course, there are a few crack pots that want to establish a marine corps, but that is wishful thinking.

The whole thing is just another example of the Australian Army, or the ADF as a whole, trying to so too much. A military our size can't be good at everything, and I think we really need to work out what we can do and concentrate on that. An amphibious capability is obviously necessary, but a parachute capability outside SOCOMD?.. probably not as you say.

And of course, the internal politicking will continue to avoid the issues out of pettiness anyway. I've had a bit of fun watching the RAInf and RAAC trying to work together on the current FMR. I remain convinced that, with very few excpetions, no officer will ever accept a new idea past the rank of major. No wonder nothing ever changes.

[Gubler, A.]

There is no point in having a combat team permanently on the LHD unless they are forward deployed. The USMC doesn't waste their time putting their Marine Expeditionary Units on USN LHDs sitting around at port or training; only when they forward deploy as an Expeditionary Strike Group.

The solution is to bring the LHDs, 10 FSB and 5 Avn Regt (- CH-47s) together somewhere as a joint amphibious capability. Townsville is probably easiest and the sight of the LHDs won’t ruin the sea side view because it’s already crap. Then as Rav. suggests balance the two ready battle groups (RBG) across the army as it goes through the force generation cycle in sync with the eight month deployments. Such a rotational cycle could mean that each brigade would have an RBG available eight months of every year. In time of a short notice emergency for most of the year the LHDs could just load in Townsville and sail with a light infantry based RBG and amphibious force support group (FSG). When a RBG isn’t available in Townsville another motorised infantry/armd cav RBG would be on hand in Brisbane only a short sail away. If the RBG needs to be heavier (mech inf/armd cav/tanks) then they can sail to Darwin.

But unlike the current model they would not have to stop into Townsville to pick up the amph FSG and then sail onto where ever the RBG is or go to action with combat team that’s been getting drunk in Kings Cross every night for their months long ‘deployment’ to Garden Island.

Of course the Terra Boot Army will stuff it up somehow...

[JimWH]

Of course, there are a few crack pots that want to establish a marine corps, but that is wishful thinking


Interestingly, I did hear a rumour regarding this, but coming from the navy side. A friend of mine who is currently a medical Sub Lieutenant was quietly asked by some rather more senior people about his willingness to train up to the army BFA standard in the event of Australia forming a marine corps. I don't think it'll happen either, but it's a curious story none the less.