3RAR retains Parachute role

[Exsandgroper]

From the latest Army News - 3RAR will still be moving to Townsville in 2012 and will retain their parachute role.

Anyone got more info on this.

Cheers

[Raven22]

They will maintain an airborne combat team (ACT) capability. This will involve a rifle coy and the usual para addons from BHQ, Bde HQ, engineers, gunners etc. About 160 dudes in total. Its a good excuse for a whole bunch of people to maintain para quals.

3 Bde now has to maintain the ready combat team, ready battle group, airborne combat team, as well as rotate through ops as per normal. I wonder whos going to pick up the ready amphibious company role when the ambhibs arrive as well.

Some day the army will work out that more than light fighters can maintain a reduced notice to move.

[JimWH]

It sounds like an excuse to me too Raven. But it also probably means that people from my corps will continue to use it as an excuse to keep the Parachute Surgical Team in existence, and realistically that's the only way I'll ever get para-wings.

[Raven22]

Well the real reason is to maintain an entry by air capability in the conventional army. 3 Bde is tasked with entry by air and entry by sea, and you can't do entry by air without paras. Like any decision though there is a lot of internal politiking involved.

Hell, I'm just annoyed there is no need for a para-qualified cavalryman.Unless we adopt Sparky's idea and have airborne M113s anyway. The only way I'm getting wings is by going special forces.

[Gubler, A.]

Hell, I'm just annoyed there is no need for a para-qualified cavalryman.Unless we adopt Sparky's idea and have airborne M113s anyway. The only way I'm getting wings is by going special forces.

Didn't manage to waylay any of those German Wiesels while they were here? If you can paradrop a M113 you should be able to do same with an ASLAV, especially with those C-17s. Anyway I think airborne tankies in a re-raised 2/7 Cdo (Cav) Regt is along way away...

[Gubler, A.]

Part of the problem is the approach of just stacking capabilities on top of previous capabilities. What’s the point of maintaining the old ODF style RBG/RCT and the para company (aka ACT) when the Army is maintaining several BG/CT overseas on deployment and the rotational force generational system and will also have an amphibious ready BG/CT? Also the specialisation of capability within brigades. Do we really need three different brigades with different equipment levels: mech, mot, lt inf?

We just need to audit the required outputs and then work backwards to achieve them. With WWT being transferred to the reserves the Regular Army really needs to maintain a deployed battle group in Afghanistan and 1-2 ready battle group for contingencies and able to deploy by air or sea. Para assault is well and truly redundant and the Army was right to write it off in 2005 but of course 3RAR just did the classic public service routine of hanging on until the leadership changed and making a big stink so they keep the capability. If the previous state of common sense can prevail and the ACT type role is provided by SOCOMD-A then the rest of the army can focus on the one ready/deployed BG per brigade.

If common sense was to prevail further then each of those three brigades could be organised identically (at least at the core) with an armd cav regt, mech inf bn and lt inf bn which would mean force generation within the brigade for army wide outcomes could be feasible. If it were up to me I would:
* Leave 3RAR in Sydney and transfer it to SOCOMD-A where they can provide the ACT and force protection to SOTG ops.
* Upgrade B Sqn, 3/4 Cav to full armd cav regt and either 1 or 2 RAR to mech inf bn (with LAND 400 vehicles)
* Swap 7 RAR in Adelaide with 1 Armd Regt in Darwin (better for tank training access with Port Wakefield and Cultanna avail all year round)

Then you would have three brigades each organised the same with the same equipment and each able to generate a balanced Afghanistan deployed or high readiness battle group capable of amphibious or air landing operations. Which was the recommended outcome from the Phantom to Force review of the Army back in 2000 anyway.

[Raven22]

If common sense was to prevail further then each of those three brigades could be organised identically (at least at the core) with an armd cav regt, mech inf bn and lt inf bn which would mean force generation within the brigade for army wide outcomes could be feasible. If it were up to me I would:
* Leave 3RAR in Sydney and transfer it to SOCOMD-A where they can provide the ACT and force protection to SOTG ops.
* Upgrade B Sqn, 3/4 Cav to full armd cav regt and either 1 or 2 RAR to mech inf bn (with LAND 400 vehicles)
* Swap 7 RAR in Adelaide with 1 Armd Regt in Darwin (better for tank training access with Port Wakefield and Cultanna avail all year round)


Personally I've moved away from the thought of having identical brigades, but simply a 'more balanced' brigade model (which I think you're intent here is anyway).

Now being a part of 3 Bde, I've come to the conclusion that giving armoured vehicles of any description to the light infantry battalions is a bad idea - they don't want them, they don't know how to use them, they flat out wont use them if they got them and there's no money for them anyway. The light infantry battalions don't even want any Land 121-4 vehicles. It also makes a good deal of sense to have a brigade that is specialised at traditional light infantry ways of getting to the fight, especially airmobile. However, what 3 Bde does need is an organic armoured element for combat ISR and the ability to mount the light infantry battalions as required.

These are obvious holes - the entire brigade does not have any dedicated ISR assets, meaning the brigade commander has to steal the battalions recon platoon when he want to know something, (which royally pisses off the COs), and B Sqn isn't big enough to conduct the lift mission. So as you've stated, 3/4 Cav needs to become a regiment that is big enough to both mount a LIB and conduct the combat ISR mission simultaneously, all in a vehicle of appropriate combat weight (Land 400).

The current thought also is that there will likely be no mech or motorised infantry as we know it. The infantry don't want to operate vehicles, and this task will likely fall to Land 400 platforms operated by the RAAC. How this will happen isn't yet clear. Options include RAAC pers replacing RAInf pers as crewmen at platoon level, each infantry battalion having an organic all-RAAC squadron able to lift the rifle coys as required, and that the lift task would fall back onto the brigades cav regt (or ACR). However if this last option was used, the cav regts must be large enough to both provide the lift and conduct their primary combat ISR, econonmy of force etc tasks.

To my mind the best (or best achievable) options would be for 3 bde to have the three LIBS and a 2 sqn cav regt (one sqn for lift, one primarily for ISR but also able to conduct lift), and 1/7 bde being largely identical with a cav regt and two inf battalions, each with enough L400 platforms (manned by RAAC pers in some arrangement) to mount the rifle coys as required. The tanks could either be left in 1 bde or if the payoff is worth it split into each bde to create ACRs. This brigade structure, while not identical, provides each brigade with all the core components of the combined arms team to enable collective training and make the brigade rotation plan work, yet allows 3 bde to specialise to some degree on traditional light infantry stuff.

A few other thoughts -

Keep 3 RAR away from SOCOMD.

Some current options include moving tanks to Adelaide.

Recent simulation has suggested that at least some of the L400 platforms that mount the infantry need a 30mm class weapon instead of just a 12.7mm class weapon, meaning that an IFV is required.

The same sim suggested that the current light-inf based ARE and ARG lacks combat power.

We need to find a way to fit the 2012 platoon into less than 7 Land 400 platforms.

If chosen today, I would put money on the Land 400 platforms being Puma for Cav and Boxer for Inf.

[Gubler, A.]

Note to Mod: this and some recent discussion probably needs to be moved into the LAND 400 thread where we have been discussing future organisation.


Personally I've moved away from the thought of having identical brigades, but simply a 'more balanced' brigade model (which I think you're intent here is anyway).
Keep 3 RAR away from SOCOMD.
The current thought also is that there will likely be no mech or motorised infantry as we know it. The infantry don't want to operate vehicles, and this task will likely fall to Land 400 platforms operated by the RAAC.
Recent simulation has suggested that at least some of the L400 platforms that mount the infantry need a 30mm class weapon instead of just a 12.7mm class weapon, meaning that an IFV is required.

I don’t think the brigades need to be identical but they need to have an identical core. That is along with the Bde HQ, Fd Arty Regt, Cbt Engr Regt (-), Bde Sig Sqn (+) and CSS Bn each brigade has they need to have at least an armd cav regt and two inf bn. You can then add to that various combat arms units that may be co-located like 1 Armd Regt and even 3RAR if it ever decides to join the rest of the Army.

The thing about having an “adaptive” army is each unit in it needs to be “adaptable” so it can fit into the rotating and modular force generation cycle. Or as this used to be called – in a more eloquent way – an “army of threes” before some uniformed civil servant came up with the mouthful “adaptive army force generation cycle”. The whole idea of an ‘army of threes’ is if you have three of everything (or multiples of three) it’s very easy to rotate the force in and out of deployment and create modular units. And as the Army’s last chief Lt.Gen. Leahy used to say ‘there’s no room for one of something in an army of threes’.

So where is the space for the airborne combat team (ACT) and the 3RAR (Para) within the army of threes? It’s an army of one or a non-adaptable unit within the adaptive army. While 3RAR (Para) can and has contributed combat teams to the deployed force it is extremely difficult to use it within a wider and more structured force generation cycle because it has to keep generating an ACT. So if the ACT is so damn important (and it isn’t but that’s a bit OT) then they need to be separated from 1 DIV/FORCOMD so the rest of the army can concentrate on generating the kind of combined arms protected battle groups and combat teams needed in the real world and available for deployment and amphibious warfare.

Which is why I suggested SOCOMD as a good dumping ground for 3RAR and the ACT. Especially since if 3RAR is just going to produce ACTs then they don’t need to be a full strength (800 men) Hardened and Networked Army (HNA) infantry battalion. They can get by with 400-450 men with the inf coy (+) ACT supported by a BHQ, 1-2 inf coy (-) and a mnv supt coy (-). This means there will be 350-400 infantry soldiers released from 3RAR to bring the other six HNA inf bn up to full strength. As even with 800 men the HNA inf bn lacks a ninth inf pltn and could do with at least an assault pioneer section or platoon. Leaving 3RAR as the somewhat pathetic para bn (-) will help the balance of HNA inf bns be full strength modular units.

Now that’s the anomaly in the infantry sorted (LOL) so what about armour? Mechanisng the infantry battalion and later motorising them were both primarily political experiments for an infantry corps struggling to survive in various times. 5/7RAR (Mech) was very much a way of building morale and purpose in the post VietNam War era as well as a good dose of peacetime experimentation and capability building (same as giving 6RAR and then 3RAR para wings). Equally the motorised battalions were generated from non warlike requirements in this case the need for the infantry corps to seem relevant in a fictional strategic guidance – Defence of Australia – in a resource constrained environment. That is a fighting from foot infantry unit was useless in defending all the Kimberley form the Dibb’s ‘Outback Kong’ and RAAC did not have the resources to divert from tanks and recce so the infantry needed their own integral vehicles.

But what has served the Australian Army extremely well in combat in VietNam, Somalia, Rwanda, East Timor, Iraq and Afghanistan has been the lt inf bn + APC sqn. The same as the lt inf bn + fd arty bty, which no one in their right mind (lets all forget A21) would imagine should be combined despite the close working relations. Apart from the issues of individual and collective training within the RAAC and RAInf the APC sqn is a highly efficient use of armoured vehicles in complex terrain. Because the APC/IFVs are independently organised and lead they can do other things when not needed to lift infantry. Something mech inf bns are very much incapable of. If the dismounts of a mech inf bn are fighting on foot with no room for IFVs to get involved they are usually laagered up in the rear. With an APC sqn construct the APC/IFV sections, troops and squadrons can then go off and do other things because they have their own intact command and control.

Providing the LAND 400 IFVs to RAAC only in ISR and/or APC sqns solves some other problems for this program. With every vehicle crewed by RAAC there is no need to downgrade the vehicle used to provide mobility to the infantry because of training limitations. All of the LAND 400 vehicles can then be IFVs armed with 30mm guns. Not only will this boost firepower it will also enable a blurring of the line between ISR and APC sqs. Effectively the only difference between such sqns, if all have the same kind of IFV, would be the cavalry scout sections. They could then be combined in a troop at regimental level reinforced by attachments from reserve light cavalry squadrons and doled out to ISR/APC armd cav tps as per need.

With a common vehicle and common squadron organisation each brigade can have a common armd cav regt with three armd cav sqns (leaving the ABRAMS in its own regiment until it is replaced by a LAND 400 common close combat vehicle). Each squadron being able to lift a lt inf bn or provide a brigade level ISR frontage. So the brigade would be able to lift both of its lt inf bn and provide an ISR capability or generate nine balanced combat teams each with a CHQ/SHQ, an armd cav tp and two inf pltns. Two of the armd cav tp’s sections could provide lift to each of the inf pltns while the third section provides ISR with a cav scout team or section attached from the armd cav regt’s supt sqn. The flexibility in such a structure is huge.

The last big question this raises is how to lift a 40 man HNA inf pltn? This is going to be a dilemma no matter what vehicle type is specified for the LAND 400 APC role be it a tracked IFV type (CV90/Puma/ASCOD) or an 8x8 armoured car type (LAV5/Boxer/AMV/VBCI). While to some extent a tank sized IFV like the Israeli Namer could lift 12 dismounts if equipped with seats at the US Army’s seat pitch it is unreasonable to expect a vehicle with a 30mm gun, the required protection and systems could carry more than eight dismounts. Especially providing space for marching order (back packs) and various extras like ISR tools and mnv supt weapons. If each IFV can only carry eight dismounts this would require an armd cav section of five IFVs. Five vehicle elements are not unique – US Army tank platoons used to have five MBTs before the ABRAMS – and could provide some advantages over smaller three vehicle elements.

This would mean an armd cav tp of at least 48 men and 16 IFVs but if organized like the APC tp is lead by a Captain (so as to plug into an infantry CHQ with a similar clout to a FOO/JOST) with a Lieutenant as 2IC, WO2 as Troop Sergeant and each section lead by a Sergeant so is more than manageable. The LAND 400 IFV would have to be a bigger tracked vehicle like the FRES SV or US Army GCV or using advanced volume and weight saving technology like the BAES Alligator (AKA SEP) in order to fit all of this in. Each armd cav regt with three sqns would need about 160 IFVs but this is within the LAND 400 scope.

[Raven22]

In general, I agree with everything you've said a few specific points though:


The thing about having an “adaptive” army is each unit in it needs to be “adaptable” so it can fit into the rotating and modular force generation cycle. Or as this used to be called – in a more eloquent way – an “army of threes” before some uniformed civil servant came up with the mouthful “adaptive army force generation cycle”. The whole idea of an ‘army of threes’ is if you have three of everything (or multiples of three) it’s very easy to rotate the force in and out of deployment and create modular units. And as the Army’s last chief Lt.Gen. Leahy used to say ‘there’s no room for one of something in an army of threes’.

The current ground manoeuvre FMR is big on creating modular units. Taking the idea of battlegrouping/task organising to its conclusion, the idea is that a battalion/regiment(unit) won't ever fight alone. The two purposes of a unit are to generate a HQ capable of commanding a battlegroup and generating modular capability bricks to contribute to the combined arms team. Hence, an infantry battalion generates neat rifle sect/pl/coy bricks, MS bricks, ISR bricks etc etc. Not a new concept to be be sure, but if applied with discipline across all units it enables battlegrouping to be done intelligently. One big thing that often gets overlooked is that HQ must be modular too. The unit HQ must be able to command any capability brick it is given. A staff officer should be able to walk form his job in, say, a tank unit straight into the same job in an infantry unit. The same for logistical stuff - the unit must be able to support any capability brick it is given. This is a big problem with the light infantry, who have no concept of an A1 and A2 echelon.

The other point is that we really need an army of fours, not threes. Three gives you enough to rotate through a theatre to be sure, but gives no leeway to continue to train to and be available for other taskings. This has happened to us now where due to the high tempo of operations the basic warfighting skills have seriously degraded, as there is no time to train outside of the deployment cycle. In essence, we need a fourth brigade.


With an APC sqn construct the APC/IFV sections, troops and squadrons can then go off and do other things because they have their own intact command and control.

[Personal Gripe]
Tell that to the infantry. Apparently the cavalry are just taxis and cannot conduct any other tasks:
'We're going to dismount over there'
'What do you want us to do?'
'Er, just wait here for us, we'll tell you when to come pick us up'
'Do you want us to put in overwatch, conduct a screen, conduct a recce of alternate routes...'
'No, just wait here'
'Righto dickhead. Brew up boys, the infantry are doing dumb shit again...'
[/Personal Gripe]


Providing the LAND 400 IFVs to RAAC only in ISR and/or APC sqns solves some other problems for this program. With every vehicle crewed by RAAC there is no need to downgrade the vehicle used to provide mobility to the infantry because of training limitations. All of the LAND 400 vehicles can then be IFVs armed with 30mm guns. Not only will this boost firepower it will also enable a blurring of the line between ISR and APC sqs. Effectively the only difference between such sqns, if all have the same kind of IFV, would be the cavalry scout sections. They could then be combined in a troop at regimental level reinforced by attachments from reserve light cavalry squadrons and doled out to ISR/APC armd cav tps as per need.

A couple of problems with a 30mm in each vehicle. It means less room and, more to the point, costs lots of money. A proposal is that the majority of vehs will be armed with 12.7mm weapons and used mainly only for lift, while a minority will have the big gun (40mm CTA please) and be used for intimate support etc. Sometimes its better to have three less capable vehs than two more capable ones.

Also, there will be larger differences between any ISR and Lift (not APC, make that term go away) sqns. Even if the ISR and Lift sqns use the same base veh, the organisations won't be interchangeable. The ISR vehs will be quite full in the back. In addition to the scouts (probably provided by infantry), they will have integrated surveillence gear, UAVs, UGVs etc, all with their own operators. In addition, ISR coys will continue to be operated by conventional sabre squadron organisations (Tps of 6 commanded by LTs etc), while any LIFT squadron would likely take on a legacy B Sqn 3/4 Cav style organisation (CAPT TP LDR, SGT Sect Comds etc) and be optimised to the size of the infantry it is going to lift.

As such, the ISR squadrons would be optimised for ISR but still able to conduct lift in a pinch, and the Lift squadrons would be optimised for lift but still able to conduct traditional cavalry tasks as well.


(leaving the ABRAMS in its own regiment until it is replaced by a LAND 400 common close combat vehicle).

Won't happen for 20 years. No money.


With a common vehicle and common squadron organisation each brigade can have a common armd cav regt with three armd cav sqns. Each squadron being able to lift a lt inf bn or provide a brigade level ISR frontage

Not an ideal organisation I don't think. You need at least two cav sqns to conduct proper ISR for a brigade. You can't conduct a full time screen/guard etc with only the one squadron. As such, if you had two sqns lifting battalions and only one for ISR, it wouldn't really work. If you want to have the cav regt lift the infantry battalions, you would really need two ISR and two Lift Sqns. The increase in personnel wouldn't be a huge issue as you would cut them across from the battalion. Also worth noting, that to lift a 2012 infantry battalion complete properly, you need exactly 100 vehicles. Not an inconsiderable number.


The last big question this raises is how to lift a 40 man HNA inf pltn?

A big consideration is that you don't only have to put bums to seats, you have to do it and maintain tactical integrity. For instance, you must keep the rifle sections separate, and you must keep the MS section separate, otherwise they can't do their job. As such, it is really hard to have less than 7 vehs. I think the best compromise will be to just give the MS section two vehs instead of three, giving a 6 car platoon. It doesn't allow you to split the MS section into three, but it saves a lot of dollars and warm bodies. Either that or just make the MS section only 8 dudes (this would save 6 people, including the crew of the 7th veh, and provide almost enough personnel for another rifle platoon.)


This would mean an armd cav tp of at least 48 men and 16 IFVs but if organized like the APC tp is lead by a Captain (so as to plug into an infantry CHQ with a similar clout to a FOO/JOST) with a Lieutenant as 2IC, WO2 as Troop Sergeant and each section lead by a Sergeant so is more than manageable.

That's pretty much exactly how its (supposed to) work now, just replace the WO2 with a SGT.

Anyway, I have some more but I think I might go get pissed in Melbourne instead. Probably should move this to a more appropriate thread too.

[Gubler, A.]

This is a big problem with the light infantry, who have no concept of an A1 and A2 echelon.
[Personal Gripe]

Yep but that’s a cultural or physiological problem…


The other point is that we really need an army of fours, not threes.

Sure, Army of Threes was meant to be a way station towards Army of Fours. But not at three yet so four has to wait.


A couple of problems with a 30mm in each vehicle. It means less room and, more to the point, costs lots of money. A proposal is that the majority of vehs will be armed with 12.7mm weapons and used mainly only for lift, while a minority will have the big gun (40mm CTA please) and be used for intimate support etc. Sometimes its better to have three less capable vehs than two more capable ones.

Except when you’re in that vehicle with the 12.7x99mm and you need to be putting 40x285mm (CTA) fires downrange to get out alive. 40x285mm vs 30x173mm: same size weapon, simpler operation (COTS components!), bigger bang, less dispersion at range; I’m sold. In the case of something like the ASCOD SV Scout the extra space consumed is just in the turret basket. Compared to a one man turret or RCWS station the two man turret is at most taking away two dismount seats and adding third crew seat. So it’s a loss of one. The big internal volume consumer from automatic cannons is the M2 magazine because the entire M3 magazine is held within the turret and/or basket. In the case of a contemporary IFV the M2 magazine is often outside the armoured hull to improve survivability (so not competitive with the dismounts) or not even carried. Its not like the Bradley where the dismounts jostle for space with 25mm ammo boxes and TOW missiles. But the two man turret places a second person into position for situational awareness and provides you with a much better sighting, including CITV and thermal channels, not to mention the bigger gun than say the 2020 version of the Tenix 12.7mm turret or a RCWS. As to the differential in cost I would be surprised if it was more than 4 to 3 for acquisition and sustainment, the biggest differential would be in 3 to 2 in crew.


Anyway, I have some more but I think I might go get pissed in Melbourne instead. Probably should move this to a more appropriate thread too.

I’ll skip responding to the rest until later because I’ve got things to do before similar!

[ARH v.3.1]

I'll finish the merger with some other threads once I find WTF they are hiding.

[Gubler, A.]

(leaving the ABRAMS in its own regiment until it is replaced by a LAND 400 common close combat vehicle).

Won't happen for 20 years. No money.

Sure and until then the MBT is perhaps best concentrated in its own unit for accessibility and maintenance issues. However… (thinking about it some more)… if the MBT support contract could be handled similar to the SP155 you could potentially have distributed squadrons. Especially if we were to even out the SP155 issue to each brigade. So instead of having three locations with only 12 MBTs to support you would have three locations with 18 MBT/SP155 or even a few more heavy tracked vehicles with the ARVs and if we acquire tank based assault bridgelayers (LAND 155). In the case of 7 BDE the tanks, SP155 and similar would have to be based with 9FSB and 21CS at RAAF Amberley because tank transporters and the roads of the Brisbane inner north (Enoggera) do not mix. This would solve the Robertson Barracks tank training problem by enabling fly in fly out in the wet to either Townsville or Amberley to play with the other squadron’s tanks.


Also, there will be larger differences between any ISR and Lift (not APC, make that term go away) sqns. Even if the ISR and Lift sqns use the same base veh, the organisations won't be interchangeable.

I admit it, I’m a committed leveller… but not that committed. The balanced armd cav regt could contain two CFV sqns for ISR and one IFV sqn for Lift. [Remember when an M113 on issue to a recce sqn became a LRV: Light Recce Vehicle and when on issue to an APC sqn, an APC, with only some minor rack changes in the back. Same thing: cavalry fighting vehicle and infantry fighting vehicle, as a means of eradication of APC from the terminology.]


A big consideration is that you don't only have to put bums to seats, you have to do it and maintain tactical integrity. For instance, you must keep the rifle sections separate, and you must keep the MS section separate, otherwise they can't do their job. As such, it is really hard to have less than 7 vehs. I think the best compromise will be to just give the MS section two vehs instead of three, giving a 6 car platoon. It doesn't allow you to split the MS section into three, but it saves a lot of dollars and warm bodies. Either that or just make the MS section only 8 dudes (this would save 6 people, including the crew of the 7th veh, and provide almost enough personnel for another rifle platoon.)

I’m all in favour of cutting the strength of the mnv supt team via such methods as placing 7.62mm LMGs into each infantry section and so on so the ninth inf pltn can be re-raised but dealing with the current cards at the moment: does each mnv supt team really need its own IFV to get around? Even if the IFV is armed *only* with a 12.7mm HMG it can still provide far more fire suppression than any dismount stick. By grouping the three mnv supt teams and single command team into two eight dismount seat IFVs you can have a five vehicle section lift a HNA inf pltn. When these vehicle unload only one of the mnv supt teams won’t have the luxury of being in wherever it may want to be. Of course to meet this need you need a LAND 400 vehicle big enough to accommodate the stores of two mnv supt teams but this should be achievable with the big hulled 30-40 tonne IFVs.

Then of course there is the HNA inf bn mnv supt coy and other elements all requiring lift. Which would probably make sense for the armd cav regt to have its own mnv supt sqn with mortars and ATGM capabilities with integral vehicles that can operate these systems under armour. So when the lt inf bn is being lifted by the IFV sqn these capabilities are on hand in similar platforms. The “unlifted” elements and units would of course have their PMVs to get around in without access to an IFV.

[SteveJH]

What is involved in the lift requirement? Is it basically just acting like a taxi driver going whereever the infantry has to be delivered?

If so, could you put that task onto the reserve cavalry units currently running around with Land Rovers? With the Active Cavalry units focusing 100% on formation recon?

[Gubler, A.]

What is involved in the lift requirement? Is it basically just acting like a taxi driver going whereever the infantry has to be delivered?

If so, could you put that task onto the reserve cavalry units currently running around with Land Rovers? With the Active Cavalry units focusing 100% on formation recon?

If it was lift with an IMV, aka PMV-M Bushmaster or an old M113A1 APC, in a classical linear battlefield then that would work. But the complexity of the basic vehicle and the mission requires a lot more. Inf pltns on operations in Afghanistan and when in Iraq are typically lifted by an element of several Bushmasters (more now as the inf pltn has grown) and a couple of ASLAV-25s to provide mobile fire and manoeuvre. The lift element is also called upon to face a lot of threats and complexity like IEDs and complex terrain (villages, towns, etc.). All this requires a lot more complex vehicle and a lot more complex tactical training.

[Raven22]

Re: Tanks:

As I think I've said before, my reading of the tea leaves is that the ACR concept is currently the preferred option under the FMR. While this would cost more to have four tank centres instead of two, LAND400 money can be used to buy more enablers (M88s, more RPS, even more M1s) to enable the distributed squadrons to work. If this was the case, if you really wanted to think outside the box you could have only small numbers of tanks in BrisVegas and Townsville, but a squadron-sized training fleet permanently based at Shoalwater Bay for the larger training activites that could be shared be everyone.

The ACR concept is handy because it essentially frees up a Regi HQ and all the current 200 soldiers of B Sqn 3/4 Cav to contibute to the larger ACRs. Such an organisation would allow three identical ACRs with a tank squadron and two 'enhanced' cav sqns (with a support troop) without increasing manning numbers. If you took the crew numbers from the inf bn and gave them to the ACRs, you could conceivably have an ACR with a tank squadron, two ISR cav sqns and two Lift Sqns.


I’m all in favour of cutting the strength of the mnv supt team via such methods as placing 7.62mm LMGs into each infantry section and so on so the ninth inf pltn can be re-raised but dealing with the current cards at the moment: does each mnv supt team really need its own IFV to get around? Even if the IFV is armed *only* with a 12.7mm HMG it can still provide far more fire suppression than any dismount stick. By grouping the three mnv supt teams and single command team into two eight dismount seat IFVs you can have a five vehicle section lift a HNA inf pltn. When these vehicle unload only one of the mnv supt teams won’t have the luxury of being in wherever it may want to be. Of course to meet this need you need a LAND 400 vehicle big enough to accommodate the stores of two mnv supt teams but this should be achievable with the big hulled 30-40 tonne IFVs.

There is a current program for buying a light 7.62mm machine-gun for the conventional infantry. This will almost certainly be the 7.62mm Minimi (AKA Maximi) as it is already in service with SOCOMD. However I think it is really only being bought for Afghan, and there won't be enough to issue each rifle section.

Regarding the MSS, there has been talk to eleminate it and simply replace it with a fourth rifle section, and simply give each section a 7.62mm MG, 7.62mm marksmans rifle and an 84 (the AGLs have already been palmed off to support company. One big problem with the Infantry 2012 concept (AKA MIB) is that it is outside the scope of the current ground manoeuvre FMR, which is an obvious weeakness. While the 2012 platoon may be close to ideal for dismounted stuff, it is no good if it doesn't fit in with the rest of the Army. I think the MIB really needs to be part of the FMR and be reworked if necessary to 'fit' the rest of the Army.


Then of course there is the HNA inf bn mnv supt coy and other elements all requiring lift. Which would probably make sense for the armd cav regt to have its own mnv supt sqn with mortars and ATGM capabilities with integral vehicles that can operate these systems under armour.

The idea of a manoeuvre support squadron for the cav regt won't get up. The idea is that each squadron will gain its own support troop, with a to-be-decided mix of surveillance vehicles, anti-armour vehs, and maybe even mortar vehs.

Of course, before we look at the nitigritty of the make up of the cav regt, we really need to look at exactly what we want it to do. If we disregard 3 Bde for the moment, each brigade will have two infantry battalions. Do we want to be able to lift both battalions at once? Do we want to be able to lift the entire battalion, or just the rifle companies and specific components of support company? Can another stake-holder bring a Land121 platform to the table to lift the left-over components of the battalion.

Looking at the lift, do we want the lift element integral to the battalion? As a separate squadron as part of the cav regt? have a lift troop integral to each cav sqn? One concept is each squadron will have a lift troop capable of mounting a rifle company, meaning with three squadrons a cav regt could essentially lift an infantry battalion with very little extra overhead.

With a little thought, a realistic and achievable orbat might be:

Design rules:
Two inf bns in 1/7 Bde, three inf bns in 3 Bde
Must have dedicated lift for one inf bn in 1/7 Bde, dedicated lift for two inf bns in 3 Bde.
All L400s platforms integral to the armoured regt.
Distrubuted tanks.
Can fit a 2012 Pl in 6 vehs.
Only need to lift rifle coys, dfsw pl and mortar pl.

Therefore:
ISR squadron will be an enhanced current sqn: three troops plus a support troop.
Lift squadron will be three 21-22 veh troops plus one 18 veh troop.

The ACR is 1/7 Bde will be identical, with the ACR in 3 Bde biased towards lift:

'2 ACR' and '2/14 ACR'
Tank Sqn
2 x ISR Sqn
Lift Sqn
(Roughly 14-18 tanks and 146 L400 CAFS)

'1 ACR'
Tank Sqn
ISR Sqn
2 x Lift Sqn
(Roughly 14-18 tanks and 208(!) L400 platforms.

This will allow four of seven inf bns to be simultaneously mounted in dedicated lift.
Will need probably 750 L400 CAFS to make it work.
Likely relatively manning-neutral.

May be biased too much towards lift and 3 bde? You could make all the ACRs identical with 2 ISR sqns and one lift sqn, or move one of the lift sqns from Townsville to somewhere else. Hmmn...

[Raven22]

What is involved in the lift requirement? Is it basically just acting like a taxi driver going whereever the infantry has to be delivered?

If so, could you put that task onto the reserve cavalry units currently running around with Land Rovers? With the Active Cavalry units focusing 100% on formation recon?

The 'lift' would be more than just being a taxi, it is mounting the infantry in the vehicle and taking them into the close fight. It is exactly what B3/4 did with the carriers, and what 5 and 7 RAR should be doing with theirs. As Abe said, the skillsets required are really too complicated for the reserves. Indeed, as using PMVs in Afghan has shown, it is really too complicated for anyone other than professional AFV crewmen (ie, the RAAC) to do properly. This is why the infantry don't want to man their own vehs anymore, but have RAAC soldiers do it in some manner.

[Raven22]

Actually, I've had a better idea with the orbat I listed earlier. To make the basing more balanced, you could swap 1 Bde and 3 Bde around. Have the Townsville based brigade wth two inf battalions and an ACR with 2 ISR/1 lift sqns, and have the Darwin based brigade with the three battalions. Put the third battalion in Adelaide with a lift squadron and the tank squadron, and have the remaining two battalions in Darwin with a lift sqn and ISR sqn. Sounds a lot more workable actually:

Ie:

Townsville:
2 x Inf Bns
ACR (tank sqn, 2 x ISR sqns, lift sqn)

Brisbane:
2 x Inf Bns
ACR (tank sqn, 2 x ISR sqns, lift sqn)

Darwin:
2 x Inf Bns
ACR- (ISR sqn, lift sqn)

Adelaide
Inf Bn
ACR- (tank sqn, lift sqn)

Of course, the biggest problem with this is infrastructure.

[SteveJH]

The 'lift' would be more than just being a taxi, it is mounting the infantry in the vehicle and taking them into the close fight. It is exactly what B3/4 did with the carriers, and what 5 and 7 RAR should be doing with theirs. As Abe said, the skillsets required are really too complicated for the reserves. Indeed, as using PMVs in Afghan has shown, it is really too complicated for anyone other than professional AFV crewmen (ie, the RAAC) to do properly. This is why the infantry don't want to man their own vehs anymore, but have RAAC soldiers do it in some manner.

As much as I hate to say this, whenever I hear someone saying "its really too complicated" for someone to learn/do something. I always start to feel very sceptical.

They may not do it as well as a dedicated unit, but just saying they can't do it is going a bit far. Besides, don't they do predeployment training?

[Raven22]

As much as I hate to say this, whenever I hear someone saying "its really too complicated" for someone to learn/do something. I always start to feel very sceptical.


Okay, it's too complicated for someone who only trains 20 days a year. Pre-depoyment training isn't enough to teach you all the skills you need be a competent close combat vehicle crew - that is one key lesson with the PMV in Afghanistan. In fact, I just wrote an essay on that.

[SteveJH]

Okay, it's too complicated for someone who only trains 20 days a year. Pre-depoyment training isn't enough to teach you all the skills you need be a competent close combat vehicle crew - that is one key lesson with the PMV in Afghanistan. In fact, I just wrote an essay on that.

That sounds better...

Out of curiousity, how many days training per year would you estimate would be needed for minimum competency to be maintained after an initial (longer?) training per year? Just wondering if an actual number has been calculated and how much it would cost for a reserve force to do that training relative to the cost of having a regular unit do it.

[Raven22]

I doubt its been worked out. Of course its not just the amount of training its the quality of training. These days most Reserve training days are spent not doing anything particularly useful, largely as a result of poor manning, no equipment and no money. If you took a perfect world, with a reserve unit that was fully manned with personnel trained to their rank and job description, with a full roster of equipment that was properly maintained by someone else, and with enough money and competence to properly plan training activities, I would estimate it would take about 30 days a year worth of training to maintain a minimal (say, up to troop level live fire) capability.

Of course, it is not a perfect world, and many, many things would have to change with the rserves for this to be an option. Ie, everyone would have to receive the same recruit, IET and career courses as the regulars, they must have contractors or someone else maintain their vehicles and equipment, all the personnel must be available for training activities, they need a decent cadre of competent regular staff to plan these training activities and with enough money to pay for it all.

In reality, while we stll want to be able to use our forces at short notice and for scheduled deployments, and when there is barely enough money to equip the regular units, giving Land 400 platforms to the reserves isn't really an option. The best bet for the reserve cavalry units, and I would suggest the only option that will save them from oblivion, is to cascade the current Bushmaster fleet to them when available. The Bushmaster is easy to teach and operate and it is easy for contractors to maintain. The reserve cavalry units can use the Bushmaster to provide protected mobility to reserve infantry units, particularly for the high readiness components, and still provides a pool of reasonablu well trained soldiers for the refulars to draw on if required.

[Gubler, A.]

'2 ACR' and '2/14 ACR'

'1 ACR'


I would edit this to 1, 2 and 3/4 ACR allowing 2/14 LHR to be returned to the Reserves and enable 11 BDE to have a light cavalry capability. It was stolen in a pretty rotten manner back in 2005 so only fair to give it back.

[Gubler, A.]

Put the third battalion in Adelaide with a lift squadron and the tank squadron, and have the remaining two battalions in Darwin with a lift sqn and ISR sqn. Sounds a lot more workable actually:

Adelaide
Inf Bn
ACR- (tank sqn, lift sqn)

Of course, the biggest problem with this is infrastructure.

This 1 BDE (REAR) at Adelaide then becomes the basis for the fourth brigade under an army of fours construct… As to infrastructure it should not be seen as a limiter except when utilising legacy infrastructure. The Govt. loves CapDev and the commercial management of it makes it a lot easier to account for. The biggest problem is getting units to agree to move and not to chuck big stinks over it (3RAR, 21CS!).

[Milne Bay]

This is concerning the SAS but I thought I would post it here:

Soldier seriously injured in parachute drill

Posted 12 minutes ago

A soldier has been seriously injured during a parachute training exercise near Perth.

The soldier from the Special Air Service regiment was injured during the training session around 6:00pm (AWST) yesterday at Hillman Farm.

In a statement, Chief of Army Lieutenant-General Ken Gillespie said the SAS member's family had been notified.

"One of our soldiers has suffered very serious injuries as a result of this incident," he said.

"Army will be doing everything it can to support him and his family at this difficult time.

"Our thoughts and prayers are very much with them."

He said Defence would not speculate on the cause of the incident.

"Military parachuting is an inherently risky activity, but it is an essential capability requirement for our Special Forces and Airborne Infantry units," he said.

"An investigation will be conducted and we will be working closely with Comcare through this process."

ABC News

[JimWH]

Between us and the Yanks, we usually loose at least one person on each Talisman Sabre during the parachute drop[1]. It's also not uncommon for there to be one or two fractured mid-shaft femurs every year during parachute drops in Australia, and if your luck is bad one of them can either kill you or get damn close to it. Which is the reason why when there is a large drop (>1 coy) we try and put a surgical team either right underneath where they're going to land or just to the side. We should be under no illusions that if we did a company drop for real, we'd probably loose 1-3 people during the drop and there wouldn't be a damn hing we could do about it[2].
Military parachute drops are amongst the most dangerous training we do with any regularity.

-----
[1] In three out of the past 5 from memory.
[2]Was told the amusing story the other day of how the 3RAR RMO dislocated his shoulder during a drop a while ago. Imagine how much more fun that would have been if there hadn't been an HSB next door to look after everybody else...

[Gubler, A.]

Here is the presento on Plan Beersheba and the new 'like' brigade structure, from CAEX:

http://www.defence.gov.au/opex/exercises/caex/pdf/caligar.pdf

[Raven22]

It's good to see the Army has maintained its knack for massive, indecipherable powerpoint presentations. I'm also quite surprised that a lot of this is has been released into the public domain.

I must admit I won't hold me breath that the 'like' brigade model will actually be adopted, no matter how much it makes sense. Too much institutional inertia there I reckon. I've seen that indicative 'like' brigade model many times before, but I've never seen an 'amphib' battle group being separate from the brigades. It'd be interesting to know more about that (as I don't think it is workable, as I mentioned elsewhere). Having more cav squadrons is good for me though.

It's also interesting to see the presentation highlights the need to increase the time spent in the 'ready' phase, which foreshadows the possible change from an 8-month deployment to a 12-month deployment for the brigades, to align with the PPC and 12 month force gen cycle.

[Gubler, A.]

I must admit I won't hold me breath that the 'like' brigade model will actually be adopted, no matter how much it makes sense. Too much institutional inertia there I reckon.

Phantom to Force 10 years ago recommended the same thing. But while I doubt there will be exact ‘like’ brigades the new structures brought about by LAND 17, LAND 400 and ops means effectively something similar can be formed. The heavy armour (M1s, SPHs any AEVs) will most likely stay in 1 Bde and 3 Bde keep the third infantry battalion but the streamlined, more modular structure aligned to in the balance of the manouvre force. The only real difference is upgrading B Sqn, 3/4 Cav to a full regiment.


I've seen that indicative 'like' brigade model many times before, but I've never seen an 'amphib' battle group being separate from the brigades. It'd be interesting to know more about that (as I don't think it is workable, as I mentioned elsewhere). Having more cav squadrons is good for me though.

I think the amphib battle group is something to do with the odd one out: the seventh infantry battalion. Messes with the neat three ‘like’ two battalion brigades.


It's also interesting to see the presentation highlights the need to increase the time spent in the 'ready' phase, which foreshadows the possible change from an 8-month deployment to a 12-month deployment for the brigades, to align with the PPC and 12 month force gen cycle.

Don’t forget 12 month deployments are cheaper…

[JimWH]

It's also interesting to see the presentation highlights the need to increase the time spent in the 'ready' phase, which foreshadows the possible change from an 8-month deployment to a 12-month deployment for the brigades, to align with the PPC and 12 month force gen cycle.
Hmmm.... the interesting thing is that I heard a presentation a couple of months ago given by quite a senior officer of the Psyche Corps who said, in as many words, "we're not going to go to a 12 month deployment cycle anytime soon". And I actually get the feeling that the fellow in question knew what he was talking about: psyche have been asked to develop the models for how to manage people coming out active deployment cycles, and they'd received specific advise that we wouldn't be going to a 12 month deployment cycle and that they shouldn't put resources into planning for such a contingency.
Of course, that presentation makes it relatively obvious that the people planning this particular party have sod-all interest in consulting with JHC about anything, so it's entirely possible that psyche will soon be told to throw out all the work they're doing at the moment and re-set for a 12 month deployment cycle.

[Raven22]

Don’t forget 12 month deployments are cheaper…

Actually, they would likely be more expensive than the current 8 month rotation. From what I understand, if they went to a 12 month deployment cycle it would be up to the brigade how they achieved it. Commanders would likely do the full 12 month tour, but individual FE would likely do less, say two rotations of 6 months for most of them. High-demand units, like EOD, int specialists, MP searchers etc, would do continuous 4 month tours the same way the SF do it now.

The idea would be to have the HOTO during Nov to align with the PPC (its a royal pain in the arse having people deploy across the PPC date, as it means you have to organise late march-ins etc), as well as provide enough time for each brigade to train up for Talisman Sabre/Hamel etc.

[Will]

It meets the requirements RAN has for a destroyer including no doubt in LO and don't get too carried away by the idea about how easy it is to sink warships with ASM's. The AWD's will be one of the best protected warships in the world and it will feature many LO elements that aren't readily identifiable at a casual glance.

Things like the LO shield on the Mk 45 gun turrets and many other features add up...

Unfortunately I am not so convinced in regards to the doctrinal soundness of current ADF thinking.

[ADMk2]

Oh really? Please explain further. What is wrong with the "doctrinal soundness" exactly?

[Will]

Oh really? Please explain further. What is wrong with the "doctrinal soundness" exactly?

We have developed a rather disturbing tendency to follow US doctrine to a large extent. Having said this, much of the literature coming out of the Land Warfare Studies Center seems to have recognised this fact and is responding accordingly.

I would cite in particular the current obsession with "Hardening" of our Infantry. Whilst I recognise the rationale for such a move and the advantages of this, changing 3RAR from Para to Mech is nothing more than risk aversion on the part of the leadership and leaves us with a critical gap in our capability.

I would cite also the move towards networking of individual soldiers. This is certainly something can effectively act as a force multiplier, however there is the tendency for the operator to perform an action simply because the computer told them to do it.

I could go on but I won't. Suffice it to say that I do understand the rationale applied within the White Paper and indeed within this rationale future procurements are sound, however I feel that it lacks vision, weakens our strengths and leaves us with critical gaps in our capability.

[ADMk2]

We have developed a rather disturbing tendency to follow US doctrine to a large extent. Having said this, much of the literature coming out of the Land Warfare Studies Center seems to have recognised this fact and is responding accordingly.

I would cite in particular the current obsession with "Hardening" of our Infantry. Whilst I recognise the rationale for such a move and the advantages of this, changing 3RAR from Para to Mech is nothing more than risk aversion on the part of the leadership and leaves us with a critical gap in our capability.

I would cite also the move towards networking of individual soldiers. This is certainly something can effectively act as a force multiplier, however there is the tendency for the operator to perform an action simply because the computer told them to do it.

I could go on but I won't. Suffice it to say that I do understand the rationale applied within the White Paper and indeed within this rationale future procurements are sound, however I feel that it lacks vision, weakens our strengths and leaves us with critical gaps in our capability.

Wow. Where to begin...

For a start, 3RAR isn't being converted to Mech. That plan went out the window years ago. Google Enhanced Land Force - ELF for more. They are in fact being relocated to Townsville to co-locate all the 3rd Brigade Air-Mobile units. 5/7 RAR has been split instead with 7RAR being created an 8/9RAR re-raised. Your "critical gap" actually saw the formation of an additional 2 Battalions within the RAR bringing up us to a regular strength we haven't has since Vietnam...

As to the loss of the para role, I think you need to learn a bit more about the "capability" that 3RAR actually provided and that was a single company sized airborne readiness group. The training toll however to maintain this company group was extremely high. We haven't lost the capability to deploy a company sized group inserted by para, it is now just provided by 2CDO Regt.

In exchange Army gets a full battalion it can actually use that isn't hamstrung by the need to maintain the ARG (and the injury toll that entails) and with the LHD's to come online within the next few years Army needs to ready itself to provide sufficient conventional forces to maximise the investment we are making in additional amphibious capability.

As to your opinion on what networking allegedly does to the individual soldier, what are you basing that opinion on?

In any case, this topic is moving beyond the rationale for this particular thread, the AWD's...

[Will]

Wow. Where to begin...

For a start, 3RAR isn't being converted to Mech. That plan went out the window years ago. Google Enhanced Land Force - ELF for more. They are in fact being relocated to Townsville to co-locate all the 3rd Brigade Air-Mobile units. 5/7 RAR has been split instead with 7RAR being created an 8/9RAR re-raised. Your "critical gap" actually saw the formation of an additional 2 Battalions within the RAR bringing up us to a regular strength we haven't has since Vietnam...

As to the loss of the para role, I think you need to learn a bit more about the "capability" that 3RAR actually provided and that was a single company sized airborne readiness group. The training toll however to maintain this company group was extremely high. We haven't lost the capability to deploy a company sized group inserted by para, it is now just provided by 2CDO Regt.

In exchange Army gets a full battalion it can actually use that isn't hamstrung by the need to maintain the ARG (and the injury toll that entails) and with the LHD's to come online within the next few years Army needs to ready itself to provide sufficient conventional forces to maximise the investment we are making in additional amphibious capability.

As to your opinion on what networking allegedly does to the individual soldier, what are you basing that opinion on?

In any case, this topic is moving beyond the rationale for this particular thread, the AWD's...

Yeah use SF to perform an infantry job. Well I suppose they need retraining and expansion. I suppose we should tell every other developed nation on the world that their airborne infantry is redundant and the role that the perform is actually a SF role....

Psychology and common sense. You know the human tenancy to do things like drive off cliffs when the gps tells them to, or to fail to apply common sense to a non sensical output on a calculator. I don't care if someone is a soldier or not, human psychology is all the same.

You asked...

[ADMk2]

Whatever. Why don't you petition to get our infantry Corps big enough to support all the potential roles we might need someday... That way we can get a proper airborne corps, a proper mech force, a proper amphibious force, a proper light nfantry only force and so on. That's the ony way all our gaps are going o be covered, but good luck getting all that funded...

When you've got such a small force, it behooves one to get the most utility out of them. Tying up a whole battalion to provide a single companies worth of forces whose only raison d etre, is to maintain an insertion method capability we've never used and can provide from other forces we maintain anyway is an outrageous waste of resources.

Anyway this is my last post on this subject in this thread. We can move onto an appropriate land forces thread if you'd like.

Cheers.

[JimWH]

I suppose we should tell every other developed nation on the world that their airborne infantry is redundant and the role that the perform is actually a SF role..
It isn't redundant? The funny thing, from my perspective, is that the only people I know who think that airborne regular infantry makes any sense... are airborne infantry. The rest of us worked out some time ago in the real world an infantry COY/BN dropped into hostile territory without a hell of a lot of back up (and so help me if you say A FLD BTRY) would get torn apart, quickly. Because regular infantry are trained and equipped to fight with the whole shooting-match of CS and CSS enabling them to head forward and do stupid-infantry-shit, and without that back-up thy run out of steam really quickly. SF (or more precisely SOF in the case of 2CDO, a subtle but important distinction) are actually trained and equipped to fight independently away from friendly CS and CSS for some time. It's actually at least part of the motivation for standing up 4RAR(CDO) in the first place: actually have a useable ACT (airborne combat team) able to be deployed in the real world, as opposed to the 3RAR Market Garden Reenactors Society.
Word of advise Will, maybe have a listen to what is said around for a bit and then think again about your initial premise that we get things fundamentally wrong.
Also, let's talk about the Hobart class AWD on this thread.

[Gubler, A.]

I suppose we should tell every other developed nation on the world that their airborne infantry is redundant and the role that the perform is actually a SF role....

Hang on a second. On one hand you are saying that we should ignore every other developed nation in the world with destroyers and frigates and invest in stealthy missile boats yet in the case of airborne infantry Australia we should do the opposite? Of course this is assuming the comparison is valid. Many other armies with airborne forces are much larger and can afford the investment. How many other armies have a single airborne battalion out of a total division level force structure? Very much the minority.


Psychology and common sense. You know the human tenancy to do things like drive off cliffs when the gps tells them to, or to fail to apply common sense to a non sensical output on a calculator. I don't care if someone is a soldier or not, human psychology is all the same.

Ahhh…. Ohh kayyy… [Slowly back out of room.] You have fun with your theories of psychology and driving off cliffs and the like.

[tiddles]

Yeah use SF to perform an infantry job. Well I suppose they need retraining and expansion. I suppose we should tell every other developed nation on the world that their airborne infantry is redundant and the role that the perform is actually a SF role....

Psychology and common sense. You know the human tenancy to do things like drive off cliffs when the gps tells them to, or to fail to apply common sense to a non sensical output on a calculator. I don't care if someone is a soldier or not, human psychology is all the same.

You asked...
Hi Will & welcome to T5C, its good to see someone new doing a bit of posting. However I was hoping that you might be able to provide a LINK to some stories of people following their GPS directions & ended up disappearing over a cliff in their car. I am a bit worried that they may have been Australian DMO employees.
Tiddles

[ARH v.3.1]

On the weekend my GPS guided me into a cul-de-sac if that helps...

[buglerbilly]

Yeah I know that situation, my hand-held GPS mis-guided me from my bedroom to my toilet. Strange how you can get lost in a little house like mine.............might have helped if I'd opened my eyes of course, but hey, I was tired...............:g7

[Gubler, A.]

This is the only story on this topic I could find:

http://www.geek.com/articles/gadgets/gps-unit-drives-british-man-off-cliff-20090327/

One person drove into a fence above a railway bridge (the cliff!) in what might have been a weather, or night aided accident (no details). I strongly doubt this one example is enough to proclaim that human's blindly follow all computerised instructions. Even more so since BMS-D systems don't actually tell soldiers what to do step by step and we fight by voice anyway it is hardly indicative of some kind of lemmingisation of the infantry.

This is all far more likely to be a case of that age old human foible: people forming strong opinions about things they don't know shit about.

[buglerbilly]

There was a Delivery Van driver that got stuck part up Mount Snowdon in Wales but hey, you'd have to be totally ferkin stupid to not realise you were going in the wrong direction, it is a mountain albeit not a big one...........still freeze your balls off most of the year!

[Chunder]

Oh I read something back in July where some woman in the U.S and her Female companion decided to drive into marshland because the GPS told them to.

TRUE STORY!

[ADMk2]

This is the only story on this topic I could find:

http://www.geek.com/articles/gadgets/gps-unit-drives-british-man-off-cliff-20090327/

One person drove into a fence above a railway bridge (the cliff!) in what might have been a weather, or night aided accident (no details). I strongly doubt this one example is enough to proclaim that human's blindly follow all computerised instructions. Even more so since BMS-D systems don't actually tell soldiers what to do step by step and we fight by voice anyway it is hardly indicative of some kind of lemmingisation of the infantry.

This is all far more likely to be a case of that age old human foible: people forming strong opinions about things they don't know shit about.

He must have gone to RMC. That's the only place that trains such an un-creative, un-imaginative person who does not possess the presence of mind to be cautious of GPS instructions, apparently telling him to plunge over a cliff at high speed...

[JimWH]

We learned "being uncreative" the morning after we learned "so you've been given 6 hours local area leave and you've managed to forget how awesome drinking to excess is". First parade was painful.

[Raven22]

We learned "being uncreative" the morning after we learned "so you've been given 6 hours local area leave and you've managed to forget how awesome drinking to excess is". First parade was painful.

Mooseheads?

[JimWH]

Mercifully no. We were working on the basis that going somewhere that we might accidentally run into SCDTs was a bad idea, hence we started at the Belgian Beer Cafe in Kingston where I reacquainted myself with the joys of beer served in a vessel which was large enough to later take a dip in. We ended up at what I remember being quite a good bar somewhere within walking distance.
Of course I'm reliably informed that I managed to miss some of the best fun of the evening when the package master struck out at said bar despite:
1). speaking French like a native*
2). Being recently returned from A'stan
3). Being a cavalry officer
4). Buying the ladies in question (NB: civys) Moet
Apparently it was hilarious, and certainly didn't begrudge doing the Maccas run for him the next morning.

*I'd guess you may know the gentleman in question.

[Raven22]

*I'd guess you may know the gentleman in question.

Please tell me it's not a short, frog looking douchebag with a last name that begins with N? I'd like to tell you my opinion of that man, but I won't. Suffice to say, we don't get on.

[JimWH]

Well we are talking about the same chap Raven. Obviously my perspective is a fair bit different, and I wouldn't presume to question your opinion. Against which I would say that he did do a good job in this particular job, certainly kicked me up the arse enough times for me to have got my moneys-worth out of the course.

[Exsandgroper]

From Strategy Page

I thought that the 3rd Battalion was losing the parachute role to the Special Forces Command

Australia Leads The Way

September 19, 2011: Australia’s SOCOM (Special Operations Command) is taking control of army parachute units (actually, one parachute battalion), in recognition that it’s increasingly common for most parachute operations to be undertaken by special operations troops.
With this move, Australia is leading a growing trend to consider parachute troops as not just elite units, but ones that ought to be considered special operations quality. In practice, parachute troops have long been considered elite, just not quite “special operations” quality.

Then there’s the fact that parachute units are more expensive to train (a parachute school) and maintain (aircraft for periodic training jumps and addition medical expenses for jump related injuries, plus bonus pay for troops on jump status.) As a result of the cost, fewer and fewer parachute troops are in service. At the same time, special operations troops are more in demand, and more common. So now the Australians are one of the first to take the logical next step and merge parachute units into special operations force.

Parachute troops are a relatively recent development. It was 71 years ago that 48 volunteers formed the U.S. Army Parachute Test Platoon. On August 16, 1940, they made their first mass jump. The exercise was considered a success. America went on to raise over 100,000 parachute and glider infantry (all volunteers) and formed five airborne divisions (11th, 13th, 17th, 82nd and 101st).

The parachute was nothing new in American history, the first jump was made (from a balloon) in 1819 (the earliest such jump was made in France in 1797). The first jump from an airplane was made by an American in 1912. The basic elements of combat jumps by infantry (using a rip cord) were developed and tested by Americans in 1919. Had World War I gone on an additional year, the first combat jump would have been over Germany, by American paratroopers. Instead, German paratroopers startled the world in May, 1940 when they dropped on an "impregnable" Belgium fortress and conquered it in hours. The U.S. Army noticed and went on to field the world's largest airborne force.

The first American combat jump was in North Africa in November, 1942. U.S. paratroopers went on to make a total of 93 combat jumps. Parachute infantry has rarely been used since World War II. The helicopter, first used at the end of World War II, had much to do with the decline of parachute forces. America still has the largest and most capable parachute forces (about two divisions worth, although only one complete airborne division.) The Russian airborne force is almost as large in personnel, but with a lower level of training and readiness.

Other nations have brigades or battalions of paratroopers, which serve mainly as elite infantry or commandos. In that role, American paratroopers have frequently been in combat, earning 70 Medals of Honor in the process. Other nations have had similar experiences, but have noted that the paratroopers rarely get to use their parachutes.

Australia SOCOM consists of several hundred elite SAS commandoes and about a thousand highly trained airborne troops in six commando companies (somewhat similar to the nine ranger companies in the U.S. 75th Ranger Regiment.) The parachute battalion from the army could easily be converted to another three companies of airborne commandos.

Cheers

[buglerbilly]

Did Heinz write that article, cos its got 47 varieties of truth-and-lies buried in there.............

[Gubler, A.]

From Strategy Page

I thought that the 3rd Battalion was losing the parachute role to the Special Forces Command


Yep and you know a lot more about what is going on that whomever wrote that article.

[JimWH]

The 3RAR ACT is a zombie: it ought to be dead, but dark magic has kept it alive far past it's use-by date. However, the statements to Parliament earlier in the year are authoritative, the ACT role is going to 2CDO. And I'd guess that's were the author of the article got his wires crossed: the ACT role is going over the SOCOMD, but that's happening because the job is moving from 3RAR (1DIV/DJFHQ) to 2CDO (SOCOMD).
Of course, the article reads like it was written by an utter prat, so it's entirely possible he's just being willfully goofy.