Afghanistan and Pakistan

[buglerbilly]

U.S. training Afghan villagers to fight the Taliban



By Rajiv Chandrasekaran
Washington Post Staff Writer
Tuesday, April 27, 2010

ARGHANDAB DISTRICT, AFGHANISTAN -- Taliban fighters used to swagger with impunity through this farming village, threatening to assassinate government collaborators. They seeded the main thoroughfare, a dirt road with moonlike craters, with land mines. They paid local men to attack U.S. and Afghan troops.

Then, beginning in late February, a small detachment of U.S. Special Forces soldiers organized nearly two dozen villagers into an armed Afghan-style neighborhood watch group.

These days, the bazaar is thriving. The schoolhouse has reopened. People in the area have become confident enough to report Taliban activity to the village defense force and the police. As a consequence, insurgent attacks have nearly ceased and U.S. soldiers have not hit a single roadside bomb in the area in two months, according to the detachment.

"Everyone feels safer now," said Nasarullah, one of two gray-bearded tribal elders in charge of the village force. "Nobody worries about getting killed anymore."

The rapid and profound changes have generated excitement among top U.S. military officials in Afghanistan, fueling hope that such groups could reverse insurgent gains by providing the population a degree of protection that the police, the Afghan army and even international military forces have been unable to deliver.

But plans to expand the program have been stymied by Afghan President Hamid Karzai, who fears the teams could turn into offensive militias, the kind that wreaked havoc on the country in the 1990s and prompted the rise of the Taliban. "This is playing with fire," an Afghan government official said. "These groups may bring us security today, but what happens tomorrow?"

Citing Karzai's objections, Karl W. Eikenberry, the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, has blocked the release of money needed to broaden the initiative. He also has instructed State Department personnel in the country not to assist the effort until the Afghan government endorses it.

In addition to sharing Karzai's concerns about what would happen to the local defense forces once U.S. oversight ends, Eikenberry and other embassy officials worry that the program would weaken the central government in the eyes of the public and compete with efforts to build up the nation's army and police.

"At the end of the day, how sustainable would a program like this be?" said a State Department official based in Kabul, who like other officials spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal disputes. "It runs counter to the goal of giving the state a monopoly of force."

The military's interest in local-defense initiatives is driven in large part by President Obama's July 2011 deadline to begin withdrawing combat forces, which has increased pressure on commanders to demonstrate clear progress in their counterinsurgency mission this year.

Some military officials have expressed frustration that U.S. diplomats in Kabul have not done more to lobby Karzai and other Afghan officials to change their minds. Interior Minister Hanif Atmar, who had been supportive of the initiative earlier in the year, told participants at a U.S.-Afghan planning session this month that he no longer sanctions it, a reversal that military officials attribute to pressure from Karzai. Atmar instead wants the United States to expand a different local-defense program, which is under the control of his ministry and has been implemented in one province in the east, but U.S. commanders think it will not be as effective as the approach undertaken in Afghanistan.

Instead of waiting for Karzai's approval, the Special Forces command has moved forward with pilot projects here and in nine other villages, hoping to show that the forces being created are not militias. The command allowed a Washington Post reporter to visit four of the sites this month.

"There are signs of real promise," said Brig. Gen. Austin S. Miller, the top special operations commander in Afghanistan.

A senior U.S. military official said Karzai has provided a tacit blessing for a small number of experiments so long as the forces that are created are connected in some way to the Afghan government. The official said the Special Forces aim to build those links.

In Washington, a senior administration official involved in Afghanistan policy said the experiments have prompted interest -- and cautious support -- in the White House. "These sorts of bottom-up solutions need to be part of the equation," the official said.

Seeking support

When a detachment from the 1st Special Forces Group arrived here in mid-January, it seemed like a good place to experiment with the Local Defense Initiative. This part of the fertile Arghandab River valley is a key route for insurgents seeking to infiltrate the city of Kandahar, located less than 20 miles away. The population here is made up largely of ethnic Pashtuns who belong to the Alokozai tribe. Their leadership has been generally supportive of the Afghan government.

But when the soldiers asked the principal tribal leaders in the area to gather to discuss security matters, they were rebuffed.

"The only thing they could agree on was saying to us, 'We don't need your help,' " the detachment commander said. U.S. military officials requested that members of the unit, as well as the name of the village, not be identified because of operational security concerns.

The soldiers responded by setting out to drink endless cups of tea with the elders. Instead of driving around in large land-mine-resistant vehicles as conventional U.S. Army units do, the soldiers jumped on camouflage-painted dirt bikes and four-wheel all-terrain vehicles equipped with a front mount for an M240 machine gun and a rear rack upon which a few AT-4 small rockets can be lashed. Their mode of transportation mirrored that of their Special Forces brethren riding horseback with troops of the Northern Alliance in 2001.

The goal was to win support for a program that was hatched at a Pentagon City sports bar last year by Special Forces Lt. Col. David S. Mann and Seth Jones, a Rand Corp. political scientist who focuses on Afghanistan. They questioned whether the United States and NATO were missing an opportunity by concentrating so many resources on building up the national police, the army and other formal institutions, arguing that the Afghans should try to re-create the informal village-level defense forces that existed in parts of the country when it was a monarchy.

Mann and Jones's plan, which senior U.S. commanders endorsed, seeks to allay fears that the effort will breed militias: The forces are not paid or given weapons, and to minimize the risk of warlordism, they are supposed to be under the authority of a group of tribal elders -- not just one person.

Within a month, the promise of modest reconstruction projects paid for with the military's discretionary money managed to sway the locals. Nasarullah, who is the Alokozai leader in the village, agreed to sit down with Mohammed Aman, the leader of the minority Kakar tribesmen in the area. A few weeks later, the 22-member force was formed, drawn principally from the Alokozai but with the support of the Kakar.

The detachment has trained the members in rifle marksmanship, basic first aid and how to conduct a patrol. They also have received lessons on setting up traffic checkpoints and searching vehicles.

Those selected were eager to participate, but they initially insisted on being paid for their work -- a line the Special Forces did not want to cross. After extensive negotiations, they compromised: Members of the defense force would receive $10 a day, but they would have to spend part of their time working on reconstruction projects.

"They're pulling security and laying bricks," the commander said.

The defense force appears more ragtag than fearsome militia. Although the members wear matching army-green salwar-kameez and camouflage vests, they have all manner of footwear and headdress. Their AK-47s are battered, and they show more interest in lolling about their compound than imposing authority on the village.

But that does not seem to trouble the soldiers here. The measure of the force's effectiveness, say members of the detachment, has more to do with perceptions of security among the villagers than the amount of time its members strut around.

"They're a tripwire," Mann said. "The fact that they're guaranteeing safety is the essence of the program."

To the soldiers here, the clearest measure of the change that has occurred may not be in statistics or comments from residents, but in a one-page handwritten letter, placed in an air-mail envelope and dropped under the gate of the local defense force compound last week.

It was addressed to Toorjan, the commander of one of the two police checkpoints on the main dirt road -- the only Afghan government presence in the area. In January, he hit a roadside bomb while driving through the bazaar. He was not seriously injured, but his truck was destroyed.

The letter, from a person who said he was a local supporter of the Taliban, was an olive branch of sorts. The writer blamed the bombing, which he said he witnessed, on fighters from Pakistan, and he suggested he was open to switching sides.

"The local Taliban are our neighbors," Toorjan said. "Now that the security is better, they have no other choice but to support us."

Slow progress

Even if the Special Forces get the authority and funding to expand the initiative, replicating what has unfolded here will not be easy.

It has taken three months of intense effort by one detachment to turn around -- for the moment -- just one village. Although there are several dozen detachments in Afghanistan, not all of them could be reassigned to this task. And even if a few dozen villages were flipped, it might not have the hoped-for strategic impact.

Among members of the village defense force here, however, questions of growth are less important than what happens once the flow of U.S. cash ends. Will the group demobilize? Or will it, like so many other armed outfits in Afghanistan's history, morph into something larger and more troublesome?

Nasarullah, the local elder, insists that he does not have the money, or the desire, to sustain the effort himself. Even the members do not regard their current roles as a permanent occupation. Some said they would like to join the police. Others said they will go back to their farms.

"I am only doing this for my village," said Zahir Jan, who owns a small shop in Kandahar that he has entrusted to his brother while he serves in the defense force. "I am looking forward to the day I can put my gun down. But that day has not arrived."

[buglerbilly]

Galbraith: Hey USMC, here’s how to get out of the stalemate in Afghanistan

By Catherine Cloud

"Best Defense" military stalemates correspondent

In Afghanistan we are in a war we cannot win, but also one that we cannot lose, Amb. Peter Galbraith said in a talk at the Marine Corps University on Thursday.

We can't win, he said, because we have no credible local partner. Galbraith, who recently served as the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to Afghanistan, argued that General McChrystal was tasked with coming up with the best possible strategy to win a war in Afghanistan, not to determine whether or not that best strategy would actually work. The kind of counterinsurgency campaign McChrystal recommended requires an Afghan national army to provide security, a police force to provide order, and a government to provide services and win the loyalty of the people. Of these, we are closest to having a passable Afghan Army. The Afghan police force is far from competent, and -- most importantly -- the Afghan government is widely viewed as illegitimate. Karzai's eight years in office have been marked by inefficiency and corruption. Galbraith believes the next five won't be any better.

Galbraith's silver lining is that our unwinnable war is equally difficult to lose. Were ISAF forces to withdraw, we wouldn't see a dramatic, Vietnam-style defeat, he said. The Taliban would not knock down the Presidential Palace gates in Kabul. Essentially, he thinks things would stay about the same without US and international troops. The Taliban is not popular in much of the country. They would likely solidify control of neighborhoods in Kandahar and the surrounding countryside, but would be unable to take Kabul. These are bold claims to make, especially since Galbraith also pointed out that, in the months following the fraudulent August elections, which undercut support in troop-supplying countries, the Taliban made their greatest advances since 2002.

What then, according to Galbraith, can we hope to glean from this apparent stalemate?

We can prevent infiltration of Taliban in non-Pashtun areas and facilitate development there.

We can secure Kabul.

We can continue pursuing counterterrorism measures in Pashtun areas.

Although the government can't control Kandahar, it can prevent it from being overrun.

The result? Maybe not what we expected upon entering the war, but perhaps the most manageable option for securing Afghanistan under the circumstances outlined by Galbraith.

Galbraith also suggested that we drop our inclination to prop up a central government. Strong central government in Afghanistan doesn't exist, isn't achievable, and isn't desirable, he said. So, he said, we instead should look for structure closer to that of Iraq -- a power sharing parliamentary system based on supermajority coalitions of various factions and a federal system with a higher degree of self-governance.

Galbraith also split with former UN teammates on the question of whether the arrests of high-ranking Taliban figures by Pakistani authorities have impaired possible peace negotiations. He rejected this argument, calling the arrests "a U.S. foreign policy triumph." According to Galbraith, there had been no contact made with senior Taliban figures, and the meetings taking place in Kabul and Dubai were with individuals whose influence and connections to the Taliban were vastly overstated. As he put it (claiming to leave all personal feelings aside), Kai Eide is a "serial exaggerator."

[buglerbilly]

Interesting Michael Yon report on the beginning Battle for Kandahar............lots of pics, too many to post here..........

http://www.michaelyon-online.com/battle-for-kandahar.htm

[buglerbilly]

Does This Video Show Afghan Cops Killing UN Guard?

By Nathan Hodge April 28, 2010 | 11:04 am



Back in October, five United Nations employees were killed during a Taliban raid on their compound in Kabul. Now, Germany’s Stern has obtained video of the incident that seems to suggest that Afghan police deliberately shot and killed Louis Maxwell, an American citizen who was working as a UN security guard — and who saved the lives of several of his colleagues during the shootout.

A statement issued yesterday by the press secretary for UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said that Maxwell “may have been killed by Afghan security forces who may have mistaken him for an insurgent.” Maxwell, a close-protection specialist, “died protecting his United Nations colleagues, many of whom are alive today because of his heroic actions,” the statement added.

The statement –based on the results of a UN inquiry that has not been made public — also left open the possibility that three other UN staffers may have been killed by friendly fire.

But not everyone is persuaded by the UN’s account. Stern has obtained video, embedded here, that appears to show Maxwell being shot. According to Stern’s interpretation of the video, Maxwell, who had been wounded in the firefight defending his charges, can be seen pulling himself up by the hood of a Humvee, and standing among a group of Afghan police. He is then felled by a single shot (or a series of shots: the grainy, shaky video image is hard to interpret). An Afghan police officer is seen carrying Maxwell’s weapon — a Heckler and Koch G36, a relatively unusual weapon for Afghanistan — and walking off with it.

Among security contractors, the incident has sparked outrage. “Someone please make sense of all of this, because this smells,” writes Matt at Feral Jundi. Danger Room pal Tim Lynch, writing from Afghanistan, is also skeptical. The G36, he notes, “is worth a fortune here.”

The UN’s response has not been particularly helpful in clearing things up. The four-member Board of Inquiry set up late last year to investigate the incident has not publicly released its findings. “The relevant findings of the report have been shared with the Afghan authorities and other relevant stakeholders have also been informed,” said the UN in its bland prepared statement. In other words, the public — and probably Maxwell’s family — aren’t entitled to read it. Hello UN, transparency?

However, the UN is following through with some additional steps. According to the UN statement, Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security Gregory Starr is supposed to lead a team to Kabul next week to discuss the investigation with Afghan authorities.

Read More http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/04/did-afghan-cops-kill-un-security-guard/#more-24101#ixzz0mRdUMLPz

[buglerbilly]

US exit from Afghanistan - don't book it in yet

PAUL MCGEOUGH

April 29, 2010


The US powerpoint presentation on the strategy for Afghanistan speaks for itself.

Strategic American reversals make for dispiriting reading. The Obama administration is positioning itself to begin leaving Afghanistan next year, which - if too hurried - could be revealed as an eerie echo of George Bush's ''mission-accomplished'' moment in the early days of the Iraq war.

By publicly stating a wish to begin drawing down his troop numbers as early as July next year, President Barack Obama has in effect made the date holy writ, as much for his competing domestic constituencies as for the governments in Kabul and Afghanistan's pointy-elbowed neighbours.

But only the foolhardy would presume certainty in identifying an exit at this stage; five things show us why.

Exhibit 1: A mind-numbing PowerPoint presentation titled ''Afghanistan Stability/COIN Dynamics'', COIN meaning counter-insurgency, now freely circulated online. It was part of a briefing for General Stanley McChrystal shortly after he took control of US forces in Afghanistan 10 months ago, and was intended to convey the complexity of the military strategy he inherited.

With the conflict in its ninth year, McChrystal's lack of faith in military engagements begun by his predecessors casts the whole Afghanistan adventure into an aimlessness that bodes ill for the Americans' latest new-best-plan for victory. Or however the period after their departure might, more truthfully, be described.

Exhibit 2: McChrystal's decision to abandon the Korengal Valley, a futile, five-year attempt to take a skinny little stretch of country - hardly 10 kilometres long; less than one kilometre wide - on the wild eastern border. Struggling for control of half the valley and failing to build a road, more than 40 Americans died in this battle within the war, which for the US media became a leitmotif of the conflict until McChrystal concluded the valley's people just wanted to be left alone.

Exhibit 3: McChrystal's doubts about the British-led effort to tame Helmand province, in which more than 250 British troops have died in more than four years of fighting. The general is reportedly crafting a plan to pull the British forces eastwards to the city and province of Kandahar - and replace them in Helmand with more than twice as many US marines.

McChrystal has the extra boots on the ground because of Obama's 30,000-strong troop surge. But Time says the general concluded it was a strategic error to have the Brits in Helmand when they might have been more useful in pushing back a Taliban effort to embed themselves in increasingly lawless Kandahar.

Exhibit 4: In Helmand, McChrystal gave us Operation Moshtarak, which was to drive the Taliban from their stronghold in the Marja district - population 80,000 - and make it a hearts-and-minds winning beacon for the rest of Afghanistan, in which all the presumed talents of the Kabul bureaucracy and security combined would bedazzle the locals.

That was in February. Afghan and US officials say the jury is still out. Townspeople say they are harassed and intimidated by the Taliban, despite the presence of 2000 US marines and Afghan military and police and buckets of US cash doled out to locals.

''The Taliban are killing and beating people, and no one knows what is going on the next block over, because they cannot go anywhere,'' a local tribal elder told the Los Angeles Times.

Those beacon government services are slow in materialising, and locals remain reluctant to back the Kabul government. Taliban fighters reportedly line up with other locals for US cash handouts as compensation for combat damage to their property. The ousted Taliban governor made a daring return to Marja, where he summoned elders to warn them against co-operating with the Americans.

Exhibit 5: Building a head of steam, a military operation that will peak in the coming months, to rout the Taliban from their spiritual home, Kandahar, the second biggest city. This anticipated strategic victory will be a critical stepping-stone as Obama makes his way to the exit.

There are a few problems. The President, Hamid Karzai, told local leaders the operation will not proceed if they object, which they do. Kandahar city is run by the President's corrupt brother, fuelling negative sentiment that reportedly drives support for the Taliban. Karzai wants to talk to the Taliban, instead of fighting them.

Seemingly, Kandaharis agree. When the US military polled public attitudes, support for negotiation with the insurgents ran at 19 to one; five out of six saw the Taliban as ''our Afghan brothers''; four in five believed the Taliban would cease fighting if they were given jobs; and over half saw the Taliban as ''incorruptible''.

The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission says only five of Kandahar province's 17 districts are under government control. Such is the violence, the United Nations evacuated its foreign staff from Kandahar on Tuesday and told the locals to stay home.

When McChrystal was shown the PowerPoint bowl of minced twine in Kabul, he reportedly exclaimed: ''When we understand that slide, we'll have won the war.'' It didn't sound like a joke. Still, the room erupted in laughter.

Paul McGeough is the Herald's chief correspondent.

[buglerbilly]

Pakistan Taliban chief Hakimullah Mehsud is alive, says spy agency

Exclusive: Setback for CIA after Pakistan intelligence official admits drone attack failed to kill the Pakistan Taliban commander

Declan Walsh in Islamabad guardian.co.uk,

Wednesday 28 April 2010 18.23 BST


Pakistani Taliban commander Hakimullah Mehsud speaks to the press in 2008. Mehsud was presumed dead in a US drone strike in January but is now thought to be alive. Photograph: A Majeed/AFP/Getty Images

The Taliban leader in Pakistan, Hakimullah Mehsud, survived an American drone strike in January and is alive and well, a senior official with Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence agency told the Guardian today.

Mehsud was reported to have died in a CIA drone strike in South Waziristan in January but, although Pakistan's interior minister claimed he had been killed, the death was never confirmed by either US or Pakistani intelligence.

Today the senior intelligence official said he had seen video footage of the missile attack on Mehsud but other intelligence had since confirmed the insurgent leader survived. He declined to elaborate further.

"He is alive," said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity. "He had some wounds but he is basically OK."

Mehsud's apparent survival will be a blow to the CIA, which intensified efforts to kill the flamboyant young Taliban leader early this year after he appeared in a video alongside an al-Qaida operative who killed seven American spies at a base in southern Afghanistan in late December.

The failed attack on Mehsud came at the start of an unprecedented onslaught by CIA-controlled unmanned aircraft in the tribal belt. The CIA has carried out 38 attacks so far this year, the official said, compared with 49 in the whole of 2009.

"The US government is under pressure because it is unable to achieve much in Afghanistan. This is one way of hitting their al-Qaida enemies, as they define them," the official said.

Drone strikes are deeply unpopular in Pakistan because of civilian casualties. The New America Foundation recently reported that between January 2009 and March 2010 the drones killed 690 alleged insurgents and 181 innocent villagers. CIA figures put the civilian tally for the same period at 20.

The Pakistani official estimated the civilian toll was "between the two figures" but insisted that targeting had improved. "For the Americans, this is an effective way of doing things from a distance with little collateral damage. I give full credit to the CIA for this."

The Washington Post reported this week that the CIA has started using more compact drones and smaller missiles in an effort to reduce civilian casualties.

The intelligence official denied reports that the Taliban deputy leader, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, had been captured in Karachi last January "by accident".

US intelligence pinpointed Baradar in a housing estate in a well-to-do part of Karachi, he said, but the raid to capture him was entirely Pakistani. "There was no American around," he said.

Baradar was being jointly interrogated by CIA and ISI agents and had yielded useful information, he said. For example, he claimed to have last met the Taliban leader in Afghanistan, Mullah Muhammad Omar, two years ago.

He also rejected claims that Pakistan had captured Baradar to scupper nascent Afghan peace talks, saying that Baradar had disdained President Hamid Karzai as "not even a real Pashtun".

In March, Kai Eide, the UN's former special representative to Afghanistan said he believed Pakistan wanted to prevent talks between the UN, the Afghan government and the Taliban, to retain control of the process.

The senior official said the ISI would be "very, very willing" to play a role in negotiations with the Taliban, but only if called upon by both the Afghan and US governments. For now, he said, Pakistan's spies are "sitting on the sidelines, watching".

"There are a number of different efforts and nobody knows what anyone else is doing. It's a very fragmented effort." He added that "if it's meant to confuse the Taliban, it's working".

One stumbling block, he said, was the clashing policies of Britain and the US. "The British are more amenable to negotiations and talking," he said. "The Americans are attempting to create conditions where the Taliban will be forced to come to the table. In my opinion they will never achieve that."

A western diplomat in Islamabad said British officials were more inclined to talks than their US couterparts, but said policy had not been fixed in either country because "otherwise things would be happening".

The ISI official denied his agency retains close ties with Jalaluddin Haqqani, an al-Qaida-linked warlord whom America blames for recent mayhem in Afghanistan, including a suicide attack on the Indian embassy.

He admitted the agency had once been close to Haqqani but insisted that recent US allegations came from people who "lived in the past". He regretted that Pakistan had broken its links with the warlord because "otherwise, resolution of the problems in Afghanistan today would be so much easier for all of us".

The ISI was heavily criticised in a recent United Nations report into the death of Benazir Bhutto in December 2007. The official described the report as a "sub-standard work with a clear agenda".

He said: "In the report, statements are made and inferences drawn on condition of anonymity and hearsay. Who in God's name does that?"

Charmed life

Hakimullah Mehsud's apparent survival represents a second miraculous escape in the career of a youthful, ruthless militant leader.

The Pakistani government previously reported that the flamboyant tribesman, thought to be about 30 years old, was killed during a leadership struggle last August.

Despite his remarkable good fortune, however, Hakimullah's days as a Taliban leader may be numbered. According to a senior ISI official, his Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan organisation has been weakened by a sweeping army assault on its South Waziristan stronghold.

Mehsud's leadership has been challenged by other figures, too, including his rival Wali-ur-Rehman. "He may not be in the leadership position," the intelligence official said. "His rise was accidental. He was mister nobody, people found it difficult to accept him."

Mehsud rose to militant fame on the back of his ambition and showy cruelty. He sprang to prominence in 2007 with the humiliating kidnapping of over 200 Pakistani soldiers in South Waziristan.

A year later, he led dozens of ambushes on Nato supply convoys as they passed through the Khyber Pass; in one instance he invited reporters to film him at the wheel of a looted American Humvee.

Hakimullah became Taliban leader in August after a CIA drone killed the Tehrik-i-Taliban founder, Baitullah Mehsud. He also became known for cruelty. In Orakzai tribal agency, which was under his sway, Taliban fighters preyed on minority Sikhs and carried out bloody sectarian attacks on Shias.

Whatever Mehsud's fate, the Taliban remain a potent force. Yesterday, a suicide bomber rammed his car into a checkpoint on the outskirts of Peshawar, killing five policemen. In North Waziristan, a clash at a checkpoint left four militants dead and injured one soldier.

[buglerbilly]

U.S. seeks to prop up Kandahar governor, sideline troublesome power brokers


Army Pfc. Nicholas Claffey, of Rochester, N.Y., searches an Afghan man during a patrol in the Maiwand district of Kandahar. American officials are adopting a new political strategy for this southern province. (Julie Jacobson/associated Press) Network NewsX Profile

By Joshua Partlow
Washington Post Foreign Service
Thursday, April 29, 2010

KANDAHAR, AFGHANISTAN -- The governor of Kandahar, Tooryalai Wesa, is an outsider with little sway in the province's politics, a mild-mannered academic who spent more than a decade in Canada and is considered by many Afghans to be ineffectual.

Below him in rank but far more powerful in reality is provincial council chief Ahmed Wali Karzai, a half brother of the president who has amassed a business empire fed by foreign aid and, many allege, the opium trade.

It is a power balance that U.S. officials are trying to upend.

In the hope of pushing power brokers such as Karzai to the sidelines, American officials are trying to infuse Wesa and his government with more clout and credibility. They see better governance as a central part of a U.S.-led effort that has brought thousands of troops to the region for a summer offensive against the Taliban.

But the government headed by Wesa has severe problems of its own. It remains understaffed, is viewed by many as corrupt and does not reflect the province's tribal mix. Karzai and other allegedly corrupt political bosses who dominate Kandahar show no sign of giving way.

"Wesa is a weak governor," said Rahmatullah Raufi, a former general and Kandahar governor. "If Ahmed Wali Karzai wants him to die, he will die. If he says, 'Live,' he'll live."

U.S. planning for a new political strategy in Kandahar began last summer and evolved out of a need to find a new way to deal with Karzai. The goal, said one official involved in the planning, was to figure out how to "shape the relationship without turning it into a completely unworkable confrontation."

Obstacles to reform

To bolster Wesa's beleaguered office, U.S. officials plan to hire about two dozen Afghan staff members, to be split with the mayor. American helicopters ferry Wesa to meetings, where U.S. officials take notes on his progress. They hope that Wesa's attempts at grass-roots organizing, combined with an infusion of funds into the province, can earn some support from a skeptical public.

To achieve reform, Wesa wants to build from the bottom up, making local tribal councils more inclusive by bringing in representatives from a wider range of villages. He expects that these councils will bring marginalized tribes back into the political fold and, at the same time, create local structures that can resolve grievances and more equitably hand out development money.

"Rather than an anti-power-broker campaign, it's a pro-government campaign," said Ben Rowswell, Canada's senior civilian representative in Kandahar.

The obstacles to reform are daunting. A series of assassinations has targeted government employees and supporters. The latest high-level casualty was Kandahar's deputy mayor, Azizullah Yarmal, who was fatally shot last week as he prayed in a mosque.

Although the insurgency is still viewed negatively by a majority of Afghans, polling late last year in Kandahar showed troubling trends: rising support for the Taliban, declining confidence in the Afghan government and growing dissatisfaction with foreign troops.

Part of the problem, according to Wesa and others, is the exclusion of key Pashtun tribes from positions of power. President Hamid Karzai's Popalzai tribe, part of the Zirak branch of the Durrani tribes, has come to dominate politics in Kandahar. Other major tribes, such as the Ghilzai, whose most famous son is Taliban leader Mohammad Omar, have lost influence. Two-thirds of the provincial government positions are held by Zirak Durranis, and an even greater proportion of district leaders and police chiefs -- 26 of 34 -- hail from these tribes, according to U.S. military officials. None of the top officials at the district level is a Ghilzai.

Afghan officials and their NATO allies also have failed to confront the network of mafia-like bosses in Kandahar. In fact, NATO forces rely heavily on them, particularly Ahmed Wali Karzai, who benefits from U.S. government contracts and provides intelligence and security for logistics convoys.

Instead of pushing for his removal, U.S. officials want to consult with him more regularly, partly in a bid to limit his power. Although the CIA has worked with him for years on a narrowly focused counterterrorism mission, U.S. officials said they need to broaden their relationship with him and have regular meetings with him on Kandahar's political issues.

In a series of recent meetings, American civilian and military officials told Karzai not to meddle in the work of the Afghan police, interfere with government appointments or rig the upcoming parliamentary elections. Without issuing specific threats, they made clear that, as one senior official put it, "it's going to be painful" for him if he crosses these red lines.

U.S. military officials are also reviewing how much money gets funneled to him through contracts and whether this can be reduced or spread among others.

Ahmed Wali Karzai's role

Confronting Ahmed Wali Karzai is no easy task. During his four-month tenure as Kandahar's governor in 2008, Raufi repeatedly clashed with Karzai. Raufi tried to convene a more inclusive tribal council as a way to pursue peace. But he said Karzai saw this as a threat and scuttled the effort.

Karzai demanded that all provincial legislation be signed by him as well as the governor, something Raufi opposed. Whatever the issue -- be it police appointments, court cases or reconstruction programs -- Karzai was involved, Raufi said. Before long, Raufi lost his job.

"He's like a chicken. Wherever he sees seeds, he tries to peck at them," Raufi said. "With the existence of Ahmed Wali Karzai, it's not possible to develop Kandahar."

Karzai could not be reached for comment. He has repeatedly denied any involvement in illegal activities.

Karzai has told U.S. officials that he will support the military offensive in Kandahar. "He knows this surge is coming. . . . He knows his freedom of movement is not going to be as good as it was," one U.S. official said. "His response has been, 'Tell me what you want me to do.' "

When Wesa took over in December 2008, he had little experience with bare-knuckle politics. He was an agriculture professor who had spent 13 years in Vancouver. When he returned to Kandahar, where he founded the local university, he had difficulty recognizing the place.

"I've lived in Kandahar during the good days. Now I have to go through the bad ones," he said.

In front of crowds, Wesa often appears placid. But he has become adamant about building local councils into relevant organizations, demanding that representatives from each village attend weekly meetings or risk losing aid money.

At these meetings, Wesa and his lieutenants have heard complaints about relatives killed and captured by U.S. troops. They have heard demands for new schools, clinics, irrigation systems and, above all, safety. As Wesa concluded his council meeting in Arghandab last week, a rocket slammed a hill looming over the conference hall, raising a cloud of dust and smoke.

At another meeting in Panjwai district, Wesa asked whether one representative from each village would show up in two weeks. The crowd murmured in noncommittal tones. It was unclear how convincing this cleanshaven Canadian transplant was to the bearded and turbaned men in a Taliban stronghold.

"Everybody's so silent," Wesa observed. "It's like you are Buddhas."

[buglerbilly]

U.S., Pakistan bolster joint efforts, treading delicately

By Karen DeYoung
Washington Post Staff Writer
Thursday, April 29, 2010

The scheduled arrival of 50 additional U.S. military personnel to Pakistan in June, accompanying four new F-16 fighter jets, will increase the official number of American boots on the ground there by 25 percent. It is enough to make the Pakistani government shudder with trepidation.

Exaggerated tales of U.S. soldiers and spies flooding the country are regular front-page fare in Pakistan, and cause for strident political criticism of Western intervention that sometimes erupts into violence. Pakistan's military and intelligence services remain highly suspicious about the motives and methods of their U.S. counterparts, a wariness mirrored in American attitudes toward Pakistan.

But a strategic decision by both sides to improve counterterrorism cooperation, along with the personnel requirements of increased U.S. aid, have led in recent months to a small but significant expansion in the U.S. presence in Pakistan.

There are currently about 200 U.S. military involved in security assistance in Pakistan, including a Special Operations training and advisory contingent, initially set at 80 troops, that has twice been enlarged since last year and now totals up to 140 troops in two Pakistani locations, according to senior U.S. military officials. The Pakistani government prohibits U.S. combat forces.

The CIA has sent additional intelligence-gathering operatives and technicians in recent months. Plans are underway to establish a joint military intelligence processing center. After an initial period of tension, Pakistani officers are using cross-border intelligence compiled at two joint coordination centers on the Afghan side of the frontier.

Although news media and the public continue to criticize the CIA's drone-fired missile attacks targeting insurgent figures in western Pakistan, intelligence cooperation in directing the missiles has improved, according to Pakistani officials who say U.S. operatives have gotten better on coordinating such activities to prevent conflicts with Pakistan's own air operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, or FATA, along the Afghan border.

Under agreements connected to Pakistan's purchase of 18 F-16s scheduled for staggered delivery this year, a U.S. military team must be on hand to ensure that sophisticated, top-of-the-line avionics, weapons and data systems aboard the aircraft remain secure. The planes, which for the first time will allow Pakistan to conduct nighttime air operations, are far more advanced than the 30-year-old U.S. aircraft that are the current air force mainstay.

They will be housed at Shahbaz air base in south-central Pakistan, one of three bases where Pakistan allowed limited U.S. use for several years after the 2001 beginning of the war in Afghanistan. Far from advertising the arrival of a new contingent of Americans at Shahbaz, the Pakistani military is building a cloistered facility to house them amid some 5,000 of its own troops that will occupy the newly expanded base. Pakistani and U.S. military and intelligence officials spoke on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to do so on the record.

"Certainly, this is a delicate area," a Pakistani military official said of the American presence. Both Pakistani and U.S. officials expressed concern about how the previously unpublished news of the team's deployment would be played in the Pakistani press, and emphasized that the U.S. personnel would have no operational role.

"For someone against the United States, it is not all that easy to make him like the U.S. overnight," Nawabzada Malik Ahmad Khan, Pakistan's minister of state for foreign affairs, said in an interview.

Progress in bilateral relations culminated with last month's meeting between senior Pakistani cabinet and military officials in Washington. Although it did not eliminate problems and mistrust, it does appear to have achieved a new degree of mutual candor and tolerance.

During a recent PowerPoint briefing in Islamabad, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence directorate, ISI, provided a comprehensive list of U.S. complaints about them.

The Obama administration, a senior ISI official said, remains "suspicious of ISI linkages with the Afghan Taliban," thinks that the ISI is indifferent to the threat posed by al-Qaeda and that it promotes anti-American diatribes in the Pakistani media. The United States, the official said, sees Pakistan as incapable of guaranteeing the security of its nuclear arsenal, irrationally obsessed with the threat from India and generally not serious about either democracy or fighting terrorists, he said.

The Pakistanis plead guilty as charged to some of the U.S. concerns. Al-Qaeda -- whose presence in its territory is officially disputed by Pakistan -- is not seen as a domestic threat. Links with the Afghan Taliban and other insurgent groups fighting U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan are long-standing and considered a strategic necessity to protect Pakistan's western flank.

Should the Americans withdraw from Afghanistan or allow Afghan President Hamid Karzai to reconcile with insurgent leaders without input from Islamabad, Pakistan believes it would need allies among the Pashtun tribes there to maintain its influence and protect its western flank from Indian inroads.

"They don't believe we don't know what Karzai is doing," a State Department official involved in Pakistan policy said. "They're afraid that we're going to cut a peace deal without them. We've told them that as soon as we know, they'll know."

A separate ISI PowerPoint slide listed Pakistan's complaints with the United States: unfounded nuclear concerns, not enough assistance, unrealistic accounting and audit demands on aid funding, and "insisting on actions that Pakistan views as inconsistent with its own concerns."

The Obama administration has additional complaints. The slow issuance of visas for additional U.S. personnel remains a sore point, along with harassment of U.S. military and civilian officials at military and police checkpoints.

But it has quieted its public criticism of Pakistan, hailing military successes against the Pakistani Taliban and easing up on pressure to do more. "We can be taken to task for giving too much advice" in the past, a senior U.S. military official said.

[buglerbilly]

Report Notes Afghanistan Developments, Challenges

(Source: U.S Department of Defense; issued April 28, 2010)

WASHINGTON --- Stability in Afghanistan is no longer on the decline, and most Afghans believe that despite increased violence, security actually has improved since this time last year, according to a new report Pentagon officials sent to Congress today.

The congressionally mandated Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan attributes the 87 percent increase in violence from February 2009 to March 2010 largely to increased U.S., coalition and Afghan national security force activity, particularly into areas where they previously had not operated.

The report, which covers the situation on the ground from Oct. 1 to March 31, cites progress in President Barack Obama’s strategy aimed at disrupting, dismantling and defeating al-Qaida in Afghanistan and Pakistan. But it offers what a senior defense official speaking on b ackground called a sobering assessment of the conditions on the ground, and a recognition of the importance of what happens within the next six months in determining the direction the operation ultimately will take.

Despite increased violence, the report notes that the downward trend in stability appears to have stemmed, along with Taliban momentum. But it’s far too soon to say the corner has been turned, the official told reporters.

“We are on the cusp,” he said. “We are no longer moving in the wrong direction.” He cited signs that he said indicate “we are moving in the right direction.”

U.S., coalition and Afghan forces activity has played a major role in changing that dynamic as they extend their reach into more Afghanistan districts, the official said. He expressed hope that their population-centric tactics will help to sway more Afghans toward supporting the democratically elected Afghan government. That, in turn, could serve as a fulcrum that could “change the dynamic of the whole country,” he added.

As of March 31, about 87,000 U.S. forces were on the ground in Afghanistan, with additional forces to bring that number to 98,000 by August. In addition, 46,500 international forces are serving in Afghanistan, with 38 countries pledging about 9,000 more troops to support operations, tactics and training. As of March 31, 40 percent of those additional troops had arrived in the country.

The report cites requirements that international partners have not filled – primarily for trainers and mentors to support development of Afghan security forces, particularly the police force, which lags behind the Afghan army.

The defense official cited additional international troop commitments since the report closed March 31, including 20 to 30 percent more institutional trainers.

But while NATO allies and partners are “cautiously optimistic” about success of the International Security Assistance Force mission, many national leaders express concerns about dwindling popular support for the mission within their countries, the report noted.

As of March 31, the Afghans had fielded about 113,000 army troops and 102,000 national police officers. They are broadly on track to meet targeted growth figures of 134,000 for the army and 109,000 for the police by October, the report said, and 171,600 soldiers and 134,000 police officers by October 2011.

Another report the Defense Department sent Congress today -- the U.S. Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces -- cites continued improvements in building capacity as well as end strength in these forces. It notes new initiatives during the past year designed to speed up this process, including organizational changes to the NATO command structure to improve unity of command and embedding international forces with Afghan security forces at all levels to promote mentorship and leadership development.

The report recognizes that for Afghan forces to be prepared to take the security lead, other elements also must be in place -- governance, courts, judges, prosecutors and correctional capacity, among them.

The Afghanistan security and stability report also acknowledges that Obama’s Afghanistan strategy requires increased civilian as well as military capacity. The State Department has tripled its civilians on the ground since January 2009, to 339, to support the governance and development goals in Afghanistan that are critical to sustaining improvements in the security situation, the report said.

“It’s not all about security,” the defense official told reporters. “It’s about what security enables.”

-ends-

[buglerbilly]

Hamid Karzai's government supported by only one in four 'key' areas, report finds

Hamid Karzai's government commands support in only one in four Afghan areas considered 'key' by the US military, according to a Pentagon report.

Published: 9:31AM BST 29 Apr 2010


Afghan President Hamid Karzai Photo: EPA

The report says that much of the country was either neutral to the government or otherwise supportive of the Taliban insurgency, blaming government corruption and lack of efficiency as major reasons.

"The overall assessment indicates that the population sympathizes with or supports the Afghan government in 24 percent (29 of 121) of all Key Terrain and Area of Interest districts," the quarterly report to Congress said.

"The establishment of effective governance is a critical enabler for improving development and security."

Mr Karzai has gone from a darling of the international powers who placed him at the head of the Afghan state in 2001 to facing accusations from the United States and other nations that he has allowed unchecked corruption.

Popular anger at Karzai's government, which is widely seen as corrupt and inefficient, has allowed the Taliban to "perceive 2009 as their most successful year," the Pentagon report said.

"Expanded violence is viewed as an insurgent victory, and insurgents perceive low voter turnout and reports of fraud during the past presidential election (in August 2009) as further signs of their success," the 150-page report said.

According to the Pentagon, "violence is sharply above the seasonal average for the previous year - an 87 percent increase from February 2009 to March 2010."

"Although the overall security situation has stabilized somewhat since the end of 2009, violence during the current reporting period is still double that for the same period in 2008-2009," the report said.

The Pentagon said increased action by coalition forces in the country meant the Taliban has "been under unprecedented pressure."

"Reporting indicates increased and often strained efforts to resource the fight, which has led to tension and sporadic dips in morale," the report said.

It added that the decline in stability seen in the last report submitted to Congress "has levelled off in many areas over the last three months of this reporting period."

"Polls consistently illustrate that Afghans see security as improved from a year ago," the report added.

[buglerbilly]

Aussies help reclaim Afghan town April

29, 2010 - 9:39PM

AAP

Australian troops in Afghanistan have helped boot Taliban forces from the northern Oruzgan town of Gizab, defence officials say.

The town has been reclaimed and the Taliban forced out following a series of firefights beginning April 21, in which 10 Taliban members were killed.

A number of Australian soldiers worked with Afghan forces, the Provincial Police Reserve, as well as locals, to take back Gizab, with no casualties reported on their side.

The commanding officer of the Special Operations Task Group credited the support of the locals in helping take back the town.

"Most of the decisive engagements at Gizab took place within the first 48 hours of the community-led uprising against the insurgents," the unnamed lieutenant colonel said in a statement.

"Within the space of a few days, Gizab went from gun fighting to relative stability."

Australian troops escorted a band of Afghan government officials through the town once the fighting ceased.

The town has already nominated a new Gizab district governor and chief of police.

"The groundswell of popular support from the townspeople culminated in an impromptu ceremony in the middle of the town to raise the Flag of Afghanistan," the Lt Col said.

"And in the middle of it all, we managed to conduct an Anzac Day dawn service at Gizab."

He said it was an important step in restoring peace in Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, the defence department was also reporting no injuries following a rocket attack at Tarin Kowt on Wednesday.

Taliban insurgents fired three rockets at the Multi National Base - two missed their target, while a third exploded inside the base without damaging equipment or wounding troops.

© 2010 AAP

[Deks]

I know it's a fairly niche item, but given how casualty averse the gov't is I'm surprised there isn't any CRAM guns out there to stop that sort of thing.

[buglerbilly]

Pentagon Doles Out Sweetheart Deals for Wartime Supplies

By Nathan Hodge April 29, 2010 | 12:38 pm

Sole-source contracts are NOT the problem, the selection of incompetent Contractors who have no ability nor the experience nor the financial-backing to perform work they have been awarded...........sole source is a viable method IF you know and have proof the work can be done on-time and to-cost is..........makes it hard for the Losers but thats life, this is NOT a Government-sponsored work creation scheme despite what some US Companies think of "Evil Foreigners"..........

According to White House budget estimates, it costs roughly $1 million a year to support the deployment of a single soldier to Afghanistan. Ever wonder why it costs so much? Landlocked country, long supply lines, poor infrastructure, yadda yadda. But how about another possible contributing factor: The reliance of the Pentagon’s main supply agency on no-bid contracts?

Newsweek’s stellar Declassified blog got the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) to fess up to awarding $1.4 billion in no-bid contracts to two shady foreign entities to supply aviation fuel to U.S. military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan. In a statement to Declassified, DLA confirmed that it had awarded contracts to two firms, Mina Corp. and Red Star Enterprises, under federal procurement guidelines that allow “contracting without providing for full and open competition.”

That’s problematic for a number of reasons: For starters, allegations of crooked base supply deals helped lead to the violent overthrow of the government of Kyrgyzstan. And leaving aside the question of whether the United States deliberately turned a blind eye to corruption in a strategically located Central Asian state, let’s turn to another point: Why the hell is DLA awarding no-bid contracts on this scale?

It’s not just limited to fuel contracts. DLA, for instance, has also given major sole-source awards to Hesco Bastion, the U.K. firm that manufactures the ubiquitous sand-and-soil-filled perimeter defenses seen at U.S. bases throughout the Middle East and Central Asia. An Illinois company, Infrastructure Defense Technologies, recently submitted a formal protest with the Government Accountability Office in a bid to overturn DLA’s most recent award to Hesco, claiming that the agency had unfairly given a monopoly on defensive barriers to Hesco.

It’s worth pointing out here that Infrastructure Defense Technologies unsuccessfully sued DLA in the Court of Federal Claims over the same issue. The website of the powerhouse law firm Patton Boggs, which successfully represented Hesco in the case, notes that the court ruled Hesco “was properly awarded the sole source contract because only the Hesco product could meet the government’s stated needs for the procurement.”

That’s essentially the same rationale that DLA offered to Declassified for its no-bid award to Red Star, described as ““the only company that had the capability to meet operational needs.”

But saying that doesn’t necessarily make it so. We’ve covered some dubious “sole-source” awards before — the procurement of Russian helicopters, for instance — and it’s easy to detect a pattern: In cases where the government grants someone an exclusive rather than seeking multiple quotes, it usually ends up paying a much higher price. Shortly after taking office, President Barack Obama vowed to limit no-bid contracts, saying that contracting overhaul could save taxpayers billions of dollars a year. One wonders if anything at all has changed.

[PHOTO: U.S. Department of Defense]

Read More http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/04/pentagon-doles-out-sweetheart-deals-for-wartime-supplies/#more-24151#ixzz0mXRLHTvI

[buglerbilly]

Gordon Brown's dithering has betrayed our soldiers


The Prime Minister's failure to allow vital missions to be completed in Afghanistan is a shameful legacy, says Con Coughlin.

Con Coughlin, UK Daily Telegraph

Published: 6:06PM BST 29 Apr 2010

Throughout Gordon Brown's troubled tenure as Prime Minister, one constant feature has been his antipathy towards our Armed Forces. But as he enters what, by rights, should be his final week in office, the sulphurous whiff of a particularly galling betrayal is polluting the Downing Street air: for Mr Brown appears to be doing his level best to lay the foundations for another humiliating capitulation by the British military.

Mr Brown's parsimony with the defence budget, both as chancellor and Prime Minister, is well documented. Despite the far greater commitments of the modern military, defence spending has declined in real terms since Labour came to power in 1997 – as Mr Brown was eventually forced to concede to the Chilcot Inquiry earlier this year.

But the Prime Minister's low regard for the military runs far deeper than matters of mere finance. One of his first acts on entering Downing Street in the summer of 2007 was to order the British contingent based in southern Iraq to withdraw from Basra, and take refuge at the airbase on the city's outskirts. Mr Brown may have grudgingly supported the invasion of Iraq in 2003, but the conflict was too closely identified with Tony Blair for the new prime minister's comfort, and he resolved to close down the issue as soon as he took power.

With this decision, Mr Brown inflicted serious damage on the reputation and standing of the British military. Before he intervened, our forces had earned the respect and admiration of their American partners by their fortitude and resilience in defending Basra from Iranian-backed militias. But all that goodwill evaporated within a few days in March 2008, when 4,000 British troops – including an SAS unit and an entire mechanised brigade – remained confined to their barracks while the Iraqi army launched an offensive to drive out the people the British were supposed to be fighting. In the end, a detachment of US Marines was sent to Basra to provide support, and the reputation of the British Army lay in tatters.

And now, a repeat looks to be on the cards in Afghanistan. The official line is that the 10,000-strong British contingent based in Helmand is set to be relocated west to the neighbouring province of Kandahar, thereby simplifying the Nato command structure. Questions have been raised about the future of the British presence in Helmand since the arrival earlier this year of around 20,000 US Marines, who have been deployed as part of Barack Obama's "surge".

Initially, British commanders, who have been starved of both men and equipment since they first deployed to Helmand in the summer of 2006, had hoped that they could work closely with the Marines to finish the job of defeating the Taliban and setting up an effective provincial government. But now that they have arrived, the American commanders have other ideas, and are pressing for the British to be relocated so that they can maintain what they call "coherence of command".

This proposition has, unsurprisingly, met with little resistance in Downing Street, given that Mr Brown would do almost anything to end the weekly funeral processions through the Wiltshire town of Wootton Bassett. Nothing wrong with that, you might think. No one in their right minds wants our young men and women to sacrifice their lives needlessly, and if the Americans want to give us a breather while they sort out Helmand, then why not declare "victory" and move on to the next phase of the campaign?

Personally, I have my doubts that Kandahar would prove to be an easier billet than Helmand. It is, after all, the Taliban's spiritual home, where the movement first emerged under the leadership of Mullah Omar in the 1990s, and remains a hotbed of support for the insurgency.

But the bigger issue is the damage another "cut and run" operation from a major conflict zone will have on our forces' international reputation. For the American commanders' plans have less to do with "coherence of command", and more to do with their growing frustration that, under Mr Brown's leadership, the British can no longer be trusted to fulfil their military commitments, whether in Basra or Helmand.

It is not just that the same Marines who bailed out the British in Basra two years ago are now being asked to do a similar job in Helmand. Despite the heroic efforts and sacrifices made by British forces over the past four years, the newly arrived Marines have been surprised to discover that large swathes of Helmand still remain firmly under Taliban control.

This is true even in those areas, such as Sangin, where British forces have driven out the Taliban and are supposed to be aiding reconstruction efforts. Lack of resources has meant that the British have only been able to maintain a nominal presence, with the result that the Taliban has been allowed to regain much of the surrounding area, with catastrophic results. The majority of the 14 fatalities suffered by 3rd Battalion The Rifles, which returned to its home base in Edinburgh earlier this week after six months patrolling Sangin, were caused by roadside bombs planted by insurgents on the outskirts of town.

To make Sangin safe, British commanders would need far more troops than are at their disposal, which is why the Marines' arrival was initially deemed so welcome. But if, as now seems likely, the American deployment results in the British beating a hasty retreat before their mission has been completed, it will not do much for our military's already tarnished reputation.

While ultimate responsibility for this regrettable state of affairs rests with Mr Brown, the top brass must also shoulder their share of the blame. When, in 2005, the Blair government first mooted the idea of supporting Nato's mission in Afghanistan, there was barely a squeak of protest from the Service chiefs, who initially believed that the Taliban in Helmand could be dealt with by a paltry force of 3,000 troops (compared with the current Nato deployment of 30,000). The failure by British intelligence to foresee the fierce resistance Nato forces would encounter is on a par with its performance over Saddam's phantom stockpiles of WMD.

These grave miscalculations have severely hindered Britain's military contribution in Afghanistan from the outset. And if the reputation of the British military is not to suffer irreparable harm, all those responsible for prosecuting this campaign need to have a serious rethink about what can, and cannot, be achieved in Afghanistan with the relatively modest forces at our disposal – rather than, as Mr Brown is prone to doing, running up the white flag.

If British forces are to succeed in Afghanistan, they must be given a clearly defined mission that they have a realistic chance of achieving, and then given the political support necessary to see the job through. If that happens, then we might still be able to ensure that the sacrifices we have made over these past four years have not been in vain.

[buglerbilly]

Afghanistan forces face four more years of combat, warns Nato official

Nato's top civilian official in Afghanistan warns of further deaths in 'very tough year' for British and other foreign troops

Richard Norton-Taylor guardian.co.uk,

Thursday 29 April 2010 19.43 BST


British troops in Helmand province. Photograph: Lewis Whyld/PA

British and other foreign troops deployed in Afghanistan face a "very tough" time ahead and can expect to be engaged in a combat role for three or four more years, Nato's most senior civilian official in the country said today.

Mark Sedwill, a former UK ambassador to Afghanistan, warned of further troop deaths in the region, saying: "We cannot allow judgment of success to be the absence of casualties."

Speaking on the margins of a Royal United Services Institute conference in London, Sedwill laid out crucial steps towards ending the conflict, to be taken over the next few months.

A "critical test" would be the imminent operation in Kandahar designed to improve security and governance in the Taliban's heartland, he said.

That operation was not primarily a military one, Nato insists. However, as more troops are engaged in counter-insurgency operations in southern Afghanistan, it was inevitable there would be more casualties, Sedwill said.

He said the "bumper sticker" message for the next British government had to be that "a stable Afghanistan is a safer world".

The stability of Pakistan was also at stake, he said, as was that of other places vulnerable to al-Qaida-inspired extremists. The message to these countries had to be: "We stand by you."

There was a gap between public opinion, with polls reflecting growing sceptism about Nato-led operations in Afghanistan, and the political leadership in Nato countries, Sedwill said.

Casualties among British and other Nato troops have increased significantly over recent years. More than 100 UK troops were killed and over 150 seriously wounded in Afghanistan last year, more than double the numbers for 2008.

Thirty-three have been killed so far this year. "Expect 2010 to be again a very tough year", Sedwill said.

British and other Nato troops could be expected to be engaged in combat roles for "another three or four years", he said. Thereafter, they could be expected to remain in Afghanistan, training and mentoring local forces, for a further 10 to 15 years.

Barack Obama has indicated that the number of US troops in Afghanistan – still rising – will begin to fall from July 2011. However, Sedwill suggested that the number of UK forces would not start to shrink at the same time as they would be needed to train Afghan troops. Senior Nato officials say they are seriously concerned about the shortage of experienced troops to train local forces.

The aim was to announce the first handover to local forces of responsibility for security in a number of Afghan provinces at the Nato summit in Lisbon in November, Sedwill said. But it was important, he added, not to expect an end of violence to be a precondition for a handover. The questions were what was an an acceptable level of violence in Afghanistan and, as important, the degree to which Afghans felt that their security and institutions of government were improving.

As Nato and Afghan forces prepare for their Kandahar operation, the Afghan president, Hamid Karzai, is due to visit Washington on 10 May. Later that month he is due to preside over a peace jirga of tribal and community leaders, designed to boost a much-discussed reconciliation and reintegration process.

In order to benefit from the process, leaders had to accept the existing Afghan constitution and renounce violence as a political weapon, said Sedwill. Although the emphasis now was on the political, governmental, and economic, development of Afghanistan, "military pressure" still played a key role. That, he said, was important in what he called "draining the fuel out of the insurgency".

Three-quarters of the insurgents were "allied with the Taliban rather than fighting for it", Sedwill said, implying that the large majority were not ideologically motivated. He described corruption as a "symptom of abuse of power", an issue between Afghans rather than one between Afghans and the international community.

[buglerbilly]

Pakistan's Punjab region on knife-edge as extremists take hold, says governor

Politicians accused of backing banned groups as minorities suffer violence and intimidation

Saeed Shah Faisalabad

guardian.co.uk, Thursday 29 April 2010 19.31 BST

Pakistan's heartland Punjab province is an extremist "bomb" ready to explode, the region's highest official has warned, with the recent targeting of minority groups seen by some as evidence of jihadists' grip on the area.

The provincial governor accused the regional government, led by former prime minister Nawaz Sharif's party, of tolerating or even supporting extremists, who are said to operate openly in Punjab free from the military operations waged against Taliban guerrillas in the area bordering Afghanistan.

"The Sharifs are creating a potential bomb here in Punjab," said Salman Taseer, the governor of Punjab, who was appointed by the national government. "These [militant] groups are armed and dangerous. There is no way you can accommodate these people. There has to be zero tolerance."

In recent weeks, a spate of armed robberies and kidnappings of the Ahmedi sect in the city of Faisalabad was traced to members of Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the group previously known as Lashkar-e-Taiba that was blamed for the devastating 2008 terrorist attack on Mumbai. Three Ahmedis were also shot dead, thought to be the work of the same group.

Sharif's opponents accuse his party, the opposition Pakistan Muslim League-N – whose support comes partly from the religious right – of accommodating extremists such as Sipah-e-Sahaba, a banned sectarian group blamed for the deaths of hundreds of Shias.

In Jhang town, a byelection last month saw Sharif's party openly court Sipah-e-Sahaba supporters. Punjab's law minister, Rana Sanaullah, was pictured on the campaign trail with the alleged head of the group, Ahmed Ludhianvi.

Experts believe that the Pakistani Taliban is deeply influenced by Sipah-e-Sahaba, with the Taliban's leader, Hakimullah Mehsud, a former member.

Sheikh Waqas Akram, an opposition member of parliament from Jhang, which is the headquarters of Sipah-e-Sahaba, likened the situation in Punjab to the Swat valley, where official inaction allowed the Taliban to take over in 2008. "There can be 10 Swats in Punjab, if you don't check them [extremists]," said Akram.

But Sanaullah denied the claims, saying that while banned groups operated in the province there was no "Talibanisation" in Punjab. "Not a single street where you can say there is a no-go area," he said.

Sanaullah said that groups based in the north-west were behind the terrorist attacks in Punjab, not local organisations, adding that "95% of the people of Sipah-e-Sahaba are not terrorists". He said: "We must persuade these persons to put aside their guns, to participate in elections. They have the right to vote, so why can't I ask them [Sipah-e-Sahaba] for votes?"

Over the last year the affluent Ahmedi community in Faisalabad has been rocked by a campaign of violence and intimidation, which intensified in recent weeks. Ahmedi are classified as non-Muslims under Pakistani law, for believing that Muhammad was not the final prophet.

Police arrested four suspects last month. Three days later, on 1 April, three members of an Ahmedi family were shot dead as they returned from work. Their car was sprayed with bullets, in what police believe was a "very professional" hit and possible revenge for the arrests.

"The four people in jail are in Jamaat-ud-Dawa," said senior Faisalabad police officer Abid Hussain. "They told us that they got a decree from a maulvi (priest) in their group that says that robbing, kidnapping and killing Ahmedis is allowed and would be rewarded in heaven."

The city's Ahmedi community have restricted their movements and some have hired bodyguards.

"We are now scared to leave the house, when the door bell rings, we are frightened about who might be there. Outside, we feel always like someone is following us," said Mohammad Iqbal Ahmed, whose son and nephew were kidnapped in March and returned after the payment of a £20,000 ransom.

[buglerbilly]

Afghan War Demands Flexible Weaponry

Apr 29, 2010



By David A. Fulghum
Langley AFB, Va.

During the next 18 months, the ability of a conventionally based military to reshape itself into a surgical strike unit that can irreparably damage or misdirect a flexible, quick-learning and fast-moving irregular force will be tested by the U.S. in Afghanistan.

That critical period also will see early products from the accelerating convergence of small, precise new weapons and electronic, information and cyber-operations, and their fusion with next-generation intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR).

Five airborne platforms and the sensors they carry will be key elements:

•The new, relatively small MC-12W Liberty fast-response, multi-sensor ISR aircraft.

•E-8C Joint Stars wide-area airborne ground surveillance radar.

•EC-130H Compass Call electronic attack aircraft.

•MQ-9 Reaper remotely piloted strike aircraft.

•Global Hawk Block 40 unmanned surveillance aircraft, which also will carry a ground moving-target indicator (GMTI).

The MC-12W’s deployment brings with it the Vader radar as a tool for tracking people on the ground at night and through clouds.

“The capability to track people had not been in Afghanistan before,” says USAF Maj. Gen. Tom Andersen, Air Combat Command’s director of requirements.

Some Joint Stars aircraft are being upgraded with new engines for high-altitude operations in Afghanistan. Advanced software will enable the aircraft’s active, electronically scanned array radar to see the movement of people—which is a new addition to the GMTI technology. And more advances are coming.

“We’re starting to look at the analyses of alternatives for the GMTI mission,” Andersen says. “And we have other sensors in development. It’s just a question of where you can put them. There’s a lot of inherent flexibility with manned aircraft because the crew is doing real-time processing of the intelligence as well as performing time-critical battle management functions while in direct contact with ground force commanders.”

In particular, Joint Stars crews have been conducting post-mission analyses in Iraq. They can “walk” data back from an event, such as a bomb attack, using GMTI recordings. They discern patterns that help establish links between different intelligence cells by overlaying the data (such as the detection of changes over time) from various sensors.

“That has led to some huge takedowns and taking bad people off the street,” says Andersen. “In the near term, we’re going to try to ‘plus-up’ our EC-130H Compass Call force of about 14 aircraft with four aircraft over the next five years because those people have been on the road continuously. So we will increase that capacity.”

In addition, the U.S. Navy eventually will provide four squadrons of EA-18G Growlers for the air expeditionary forces to replace the EA-6Bs that will be retired.

The presence of Compass Call and aircraft such as the EA-18G Growler is essential for conducting electronic attack on enemy command-and-control networks and remote triggering of hidden bombs.

“EA is being looked at for several areas of the problem,” says USAF Brig. Gen. Dave Goldfein, ACC’s director of air and space operations. “That’s where we’re focusing, is pretty fragmented over there. It’s a matter of attacking a system, and an IED is the end-state of that system that we are trying to bring down. [The service’s] counter-IED efforts determine what the Air Force can provide in terms of platforms, intelligence, sensors and weapons. What’s our contribution? The determination of our success or failure is how well we take down the system.”

Afghanistan is proving to be a different type of war from the one fought in Iraq, but the the most important change will be increased demand. Afghanistan is a large, sparsely populated country with few cities, roads and railways. Yet it must be thoroughly patrolled and hot spots monitored.

“From the ISR perspective, the need is just for more,” says Andersen. “We talk about wide-area surveillance, hyperspectral [imagery] and GMTI. If you have a cafeteria plan [for a variety of sensors and capabilities], the challenge is what capability do you bed down first. Right now, ramp space is at a premium in Afghanistan. If you can pour cement, you are a rich man. The engineers and logisticians of the world are earning their keep.”

Those ramps and runways are going to be packed with ISR platforms, and prominent among them will be remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs). While there is an acute demand for RPAs, the capability comes with a lot of baggage, literally. Some internal Air Force estimates say that it takes 120 people—many of them in intelligence—to support one RPA on a combat air patrol.

[B][I]“The first thing I will tell you is that there is nothing unmanned about unmanned,” says Andersen. “We have just under 600 pilots right now flying RPAs. We’re on target for 65 unmanned combat air patrols. That means we will more than double the number of pilots to 1,400. It is the most manpower-intensive part of our business.

“I went out and spent a week with the folks at Creech [AFB, Nev.] and got a full checkout on the MQ-9 Reaper weapons system,” he says. “The platform is just a truck with a huge network behind it. What you get with the RPA is a connection to the network. For every aircraft flying downrange, there is a [support] army back home.”

And because the Pentagon and industry are aware of the need for ISR innovations, the number of projects is mounting. Officials contend that there is a sensor a week that shows up and offers promise.

“We’re trying to prioritize them,” Andersen notes. “There is a wide-area surveillance sensor—Gorgon Stare—that will go in late summer. It will probably increase the MQ-9’s surveillance capacity by something like ten-fold. We’re wrestling with the concept of operations. We’re very focused on getting it through test and evaluation and into the field.”

Also in the mix of new technology are hyperspectral sensors that monitor change detection in the search for IEDs. These devices are again surfacing as one of the biggest challenges in Afghanistan. Anti-IED operations include three basic steps: overwatch, which is catching terrorists placing the bombs; change detection, which is locating something that has moved or does not look right; and, finally, post-mission analysis to backtrack, overlay data and pick out patterns.

As for weapons, the capability of choice is “low-collateral-damage [devices] that can operate in an urban environment with precision and that can hit moving targets,” says Andersen. “Limiting civilian casualties is huge on the list. We’ve done a lot of work with [U.S. Air Forces Central] on different warhead fills with a lot smaller bang for the buck and composite casings to limit damage [from shrapnel]. That effort includes taking an existing capability like a laser [Joint Direct Attack Munition] or Maverick missile and adding a capability that lets you attack moving targets with an extra measure of precision.”

Photo: USAF

[buglerbilly]

State Department Flies Mercenary Air Force Over Pakistan

By Nathan Hodge April 30, 2010 | 3:43 pm



The airspace along the Afghanistan/Pakistan border is pretty crowded these days: Along with U.S., Afghan and Pakistani military missions, the CIA is running its own covert drone ops. Less well known, but perhaps equally controversial, is the State Department’s counter-narcotics air force, staffed by mercenaries.

A recently released State Department Inspector General report, however, gave an unusually detailed look at the size and scope of these operations. The report fills in more details about America’s growing and undeclared war in Pakistan.

The State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (known by the abbreviation INL) operates an air wing of around 14 aircraft in Afghanistan and another 17 in Pakistan. The aircraft help monitor the border, fly crop-eradication and interdiction missions, and move equipment and personnel around the region.

These kinds of missions aren’t new: The State Department has similar Air Wing programs in Bolivia, Colombia, Guatemala, and Peru. Perhaps more importantly, the State Department has outsourced much of this mission. The INL’s air wing in Afghanistan and Pakistan is operated by private military company DynCorp, and the presence of U.S. contractors in Pakistan has proven extremely controversial (the released IG report, not surprisingly, was originally marked “sensitive but unclassified”).

For instance, when it was disclosed earlier this month that the U.S. government was seeking land for an aircraft maintenance base DynCorp, the Pakistani press had a field day. Pakistani Interior Minister Rehman Malik had repeatedly denied the presence of U.S. private security contractors on Pakistani soil, but here was the U.S. government, asking for a maintenance base for its contracted air wing. “This is worth recalling here that Interior Minister Rehman Malik had told the National Assembly in February this year, ‘Neither Blackwater nor any other security agency with such name is operating in Pakistan,’” Pakistan’s The Nation newspaper snarkily noted.

In fairness, the State Department hasn’t really been too secretive about this: INL’s winter newsletter featured a news announcement about the delivery to Pakistan of more Huey II helicopters, similar to the rotorcraft pictured here. More interesting is what the recent Inspector General report hints at the extent to which the Pakistani government relies on this air wing for domestic policing and security operations. “In Pakistan, the Air Wing program, funded at $32 million to date, has been generally effective in providing critical air support for activities along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, including a variety of missions for the Pakistan Government,” the report states.

Inevitably, the report also notes some shortcomings. DynCorp, the IG found, “had problems meeting some of the contract terms, particularly flying hour goals. The inability to meet the required aircraft readiness rate is directly related to low levels of maintenance personnel and, according to INL/A, is also affected by issues with staff from Pakistan’s Ministry of Interior.”

In addition, the IG also found the Pakistani government was less than forthcoming about how it was using State’s aircraft. The government of Pakistan, the report said, “continues its reticence in providing information on flights.”

Incidentally, the inspector general also alluded to another contracted air force, called “Kabul 40.” That air wing provides passenger and cargo movement for diplomatic staff in Afghanistan.

[PHOTO: U.S. Department of Defense]

Read More http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/04/state-department-flies-mercenary-air-force-over-pakistan/#more-24194#ixzz0mdP5CJrh

[buglerbilly]

British officer's death forced MoD to addess kit shortage, says father

The father of Lt Col Rupert Thorneloe, the most senior British Army officer to be killed in Afghanistan, said it took his son’s death to convince the Ministry of Defence to give troops the equipment they required.

By Richard Savill, in Trowbridge, Wiltshire
Published: 4:31PM BST 30 Apr 2010


Lieutenant Colonel Rupert Thorneloe Photo: PA

Major John Thorneloe was speaking after an inquest heard how his son, Lt Col Rupert Thorneloe, 39, commanding officer of the 1st Battalion, Welsh Guards, was killed after insisting on taking the most exposed position on a patrol to set an example to his men.

Lt Col Thorneloe died in the blast from in a roadside bombing along with Trooper Joshua Hammond, 18, during Operation Panther’s Claw, the offensive against insurgent strongholds in Helmand.

Lt-Colonel Rupert Thorneloe and Trooper Joshua Hammond should not have diedThe convoy was hit on July 1 last year by an improvised explosive device (IED) near Lashkar Gah.

The inquests into both men’s deaths heard the Viking armoured vehicle in which the men was travelling is being phased out in Afghanistan. It is due to be replaced this summer by larger and more heavily armoured tracked vehicles known as Warthogs.

The hearing was also told that less than a month before he died, Lt Col Thorneloe had sent an e-mail to brigade commanders in Britain warning about the risks posed to troops by a shortage of helicopters.

However, it was stated a helicopter would not have been used on the fatal patrol, because it was too dangerous.

After the hearing, Major Thorneloe, said: "I think that you could say, I could say, that if my son was killed, as he was, then one good thing might have come from it - and that was that it made the nation, but more importantly the Government, realise that it was a war that we are involved in in Afghanistan and that you don't fight wars based on hope, you fight them based on the worst case and you have all the requisite equipment to manage it."

"I hope that…… at least the Armed Forces were better equipped as a result of the funds made available accordingly."

David Ridley, the Wiltshire and Swindon coroner, recorded verdicts of unlawful killing while on active service.

Lt Col Thorneloe was the most senior Army officer to have been killed in action since Lt Col “H” Jones, VC, who died leading an attack at Goose Green in the Falklands in May 1982.

The commander's colleagues told the hearing that he was always keen to set an example for his men.

Cpl Kevin Williams, of the 2nd Royal Tank Regiment, who survived the blast, and was the first to attend to Lt Col Thorneloe, said the commanding officer “told the guy (the other soldier) to get down and he would take his place.”

The inquest in Trowbridge, Wilts, heard Lt Col Thorneloe had also helped his men conduct a drill with metal detectors, known as “Op Barma”, shortly before the blast.

Major Andrew Speed, Lt Col Thorneloe's second in command, added: "Like all good leaders, Col Rupert wanted to get on the ground. Any good leader wants to get a good feel for what his troops are doing. He was a hands-on guy."

"He was extremely bright and intelligent. He wanted to see for himself what was happening, which you couldn't do from simply by listening to a radio."

Major Speed also recalled sitting down with Lt Col Thorneloe in the camp. “He told me he was going to do the Barma drills and he was going to be in the lead vehicle.

"He wanted to show his troops he was prepared to do what they were doing, and they could only be inspired by that."

Major Speed told the coroner he was aware that Lt Col Thorneloe had sent an e-mail to brigade commanders in Britain warning about the risks posed to troops by a shortage of helicopters. However, he had not been aware of its content.

Maj Speed said: "He (Lt Col Thorneloe) had his own mind. He wanted to share his views with someone else outside Afghanistan."

Maj Speed added that a helicopter would not have been used on the fatal patrol, because there was a risk it might have been shot down.

Earlier Cpl Williams said the Viking had received an armour upgrade to its front section, but not to the rear, where the blast struck.

The inquest heard the Viking had since had an armour upgrade to its rear section.

The hearing was also told the Viking, which is known to be vulnerable to Taleban attack, was being phased out in Afghanistan. It is due to be replaced this summer by larger and more heavily armoured tracked vehicles known as Warthogs.

Lt Col Thorneloe left behind a wife, Sally, and two daughters, Hannah, and Sophie, then aged four and two. Mrs Thorneloe and Trooper Hammond’s mother and stepfather, Sarah and Kevin Finnegan, attended the hearing.

[buglerbilly]

Taliban splinter group executes Pakistani spy turned jihadi

Asian Tigers faction dumps Khalid Khawaja's body in North Waziristan, raising fears over fate of two other hostages

Declan Walsh in Islamabad guardian.co.uk,

Friday 30 April 2010 17.03 BST


Khalid Khawaja pictured in June 2007. Photograph: Aamir Qureshi/AFP/Getty Images

A Taliban splinter group in the tribal belt has executed a former intelligence officer and prominent jihadi activist, raising fears for two other hostages being held by the same group.

Khalid Khawaja's body was found dumped by the road near Mir Ali, a notorious centre of militant activity in North Waziristan.

Khawaja, a retired Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) agent, had been shot in the head and chest. A note pinned to his body warned that other "American spies" would face a similar fate.

A previously unknown group named Asian Tigers claimed responsibility in an email to the Guardian titled "khalid khawaja (episode is over)". It read: "Khalid Khwaja is no more ... We have given the deadline in order to approve our demands. The ISI and government didn't take it serious. This is the last warning to set your minds. What would be the next?"

Khawaja was a retired Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) official who boasted of his links with Osama bin Laden. He was kidnapped just over a month ago while travelling with another well known ex-ISI official, Colonel Imam, and Asad Qureshi, a journalist. Their fate is not known.

The militants recently sent the Guardian hostage videos of the three men from the same email address. Asian Tigers is believed to be a cover name for a group of Punjabi sectarian militants belonging to the notorious Lashkar I Jhangvi group.

In recent weeks sectarian attacks on Shias have increased in the tribal belt, including one against a UN aid distribution centre. Asian Tigers is demanding the release of dozens of militant prisoners in Afghanistan in return for hostages, stoking suspicions that it has links with a larger Taliban group.

Colonel Imam, whose real name is Sultan Amir Tarar, trained jihadi fighters with CIA funding in the 1980s and helped nurture the Taliban movement in Afghanistan in the 1990s. He is widely referred to as the "father of the Taliban".

The three men entered North Waziristan in late March on a mission to meet and film Taliban groups. Before leaving Islamabad Khawaja told journalists he had proof that the Taliban leader, Hakimullah Mehsud, had survived a CIA drone attack last January – something that a senior ISI official confirmed to the Guardian this week. Khawaja may have promised Qureshi, the journalist, that he would broker a meeting with Mehsud.

Khawaja occupied a prominent, if ambiguous, position in the murky world of Pakistan's jihadi politics. He boasted of being a close associate of Osama bin Laden during the 1980s; last year he said he brokered a meeting between Bin Laden and the opposition leader Nawaz Sharif in 1990 with a view to ousting the government of then prime minister Benazir Bhutto.

After retiring from the ISI Khawaja became a prominent champion of jihadist causes and, when necessary, turned against his former spymasters. He spent time in jail after the Red Mosque siege in central Islamabad in 2007.

He became a human rights activist of sorts, championing the rights of the "disappeared" – Islamist suspects who had been illegally abducted, detained and sometimes tortured by Pakistani intelligence, often at the behest of the CIA and, less frequently, MI6.

But by several accounts he was playing a complex game – one that appears to have caught up with him.

In his hostage video Khawaja said he was secretly working for the ISI during the Red Mosque crisis and helped engineer the arrest of Maulana Abdul Aziz, an extremist cleric who was caught fleeing the mosque wearing a woman's burqa.

Ali Dayan Hasan, a Human Rights Watch researcher who had worked with Khawaja, described him as an ambiguous operator who balanced an implacable belief in jihadist causes with a concern for the plight of those victimised by the "war on terror".

"He made an essential contribution in bringing to attention the disappearances by the Pakistani intelligence agencies at the behest of the US authorities – whatever his motivations," Hasan said.

[buglerbilly]

From The Sunday Times May 2, 2010

Hotshot sniper in one-and-a-half mile double kill

Michael Smith

A BRITISH Army sniper has set a new sharpshooting distance record by killing two Taliban machinegunners in Afghanistan from more than 1 miles away.

Craig Harrison, a member of the Household Cavalry, killed the insurgents with consecutive shots — even though they were 3,000ft beyond the most effective range of his rifle.

“The first round hit a machinegunner in the stomach and killed him outright,” said Harrison, a Corporal of Horse. “He went straight down and didn’t move.

“The second insurgent grabbed the weapon and turned as my second shot hit him in the side. He went down, too. They were both dead.”

The shooting — which took place while Harrison’s colleagues came under attack — was at such extreme range that the 8.59mm bullets took almost three seconds to reach their target after leaving the barrel of the rifle at almost three times the speed of sound.

The distance to Harrison’s two targets was measured by a GPS system at 8,120ft, or 1.54 miles. The previous record for a sniper kill is 7,972ft, set by a Canadian soldier who shot dead an Al-Qaeda gunman in March 2002.

In a remarkable tour of duty, Harrison cheated death a few weeks later when a Taliban bullet pierced his helmet but was deflected away from his skull. He later broke both arms when his army vehicle was hit by a roadside bomb.

Harrison was sent back to the UK for treatment, but insisted on returning to the front line after making a full recovery.

“I was lucky that my physical fitness levels were very high before my arms were fractured and after six weeks in plaster I was still in pretty good shape,” he said. “It hasn’t affected my ability as a sniper.”

Harrison, from Gloucestershire, was reunited in Britain with his wife Tanya and daughter Dani, 16, last month. Recalling his shooting prowess in Helmand province, he said: “It was just unlucky for the Taliban that conditions were so good and we could see them so clearly.”

Harrison and his colleagues were in open-topped Jackal 4x4 vehicles providing cover for an Afghan national army patrol south of Musa Qala in November last year. When the Afghan soldiers and Harrison’s troop commander came under enemy fire, the sniper, whose vehicle was further back on a ridge, trained his sights on a Taliban compound in the distance. His L115A3 long-range rifle, the army’s most powerful sniper weapon, is designed to be effective at up to 4,921ft and supposedly capable of only “harassing fire” beyond that range.

“We saw two insurgents running through its courtyard, one in a black dishdasha, one in green,” he said. “They came forward carrying a PKM machinegun, set it up and opened fire on the commander’s wagon.

“Conditions were perfect, no wind, mild weather, clear visibility. I rested the bipod of my weapon on a compound wall and aimed for the gunner firing the machinegun.

“The driver of my Jackal, Trooper Cliff O’Farrell, spotted for me, providing all the information needed for the shot, which was at the extreme range of the weapon.”

Harrison killed one machinegunner with his first attempt and felled the other with his next shot. He then let off a final round to knock the enemy weapon out of action.

Harrison discovered that he had set a new record only on his return to UK barracks nine days ago. The previous record was held by Corporal Rob Furlong, of Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, who was using a 12.7mm McMillan TAC-50 rifle.

Tom Irwin, a director of Accuracy International, the British manufacturer of the L115A3 rifle, said: “It is still fairly accurate beyond 4,921ft, but at that distance luck plays as much of a part as anything.”

News of Harrison’s success comes amid concern over a rival insurgent sharpshooter who in a five-month spree has killed up to seven British soldiers, including a sniper, in and around the Taliban stronghold of Sangin.

In a later incident during the tour, Harrison’s patrol vehicle was hit 36 times during a Taliban ambush. “One round hit my helmet behind the right ear and came out of the top,” he said. “Two more rounds went through the strap across my chest. We were all very, very lucky not to get hurt.”

[buglerbilly]

Pakistan Taliban leader threatens US cities

SAJJAD TARAKZAI

May 3, 2010 - 6:44PM

Pakistani Taliban leader Hakimullah Mehsud has vowed to attack major US cities in two purported new videos released months after his reported killing in a US missile strike.

The videos emerged after an attempted car bombing in New York City, for which his faction claimed responsibility in a third video, and provided the most substantial evidence so far that he survived a barrage of US missiles.

Mehsud threatened to retaliate against the United States within a month for the killing of Islamist militant leaders, appearing in a nine-minute video allegedly made on April 4, after his supposed death in January.

"The time is very near when our fedayeen will attack the American states in the major cities," said Mehsud, who was seen flanked by two armed and masked men in the video released by the SITE and IntelCenter monitoring groups.

The video is the first showing Mehsud since January and was issued on the heels of a claim by Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan that it was behind the attempted bombing in New York's Time Square on Saturday.

US officials believed Mehsud was likely killed in a US drone strike in northwestern Pakistan on January 14, but the Taliban denied his death and Pakistani intelligence officials said last week that he had survived.

The Islamist leader, who took over leadership of the TTP last August, poured scorn on reports of his death, describing them as an "open lie and propaganda by the kuffar (non-believers)".

"Inshaallah (God willing) very soon in some days or a month's time, the Muslim ummah (world) will see the fruits of most successful attacks of our fedayeen in USA," Mehsud said.

He made similar remarks in an audio message in another TTP video Monday that was apparently recorded on April 19 and features Mehsud's face next to a map of the United States showing multiple explosions across the country.

IntelCenter, a US-based group that monitors Islamist websites, said it believed all the TTP videos issued since the New York car bomb scare were credible.

"It is our assessment that this threat is credible and that there is a high threat of further attacks like the NYC attack during the coming days and weeks ahead," it said.

US officials initially dismissed the TTP claim of responsibility, which also met with scepticism in Pakistan, where the faction's capability had been seen as dented following military offensives and US drone attacks.

If the claim -- made in a video broadcast on YouTube -- was authenticated, it would be the first attack by the TTP against a target in the United States.

Mehsud assumed leadership of the faction, which is blamed for the deaths of thousands of people in attacks across Pakistan, after his predecessor Baitullah Mehsud was killed in a US drone strike in August 2009.

The January US missile attack was launched after Mehsud appeared in a video alongside the Jordanian double agent who blew himself up on a US base in eastern Afghanistan in December that killed seven CIA agents.

Islamabad has offered a reward of 50 million rupees (about 590,000 US dollars) for information leading to the militant's capture, dead or alive.

Mehsud, believed to be aged about 31, said the TTP would attack the United States "for having martyred many of our great Muslim leaders including Baitullah Mehsud and many respected brothers from Al-Qaeda", SITE reported.

"Our fedayeen have penetrated the terrorist America, we will give extremely painful blows to the fanatic America."

Mehsud, bearded and with long hair, also warned members of NATO and other allies to abandon the United States, telling them: "You will face even worse humiliation, destruction and defeat than America itself."

A Pentagon spokesman had said last week that it was unclear if Mehsud was dead or alive, but that he was no longer running the TTP.

"I certainly have seen no evidence that the person you speak of is operational today, or is executing or exerting authority over the Pakistan Taliban as he once did," Pentagon press secretary Geoff Morrell said.

Rahimullah Yusufzai, one of Pakistan's most prominent experts on the tribal belt where the Taliban are holed up, dismissed the claim of the attempted New York bombing as a vain attempt at recognition.

"They have the capacity to do it in Pakistan. They can do it in Afghanistan, but I doubt they are capable of doing it in the United States," he said.

© 2010 AFP
This story is sourced direct from an overseas news agency as an additional service to readers. Spelling follows North American usage, along with foreign currency and measurement units.

[buglerbilly]

Push for Afghan role delays military building

By HEIDI VOGT (AP) – 1 day ago

KANDAHAR AIR FIELD, Afghanistan — An effort to give construction projects to Afghan firms is leading to delays at a time when NATO is rushing to accommodate tens of thousands more international troops, U.S. officials say.

The Army Corps of Engineers is trying to award as many construction contracts as possible to Afghan companies to pump money into the local economy and win public support. New contracts are for NATO base expansions, Afghan police stations, Afghan army bases and other facilities.

But officials say the "Afghan First" effort is slowing down badly-needed construction projects. Even U.S. officers who support the goals acknowledge there's a trade-off.

"You can either have it done on time, or contracted to the Afghans," said Col. Kevin Wilson, the head of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in the south and west. He says his own office building took longer to complete because it was Afghan-built.

The reasons for the delays are manifold.

Afghan companies often bid on projects that they don't have the money or skills to complete, Wilson said. Quality inspectors end up teaching the basics of drainage or safe electrical wiring.

Small Afghan companies are also under more pressure to pay bribes to local authorities than large international firms, Wilson said. The military has received invoices for as much as $40,000 from Afghan contractors for bogus building permits, he said. International companies either have the power to say no or don't even try to get their money back from the military.

On NATO bases, hours are also lost each day getting Afghan workers through security.

Despite the problems, Wilson says the "Afghan First" program is the right approach given the new focus on winning over the population. The problem is that this year, in the midst of a troop surge, there's just too much to build.

The Army engineers expect to award nearly 355 contracts in fiscal 2010, nearly three times the number awarded in 2009. The dollar value is increasing as well — $3.2 billion from $2.7 billion the year before, according to Army figures.

"The whole ramping up of the U.S. presence here has pushed a big requirement on us," said Col. Michael McCormick, who oversees engineering projects in the north.

And the delays are already piling up. Two Afghan army barracks being built by Virginia-based DynCorp International LLC to house 5,800 soldiers are behind schedule by 14 months to two years, according to a U.S. government report issued Friday.

In the past, most of the contracts would have gone to large international companies like Dyncorp. Many still do: more than 130 international construction companies were registered with the Afghan government in 2009, according to official figures.

But the military now demands that even the international companies incorporate training of Afghan workers and subcontractors. So in nearly every project now, the military is more deeply involved — dictating terms that previously would have been hashed out between prime contractors and subcontractors.

International construction companies and Afghan subcontractors have long had an uneasy relationship. The foreign firms say that they get cheated by fly-by-night Afghan firms. The Afghans say international companies unfairly withhold payment.

One Kabul construction company owner tells of a road he helped build as a subcontractor to a Turkish firm. Mohammad Jan Alikozay said the prime contractor skimped on cement for much of the road, which then started breaking apart within a year. The Turkish company, which he declined to name, had already left the country by then — without completing payments, he said.

"We lost $300,000. And we rebuilt the road," Alikozay said.

Abdul Razaq Asem, who started his Road & Roof Construction Co. with $300 in 2001, has hired a lawyer to explore suing in U.S. courts against an American company that didn't pay him for work on a project to build two Afghan army compounds. He says the company, California-based ECC Inc., snatched away his main subcontractor on the project, then withheld $4 million from him because the project was delayed while he looked for another subcontractor.

A spokesman for ECC said the company does not comment on issues with specific contractors.

Asem said when he started out he often bid too low on U.S. projects because he didn't understand the higher cost of equipment required to meet U.S. safety standards.

Light sockets that he could get for $5 in Turkey cost hundreds of times more when imported from the U.S. as required, Asem said. He blamed international contractors for not being clear about the requirements, then using the inaccurate pricing as a reason to withhold payment. He has since hired Western consultants.

For their part, international firms and inspectors complain of Afghan firms that pocket money and disappear or win contracts by using a name and logo identical to that of a more reputable firm.

In the United States, construction contractors are held to their promise to complete a project by a process known as "bonding," in which they pay a security deposit to be held until work finishes. In Afghanistan, the government has no such requirement, and many small Afghan companies do not have the money on hand anyway.

So when work isn't completed, or disputes arise between companies, there's no easy way to resolve them.

The legal system is so ineffective that no one wants to go to court, explains Aziz Taheer, who works to resolve business disputes for the government's Afghanistan Investment Support Agency.

"Once the case goes to court then it's a problem for both parties because our judicial system is not that clean," Taheer said. "Both sides will pay a lot of money in bribes and it will take a long time."

Instead, the agency tries to act as an impartial mediator, getting the two sides together to talk. However, the mediation usually fails because the agency holds no power to force an agreement, Taheer said.

The Army is trying to establish rules that solve some of these issues, such as requiring the company that wins the contract to do 15 to 25 percent of the work itself, depending on the size of the project.

Before, companies that were good at submitting bids would often subcontract out the entire project for a lesser amount, taking pure profit off the top, McCormick said. In addition, the Army holds the prime contractor responsible for making sure everyone working on the project is paid — even if they're employed by a subcontractor.

But some American firms said the changes mean they're now being treated unfairly. Paul "Tracy" Wright, the Afghanistan director of U.S.-owned AISG Construction, said his firm can lose all the cost savings of subcontracting if they have to monitor every action taken by companies they hire.

Wright already spends a couple days a week trying to screen potential subcontractors at his Kabul offices — asking them about their equipment and requiring photos of buildings they've completed.

"Often completely different companies come in with the same pictures," Wright said.

Copyright © 2010 The Associated Press. All rights reserved.

[Riđđu]

The shooting — which took place while Harrison’s colleagues came under attack — was at such extreme range that the 8.59mm bullets took almost three seconds to reach their target after leaving the barrel of the rifle at almost three times the speed of sound.


Actually flight time would have been around 6 seconds and the drop around 120 meters. Something causes mixed feelings whenever I hear stories of lucky shots like this.

[buglerbilly]

Navistar Defense Receives $191 Million in New Vehicle and Upgrade Orders

(Source: Navistar; issued May 4, 2010)

WARRENVILLE, Ill. --- Navistar Defense, LLC today announced that it has received two separate awards totaling $191 million for the delivery of new medium tactical vehicles as well as enhancements to International MaxxPro Dash Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) units in Afghanistan.

Under the new delivery order for medium tactical vehicles from the U.S. Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) Life Cycle Management Command, Navistar will provide 629 additional medium tactical vehicles for $89 million. The order falls under Navistar’s three-year contract awarded in May 2008 to support the Afghan National Police and Afghan National Army. Deliveries are scheduled to begin in October 2010 and all units will be general troop transport trucks for use in Afghanistan.

“To date, we have more than 14,000 vehicles in Iraq and Afghanistan that leverage the same commercial truck platform, but operate as different medium tactical vehicle and MRAP variants,” said Archie Massicotte, president, Navistar Defense. “This commonality allows us to customize our vehicles for the mission while also accelerating the fleet support provided by our global parts and support network.”

Navistar’s second award is from the U.S. Marine Corps Systems Command for $102 million for MaxxPro Dash MRAP capability insertions. Under the contract, the company will provide a number of vehicle enhancements for the 1,222 Dash units currently in Afghanistan. Installations will begin in August 2010 and be completed by the end of October 2010. These same enhancements have been incorporated into the new MaxxPro Dash vehicles with DXM independent suspension currently being delivered.

“Capability insertion is just one form of vehicle sustainment that Navistar provides,” said Massicotte. “Vehicle fleets have been known to operate for 15 and 20 years and we will provide all the support necessary to keep our trucks up and running and equipped with the latest and greatest technology.”

Navistar International Corporation is a holding company whose subsidiaries and affiliates produce International brand commercial and military trucks, MaxxForce brand diesel engines, IC Bus brand school and commercial buses.

-ends-

[buglerbilly]

Suicide bombers target Afghan city

ARIF KARIMI

May 5, 2010 - 7:04PM

AFP

Militants armed with guns and suicide vests have stormed government buildings in a remote southwest Afghan city, setting off multiple explosions, the provincial governor says.

Police said two officers were killed in Wednesday's co-ordinated attack on Zaranj, where witnesses reported gunbattles between police and militants in government offices.

"Five suicide bombers detonated their bombs around the governor's office. One suicide bomber was shot dead," said a police officer who asked not be named.

"Two police officers have been killed. There might be more casualties," added the officer, speaking from the scene of the attack.

The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack on the capital of Nimroz province, which shares a border with Helmand - the volatile vortex of the insurgency that has been blighting Afghanistan for more than eight years.

"We sent six suicide bombers and three other attackers. They have attacked several government buildings, including the governor's office," said Taliban spokesman Yousuf Ahmadi.

Provincial governor Ghulam Dastagir Azad said seven blasts rocked the city.

"Police are engaged with the attackers in five or six locations, including the provincial council and provincial court," he told AFP.

Witness Ahmed Khan told AFP he had heard several explosions in the provincial capital and gunfire from the governor's office.

Security in Nimroz has deteriorated in recent years amid reports Taliban insurgents are crossing into the province from Helmand, where US, NATO and Afghan troops conducted a major operation earlier this year.

The Afghan interior ministry said the militants targeted civilian as well as government buildings.

"A group of terrorists attacked some civilian and government buildings this morning in Zaranj. The police response was very quick and strong," said spokesman Zemarai Bashary.

"Five suicide bombers have been killed. There is an operation still ongoing in one location where some of the attackers are resisting.

"They entered the governor's office first but police killed all those attackers instantly."

NATO and the United States are throwing thousands of extra troops into Afghanistan, where their deployment is to peak at 150,000 in August under a strategy designed to bring a swift end to the conflict.

Most of the extra troops are deploying in the south, the heartland of the insurgency, with the main focus on the provinces of Kandahar and Helmand.

© 2010 AFP

[buglerbilly]

Taliban leaders to be offered exile under Afghanistan peace plan

Exclusive: Karzai to discuss proposal that also offers reinsertion and jobs to former militants with Obama on US visit

Jon Boone in Kabul guardian.co.uk, Wednesday 5 May 2010 20.34 BST


Afghan Taliban leaders are to be offered exile under President Hamid Karzai's peace plan. Photograph: Saeed Achakzai/Reuters

Top Taliban leaders could be offered exile outside Afghanistan if they agree to stop fighting the government of Hamid Karzai, a long-expected peace plan by the Afghan government will propose later this month.

The far-reaching proposals, seen by the Guardian, also call for "deradicalisation" classes for insurgents and thousands of new manual jobs created for foot soldiers who renounce violence.

The long-delayed Afghan Peace and Reintegration Programme has emerged just as Karzai prepares to go to Washington for talks with Barack Obama, where the issue is likely to be top of the agenda.

The plan will then be presented later in the month to a gathering of representatives from across Afghanistan called the National Consultative Peace Jirga. Once agreed upon, the government will be able to start spending around $160m (£100m) pledged by the international community to lure fighters away from the conflict. The document refers to such fighters as "angry brothers", reflecting the belief that a substantial portion of insurgents are not motivated by strong ideological beliefs.

Little is said in the report about the Taliban leaders managing the war against Karzai's government. However, it does say insurgent leaders could face "potential exile in a third country".

Saudi Arabia has been used in the past for such purposes, and there has been widespread speculation that exile could be offered to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the leader of the Hizb-e-Islami armed group, which in March sent a peace delegation to Kabul for talks with Karzai.

Western powers are likely to be pleased by the level of detail about the new High Level Peace Council, which will take over from a notoriously chaotic predecessor body accused of reintegrating fighters who subsequently took up arms again.

However, diplomats are worried that the government lacks the capacity to implement a programme that calls for complex activities in around 4,000 villages most affected by the insurgency. One diplomat said: "For the international community money is not a problem, they will pay whatever it takes. One gets a sense that there are people on the military side who will do most of the work and then give it some sort of an Afghan face."

The High Council and its executive body will be in charge of processing fighters who want to live peacefully. They will initially be put in "demobilisation centres" for a "cooling off" period of 90 days where their needs can be assessed and their personal security assured.

If they agree to lay down their arms and cut ties with al-Qaida they will be entitled to an amnesty against prosecution for any crimes they may have committed. They will also be issued with a biometric "reintegration card". They will then be offered a "menu" of options designed to keep them peacefully occupied, including vocational training in such trades as carpet-weaving and tailoring.

There will also be the option to go through "deradicalisation" training, of the sort pioneered by Saudi Arabia. However, the report acknowledges the complexity of such programmes, the lack of "adequate experience" in Afghanistan and the likely need to send "highly radicalised" people to other countries for treatment.

Major new institutions will also be set up to manage enormous job-creation schemes. An Engineering and Construction Corps will focus on labour-intensive work, such as the construction of Afghanistan's national highway system and other large-scale infrastructure projects. It also envisages teams of ex-Taliban fighters being rapidly deployed to respond to emergencies such as floods and landslides. By far the most controversial option is the option for former insurgents to join the Afghan army or police force.

Western embassies and Nato have for months been impatient for the government to produce a reintegration strategy, which is an important part of the counterinsurgency plan being pursued by Stanley McChrystal, the US commander of Nato forces in Afghanistan.

On the other hand, it has been widely reported that Karzai is frustrated at US opposition to high-level peace talks with insurgent leaders.

However, both US and Afghan officials say there is only disagreement on the timing of the talks and, to the frustration of the UK, which wants to see a high-level political accommodation with the Taliban, both sides are determined that there should be no significant compromise.

Last week Ahmed Wali Karzai, the Afghan president's hugely influential half-brother, told the Guardian that while fighters could surrender and return in peace, the Afghan government would never share power with the Taliban or give in to demands for the country's constitution to be changed in return for peace. Speaking at his home in Kandahar, he said: "Give them Uruzgan, Kandahar and Helmand? Change the constitution? No way, they are a defeated force, they are running, they are hiding, they are defeated."

His remarks echo those of a senior presidential aide who said Karzai has no interest in a grand deal with the Taliban movement as a whole, but is interested in talking to individuals in order to "chip away at and weaken the insurgency".

It is thought that the offer to return home to Afghanistan from their sanctuaries in Pakistan and live without the fear of being killed by Nato forces would be enough to encourage people to give up. However, Harvard analyst Matt Waldman said the Taliban would only be happy with significant change to the current political set-up in Afghanistan.

"From my discussions with Taliban commanders it is clear they are driven to fight by predatory politics, the abuse of power and perception of military aggression. Until these causes are addressed the fighting will go on."

Peace plan

• Taliban foot soldiers will be encouraged by provincial and district governors to reintegrate into society. An initial 90-day cooling-off period will decide how they can be helped.

• They will vow not to fight against the government, and disavow al-Qaida. The authorities will hold their biometric profile, including fingerprints and iris scans.

• To help former fighters support themselves, the government will offer vocational training in trades such as tailoring and electrical repairs.

• Thousands of manual jobs in construction and agriculture will be created for reintegrated rebels. Others may join their local police force or the army.

• The programme will be initially rolled out in the provinces of Kandahar, Helmand, Herat, Baghdis, Nangarhar, Kunduz, and Baghlan. It will affect 220 districts and around 4,000 villages.

• Insurgent leaders who reconcile themselves with the government may be removed from the UN's terrorist blacklist and possibly be offered "exile in a third country".

[buglerbilly]

British and US accused of poppy plague warfare in Afghanistan

Britain and the US have been accused of launching secret biological warfare on Afghanistan's poppy fields in a bid to blight the opium crop.

Ben Farmer in Kabul

Published: 7:00AM BST 06 May 2010



Afghanistan grows about 90 per cent of the world's opium Photo: AP Poppy plants have been suffering from a mysterious disease which leaves them yellow and withered and slashes the yield of opium resin which is sold on and processed into heroin.

The worst affected farmers have said the scale of the infection is unprecedented. Yields have dropped by up to 90 per cent in some fields they complained.

Farmers are claiming that the British and Americans are responsible for the outbreak of the poppy plague but officials have both strongly denied involvement.

Samples of diseased plants are awaiting tests in Kabul and the cause remains unclear.

The blight was first noticed a month ago with reports it was linked to an infestation of aphids in wheat and fruit trees. It has since been found in four provinces across the south.

Early surveys suggest half the crop in northern Helmand is affected and a fifth of fields in the province's south. Symptoms have been spotted in Kandahar, Zabul and Uruzgan.

The United Nations said the disease would contribute to a significant drop in the opium harvest from last year's total of nearly 7,000 tonnes.

The country grows about 90 per cent of the world's opium. Tithes and protection money from the drug trade are estimated to give up to £60m a year to the Taliban-led insurgency.

The allies have spent billions of pounds trying to cut opium cultivation, but have rejected crop spraying, fearing that robbing farmers of their livelihood will push them to the militants.

The British-led anti-drugs strategy has instead tried to wean farmers from opium on to wheat, saffron and fruit.

British officials in Helmand are now trying to counter the rumours of international involvement in the outbreak, fearing they will be used by the Taliban to alienate farmers from Nato troops.

Abdul Ahmad, a 39-year-old farmer from Helmand's Gereshk district, said he expected his opium crop to fall from 154lbs last year to 15lbs this year.

He said: "We have had disease before although nothing like this. There were little insects in the trees and the wheat, but they are only harming the opium." "I said first this is a disease because of the insects. Now people are saying foreigners have sprayed some kind of chemical from planes."

Ahmad Jan, a 25-year-old farmer from Nad-i-Ali district, said: "We cannot be certain this is a disease. Most people think this is a chemical spray." Prior to the outbreak, the UN had estimated the 2010 crop would be similar to last year.

Jean-Luc Lemahieu, head of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime in Afghanistan, said: "Samples are at the lab and we are at this moment not sure if it is a fungus or some insect.

"Spraying has been forbidden in very clear words by the President of Afghanistan. Hence, awaiting the results from our lab tests, we start with the belief that this is a natural phenomenon."

Fighting and opium seizures had already been credited with pushing farm gate opium prices up by 19 per cent since last year as speculators bet on reduced supply.

An international official in Helmand said there was "absolutely" no US or British involvement. He said: "The government of Afghanistan are not using any kind of spraying and there's nothing else going on either." --

[buglerbilly]

Army Sustainment Command - Forward Steps Up Production for Afghanistan Surge

(Source: U.S Army; issued May 4, 2010)

LEXINGTON, Ky. --- The Army Sustainment Command - Forward has stepped up its operations to install armor and accessory kits for more than 1,300 vehicles headed to Afghanistan.

The Project Manager-Tactical Vehicles asked the Field Logistics Readiness Division, ASC-Forward, in December 2009 to assist with armor installation on approximately 500 heavy tactical vehicles, said Carmen Madero, FLRD project manager. The completed vehicles would be sent to Afghanistan to support the surge.

The work fell to the Field Logistics Readiness Center, at Lexington, Ky., because of its valuable experience since 2004 in installing armor on tactical vehicles, Madero said.

The mission expanded, however, when the Army requested accessory kits be installed in both heavy tactical vehicles and medium tactical vehicles, Madero said.

The kits include the Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS), Counter Remote Control Improvised Explosive Device Electronic Warfare (CREW), Blue Force Tracker (BFT), Field C4I Integration kit, Fire Fuel Tank Fire Suppression kit, and the Tanker Armor Module (TAM).

Installing the kits required increased coordination with Project Manager SINGARS, PM CREW and PM BFT offices, which Madero said increased the complexity of the mission.

"This mission is the largest FLRC Lexington has undertaken," said Cash Centers, chief, FLRC Lexington (BAE Systems). "It was imperative that numerous players worked together to accomplish the mission. Everyone worked as a team ensuring that we provide our Soldiers the equipment to keep them safe as they work to complete their mission. After all, that is why we are here and we are all proud of the support we provide."

By the time the mission is complete, an estimated 1,415 pieces of equipment will have been serviced through FLRC Lexington, Centers said. That includes installation of 1,339 SINCGARS, 1,307 CREW and 440 BFT installation kits to 1,356 wheeled vehicles.

The FLRC is capable of running three shifts, seven days a week, if needed. During this mission, the tempo has been adjusted based on the volume of vehicles and shipping schedules, said Henry Meadows, FLRC Lexington deputy chief (BAE Systems).

FLRC Lexington must work with 17 variants of tactical vehicles -- eight HTVs and nine MTVs -- while making adjustments to installing the kits to fit each variant.

Shortened schedules, frequently changing vehicle packages for shipment dates, complexity of installing the kits, accounting for the large number of vehicles arriving to the facility from the original equipment manufacturer, and the large shipments of completed vehicles leaving the facility, all combine to create significant challenges, Meadows said.

Thus far, the facility has completed each of its shipments either on time or ahead of schedule, Meadows said.

-ends-

[buglerbilly]

No-Name Terrorists Now CIA Drone Targets

By Noah Shachtman May 6, 2010 | 11:25 am



Once upon a time, the CIA had to know a militant’s name before putting him up for a robotic targeted killing. Now, if the guy acts like a guerrilla, it’s enough to call in a drone strike.

It’s another sign of that a once-limited, once-covert program to off senior terrorist leaders has morphed into a full-scale — if undeclared — war in Pakistan. And in a war, you don’t need to know the name of someone on the other side before you take a shot.

Across the border, in Afghanistan, the rules for launching an airstrike have become tighter than a balled fist. Dropping a bomb from above is now a tactic of last resort; even when U.S. troops are under fire, commanders are reluctant to authorize air strikes. In Pakistan, however, the opposite has happened. Starting in the latter days of the Bush administration, and accelerating under the Obama presidency, drone pilots have become more and more free to launch their weapons.

“You’ve had an expanded target set for [some] time now and, given the danger these groups pose and their relative inaccessibility, these kinds of strikes — precise and effective — have become almost like the cannon fire of this war. They’re no longer extraordinary or even unusual,” one American official tells CNN.

This official — like many other officials — insists that the drone strikes have torn up the ranks of militants.

“The enemy has lost not just operational leaders and facilitators — people whose names we know — but formations of fighters and other terrorists,” the official tells the Los Angeles Times. “We might not always have their names, but … these are people whose actions over time have made it obvious that they are a threat.”

National security law experts, inside the government and out, are in the middle of an intense debate over whether the remotely piloted attacks are legal. One leading law professor told Congress last week that the drone operators could be tried for “war crimes,” under certain circumstances. The State Department’s top lawyer counters that the drone attacks are a legitimate act of self-defense.

The connection between the robotic strikes over there and our safety here appears to be growing, The Pakistani Taliban, who have claimed credit for the botched Times Square bombing, say the car bomb was in retaliation for drone strikes. But the robotic aircraft are only one component in the war in Pakistan. American troops are on the ground there, and getting into firefights. American contractors are operating a fleet of helicopters above. Higher in the sky are the American drones, flown by the U.S. Air Force and the CIA.

[Photo: Noah Shachtman]

Read More http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/05/no-name-terrorists-now-cia-drone-targets/#more-24442#ixzz0nCTBfSyl

[buglerbilly]

From The Times May 7, 2010

Commentary: Time is running out for the West to make a decisive difference in Afghanistan

Anthony Loyd, Kandahar

The clock is counting down on the Afghan war. In all probability the coalition has little more than six months to achieve a decisive impact and turn the conflict to its advantage before the final sands begin to run out on President Obama’s promise to start withdrawing US combat troops from Afghanistan next year.

“Everyone is positioning for the end game now,” one diplomat observed. “You can see it. You can feel it. Obama has told the American people, ‘We’ll take one more good try at this’. No one in the West Wing thinks American public opinion, let alone that in the UK or Europe, can sustain this much longer. There has to be a demonstrable change on the ground or the pack-up-and-go lobby will gain momentum.”

The field of battle chosen for this final drive — the huge summer surge that will be as much political as military — is Kandahar, the Southern Afghan province that is the Taleban’s spiritual heartland and home, as well as a territory that best epitomises the deepest malaise of Afghan government corruption and inefficiency.

Here Ahmad Wali Karzai, brother to the President, dominant power broker in the region and a man overshadowed by an array of allegations of criminality, will become the test of the coalition’s final experiment to reform Afghan governance. Some believe that the coming operation, which will bring a surge of thousands of fresh US troops across Kandahar in parallel to huge efforts to reconstruct government bodies, is already a busted flush. Wali Karzai’s continuing presence at the helm of the Kandahar provincial council and all its attendant implications will, they say, ensure that the coalition’s efforts sink into the mire of bad governance.

But what to do? The allegations against Wali Karzai may be contestable, but his power is not. ”It doesn’t matter what position he holds,” noted Kandahar’s Governor, Tooryalai Wesa, last week. “He is the one who keeps the balance here. If he is not in this position . . . not in this province even, then you don’t want to see what will happen from other tribal leaders.”

Moreover, there is a very clear precedent in Iraq and Helmand province in Afghanistan as to what happens when undesirable local leaders are overthrown in too hasty a fashion. In Iraq the sudden purge of Ba’athists had such a negative effect that many had to be reinstated in the interests of long-term peace. In Helmand in 2006, Britain demanded the removal of the Governor, Sher Mohammed Akhunzada, as a precondition to the deployment of its troops there. British soldiers are still paying the price for the resulting increase in violence, and have found that re-employing some of Akhunzada’s more brutal thugs as police chiefs is an effective way of establishing peace — at least in the medium term.

Thus in Kandahar, the coalition has adopted a strategy that attempts to contain and reform Ahmed Wali Karzai, while bolstering the position of Governor Wesa above him, and restructuring district authorities below him.

It might not be the best strategy. But it is the only one left.

[buglerbilly]

U.S.: Too few Afghans to take control in Marjah

By Anne Flaherty - The Associated Press

Posted : Thursday May 6, 2010 18:57:37 EDT


Staff Sgt. Luis R. Agostini / Marine Corps
Men place bags of fertilizer onto a wheel barrow April 25 at the Civil-Military Operations Center at Camp Hansen, Marjah, Afghanistan. Marines and NATO forces still run much of the area, despite the presence of an Afghan civilian administrator.

WASHINGTON — Not nearly enough trained Afghans are available to take control of key Taliban strongholds like Marjah after the military has pushed out the enemy, U.S. officials told a Senate panel on Thursday.

The lack of competent local officials in southern Afghanistan could frustrate Washington’s aims in the region, and keep the U.S. on the hook — financially and militarily — for several years to come. President Obama has pledged that American forces will begin their exit next year.

“The number of those civilians ... who are trained, capable, willing to go into [Taliban-controlled areas] does not match at all demand,” David Sedney, a deputy assistant secretary of defense, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The assessment didn’t sit well with lawmakers, who have grown tired of committing limited U.S. resources and lives to a war with an uncertain outcome.

“You get the queasy feeling that maybe they either aren’t able to sustain it or they don’t really have the same desire that we as Americans do,” Sen. James Risch, R-Idaho, said of the Afghans.

Sen. Richard Lugar of Indiana, the panel’s top Republican, said he is concerned that Afghanistan doesn’t have the potential for the economic growth of oil-rich Iraq and that the U.S. will pay to support the Afghan military for decades to come.

“I see a scenario down the trail that after arduous training exercises ... the wherewithal to pay for all this simply is not there,” Lugar said.

The hearing was the first devoted entirely to Marine operations in the southern Taliban stronghold of Marjah earlier this year. The assault was widely regarded as a test of Obama’s new strategy for empowering the Afghan government.

A week into the battle, Marjah’s civilian chief was brought in to raise the Afghan flag over the town center and Marjah residents who had fled began to return. Since then, progress has been slower than U.S. officials had planned. NATO forces still run much of the area.

Army Chief of Staff George Casey told reporters Thursday that a top concern among U.S. troops, expressed to him during a recent trip to Marjah, was the lack of trained Afghan forces to take over the fight.

Testifying on Thursday, the senior U.S. civilian in southern Afghanistan, the State Department’s Frank Ruggiero, said the effort of transferring control of the region could take some time. For one thing, he said, there’s a need to replace the area’s corrupt local police force with new units.

“There is an American speed for doing things, and we can go in with a battalion of Marines or a battalion of Army soldiers and U.S. civilians, and we can have an effect in a district without a doubt,” Ruggiero said. “But in the end it has to be an Afghan process, and you have to operate at Afghan speed.”

Brig. Gen. John Nicholson of the Joint Staff told the committee he believes “there’s a critical mass of Afghans who want to do this as a society, enough to make that happen.”

Despite the problems with solidifying the Afghan government’s grip on the Marjah area, Sedney said he’s never been more optimistic about the fate of Afghanistan.

[buglerbilly]

From The Sunday Times May 9, 2010

Swift and bloody: the Taliban’s revenge


Rebels have returned to terrorise a former stronghold with shootings and beatings, raising doubts about America’s ability to secure Kandahar

Marie Colvin, in Marjah, Afghanistan

The sniper’s aim was merciless. Lieutenant Brandon Barrett was shovelling sand into bags to fortify his post in the Helmand town of Marjah when a Taliban gunman slotted a bullet between armoured vehicles pulled around for protection, hitting him in the chest.

Although the sun was setting and the fierce heat of the day had softened, it was still hot and Barrett and LanceCorporal Marcus Lounello had taken off their flak jackets as they worked.

The sniper’s second bullet hit Lounello in the chest.

The call came in to the US marines’ forward operating base (FOB) Marjah at 6pm last Wednesday: “Two down, gunshot wounds to the chest, non-responsive.”

Barrett, 27 and unmarried, from Indiana, was dead before the medical team reached them. Lounello, 21, lost a kidney, his spleen and part of his diaphragm but will survive.

“It’s surreal,” Captain Tony Zinni, Barrett’s commanding officer in the 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, said yesterday outside his tented office on a barren base. “I keep expecting him to walk around the corner, big smile on his face.”

Barrett had been running a post that checked traffic coming in and out of Marjah, a former Taliban stronghold that was taken by the marines and their Afghan allies with an overwhelming show of force in February. A small, wiry officer, he was a favourite at FOB Marjah at the centre of the market town.

Zinni held his emotions in check as he described his last visit to Barrett’s post. “It was a really boring duty but he was good about it,” Zinni said, smiling at the memory.

Some elders arrived and Barrett had chatted to them. “I said where the hell did you learn Pashto,” Zinni recalled. Barrett had been visiting the neighbourhood’s elders, trying to win them round, learning words and phrases.

Zinni thinks the lieutenant was targeted and it makes him angry. “Everyone in the block knew him, knew he was the officer,” the captain said. Barrett had 60 days left in Afghanistan. His was the first death in Marjah for the battalion’s weapons company.

That night Zinni gathered Barrett’s platoon for what he said had been one of his toughest moments in his 10 years in the Marine Corps. One of the men still had blood on his trousers.

The 41 soldiers had been together since they were at Camp Lejeune in North Carolina, where Barrett held weekend parties at his beach house. He would dress up as a penguin with aviator sunglasses and a cigar to make people laugh. There were only tears last week.

“I don’t even know what to say to you. Our loss is so great,” Zinni said. “But I do know that Barrett would have wanted us to make a success of this mission.”

Last week was the worst in living memory for weapons company, the first unit to enter Marjah on D-Day, February 13.

Hours before the sniper killed Barrett, another 13-man squad in the company had been walking down a dusty street in the fierce morning heat, spread out on either side of the road so that only one of them would die if anyone stepped on an improvised explosive device (IED), when an insurgent jumped out from behind a building 40 yards ahead and fired three shots.

One bullet hit Lance-Corporal Matthew Hunter, the point man, in the stomach, just below his flak jacket. The second skidded around the armoured vest of a lucky Lance- Corporal Kyle Schneider, leaving him uninjured. Hunter, known in the squad for his 60 socks, which he would wear for two days and then discard, was seriously injured but survived.

On Thursday a member of the elite Afghan National Civil Order Police, which works side by side with the marines, was also shot and killed. The unidentified officer had arrived at FOB Marjah only two days earlier, determined to get his men out of the checkpoints and onto the streets.

Marjah was supposed to be safe. When 5,000 marines and their Afghan national army partners rolled in to oust the Taliban who had ruled the town for almost three years, the fighting lasted just two weeks.

“If you go to Marjah today, you will find a city that is free of the Taliban, that has schools that are open, a marketplace, a bazaar,” Major-General Richard Mills, commander of the US Marine Corps in Afghanistan, said just last month.

Marjah has indeed improved. The idea was to set up “security bubbles”, to get the economy and normal life going inside them in the hope that at some point the locals would throw in their lot with the government. Major David Fennell, a civil affairs officer for the marines, explained that his men had moved as soon as the fighting eased.

“We decided to get in there immediately and spend money. To use money as a weapon system,” Fennell said. He started a project paying $5 (£3.40) a day to clean the canals. Only a few nervous locals turned up on the first day, but when cash started to flow, 1,000 workers soon came on board, defying Taliban threats.

Contractors are now engaged in what the marines call “quick impact projects” — bridges, wells, mosque restorations, anything that shows tangible improvement.

Last week hundreds flocked to the unpainted concrete villa that is the district government’s headquarters, a building said to have been commandeered from a local drug lord.

Some farmers received cash in hand for destroying their poppy crop. Others pushed new wheelbarrows full of cheaply purchased mung beans, alfalfa seeds and huge 50kg (110lb) bags of fertiliser. Down the street the stalls of the once shuttered Loy Chareh bazaar lined the street with wooden crates spilling okra, tomatoes, chilli peppers, mint, watermelon.

All that progress is threatened by the Taliban “surge”. There were always fears that they would re-emerge, bolstered by poppy taxes levied from farmers. But nobody expected their return to be so swift and bloody.

My first night in Marjah had left little doubt that the Taliban were back. On Tuesday I walked out of FOB Marjah with a weapons company squad charged with “rolling up” an IED-maker called Izra, or “signature” in Pashto, probably a nom de guerre.

Izra was thought to be sleeping in a small local mosque. There was no moon and it was pitch black. After 20 minutes a light glowed on a rooftop, a suspicious sight in an area where there is no electricity and everyone sleeps during the hours of darkness.

The flashlight followed our progress. Corporal Josh Hurst, the squad leader, realised we had been spotted by the Taliban when his point man saw four men slipping through the tree line. Hurst motioned the squad down a path to a field of dry furrows and mud channels. I realised why I was slipping and sliding while the marines remained sure-footed — they all had night-vision goggles.

I slid noisily into a canal that I had not noticed. LanceCorporal Tim Ryan hauled me out by the scruff of my flak jacket. Dogs barked. I was terrified that we were walking into an ambush.

After three hours we found the mosque, but Hurst decided to move on because of the danger. “It just kept getting worse and worse and worse,” Hurst said with good humour when we were back on base.

The strength of the Taliban’s presence is gradually becoming clearer. One of their targets is Wafa Aghasheran, a contractor for the marines who builds bridges and wells. He sat cross-legged in his cream-coloured shalwar kameez and dark wool vest last week recalling how Hazrat Gull, 19, his young business partner, had been killed by the Taliban several weeks ago.

“They pulled up on a motorcycle at our project, asked who is the contractor and shot him in the head,” Aghasheran said. “I ran to the bridge and found him. His head was in the canal. All our workers had run away.”

More recently two motorcycles carrying four Taliban converged on Aghasheran’s truck and pointed Kalashnikovs at the driver. They broke both the driver’s arms with the butts of their guns and set fire to the vehicle. Their aim was to stop anyone from working with the Afghan government and marines.

They then put up a letter to Aghasheran in the local mosque saying: “Stop your business or we will kill you and your family.” He smiled and said that he could not afford to stop: at 42, he has three wives and 18 children.

The Taliban are growing bolder. A man in his early twenties known only as Sharitulla was at home about two weeks ago when the Taliban came knocking in broad daylight. When he refused their demand for taxes, they took him out to the desert and beat him to death. His body was left on the doorstep of his elderly father.

While they may not want the Taliban back, many of Marjah’s people are reluctant to commit themselves to the administration that has replaced them. “The local residents don’t trust we will provide security,” said Naimatullah, the acting district governor of Marjah, in a late-night interview.

“They are taking a wait-and-see attitude to the government,” he said, fingering black worry beads. “The people are worried that the Taliban will return and punish them for supporting the government.”

The offensive in which Marjah was captured was the largest in Afghanistan since 2001, when the Taliban regime was driven out by US-supported Afghan warlords after the September 11 attacks on America.

After that victory, Afghanistan was largely neglected as America and Britain became bogged down in the war in Iraq. Only last year did attention shift back. Heavy-handed military operations that killed civilians helped the Taliban to reestablish support and organise a virulent insurgency.

General David Petraeus, who came up with the idea of the “surge” that quelled the violence in Iraq, has tailored his theory to Afghanistan at a pivotal moment in the nine-year war. The Obama administration is deploying 30,000 new troops to Afghanistan as part of a shift to a counterinsurgency strategy.

Until recently Marjah was seen as a success story that could serve as a template for an expected operation against the Taliban in Kandahar, the birthplace of the Taliban.

“In many ways [the Marjah operation] is a model for the future: an Afghan-led operation supported by the coalition, deeply engaged with the people,” General Stanley McChrystal, leader of Nato and American forces, said.

Yet worries are growing in the Pentagon that if thousands of marines and Afghan security forces cannot entirely defeat the Taliban in Marjah, a town of only 50,000, securing the far larger prize of Kandahar may be an even greater struggle than has been foreseen.

This week Hamid Karzai, the Afghan president, flies to Washington for a meeting with President Barack Obama. The two men know that success in Kandahar will be crucial both to persuading the Taliban to the negotiating table and to enabling Nato forces to leave.

Yet after Marjah, McChrystal is playing down expectations. Last week he warned that it could be the end of the year before any progress is seen.

Additional reporting: Christina Lamb, Washington

[buglerbilly]

Taliban threatens new attacks in Afghanistan

By Deb Riechmann - The Associated Press

Posted : Saturday May 8, 2010 10:55:27 EDT

BAGRAM AIR FIELD, Afghanistan — The Taliban threatened Saturday to launch a fresh offensive across Afghanistan this coming week, as President Hamid Karzai said international forces have yet to secure large parts of the country.

The Taliban said the offensive starting Monday will include assassinations of government officials, roadside bombs and suicide attacks against foreigners and those who support them.

“All foreign invading forces will ultimately face defeat,” the Taliban said in a statement sent to reporters from an e-mail address used by the militants.

Defense Minister Gen. Abdul Rahim Wardak quickly dismissed the threat as insurgent propaganda. He said the Taliban do not have the ability to launch a series of attacks across Afghanistan. Moreover, he said, intelligence reports show many of the Taliban commanders currently are across the border in Pakistan.

“I doubt seriously that they have the capability to do something like what they claim,” he said. “I do believe it is a propaganda campaign rather than a reality.”

A crucial test of the nine-year war is coming this summer, when a U.S.-led military operation tries to clear the Taliban from the key southern city of Kandahar, the group’s spiritual heartland.

Insurgents have ramped up attacks there recently. On Saturday, the Taliban claimed responsibility for the death of a government official in Arghandab in Kandahar province.

Manan Khan, vice president of the Arghandab district shura and former police chief in the district, was killed Friday night along with two of his bodyguards, according to district chief Syed Ali said.

In an opinion piece in The Washington Post, Karzai said Saturday that the U.S. and its allies still have “miles to go” in Afghanistan and international forces have yet to secure large parts of the country.

“We have traveled far together, but the international effort in Afghanistan still has miles to go,” said Karzai, who begins meetings in Washington on Monday after months of rocky relations with the Obama administration.

Karzai is hoping his upcoming trip will bring renewed legitimacy and the political backing he needs for possible peace talks with the Taliban.

The Washington trip comes at a critical juncture in the war. At the same time that more troops and aid are moving into Afghanistan, the U.S. has made it clear its involvement is not open-ended. President Barack Obama, who gathered his national security team to discuss Afghanistan and Pakistan on Thursday at the White House, wants to start pulling out troops in July 2011 if conditions allow.

In his opinion piece, Karzai said civilian casualties were harming efforts to bring security and urged an end to night raids and house searches that have been known to kill civilians as well as insurgents.

Civilian deaths at the hands of U.S. and other international forces are highly sensitive in Afghanistan. Public outrage over such deaths prompted the top commander, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, last year to tighten rules on the use of airstrikes if civilians are at risk.

Karzai, who was at Bagram Air Field on Saturday with several of his ministers, met with wounded soldiers at the base, offering a lapis lazuli bowl as a gift to U.S. Army Pfc. Jordan Wright, 19, of Russellville, Tenn.

Wright suffered a broken leg in a roadside bomb blast May 6.

Karzai later spoke to about 50 U.S. troops at the base and thanked them for training Afghan forces.

“When you’re out in the fields in Afghanistan alongside Afghan soldiers it is like any other society,” Karzai said. “There are families. There are children. There are women. There are elderly people. There are young people and people who are ill. I’m sure that you take appropriate and good care of the situation when you face it.”

In Kabul, Karzai was scheduled to meet briefly with U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, D-California. She is visiting Afghanistan with colleagues Reps. Susan Davis, D-Calif.; Niki Tsongas, D-Mass.; Donna Edwards, D-Md., and Madeline Bordallo, D-Guam. They were to meet with Afghan women who counsel victims of sexual assault, female Marines who engage with Afghan civilians in the field and Afghan women who have received vocational training.

In eastern Afghanistan, private security guards opened fire and killed a 30-year-old civilian after the guards’ vehicle hit a roadside bomb in Wardak province, the provincial governor’s office said.

One of the guards was arrested.

Also Saturday, NATO said a service member died following an insurgent attack in southern Afghanistan on Friday. It did not provide further details.

Afghanistan’s Foreign Ministry said the government was preparing to send a high-level delegation from several ministries to neighboring Iran to investigate recent reports of the abuse of Afghan prisoners there. Afghan officials still have not decided which officials will make the trip.

[buglerbilly]

Obama makes personal diplomacy part of Afghan strategy


President Obama with, from left, Vice President Biden, President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan and President Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan. (Bill O'leary/the Washington Post)

By Scott Wilson and Rajiv Chandrasekaran
Washington Post Staff Writer
Sunday, May 9, 2010

President Obama has bluntly instructed his national security team to treat Afghan President Hamid Karzai with more public respect, after a recent round of heavy-handed statements by U.S. officials and other setbacks infuriated the Afghan leader and called into question his relationship with Washington.

During a White House meeting last month, Obama made clear that Karzai is the chief U.S. partner in the war effort -- which will be reflected in his visit to Washington that begins Monday, according to senior administration officials. In doing so, Obama is seeking to impose discipline on an administration that has sent mixed signals about Karzai's legitimacy and his value to the U.S.-led counterinsurgency campaign. As a result, Karzai threatened to join the Taliban just days after Obama concluded his first presidential trip to Kabul in late March.

After a two-hour palace meeting that advisers to both leaders described as productive, Karzai grew bitter after receiving a copy of comments made by Obama's national security adviser on the way to Kabul that struck him as insulting. Days later, Karzai read in a newspaper article that an unnamed U.S. official was threatening to put Ahmed Wali Karzai, his half brother, on the military's kill-or-capture list.

Karzai had been led to believe months earlier that his brother -- the leader of Kandahar's provincial council -- would remain in his post despite persistent accusations of corruption and ties to drug trafficking. Karzai erupted in anger soon after, stunning the White House.

"There has been a rough patch," said a senior administration official who participates in Afghanistan policy development. "Frankly, some of what Karzai said needed to be responded to. But the bottom line is that there has been an improvement since then in the atmospherics and in the substance of our dealings with President Karzai and his team."

Managing the relationship with Karzai is part of the far broader challenge of maintaining political support for a nearly nine-year-old war, which a new Washington Post-ABC News poll found is once again opposed by a majority of Americans. Fifty-two percent of respondents said the war is not worth fighting, which means the bump in support for the war that followed Obama's announcing his new Afghanistan strategy in December has disappeared.


Karzai's meeting with Obama in the Oval Office on Wednesday will be the centerpiece of a rare extended visit. Over the next four days, Karzai and many of his senior cabinet ministers will be publicly embraced and privately reassured by Obama of the U.S. commitment to Afghanistan, which officials say will endure long after American forces begin leaving in July 2011.

Karzai has been frightened by the deadline, U.S. officials acknowledge. Obama intends to devote much of his meeting with him to spelling out a long-term relationship that includes far fewer U.S. troops but deeper diplomatic and economic support.

It is not certain whether the message discipline will be able to reset what has long been a complicated relationship. Despite Obama's edict that the Afghan leader receive public support, deep policy differences remain inside the administration, including among top U.S. officials in Afghanistan, over Karzai's commitment to the government and security reforms essential to the U.S. mission.

Some of the mixed signals in recent months appear to be a direct result of the president's actions. In contrast to George W. Bush, Obama established more of an arm's-length personal relationship with Karzai. He also raised questions about Karzai's viability as a partner during a White House strategy review of the Afghanistan war last fall.

But Obama now wants his administration to close ranks, senior officials said.

Karzai's visit has been designed to be "a manifest demonstration of the relationship and the issues we are working on," the senior administration official said. Karzai will be hosted at dinners by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, whom he trusts perhaps more than any other U.S. official, and Vice President Biden, with whom he has had a stormy relationship.

The administration has encouraged Karzai to bring a large delegation of senior Afghan officials, giving them a chance to meet their U.S. Cabinet counterparts and influential congressional leaders. Among them are ministers Obama recommended to Karzai during the Kabul visit, based on their competence rather than the tribal or ethnic affiliations that can complicate government reforms in Afghanistan.

"We want to emphasize that this is not a relationship with just one person," said a second senior administration official involved in Afghanistan policy, who, like others, spoke on the condition of anonymity to describe White House thinking about Karzai. But, the official hastened to add, "we do not look at this as a zero-sum situation or as a way of working around Kabul."

'Spiral of events'

Karzai's most recent tirade was set off by what one White House official called "a spiral of events" surrounding Obama's visit -- some within the administration's control and some beyond it.

According to senior administration officials, the circumstances that angered Karzai included remarks made by national security adviser James L. Jones before the meeting even began.

Jones told reporters traveling aboard Air Force One that Obama intended to "make [Karzai] understand that in his second term there are certain things that have not been paid attention to almost since Day One." Those remarks were viewed by Afghan officials as condescending, but Karzai did not learn of them until after Obama left Afghanistan.

Three days later, Karzai was enraged to read a report in The Washington Post that quoted an unnamed U.S. official threatening Ahmed Wali Karzai with a spot on the military's Joint Prioritized Engagement List, better known as the kill-or-capture list. The next day, Afghanistan's lower house of parliament rejected Karzai's proposal to change the national election law to give him more control over the body that investigates voter fraud, a move the Obama administration had opposed.

"We have our own national interest in the country," Karzai told a gathering of Afghan election officials the next day, accusing the United Nations and the international media of conspiring against him. "They wanted a servant government."

Within days, Karzai called Clinton to clarify his comments. But days later, White House press secretary Robert Gibbs still declined to call Karzai an ally.

"At the end of the day for Karzai, this is very much a question of respect," said a third senior administration official involved in Afghanistan policy. "He tends, like any head of state, to conflate an insult against me as an insult against my people. We tend to try to separate the two."

'Apply that touch'

Karzai was not the only leader who was angry. Obama was, too, particularly at the way U.S. officials had spoken about the Afghan president.

Obama made clear in a meeting with his senior national security team that Karzai is "someone we're going to have to work with for the next 4 1/2 years." Therefore, "high expectations should be set for [Karzai], and he should be held to them," but Obama would not tolerate any more public criticism.

On April 8, a note from Obama was delivered to Karzai in Kabul, thanking him for arranging his recent visit. Three days later, Clinton and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates appeared on the Sunday morning talk shows to praise Karzai.

Obama's decision most reflected the position of Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the military commander in Afghanistan. McChrystal had been arguing during monthly Situation Room review sessions that U.S. officials needed to show more public deference to Karzai.

The chief U.S. diplomat in Afghanistan, Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry, has been on the other side of that argument, pushing to identify leaders outside Kabul to work with, rather than relying so heavily on Karzai.

In Afghanistan, much of Karzai's handling has fallen to McChrystal, who often takes the Afghan leader on his travels inside the country. According to diplomats in Afghanistan and analysts who travel there often, Karzai does not think he can trust Eikenberry or Richard C. Holbrooke, Obama's special envoy to the region, who has had a long and bitter relationship with the Afghan leader. A senior foreign diplomat in Kabul called Holbrooke a Karzai "bete noire," but both Holbrooke and Eikenberry say they have a productive relationship with the Afghan president.

Ryan C. Crocker, the former U.S. ambassador to Baghdad, said the troop surge in Iraq succeeded in part because of the unity he and Gen. David H. Petraeus, the U.S. commander there at the time, showed in dealing with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, another complicated leader. But Crocker said the troop surge's success was also made possible by Bush's personal relationship with Maliki, with whom Bush spoke often via videoconference.

"So there was confidence at the top," said Crocker, who is now dean of Texas A&M University's Bush School of Government and Public Service. "President Obama certainly has the touch, there's no doubt about it. And now is the time for him to apply that touch."

'Designed to focus us'

In his December speech at West Point, Obama announced that U.S. troops would begin to leave Afghanistan in July 2011.

"The date was meant to focus the mind of the Afghans, certainly," a senior administration official said. "But it was also designed to focus us back here. It enforces discipline on a project that really had been adrift for years."

Diplomats in the region say the date has sometimes had the opposite effect on Karzai, causing him to weigh every U.S. demand against its potential implications for his political life after the troops leave. Those fears lay behind his comments about joining the Taliban, officials say.

Obama is mindful of Karzai's anxieties, and he began describing the long-term U.S. role in Afghanistan in a videoconference with Karzai a few weeks before his Kabul visit, a senior administration official said. Obama will spend much of his Wednesday meeting with Karzai addressing those same concerns.

"President Karzai wants to have a sense of the enduring nature of the commitment, of his relationship with the president, and where he stands -- and that's natural," the senior official said. "What we'll be doing coming out of this is to talk in more detail about what the long-term relations between the U.S. and Afghanistan will look like. And that isn't about having 100,000 troops there forever."

Staff writers Al Kamen and Anne E. Kornblut and polling director Jon Cohen contributed to this story.

[buglerbilly]

From The Times May 10, 2010

Karzai arrives in Washington as Taleban threaten fresh assault

Tim Reid, Washington

President Karzai arrives in Washington today for crucial talks to mend relations with the US as the Taleban threaten a new assault in Afghanistan.

The four-day visit by Mr Karzai comes at a critical moment in his strained relationship with the Obama Administration and in the eight-year Afghan war.

With a US-led military operation aimed at routing the Taleban in their heartland of Kandahar to be launched within weeks, the insurgent group warned last night that a counter-offensive — called “Operation Victory”, in opposition to Nato’s “Operation Hope” — would begin today.

Mr Karzai, who at the request of the White House is bringing key ministers with him, lands in the US at a time when Mr Obama’s Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy is in a dangerous state of flux.

The volatile situation in northern Pakistan is threatening to undermine the war effort in Afghanistan, particularly because of Taleban activity in Pakistan’s border region of Waziristan.

Eric Holder, the US Attorney-General, announced that US authorities believed that the Pakistani Taleban group was responsible for last week’s unsuccessful car bomb plot in Times Square, New York, in a development that reflects the ambition and reach of the group.

“We’ve now developed evidence that shows the Pakistani Taleban was behind the attack,” Mr Holder said. He added that the group probably financed the plot and had been “intimately involved” with Faisal Shahzad, the Pakistani-born US citizen who allegedly tried to detonate the device.

Mr Shahzad, who was arrested trying to leave America on a commercial aircraft, has told the FBI that he received bombmaking training in North Waziristan.

Mr Holder divulged the new intelligence as a US unmanned drone fired two missiles into a Taleban camp in North Waziristan, killing nine militants, according to Pakistani officials. Pakistani army helicopter gunships also killed 18 militants in the northwestern region of Orakzai, according to local officials.

It emerged that the Obama Administration had delivered severe warnings to Pakistan that it must move against Taleban and al-Qaeda strongholds in Waziristan.

Pakistani officials have been warned that a failure to take on the border militants could lead to US troops being sent into the region, a prospect that has been opposed by Islamabad. Pakistani officials are already sensitive to the drone strikes, which have claimed many civilian lives.

General Stanley McChrystal, the US ground commander in Afghanistan, met General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the Pakistani military chief, on Friday to insist that he confronts the Taleban and al-Qaeda in Waziristan.

Mr Karzai will be welcomed publicly in Washington today, weeks after the visit looked in jeopardy. After being rebuked by Mr Obama during a brief visit to Kabul last month over his failure to end corruption, Mr Karzai said that he might join the Taleban.

Mr Obama believes that the public feuding has been counter-productive. The Afghan leader is the only partner that the US has in Afghanistan and the American President, in an attempt to inject discipline into the war strategy, has ordered aides to treat Mr Karzai well and to end anonymous briefings against him.

Before Mr Karzai meets Mr Obama on Wednesday he will hold talks with Hillary Clinton, the US Secretary of State, Robert Gates, the Defence Secretary, and senior members of both parties on Capitol Hill.

Mr Karzai’s desire to negotiate with the Taleban, a topic fraught with tension, will be central to the talks. The White House has agreed to the co-opting of low-level Taleban but there is a wariness in Washington to Mr Karzai’s suggestion of wooing the Taleban leadership.

[buglerbilly]

Kandahar braces itself for a bloody summer offensive

The Taliban's more brutal treatment of civilians and Nato's response have raised the temperature – and the fear factor – as the fighting season approaches

John Boone in Kandahar

guardian.co.uk, Sunday 9 May 2010 17.17 BST


A US soldier secures a pomegranate orchard near Kandahar. US forces are massing on the outskirts of the city for the biggest military offensive of the nine-year war. Photograph: Yannis Behrakis/Reuters

The coming of spring always brings an influx of Taliban fighters to the district of Zhari, where the young leaves on the grapevines and fruit orchards provide cover so thick that Nato's hi-tech thermal imaging cameras struggle to see the insurgents hiding within.

But this year things are different. The Taliban are back once again, but the locals who live in the area on the western doorstep of the city of Kandahar say they have arrived in far higher numbers than in previous years.

"Two months ago there were only around 30 in the area, but it has increased dramatically in the last two weeks," said Faiz Mohammad, a shopkeeper from the town of Sanzari in Zhari district.

"We now see hundreds of them, young teenage boys, led by older commanders. They are clean shaven and look like everyone else, except they carry good weapons and communications equipment."

It is a similar story in the nearby villages of Pashmol and Ashgho, locals say. According to one farmer, the fighters operate within just a few hundred metres of Nato bases. "They just come up and check we haven't met government officials and demand we give them food and money," said Bari Dad.

The young fighters, fresh from over the border in Pakistan, appear to be mustering in exactly the places where Nato expects to do some of its heaviest fighting this summer.

As they did before the major February operation in Marjah in Helmand, the insurgents are preparing for the onslaught by laying roadside bombs and mines in the areas where they expect to fight. But, unlike in the past, they now rarely tell the locals where they are buried, Dad said.

In what has been called the "cornerstone of the surge effort", June and July will see about 23,000 US, Canadian and Afghan troops attempt to clear Kandahar's rural hinterlands, focusing particularly on areas such as Zhari and the neighbouring district of Panjwai.

The hope is that by controlling these areas they will take the pressure off the beleaguered city of Kandahar and its estimated 500,000 citizens.

Nato talks of creating "rings of security" around the provincial capital. But inside the city a Taliban campaign of violence has succeeded in creating an atmosphere of panic and terror.

Sources throughout the vital southern province report similar stories of a higher than usual influx of fighters, including insurgents, passing through the district of Shah Wali Kot to the north and the area of Dand to the south. The Indian consulate in Kandahar also said it had received reports from locals from Maruf, a district on the border with Pakistan, that Taliban activity has "increased many-fold" compared with last year.

Pranav, a diplomat at the heavily fortified Indian consulate, said that insurgents appeared also to be moving in from neighbouring provinces, including Helmand, in preparation for a major Kandahar offensive.

Both sides are gearing up for a bloody summer. The head of the health department has set up an additional 100 beds for the city's main hospital, which previously held 330. Those beds are already full of the war wounded, including many suspected Taliban fighters.

Caught between the two sides, civilians are hoping to avoid the crossfire.

Mohammad Karim, a farmer from Ashgo, said: "The Taliban publicly executed a man in our village by hanging him from a tree and then shooting him. He was accused of passing information to the foreigners. Both sides are creating problems for us and we try to remain neutral."

Haji Abdul Haq, a tribal elder from Arghandab district, said people in his area were only interested in avoiding the fight. "The people only want peace and security; they don't care if it's provided by Isaf [the international security assistance force led by Nato] or the Taliban," he said.

A recent public opinion survey in Kandahar conducted for the US army found that despite their efforts to remain above the fray, most of the 1,994 people questioned sympathised with the insurgents' reasons for taking up arms against the government. Some 94% of respondents did not want foreign forces to start a new operation.

The US has already stepped up its secret war against the Taliban: special forces teams have been killing and capturing mid-level commanders and apparently squeezing the insurgents' supply chains.

But in recent weeks the Taliban have responded with an aggressive assassination campaign, bringing an unprecedented level of fear to the city.

Rumours are circulating that Taliban leaders in Pakistan have issued a "kill list" of officials who have been targeted – most of whom do not have any security to speak of.

Last month the city's deputy mayor was shot dead as he prayed in a mosque. A week earlier, a young Afghan woman employed by Development Alternatives, a company that works on US government construction projects, was gunned down as she travelled to work.

These developments have created a clear sense of fear, particularly among anyone connected with the government, Nato or any foreign organisation.

At a time when the US military is trying to bolster the provincial government's capacity to get things done, key staff members are trying to quit. One aide in the governor's office, who cannot be named, has handed in his resignation although it has not yet been accepted.

Some who leave government employment find that it is already too late: former interpreters for Nato soldiers have been targeted and killed, in one case more than a year after leaving the job.

One Afghan man, who cannot be named, said he quit his well-paid job at the International Committee of the Red Cross after receiving phone calls from acquaintances in Quetta, the frontier town in southern Pakistan where many Taliban live with their families, politely asking him not to work with the foreigners any more. When he argued that the Red Cross was a humanitarian organisation that famously strives to be neutral, he was told the Taliban believe that they share information with the Americans and cannot be trusted.

And the United Nations, which also describes itself as neutral, now considers its staff to be in such danger that on 27 April all foreign workers were hurriedly evacuated to Kabul and local staff told to remain at home after rumours that the UN compound was going to be attacked.

With the departure of the UN, there are very few foreigners still living in the city. When I checked into a heavily fortified guesthouse, the first thing the manager showed off was not the bedroom but a basement safe room and an escape route over the roof.

He was right to be cautious: just round the corner is the remains of a compound that housed a number of foreign companies working on US-funded projects. The building was largely destroyed on 15 April by a suicide bomber who drove a car packed with explosives into the front gate.

"They are trying to show who is the boss in Kandahar city, and it appears to be working," said Ganesh, the Indian diplomat.

The collapse in security and the increase in US military patrols have frightened locals who used to regard the city as a sanctuary from more dangerous outlying districts.

And foreign officials worry that operations in the surrounding districts will displace fighters into the city itself; urban warfare on the streets of Kandahar would be a disaster for the Nato strategy of trying to create security in areas where the population is most dense. Last week, Mark Sedwill, Nato's senior civilian representative, admitted that street to street fighting was a possibility.

"We are just in absolute despair," said one man from Arghandab district who had come into the city to shop. "People used to move their families into the city when there was fighting in the districts, but now that's not safe either. We really don't know where to go."

Despite the dire state of security in the city and its surrounding areas, there is widespread opposition among locals to a major military offensive, which, like the February operation in Marjah, has been well publicised in advance.

Nato hoped that this would encourage fighters to simply withdraw. But it has, in fact, given the Taliban time to thoroughly prepare the battleground with bombs and mines as well as terrifying the local population.

When Hamid Karzai visited the city at the beginning of April to talk to elders, most of them called on him to cancel the plan.

Last week Nato began trying to play down the military aspect of this summer's surge, saying it would prefer to call it a "process that is encompassing military and non-military instruments" rather than an "operation", or "offensive".

Others say that nothing will change until a solution is found for Kandahar's underlying problems of official corruption and tribes who feel excluded from power, which they say is controlled by a small oligarchy of businessmen-politicians.

Several Kandaharis I interviewed saw the Taliban insurgency in terms of rivalry between members of the largely excluded Gilzai tribe, which has always been heavily represented within the Taliban, and the traditional elite Durrani tribe to which Hamid Karzai belongs.

The claim is backed up by figures from the US military, showing that Durranis hold two-thirds of positions within the provincial government and 26 out of 34 district and police chiefs.

"Things will never get better unless the Ghilzai are more fairly represented," said Faiz Mohammad the shopkeeper from Zhari. "You cannot just ignore the needs of a major tribe like that."

[buglerbilly]

Militant factions with global aims are spreading roots throughout Pakistan


A Pakistani man reads about Faisal Shahzad, a U.S. citizen accused of trying to set off a bomb in Times Square. Officials said Shahzad allegedly worked his way through militant training in Pakistan. (Anjum Naveed/associated Press)

By Karin Brulliard and Pamela Constable

Washington Post Foreign Service

Monday, May 10, 2010

KARACHI, PAKISTAN -- Terrorism suspect Faisal Shahzad's alleged path to Times Square reflects what experts say is a militant support network that spans Pakistan and is eager to shepherd aspiring terrorists from around the globe.

In this teeming southern metropolis, authorities are focusing on a domestic militant outfit that might have escorted Shahzad to distant northern peaks where U.S. investigators allege he received training with the al-Qaeda-affiliated Pakistani Taliban. In Pakistan's heartland, extremist organizations freely build compounds and campaign with politicians, while their foot soldiers fight alongside the Taliban in the borderlands, intelligence officials say.

The overall picture is one of a jumbled scaffolding of militancy that supports al-Qaeda and the Taliban with money and safe houses, and can provide entrance tickets to mountain training camps for aspiring terrorists, one U.S. counterterrorism official said.

Although the planners of most serious terror plots against the West in recent years have received direction or training from groups in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, the reach of extremist organizations across Pakistan underscores the limits of Pakistani military offensives and of U.S. airstrikes that target the Taliban and al-Qaeda only along the frontier.

"Our cells are working everywhere," one Pakistani Taliban fighter said in a telephone interview. New foreign recruits, among them Europeans and Americans, undergo days of isolation and "complete observation" by militants outside the tribal areas before gaining access to camps, he said.

Many such aspirants do not make it, the Taliban fighter said, because they are deemed to be spies. That happened to five Northern Virginia men, who were rebuffed by Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-i-Taiba last year despite the reference of an online recruiter, according to Pakistani authorities. However, those aspirants deemed sincere represent a "one in a million" opportunity for militants to strike in the West, said Masood Sharif Khattak, a former Pakistani Intelligence Bureau chief.

Their first stop is typically not the mountains of Waziristan, where Shahzad told U.S. investigators he had trained, but 1,000 miles south in Karachi, the Taliban fighter said.

An Arabian Sea gateway of 18 million people, the city is awash in weapons and dotted with mosques where, police say, jihadist literature is freely distributed and clerics deliver vitriolic anti-American sermons. Among them is the Bath'ha mosque and seminary, an unassuming building known locally as a bastion for Jaish-e-Mohammed, a banned Kashmir-focused group. Authorities said they have arrested a man at the mosque who escorted Shahzad to the northwestern city of Peshawar.

Operatives from Pakistan's array of jihadist groups find haven in Karachi's multiethnic sprawl; Afghan Taliban deputy leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar was arrested in the city earlier this year.

The groups form a nexus, according to recent local intelligence reports. One report, obtained by The Washington Post, warns of coordinated plans by the Pakistani Taliban -- a group based in the tribal areas that has focused its attacks inside Pakistan -- and the traditionally anti-India militant groups of Punjab province. The target: NATO supply convoys in Karachi.

Farther north in the expanse of Punjab, experts say the major anti-India militant groups and other radical Sunni organizations need little cover: They are tolerated and even supported by the state. Banned groups such as Lashkar-i-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed have formed organizations with new names that operate freely. Some of their leaders have been arrested for alleged links to terrorist attacks, then released by the courts.

The groups have in recent years increasingly focused attacks within Punjab as provincial officials have tried to placate them, both to capitalize on their popularity and in hopes of moderating their views.

The chief provincial minister, Shahbaz Sharif, was widely criticized in March for calling on the Pakistani Taliban to "spare Punjab," which he suggested had common cause with the militants by rejecting Western dictates. Another provincial minister visited the seminary of a banned group and campaigned for office with the leader of another. Jaish-e-Mohammed recently built a large walled compound in the southern Punjabi city of Bahawalpur.

"These groups have not been touched," said Ahmed Rashid, a leading Pakistani expert on the Taliban and Islamist extremism. "They have been through a metamorphosis and turned their guns inward and linked up with other groups in the northwest, but no one is acknowledging it. The word is out that if you hang with them, you're safe."

The counterinsurgency tactics used in the tribal areas -- missiles and military operations -- are widely thought to be unfeasible in Pakistan's populous mainland. But critics say Pakistani police, security agencies and officials could at least start to clamp down on extremist organizations by vocally condemning them, monitoring mosques and madrassas and denying public space and private property to militant-linked groups.

Pakistan says it is still investigating the extent of Shahzad's militant links; some security officials have said that he definitely had ties to Jaish-e-Mohammed. Terrorism analyst Muhammad Amir Rana said that what appears to be a lack of political will to tackle militant organizations in Pakistan's heartland is actually rooted in a problem with far greater implications for the global battle against terror: The groups' reach and presence in cities has made them a beast that cannot easily be dismantled.

"It's very complex," Rana said. "They have infrastructure in all different areas."

Constable reported from Lahore. Staff writer Joby Warrick in Washington and special correspondent Haq Nawaz Khan contributed to this report.

[buglerbilly]

U.S. military runs into Afghan tribal politics after deal with Pashtuns

By Joshua Partlow and Greg Jaffe
Washington Post Foreign Service

Monday, May 10, 2010

ACHIN, AFGHANISTAN -- U.S. military officials in eastern Afghanistan thought they had come up with a novel way to stem the anger and disillusionment about government corruption that fuels the Taliban insurgency here.

Instead, their plan to empower a large Pashtun tribe angered a local power broker, provoked a backlash from the Afghan government and was disavowed by the U.S. Embassy.

The struggling U.S. military effort to give the Shinwari tribe more voice in its affairs shows the massive challenges the United States will face this summer in Kandahar province, as it prepares to launch what is being touted as one of the largest and most important military campaigns of the nine-year-old war. One of the main U.S. goals in Kandahar is to reduce the influence of local power brokers, widely seen as corrupt, and to give tribal alliances a stake in how the province is governed and how development contracts are parceled out.

But the swirling controversy surrounding the American deal in eastern Afghanistan's Nangarhar province demonstrates that efforts to alter the existing power structure can have unintended and unsettling effects. The plan involving the 400,000-strong Shinwari tribe developed earlier this year when elders told Col. Randy George, a senior commander in eastern Afghanistan, that they wanted to unite to oppose the Taliban and stamp out opium cultivation. As a reward, George offered the Shinwari elders the power to decide how to spend $1 million in U.S.-funded development projects.

It ended after the local power broker, Gov. Gul Agha Shirzai, a towering and controversial figure in Afghan politics, complained to President Hamid Karzai, who lambasted U.S. Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry in a February meeting for meddling in tribal politics.

Shirzai accused U.S. officials of turning tribal elders into "little governors."

Soon, the State Department ordered its employees to cease working on the deal. The embassy has drafted, but not yet issued, guidance that no civilians in Afghanistan should be involved in tribal pacts.

The American approach had also angered other tribal leaders, who complained that an initial $200,000 allotted for day-labor work hadn't been distributed equitably, even among the Shinwaris.

"It really stirred things up," said one State Department official in Kabul, referring to George's approach. "They were basically paying the Shinwaris to do nothing: 'Congratulations, you get a pony.' Now other tribes are saying, 'Why don't I get a pony?' "

Although military officials expected resistance from Shirzai, they were surprised by the blowback from Afghan officials in Kabul and from the State Department, which had been informed about the effort prior to moving forward. "The big worry was that the pact undermined the central government," said one U.S. official.

U.S. military officials rejected the notion that branches of the Shinwari were excluded from the deal. "We did it in a very open way. We announced it in front of 130 tribal elders," George said.

After spending $167,000 on a series of small, labor-intensive initiatives to clean out irrigation canals and build retaining walls, the money stopped flowing. "It's all been stopped, the money and the projects," said Shinwari elder Mohammad Usman. One of the main beneficiaries was Malik Niaz, a white-bearded leader of the Khaidar Khel sub-tribe, who said he accepted $10,000 in two installments. Niaz said the Interior Ministry gave him pickup trucks, 50 bodyguards and 100 rocket-propelled grenades, while U.S. Special Operations forces helicopters flew in ammunition and food. A spokesman for Special Operations forces did not address the claims but said none of their forces are currently in Nangarhar or "providing assistance to the Shinwari tribe at this time." The weapons, food and ammunition were not part of the broader Shinwari deal, military officials said.

The new prestige for Niaz and others did not sit well among all Shinwaris. "Before the money, we were all equal," said Akthar Mohammad, a Shinwari elder from the Ali Sher Khel branch. "They became very selfish, very proud of themselves. They wanted to control the other tribes."

Other tribes in the area complained as well. "Why did they choose the Shinwari?" said Zainullah Khan, administrator of the tribal affairs ministry in Jalalabad. "Afghanistan has a tradition: If you help one brother, the other one gets angry."

Some Shinwari and U.S. officials said the deal played a role in sparking violence early March, when hundreds of Shinwari from the Shublai branch walked down from the mountains and began to build rock huts on disputed land controlled by the Ali Sher Khel branch of the Shinwari.

The Ali Sher Khel chafed at this flash settlement. Afghan officials said the Taliban jumped in, trying to capitalize on the rift by offering weapons to both sides. After days of tense negotiations, the Ali Sher Khel staged a protest, and they were taunted by the settlers.

"They said, 'Go home and wear your women's bracelets,' " one protester recalled.

When fighting broke out, it killed 13 people and wounded more than 30 others. The Ali Sher Khel drove the Shublai back into the mountains. "We didn't want to take anything from their homes. We just wanted to burn it all down," said a man who identified himself as Habibullah, a 30-year-old car battery salesman who took part in the fighting.

U.S. military officials said the dispute wasn't necessarily related to the development deal, and they defended the broader Shinwari deal.

In early May, the tribal elders met with Shirzai and demanded that he remove the corrupt district governors serving under him, military officials said. Shirzai asked them for a list of replacement candidates. "It may be rose-colored glasses, but I believe these are the kind of changes that need to occur," George said.

Recently, the feuding branches of the Shinwari agreed to a one-year ceasefire. But relations remain fraught.

"This clash split the Shinwari in two," said Malalai Shinwari, a parliament member. "It will take years and years to rejoin these two tribes together."

Partlow reported from Achin and Jalalabad, Afghanistan; Jaffe from Jalalabad. Special correspondent Javed Hamdard contributed to this report.

[buglerbilly]

How to manage Karzai

By Stephen Biddle

Monday, May 10, 2010

This week's state visit by Afghan President Hamid Karzai almost wasn't going to happen.

The Obama administration, unhappy with Karzai's attempt to pack the Afghan Electoral Commission with supporters willing to ignore voting fraud, briefly held the visit hostage this spring. This striking move also followed Karzai's threat to join the Taliban. In the ensuing brouhaha last month much of Washington wondered, loudly, whether Karzai was an adequate partner.

This is the wrong question.

Local partners are almost never adequate at the outset -- this is why they face insurgencies in the first place. Almost by definition, counterinsurgency implies a problematic host government. If the local leadership were effective already, there would be no insurgency to fight.

Nor is the leader the problem. Americans often want to "fix" things by replacing the leader. As recently as 2006, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was the subject of a similar debate: Was Maliki a suitable partner or so flawed a personality as to require replacement? In Vietnam, the United States decided that Ngo Dinh Diem was too erratic and quietly allowed a coup to remove him. Yet Maliki presided over a major reduction in violence, whereas new management hardly improved the war effort in Vietnam.

The real issue is not whether Karzai is an adequate partner but, rather, how to make his government into one. The answer is to change its incentives.

The United States needs a consistent, balanced program of private sticks and public carrots designed to push Afghan governance gradually toward reform.

U.S. policy since 2001 has oscillated between schizophrenic extremes. The Bush administration saw Hamid Karzai as a hero. From 2001-08, it provided aid but made few demands while President George W. Bush built a personal relationship based on admiration of Karzai's bravery in standing up to the Taliban in 2001. This all-carrot-and-no-stick policy failed, and Afghan governance got worse.

The Obama administration entered office determined to overturn their predecessor's mistakes. This produced stern public demands for reform coupled with threats of withheld benefits and a commitment to early U.S. withdrawal. The attempted public coercion instead caused Karzai to dig in his heels. This was only partly attributable to Karzai's mercurial personality. Afghan politics would push any incumbent to resist such strong-arm tactics; any president who gave in to such ultimatums would look like a puppet of foreign interests. And in a country with Afghanistan's xenophobic political culture, a U.S. policy of public pressure is very likely to increase local resistance to change, whoever is in charge. This policy approximated an all-stick, no-carrot approach that fared little better than the Bush administration's opposite extreme.

The Obama administration is trying to mend its relationship with Karzai. But a return to carrots without sticks would merely replicate past failures.

What is needed is a tack toward the center, with a balance of public incentives and private pressure. The underlying problem is tough enough that neither sticks nor carrots alone will suffice. Afghanistan is misgoverned partly because officials lack skills and resources but largely because they benefit from an unrepresentative distribution of resources. They prefer this, and will not change simply because Americans want reform and offer training and mentoring. An all-carrot approach creates better-trained miscreants with bigger aid budgets to direct to their friends. Carrots must be combined with sticks big enough to change officials' real interest calculus. But threats and demands must be quiet and private, lest they create self-defeating pushback from officials who must resist to avoid looking weak.

In principle the United States enjoys tremendous leverage for an integrated sticks-and-carrots approach. The international community does thousands of things every day in Afghanistan, and the Karzai government depends on this assistance for survival. Any of these things can be a source of leverage if their provision is quietly made contingent on specific reforms. Particular aid programs can be accelerated or slowed; training and mentoring can be expanded or contracted; logistical support can be provided or withheld for particular units at certain places and times; visas can be granted or denied; the possibilities are nearly endless. Adroitly used, they offer the raw material for a powerful realignment of incentives for governance in Afghanistan.

If Karzai's government were more effective, then perhaps such sticks and carrots would be unnecessary. But to paraphrase Donald Rumsfeld, you wage counterinsurgency with the partner you have. To succeed will require changing that partner's incentives for governance -- as it normally does in counterinsurgency. A more balanced, less schizophrenic approach could go a long way in Afghanistan.

The writer is the Roger Hertog senior fellow for defense policy at the Council on Foreign Relations.

[buglerbilly]

Why Pakistan keeps exporting jihad

By Fareed Zakaria

Monday, May 10, 2010

Faisal Shahzad, the would-be terrorist of Times Square, seems to have followed a familiar path. Like many recruits to jihad, he was middle-class, educated, seemingly assimilated -- and then something happened that radicalized him. We may never be sure what made him want to kill innocent men, women and children. But his story shares another important detail with those of many of his predecessors: a connection to Pakistan.

The British government has estimated that 70 percent of the terror plots it has uncovered in the past decade can be traced to Pakistan. That country remains a terrorist hothouse even as jihadism is losing favor elsewhere in the Muslim world. From Egypt to Jordan to Malaysia to Indonesia, radical Islamic groups have been weakened militarily and have lost much of the support they had politically. Why not in Pakistan? The answer is simple: From its founding, the Pakistani government has supported and encouraged jihadi groups, creating an atmosphere that has allowed them to flourish. It appears to have partially reversed course in recent years, but the rot is deep.

For a wannabe terrorist shopping for help, Pakistan is a supermarket. There are dozens of jihadi organizations: Jaish-e-Muhammad, Lashkar-e-Taiba, al-Qaeda, Jalaluddin, Siraj Haqqani's network and Tehrik-e-Taliban. The list goes on. Some of the major ones, such as the Kashmiri separatist group Lashkar-e-Taiba, operate openly via front groups throughout the country. But none seem to have any difficulty getting money and weapons.

The Pakistani scholar-politician Husain Haqqani tells in his brilliant history "Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military" how the government's jihadist connections date to the country's creation as an ideological, Islamic state and the decision by successive governments to use jihad both to gain domestic support and to hurt its perennial rival, India. Describing the military's distinction between terrorists and "freedom fighters," he notes that the problem is systemic. "This duality . . . is a structural problem, rooted in history and a consistent policy of the state. It is not just the inadvertent outcome of decisions by some governments." That Haqqani is now Pakistan's ambassador to Washington adds an ironic twist to the story. (And a sad one, because the elected government he represents appears to have little power. The military has actually gained strength over the past year.)

In recent months Pakistan's government and military have taken tougher actions than ever against terrorists on their soil -- and Pakistani troops have suffered grievously. Yet the generals continue to make a dubious distinction among terrorists. Those who threaten and attack the people of Pakistan have suffered the wrath of the Pakistani army. But then there are groups that threaten and attack only Afghans, Indians and Westerners -- and those groups have largely been left alone.

Consider the tribal area where Faisal Shahzad is said to have trained on his visits to Pakistan: North Waziristan, where the deadliest groups that attack Afghans, Indians and Westerners hole up. Although last year the Pakistani military took the fight to South Waziristan, a haven for groups that have launched attacks inside Pakistan, the generals have refused to go into the North, despite repeated entreaties from the United States and NATO. As far as the Pakistani military is concerned, there's always a compelling reason why now isn't the right time to go there. And the respected Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid, an expert on the Afghan insurgency, recently wrote in The Post that Pakistan continues to have influence with the Afghan Taliban and is using that leverage to force the Kabul government to do its bidding rather than to broker a peace between the Taliban and the Afghan government.

Until the Pakistani military truly takes on a more holistic view of the country's national interests -- one that sees economic development, not strategic gamesmanship against Afghanistan and India, as the key to Pakistan's security -- terrorists will continue to find Pakistan an ideal place to go shopping.

Over the past four decades, much Islamic terrorism has been traced to two countries: Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Both were founded as ideological, Islamic states; the governments sought legitimacy by reinforcing that religious ideology, and that made the countries hothouses of militancy, fundamentalism and jihad. That trend is slowly being reversed in Saudi Arabia, perhaps because King Abdullah could make it happen as the enlightened ruler of an absolute monarchy. It may not be so easy for Pakistan to overcome its jihadist past.

Fareed Zakaria is editor of Newsweek International. His e-mail address is comments@fareedzakaria.com.

[buglerbilly]

From Kalashnikovs to the M-16 -- Afghan Army transitions to NATO weapons

Monday, 10 May 2010 20:27 SSgt Rachel Martinez 657

By Staff Sgt. Rachel Martinez, USAF


Photo by MC1 Christopher Mobley, USN

KABUL – As part of a new course, Afghan National Army soldiers are putting down their Kalashnikovs and AK-47s and picking up M-16 rifles and .50-caliber machine guns.

The NATO basic armorer course is a six-week course designed to familiarize soldiers and teach them basic maintenance on the variety of NATO weapons they can expect to see and use in the field. The first class of students is scheduled to graduate May 15.

The ANA is preparing to transition to the M-16 rifle as the primary duty weapon. With the influx of weapon inventory, familiarization is important. This transition to NATO weapons will benefit the ANA, according to Matt Bullard, HEB International chief technical officer. “They are a better weapon and you can get parts better, so that’s going to be a big help for these guys,” said Bullard.

Bullard is the main mentor for the NATO basic armorer course. During the course, students are taught armor room operations, with focus on control and accountability of weapons. They also learn about the M-9 pistol, M-16 rifle, M203 grenade launcher, M-249 squad automatic weapon, M-240B machine gun and .50-caliber machine gun. The final week of instruction covers former Warsaw Pact weapons.

“The class prepares them pretty good because they’ve never used NATO weapons before until our class,” Bullard added. “They might have held them and touched them, but they’ve never physically broke them down until they got to our class.”

Students are selected for the armor course through their command. During the course of instruction they transition from level-10 operators to level-20 armorers. Mohamad Salem Baba Karkhil is a student in the first NATO armor course. Assigned to the Central Workshop in Kabul for the past four years, he had some experience repairing Russian weapons familiar to the ANA, but said the instruction in NATO weapons was vital.

“This training class was important and useful,” Baba Karkhil said. “We now know how to repair NATO weapons. These are new weapons and modern for Afghanistan – we need to learn how to repair them.”

Bullard teaches the course with the help of Mohamed Anwar Sherzad. Sherzad, a Russian and NATO weapons trainer, has been teaching at the Central Workshop for four years, but only started learning about NATO weapons in the last two years.

“When the American mentor came he taught me and now we are teaching together for the newer students,” said Sherzad.

According to Bullard, the biggest obstacle in teaching the course has been the language barrier, but they seem to have a system that is working well. Each night, Bullard teaches Sherzad what he wants the class to learn. Sherzad then teaches that same lesson the following day. This approach helps to minimize language barrier problems. After an instructional lesson on the designated weapon, students are given practical time to handle the weapon.

“We give a test to see if students get it or not and we have good results,” said Sherzad. “They get it very quick and we don’t need to repeat it again.”

The Central Workshop in Kabul is currently the only location teaching the NATO basic armorer course. Additional training sites will stand up in the near future at the five ANA corps sites, with 27 additional sub-sites.

Photo: Kabul, Afghanistan (May 10, 2010) The first six-week NATO basic armorer course with instruction on all NATO weapons for familiarization and basic maintenance is ending this week. During the sixth week of the course students learn about former Warsaw Pact weapons. Some instructors even learn things form the students during this final week of training. In the future this course will be taught at 32 locations throughout Afghanistan. (Photo by Mass Communications Specialist 1st Class Christopher Mobley/Released)

[buglerbilly]

From The Times May 11, 2010

Nato has only seven months to take Kandahar from the Taleban



Anthony Loyd, Kandahar

The campaign to drive the Taleban out of Kandahar province has until the end of the year to succeed if it is to capitalise on maximum troop numbers and political unity, Nato commanders and Western diplomats told The Times.

“Our mission is to show irreversible momentum by the end of 2010 — that’s the clock I’m using,” Brigadier-General Frederick Hodges, the US Director of Operations in southern Afghanistan, said. “We’ll never have more capacity than we have by late summer 2010. We ’ll never have it any better.”

The joint Nato-Afghan campaign — codenamed Hamkari, which is the Dari word for co-operation — will use the biggest number of troops and police in the country yet. Thousands of Afghan National Army soldiers and paramilitaries are to combine with the existing coalition force in Kandahar as well as additional units from among the 13,000 troops being sent in the second phase of the US surge.

The military strategy involves combining regular US soldiers and special forces with Afghan police and paramilitaries to establish 32 posts around Kandahar city at every access point along the key route through the province. Afghan army units and coalition troops will then attempt to clear the Taleban from the outlying districts of Arghandab, Zhari and Panjwayi.

President Karzai and Western commanders have avoided calling Hamkari an operation and have emphasised its political and administrative focus. Kandahar is the Taleban’s traditional heartland and its population has become disaffected with the nepotism, ineptitude and corruption that have characterised the local government.

“I’m not going to talk about a D-day or an H-hour or even, for that matter, military operations,” said Major-General Nick Carter, the British officer commanding coalition forces in the south. “This is much more about getting the population to feel secure in the hands of its own government and its own security forces so that it then begins to work . . . as an informing population, so that it denies the insurgent the freedom of movement to come in and intimidate and mount ‘spectaculars’.”

The first phase of Hamkari began a fortnight ago and the strategy will include measures such as registering weapons, vehicles, hotels, madrassas and seminaries. Western officials are keen to have a broader range of village and tribal representation in the shuras, or councils, which communicate with officials. They are also keen to bolster the authority of Tooryalai Wesa, the Governor, at the expense of the city’s current strongman, Ahmad Wali Karzai, the half-brother of the President.

Nato commanders estimate that up to 75 per cent of Taleban fighters in Kandahar province, most of whom are concentrated in the three districts targeted by the military campaign, are locals who may reintegrate if they are offered the right incentives. The commanders are also encouraged by the absence of foreign fighters. “We’ve seen no hardcore al-Qaeda links here,” a senior Nato intelligence officer told The Times. “Zero al-Qaeda.”

Yet Nato officers know that they have a tough deadline. By the end of the year troop numbers will decline and Dutch forces will withdraw. In November political attention in Washington will be focused on the midterm elections and critics of the war will remind President Obama of his pledge to start pulling out combat troops in 2011.

“If there’s a change in the game and it looks like we can run the table then Obama will gain some political oxygen,” noted a senior Western diplomat involved closely with the Hamkari campaign. “But if we can’t deliver by Christmas ... people at home will remind the President of the deal [to begin the withdrawal of US combat troops in 2011].”

Apart from the need for evidence of success, Nato planners have several other concerns. Officers note that it took the Afghan Government too long to put ministry level representatives in two districts of Helmand that were cleared of the Taleban during Operation Moshtarak this year, and question how it will fare in Kandahar, which is four times the size.

Although the Western officials are keen for the Taleban fighters to reintegrate, as yet there is no plan from the Government to encourage this. “There has to be a carrot at the end of the stick if these fighters are to reintegrate,” one officer said, “but as yet we don’t see one from Kabul.”

[buglerbilly]

From The Times May 11, 2010

When information hits harder than firepower in military campaigns

Anthony Loyd: Analysis

The success or failure of Hamkari, the coalition’s make-or-break gambit in Kandahar, will define the future of the Afghan war, so some may puzzle over why so much is being given away so early. Won’t revealing information about the forces and the political plan for Kandahar endanger coalition lives and allow the insurgents to develop an informed counter-strategy?

In non-conventional warfare, the information campaign is everything and the psychological effect will be far greater than that of bombs and bullets. There are plenty of precedents for civilians and enemy forces being informed of an army’s intent — not least in Helmand during Operation Moshtarak.

In most cases the objectives are simple: to encourage civilians to leave and prevent innocent casualties. In Kandahar the priorities are more complex but can be decoded easily enough.

Emphasis has been placed by diplomats and commanders on the narrow window of opportunity — between the peak of troop numbers in August and the US midterm elections in November.

This amounts to a message to President Karzai and his government in the following terms: “Don’t fritter away your chances and our soldiers’ lives by wasting this opportunity with more corruption and incompetence.

“This is the best and last chance we have to end the war on favourable terms. We won’t be here forever.”

Hamkari has repeatedly been described as having political rather than military objectives. This is designed to assuage the fears of civilians.

The checkpoints around Kandahar and details of remodelled, inclusive shuras are also in keeping with General Stanley McChrystal’s strategic aim of civilian protection — “you will be guarded and represented” is the idea he is trying to get across.

Details have been released by intelligence officers about al-Qaeda’s presence in southern Afghanistan which is negligible.

Whatever else has gone wrong, in Afghanistan, we are being told, one of the war’s prime objectives has been achieved.

[buglerbilly]

Defence chiefs plan more UK troops for Afghan danger zone

British troops in Sangin are vulnerable to increasingly accurate small arms fire by Taliban-supporting fighters and IEDs

Richard Norton-Taylor guardian.co.uk, Monday 10 May 2010 19.38 BST

Defence chiefs are drawing up plans to reinforce hard-pressed British troops in Sangin, an area they describe as one of the most dangerous in Afghanistan.

The announcement came after a Royal Marine from 40 Commando was killed on Sunday by an explosion near Patrol Base Blenheim, one of 30 bases and checkpoints manned by British forces in Sangin. The soldier was named last night as Corporal Christopher Harrison, 26, from Taunton, Somerset. It was his second posting to southern Afghanistan.

The Sangin valley is an important communications crossroads and commercial area of Helmand province. It is an opium poppy growing area and a centre of the narcotics trade.

Of the 40 British troops killed this year in Afghanistan, nearly half were patrolling in the Sangin district. 3 Rifles, whose battlegroup was based in Sangin, lost an unprecedented 30 men during a six-month Afghan tour which has just ended.

Troops there are vulnerable to increasingly accurate small arms fire by Taliban-supporting fighters as well improvised explosive devices, or IEDs. Royal Marines from 40 Commando were also approached last month by a suicide bomber aged between 12 and 14. The boy killed himself, and a Marine and an interpreter suffered minor injuries.

Afghan forces are supporting British troops in the region, but not in the numbers planned mainly because of the difficulty in recruiting from the local population, defence sources say. British defence officials are also concerned about a lack of skilled Nato troops needed to train the Afghan national army, a shortage which they admit could jeopardise any British or US exit strategy. Nato officials said recently they were seeking at least 500 more military trainers.

The Guardian has been told that when David Cameron visited Afghanistan in December he sent a message via the then-UK ambassador to Kabul, Mark Sedwill, that the party would not criticise the government if it pulled out of areas of Helmand such as Sangin where the army was overstretched. However, there is a growing view among military commanders that more British troops should be deployed in Sangin, reinforced by withdrawing UK soldiers from the area around the Kajaki dam.

Corporal Harrison's wife Rebecca said yesterday: "Even though I knew and fully supported what Chris did as a Royal Marine and the dangers he was facing, I am still broken by his loss … it hurts me beyond words knowing that I will never have my beloved husband by my side ever again and we will never raise the family that we so desperately craved to complete our lives together."

Lt Col Paul James, commander of the 40 Commando Group in Sangin, said Harrison "achieved legendary status amongst his cohort having overcome snakebites in Brunei and delivering rapid and accurate mortar fire support on this, his second deployment to Afghanistan".

[buglerbilly]

Afghanistan's Security Environment (Summary)

(Source: US Government Accountability Office; issued May 5, 2010)

In December 2009, recognizing that the situation in Afghanistan had become more grave since the March 2009 announcement of the U.S. strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, the administration concluded a 10-week review of the strategy's goals and the methods needed to achieve them. In announcing the results of this review, the President reaffirmed the core strategic goal of disrupting, dismantling, and eventually defeating extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan and preventing them from threatening the United States and its allies in the future.

To meet this goal, the President announced his decision to rapidly deploy an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan. In addition, he pledged a "surge" of civilian experts to help enhance the capacity of Afghan government institutions and assist in the rehabilitation of key economic sectors.

Since the President's December 2009 announcement, about 16,000 of the additional U.S. troops have gradually deployed to Afghanistan--including about 10,000 as of March 2010 and approximately another 6,000 since that time--and the number of U.S. government civilians present in country has grown by about 200.

In February 2010, in what senior Department of Defense (DOD) officials have described as the first step in a prolonged effort to break the momentum of the insurgency where it has been the strongest--southern Afghanistan--U.S., coalition, and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) launched a campaign to clear insurgent safe havens in the central Helmand river valley.

According to DOD officials, the intent of these operations was to pave the way for reconstitution of the Afghan government in Helmand province, and Defense has indicated that similar operations will follow in Kandahar province. We previously reported on security conditions in Afghanistan in November 2009.

This report provides updated information on (1) the security situation as gauged by trends in enemy-initiated attacks; (2) challenges for U.S. reconstruction efforts posed by security conditions; and (3) recent increases in U.S., coalition, and Afghan troops and U.S. civilian presence. To address these objectives, we incorporated information from our past and continuing work and analyzed updated data on attacks. According to Defense Intelligence Agency officials, the data they report on enemy-initiated attacks represent a reliable and consistent source of information that can be used to identify trends in enemy activity and the overall security situation in Afghanistan.

DOD attack data as of March 2010 show that the pattern of enemy-initiated attacks in Afghanistan has remained seasonal in nature, generally peaking from June through September each year and then declining during the winter months. While attacks have continued to fluctuate seasonally, the annual attack "peak" (high point) and "trough" (low point) for each year since September 2005 have surpassed the peak and trough, respectively, for the preceding year.

In November 2009, we reported that while U.S. and international development projects in Afghanistan had made some progress, deteriorating security complicated such efforts to stabilize and rebuild the country.

Since that time, the lack of a secure environment has continued to challenge reconstruction and development efforts. Some specific effects of these security challenges are (1) delayed programs and increased costs, (2) hampered progress of some counternarcotics operations; and (3) limited ability to conduct oversight of ongoing programs.

According to the U.S. Central Command, as of April 2010, there were reportedly almost 84,000 U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan--a result of the gradual increase in U.S. force levels from the 68,000 present in country at the time of the President's December 2009 commitment to deploy additional troops to target the insurgency, secure population centers, and train the ANSF. Overall, the number of U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan is expected to increase from 68,000 to about 98,000 once all 30,000 additional troops are deployed.

In addition to the ongoing expansion of U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, the United States has also significantly increased its civilian presence in Afghanistan. State's Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy identifies additional civilian expertise as a key element of stabilization efforts in Afghanistan. Overall, the total U.S. government civilian presence grew from about 360 in January 2009 to approximately 1,000 as of March 2010, including an increase of about 200 civilians since December 2009.

Click here for the full report (12 pages in PDF format) on the GAO website.

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10613r.pdf

-ends-

[buglerbilly]

‘18 Missiles,’ 14 Dead in Latest Drone Attack

By Noah Shachtman May 11, 2010 | 8:07 am



There was a massive drone attack in Pakistan today — one involving multiple unmanned aircraft and “up to 18 American missiles,” according to the Associated Press. 14 people are dead.

This second robotic strike in three days is the latest sign that the American drone war in Pakistan has reached a new peak. There have been 34 reported attacks in Pakistan in the first 19 weeks on 2010. That’s almost as many as the 36 strikes carried out in all of 2008. And these strikes are no longer against specific, named terrorists. Signs of militant activity are enough to bring in the drones.

The latest target, according to AFP: a training camp “run by militants attached to Taliban-linked Afghan warlord Hafiz Gul Bahadur, who is reputed to control up to 2,000 fighters who attack U.S.-led forces over the border in Afghanistan.” CNN’s national security desk wonders whether the strike is in “retaliation” for the attempted Times Square bombing — which was allegedly inspired, at least in part, by the drone attacks in Pakistan.

American Reaper drones typically fly with four weapons stations. Each of those stations can carry two, 100-pound Hellfire missiles. Last month, however, the Washington Post reported that the CIA had begun outfitting their unmanned attackers with smaller, 35-pound glide bombs. So it’s tough to tell exactly how many drones were involved in the latest strike.

In Washington, there’s increased debate about the consequences of the drone strikes — whether they’re inspiring more militants than they are eliminating. Meanwhile, American officials are sending mixed messages to their Pakistani counterparts about whether local forces should join the drones in assaults on the militant haven of North Waziristan. On Sunday, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warned of “very severe consequences” if a successful terror attack in the U.S. was traced back to Pakistan. Yesterday, an unnamed U.S. military official told CNN: “We believe right now the Pakistanis are doing everything they can.” Which means it’s up to the drones to keep up the attack.

[Photo: Noah Shachtman]

Read More http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/05/18-missiles-14-dead-in-latest-drone-attack/#more-24645#ixzz0ndNiMWSv

[buglerbilly]

Our Pal Karzai Kicks Charities Out of Afghanistan

By Nathan Hodge May 11, 2010 | 2:54 pm



Afghan President Hamid Karzai is in Washington this week, and corruption is expected to be at the top of the agenda. Back at home, Afghan authorities have already launched their own crackdown — aimed, in part, at foreigners.

Reuters reports today from Kabul that the Afghan government has closed down nearly two dozen international aid groups and charities working in the country for failing to provide proper documentation and paperwork to the government. IRIN reports that the groups hit by the ban include Save the Children Japan, Afghan Children’s Relief Organization, International Dispensary Association and Samaritan’s Purse International. In addition, several dozen 152 Afghan non-governmental organizations had their licenses revoked.

It’s not clear if this is a populist push — Karzai has blamed “foreigners” for encouraging electoral fraud during Afghanistan’s flawed 2009 presidential election – or part of a genuine effort to close non-profits that aren’t doing what they are supposed to do. But it comes after a series of raids by Kabul’s vice squad that targeted expatriate watering holes and set the capital’s international community on edge.

Private security firms also seem to be in the crosshairs. Early this week, the Afghan government barred two private security firms after separate incidents in which hired guards shot and killed civilians on a dangerous southern highway. One of the firms, Compass Integrated Security Solutions, maintains offices in Sudan, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan and Iraqi Kurdistan; a second, Watan Risk Management, describes itself as “Afghan owned and British managed.”

Again, it’s not clear if the move represents the beginning of a broader crackdown on expatriate security firms, or a genuine effort to reduce on civilian casualties. In the past, the presence of private security firms in Afghanistan has been a controversial issue, but aid agencies, private firms and the military rely on private guard services to escort convoys around the country.

Karzai is traveling to Washington with a large delegation of cabinet ministers. The talks kicked off last night with a formal dinner hosted by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and attended by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and National Security Advisor James Jones. The administration has been careful to strike a cordial tone. In a briefing yesterday, White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs described Karzai’s administration as “our partner in this battle against al Qaeda and its extremist allies.”

It’s a sharp contrast to public statements just a few months ago. Back in December, when asked if the new government reflected Karzai’s commitment to fighting corruption, State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley gave only a tepid endorsement.

“Our judgment is not universal regarding every single minister that he’s announced,” he said. “We have said to President Karzai, quite specifically, that we remain concerned about the performance of his government … and we will continue our process of certifying very specific ministries and channeling our assistance through those ministries that we think are being run well and address the concerns that we have for performance and corruption.”

[PHOTO: U.S. Department of Defense]

Read More http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/05/our-pal-karzai-kicks-charities-out-of-afghanistan/#more-24673#ixzz0nfbd9XJl

[buglerbilly]

VBCIs Embark for Afghanistan

(Source: French Army; issued May 11, 2010)

(Issued in French only; unofficial translation by defense-aerospace.com)

The Belfort-based 35th Infantry Regiment, the first French Army unit to convert to the new Véhicule de Combat de l’Infanterie (VBCI, or infantry combat vehicle), and which subsequently carried out the vehicle’s operational evaluations, will deploying two platoons to Afghanistan this summer.

The ten VBCIs embarked on May 10, at the Toulon naval base, on the MS Eider, a commercial vessel chartered by the Ministry of Defense. The ship is due to sail on May 12 and is due to arrive in theater in the early summer.

The two VBCI sections will be integrated into the Joint Tactical Groups operated by the 21st Marine Infantry Regiment (Fréjus) and the 126th Infantry Regiment (Brive), and respectively deployed in the Kapisa and Surobi regions of Afghanistan.

-ends-

[buglerbilly]

U.S., Afghan Defense Leaders Agree to Long-Term Partnership

(Source: U.S Department of Defense; issued May 11, 2010)

WASHINGTON --- Senior U.S. and Afghan officials today agreed to explore ways to broaden and deepen defense cooperation between the two countries and establish a long-term partnership for the future, Pentagon Press Secretary Geoff Morrell said.
Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates today hosted Afghan Defense Minister Abdul Rahim Wardak, Interior Minister Mohammad Hanif Atmar and Afghan Intelligence Chief Amrullah Saleh during a 90-minute Pentagon meeting.

The meeting is part of a series of discussions between U.S. and Afghan officials built around Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s visit here.

“This is a very important week for our partnership, for our relationship,” Gates told the group at the top of the meeting.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Navy Adm. Mike Mullen, Michele Flournoy, the undersecretary of defense for policy; Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan; and Mike Vickers, the assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict, joined Gates and the senior Afghan officials in the meeting.

Morrell said the meeting went well and there was broad agreement among the parties on the way forward in Afghanistan. “This is about, how do we build an enduring, long-term partnership with Afghanistan,” he said.

The two countries agreed to begin a regular, high-level defense dialogue, Morrell said. Details such as how often meetings are held and who the players are, he said, are yet to be worked out, but the agreement signifies the United States’ concern for Afghanistan and its desire to remain involved with that country.

“‘The relationship must be an enduring one; it is in our mutual interests to do this,’” Morrell quoted Gates as saying.

The officials discussed how the relationship should evolve. Gates believes that the relationship between the United States and Afghanistan must be enduring and not predicated just on the need to fight the current war. The United States, Morrell said, stands ready to continue training, equipping and advising Afghan security forces, and in assisting in counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts long after the current conflict has been decided.

The United States wants to reassure the Afghan government that it “is not going to repeat the mistakes of the late ’80s and early ’90s, when we turned our back [on Afghanistan and Pakistan] and walked away from the relationships,” Morrell said. “I think there is clearly … a trust deficit … that clearly needs to be addressed.”

The group also talked about regional security and the evolving trilateral relationship among Afghanistan, Pakistan and the United States. They discussed developments of the Afghan security forces. Gates noted the success the Afghan security forces have had with increasing their numbers.

“Obviously, there are quality issues that need to be addressed in the long term,” Morrell said.

The group also discussed the transition of security responsibility to Afghan forces. They discussed the July 2011 date that President Barack Obama has set to begin that transition.

“Everybody was in agreement that transition was a process, not an event,” Morrell said. “July 2011 will be the beginning of a conditions-based process. But even as that process evolves, we will enjoy a robust military-to-military partnership well into the future.”

-ends-

[buglerbilly]

Military Expands ‘Obama’s Gitmo’ in Afghanistan

By Nathan Hodge May 12, 2010 | 12:13 pm



The U.S. military is getting set to expand its controversial detention camp at Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan — just as new reports of a “black jail” inside the facility are surfacing.

In a solicitation issued today, the U.S. military put out a request for a contractor to build three new detention housing units next to the existing facility, known formally as the Afghan National Detention Facility at Parwan (Bagram is in the southwest corner of Parwan Province). As of last September, 645 prisoners were held there.

The cost of the project — which will include construction of one special housing unit and two detention housing units — is projected to run between $10 million and $25 million. The contractor will have approximately nine months to complete the entire project.

Presumably, these new buildings are in addition to Bagram’s separate and previously clandestine detention facility, revealed by the International Committee of the Red Cross yesterday. Nine former prisoners say they were abused there, according to the BBC.

Timing here is key: The jail is supposed to be handed over to Afghan control of the place, sometimes called “Obama’s Guantanamo,” sometime next year. (Afghan president Hamid Karzai would like tomake the hand-off even earlier.) Afghan and U.S. officials have signed an agreement to hand control of the Parwan facility to the Afghan ministry of defense, and eventually to its ministry of justice. The transfer may help resolve an issue that has caused a fair amount of controversy for the U.S. military.

Back in 2002, two Bagram detainees died in a prisoner-abuse scandal. And last year, The New York Times reported the existence of a “black jail” at Bagram that was kept off limits to the Red Cross. The military has maintained that there is no separate facility at Bagram: In a bloggers’ roundtable earlier this year, Navy Vice Adm. Robert Harward emphasized that there were “no black jails” at Bagram, but he did clarify that there was a short period of detention at undisclosed “field-detention sites,” where Afghan and U.S. authorities hold individuals to determine who they are and whether they have any actionable intelligence.

“We don’t disclose where those field-detention sites are, because of operation security,” Harward said. “They would be targeted. They’d be at great risk. At those field-detention sites, they’re held for a very short period, to determine who they are, their classification, immediately actionable intelligence. And then, from that point, they’re moved to our detention facility in Parwan.”

It’s worth emphasizing here that humane treatment of prisoners is considered a cornerstone of effective counterinsurgency. The idea is to prevent further radicalization of detainees, and turning detention facilities into recruiting centers for the insurgency.

In the roundtable, Harward borrowed a phrase from counterinsurgency guru David Kilcullen. The goal is to prevent the “accidental guerrillas” from filling up the facility.

“If that village says, yeah, he’s a bad guy, we’ve just gotten additional intelligence on him and better understanding of the individual,” said Harward. “The village may say, hey, he’s a bad kid but he could be good. Well, then maybe he does need a program where we teach him to read or write, and a short incarceration would benefit him and convince him not to be the jihadist, that he was the accidental guerrilla; that there’s options and purpose for him in Afghan society outside of that, and maybe we can give him some skills that will help him.”

[PHOTO: U.S. Department of Defense]

Read More http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/05/military-expanding-obamas-gitmo-in-afghanistan/#more-24693#ixzz0nlCtP93w

[buglerbilly]

Pakistani officials know where Osama bin Laden hiding: Hillary Clinton

Hillary Clinton, the US Secretary of State, has accused Pakistani government officials of knowing where Osama bin Laden and leaders of the Afghan Taliban are hiding.

Rob Crilly, in Islamabad

Published: 5:14PM BST 11 May 2010


Osama bin Laden: Hillary Clinton claims Pakistani officials know where he is hiding Photo: AFP/Getty Images

Western officials have repeatedly questioned the determination of Pakistan to tackle militants, a problem which has taken on added significance following the arrest of Faisal Shahzad, accused of trying to detonate a bomb in Times Square.

American officials believe his plot was backed by the Pakistan Taliban increasing pressure on the Islamabad government to strike against the armed groups.

Mrs Clinton said: "I'm not saying that they're at the highest levels, but I believe that somewhere in this government are people who know where Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda is, where Mullah Omar and the leadership of the Afghan Taliban is, and we expect more co-operation to help us bring to justice, capture or kill those who attacked us on 9/11."

Her comments, are the latest sign of difficult relations between the two countries in the wake of the Times Square bomb plot.

Last week a documentary claimed that bin Laden was alive and well and living in Tehran, where he was learning falconry. However, during a visit to the US, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the Iranian president, responded by saying the al-Qaeda leader was in fact hiding in Washington.

American drone aircraft pounded targets in Pakistan's North Waziristan region, an al-Qaeda and Taliban sanctuary.

Pakistani security officials said at least 14 militants were killed.

It was the third missile strike since the failed attempt to explode a car bomb in Times Square last weekend.

The presence of militant havens has become a headache for Pakistan, which at different times has used Islamist groups to further its foreign policy.

Its military and intelligence services helped set up and equip the Afghan Taliban. They also have backed Jihadi groups in Kashmir fighting Indian forces.

Farhatullah Babar, spokesman for the President of Pakistan, dismissed Mrs Clinton's claims.

"If there were officials who knew where bin Laden was, I can assure you that he would not be a free man," he said.

"The fact is that at the moment we don't even know if he's alive or dead."

The government in Islamabad has insisted it is trying to tackle its home-grown militants. Officials point out the Pakistani civilians and military personnel bear the brunt of attacks, with hundreds of deaths each year.

[buglerbilly]

'Wallace and Gromit' patrol the streets of Kabul

A People In Defence news article

12 May 10

Lance Corporal Andy Wallace and his patrol dog Gromit from the working dogs section based at Camp Bastion in Helmand province are currently helping to increase security on the streets of Kabul.


Lance Corporal Andy Wallace and patrol dog Gromit out on patrol in the suburbs of Kabul
[Picture: Squadron Leader Dee Taylor, Crown Copyright/MOD 2010]

LCpl Wallace, usually based in Sennelager, Germany, with 105 Military Working Dog Support Unit, Royal Army Veterinary Corps, and his dog Gromit will be deployed to Kabul for a few weeks before returning to Camp Bastion.

Their current role sees them leaving Camp Souter in Kabul every morning as part of a security patrol and going out onto the streets to reassure the local Afghans that the area is safe.

LCpl Wallace said:

"Both Gromit and I love getting out. The local people are always glad to see us. Well, they're glad to see me!"

LCpl Wallace explains that Gromit is not necessarily the cuddly character that his name suggests - he's trained to be a protection dog:

"If ever a crowd becomes too rowdy or riotous, Gromit is brought in to calm things down.

"He can be fairly aggressive when he needs to be. Most people don't mess with Gromit," LCpl Wallace added.


Lance Corporal Andy Wallace and patrol dog Gromit out on patrol in the suburbs of Kabul
[Picture: Squadron Leader Dee Taylor, Crown Copyright/MOD 2010]

LCpl Wallace was posted to Afghanistan after he completed his dog handling course in June last year following two tours of Iraq as a medic.

He and two-year-old Gromit have been teamed up for the last six weeks and will see out the six-month tour in Afghanistan together:

"We have made a real bond," LCpl Wallace said. "Gromit is so protective of me and won't let anyone else come near.

"We spend most of every day together, be it on patrols talking to the local people to see if they have any concerns and picking up ideas for developing the community, or on guarding duties.

"You never feel lonely when you have a companion like Gromit but I do miss my family and my girlfriend Zoe."

Also patrolling on the streets of Kabul are Private Laura Foxon, from 102 Military Working Dog Support Unit, Royal Army Veterinary Corps, and her vehicle search dog, four-year-old Springer Spaniel JJ.


Private Laura Foxon with vehicle search dog JJ in Kabul
[Picture: Squadron Leader Dee Taylor, Crown Copyright/MOD 2010]

As a search dog, JJ can check up to 30 vehicles a day, sniffing for ammunition, explosives or unusual scents.

Private Foxon has been in the Army for three years and says that JJ is much less intimidating than Gromit:

"We are definitely the friendlier pair!" she laughs.

LCpl Wallace and Gromit keep watch as Private Foxon and JJ check all around some vehicles:

"We've not had any finds as yet, but JJ is very thorough," notes Private Foxon.

Shortly, both teams will go back to Camp Bastion in southern Afghanistan where they will patrol the perimeter and keep safe the thousands of troops living there.

[buglerbilly]

Jordan Says It Trained 2,500 Afghan Special Forces

AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE

Published: 12 May 2010 11:27

AMMAN - Jordan said on May 12 it has trained 2,500 members of Afghanistan's special forces but added that it was still studying a request from NATO to train members of the Afghan police.

"Jordan has trained 2,500 members of the Afghan special forces. This was in the past. The group has completed its training and there are no trainees now," Information Minister Nabil Sharif told a news conference.

A Jordanian military source said the training took place three years ago but declined to give details.

Asked about training for the Afghan police, Sharif said: "The kingdom hasn't yet decided on NATO's request."

Jordan announced it had been asked to conduct the training after a visit to Amman in March by NATO secretary general Anders Fogh Rasmussen.

Jordan's special forces chief Brigadier Ali Jaradat has said in published remarks that 1,500 servicemen, including anti-terror forces, from Afghanistan and Iraq have received training at the $200 million King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Centre, which was inaugurated in May last year.

"Troops from most of the Arab countries and other states have received training at the centre," he was quoted as saying.

"The Americans and Europeans took part ... Most of the troops serving in Afghanistan received training at the centre before they went there."

Jordan acknowledged it had a counterterrorism role in Afghanistan after the death in a January suicide bombing of a senior intelligence officer, who was also a member of the royal family.

His death along with seven U.S. Central Intelligence Agency personnel spotlighted for the first time Jordan's role in the international coalition in the war-hit country.

[buglerbilly]

iPhone in the Zone: Yes We Can!

by christian on May 12, 2010



One of the most ubiquitous pieces of kit we’ve seen here so far — of the personal kind, that is — are cell phones. Everyone’s got them at the bigger FOBs since there’s pretty good cell coverage near the major cities. What a revolution in connectivity when you’re deployed for a year…you can talk to loved ones every day if you want. It’s a long way from the snail mail only comms of just 20 years ago.

Sure there are tons of basic cells clasped in the troops’ hands. But there are also some iPhones here and there sprinkled in with the Motorolas and T-Mobiles — including yours truly.

The key is to get a sim card linked to the local network so your calls are cheap (free if you receive a call) or to just buy a local cell phone altogether. But how to get around the notoriously draconian rules governing the use of iPhones and its sealed system?

I chatted with a young Sailor assigned to ISAF HQ in Kabul who was waiting in the pax terminal to deliver some radios to a unit in Bagram about this issue since he was sporting an iPhone. He said that he just used a jail break program to open up his iPhone to other networks and swapped out the AT&T card with a local Roshan network one. He assured me the card swap didn’t mess up the phone and that a menacing mug of Steve Jobs didn’t auto launch on his desktop when he tried to sync telling him he was a bad boy and nuking his phone to smithereens.

I know this may sound obvious, but some might be reasonably worried about tinkering with their beloved iPhones and swapping in a very foreign sim card to make cheaper calls. Well this guy says it’s no sweat at all and that when you replace your old AT&T card, all it does is restore the phone to factory fresh (you gotta re-install the playlists, movies and apps).

So for all you deployers out there thinking of leaving home your iPhone and doing without your SISiPhone shot timer or Knights Armament Bullet Flight app in The Box, think again. You can bring the Apple wunderfon with you and still get a daily sitrep from CINC House while you’re calculating how fast you can make those 700 meter shots.

Read more: http://kitup.military.com/#ixzz0nlMwOaVa

[buglerbilly]

Afghanistan's opium output goes up in smoke

As the pink poppy fields of southern Afghanistan yield their sticky harvest, opium production in the country that supplies the world with heroin is set to fall, farmers and officials say.

By Lynne O'Donnell in Kabul, for AFP

Published: 9:48AM BST 13 May 2010


Poor harvest: the amount of opium produced in the poppy fields of Afghanistan has been affected by fungus Photo: AFP/GETTY IMAGES

That's good news for the fight against the multi-billion-dollar drugs trade but it could be bad news for Afghan farmers struggling to feed their families as the war against Taliban insurgents and drugs gangs escalates.

"This year we had less poppy cultivation, which I think was because of our public awareness campaign which we launched before cultivation started," said Gul Mohammad, head of the counter-narcotics department of Kandahar province.

Farmers in the southern provinces of Kandahar and Helmand, the source of around 90 percent of the world's opium, agreed the harvest will fall this year.

The farmers and other experts cited high rainfall in some areas, drought in others, free seeds for alternatives such as wheat and good prices for food crops, and a mysterious disease withering poppies in some areas.

While some farmers have reportedly accused the United States and Britain of spraying their crops with chemicals, the UN's Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) said disease was the likely culprit.

Tests by the interior ministry were inconclusive and more were being carried out, said the agency's representative in Kabul, Jean-Luc Lemahieu, adding that "plagues, pests, blight" had hit Afghanistan's poppy crop in 2002 and 2006.

"Natural phenomenon cannot be excluded, as happens to wheat, corn, apples. It is part of nature," Lemahieu said.

Antonio Maria Costa, head of the UNODC, told the BBC that Afghanistan's 2010 opium output could fall by up to 25 per cent, thanks to the disease, a fungus that could have infected about half of the total poppy crop.

Bilal, a farmer in Helmand's Nad Ali district, said the disease had drastically cut his opium output.

"We are in the very last days of the harvest, maybe in two or three more days we'll be done. We'll have less output this year," he said. "I don't know what the disease is but we'll have little output (as a result)."

UNODC said opium output was down by 10 per cent in 2009 to 6,900 tonnes, but yield rose 15 per cent because farmers extracted more opium per bulb.

Production far outstripped annual world demand of 5,000 tonnes, it said, with stockpiles of opium estimated at 10,000 tonnes as cartels hoarded in an effort to push up prices that had fallen by 30 per cent in a year.

Stockpiles were equal to two years' supply of heroin for addicts, or three years of morphine for medical use, it said.

Lemahieu said it was too early to say if 2010 output would be lower than last year's - making it the third consecutive annual fall - but yields were likely to be affected.

Stockpiles had kept opium and heroin prices artificially high, which could encourage Afghan farmers to continue to plant poppies, he said, adding that the price of alternative cash crops, from almonds to wheat, would also be a factor.

The impact of the conflict between insurgents - who often work with drugs gangs to protect crops and distribution routes - and Western-backed government forces would also influence farmers, he said.

Afghans would plant whatever earned most and the instability of war could see them favour the "one sure way of safe-guarding against an insecure future," he said.

Marjah, a major poppy-producing region in Helmand, was targeted in a military campaign in February that aimed to push out the Taliban, who were acting as enforcers for the drugs gangs.

Afghanistan's opium industry is worth up to three billion dollars a year, supplying Russia, where authorities say it kills between 30,000 and 40,000 addicts a year, and Europe.

Lemahieu said about 150 million dollars funds the insurgency, widely seen as based on ideology but fast becoming a militia for the cartels with tenuous links to the religious extremists who founded the Taliban.

A recent report by the independent Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit said the Taliban were "increasingly seen as synonymous with drug traffickers".

But it added: "There is a growing belief in the south that those working for the government are more actively involved in the trade in narcotics than the Taliban."

[buglerbilly]

Obama meets with Afghan President Hamid Karzai at the White House

By Scott Wilson

Washington Post Staff Writer

Thursday, May 13, 2010

President Obama and his Afghan counterpart, Hamid Karzai, appeared side by side Wednesday in a stiff, choreographed effort to demonstrate that they have set aside differences over how to prosecute the war in Afghanistan.

Both acknowledged that the war is likely to worsen in the months ahead as U.S. troops push into insurgent strongholds.

But the events at the White House, starting in the Oval Office and concluding with a private moment between presidents after lunch in the Cabinet Room, were as much about shoring up the symbolism of a sometimes-troubled partnership as they were about the substance of how to fight the war.

Although there were few flourishes of warmth between the men, both Obama and Karzai appear to have gotten what they sought from the Afghan president's extended visit -- a chance to clear the air after weeks of recriminations and public acknowledgments, delivered by each leader in unusually personal terms, of the political difficulties the other faces in maintaining support for the war at home.

Obama talked about his moral stake in protecting Afghan civilians, and Karzai reflected on his visit with a badly wounded American soldier at Walter Reed Army Medical Center the previous day.

"We are in a campaign against terrorism together," Karzai said at a news conference held in the ornate East Room of the White House. "And definitely days have come in which we have had differences of opinion, and definitely days in the future will come in which we have differences of opinion. But the relationship between the two governments and the two nations is strong and well-rooted."

On substance, Obama told reporters he believes the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy is proceeding on schedule, reaffirming his intention to begin withdrawing U.S. forces from the country in July 2011. He also endorsed Karzai's plan to begin peeling off disaffected Taliban fighters in a peace conference later this month, saying that an Afghan-led "political component" is essential to the overall strategy.

Karzai, who in a recent fit of pique with the United States threatened to join the Taliban, came to Washington in part to secure Obama's blessing for his "reintegration" plan, though a longer-term approach for dealing with Taliban leaders remains unclear. Addressing U.S. concerns over who would qualify for amnesty, Karzai said he is focusing on the "thousands" of insurgents who are not fighting for ideological reasons or against U.S. long-term interests.

'Important months'

The visit comes ahead of an intensive several months of political and military initiatives in Afghanistan that U.S. officials say could determine the success or failure of Obama's surge strategy.

Later this month, Karzai plans to convene the first peace conference to draw out casually committed Taliban foot soldiers, followed in the summer by the Kabul Conference, which will bring together countries that provide military and financial support to the Afghanistan war effort.

At the same time, the U.S. military will begin its push into Kandahar, the heart of Taliban control. The success of such military operations, Obama said, would make it far easier for Karzai to negotiate from a position of strength with Taliban fighters.

"We think these are several extremely important months," said a senior administration official involved in Afghanistan policy, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal thinking on the issue. "This meeting was a way to make sure we're coordinated and on the same page as this period gets going."

Rehabilitating the partnership with Karzai is also important politically for Obama, who went against many in his own party in deciding to send an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan last fall. About half of them have now arrived, with the rest scheduled to land by the end of the summer, bringing the total number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan to about 100,000.

The military operations are designed to clear Taliban strongholds, making way for the Afghan government to take control. But Obama's senior advisers have disagreed sharply over whether Karzai is a reliable and effective partner in the U.S.-led war effort.

Unified message

Before this week's visit, Obama warned his team that a unified message of support for the prideful Afghan president was essential to the relationship. On Wednesday, he said that "our job is to be a good friend and to be frank with President Karzai in saying here's where we think we've got to put more effort."

The day began with a relatively large Oval Office meeting that included Vice President Biden, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry and four other senior advisers.

Senior administration officials described the meeting as a constructive appraisal of security operations and government reforms, as well as a discussion of the U.S.-Afghan relationship after July 2011. It also touched on issues particularly important to Karzai's immediate domestic political standing, including a U.S. pledge to turn over control of detention operations to the Afghan government and the administration's concern over Afghan civilian casualties.

"When there is a civilian casualty, that is not just a political problem for me," Obama said. "I am ultimately accountable, just as General McChrystal is accountable, for somebody who is not on the battlefield who got killed. And that is something I have got to carry with me."

After the meeting, Obama's senior advisers on Afghanistan filed into the East Room and filled the front row of seats set up for the joint news conference, an event Obama has held only rarely with visiting heads of state. Karzai wore his customary dark blue robes and hat, Obama a dark suit and pale blue tie. There was a tense formality to the event with each leader ostentatiously emphasizing the health of the U.S.-Afghan partnership, while calling past differences a sign of candor between close friends.

"A lot of them were simply overstated," Obama said of what he called "perceived differences" that emerged most recently after his late March visit to Kabul.

For his part, Karzai spoke about his visit to Walter Reed as a way of underscoring his country's "deep, heartfelt gratitude" toward the United States.

"It was a very difficult moment for me, Mr. President, to meet with a young man -- a very, very young man -- who had lost two arms and legs," Karzai said.

Biden hosted a dinner for Karzai on Wednesday evening, and on Thursday, the Afghan president is scheduled to take a long walk with Clinton -- the administration official he perhaps trusts more than any other.

[buglerbilly]

The Hardcore Insurgent Kit

by christian on May 13, 2010



We were fortunate enough to sit in on a brief today with the 3rd Brigade Combat Team staff and other government agencies who gave a “one over the world” of the battle space we’re covering here in this section of RC-East.

They call it P2K — which stands for Paktia, Paktika and Khost.

One of the interesting bits of intel is how the command here is able to distinguish the difference between local insurgents, known here as “anti-Afghan Forces,” or AAF, based on their equipment.

The harcore fighters, who come primarily from the training camps and madraasas controlled by Jalaluddin Haqqani’s son Saraj just over the border in Pakistan, are moving across the border in well organized, platoon-sized groups of 20-40 men and sporting brand new equipment. A high-level BCT source said these guys are wearing new tennis shoes, as opposed to the cheapo rubber sandals of locals, donning full-on chest rigs, packs, newer weapons and sporting high-end, military-style field jackets.

US forces here aren’t trying to plug the nearly 300 mile border with Pakistan in their AO. Instead they’re raiding where the bad guys lay up in transit to other battlefields throughout the country, hitting them at mosques and compounds where they rest and refit before moving on.

On one raid, US troops killed a bunch of Haqqani fighters and found about 30 high-end sleeping bags at their hide. A source told us these sleeping bags are no-joke mountaineering bags bought for high altitudes and warmth, rather than the chintzy blankets most locals use. I’m sure these guys can’t afford Arc’teryx or Patagonia, but they’re clearly moving up on the level of supply through their own version of SysCom — which speaks to the fact that they’re getting the funds to kit up for a fight.

Read more: http://kitup.military.com/#ixzz0nr1jzfeQ

[buglerbilly]

From The Times May 14, 2010

Mysterious ‘White Taleban’ strike fear in village hearts



Tom Coghlan, Forward Operating Base Lane, Zabul

As they got to the crest of the hill the US patrol stopped in their tracks, astonished at the scene below. In the river was a group of men, one soldier said, “just kinda frolicking about”.

For several minutes each side contemplated the other in silence. “There were about 15 of them,” said Specialist Tom Weaver, 24. “At first I thought it was some of our Navy Seals” — US special forces who are encouraged to grow beards. “They saw us and they didn’t really run away. Some just stayed and watched us.”

The men had long beards and long hair, in some cases below their shoulders, quite unlike the local style. They were shirtless and wore only Western-style shorts, a degree of nakedness alien, even offensive, to Afghan culture. But their most remarkable feature was their skin colour. They were white.

Foreign fighters remain a rarity in the Afghan war — Nato commanders insist that Kandahar, the focus of the next big campaign, is all but free of them — but Zabul is one area in which there have been consistent reports of their presence, infiltrating from Pakistan’s Waziristan province, a few days’ walk across the border.

“We’ve had reports of Arabs, Uzbeks and Chechens,” says Lieutenant-Colonel David Oclander, commander of the 1-508th Parachute Infantry Regiment of 82nd Airborne Division. “We believe there is a training camp in the Larzab Bowl” — 30 miles north of Forward Operating Base (FOB) Lane.

The identity of the white militants is a mystery. One local man with memories of the Russian invasion has told the Americans that they speak Russian, which could make them Chechens.

These are not the only ominous comings and goings. Until recently FOB Lane — a clutch of plywood buildings, watchtowers and galvanised steel walls overlooked by jagged peaks — was a quiet corner of a largely forgotten province, but in the past month it has been the scene of an increased level of Taleban activity, centred on the arrival of a group of white fighters said by locals to number about 100.

This is the time of year that always brings an increase in Taleban activity but the changing tempo of enemy movements around FOB Lane has been dramatic. “This place was dead till last month,” said Staff Sergeant Matthew Chambers, 28, the senior NCO for 3rd Platoon. At dusk on Saturday three 107mm rockets fell around the perimeter of the base without causing casualties.

It was the ninth such attack in 30 days. US spotters saw the firing point of the last rocket and two minutes later a distant hillside was splashed with fire and smoke as they responded with high explosive and white phosphorus mortar rounds.

On Monday red tracer fire arced back and forth after dark as an Afghan Army convoy moving up the valley was ambushed a mile or two from Lane. Ten days earlier the base was subjected to a two-hour attack from the surrounding hills by about 40 gunmen; it had the feel of an attack designed to test defences and probe for weaknesses and response times. Several other firefights have taken place along the Arghandab Valley, running southwest into Kandahar province.

Despite its remote location FOB Lane sits across a key infiltration route into Kandahar, where Nato forces are making final preparations for the largest offensive of the war. With reports of mysterious foreigners and a rise in Taleban activity, the key question for Western commanders is whether the insurgents will put up a fight in Kandahar or simply move elsewhere — such as Zabul.

“My gut instinct is that the Taleban won’t have the ability to oppose Nato directly in Kandahar,” Lieutenant-Colonel Oclander said. “It is more likely that they will shift to areas where the coalition is not.”

That could well mean Zabul, a grindingly poor and almost wholly illiterate desert backwater — “not particularly relevant to the Government of Afghanistan”, said Lieutenant-Colonel Oclander “but very relevant to the Taleban as a place of movement, training and command”. The Nato presence in this province is less than 2,000 strong.

The commotion caused by the arrival of the new fighters is being felt not only by the Americans. US intelligence intercepts suggest that the new arrivals are also causing divisions within the local Taleban, some of whom have taken a deep dislike to the foreigners.

Nor do the locals want them to stay. The arrival of the white Taleban has been accompanied by the imposition of a crude campaign of intimidation against the population. Last week several local tribal elders were taken away by the foreign fighters. They have not returned. The locals have been told that anyone trying to leave the area will be killed.

[buglerbilly]

Afghan private security firms fuelling corruption, warns British commander

Security firms in Afghanistan need to be properly regulated and registered, said Major General Nick Carter

Richard Norton-Taylor guardian.co.uk, Thursday 13 May 2010 19.12 BST


Carter said Ahmad Wali Karzai, the Afghan president's half-brother, had been 'in many ways a positive influence' in southern Afghanistan. Photograph: AFP/Getty Images

Private security companies are operating in a "culture of impunity" that is encouraging lawlessness and corruption, Britain's most senior commander in southern Afghanistan warned today.

The companies, mainly Afghan, needed to be "properly regulated as well as registered", said Major General Nick Carter as he spoke to the MoD about the wider situation in the country. There was no system of registering guns or vehicles, he added.

Carter said Nato-led forces are planning a campaign in Kandahar he described as of "massive significance".

The ambitious plan is to establish a system of government which would encourage Afghans to not only support the national and provincial authorities but convince them that Nato-led forces will help develop the country's civil structures as well as provide security.

Carter said there were "no plans now" to deploy the 9,500 British troops based in Helmand to neighbouring Kandahar. But US and British commanders have discussed the possibility of redeploying the UK force when, as expected, Canadian troops leave next year.

Carter's remarks came as a defence thinktank warned that the economic situation and the war in Afghanistan presented Britain with a "hard strategic choice". The Royal United Services Institute (Rusi) said the choice was between continental expeditionary capability – equipping armed forces to conduct future operations similar to Afghanistan only – or a maritime expeditionary strategy, which would confirm the case for aircraft carriers.

The Rusi report suggests Britain is at a "tipping point" and, according to its author Michael Codner, needs to consider future military capabilities by addressing the key question: will defence spending be increased in real terms?

"The UK is the fourth biggest defence spender in the world but the ninth largest economy. In other words, the country pays more for defence than its world economic standing justifies," writes Codner.

Carter also referred to Ahmed Wali Karzai, half-brother of the Afghan president and the chair of Kandahar's provincial council, who has been accused of being a CIA informant, a drugs baron, a mafia-style criminal, as well as a target for assassination on a US hit list. Carter said: "He is either a candidate for an Oscar or the most maligned man in Afghanistan." The commander's message was that the Kandahar politician had been unfairly criticised.

As President Hamid Karzai was being feted by Barack Obama in Washington, British military commanders in Afghanistan are praising his half-brother's role in the country's Taliban heartland.

"In many ways he is a positive influence," Carter said, adding that Ahmed Wali Karzai was an "avid Chelsea supporter" who had remarked that he would far rather watch a soccer match than, by implication, try to sort out Kandahar's problems. Carter made clear that those problems were immense.

[buglerbilly]

From The Sunday Times May 16, 2010

Taliban bullets bounce off ‘lucky platoon’


Over two months in Helmand province, members of the 3rd Battalion, the Yorkshire Regiment, escaped death repeatedly. Tonga Loseli, far left bottom row, was shot three times but sustained only a graze


Private Loseli


Tonga's injury - bullet scraped up his side and buried in his armpit.


Michael Smith

THEY are not so much the dirty dozen as the fortunate few. A band of 12 British soldiers has been described as the “luckiest platoon” in Afghanistan after repeatedly cheating death at the hands of the Taliban.

The men from the 3rd Battalion, the Yorkshire Regiment, came within inches of losing their lives to sniper fire and roadside bombs during a two-month period of intense fighting in Helmand province.

One soldier survived being hit three times in a hail of bullets, while another continued to fight off the enemy despite being shot in the neck in another attack.

Even the platoon commander narrowly avoided being blown up thanks to a malfunctioning bomb.

The army unit’s tale of luck and heroism is one of the few positive stories to emerge from the area of Sangin, regarded as the most dangerous place in Afghanistan for British troops.

Another battalion, 3 Rifles, posted close to the same Taliban stronghold suffered 30 deaths and a further 80 injuries during a six-month tour. A total of 285 British soldiers have died in Afghanistan since 2001.

“We all feel very lucky and grateful that we didn’t lose anyone out there,” said Lieutenant Will Sutton, the platoon commander.

“The insurgents came very close on several occasions, but we didn’t let that stop us getting on with the job. Everyone got through it okay.”

His unit — call sign Hades One Five — arrived at patrol base Hanjar, just south of Sangin, in mid-January to protect nearby villages and farmland from the Taliban.

The platoon’s sniper, Lance Corporal Joe Jones, 24, from Halifax, West Yorkshire, was the first member of the tightly knit group who was almost killed. Jones described last week how he was shot in the neck by an enemy sharpshooter. “There was a loud ‘crack’ and I was thrown about 3ft onto my back,” he said.

“I put my hand up to the wound and it was covered in blood. I felt a burst of adrenaline as I realised I had been shot by a sniper. I was still alive, so I got back up and started to return fire.

“I knew roughly where the round had come from. There was a compound nearby with ‘murder holes’ knocked into the walls so the Taliban could fire out of them.”

Jones was treated at Hanjar by a medic who found a bullet fragment lodged in his neck. “Another fraction of an inch and that would have been me,” he added. “As it was, the medic patched me up and I was fine.”

Private David Dyer, 22, from Barnsley, South Yorkshire, was hit by a Taliban sniper as the platoon was on patrol near a village on March 3.

“I heard a loud crack a split second before I was hit,” said Dyer. “It felt as if someone had hit me in the back with a sledgehammer.

“It knocked me forward onto my stomach and I heard the crack of another round going by. The fact I could hear it meant it was within a couple of feet.

“The bullet lodged in my body armour. Two inches lower and it would have hit me in the spine.”

Sutton, 29, said the closest call came less than a fortnight later when one of his men, Private “Tonga” Loseli, 31 — whose nickname comes from his country of origin — was shot three times in an ambush by insurgents.

“We were leaving a dangerous village, one heavily influenced by the Taliban,” he said. “We were patrolling out along a ditch when the Taliban opened up on us from two well-prepared positions at the same time.

“One of their rounds passed between Tonga’s arm and his body and hit him in the armpit. Some of the bullet lodged in the wound and he had a long graze where the round passed down his side.

“He simply turned to Sergeant [Anthony] Oxley and said ‘Ox, I think I’ve been shot.’ Back at the base we found another bullet hole in his body armour and one in his medic pouch. He had been very lucky.”

The platoon returned to their base at Warminster, Wiltshire, last month.

As Sutton, from Cleveland, in the north of England, led his men onto the Chinook helicopter at the end of their tour of duty, he was pulled aside by company commander Major Tim Harris and congratulated for keeping his men safe.

Harris said: “I can tell you this, Will, now that the tour is over — you guys are the luckiest platoon in Afghanistan.”

Sutton’s own near-death experience came when a bomb short circuited and exploded just seconds before he was about to walk over it.

“We think it didn’t go off properly because of recent heavy rain,” Sutton said. “We were about 20 seconds from being on top of it at the time it detonated and were glad we hadn’t got any nearer.”

The luck of Yorkshire’s own “band of brothers” held out one final time when Private Adam McCurdy got caught up in another explosion. “He disappeared in a smoke cloud and most of the lads thought he was dead,” said Sutton.

“The next moment, Private McCurdy staggered out of the smoke unscathed and jumped into cover. He was dazed but otherwise untouched.”

[buglerbilly]

War of persuasion: The modern U.S. officer emerges in Afghanistan

Gallery
Battling Afghan counterinsurgency means reassessing the enemy
U.S. commanders are learning that victory in today's wars is less a matter of destroying enemies than of knowing how and when to make them allies.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/gallery/2010/05/15/GA2010051503593.html

By Greg Jaffe

Washington Post Staff Writer

Sunday, May 16, 2010

NARAY, AFGHANISTAN -- Lt. Col. Robert B. Brown could hear the fear in his 24-year-old lieutenant's voice on the patchy radio. "We have enemy inside the wire. It is really bad here," 1st Lt. Andrew Bundermann said. "We need those [expletive] birds now."

Just before 6 a.m., more than 300 insurgents launched a massive attack on Bundermann's remote outpost in the Kamdesh district of northeastern Afghanistan. By 6:30 three of Bundermann's soldiers were dead, and the Apache attack helicopters he desperately wanted weren't going to arrive for another half hour.

Brown, who was at his base about 30 miles away, grabbed the radio handset from one of his sergeants. "You are going to be all right," the 41-year-old officer told his young lieutenant. "We are going to get you as much help as possible."

Bundermann made a wrenching decision. Unable to control the entire outpost, he ordered his remaining troops to collapse around a small cluster of its 23 buildings. Twelve of his 53 soldiers, pinned down by heavy enemy fire beyond those inner defenses, would have to fight on their own until the attack helicopters arrived.

One was a 21-year-old soldier from Loudoun County, who had been wounded in his leg and hip. Bleeding, he crawled on his elbows behind the base's latrine for protection. "Help me," Spec. Stephan L. Mace called out to his fellow soldiers. "Help me, please."

Eight U.S. troops were killed in the Oct. 3, 2009, battle at Combat Outpost Keating, making it one of the deadliest fights for Americans of the Afghan war. For soldiers, the harsh reality of combat has scarcely changed in the decades since Vietnam. To survive, the outnumbered Keating grunts relied on their mutual devotion and marksmanship.

What makes Keating different from past battles is what happened afterward. A decade of fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq has forced battlefield commanders to accept that victory in today's wars is less a matter of destroying enemies than of knowing how and when to make them allies. This new kind of war has compelled midlevel officers such as Brown to take on new roles: politician, diplomat, tribal anthropologist.

"My goal is to get people to stop shooting at my soldiers and support government," said Brown, a wiry, quick-talking officer whose three combat tours have imbued him with modesty, skepticism and a little self-doubt.

After the Kamdesh battle, an insurgent leader known as Mullah Sadiq sent word to Brown that he wanted to drive his more radical Taliban rivals from the area around the Keating outpost. Sadiq, who had been on U.S. kill-or-capture lists for five years, needed money and Brown's help brokering a peace deal with Afghan government officials in Kabul. The offer was Brown's chance to ensure his eight soldiers didn't die in vain.

"We don't think Sadiq is a Jeffersonian Democrat," Brown wrote of Sadiq in a February e-mail from Forward Operating Base Bostick in Naray. "But he is rallying public support to the Afghan government and against the Taliban. . . . And frankly, that may be good enough."

In the Dixie cup

Three months before the attack, Brown and his brigade commander, Col. Randy George, had petitioned Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top U.S. general in Afghanistan, for permission to close the Keating base and withdraw from the surrounding Kamdesh district.

The outpost, surrounded by soaring mountains on all sides, was isolated and hard to defend. "It felt like we were living in the bottom of a Dixie cup," one of Brown's soldiers said.

Attacks on U.S. forces had increased every year since Keating was established in 2006, and by summer 2009 Brown concluded that the presence of U.S. troops was feeding the insurgency.

His study of the local rebel factions had led him to believe that a U.S. withdrawal from the area would split the insurgency. Most of the powerbrokers in Kamdesh were affiliated with Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin, or HiG, an insurgent group that had formed decades earlier to repel the Soviets. Although HiG fiercely opposed the U.S. presence in Afghanistan, there were signs that its local leadership was willing to work with the Afghan government.

The other branch of the insurgency was loyal to the Taliban and opposed any Afghan government presence.

As long as U.S. troops remained, HiG commanders wouldn't push out the Taliban leadership from the area. "The HiG and Taliban were competitors," Brown said, "but they could agree to hate us."

Brown was commissioned as an armor officer in 1991 just months after U.S. tanks sliced through Saddam Hussein's Republican Guard in a demonstration of the post-Vietnam Army's raw power.

Two Iraq tours in 2004 and 2007 opened Brown's eyes to the limits of his Army and himself. He avoided "we can do the impossible" pep talks that other commanders used to fire up their troops. His goal was to build the Afghan government and bring his soldiers back alive.

The vast majority of his time was spent quizzing Afghan elders and officials on decades-old tribal disputes and intrigues. In the evenings he scoured the Internet for information on the HiG and its history in Nurestan province during the Soviet era. "There is so much here that is opaque to us," he said.

Even before the Keating attack, Brown believed that he might be able to help broker a peace deal between local HiG leaders and the Afghan government. His hypothesis had led him to write to Sadiq in September, about three weeks before the Keating assault.

In his letter, sent with the approval of his commander, Brown apologized to Sadiq for earlier NATO bombings that had killed civilians. Some of Sadiq's relatives had been killed when U.S. troops fired a missile into the insurgent leader's house, local Afghans said.

Brown also asked for Sadiq's "wisdom." "We need assistance from leaders like you that are able to reach out and encourage the people of Kamdesh to cease the violence and oust the Taliban," he wrote. He offered to meet with Sadiq whenever it was convenient and promised him protection.

A closure delayed

On Sept. 27, McChrystal approved the closing of Keating, which was set for Oct. 9. The general had taken longer than Brown and his immediate bosses had hoped to issue his final decision.

Six days before the planned closure, hundreds of local fighters launched a break-of-day fusillade of rocket-propelled grenades, machine-gun fire and mortar shells at the tiny base. This account of the battle and the negotiations with Sadiq is based on interviews with Brown, Keating troops and U.S. and Afghan officials.

Bundermann jumped out of bed and ran to call Brown's headquarters. Fire was burning through the outpost's wood buildings, and the Afghan soldiers had abandoned their posts en masse.

Brown urged his lieutenant to try to get the Afghans back into the fight.

"Roger," Bundermann replied curtly, knowing from previous experience that the Afghans were a lost cause.

Bundermann decided to focus on holding the base and saving as many of his troops as possible. About 200 yards north of Bundermann's position, five soldiers were hunkered down in an armored Humvee, fighting to keep the insurgents off the outpost.

Rocket-propelled grenades were bouncing off the truck's doors and roof. The troops concluded that it was only a matter of time before a round penetrated the Humvee's armor.

Three of the five soldiers sprinted for nearby cover, but were felled by an grenade blast and a burst of machine-gun fire. Only Mace, who was wounded in both legs, survived. He crawled to a hiding spot between a boulder and the base latrine.

The two soldiers who remained by the battered Humvee -- Spec. Ty Carter and Sgt. Bradley Larson -- fired at two insurgents running across the outpost and then clambered back into the truck. Carter wanted to look for Mace, but Larson ordered him to stay put. "You are no good to him dead," he said.

Carter had always been a bit of an outsider within his platoon. After a stint in the Marine Corps in the late 1990s, he'd cycled through a half-dozen jobs -- movie theater manager, nursing assistant and hardware store clerk. He married, had a daughter and divorced. In 2008, he enlisted in the Army. "I joined for my daughter," he said, "and because I suck as a civilian."

Twenty minutes passed before Carter spotted Mace, who had crawled out from his hiding spot on his elbows.

"Help me, please," the wounded soldier mouthed.

"Stay there," Carter screamed. "I'll get to you when I can."

Over the radio, Brown was pressing Bundermann to determine how many of his troops were missing. "We don't know," the lieutenant initially replied. A few minutes later, Bundermann reported that the unit was unsure of the whereabouts of nine soldiers.

"You need to get accountability for your men," Brown told him.

At the Humvee, Carter had persuaded Larson to let him retrieve Mace. The attack helicopters had arrived and a blast from one of their guns gave Carter cover to sprint to the downed soldier. He tied a tourniquet around Mace's leg, giving it two hard cranks, and stuffed gauze into his shrapnel wounds. He taped a pad over his stomach wound and splinted his fractured leg with a tree branch.

With Mace clinging to his neck, Carter sprinted back to the Humvee. Mace's face was white and his lips were purple. The soldiers worried they were the only Americans still alive in the valley.

Carter volunteered to push back toward the outpost's headquarters to try to find anyone else who was still alive. About 20 yards from the Humvee, he spotted a radio on the ground and ran it back to Larson in the Humvee. They could hear Bundermann organizing a counterattack to take back the outpost.

"Can you get Mace . . . back to the aid station?" Bundermann said.

Mace gripped the stretcher with both hands and groaned in pain as Carter and Larson ferried him to safety.

Battlefield transfusions

Capt. Christopher Cordova, the senior physician's assistant in the Keating aid station, began searching Mace for signs of life. His femoral pulse was weak. There was no pulse in his wrist.

Cordova had never seen a blood transfusion carried out in a field aid station in two years of duty in Iraq and Afghanistan, and was reluctant to experiment on Mace.

"I didn't want to cause more harm," Cordova recalled. "At the same time, I didn't want to sit there and watch him die."

As Mace's heartbeat grew weaker and his skin paler, Cordova and two of his medics each donated a bag of A-positive blood, Mace's type, which Cordova began to pump slowly into one of Mace's veins. He opened his eyes and asked for a cigarette and some morphine to kill the pain.

"You're not a real man anymore now that you've got Floyd's blood in you," said Cordova, referring to one of the medics.

Mace chuckled faintly.

The aid station floor was covered with blood from three of the previous casualties. Body armor and Kevlar helmets, with bits of skull and brain matter, littered the floor. Grenade blasts had knocked most of the pictures off the wall.

Over the next four hours, Cordova pumped three more bags of blood into Mace. At 8:07 p.m. -- about 13 hours after Mace was injured -- the first medical evacuation helicopter touched down at Keating. Cordova and his medics had wrapped Mace in blankets for the trip and pulled a small cap over his head. He hooked up one last bag of blood, from Bundermann, to Mace's arm.

"Mace, you've made it man," Cordova told him when he heard the thump of the rotors.

Mace nodded his head and grinned.

Just minutes after Mace departed, Brown arrived at the outpost. Night had fallen and from the helicopter he saw the smoldering embers of Keating's barracks, chow hall and command post.

Brown told Bundermann that he'd done a good job holding off the attackers. He also asked about Mace. Throughout eastern Afghanistan, staff officers had followed his progress via radio reports from the outpost.

"It was the one good thing that happened on an awful day," Cordova said.

Around 1 a.m. word began to filter through Keating that Mace had died on the operating table. Cordova learned the news from the outpost's first sergeant. "Before he even said a word, I knew it was not good," Cordova said.

Cordova couldn't bear to tell his fellow medics. He retreated to a closet in the aid station where he could be alone.

Abandoning Keating

The next morning, Afghan villagers approached Keating's main gate and asked for permission to collect their dead from the base and a nearby village. Brown gave the Afghans some body bags and told them to stay off the high ground where the U.S. forces were still dropping bombs to take out snipers.

The next two days were spent packing up equipment and rigging the outpost's remaining buildings with explosives. After nightfall on Oct. 6, a half dozen Chinook helicopters flew into Keating and hauled away the troops. Brown climbed on the last bird. As he was leaving, engineers triggered the delayed fuses on the explosives. Forty minutes later Keating was in flames. A B-1 bomber finished the job the next day.

Brown typed up an e-mail cataloguing mistakes he made in failing to build up the outpost's defenses in the months before the planned withdrawal. He sent it to his boss, his fellow battalion commanders and the two-star general assigned to conduct an investigation of the attack. The letter of reprimand the general wrote to Brown closely tracked the e-mail.

A short time later, Brown attended the memorial service for his eight dead soldiers. "These men faced their fears and fought for their brothers. In a desperate few hours, they did their best and gave everything," he said, his dirty, green patrol cap pulled low on his forehead. "It is fitting we mourn what was lost. But I ask every person here to remember and celebrate what was saved by their sacrifice. Sitting among us are soldiers who will once again see their families, love their children and tell their grandchildren what it means to know a hero."

He returned to his seat and forced a smile as his troops, choking back tears, recounted early-morning training runs and late-night bar crawls with friends who were now dead.

Alone in his office a few weeks after the attack Brown re-read the letter he had sent to Sadiq in September. It made him cringe.

"I was playing to his ego. But reading it over, it sounds like I was kissing his ass from a position of weakness," Brown said months later. He paused and exhaled. "We certainly weren't operating from a position of strength."

[buglerbilly]

From The Times May 17, 2010

Afghan army pays its dues in blood as it takes the fight to the Taleban


American and Afghan soldiers carry one of two seriously injured soldiers to a helicopter for evacuation


One of the soldiers, Zamin, later died of terrible wounds caused by a Taleban IED blast


The blast shattered the American humvee vehicle which had been out on patrol in Zabul province


An Afghan soldier weeps over the body of his friend

Tom Coghlan in Zabul Province

Recommend? (4) The Blackhawk helicopter rose from the river bed, whipping up a hurricane of swirling dust. American medics crouched against the wind, turning their faces as the casualty evacuation team flew away. Two Afghan soldiers remained standing, faces to the gale, weeping inconsolably for a dying friend.

Forty-five minutes earlier, the pre-dawn grey had just begun to lighten when there was a fist-in-the-guts thump and a rolling pressure wave — and the first vehicle in the convoy moving into the village of Khan Khalay vanished under a white pall.

It was an armoured Humvee, American-designed and built, but one of 4,500 donated to the Afghan National Army. As the dust cleared it was visible, a twisted wreck, lying in a deep crater left by the roadside bomb.

Of the front of the Humvee, nothing remained. The radiator had landed in a field more than a hundred metres away, along with parts of the engine block. As the smoke cleared, one of the three occupants, a baby-faced, teenage soldier named Assamuddin, staggered, wild-eyed and shaking, back up the road; not only alive, but unhurt — physically, at least.

The other two were not so fortunate. From the wreckage the troops pulled an unconscious, mangled figure. His name was Zamin, but as American medics began desperate efforts to save him some of his Afghan comrades wept at what they saw. The devastating blast had deformed his body and made his face all but unrecognisable. His form had lost the rigidity of bone and muscle and moved, instead, like a bag of flour. The medics could only speculate on the number of bones that were broken. Somehow he clung to life, sucking in air and choking on blood.

In the dust by the roadside Specialist George Linares, 26, performed an emergency tracheotomy, cutting through Zamin’s throat to insert a tube directly to his lungs. While he did so another medic cradled Zamin’s face, the features gone, the skull moving under his hands.

From the wreckage a voice screamed and the Afghans worked to free a second survivor, Niamatullah. He had a deep wound to the back of his head and his legs writhed on the stretcher until he was tied to it.

The first rays of sunlight appeared over the dun hills of Zabul province. “Is there any word yet on casevac?” asked an American officer.

“Twenty mikes,” came the reply — another 20-minute wait. It was 5.20am; 27 minutes since the explosion.

As they waited, the two American medics pressed air from a hand pump directly into Zamin’s lungs. “One thousand, two thousand,” Specialist Linares counted. Somehow, Zamin’s pulse was holding. A few minutes later they carried him into the waiting belly of the helicopter — but as many of his comrades had already guessed, he would not survive.

The watchword these days is “partnering” — operations intended to be the proving ground for Afghanistan’s security forces, being built from scratch at a cost of billions of dollars. Yesterday it was the turn of three battalions of Afghan troops in Zabul province, out on a search operation called Eagle Claw along the Kabul-to-Kandahar highway. Alongside them were just a few dozen soldiers from 4th Platoon, Alpha Battery of 1/508th Parachute Infantry. For the Afghans, it was a significant change from the kind of operations that they were given even a year ago.

The focal point of Operation Eagle Claw was the provincial capital Qalat, whose population finds itself in the middle of the fight between the Afghan and Nato forces against the Taleban. Through local contacts they described to The Times a wretched situation, caught as they are between the hunt for insurgents and the vengeance of the hunted.

“People hate the Taleban and the Americans in my village,” said one source, who cannot be named for his own safety. “The Americans blame us for mining the land. The Taleban accuse us of spying for the Americans.”

The Taleban are local recruits, they said, drawn as much from the uneducated and unemployed as from any ideological reservoir. Villagers said that they had been impressed by recent US development work in Zabul, which has included building roads into outlying areas without previous access to the major highways. They said that an economic boom in Qalat, was attracting many people from outlying villages and boosting support for the local government.

There remains, however, an instinctive and implacable antipathy in the villages for foreign troops and a deep loathing of the search operations such as Eagle Claw that characterise the counter-insurgency.

As the injured soldiers were airlifted away, thoughts turned to Khan Khalay up ahead — and to whoever it was who had planted the bomb. A Taleban radio call intercepted in the seconds after the explosion confirmed the presence of a “triggerman” close by, watching and detonating the device by remote control.

The Afghan troops had moved ahead into the village and rounded up a group of men they regarded as suspicious. Now the men, nine of them, squatted on the ground. Some carried spades and all looked unhappy; one of them, a young man in a black shalwar kameez, shook visibly.

If the anonymous roadside bomb has given the insurgents a tactical advantage in Afghanistan and Iraq, Western technology is beginning to redress the balance. The US soldiers produced a box containing an instant explosive-residue testing kit, known as Exspray.

As the hands of the bemused men were swabbed, the chemical test indicated that all might not be the innocent civilians they insisted they were. Two young men, including the man in black, tested positive for TATP, a substance exclusive to explosives, as well as for nitrates used in explosives.

Now there was anger and more than a hint of vengeance in the air. The Afghan soldiers hauled the two men away from the main group, delivering kicks and blows none too discreetly as they bound their arms with their scarves. The Americans soldiers were deeply angry, too, and several stood over the suspects, cursing them. Their unit had lost a popular officer, Lieutenant Sal Corma, to a similar device a few weeks earlier.

One leant forward to draw his finger across his throat a few inches from the men’s faces before walking away in fury.

[buglerbilly]

Combat Generation: Trying to work with an Afghan insurgent

By Greg Jaffe

Washington Post Staff Writer

Monday, May 17, 2010

NARAY, AFGHANISTAN -- Last November, Lt. Col. Robert B. Brown received an enticing offer from a mysterious enemy.

The entreaty followed a devastating insurgent assault on a small base under Brown's command in eastern Afghanistan. More than 300 fighters had attacked the outpost, killing eight of his soldiers. For the first time in his 19-year career, Brown had serious doubts about his future in the military.

The offer came from an insurgent known as Mullah Sadiq, who had been on the U.S. kill-capture list since 2005. Brown assumed that some fighters aligned with Sadiq had taken part in the assault.

Sadiq wanted 50 assault rifles, $20,000 and a promise that U.S. forces would not kill him. In return, he promised to turn against more-radical Taliban insurgents and to begin to work with the Afghan government.

Sadiq's proposition gave Brown a chance, however tentative, to achieve a victory of sorts in his corner of Afghanistan and redeem the loss of his men.

"This has the potential to work," Brown told his commander.

It has become a given within the U.S. military after nearly a decade of grinding battle in Afghanistan and seven years in Iraq that U.S. forces cannot kill their way to victory. Enemies must be persuaded to lay down their weapons through a mix of negotiation and force. Grievances must be understood and wherever possible addressed. These principles are at the core of the military's coming campaign in Kandahar, which U.S officials are touting as the most important battle of the nine-year war.

Brown is a firm believer in this new American way of war, one that has forced him to puzzle through dauntingly complex tribal feuds and to overcome a fractured Afghan government that often prefers to fight enemies, such as Sadiq, rather than cede influence to them.

Brown, 41, has struggled to make sense of Sadiq, who insists on dealing with the Americans solely through intermediaries. Some Afghans describe Sadiq as a religious scholar and brave commander. Others maintain that he is a warlord and extremist.

"The bad guys aren't bad because they were born bad," Brown said from his base in Naray. "What no one ever teaches you is how to get to the bottom of the story. No one ever teaches you to ask, 'Why is Mullah Sadiq the way he is?' "

A stirring speaker

Sadiq grew up in a poor family in Kamdesh district, an isolated valley of about 22,000 people. His parents sent him at an early age to be educated at a free religious school in Pakistan.

A bright student and stirring speaker, Sadiq was tapped as a regional commander in the anti-Soviet insurgency, his brother-in-law said. He fought with Hezb-i-Islami, or HiG, a group led by Gulbuddin Hemkatyar, a hard-line Islamist who served briefly as prime minister during the chaotic years after the Soviet withdrawal.

Sadiq's battlefield exploits and knowledge of Islam made him a power broker in the region, according to U.S. and Afghan officials. In 2004, he met regularly with a U.S. Special Forces officer known to locals as Sean.

"Sean was transfixed by Mullah Sadiq," said Col. Shamsu Rahman, a border police commander and Sadiq's brother-in-law. "He said he knew everything -- geography, politics, religion."

Sadiq's relationship with subsequent American officers deteriorated, and in 2005 U.S. forces tried to kill him with a Hellfire missile. His history with HiG, which was labeled an international terrorist organization, may have set off alarms. Sadiq's brother-in-law insisted that the U.S. commandos were acting on bad intelligence from a rival who had accused Sadiq of murdering his father a decade earlier.

Brown has no idea why previous U.S. commanders sought to kill Sadiq.

"We spent the first five or six years in Afghanistan making enemies, because we were used to settle political, economic and historical conflicts," he said. "We were pretty credulous."

On Brown's first combat tour in Iraq in 2004, he and his fellow officers were under orders from Washington to stay out of tribal politics. The approach made it impossible for officers to understand the forces propelling the insurgency, which was driven more by political discontent than religious extremism.

"What I thought I knew coming out of East Baghdad, I laugh at today," Brown said.

In 2007, he returned to the Iraqi capital as a military planner managing the influx of 30,000 fresh forces in Baghdad. U.S. commanders began organizing tens of thousands of Sunnis, some of them former insurgents, into informal watch groups to safeguard their neighborhoods from extremists. The defections, fueled by huge influxes of American cash, led to a stunning drop in violence in 2008 and helped reverse the course of a war that looked hopeless.

For U.S. military officers, the experience in Iraq forever altered their view of the enemy. It also changed the way the war would be fought thousands of miles away in Afghanistan.

This account of the negotiations with Sadiq is based on meetings observed by a Washington Post reporter and interviews with U.S. and Afghan officials.

Last December, Brown quietly asked Commander Youssef, the police chief in a district near Kamdesh, whether he should help Sadiq.

"Working with Mullah Sadiq is like handing a snake to your enemy," Youssef told him. Sadiq might drive out the Taliban, but he was still dangerous and unpredictable.

"So, should we work with him?" Brown pressed.

"At the present time we have no other choice," Youssef recalled saying. "We really need him."

An American telephone

After the attack on Combat Outpost Keating, Brown and the local Taliban leadership went through similar rituals.

Brown had petitioned the top brass in Afghanistan to close Keating two months before the attack, and family members wanted to know why it had taken senior commanders so long to approve the U.S. withdrawal. U.S. troops left Kamdesh a few days after the battle.

"We should know the names of the officers who made the decisions," the mother of one of the dead soldiers told the Philadelphia Inquirer in late February. "They should feel the pain that we feel."

Brown had little to offer in the way of solace. Most of the dead men's possessions had been destroyed in the attack. His troops gathered up what they could -- a prized Yankees cap, a watch, a wallet, a pair of broken eyeglasses -- and shipped them to the families.

The Taliban faced similar questions from angry fathers who demanded to know why their sons had been ordered to storm a base that the Americans were leaving. More than 75 local fighters had been killed in the battle. U.S. intelligence officials tracked the two top Taliban commanders in the area, Dost Mohammed and Haji Usman, as they attended funerals and made payments to grieving families.

The Taliban and Sadiq had long competed for the allegiance of fighters in Kamdesh, and the U.S. withdrawal heightened the split. Sadiq wanted to allow long-stalled development projects to resume. The Taliban vowed to attack such efforts as part of a campaign to discredit the Afghan government.

The two groups exchanged emissaries and argued. "I am not supporting the U.S.," Sadiq told the Taliban, according to his brother-in-law. "There are no Americans in Kamdesh. I am supporting myself, my village and my people."

In December, the Americans gave Sadiq a few thousand dollars to organize meetings with the Kamdesh elders, and an Afghan official passed him some guns. As a gesture of good faith, Sadiq sent a photo of himself using a U.S.-supplied satellite phone.

In a 2002 picture taken by U.S. commandos, Sadiq had dark, piercing eyes and a chiseled face. By 2010, he was older and grayer, with softer features.

Every few nights, one of Sadiq's deputies telephoned Brown to work out the terms of the deal. By March, the insurgent commander had assembled an informal police force of about 230 locals, some of whom had probably taken part in the Keating attack. Brown arranged for the United States to pay the men about $25,000 a month until the Interior Ministry formally accepted them as police.

Dante Paradiso, the senior State Department representative in the area, worked with Afghan officials to replace the weak Kamdesh district sub-governor with one of Sadiq's backers, who also had the support of the tribal elders in the area.

Brown could only guess at Sadiq's motivation for approaching him. Sadiq's religious education and his exploits as an anti-Soviet commander had helped him gain acceptance among the wealthy landowners in Kamdesh.

"If the Taliban were to dominate the area, Sadiq would lose prestige and his position," Brown hypothesized. Brown also hoped that Sadiq understood that Taliban rule would be a disaster for Kamdesh.

"Honestly, I am speculating about the motives about someone I have never met or talked to," he said.

In mid-March, Col. Randy George, Brown's immediate commander, met with Brig. Gen. Mohammad Zaman, the local Afghan Border Police chief, to discuss how to move ahead with Sadiq. Zaman's relationship with the insurgent leader went back to their days together in the anti-Soviet insurgency.

"Mullah Sadiq has no help from the government," Zaman told George. "He is not sure he can trust us."

Zaman offered to dispatch more than 500 Afghan troops to link up with Sadiq's fighters. The U.S. and Afghan officers made plans for a reconciliation ceremony at which Sadiq would declare his support for the Afghan constitution, Zaman would announce the return of Afghan government forces to Kamdesh and the provincial governor would pledge $150,000 in new development projects.

George and Brown planned to stay away from the event. "I don't see us saying a word," George told Zaman.

The Afghan general disagreed. Sadiq needed public assurance that the cash for reconstruction projects was going to arrive.

"Everyone knows we don't have anything," Zaman explained. "All the money comes from the Americans."

Signs of progress

In early April, the deal with Sadiq began to fall apart. Senior Afghan officials in Kabul banned Zaman from sending any of his forces to meet up with Sadiq's fighters.

"They are worried that we are trying to give Kamdesh district to the HiG," Zaman said. "They don't want us to give these guys a say in the government."

The hedging in Kabul also unnerved Sadiq, whose representatives immediately called Brown. "We are surrounded by 1,000 Taliban, but our government doesn't accept us!" one of Sadiq's deputies screamed over the satellite phone. He demanded Brown's help in acquiring 600 assault rifles, 16 Ford Ranger pickup trucks and two dozen machine guns and grenade launchers for the new Kamdesh police force.

Brown explained that the weapons had to come from the Afghan Interior Ministry, which was refusing to send any arms to Kamdesh. Sadiq's representative hung up on Brown in mid-sentence.

To get the deal back on track, Brown and George pressed the Afghan officials to write a letter to the central government in Kabul detailing the need to move forces into the valley and to better arm Sadiq's police force.

"After much cajoling, we have gotten all the Afghan players supporting the resources for the police in Kamdesh," Brown wrote in an e-mail in early May. Sadiq didn't get all the weapons he wanted, but he got some.

A new U.S. unit was scheduled to replace Brown's cavalry squadron at the end of May. He knew the next U.S. commander wouldn't have the same incentive to close the deal with Sadiq. Brown also had ample reason to question Kabul's commitment to working with Sadiq.

"We want this to happen more than the Afghans do," he said he often worried.

The reconciliation ceremony has not been held, but in recent days hundreds of Afghan army and police forces have been inching along the perilous road to Kamdesh to link up with Sadiq. Taliban commanders have been assembling a force to stop them.

Brown said he does not know exactly what to make of the maneuvering, although he detects signs of progress. "The momentum change has been significant," he wrote in an e-mail.

He expects to be home in Colorado in about two weeks. Kamdesh will be a new commander's fight.

[buglerbilly]

Penguins of Afghanistan & A few Words on Charlie Company

Not many words BUT one of the better articles by Michael Yon, great images as well...........I recommend you look!

http://www.michaelyon-online.com/penguins-of-afghanistan.htm


Published: 13 May 2010

There are no birth certificates in these villages. No death certificates. No driver’s licenses or addresses or phonebooks, and if there were, few people would be able to read them. In this mostly illiterate country, there are no paperwork hassles. Corruption is a problem but bureaucracy and identity theft surely aren’t. Most Afghans have never been entered into any system. Like penguins on the ice, they are born, they live and they die, and that’s all.


Whereas most Westerners have been thorougly inventoried by their governments (readers probably have many sorts of IDs ranging from birth certificates to fishing licenses), Afghans are still in the Penguin stage. They’re just out there doing laps around the sun. Most don’t know how many laps because they don’t know how old they are, and it’s not because they are orphans but because it doesn’t matter one iota. A kid can drive when he can drive and shoot when he can shoot.




HIIDE sytem.

To take inventory, the military is using systems that soldiers often call “bats and hides,” or, more accurately, BAT and HIIDE, which are two different systems for collecting biometrics. BAT= Biometrics Automated Toolset, while HIIDE = Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment. This dispatch is about field usage of the HIIDE system made by www.securimetrics.com.

READ the rest of it at the link..............

[buglerbilly]

Houston sees progress in Afghanistan

MAX BLENKIN

May 17, 2010 - 8:24PM

AAP

Progress in Afghanistan is steady and Australia will likely be able to hand responsibility for Oruzgan province's security to Afghan forces within three to five years, the defence chief says.

Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston said Australian troops had steadily extended their influence into Oruzgan province, clearing insurgents and establishing bases.

He said handing responsibility to Afghan security forces was a key objective with Australian forces making good progress in training the Afghan National Army 4th Brigade.

"I have always said in 3-5 years we will be in a position to transition responsibility for security to the 4th brigade and they will be of a level of capability where they can conduct complex brigade level operations to ensure the security of the province," he told reporters on Monday.

Air Chief Marshal Houston said Australia had trained Iraqi troops, eventually redeploying them to act as security backup, before withdrawing entirely.

He said there was much to be done in Afghanistan but the tide was turning against the insurgents and the coalition was making progress.

"Some clear signs of this are the improving capability of the Afghan National Security forces. Additionally 59 per cent of Afghans who were polled believe their country is heading in the right direction, up from 45 per cent from a year ago," he said.

"I firmly believe that progress in Afghanistan will not be in leaps and bounds. It will be slow and steady but over time we will prevail."

Air Chief Marshal Houston said Australian, coalition and Afghan forces had already achieved considerable success in Oruzgan.

"If we go back to 2006, the only area we really controlled was the area immediately around Tarin Kowt," he said.

Now Dutch forces are at Deh Rawood, west of Tarin Kowt, while Australian and Dutch forces have achieved contested control of the Baluchi and Chora Valleys to the north.

To the east, troops are in the Mirabad Valley, an area regarded as a Taliban sanctuary only a year ago.

"Over time we have expanded our influence out from Tarin Kowt to encompass quite a large area, certainly the three richest parts of the province," he said.

"It is still contested as we still have the Taliban engaging us from time to time."

Air Chief Marshal Houston said the Oruzgan's north was sparsely populated and not a high priority under current coalition strategy of concentrating on the areas where most people lived.

Australia now has some 1550 troops in Afghanistan with no plans to significantly change that number.

Since moving into Oruzgan in 2006, Australian forces have operated as junior partners to the Netherlands.

But with the Netherlands to start withdrawing in August and Australia declining to take the lead role, a new lead partner needs to be found.

Air Chief Marshal Houston said he had just returned from talks in Brussels where that was discussed, with good progress made towards filling that role.

"We are still working through the details. However I am very confident we will achieve a seamless and smooth transition," he said.

"I would anticipate.....that we will see a heavier US participation in Oruzgan."

© 2010 AAP

[buglerbilly]

Australian forces kill three Taliban

May 17, 2010 - 8:19PM

AAP

Australian forces in Afghanistan have helped kill three Taliban commanders in the past week, the Defence department says.

The Special Operations Task Group (SOTG) participated in an Afghan army-led operation which killed Mullah Jalil in the Deh Rafshan area.

Jaili was responsible for roadside bomb attacks against coalition forces operating out of Tarin Kowt, Defence said.

A Taliban leader believed to be responsible for a bomb attack that killed two Dutch soldiers last month, Abdul Malik, was also killed in an Australian special forces operation.

The last known insurgent leader in the Gizab district was also killed in a combined operation on the weekend.

Australia's SOTG commanding officer said the killings illustrated "successful training and partnering" with Afghan security forces.

"Every time we remove an insurgent leader we make the area safer for Afghan civilians and help the Afghan government forces to regain control of their communities from the Taliban," the commanding officer said in a statement on Monday.

Earlier on Monday, Defence revealed three Australian special forces soldiers had been wounded in a roadside bomb blast in southern Afghanistan.

They have been admitted to hospital in Kandahar but their condition is described as satisfactory and they are expected to return to duty.

Defence force head Angus Houston said improvised explosive devices (IED) remained a persistent threat, with 48 such incidents involving Australian troops between November last year and April.

© 2010 AAP

[buglerbilly]

Taliban Hold Sway in Area Taken by U.S., Farmers Say


Tyler Hicks/The New York Times
A Marine on patrol in Helmand Province, Afghanistan.

By CARLOTTA GALL

Published: May 16, 2010

(May 17, 2010) The departure of the farmers is one of the most telling indications that Taliban fighters have found a way to resume their insurgency, three months after thousands of troops invaded this Taliban stronghold in the opening foray of a campaign to take control of southern Afghanistan. Militants have been infiltrating back into the area and the prospect of months of more fighting is undermining public morale, residents and officials said.

As the coalition prepares for the next major offensive in the southern city of Kandahar, the uneasy standoff in Marja, where neither the American Marines nor the Taliban have gained the upper hand and clashes occur daily, provides a stark lesson in the challenges of eliminating a patient and deeply rooted insurgency.

Over 150 families have fled Marja in the last two weeks, according to the Afghan Red Crescent Society in the provincial capital, Lashkar Gah.

Marja residents arriving here last week, many looking bleak and shell-shocked, said civilians had been trapped by the fighting, running a gantlet of mines laid by insurgents and firefights around government and coalition positions. The pervasive Taliban presence forbids them from having any contact with or taking assistance from the government or coalition forces.

“People are leaving; you see 10 to 20 families each day on the road who are leaving Marja due to insecurity,” said a farmer, Abdul Rahman, 52, who was traveling on his own. “It is now hard to live there in this situation.”

One farmer who was loading his family and belongings onto a tractor-trailer on the edge of Lashkar Gah last week said he had abandoned his whole livelihood in Sistan, Marja, as soon as the harvest, a poor one this year, was done.

“Every day they were fighting and shelling,” said the farmer, Abdul Malook Aka, 55. “We do not feel secure in the village and we decided to leave. Security is getting worse day by day.”

“We thought security would be improving,” he said.

Those who remain in Marja voiced similar complaints in dozens of interviews and repeated visits to Marja over the last month.

“I am sure if I stay in Marja I will be killed one day either by Taliban or the Americans,” said Mir Hamza, 40, a farmer from Loye Charahi.

Combat operations in Marja ended at the end of February and the military declared the battle won. But much of the local Taliban, including at least four mid-level commanders, never left, stashing their rifles and adopting the quiet farm life.

A Taliban resurgence was not entirely unexpected, especially now as the poppy harvest ends, freeing men to fight, and as the weather warms up. But the military had seen Marja as a “clear and hold” operation in which the first part, clearing the district of militants, would be wrapped up fairly quickly. In fact, clearing has proved to be a more elusive goal.

By April, life had picked up. People began coming forward to receive government handouts and farmers were happily taking money in return for destroying their poppy crops, whose opium provides a main source of Taliban financing. As villagers saw their neighbors benefiting, more were encouraged to approach the district administration as well, despite Taliban threats.

The change was even more pronounced in the adjacent Nad-e-ali district, where the Taliban have been weakened and security improved thanks largely to the operation in Marja.

But the insurgents’ extensive intelligence network in Marja has remained intact, and they have been able to maintain a hold over the population through what residents have described as threats and assassinations. In April members of the Taliban visited one old man late at night and made him eat his aid registration papers, several residents said, a Mafia-style warning to others not to take government aid.

At the beginning of May, a well-liked man named Sharifullah was beaten to death, accused of supporting the district chief and not paying taxes to the Taliban. His killing froze the community and villagers stopped going to the district administration.

“The Taliban are everywhere, they are like scorpions under every stone, and they are stinging all those who get assistance or help the government and the Americans,” Mr. Rahman, the farmer, said.

The population remains divided in its support for the Taliban, with a portion providing shelter and assistance to the militants and few daring to oppose them. In some places, people are still lining up for aid, indicating a certain resistance to Taliban strictures.

But many repeat the Taliban contention that the Americans are bent on long-term occupation of Afghanistan and seek to eradicate their religion, Islam, and impose an alien, Western-style democracy.

Villagers complained of indignities imposed by the foreign forces, the arrest and killing of civilians, house searches that violate the ethnic Pashtuns’ sense of honor and the sanctity of the home, and checkpoints where they are forced to lift up their shirts, which is deeply shaming for Afghans, to show that they are not carrying explosives.

Yet they also say that the American Marines are good with the people, only shoot at those who shoot at them, and are showing greater restraint than the British forces who came before them. Farmers tell stories of how the Marines pursue Taliban fighters but leave the farm workers alone, and how in the last week four known insurgents have been killed in airstrikes as they were laying roadside bombs at night.

Nevertheless Afghans express frustration that the American military, which defeated the Taliban so resoundingly in 2001, cannot clear Marja, a district of 100 square miles, of Taliban insurgents that residents estimate number no more than 200.

More Taliban fighters have arrived in recent weeks, slipping in with the itinerant laborers who came to work the poppy harvest and staying on to fight, villagers and officials said. Haji Gul Muhammad Khan, tribal adviser to the governor of Helmand Province, said he had reports of Taliban arriving in the area in the last three or four days.

Everyone in Marja knows the Taliban, since they are village men who never left the area although they quit fighting soon after the military operation. Gradually they found a stealthier way of operating, moving around in small groups, often by motorbike or on foot.

They fire several shots at an American patrol and then flee, or throw aside their weapons and pick up spades, posing as innocent farmers. At least three midlevel Taliban commanders were seen operating in the area in recent weeks, moving among the farms, staying in different houses every night, and asking for food and shelter from the villagers as they go.

The villagers do not dare give them away to the Americans because they are local men and can exact revenge, villagers said.

“We know who the Taliban are,” said Muhammad Ismail, 35, a farmer from Loye Charahi said. “When they attack the police or the Americans, they put down their weapons and sit down with ordinary people. We cannot say a word against them, they know us and we know them pretty well. We know Taliban are killing people and threatening people, but we cannot stand against them, or tell Americans or police about their whereabouts.”

Mr. Khan, the governor’s adviser, expects a further exodus of civilians. “People are just waiting for the harvest to be over and then they will leave,” he said.

C. J. Chivers and an Afghan employee of The New York Times contributed reporting from Marja, and Taimoor Shah from Lashkar Gah.

[buglerbilly]

Nice video of the Canadians in Afghanistan............turn the sound off first WHY people think LOUD Gotterdamerung musik is sensible to use is beyond my reasoning..................

[Deks]

I didn't mind it to be honest! Definitely a personal taste thing though. Good find! 6 minutes long but worth watching. :)

[buglerbilly]

Wolftrap will have enjoyed that video!

[buglerbilly]

Pakistani news presenter accused of link to Taliban hostage's murder

Leaked audio tape purportedly reveals phone conversation between Hamid Mir and a Taliban spokesman about hostage

Declan Walsh in Lahore guardian.co.uk, Monday 17 May 2010 19.50 BST


The Pakistani journalist Hamid Mir. Photograph: Getty Images

Pakistan's pugnacious media world was plunged into controversy today when a leaked audio tape apparently linked its most popular television presenter with the execution of a Taliban hostage.

The tape purports to be a recording of a phone conversation between the journalist, Hamid Mir, and a Taliban spokesman about the fate of Khalid Khawaja, a former intelligence agent being held by the Taliban.

In the tape Mir describes Khawaja as a CIA collaborator, questions his Islamic credentials, and accuses him of playing a treacherous role in the 2007 Red Mosque siege in which more than 100 people, including the chief cleric, were killed. When the abductor asks the journalist whether Khawaja should be released, he urges him to further interrogate him.

Last month Khawaja's bullet-pocked body was found on a roadside in Waziristan with a warning note to other "American spies".

As debate about the tape swirled in media circles, Mir issued a strenuous denial saying the tape had been fabricated by his enemies in government to destroy his reputation and silence him.

"I never said these things to these people. This is a concocted tape," he told the Guardian. "They took my voice, sampled it and manufactured this conspiracy against me."

But several senior journalists said the tape sounded authentic and one called on the government to investigate further. "There are serious allegations to be answered," said Rashed Rahman, editor of the English-language Daily Times newspaper. "If this tape turns out to be genuine, it suggests a journalist instigated the murder of a kidnapee. A line must be drawn somewhere."

The Taliban added to the controversy by issuing a statement that denied the tape was real but, confusingly, threatened the state telephone company for having taped the conversation.

The acrid arguments have thrown Pakistan's normally tight-knit media community into a spin as some of the country's most contentious issues – militancy, politics and the role of the powerful, overwhelmingly rightwing media – have come into focus around the death of Khawaja, a controversial figure in his own right.

Khawaja, a former Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) agent and chief co-ordinator of a human rights group, who claimed to have met Osama bin Laden, travelled to the tribal belt in March with Sultan Amir Tarar, another former ISI agent, and Asad Qureshi, a documentary filmmaker. Khawaja had promised the journalist an interview with Hakimullah Mehsud, the Taliban leader who was almost killed in a CIA drone strike in northwestern Pakistan in January.

However, the three men were kidnapped, and the Taliban demanded money and prisoners in return for their freedom.

On 24 April the Taliban issued a video showing a strained-looking Khawaja admitting to having worked for the CIA and betrayed the Red Mosque clerics.

A week later, after his execution, Mir wrote a detailed account of Khawaja's life. He recycled the allegations against the former ISI agent, attributing them to militant sources.

Mir has vowed to take his critics to court, but for now the controversy is playing out on the pages of the Pakistani press. Mir said the recording had been doctored by the Federal Investigation Agency, a security agency that has been frequently attacked by the Taliban.

But he said the slurs had been politically orchestrated by the Punjab governor, Salman Taseer, and Pakistan's ambassador to the US, Husain Haqqani, who, he said, had released the tape on a blog.

"This blog has a personal grudge against me and it is being operated from Washington by our ambassador, Husain Haqqani," he said.

Haqqani said: "We do not dignify conspiracy theories with comment." He denied any role in the tape recording.

Some Pakistani television channels have carried the allegations but others have avoided it. "

"For too long we have protected our own," said Rahman. "Now we have to speak out." Mir said he was instituting legal proceedings against the Daily Times.

Khalid Khawaja's wife declined to comment. "I don't want to say anything," she said. "This is a very, very dirty conspiracy and I don't want to indulge in it."

[buglerbilly]

News Alert: Taliban bombing kills 18, including 5 U.S. troops

06:16 AM EDT Tuesday, May 18, 2010
--------------------

A Taliban suicide car bomber struck a NATO convoy in Kabul Tuesday, killing six of its service members, five of them American, officials said. Twelve Afghan civilians also died - many of them in a public bus in rush hour traffic.

Forty-seven other people were wounded in the blast, the first major attack in the capital since February when suicide bombers struck two small hotels in the city center. That attack killed 16 people and led Afghan police to pledge that they would tighten security and surveillance.

[buglerbilly]

More detail on this..............

Taliban suicide attack on NATO kills 18 in Kabul

SARDAR AHMAD

May 18, 2010 - 8:59PM

A suicide car bomber attacked a NATO convoy in the Afghan capital on Tuesday, killing six foreign soldiers and at least 12 Afghan civilians in one of the deadliest strikes on Kabul in more than a year.

The Taliban, which is leading a nearly nine-year insurgency against the Western-backed government and US-led military, claimed responsibility for the bomb, which followed a pledge to unleash a new nationwide campaign of attacks.

The bomber detonated a vehicle packed with explosives, reducing the busy rush hour to blood and chaos on a clogged street near parliament, a hospital run by foreigners, an army recruitment centre and the ministry of water and energy.

The American University of Afghanistan is just across the road and the Kabul museum about 100 metres away.

The NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) confirmed one of its convoys had been hit and said six international soldiers were killed.

"Six international service members were killed and several wounded when a suicide vehicle-born improvised explosive device exploded near an ISAF convoy and civilian vehicles," ISAF said in a statement.

Interior ministry spokesman Zemarai Bashary said at least 12 civilians were killed and 47 others wounded, most of whom had been travelling in a bus that passed when the suicide bomber blew up a car packed with explosives.

Children and women were among the dead and wounded, Bashary said.

Afghan army chief military doctor, General Ahmad Zia Yaftali said initially that at least 20 people died.

Ambulances were seen speeding off carrying the wounded through Kabul streets heavily clogged with traffic, an AFP reporter said.

Several SUV-style vehicles, of the type used by Western military troops and diplomats, were damaged at the bomb site, where Afghan and American security forces were investigating, an AFP photographer said.

Tuesday's bombing was the first major attack in Kabul since February 26 when Taliban suicide bombers targeted guesthouses, killing 16 people including Westerners and Indians in one of the deadliest attacks on foreigners.

On October 8, 2009 a massive suicide bomb killed 17 people near the Indian embassy in Kabul. On February 11, 2009, the Taliban launched suicide bomb and gun attacks on three Afghan government buildings, killing at least 26 people.

Zabihullah Mujahed, a Taliban spokesman called AFP from an undisclosed location to claim responsibility.

"The attack, which was a suicide car bomb, was carried out by one of our mujahedeen (holy warriors)," he said.

The Taliban had vowed to unleash a new nationwide campaign of attacks from May 10 that would target diplomats, members of the Afghan parliament and foreign contractors as well as foreign forces in Afghanistan.

The militia is waging an increasingly deadly insurgency and attacks have increased over the past 12 months in the heavily guarded capital.

Last month, Afghan authorities announced the arrest of nine would-be suicide bombers who were allegedly plotting attacks on "strategic targets" in Kabul.

The men, aged between 16 and 55, were arrested during a coordinated operation that included raids on at least one madrassa, or religious school, in the capital, a spokesman for the country's spy agency said.

So far this year, 208 NATO soldiers have died according to an AFP tally, marking the deadliest January to mid-May period in the war, as the Taliban fight escalates and the West pours thousands more troops into battle.

From January to end-May 2009, 119 NATO soldiers died in Afghanistan. Overall, 520 NATO troops died in 2009, the deadliest year so far for US-led foreign troops since the 2001 US-led invasion brought down the Taliban regime.

Since summer 2009, one or two NATO soldiers have died on average each day. The United States and its NATO allies are increasing to 150,000 their military deployment in Afghanistan. About two-thirds of the troops are American.

The United States believes the troop "surge" can wrest the initiative from the Taliban in key population centres and allow American forces to start withdrawing from the unpopular and costly conflict next year.

© 2010 AFP

[buglerbilly]

Pakistani Site: Drones Only Killed One Terrorist in 2010 (If You Don’t Count Taliban)

By Noah Shachtman May 18, 2010 | 11:07 am



Read one American analysis, and you’ll be told that U.S. drones haven’t killed a single civilian in Pakistan this year. A look through one pair of local eyes yields a very different result, however. According to the website Pakistan Body Count, America’s drones have only hit a single terrorist in 2010, while slaying dozens and dozens of innocents.

http://www.longwarjournal.org/pakistan-strikes.php

http://pakistanbodycount.org/drn.php

Both Pakistan Body Count, run by computer science professor Zeeshan-ul-hassan Usmani, and the Long War Journal, operated by former G.I. Bill Roggio, rely on the same data: local news accounts. But the two sites use startlingly different methodologies to reach their results. Roggio only counts civilian deaths if they’re specifically mentioned in the news stories. Usmani figures that all reported “Taliban” are, in fact, civilians. It’s a questionable assumption, all-but-discounting the possibility of drones hitting home-grown militants. Nevertheless, the site provides a look at how the U.S. drone strikes are perceived in the country where the Hellfire missiles land.

“Literally the Arabic word ‘Talib’ means student, so ‘Taliban’ means students. Almost 100% of the population of [these] areas go to the local Madarasah for their basic education,” he tells Danger Room. “Therefore we can surely categorize every single habitant of these areas as ‘Talibans.’”

Usmani, an American-educated researcher now working at Ghulam Ishaq Khan Institute in Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province, also uses his site to decry the terrorist attacks in his country. “Whether it is a suicide bombing or an attack by a flying drone, for me it’s the same, a Pakistani got killed,” Pakistan Body Count declares on its home page.

But Usmani doesn’t see a connection between the remotely-piloted airstrikes and the explosive vests. “I highly doubt that U.S. drones are doing anything to stop suicide bombing, as it is evident from the data, the number of suicide bombing is almost directly proportional to the drones attacks. More drones, and we have more SB [suicide bomb] attack[s] in our country,” he e-mails.

Usmani says his site gets about 15,000 visitors a week. His tallies of innocent deaths are wildly different from the estimates produced by the Long War Journal and the New America Foundation. But Usmani’s dark analysis is similar to other Pakistani reports. According to The News of Pakistan, “US drones killed 123 civilians [and] three al-Qaeda men in January.” Dawn’s account is even more morbid: “For each Al Qaeda and Taliban terrorist killed by US drones, 140 innocent Pakistanis also had to die.”

Last month, Faisal Shahzad attempted to bomb Times Square — allegedly as some sort of revenge for drone attacks in Pakistan. That caused the political class in Washington to finally starting wondering whether the unmanned strikes might be driving Pakistani public opinion towards the militants. Read sites like Usman’s, and it’s clear that the resentment has been building for a long time.

[Photo: USAF]

Read More http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/05/pak-site-drones-only-killed-one-terrorist-in-2010-if-you-dont-count-taliban/#more-24898#ixzz0oKOo1jhW

[buglerbilly]

Germany Deploys More Fighting Equipment to Afghanistan

By ALBRECHT MüLLER

Published: 18 May 2010 15:35

BERLIN - After the mid-April decision to deploy Panzerhaubitze 2000 self-propelled guns to the north of Afghanistan, German Defense Secretary Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg announced additional heavy materiel, such as infantry fighting vehicles (IFV), also would be sent.

While emphasizing this does not represent a general arms build-up, he told the German weekly magazine Focus that another 15 Marder IFVs would be transported to the north of Afghanistan. In addition, the Bundeswehr troops would be equipped with Panzerschnellbrücke 2 vehicle-launched bridges and Dachs tracked engineer tanks.

According to the Bundeswehr Operations Command, Bundeswehr troops in Afghanistan have 10 Marder IFVs with Büffel tracked salvage tanks. Including about 100 Fuchs armored personnel carriers and about 200 Dingo protected wheeled vehicles, the military has about 1,000 protected vehicles on location.

While the IFVs and self-propelled guns start heading toward the Hindu Kush, the Bundeswehr still has no plans to send its heaviest weapon, the Leopard 2 main battle tank, according to a Bundeswehr Operations Command spokesperson.

[buglerbilly]

Taliban militants attack NATO Afghan military base

May 19, 2010 - 1:29PM

Seven Taliban militants were killed and at least five NATO personnel wounded in clashes at Bagram military base in northern Afghanistan on Wednesday, NATO said.

The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack, saying 20 suicide bombers took part in the assault, which began overnight.

"Seven insurgents have been killed during an ongoing attack on Bagram that included rockets, small arms and grenades," NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) said in a statement.

"Five service members were wounded."

Zabihullah Mujahid, a spokesman for the Taliban leadership, told AFP: "Twenty Taliban suicide bombers attacked the base in Bagram."

"Four suicide bombers activated their explosive belts and fighting is continuing at the base," Mujahid said.

Bagram, around 60 kilometres (35 miles) north of Kabul, is a huge NATO airbase. International forces also have a prison at the site, opened following the fall of the Taliban regime in late 2001.

Wednesday's attack came after attacks on Tuesday left eight NATO soldiers dead.

A car bomb attack claimed by the Taliban killed at least 18 people, including six troops -- five US and one Canadian.

NATO said another two soldiers had been killed in the south of the country on Tuesday, one by an improvised explosive device, the weapon of choice for Taliban insurgents, and one by small arms fire.

At least 210 NATO soldiers, 130 of them from the United States, have died in the war so far this year. It has been the deadliest January to May period since a US-led invasion brought down the Taliban regime.

© 2010 AFP

[buglerbilly]

U.S. Delivers New Helicopters to Pakistan Army

(Source: US Embassy in Pakistan; issued May 18, 2010)

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan --- The United States government delivered two Bell 412 EP helicopters to the Government of Pakistan today to assist the Pakistan military in its counterinsurgency efforts.

U.S. Army Brig. Gen. Michael Nagata handed over the helicopters to Brig. Gen. Tippu Karim, 101 Army Aviation commander, during a signing ceremony at Qasim Army Air Base near Rawalpindi, Pakistan.

The U.S. purchased the two enhanced-performance utility transport helicopters, valued at $24 million, to support Pakistan's counterinsurgency operations. The U.S. also provided $20 million in associated spare parts, special tools and other equipment to support the aircraft.

"The purchase of the aircraft demonstrates the United States' full commitment to a stable, long-term strategic partnership with Pakistan-one based on shared interests and mutual respect that will continue to expand and deepen in future years," Brig. Gen. Nagata said during the ceremony.

During the last three years, U.S. civilian and security assistance to Pakistan has totaled more than $4 billion. Assistance provided and delivered has included support for medical aid, school refurbishment, bridge and well reconstruction, food distribution, agricultural and education projects.

Specific security assistance includes 14 F-16 fighter aircraft, 10 Mi-17 helicopters, more than 450 vehicles for Pakistan's Frontier Corps, hundreds of night vision goggles, day/night scopes, radios, and thousands of protective vests and first-aid items for Pakistan's security forces.

In addition, the U.S. funded and provided training for more than 370 Pakistani military officers in a wide range of leadership and development programs covering topics such as counterterrorism, intelligence, logistics, medical, flight safety, and military law.

-ends-

[buglerbilly]

Alenia North America Delivers Fifth C-27/G.222 Aircraft for the Afghanistan National Army Air Corps

(Source: Alenia Aeronautica; dated May 17, issued May 18, 2010)

CAPODICHINO (Naples), Italy --- Alenia North America, a subsidiary of Alenia Aeronautica and a part of the Finmeccanica Group, delivered the fifth Afghanistan National Army Air Corps (ANAAC) C-27/G.222 aircraft to the United States Air Force.

The remanufactured and modernized airlifter was delivered at the end of April and was immediately deployed to Kabul, Afghanistan to join the other four aircraft. The aircraft is the fifth of 18 C-27/G.222 aircraft ordered by the United States Air Force to be delivered at Alenia’s Capodichino facility near Naples, Italy.

Alenia North America began delivery of the aircraft in September 2009 and deliveries are scheduled to continue through 2011. The aircraft are currently flying with the Combined Air Power Transition Force (CAPTF) and the Afghanistan National Army Air Corp (ANAAC) in Kabul, Afghanistan. The United States Air Advisor crews are trained on the C-27/G.222 by Alenia Aeronautica in Capodichino, Naples.

About the C-27/G.222 ANAAC Program

In 2008, Alenia North America was awarded a contract by the United States Air Force to supply 18 refurbished C-27/G.222 aircraft for the Afghanistan National Army Air Corps (ANAAC). The 18 refurbished aircraft will be used by the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan. They will be transferred by the Combined Air Power Transition Force in Kabul to the reconstructed ANAAC.

The C-27/G.222 will serve as the back bone of the ANAAC and aid significantly through expanding its capability to provide humanitarian aid and security to the Afghan population throughout the country.

Alenia North America, as prime contractor, is responsible for program management while the aircraft are being refurbished and modernized by its parent company Alenia Aeronautica in its Capodichino facility near Naples, Italy. Logistical support in Afghanistan will be carried out by L-3 Vertex Aerospace.

-ends-

[buglerbilly]

Camp Bastion Doubles In Size

(Source: UK Ministry of Defence; issued May 18, 2010)

Camp Bastion, the lynchpin of British and, increasingly, American operations in Helmand, is a desert metropolis, complete with airport, that is expanding at a remarkable pace.

Bastion exists for one reason: to be the logistics hub for operations in Helmand. Supply convoys and armoured patrols regularly leave its heavily-defended gates. They support the military forward operating bases, patrol bases and checkpoints spread across Helmand province.

Colonel Angus Mathie is the officer in charge of the British-owned and run camp. His main role is to ensure the base is secure. He also keeps a hand on the tiller of development, deciding where people are going to live, and if someone wants to move a unit somewhere it's the Colonel who gives them the OK.

It is also Colonel Mathie's office that provides all the administrative support to all the units in Bastion, everything from cashing cheques to organising leave.

Speaking about the area where Camp Bastion has been built, Colonel Mathie says:
"Whoever picked this bit of ground really got it right. It's right in the middle of the desert and the Russians were never here, so there is no legacy of unexploded ordnance."

The UK's largest military base and centre of operations in Afghanistan needs that desert. The camp has doubled in size during the past year. Following the surge of 12,000 US troops who share it, Bastion now accommodates 21,000 people:

"It's one thing looking at Bastion on a map," says Colonel Mathie, "it's another thing driving around it. People returning who were here a year ago are absolutely amazed because it is so much bigger."

Leatherneck, the American camp-within-a-camp, was built to accommodate the surge troops. Now, this mega-base spreads across 35 square kilometres: "There was an argument that it should be in Lashkar Gah, among the people," Colonel Mathie says. "But we could never have put this there."

The wide open spaces around the camp are largely empty terrain. Within the perimeter, graded roads with ditches on either side divide prefab buildings and tents erected to a strict grid system.

Bastion's airfield handles around 600 fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft movements every day:
"It's a remarkable place," says the Colonel, "busier than Luton or Stansted, and it's twice as busy now as it was three months ago. Most movements are helicopters, but they are just as demanding as fixed-wing aircraft."

Providing protection to every British aircraft arriving or leaving Bastion is the RAF Regiment who patrol out on the ground to make sure nobody can take a shot.

Bastion is home to around 5,000 UK military personnel from more than 60 Navy, Army and RAF units. There are also some 2,000 contractors providing a multitude of services, from building maintenance to catering. The Americans, in the fully incorporated Camp Leatherneck, number around 14,000.

The waste created by so many people is disposed of in eight incinerators and a burn pit. There is also a water bottling plant, providing drinking water sourced from the Hindu Kush.

Colonel Mathie explains how he keeps his finger on the pulse from day-to-day:
"Every morning at 8.30 I meet with representatives from every unit in Bastion, including the Americans, Danes and Estonians. We give them an intelligence update, an operations update and the weather. Then we get an update on what they're doing."

The sheer size and importance of the base means that security is the thought preoccupying Colonel Mathie and many of his staff, from the moment they wake until their eyes close at the end of the long days.

The perimeter fence winds its way over many kilometres, traversing guard towers, weapons pits and sangars. Sensitive long-range cameras and radars scan the surrounding area for suspicious movements that might presage attacks, and seemingly these precautions have been effective:

"Attacks on Bastion happen very rarely," Colonel Mathie says. "The main threat here is from IEDs and we've had a number in the nearby wadi over the last few months. During Operation MOSHTARAK there was a half-hearted attempt to throw some rockets at us, but none of them hit the camp. We have force protection teams and a patrol base to the south of here, which is manned 24-hours-a-day."

Commander Bastion, as the Colonel is known, likens the sprawling military base to a medieval fort: "People outside have moved towards the edges of the base because of the security afforded by it, in the same way that settlements would develop around castles." He points to a patch of greenery a short distance outside the wire belonging to a local farmer, who has cultivated melons on ground irrigated by water flowing from Bastion.

The melons are sold to the drivers of the vehicles delivering stores to the camp, but official trade with such farmers is out of the question says Colonel Mathie:

"We have to be very careful about any local produce - the security implications of buying our food locally are just too many." But there has to be interaction with local people. The main entry point to Bastion processes around 250 vehicles every day, including about 50 tankers bringing in the fuel needed to run generators, kitchens and vehicles. All must be searched by soldiers and military search dogs before they are allowed onto the base.

In a bid to loosen the log jam without compromising security, a 3.5m gallon fuel depot is being built just outside the camp. A pipeline will run from there to Bastion's diesel and petrol pumps, removing the need for tankers to drive onto the base:

"The fewer vehicles we have to bring in here the better," says the Colonel. There are also hundreds of local people employed to work within the wire:
"We run checks through the intelligence services, and RAF Police and Royal Military Police also vet people regularly," he explains.

Locally-employed civilians live in a camp within the camp: "They are not allowed to be roaming the streets of Bastion after 1900hrs. There's a curfew and we keep a tight grip on it," says Colonel Mathie.

Colonel Mathie says that if anyone tries to fire a rocket at Camp Bastion from outside the wire, radar will detect where it's going to land, and if that's within 800m of the perimeter, the warning alarm automatically sounds so everyone can take cover.

There are though also threats to personnel inside the wire and road traffic accidents are a concern to the Colonel:

"This is a very dangerous environment, if only because we're expanding and we've got lots of construction traffic. Visibility can be less than 50 metres."

The camp, its airfield and the surrounding 670-kilometre area of operations are regularly patrolled by the RAF Regiment, RAF Police and US Marines. Co-operation with the Americans is complete, but there are differences: "They are slightly more expeditionary over in Leatherneck," says Colonel Mathie. "It's the only place I've been to in my military career where we are more comfortable than the Americans.

"Compared to a patrol base, it's luxury. The facilities are good, considering we're stuck in the middle of the Afghan desert. It's a good place to come to get a bit of rest if you have been at one of the patrol bases. However, I wouldn't want it to be so comfortable that it had an adverse effect on operational efficiency."

This is an amalgamation of two articles first published in Defence Focus magazine.

-ends-

[buglerbilly]

Gitmo Shutdown Means More Drone Strikes, Officials Claim

By Noah Shachtman May 19, 2010 | 1:02 pm



The White House has essentially forced the Pentagon and the CIA to fire off more and more drone strikes in Pakistan, because of “executive orders to ban secret CIA detention centers and close the Guantanamo Bay prison camp.”

It’s one of a number of remarkable assertions military and intelligence officials make to Reuters’ Adam Entous in this monster of an article.

Some current and former counterterrorism officials say an unintended consequence of these decisions may be that capturing wanted militants has become a less viable option. As one official said: “There is nowhere to put them.”

A former U.S. intelligence official, who was involved in the process until recently, said: “I got the sense: ‘What the hell do we do with this guy if we get him?’ It’s not the primary consideration but it has to be a consideration.”

In certain military circles, that’s certainly the view; if the two choices in dealing with an enemy are “kill” or “capture,” the lethal option gets more attractive as the non-lethal one gets seemingly more difficult.

But the real swap here isn’t secret jails for drone attacks. It’s counterterrorism for undeclared war.

Consider: of the 500 or more people that American drones have killed in Pakistan since 2008, U.S. officials tell Reuters, only 14 were top terrorist targets. Another 25 were mid-level jihadists. The rest were civilians and militant joe schmoes.

So it’s not like all these guerrillas in Pakistan would’ve been sent to Gitmo. Since 2001, only 775 alleged terrorists have been shipped there, total. America wasn’t about to add another 500 detainees in a year and a half. And it’s not like there aren’t options besides Gitmo and black sites for holding militants.

The 500 killed in Pakistan - the vast majority them aren’t jihadist masterminds. They’re nameless foot-soldiers in a guerrilla conflict. And in a war like that, the two sides tend to exchange fire. On the other side of the Afghanistan/Pakistan border, American forces shoot at their enemies, mostly with helicopters and mortars and small-arms fire. In Pakistan, American forces use armed drones as their weapons of choice. That’s because of our political leadership’s reluctance to put too many ground troops in Pakistan; the reluctance to keep detainees out of Gitmo is a secondary consideration.

“As of May 3, American unmanned systems had carried out 131 known airstrikes into Pakistan, well over triple the number we did with manned bombers in the opening round of the Kosovo War just a decade ago,” Danger Room pal and Wired for War author Peter Singer notes. “By the old standards, this would be viewed as a war.”

[Photo: USAF]

Read More http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/05/gitmo-shutdown-means-more-drone-strikes-officials-claim/#more-24996#ixzz0oQ33fbUT

[buglerbilly]

Taliban Stages Big Attack on (Allegedly) Pro-U.S. Ground

By Nathan Hodge May 19, 2010 | 12:18 pm



This wasn’t supposed to happen here. U.S. forces and the people living around the massive Bagram Air Field got along, allegedly. They cooperated on all kinds of projects. Yet somehow, the Taliban managed to launch one of their biggest, most complex assaults of the year, on this seemingly-friendly ground. Now, one American contractor is dead and a dozen U.S. troops are wounded.

Taliban insurgents sporadically launch rocket attacks against the sprawling base, which was originally built by the Soviets during their war against the U.S.-backed mujahideen in the 1980s. Most of those attacks are ineffective, but this takes things to a new level. For starters, this is in relatively peaceful Parwan Province, not Afghanistan’s violent south. And it points to a much more worrisome issue: The state of relations between the coalition and the local population.

This past summer, I spent some time with soldiers of the 82nd Division Special Troops Battalion, who helped patrol some of the surrounding communities as part of what the military calls “Bagram outreach.” The coalition runs a variety of development schemes in the area, spending money to pave roads, refurbish schools and dig wells. It’s not done out of altruism: The military wants people in local communities to tell them where insurgents can stash rockets or bomb-making materials, and spreading around development funds is part of the intel-collection process.

An example: I went on an operation in the village of Gojurkhel, which had been identified as a point of origin for a recent rocket attack. U.S. troops had first swept the village with the Afghan National Police and with working dogs; they then followed with a KLE (”key leader engagement”) and HA (”humanitarian assistance”) mission. The whole point was to deny sanctuary to insurgents in a settlement just outside the base, and hopefully win a few friends.

Some of the outreach is focused on ethnic Pashtun communities, which feel they have been left out of the local reconstruction bonanza. I tagged along with a U.S. company commander, who set up a KLE with elders in the village of Qaleh Dewana. As he explained the mission to me, Qaleh Dewana had been overlooked in the past by coalition patrols, and he wanted to build rapport in an community that is key to base security. (Air Force troops, incidentally, are taking a greater share of this mission: The video embedded here, shot by David Axe, features interviews with some of the Bagram security force.)

The fact, then, that the Taliban were able to stage a complex assault — instead of just propping up rockets and setting them off by timer — is troubling. It suggests that insurgents were able to move around the communities near Bagram, perhaps relying on local supporters.

Regardless of how the attack was staged, the base’s relationship with the local population has sometimes been fraught. Back in 2005, a large riot broke out outside the gates after detention of six villagers by U.S. forces during operations in the neighboring province. The presence of a large detention facility — which the military is apparently expanding — may also be a sore point. Allegations of prisoner abuse there, including the brutal deaths of two detainees in 2002, probably haven’t help burnish Bagram’s reputation.

[VIDEO: David Axe/War Is Boring]

Read More http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/05/taliban-stages-big-attack-on-allegedly-us-friendly-ground/#more-24994#ixzz0oQ3cqQjM

[buglerbilly]

RAF's Reaper logs 10,000 hours over Afghanistan

An Equipment and Logistics news article

19 May 10

The RAF's Reaper programme has achieved the milestone of providing more than 10,000 hours of armed overwatch in support of UK and coalition forces in Afghanistan.


Royal Air Force Reaper Remotely Piloted Air System
[Picture: Antony Loveless, Crown Copyright/MOD 2008]

The UK Reaper Remotely Piloted Air System (RPAS) has been deployed to Afghanistan since October 2007 and provides a persistent, armed intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capability.

Since November 2009, Reaper has been supporting operations 24-hours-a-day and more Reaper Remotely Piloted Aircraft are planned to be delivered later this year.

The RPAS is an integral part of the UK's air power capability. Procured to meet an urgent operational requirement, Reaper is the only RPAS currently in service with the RAF.

Air Vice-Marshal Baz North, Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, said:

"10,000 hours in direct support of operations is a significant milestone.

"There's no doubt that this cutting-edge capability is saving lives and making a difference to those in danger in Afghanistan."
Wing Commander Jules Ball

"Our experience of operating RPAS has confirmed that they have unique capabilities that complement those of traditional combat and ISR platforms; maximum effect is achieved by employing them in a mixed grouping.

"This network-enabled force has delivered a comprehensive combat ISTAR capability that provides assured intelligence and situational awareness across the full range of operating environments, through the employment and integration of air, space and cyber systems."

Reaper is flown by 39 Squadron via satellite from a UK operations facility at Creech Air Force Base in the Nevada desert, and provides a range of ISR products to troops on the ground and operational headquarters.

Its primary role is ISR but from May 2008 the system has been armed with Hellfire missiles and laser-guided bombs to enable it to better meet the requirements of ground commanders.

The rules of engagement used for Reaper weapon releases are no different to those used for manned combat aircraft; the weapons are all precision-guided, and every effort is made to ensure the risk of collateral damage and civilian casualties is minimised, including deciding not to release a weapon.


[I]A Royal Air Force 39 Squadron Reaper is unloaded of its offensive weapons at Kandahar Airfield after completing another mission over Afghanistan
[Picture: Corporal Steve Bain RAF, Crown Copyright/MOD 2009]

Wing Commander Jules Ball, Officer Commanding 39 Squadron, said:

"The squadron's personnel, from pilots to imagery analysts and support teams, are motivated and dedicated to supporting all our coalition forces and the people of Afghanistan; everyone has played a significant part in the delivery of this landmark achievement. It's absolutely clear that the Reaper plays a vital role in delivering Air's contribution to operations in Afghanistan.

"Our involvement has increased steadily since the MQ-9 Reaper's introduction into the RAF inventory. In fact, in the last 12 months alone, 39 Squadron has more than doubled its operational flying output.

"By supporting coalition forces every minute of every day, there's no doubt that this cutting-edge capability is saving lives and making a difference to those in danger in Afghanistan."

This article was first published in RAF News, Voice of the Royal Air Force, on 7 May 2010.

[buglerbilly]

Human Terrain Teams MIA in Afghanistan?

By admin May 20, 2010 | 8:04 am



The ‘Security Crank’ is a former employee of the Army’s Human Terrain System, now working in the bowels of the national security establishment. This is the Crank’s first post for Danger Room.

How do you properly vet the insurgents you’re trying to “win over” to your side? Is simply promising not to attack your forces enough, or should you press for a formal integration with the government? At what point do a militant’s activities make him irredeemable?

Those are just some of the difficult choices facing U.S. military commanders in Afghanistan – questions explored in a fine, fine dispatch by the Washington Post’s Greg Jaffe. In it, he tells the tale of Lieutenant Colonel Robert Brown, who led a group of soldiers during last year’s insurgent assault on Camp Keating, in Kamdesh district of Nuristan province. After the attack, Lt. Col. Brown faced a difficult choice: whether or not to align himself with a local warlord and militant, Mullah Sadiq, who promised to repel future Taliban attacks.

It seems like the sorts of question were designed to be answered by the Human Terrain System. HTS is the famously controversial U.S. Army program to embed various types of social scientists with Brigade Combat Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan. Ostensibly, these Human Terrain Teams should be out, canvassing the local population to gauge their interests, feelings, and preferences. The local HTT is conspicuously absent from Jaffe’s account of the events following the Kamdesh attack.

Yet the questions Lt. Col. Brown seems desperate to answer—why was Mullah Sadiq first trusted, then distrusted, then blacklisted, and later trusted again by U.S. forces, for example—are the kinds of questions HTTs have answered elsewhere.

Jaffe has indirectly raised similar questions before. In the series he wrote on the Battle of Wanat last year, he highlighted Lt. Col. William Ostlund, who ran the battalion responsible for the Wanat base, as saying some troubling things about the locals. “It was a population I really had a hard time understanding and did not respect,” he is quoted as saying. Connecting them to the central government, Ostlund said, “would be the first step to making them better people, less of a threat to themselves.”

There is a HTT active in the area (Wanat and Kamdesh are both in the south of Nuristan, with Kamdesh right along the eastern border with Pakistan). They were an active presence at Brigade headquarters at Forward Operating Base Fenty in Jalalabad, and several of their personnel spent the majority of their time working these remote valleys to help soldiers get a better handle on social relationships and the general zeitgeist.

The HTT is conspicuously absent from Jaffe’s account of the Battle of Wanat as well. Lt. Col. Ostlund is not the only person in this story to write off everyone in the area as contemptible jackasses — Lt. Bromstrom, Jaffe’s main character, who died trying to rescue his men from the observation post above Want, said something similar. When his father asked him how he knew the people he bombed were bad guys or just locals burying their dead, Bromstrom replied, “They are all [expletive] Taliban up there.”

It is possible Jaffe simply didn’t know enough to ask about it—HTTs are not exactly high profile, despite an entrenched resistance to the project from some parts of academia. But it’s also possible the HTT just wasn’t involved in the broad events of their area, which is perhaps most worrying of all.

The recent complex attack on Bagram Air Field raises similarly troubling questions. As Nathan highlighted, “it suggests that insurgents were able to move around the communities near Bagram, perhaps relying on local supporters.” Rumors abound in the villages surrounding Bagram: lots of people think it a conspiracy they only get occasional electricity while the base has more than it knows what to do with. Some villages see ISAF patrols, at most, a few times a month. In 2009, bazaar merchants—the Friday bazaar inside the base, not the larger one outside the gates most Bagram residents cannot visit—darkly hinted that any Parwani had to pay a substantial bribe, thousands of dollars, just to get a job on the base.

In theory, the HTTs would able to offer advice and informed analysis to the various commanders making decisions about how to relate to these communities. Often, the commanders don’t even know enough to ask, and in at least a few cases, the HTTs don’t know how to “pitch” their services. As events in Nuristan indicate, even if there is an HTT in the area, their advice could fall on deaf ears. Worse still: if they are deliberately or even unintentionally excluded from the very process they were deployed to influence—then HTS as a whole is facing a much more serious problem: just what, exactly, are they expected to do?

It is a strategic issue HTS itself hasn’t seemed to work out. Nowhere in its documents can one find any firm doctrine (pdf) on how they should be used by Brigade commanders. And indeed, that was initially sold as its strength: the teams would be flexible enough to be used however a commander felt they could be most effective. But what if a commander sees no need for them? What if, as Lt. Col. Ostlund said, he felt no need to understand the people of his area? What if the teams themselves have no reliable way to pass along the information they collect?

These are the existential questions few seem willing to answer within the program. However good an idea it may be, if the commanders on the ground either don’t know how or refuse to utilize its components, it’s worth questioning what HTS’ purpose really is. In the case of Nuristan, it seems clear that tighter integration with the human terrain team could have possibly prevented some needless deaths, and at the very least helped commanders wrap their heads around what to do in the surrounding communities immediately afterward. But if HTTs aren’t doing their jobs, why are they even there?

[Photo: U.S. Army]

Read More http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/05/human-terrain-teams-mia-in-afghanistan/#more-25032#ixzz0oWKqPVvV

[buglerbilly]

House Panel Puts the Brakes on ‘Human Terrain’

By Noah Shachtman May 20, 2010 | 5:43 pm



The Army wants to expand its controversial social science program, the Human Terrain System, to 29 of its Brigade Combat Teams. The House Armed Service Committee isn’t so sure that’s a hot idea.

HTS, originally designed to provide cultural advisors to combat commanders, has been questioned from nearly every angle: the quality of its “experts”, the depth of its training, the utility to infantry leaders, the competency of its managers, the exposure of civilian researchers to hostile environments, the ethics of turning social science into military intelligence.

But despite high-profile missteps and tragedies, the Army’s leadership remains convinced that Human Terrain is worth it. As of this time last year, there were 21 Human Terrain Teams operating in Iraq and six in Afghanistan, each with five to nine members.

“We found that Human Terrain Teams have been very valuable in theater,” Army Deputy Chief of Staff Lt. General Robert Lennox tells Danger Room. “There is still work to be done on the number and location and how they will be used in the future. But this was clearly a recommendation of the TRADOC [Training and Doctrine Command] review team; they thought this was an enduring and valuable addition to a command.”

The House Armed Services Committee, in its version of the defense budget bill, says it “remains supportive” of HTS. But, as Spencer Ackerman points out, the committee says it will “limi[t] the obligation of funding”the project, until “the Army submits a required assessment of the program, provides revalidation of all existing operations requirements, and certifies Department‐level guidelines for the use of social scientists.”

Last year, the congressional defense committees asked for an “independent assessment” of HTS by March 1st, 2010, reviewing everything from “the adequacy of the management structure” to the “adequacy of human resourcing and recruiting efforts.” Apparently, that assessment hasn’t been delivered yet.

[Photo: U.S. Army]

Read More http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/#ixzz0oWLCKTf9

[buglerbilly]

From The Times May 21, 2010

Afghan officials met insurgent representatives in Maldives

Tom Coghlan, Kabul

An Afghan Government delegation has met representatives of Afghan insurgent groups in the Maldives, it was claimed yesterday, and is to do so again this weekend. The alleged talks were confirmed by Maldives Government officials.

Muhammad Zuhair, a Maldives Government spokesman, said that 15 Afghan government representatives took part with seven Taleban members. Tthe Afghan Government denied, however, that its representatives were present in the Maldives and insisted that its focus for a reconciliation with the Taleban and other groups remained the “Peace Jirga” of tribal representatives that is to be held in Kabul at the end of the month.

Other Afghan Government officials said that the talks were with Hizb-e-Islami, a militant group often allied to the Taleban which has armed groups in at least four eastern provinces of the country as well as parts of the north.

Hizb-e-Islami is led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the renegade warlord and former Afghan Prime Minister. Talks in the Maldives were also held in January.

Arsala Rahmani, an Afghan lawmaker and regular intermediary in back channel talks with the insurgency, said that Hekmatyar’s son-in-law, Humayoun Jareer, was leading the Hizb delegation.

A senior Hizb-e-Islami figure, Qaribul Rahman Sayad, who now lives in Belgium, denied that the talks were officially sanctioned by the group.

“Officially Hizb e-Islami is not involved in this but we have unofficial representatives there,” he said by telephone.

The Times understands that Afghan officials believe talks with Hizb e-Islami are very close to producing a deal under which the group’s armed wing would lay down its weapons and join a reintegration programme.

Though much smaller than the Taleban, officials believe such a development would give momentum to the wider Afghan Government reconciliation effort.

One senior Afghan official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said: “The inner circle of Hizb e-Islami will be reintegrated soon.” However, the official said that he did not believe that the leader of Hizb-e-Islami, Mr Hekmatyar, would feature in such a deal, describing him as “too explosive” a figure. Mr Hekmatyar’s forces were accused of numerous human rights abuses during Afghanistan’s civil war. Heand his followers switched allegiances repeatedly during the civil war period.

A legally recognised political wing of Hizb e-Islami, which claims to have no ties to the insurgency, enjoys significant support amongst conservative Afghans in urban and rural areas and claims to be the largest bloc in the Afghan parliament.

Relations between the Taleban and Hizb e-Islami groups have sometimes been strained and evenspilled over into violence. In March there were serious clashes between the two groups in Baghlan Province during which Hizb e-Islami militants reportedly contacted Nato forces offering to defect if Nato conducted airstrikes against their adversaries.

[buglerbilly]

Command and control changes in southern Afghanistan

A Military Operations news article

21 May 10

Changes to the command and control of ISAF forces in southern Afghanistan that will see the current Regional Command (South) split in two to better reflect the significant changes on the ground in recent months have been announced today.


The new ISAF Command and Control Structure
[Picture: Crown Copyright/MOD 2010]

The announcement from ISAF, the International Security Assistance Force, confirms that the present Regional Command (South) will be split into two new headquarters.

A new Regional Command (South West), based in Helmand, will oversee Helmand and Nimruz provinces; while the existing Regional Command (South), headquartered in Kandahar, will continue to control ISAF forces in Kandahar, Daykundi, Uruzgan and Zabul provinces.

This change, which is based on the military advice of ISAF commanders on the ground, reflects a number of significant changes over recent months and was welcomed today by the Defence Secretary, Dr Liam Fox.

The recent changes on the ground include a large increase in the number of ISAF troops in southern Afghanistan - up from 35,000 in October 2009 to over 50,000 by this summer - and a greater complexity in the conduct of operations, with major ongoing security efforts in Kandahar and central Helmand.

The new command structure will also enable a better alignment with Afghan National Army units, with 205 Corps continuing to work with Regional Command (South) and 215 Corps partnered with the new Regional Command (South West).

The decision to divide responsibility between the two headquarters will help provide the best focus of command support for ISAF forces across the region.


British troops talking with locals during a patrol through the village of Gorup-e Shalsh Kalay
[Picture: Corporal Barry Lloyd RLC, Crown Copyright/MOD 2010]

Secretary of State for Defence, Dr Liam Fox, said:

"I welcome these changes to the command and control of our forces in Afghanistan which are based on sound military rationale and are in the interests of the overall coalition strategy and mission.

"Through their sheer professionalism, bravery and sacrifice, British forces have made real progress in Helmand. They will continue to do so working alongside Afghan, American and other ISAF partners making up an international effort of more than 45 nations."

Major General Gordon Messenger, the Chief of the Defence Staff’s Strategic Communications Officer, said:

"This command and control change makes complete sense and is welcome. The span and complexity of the command challenge in southern Afghanistan has increased enormously in recent months and these changes provide the best command support to the troops on the ground.

"The change will also align the ISAF military structure in the south with the structure of the Afghan National Army, enabling a greater partnering capacity between ISAF and Afghan forces.

"The UK has been closely involved in the preparations for this change and entirely agrees with its rationale. We are well accustomed to operating within a multinational coalition command structure and are entirely content that the best interests of the UK force will be maintained under the new arrangements."

Looking to the future, Regional Command (South West) will operate under a rotational command, agreed in principle to be shared between US and UK forces. The first commander will be Major General Richard Mills of the US Marine Corps.

As part of the new arrangements, command and control boundaries will change within Helmand province.

Following the split, Task Force Helmand (TFH) will come under the command of the US Marine Corps' 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (1 MEF), under Major General Mills. TFH will retain responsibility for central Helmand.

Major General Richard Mills, Commanding General of 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward), said:

“Regional Command (South West) will ensure that ISAF and Afghan forces in Helmand and Nimruz provinces achieve the objectives of Operation MOSHTARAK, which are intended to assert the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's presence in the region.

"Since taking command six weeks ago I have been hugely impressed by the momentum and achievements of RC(S) under General Carter.

"My predecessors in the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade and the British troops of Task Force Helmand have distinguished themselves in the service of the Afghan people.

"Real progress is being made. This will be the first time that the USMC has led an ISAF Regional Command.

"The British officers in my coalition headquarters and Task Force Helmand bring invaluable experience and knowledge. We are partnered with ANSF at all levels and conducting joint operations throughout Helmand province.

"While tough fighting remains, I see evidence daily of progress that will bring about lasting stability across southern Afghanistan.

"This will be a significant year for the future of Afghanistan. Coalition forces, alongside our Afghan counterparts, will continue to support the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan as it delivers legitimate governance, improved security and lasting economic development."

Additionally, under the changes, the command of the 1,100-strong British battle group based in Sangin and Kajaki, will transfer from Task Force Helmand to the US-led Regimental Combat Team (North) which is taking on responsibility for the north of the province.

In common with the other changes to ISAF’s command structures, this transfer of command will take effect on 1st June and is intended to optimise the command support available to the troops on the ground in light of the increased number of ISAF troops and other operational assets.

ISAF intends for Regional Command (South West) to become fully operational later this summer. In order to ease transition, there will be an interim phase where 1 MEF will take responsibility for Helmand and Nimruz but will continue to work to Regional Command (South). This arrangement is planned to run from 1st June.

The UK-led provincial reconstruction team in Helmand will work closely with the headquarters of Regional Command (South West) and will continue its vital role in delivering governance and socio-economic development in the province.

UK forces are committed to their enduring deployment to central Helmand and there are no plans to deploy UK forces from Helmand to anywhere else.

[buglerbilly]

Ares

A Defense Technology Blog

ISAF Reshuffles

Posted by Nicholas Fiorenza at 5/21/2010 3:29 PM CDT

NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan is reorganizing to accommodate US reinforcements. Today, the North Atlantic Council, the alliance's highest decision-making body, gave the final go-ahead for the reorganisation of ISAF’s Regional Command South by spinning off a new Regional Command South-West.

Initially commanded by a US general, the new regional command will be responsible for Helmand and Nimruz provinces. Regional Command South, currently commanded by British Major General Nick Carter, will continue to be responsible for Kandahar, Uruzgan, Zabul and Daikundi provinces. The changes, which come into effect in the summer, are designed to ease the burden on and increase the effectiveness of Regional Command South, which currently commands over 50,000 ISAF troops and eight Afghan National Army brigades.

The changes are in addition to a German two-star general taking over command of Regional Command North, which has usually been headed by a one-star general. Spiegel magazine reported last month that this post will be occupied by Major General Hans Werner Fritz, who currently commands Germany's Special Operations Division. With a US Special Forces general as his deputy, Fritz will command some 5,000 US troops reinforcing Regional Command North, including Special Forces operating out of Mazar-e-Sharif. The Bundeswehr fears creeping US control of Regional Command North, according to Spiegel.

[buglerbilly]

From The Times May 22, 2010

Liam Fox flies to Afghanistan seeking to speed up troop withdrawal

Alice Thomson, Rachel Sylvester, Deborah Haynes

The Government hopes to speed up withdrawal of thousands of British troops from Afghanistan and has ruled out any move from Helmand province to neighbouring Kandahar.

In a significant shift from Labour’s foreign policy, Liam Fox, the Defence Secretary, said that Britain was not a “global policeman” and emphasised that the mission in Afghanistan was about making British streets safer rather than sending Afghan girls to school.

His comments, in an interview with The Times, came as the Ministry of Defence announced yesterday that 8,000 British troops in southern Afghanistan would come under the control of the US, a change that underlines Britain’s diminished role in the region.

Dr Fox, who is due to visit Afghanistan this weekend, plans to use the trip to explore ways to accelerate the departure of some 10,000 British troops. “We need to accept we are at the limit of numbers now and I would like the forces to come back as soon as possible,” he said.

General Stanley McChrystal, the US commander in Afghanistan, has said that by 2014 Afghans should be able to manage their own security. Dr Fox said: “That is something I will get a chance to look at. I want to talk to people on the ground, our trainers, to see whether there is room to accelerate it without diminishing the quality.” Dr Fox, who will be accompanied by William Hague, the Foreign Secretary, and Andrew Mitchell, the International Development Secretary, said that the Lib-Con coalition would impose clearer limits on the Afghan campaign.

“We have to reset expectations and timelines,” he said. “National security is the focus now. We are not a global policeman. We are not in Afghanistan for the sake of the education policy in a broken 13th-century country. We are there so the people of Britain and our global interests are not threatened.”

Despite speculation that British Forces would move to Kandahar to replace the Canadian mission that leaves in July, as favoured by some US and British commanders, Dr Fox said that UK troops would stay in Helmand. “It would be crazy to go somewhere else and start all over again,” he said.

On Iran, Dr Fox refused to rule out military action. “If Iran gets a nuclear weapon you are likely to see Saudi [Arabia], Egypt and other countries follow suit and we will bequeath to the next generation a nuclear arms race in the world’s most unstable region,” he said.

The first UK casualty in Afghanistan under Britain’s new Government was announced last night. A member of 40 Commando Royal Marines was killed in a bomb blast while on foot patrol in the Sangin area of Helmand. His family have been told.

[buglerbilly]

From The Times May 21, 2010

Liam Fox, new Defence Secretary, flies flag for our boys and Eurosceptics

Rachel Sylvester and Alice Thomson

He is the very model of a modern Defence Secretary, with his Union Jack cufflinks, red and blue tie and polished black shoes. There is a picture of Churchill to the left of him, a map of Afghanistan to the right of him, and a bow and arrow in front of him. The generals are queueing up outside his office.

Liam Fox has been preparing for this job from the moment that he became Shadow Defence Secretary five years ago. The Conservatives may have to share the biscuits at Cabinet meetings with the Liberal Democrats but the traditionalists have a true-blue Tory in charge of the defence of the realm. He will be staunch in maintaining national security but has little time for ethical foreign policies. “I’m not a neocon, more a neo-realist,” he says. “More Palmerston than Blair.”

Already he has visited wounded service personnel at the Headley Court and Selly Oak military hospitals. “David Cameron had the Service chiefs to Chequers on Saturday,” he says. “The message was that Afghanistan is our top priority.”

Today the Defence Secretary is due to arrive in Helmand province, accompanied by William Hague, the Foreign Secretary, and Andrew Mitchell, the International Development Secretary. “The first question I asked myself when I got the job was, ‘Do we have to be in Afghanistan? Is it worth it for those who have lost their lives or limbs?’ You have to keep asking yourself that question each day.”

For now at least, the answer has to be yes. “We can’t afford to see Afghanistan roll backwards into a failed state that could become a base from which terrorist campaigns can be launched anywhere in the world.”

In Opposition Dr Fox was excoriating over the lack of equipment for the Armed Forces in Afghanistan and since arriving at the Ministry of Defence he has been going through the order lists. “The personal kit now is good, we need to speed up delivery.” He plans to boost morale by doubling the operational allowance and helping Forces families. “They need proper housing, healthcare and educational attainment.”

But as the bodies come back to Wootton Bassett and the country enters the austerity age, how much longer can Britain afford to be involved either emotionally or financially in Afghanistan? Dr Fox says that the mission must be refocused. “There is a difference between a military mission and the aspiration for the long-term plans for the country. What we want is a stable enough Afghanistan, able to look after its own security so we can leave without the fear of it imploding ... But let’s be clear — it’s not going to be perfect.”

There must be a distinction between military and humanitarian goals. “We are not in Afghanistan for the sake of the education policy in a broken 13th-century country. We are there so the people of Britain and our global interests are not threatened.”

Under the coalition Government, wars will be about defending British interests rather than exporting democracy. “National security is the focus now. We are not a global policeman. We have obligations to deal with poverty and human rights but that is no different in Afghanistan from dozens of other countries. We shouldn’t deploy British troops unless there are overwhelming humanitarian emergency considerations or a national security imperative.” It was the briefing that he received on Iran that worried him most when he arrived at the MoD. “There is a lack of urgency and understanding in this country about the threat posed by Iran.”

He says that it is far more dangerous than Iraq was under Saddam Hussein. “If Iran becomes a nuclear weapon state it is the end of non-proliferation as we know it. If Iran gets a nuclear weapon you are likely to see Saudi, Egypt and other countries follow suit and we will bequeath to the next generation a nuclear arms race in the world’s most unstable region.”

He has no doubt that Iran is trying to get a nuclear weapon. “They are engaging in an enrichment programme way beyond that which can be justified by a civil nuclear programme.” If the West is not tough enough in imposing sanctions, Israel may decide to take matters into its own hands. “You’ve had Ahmadinejad talking about wiping Israel off the face of the map. People here may think that’s hyperbole but there are people in Israel who remember the last time someone said ‘We’re going to wipe you off the face of the map’ and had a damn good try at it.

“Unless we get a sense of urgency into the European Union and other Western countries, there’s a danger that we either end up with Iran with a bomb or a bombed Iran.” Would he authorise a war with Iran? “Our policy is always not to rule anything out ... The Iranian regime need to understand that we are serious when we say they cannot become a nuclear-weapon state.”

Given the size of the deficit, there may be no money for new wars, we suggest. The Government wants to cut MoD running costs by 25 per cent. “This is our first post-Cold War Government,” Dr Fox says. “None of the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary, the Defence Secretary or the Chancellor were in the House of Commons at the fall of the Berlin Wall. That gives an opportunity to totally reset what we think of as Britain’s global role.”

First the MoD must work out what threats the country faces. “Once you’ve done that, then you can come back to this building and say – what military capabilities do we require? Do we require the number of main battle tanks that we have in Germany? Or will we have to be investing more in, say, cyber security? This review cannot be incremental. It has to say goodbye to the Cold War, we now need different things.”

Dr Fox will not say which projects he is going to axe, although he emphasises: “We are looking at each of the big programmes to see if there are elements within them that we will not need.”

Trident is not up for grabs. “I have said to the Lib Dems that I am very confident that Tony Blair didn’t pick the current programme because it was the most expensive, he picked it because he thought it was the best value.” Scrapping one of the three Services has been ruled out but Dr Fox will not guarantee that troop numbers will be maintained.

He sees himself as a guarantor for the Conservative Right. As backbench grumbles intensify, he warns Mr Cameron not to forget his traditional supporters now that he has jumped into bed with the Lib Dems. “The Tory party is a broad internal coalition and it needs to maintain the cohesion of that coalition.

“But with William Hague as Foreign Secretary and me as Defence Secretary, I think the broadly Eurosceptic wing of the party is well represented.”

CV

Born September 26, 1961

Education St Bride’s High School, East Kilbride; University of Glasgow medical school

Career GP in Buckinghamshire; civilian army medical officer and divisional surgeon with St John Ambulance before entering politics

Political Elected at Woodspring in 1992 and was a junior minister in the last Tory government. Served as Shadow Health Secretary and, since 2005, Shadow Defence Secretary

Quickfire

Navy blue or khaki? I’m colour-blind

Tank or helicopter? It depends on the weather

The Great Escape or The Hurt Locker? The Great Escape

Top Gun or The Dambusters? The Dambusters

Kilt or black tie Black tie

Washington or Paris? It depends whether it’s business or pleasure

Biggles or Dennis the Menace? Dennis the Menace

[buglerbilly]

Pentagon Plan to Beef Up Afghan Base Near Iran May Rile Regime

May 21, 2010, 12:03 AM EDT

By Tony Capaccio

May 21 (Bloomberg) -- A U.S. plan to upgrade its airbase in southwestern Afghanistan just 20 miles from Iran’s border will likely rile the Islamic regime, bolstering suspicions the West is trying to pressure it with military might, analysts say.

The Defense Department is requesting $131 million in its fiscal year 2011 budget to upgrade Shindand Air Base so it can accommodate more commando helicopters, drone surveillance aircraft, fuel and munitions.

Plans to expand the base come as the U.S. works to strengthen the militaries and missile defenses of allies in the region and presses at the United Nations for a new round of sanctions aimed at forcing Iran to curb its nuclear program.

U.S. military officials say the base is only to support U.S. and Afghan military operations in Afghanistan. Iran will likely view the Shindand buildup as another step to squeeze it, said Kenneth Pollack, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution in Washington.

“Whatever U.S. intentions, the Iranian regime will see it as a threat -- as another American effort to surround Iran with U.S. military forces,” Pollack said in an interview.

“The Iranians are almost certainly going to assume that a beefed-up intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance presence is really about spying on them,” he said.

Andrew Krepinevich, president of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington, shares that view.

“The positioning of the base gives us the opportunity to monitor any efforts by Iran to serve as a sanctuary for anti- government Taliban and allied forces, and to support operations in Iran itself if that were to become necessary,” he said.

Sanctions

The Pentagon planning for Shindand comes as the U.S. is helping to strengthen missile defense systems in Israel and allied nations in the Persian Gulf.

The U.S. Navy is coordinating its ship-borne Aegis missile defense with Israel’s land-based systems, and Defense Secretary Robert Gates and other top U.S. military officials have encouraged Persian Gulf nations to strengthen and coordinate their individual defenses.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates also are upgrading their air, ground and naval forces, spurred by Iran’s military buildup.

The United Arab Emirates has spent $18 billion since 2008 on U.S.-supplied training, munitions and equipment such as the Patriot missile defense built by Lockheed Martin Corp.

Fighter Jets, Missiles

Saudi Arabia has bought 72 Eurofighter Typhoon jets and is in negotiations to buy 24 more. The nation also has bought Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, laser-guided equipment to enhance the accuracy of its air-to-ground missiles, Black Hawk helicopters and U.S. kits to upgrade Apache helicopters and armored personnel carriers.

“We have worked hard in the region to build a network of shared early warning, of ballistic missile defense and of other security relationships,” General David Petraeus, the U.S. military commander in the Middle East and Central Asia, told the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 16.

Strengthening Gulf partners is important because containing Iran “will be a challenge as long as Iran’s theocracy keeps building asymmetric forces, moving towards nuclear capability and using proxies and non-state actors in neighboring states,” Anthony Cordesman, a military analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, said.

Asymmetric forces are used in an attempt to offset the capabilities of a more advanced military foe. Iran might deploy speedboats in a swarm to attack U.S. warships, military officials have said.

Containment Strategy

Iran will view the U.S. base expansion and acceleration of “missile defense and other systems in the Gulf states” as part of a containment strategy, said Kenneth Katzman, a Middle East analyst with the non-partisan Congressional Research Service.

The U.S. should be prepared for what could be a vigorous reaction, he said. “‘Iran will almost certainly respond by stepping up weapons shipments to Taliban militants in Herat and Farah provinces, and Tehran might direct these militants to use the assistance to attempt attacks on the airfield,” he said.

Pollack gave a similar warning. “We need to go in with eyes wide open that we could be provoking them,” he said. “We should not be expanding our operations in this area unless we are ready to deal with the potential.”

Michael O’Hanlon, a military analyst for the Brookings Institution who is in Afghanistan, said he heard from U.S. military officials that Shindand is in line for “a limited tactical expansion for Afghan-specific purposes.”

“I think it would be a big mistake to provoke Iran with an airfield actually designed for possible operations there and potentially encourage Tehran to up its involvement in Afghanistan,” O’Hanlon said. “So I am hoping that we have no such designs and doubt that we do in fact.”

--Editors: Bill Schmick, Edward DeMarco

To contact the reporter on this story: Tony Capaccio at acapaccio@bloomberg.net

To contact the editor responsible for this story: Mike Tackett at mtackett@bloomberg.net

[buglerbilly]

COIN in Paktika: Few Facts, Little Logic

May 21, 2010

Military.com|by Ward Carroll



FORWARD OPERATING BASE RUSHMORE -- It took elements of First Platoon, Angel Company, 3-187, an hour to navigate a convoy of MRAPs across 10 miles of bumpy dirt road between the Combat Outpost at Yosef Khel to the village of Mest. And that slow ride was considered a good commute by infantry standards -- no IEDs hit; no RPGs fired at them, and no small-arms contact with the enemy.

The day's mission was an "election site survey." The platoon was tasked with taking historical data -- grid information from the previous election that indicated where polling stations had been located, etc. -- and verifying that it might still be viable for the upcoming elections in the fall. It seemed simple and straightforward enough.

But in this rural portion of Afghanistan's Paktika province, nothing is simple and straightforward in terms of moving the population toward self governance -- including establishing security against the Taliban.

The convoy arrived in Mest and was greeted by a small, curious band of local children at the village edge. On an adjacent small hill sat an Afghan National Army outpost. The Afghan soldiers stood by their modest barracks and lookout posts until Capt. Joshua Powers, Angel Company's commander, directed his interpreter -- a handsome young Afghan who favors a Philadelphia Phillies baseball cap along with his camouflage uniform and goes simply by "Matty" -- to call them down.

"We need four ANA to join us for a patrol of the village," Powers said once the handful of Afghans reached the line of parked MRAPs.

The Afghan leader replied that he could spare two. Powers insisted he needed four, and the Afghan relented. Soon, the patrol was underway.

Mest is situated along the main Taliban supply line from Pakistan toward the west and has been a hotly contested area since the start of the war. It is also infamous in U.S. Army circles as the place where Pfc. Bowe Bergdahl walked off an American combat outpost and into Taliban hands, where he reportedly remains.

"I'm not going to lie to you, this is currently a Taliban controlled village," Powers said. "But they know that we know that, so they most likely won't mess with us today."

Once inside the walls of the city, part of the platoon spread out to sweep the area and establish a perimeter while the officers split the balance of the force present into two groups. As 1st Lt. Marcus Smith, the leader of First Platoon, set about verifying the polling station data, Capt. Powers walked through the small bazaar, waving and nodding to the merchants.

About halfway down the line of shops, Powers removed his helmet and stopped to chat with two young men astride Honda motorcycles -- a common form of local transportation but also one favored by Taliban insurgents. After exchanging pleasantries and inquiring about their crops, water supply and schools, the American officer got down to business.

"Have you guys heard anything about the crazy stuff the Taliban is doing these days?" Powers asked as Matty translated in Pashto. The locals looked back at him with mostly blank stares. Powers continued, telling them about how just the day before a young Afghan boy had stepped on an anti-personnel landmine near the village of Yosef Khel to the north. "He would have died had the police and coalition forces not been able to get him, treat him, and move him up to the Sharana hospital," he said.

"We know," a bearded villager replied in Pashto. "That's why you guys are here -- to solve those kinds of problems."

"And then two days ago in the Yahya Khel district, the Taliban fired four mortar rounds where children were in school," Powers continued. "What kind of crazy person fires mortar rounds at a school when there are children there?"

The crowd didn't seem particularly upset by the Taliban's recklessness. "We just pray for them," the same bearded villager replied.

Meanwhile across the village, 1st Lt. Smith was having little success figuring out where polling stations might have been in the past, not to mention where they might safely be established in the future. A member of the Afghan Uniformed Police on a motorcycle said he knew where the polling station had been, but when Smith asked the policeman to take him there, he just drove off. Near the mosque, an elder said there had never been elections in Mest and that those wanting to vote had to travel to other villages to do so.

Smith, who graduated from West Point in 2008, worked to contain his frustration. "I have resources I can give you," he offered the elder. "But you have to work with me." The elder smiled and said he wanted to work with the lieutenant and that he would take him up on the invitation to visit the outpost at Yosef Khel for follow-on assistance coordination.

After another 45 minutes or so of the locals offering contradictory facts and faulty logic, the patrol was over. "Tonight the Taliban will come back and nail 'night letters' to the doors of the elders," Powers said on the way out of the village. "They'll threaten them with death if they work with the coalition."

A few days later, Capt. Powers led an air assault into the village of Ateh Khanek located east of Mest in the shadow of the first mountain range toward Pakistan. The village was thought to be a way station for the Taliban, and after weathering several attacks on the combat outpost at Yahya Khel, the Americans were ready to seize the initiative and, hopefully, engage the enemy on more offensive terms.

But as the two lumbering Chinooks landed in a field of high grass adjacent to the village, they were met by no opposition. The Apache attack helicopters flying cover overhead spotted a couple of men fleeing to the west into another group of buildings, but by the time the members of Second Platoon got there, they found nothing unusual. The men had either fled without being seen somehow or re-assimilated into the population.

As the assault continued, a single shot rang out. The Americans ducked for cover and got ready to engage, but their posture relaxed as word circulated over the radios that a member of the Afghan Uniformed Police had shot himself in the foot.

Meanwhile, coalition forces found a small cache of enemy weapons stashed in the mosque: Four rocket-propelled grenades, one launcher, two motorcycles, and one long-haired wig.

Behind the cover of an unoccupied farm house about 100 yard from the center of the village, Powers met with a group of four elders. Again, pleasantries were exchanged before the captain turned to more immediate concerns.

"We have indications Taliban are using your village as a staging ground to attack Yahya Khel," Powers said.

"I am Muslim; I won't lie to you," one of the elders replied. "The Taliban were here this morning."

"Are they here now?" Powers asked.

The elders didn't answer immediately, but eventually they said that the Taliban were gone. "Let me get this straight," Powers said. "Today Taliban came to the village and they put RPGs in the mosque."

"We didn't know about the RPGs in the mosque," the elder offered.

Powers grimaced as he wrestled with the moving body of facts. "So if I search your village, will I find any more weapons?"

"You can have whatever weapons you find," the elder said in return.

"That's not what I asked," Powers said. "Will I find any weapons?"

The elders conferred among themselves. "This village has been searched three times and they never found any weapons," another elder said.

"Well, now it's been searched four times and we did find some weapons," Powers retorted.

An hour later, Powers sat in front of a gathering of the village men -- an impromptu shura. "Thank you for welcoming us as visitors," he said. "Our search here was definitely warranted based on what we found." He gestured toward the confiscated weapons cache gathered next to the mosque as he continued. "There is no use arguing about whether or not the Taliban come here because the evidence is here." The locals nodded and murmured among themselves.

"There is nothing I would enjoy more than to build you a school," Powers said after discovering the children had nowhere to learn. "But I can't until there is security."

The captain went on to describe the Obama Plan for a surge to establish security as well as the timeline for withdrawal. "Ultimately, your security is up to you."

The villagers argued, mostly among themselves, about whether they would ever have the means to defend themselves. "Give me a rifle and I will shoot them now," one of the elders shouted.

"If we try to fight they will kill us all and all that will be left are the women," another said. "They will abandon the village and move to Kabul."

Another man stood up and said he was upset that his cousin had been detained during the assault. He pointed toward his two nephews and said they were crying because their father was now a prisoner. "He is a simple farmer," the man declared. "Let him go."

Captain Powers was unmoved. "If you're saying this man is not the one responsible for the weapons, then bring me the right man and I will gladly trade." The villagers had nothing to offer in return.

At sunset, the coalition forces gathered their meager haul and marched onto a nearby hill and waited for dark. Some time later, a single Blackhawk landed nearby and then quickly took off -- a "false extraction" designed to make the enemy think the coalition forces had left. But if there were any Taliban hiding near the village, they didn't take the bait.

Once the last Chinook had dropped the Joes back at FOB Rushmore, the company commander reflected on the events of the past few days and considered how things were going overall. In spite of the apparent lack of progress and the frustrations he faced, Powers -- who's been constantly deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan since he graduated from the Virginia Military Institute in 2004 and plans on returning early next year after only five months at home -- remained upbeat and resilient.

"I get paid to kill bad guys," he said. "What could be better than that?"

© Copyright 2010 Military.com. All rights reserved.

[buglerbilly]

From The Sunday Times May 23, 2010

Taliban win £1,600 bounty for each Nato soldier killed

Miles Amoore

TALIBAN rebels are earning a bounty of up to 200,000 Pakistani rupees (£1,660) for each Nato soldier they kill, according to insurgent commanders.

The money is said to come from protection rackets, taxes imposed on opium farmers, donors in the Gulf states who channel money through Dubai and from the senior Taliban leadership in Pakistan.

So far this year 213 Nato soldiers have been killed in Afghanistan, including 41 British troops, bringing the potential rewards for the Taliban to £350,000.

Taliban commanders said the bounty had more than doubled since the beginning of last year.

The insurgents, who employ “hit and run” tactics against foot patrols and convoys, use paid informants, media reports and the local population to confirm the deaths of Nato soldiers.

“We can’t lie to our commanders: they can check to see if there was a fight in that area. We get money if we capture equipment too. A gun can fetch $1,000 [£690],” said a commander from Khost province who controls about 60 fighters.

The money usually reaches commanders via the traditional hawala transfer system found in many Muslim countries. They then share it among their men and sometimes celebrate with a feast.

“It’s a lot of money for us. We don’t care if we kill foreigners: their blood allows us to feed our families and the more we kill, the more we weaken them. Of course we are going to celebrate this,” said a commander from Ghazni province.

The increase in rewards for Taliban fighters comes as the Afghan government prepares to present its strategy for ending the insurgency. This aims to lure less senior insurgents away from the fighting by offering them jobs in farming and engineering, vocational training in carpet weaving and carpentry, education and assimilation into the Afghan security forces, including the secret police.

President Hamid Karzai hopes that a peace jirga (tribal council) in Kabul next weekend will rally support for this peace and reintegration programme (PRP).

The PRP says little about the government’s approach to negotiations with senior Taliban, but suggests that exile in a third country is one option.

“We are weary of war and division and we have shed too many tears. Out of division let us build unity,” says the draft strategy. In January a conference in London attended by the Afghan government and its international backers raised £110m to fund the reintegration strategy.

Insurgents who are willing to lay down their weapons and join the government will undergo a 90-day cooling off period in “demobilisation centres”, where they will be vetted and given biometric identity cards.

After that they will be granted amnesty provided they sever any links with AlQaeda and renounce violence. Fighters will be sent to “deradicalisation” classes taught by mullahs and for psychological counselling and psychiatric treatment.

The government’s proposals have received a mixed reaction from Taliban commanders, who are referred to as “our upset brothers” in the draft.

“I think our leaders are trying to find ways to counter the government’s proposals. The extra cash [bounties] will encourage more people to join us and will get inactive groups to fight,” said a deputy district commander from Kandahar.

A minority said they would be willing to surrender their weapons in return for jobs. “But the government and international community should know that they can’t solve the problem by giving jobs only to us fighters. They must consider all the poor people; otherwise those who don’t get jobs will take up arms,” warned a low-level commander from Ghazni who said he had joined the Taliban four years ago to feed his family.

Most Taliban commanders deny any financial motive. In a dozen interviews over the past four months, low and midlevel Taliban commanders from provinces where the insurgency is fierce have set out their conditions for ending the violence.

“We are not fighting for money or power. We are fighting to end government corruption, to rid this country of foreign troops, and we want a return to sharia law,” said a Kandahar commander.

Nato’s reintegration group in Kabul acknowledges the insurgency is driven by local factors: inept governance, predatory politics, malign and manipulative power brokers, poverty and tribal feuding. “There will always be the hard core that will continue fighting for ideological reasons but there’s an awful lot of people who are tired of fighting and who we can bring in,” Major-General Phil Jones, the unit’s British commander, said.

Some analysts believe reintegration fails to address the underlying causes of the insurgency in thousands of villages that are among the worst afflicted. “Reintegration addresses the symptoms rather than the disease itself,” said Matt Waldman, a Harvard analyst.

[buglerbilly]

Results of Kandahar offensive may affect future U.S. moves

By Karen DeYoung
Washington Post Staff Writer
Sunday, May 23, 2010

The Obama administration's campaign to drive the Taliban out of Afghanistan's second-largest city is a go-for-broke move that even its authors are unsure will succeed.

The bet is that the Kandahar operation, backed by thousands of U.S. troops and billions of dollars, will break the mystique and morale of the insurgents, turn the tide of the war and validate the administration's Afghanistan strategy.

There is no Plan B.

The deadline for results is short: Administration officials anticipate that the operation will form the centerpiece of a major strategy assessment due in December and will justify the first withdrawals of U.S. troops from elsewhere in Afghanistan in July 2011. Although operations initiated last winter in southwestern Helmand province will continue, and new troop deployments are scheduled this year for northern and eastern Afghanistan, little else will matter if the news from Kandahar is not good.

The urgency and the difficulty of the task were illustrated Saturday when the Taliban launched an unprecedented rocket and ground attack against the Kandahar air field, NATO's largest installation in southern Afghanistan and the headquarters of the upcoming offensive. Several coalition troops and civilian employees were wounded when rockets sailed over perimeter fortifications, but gunmen who tried to fire their way inside through a gate were unsuccessful, the U.S. military said.

Officials have described the offensive's blend of civilian and military operations as the first true test of the counterinsurgency doctrine adopted five years ago on the eve of the 2007 surge in Iraq, but since only imperfectly applied. As troops battle insurgent forces entrenched among the population on the outskirts of the city, the birthplace of the Taliban movement, U.S.-mentored Afghan police will establish a presence in the relatively secure center.

There will be no "tanks rolling into the city," Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said May 13, adding that care will be taken so that the effort "doesn't destroy Kandahar in the effort to save Kandahar."

A delicate balance

"Shaping" operations for the offensive began late last winter as Special Operations forces began killing or capturing insurgent leaders. The Taliban has also begun an assassination campaign against people working for foreigners or the Afghan government.

U.S. civilian officials are simultaneously trying to wrest control from local power brokers and to correct imbalances that favor one tribal group. They plan to set up 10 administrative districts, each with a representative council and money to spend.

Success has been only vaguely defined, and progress will be monitored through what the military calls "atmospherics reporting," including public opinion polls and levels of commerce in the streets. A senior military official said the central question, which the administration will pose and answer for itself, is: "Are we moving toward a solution in Kandahar that the people support?"

Public descriptions of the balance between the offensive's military and civilian aspects have fluctuated in response to Afghan sensibilities in a region that is arguably more hostile to foreign intervention and the government in Kabul than to the Taliban.

Senior U.S. military officials briefing American reporters in Kabul early last month described extensive "clearing operations" planned in the outlying Kandahar districts of Zhari, Argandab and Panjwai, where the Taliban is entrenched.

But Afghan President Hamid Karzai said last week that military force would be used only "if and when and where needed . . . in consultation with the community." Although the administration has pledged to consult with Karzai every step of the way, and Karzai with Kandaharis, it remains unclear whether consultation equals a veto.

"It's not a military operation in the normal sense of the word," an administration official said. "Maybe they just should have done it," and not talked about it first, "but you couldn't . . . bring so many troops in" without an explanation, he said, referring to the 10,000 additional U.S. troops that have begun to flow into the Kandahar area.

The name of the offensive -- Hamkari Baraye Kandahar, or Cooperation for Kandahar -- was carefully chosen to avoid the word "operation," which suggests violence. The administration official described it benignly as a "military presence" and Karzai has defined it as a "process." Last week, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, called the offensive "a unique challenge."

"I actually think the U.S. military would love to find an enemy that was dug in on a piece of terrain, that we could establish a D-Day and we could attack with no civilians around," McChrystal said, "because that would play to every strength that the coalition has."

Instead, the Kandahar operation might highlight areas of traditional U.S. and Afghan government weakness. Avoiding the civilian casualties that have plagued U.S. operations elsewhere will be particularly difficult in and around Kandahar, an urban and farming area of 2 million people.

The offensive requires Afghan police to demonstrate, arguably for the first time, competence and integrity. It assumes that Americans, both military and civilian, can sort through complex tribal politics to ensure that power and funding go to the right people, and that Kandahar's chieftains will relinquish some control and support U.S. aims.

The perils underlying all these assumptions, and the pitfalls of getting it wrong, were outlined in an 80-page, unclassified analysis prepared this spring by McChrystal's command as a sociological primer on Kandahar.

"Of all the districts and cities in Afghanistan," the March 30 analysis said, "none is more important to the future of the Afghan government or the Taliban insurgency than Kandahar City."

'Significant risks'

Despite initial indications that the Taliban would not challenge the U.S. troop buildup and would lie low until the withdrawal begins, the analysis said, "There are signs the Taliban leadership believes it cannot afford to remain idle as a surge of foreign troops and the largest influx of development aid in modern Afghan history are focused on establishing governance in the Taliban's birthplace and former capital."

Military and civilian momentum in Kandahar, it concluded, "will probably compel the Taliban to make a political compromise with the Afghan government or to wage a climactic campaign of violence in Kandahar City (or perhaps even both)."

Statistics in the analysis are grim. Of 784 uniformed police in Kandahar city and the surrounding area, only 25 percent to 30 percent have been trained, although new forces are scheduled to arrive for the offensive. Of 87 slots for local judges, nine are filled. Saraposa prison, the main detention facility in Kandahar, is overpopulated and is considered less than secure, and the offensive is expected to produce "far more" prisoners than it can handle.

Among the "significant risks" the strategy poses, the analysis said, huge U.S. expenditures in Kandahar -- including 80 percent of U.S. Agency for International Development resources designated for Afghanistan this year -- could "undermine, rather than create, stability." Citing the "unsettling" results of research being conducted at Tufts University, it noted that little link has been established between aid and stability, and that most Afghans think more aid would simply contribute to the corruption seen as the primary fuel for insurgency.

The strategy envisions quickly "wrap[ping] Kandahar City in a circle of assistance and development projects," some of them up and running by June 1, "followed by an influx of new projects in the city itself," the analysis said. But, it said, "There is a risk that ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] will exacerbate the popular perception that powerbrokers are the only real beneficiaries."

Finding Afghans to run new development projects, it said, is problematic: "An ironic side-effect of the U.S. civilian surge in Kandahar is that, because we have hired many of the best educated and motivated Afghans to support us, fewer talented Afghans are available to work for the Afghan government itself in Kandahar City."

The influence of Kandahar's chief power brokers, presidential brother Ahmed Wali Karzai and former governor Gul Agha Sherzai, far exceeds the portion of the region's tribal makeup they represent, yet their competition is the dominant fact of political life there. Early this year, the two separately approached the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team, the U.S. civilian headquarters, "to promote themselves as the preferred figure to bring the Taliban to the table to strike peace deals," the analysis said.

Rather than directly challenge them, U.S. planners will try to boost more representative alternatives appointed to district councils. That, too, presents a significant risk of failure, the analysis said. "The problem is that the Afghan central government . . . wants to nominate the district positions and staff from Kabul," the report said.

"Experience suggests this will not work," it said.

[buglerbilly]

Insurgents attack major coalition base in Afghanistan


United States Army Spc. Kevin O'Connor, of Hingham, Mass., right, sits in the darkness with other members of United States Army Spc. Kevin O'Connor, of Hingham, Mass. during an ambush set up Friday, May 21, 2010 to catch Taliban fighters who had fired on their outpost earlier in the week, in Afghanistan's Kandahar province. (AP Photo/Julie Jacobson) (Julie Jacobson - AP)

By Joby Warrick and Joshua Partlow
Sunday, May 23, 2010

KANDAHAR AIRFIELD, AFGHANISTAN -- Insurgents launched a brazen ground and rocket attack late Saturday against NATO's largest military base in southern Afghanistan, wounding several coalition troops, military officials said.

About four rockets crashed down about 8 p.m. on Kandahar Airfield, one of them exploding near a popular coffee shop and causing several casualties, officials said.

In an apparently coordinated strike, a group of insurgents attempted to breach a gate on the north side of the base but were beaten back. At least two insurgents were killed, the officials said.

The number and nature of coalition casualties were not immediately clear.

"The perimeter was not breached," said Brig. Gen. Josef Blotz, a spokesman for the International Security Assistance Force.

The assault appeared to be ongoing late Saturday. Attack helicopters were seen blasting positions near the fence with missiles and machine guns.

Several planes that were awaiting takeoff on the runway were evacuated, and base officials ordered passengers into bunkers as loudspeakers blared warnings. Some troops who were awaiting flights were dispatched with their weapons to help fend off possible attackers, while others huddled in the dark near the tarmac to watch the helicopters' counterattack.

A security contractor at the base who spoke on the condition of anonymity said he heard about five or six explosions. One of the rockets, he said, landed near the Green Bean coffee shop on the base "boardwalk," a covered wooden walkway area that includes many restaurants and shops.

"There was a number of casualties. We saw a lot of smoke. It's a heavily populated area," the contractor said.

Sirens began wailing a second time around 11 p.m., three hours after the initial assault, but there were no reports of additional rocket fire from insurgents. Unmanned drone aircraft buzzed overhead and flares lighted up the sky near the northern gate as the hunt for the assailants continued.

The attack came three days after insurgents assaulted Bagram air base, another massive NATO facility, with rockets, grenades and gunfire, killing one U.S. contractor and wounding several others.

It was at least the third high-profile attack targeting NATO troops in less than a week. One day before the Bagram strike, a suicide bomber blew up his car near a NATO convoy in Kabul, killing five U.S. troops, a Canadian officer and at least a dozen Afghan civilians. Those incidents followed a Taliban warning earlier in the month that the movement was launching a spring offensive aimed at killing foreign soldiers and derailing reconciliation talks scheduled to begin in a few weeks.

Blotz, the ISAF spokesman, said the Kandahar attack appeared to involve a small group of insurgents and lacked the sophistication of the assault on Bagram.

[buglerbilly]

Top bomb disposal officer in Afghanistan resigns

Colonel Bob Seddon, Britain’s senior bomb disposal officer, has resigned his post after raising concerns for the welfare of his men.

By Alastair Jamieson and John Bingham, UK Daily Telegraph

Published: 6:58AM BST 24 May 2010


Seddon: He has resigned his commission and is due to leave in January amid concerns that previous cuts have left his team overstretched and undermanned. Photo: PA

Col Seddon, of the Royal Logistic Corps, has been responsible for tackling the growing threat to troops posed by Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) on the front line as the Army's Principle Ammunition Technical Officer (PATO).

He has resigned his commission and is due to leave in January amid concerns that previous cuts have left his team overstretched and undermanned.

Although moves are under way to bring more in, it can take up to seven years to train a "High Threat Specialist" and many are now having to work without breaks, against Army rules, to counter the threat.

Taliban fighters have successfully adopted roadside bomb tactics developed in Iraq making it the most deadly threat to British troops in Afghanistan.

Earlier this year two bomb disposal experts received the George Cross, which ranks alongside the Victoria Cross as Britain's highest award for bravery, for "awe-inspiring and humbling" efforts to defuse IEDs in Afghanistan.

They include included Staff Sergeant Olaf Schmid who was killed in October last year on what should have been the last day of his tour of duty while disarming his 70th roadside bomb.

He was one of four bomb disposal experts to lose their lives while performing their duties in a few months.

Col Seddon, who received the Queen's Commendation for Bravery in 2006, also expressed concerns that his men could "pay a deeper psychological price" for their work.

He told a BBC Panorama documentary, to be shown tonight: ''I am very concerned as their head of trade at the pressures that they are facing in Afghanistan.

''We are seeking now to bring people back into high threat IED operations that have been out for some time.

''We are looking at more senior officers becoming involved in this. We've broadened our training and selection but it will take some time before these measures can come into play.

"And what it does mean is, it means the existing cohort are going to be under pressure.''

The documentary, which features Staff Sergeant Schmid's widow Christina, also discloses that the MoD suspended bomb squad recruitment in 2002 for 18 months – in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq - resulting in a severe shortage of operatives to deal with the huge numbers of IEDs there and in Afghanistan.

An Army spokesman said: "We can confirm that the current PATO has resigned and will leave his post and the Army in January next year.

"He remains a serving officer and will not be commenting. The Army remains committed to the counter IED effort which is the number one priority in Afghanistan."

With Britain facing billions of pounds of spending cuts, the defence budget will come under further scrutiny later this year.

Liam Fox, the Defence Secretary, nevertheless told troops in Afghanistan at the weekend that he would honour a pledge to double the operational allowance for those serving on the front line.

Dr Fox said: "Countering the IED threat faced by our forces in Afghanistan is a top priority for the new Government."

[buglerbilly]

From The Times May 24, 2010

Afghans accuse Defence Secretary Liam Fox of racism and disrespect

Tom Coghlan, Defence Correspondent

Liam Fox was under attack last night for damaging Britain’s relations with Kabul after he described Afghanistan as a “broken 13th-century country”.

The Defence Secretary’s comments, made in an interview with The Times published on Saturday, provoked fury from the Afghan Government and media with officials calling the claims racist.

According to senior Afghan officials, Dr Fox’s characterisation of the country was raised at a meeting with President Karzai on Saturday. The President expressed his deep displeasure at the remarks, they said.

In his interview Dr Fox said that there must be a distinction between military and humanitarian goals. “We are not in Afghanistan for the sake of the education policy in a broken 13th-century country. We are there so the people of Britain and our global interests are not threatened.”

A senior Afghan government source said: “His view appears to be that Afghanistan has not changed since the 13th century and it implies that Afghanistan is a tribal and medieval society.

“Despite the sacrifices of British soldiers and the massive support of the British Government we do not feel that there is a mutual respect. His remarks show a lack of trust.”

The source added: “We see Britain as still a colonial, orientalist and racist country that they should have this view. Dr Fox really believes what he said, and he is not alone. London and Kabul must move on or things will be more difficult.”

The issue provoked furious editorials in the Afghan press, with the daily Arman-e Melli publishing a leading article yesterday with the headline: “We don’t need Britain in Afghanistan”. At a press conference at the British Embassy in Kabul yesterday Dr Fox said: “Of course, what I was pointing out, and I welcome the opportunity to amplify it, is that the primary reason for sending our Armed Forces to Afghanistan was one of national security.

“But clearly if we are to make the long-term gains that will provide the stability to maintain the momentum when our Armed Forces eventually hand over to the forces of the Afghans, we will require a long period of development in concert with the international authorities, the NGOs and our and other countries’ aid programmes.”

Dr Fox was returning home last night with William Hague, the Foreign Secretary, and Andrew Mitchell, the International Development Secretary, after meeting British Forces in Helmand province. A Ministry of Defence spokesman denied that there had been any confrontation and said that the allegations were “groundless and without truth”.

Mr Mitchell said yesterday: “You can’t get a cigarette paper between Liam Fox’s views and mine on the importance of joining together better and more effectively defence, diplomacy and development.”

Dr Fox’s office said: “Hamid Karzai has used similar words himself, describing what the Taleban left behind as 13th or 14th-century.”

The visit was intended to display unity within the coalition British Government on what is regarded as the most important foreign policy issue.

The Defence Secretary got off to a controversial start, however, when he told The Times that Britain was not a “global policeman”.

He added that he wanted to “reset expectations and timelines”, a hint that he wanted to use the trip to accelerate the return of some of the British contingent.

Last night General Stanley McChrystal, the commander of US and Nato troops in Afghanistan, who also met Dr Fox, said that he was confident that the British would continue to serve in Afghanistan.

“British support is absolutely rock- solid — nobody has told me anything differently,” he told journalists at his headquarters in Kabul.

Davood Moradian, a senior policy adviser to the Afghan Government, said that the new Defence Secretary’s view contradicted Britain’s stated position, which committed Western nations to the pursuit of a “comprehensive approach” to Afghanistan’s problems.

[buglerbilly]

From The Times May 24, 2010

'We fled our plane for the shelter as the Taleban attacked our base'

The Times Foreign Editor was ready to fly out of Kandahar when a salvo of rockets landed

Richard Beeston

We knew something had gone badly wrong when a nervous-looking RAF crewman addressed the passengers. “Does anybody have weapons and ammunition on board?” he asked a rugged but bemused collection of American troops.

A few of the US Marines put up their hands and were asked to go to the back of the aircraft. No, their firearms were not being confiscated; they had just been volunteered into forming a guard around the giant Hercules transport craft because of very real fears that the Taleban were about to attack.

Someone pointed out that the worst place to be in a gun battle was sitting inside a fully fuelled aircraft parked on the tarmac — so we made our escape into the gloom.

Kandahar airfield is one of the busiest military bases in the world and the spearhead of the Nato coalition’s operations against the Taleban in their southern Afghan heartland. There is normally a constant roar of jets and the clatter of helicopters — but this time it was ghostly quiet. Cars and aircraft had been abandoned with their lights still on and everyone was ordered to take shelter by a British soldier speaking, barely audibly, on the base’s crackling intercom.

Our refuge was an uninspiring concrete hovel. It was soon abandoned as all the passengers moved outside to witness one of the most audacious attacks attempted by the Taleban.

WTF did he want? A 5-star lounge suite? :razz

Their fighters had launched a salvo of rockets into the sprawling southern sector of the base and then sent a team on foot to infiltrate the northern perimeter fence. The silence was broken by the roar of American attack helicopters scrambled to intercept them.

The aircraft rolled in one by one. First there was the flash of the heavy machinegun then the report as red tracer fire lit up the night. Another helicopter came in, disgorging a volley of rockets that streaked across the sky before exploding on impact. Twinkling high above were the unmanned drones scouring the ground with their powerful cameras for signs of further movement.

By morning it was clear that the Taleban had largely failed in their attempt to breach Kandahar’s defences. Several off-duty soldiers and contractors playing volleyball had been injured by the five rockets fired into the base, with one bloodied trainer still visible lying at the impact site, but no one was killed and the Taleban assault party never made it over the wire.

The attack did have an impact, however. The airfield at Kandahar was closed for hours, leading to the cancellation of the first British ministerial visit by William Hague, the Foreign Secretary, Liam Fox, the Defence Secretary, and Andrew Mitchell, the International Development Secretary.

The daring nature of the operation is also significant.

No its not! They sent a poor, stupid bunch of Suicide attackers against insurmountable odds............they all died!

Nato insists that it is beginning to turn the course of the war and gain the initiative. The Taleban are clearly intent on seizing it back with their own spring offensive, announced on May 20. In the past week the Taleban launched bloody attacks in Kabul, where three senior US officers were killed by a suicide bomber, and at America’s main base in Bagram, north of the capital, where a group of militants engaged in an eight-hour firefight with the Americans.

The Taleban is intent on making home & political opinion turn against the military effort and they don't care how people get to meet the same group of 40 virgins......................

The violence raises fears of more incidents in the run-up to President Karzai’s peace Jirga (council), originally set for May 29 but rescheduled yesterday to June 2. The other trigger could be the deployment of thousands of additional US troops, part of Washington’s strategy to surge more forces into the area and help to stabilise the south.

No shit Einstein..............:doh

The new counter-insurgency strategy seeks to protect the civilian population, push out the Taleban and allow reconstruction, with the fledgeling Afghan Government assuming authority in areas that have known little but the rule of the gun for 30 years.

Major-General Nick Carter, the British officer who commands all forces in the south, accepts that there has been an increase in violence but that the strategy remains sound. He predicts that once a security cordon has been placed around Kandahar this summer, the city will reclaim its place as a major Central Asian trading hub.

The test case for the strategy is Marja, a remote rural district in the neighbouring Helmand province, best known for opium production. Thousands of US Marines poured into the area three months ago in Operation Moshtarak and have attempted to bolster Afghan government authority in the area.

The operation went well initially, particularly during the poppy harvest when violence traditionally tails off, but there are now fears that fresh attacks and a campaign of intimidation by a resurgent Taleban could halt progress.

Lieutenant-Colonel Cal Worth, the commander of US Marines in Marja, insists that life is returning to normal. Bazaars have reopened, the police have arrived and a few civil servants have reported for work.

But Kareem Mateen, the head of Afghan development in Helmand, is not convinced and warned that the Taleban’s campaign of intimidation against those co-operating with the Government had made life very dangerous in the area. “The situation is deteriorating. It is getting worse, day by day. A lot of people are trying to leave Marja,” he said.

[buglerbilly]

In Former Free-Fire Zone, Marines Now Cut Taliban Loose

By Noah Shachtman May 24, 2010 | 10:30 am



When last we visited Mian Poshteh, the marines in the Afghan farming community were getting into firefights several times a day. Who was on the other side wasn’t exactly clear. Now, nine months later, there’s a new group of marines in Mian Poshteh. And they have a database of nearly every military-aged male in the area. Battles are rare. And when a militant is captured, Captain Scott Cuomo, the the local U.S. commander in Mian Poshteh, is likely to let him go, if he swears off fighting.

Cuomo knows it’s a risky strategy; the militants could easily break their word. “If they realize at some point that the cause they think they’re fighting for is not a worthy one, and we’re here to bring stability to the area, then you have to make an overture,” he tells the New York Times. “Will it bite you in the butt?”

And if Cuomo’s approach is successful, it raises another issue: Did the firefights of 2009 pave the way for 2010’s reconciliation, or forestall it? When General Stanley McChrystal took over command of allied forces in Afghanistan, he promised a strategy that focused less on whacking enemies are more on winning the trust of the locals. “It’s not the number of people you kill, it’s the number of people you convince,” McChrystal told his troops.

But Marines in Mian Poshteh did their share of killing, before they starting convincing people in earnest to join them. “To keep the good areas here relatively calm,” 2009’s commander, Captain Eric Meador told me, “you have to go to the enemy and punch him in the chest, punch him in the face.”

[Photo: Noah Shachtman]

Read More http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/05/in-former-free-fire-zone-marines-now-cut-taliban-loose/#more-25169#ixzz0otvSls9O

[buglerbilly]

Defence secretary Liam Fox tells troops in Aghanistan they will be rewarded

Liam Fox, the defence secretary, used his first visit to southern Afghanistan since taking office to promise troops a bonus for their efforts on the frontline.

Published: 7:30AM BST 24 May 2010


Defence Secretary, Liam Fox, right, talks to troops during a visit to Lashkar Gah in Afghanistan Photo: REUTERS

After flying into Lashkar Gah, Mr Fox was pressed by servicemen and women about the Tories' pledge to double the operational allowance for those serving in the country.

The new defence secretary said the commitment had survived the coalition negotiations with the Liberal Democrats and that details would be revealed in the Budget next month.

However, he was unable to say when it would take effect from.

He was flanked by William Hague, the foreign secretary, and Andrew Mitchell, the international development secretary.

The three spent yesterday in Kabul before flying down to Camp Bastion, where most of Britain's 10,000-strong deployment is based, last night.

They took Chinook helicopters into Lashkar Gah this morning, where they met troops and Helmand governor Mohammed Gulab Mangal at the headquarters of the Provincial Reconstruction Team.

In a speech to about 80 service personnel, Mr Fox said: ''I will give you my promise that we will do everything we can to ensure that whatever you are asked to do, you are properly, fully equipped to do so, to maximise your chance of success and minimise the risk to you.''

He said the Tories' manifesto promise to double the operational allowance for troops serving in Afghanistan had been included in last week's coalition agreement.

''We will announce that we are going ahead with that. The details of that will be announced in the Budget next month,'' he said.

''We believe it is not just enough to come and say thank you or to tell you how proud we are about what you are doing.

''We also have to recognise that as well in the hardest way possible - which is to get the Treasury to cough up.''

Asked when exactly the operational allowance would be doubled - from about £2,600 per six-month tour at present - he was non-committal.

''The Chancellor will announce the timing when he makes the Budget statement,'' he said.

[buglerbilly]

MRAPs Take Over for Humvees Off Base



Our own Christian Lowe is embedded with U.S. forces in Afghanistan through June 1 and sends us this dispatch from FOB Sharana in eastern Afghanistan.

By Christian Lowe

FORWARD OPERATING BASE SHARANA, Afghanistan — In one of the most conspicuous shifts in policy since the war in Afghanistan began, local Army commanders have ordered that Soldiers must be in heavily-armored IED-resistant vehicles when leaving the confines of any base in eastern Afghanistan.

Up-armored Humvees, the go-to patrol truck for troops here since 2001, have been relegated to driving within forward operating bases or were donated to the Afghan army and police.

The Pentagon is sending so-called “mine resistant ambush protected” vehicles, or MRAPs, to the theater at a fevered pitch, with planeloads of the heavy trucks arriving daily at FOBs in this region.

The motor pools now feature a hodgepodge of MRAP trucks, including the International Truck-made Maxpro, the BAE Systems-made RG-31 Nyala, and the most recent arrival, the Oshkosh-built MAT-V. Soldiers here say each has its advantages and disadvantages.

“I love the MAT-V,” said Staff Sgt. Philip Burchfield, platoon sergeant with 1st Platoon, Angel Company, 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment. “It can take us places we can’t go with the Maxpros or RG-31s.”

Battalion officials here want more of the nimble MAT-Vs. Their lighter weight, lower profile and more forgiving suspension give unit commanders greater flexibility in supporting troops who have to patrol remote villages situated along roads that better support tractors and livestock than they do trucks.

But what the MAT-Vs gain in agility, they give up in protection against IEDs. Soldiers here say the MAT-V protects against roadside bombs better than an up-armored Humvee, but not much.

“If we hit an IED, it’s still going to mess this thing up,” one Soldier said during a recent vehicle patrol.

Sitting in an MAT-V is like strapping into a cockpit. The four contoured seats each has five-point seatbelts and a communications suite. Gunners wear heavy-duty harnesses clipped to a fixed point inside the vehicle to avoid being thrown from the turret in a rollover or explosion.

The tight confines are more akin to a Humvee than anything else. But being strapped in and linked by i-comm to the rest of the vehicle gives its own sense of security.

Though it offers more protection than a MAT-V, the ride in a Maxpro or RG-31 along most of the main routes between bases here is brutal, with the stiff suspension taking every bump and furrow like a trampoline. But despite the rough ride, Soldiers here are glad to have the marginal addition of protection that these vehicles give from increasingly sophisticated IEDs.

However while IEDs remain a huge concern, Soldiers are more worried about the number of armor-piercing rocket propelled grenades that are winding up in the hands of insurgents.

One Soldier with Angel Co. was severely wounded last month when an RPG entered the driver’s side of the vehicle, slicing right through the MRAPs armor. While some MRAPs have the RPG-catching “bird cages” attached to the exterior for added protection, some of the RPGs still find their way through.

Commanders here clearly prefer the MAT-V to the other varieties of MRAPs, but even with the added mobility the smaller vehicle provides, getting from point-A to point-B can take an agonizing amount of time and the conditions force drivers to go slower, leaving them more vulnerable to command-detonated IEDs and RPG shooters.

And with combat outposts separated sometimes by as much as an hour and a half drive, there’s little chance one platoon can rush over to offer support to another.

But the Soldiers make do. And despite all the drawbacks, one Soldier who’s on his second deployment to Afghanistan – and his first using the MRAPs – said he wouldn’t leave on a patrol in anything else.

“I like MRAPs way more than the Humvee,” said Spc. John Johnson, an infantryman with Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 3–187, during a recent mission riding in a Maxpro. “It’s the IEDs that scare me the most. And this thing can take an IED a lot better than a Humvee.”

Read more: http://defensetech.org/2010/05/24/mraps-take-over-for-humvees-off-base/#ixzz0ouPwc4dy
Defense.org

[buglerbilly]

Special Report: How the White House learned to love the drone

Adam Entous

WASHINGTON

Tue May 18, 2010 5:03pm

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - By all appearances, the Obama administration wanted him alive, not dead. It posted a $5 million reward for information leading to the "location, arrest, and/or conviction" of Baitullah Mehsud, the fierce leader of the Pakistani Taliban, in a March 25, 2009 notice.

But delivering Mehsud alive for prosecution was never a serious option for the Central Intelligence Agency and U.S. military Special Operations teams that track such "high-value" targets. He was killed less than five months later in a CIA-directed drone strike.

In the rugged mountains of western Pakistan, missiles launched by unmanned Predator or Reaper drones have become so commonplace that some U.S. officials liken them to modern-day "cannon fire." And they are no longer aimed solely at "high-value" targets like Mehsud, according to U.S. counterterrorism and defense officials.

Under a secret directive first issued by former President George W. Bush and continued by Barack Obama, the CIA has broadly expanded the "target set" for drone strikes. As a result, what is still officially classified as a covert campaign on Pakistan's side of the border with Afghanistan has in many ways morphed into a parallel conventional war, several experts say.

Killing wanted militants is simply "easier" than capturing them, said an official, who like most interviewed for this story support the stepped-up program and asked not to be identified. Another official added: "It is increasingly the preferred option."

An analysis of data provided to Reuters by U.S. government sources shows that the CIA has killed around 12 times more low-level fighters than mid-to-high-level al Qaeda and Taliban leaders since the drone strikes intensified in the summer of 2008.

Reuters has also learned that Pakistan, though officially opposed to the strikes, is providing more behind-the-scenes assistance than in the past.

Beyond the human intelligence that the CIA relies on to identify targets, Pakistani agents are sometimes present at U.S. bases, and are increasingly involved in target selection and strike coordination, current and former U.S. officials said.

Back in Washington, the technology is considered such a success that the U.S. military has been positioning Reaper drones at a base in the Horn of Africa.

The aircraft can be used against militants in Yemen and Somalia, and even potentially against pirates who attack commercial ships traversing the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, officials said.

"Everyone has fallen in love with them," a former U.S. intelligence official said of the drone strikes.

NOWHERE TO PUT THEM

By some accounts, the growing reliance on drone strikes is partly a result of the Obama administration's bid to repair the damage to America's image abroad in the wake of Bush-era allegations of torture and secret detentions.

Besides putting an end to harsh interrogation methods, the president issued executive orders to ban secret CIA detention centers and close the Guantanamo Bay prison camp.

Some current and former counterterrorism officials say an unintended consequence of these decisions may be that capturing wanted militants has become a less viable option. As one official said: "There is nowhere to put them."

A former U.S. intelligence official, who was involved in the process until recently, said: "I got the sense: 'What the hell do we do with this guy if we get him?' It's not the primary consideration but it has to be a consideration."

There are other reasons behind the expansion of the drone program, including improvements in drone technology.

"Many of the highest priority terrorists are in some of the remotest, most inaccessible, parts of our planet," one U.S. official said of why targeted killing has gained favor. "Since they're actively plotting against us and our allies, you've got two choices -- kill or capture. When these people are where they are, and are doing what they're doing, it's just not a tough decision."

The Obama White House chaffs at suggestions its policies could make it harder to capture wanted militants.

"Any comment along the lines of 'there is nowhere to put captured militants' would be flat wrong. Over the past 16 months, the U.S. has worked closely with its counterterrorism partners in South Asia and around the world to capture, detain, and interrogate hundreds of militants and terrorists," a senior U.S. official said.

As the CIA program in Pakistan expands, the Pentagon's own targeted killing programs, run by secretive Special Ops and intelligence units, have also been ramped up under Obama.

"There is little to no pushback" from the White House, according to one defense official who supports the policy. He said that when it came to adding wanted militants to top secret target lists, the Pentagon was getting "all the support it could want," though some insiders think the military isn't updating the lists fast enough.

For their part, U.S. officials say the targeted killing programs have dealt a serious blow to al Qaeda and the Taliban, probably saving American lives in the process.

But as one former intelligence official, quoting Newton's law of motion that every action has a reaction, said: there's no way to know the consequences "upfront."

There are signs that the drone strikes may have become a rallying cry for many militants and their supporters, including Faisal Shahzad, the suspect in the attempted car-bombing in New York's Times Square on May 1. U.S. investigators believe Shahzad received assistance from the Pakistani Taliban, which had vowed to avenge the killing of Mehsud.

Likewise, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula said its plot to blow up a U.S. passenger jet on Christmas Day was payback for what it called U.S. attacks on the group in Yemen.

COMMONPLACE KILLINGS

In a June 2007 debate with his Democratic rivals, then-candidate Obama spelled out why he believed it would be legal to use a Hellfire missile to take out Osama bin Laden in Pakistan even if some innocent civilians would be killed in the process.

"I don't believe in assassinations, but Osama bin Laden has declared war on us, killed 3,000 people, and under existing law, including international law, when you've got a military target like bin Laden, you take him out. And if you have 20 minutes, you do it swiftly and surely," Obama said.

Obama's saber-rattling about using force in Pakistan was a way to "demonstrate his national security bona fides" in the middle of a tough campaign, said Richard Fontaine, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security who served as foreign policy adviser to Republican Senator John McCain, who lost to Obama in the 2008 election.

Bruce Riedel, a former CIA analyst, said the Obama administration ran with the drone program because, when it came to office, "it found itself with a real al Qaeda threat and one tool to work with."

"I don't think he (Obama) had really any alternatives. He seized the tool that was in front of him," said Riedel, who chaired Obama's strategic review of Afghanistan and Pakistan policy that was completed in March 2009.

A former U.S. intelligence official said the strategy was "politically foolproof" because the mainstream candidates on both sides of the political spectrum "campaigned on who can kill more of these guys."

Under Obama, the program has grown to such an extent that, according to a Reuters tally, the nearly 60 missiles fired from the CIA's drones in Pakistan in the first four months of this year roughly matched the number fired by all of the drones piloted by the U.S. military in neighboring Afghanistan -- the recognized war zone -- during the same time period.

In Pakistan, the pace has jumped to two or three strikes a week, up roughly fourfold from the Bush years.

Of the 500 militants the agency believes the drones have killed since the summer of 2008, about 14 are widely considered to be top tier militant targets, while another 25 are considered mid-to-high-level organizers.

Independent tallies based on news accounts from the region put the deathtoll from drones since mid-2008 much higher -- at anywhere from nearly 700 to around 1,200.

In addition to authorizing the CIA to strike fighters and leaders linked to Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Pakistani Taliban, Obama's National Security Council recently took the program in a new direction by adding an American citizen to the CIA's hit list -- Muslim cleric Anwar al-Awlaki of Yemen's al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

The Obama administration says it has safeguards in place for identifying what it calls "lawful targets." A U.S. counterterrorism official said: "Targets are chosen with extreme care... There's no such thing as a random strike."

But some human rights groups question how robust those safeguards could be if the CIA is killing hundreds of militants whose identities are largely unknown. They also worry about civilians.

A Pakistani intelligence official dealing with South Waziristan said the vast majority of the deaths were just foot soldiers. "They hit whoever they get," another intelligence official in North Waziristan said.

A former U.S. intelligence official said it was unclear what protocols the CIA was following for targeting foot-soldiers: "If it becomes a more generalized 'kill anybody' (approach), it degrades the notion we're going after serious threats to the United States. It's a slippery slope."

According to U.S. intelligence estimates, no more than 30 non-combatants were killed alongside the 500 militants -- the equivalent of a little more than 5 percent, or about one out of every 20. These mainly included family members who live and travel with the CIA's targets.

The CIA won't disclose how it verifies who's who among the casualties, but former officials say drones will linger overhead, in some cases for hours after each strike so the CIA can literally count the bodies.

To determine who is a civilian, the CIA looks at a number of indicators, including gender. As a general rule, a woman is counted as a non-combatant, former officials said.

The Pakistani intelligence officer in North Waziristan said 20 percent of total deaths were civilians or non-combatants, or one in five.

But others put the figure much higher. "The ratio is getting better but based on my military experience, there's simply no way" so few civilians have been killed, Jeffrey Addicott, who served as the senior legal adviser to the U.S. Army Special Forces, the Green Berets, said of the U.S. tally.

"For one bad guy you kill, you'd expect 1.5 civilian deaths" because no matter how good the technology, "killing from that high above, there's always the 'oops' factor," he said.

'KILL THEM WHEN THEY'RE EATING'

To justify its extensive use of drones in targeted killings, Obama administration lawyers poured over reams of legal opinions and findings. They pointed to precedents as far back as World War Two, when a squadron of U.S. fighter planes tracked and shot down the airplane carrying the architect of Japan's surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto.

"In a different time and place, that action might have been seen as unchivalrous or unsportsmanlike," Conrad Crane, director of the U.S. Army Military History Institute, said of the 1943 targeted killing.

Like technology, battlefield norms "change by year, change by culture," Crane said. "But taking out enemy leaders is an important part of warfare and has been going on for millennia."

In a recent speech outlining the Obama administration's position publicly, Harold Hongju Koh, the State Department's legal adviser, said: "The United States is in an armed conflict with al Qaeda, as well as the Taliban and associated forces, in response to the horrific 9/11 attacks, and may use force consistent with its inherent right to self-defense under international law."

Scholars say Obama's targeted killing doctrine appears to be little different from Bush's: Once someone has been deemed a lawful target, the CIA has no obligation to warn or seek to detain that person before attacking, said Kenneth Anderson, professor of law at American University.

Other human rights lawyers argue that even in an armed conflict zone, individuals may be targeted only if they take a direct part in fighting. Outside armed conflict zones, they say, international law permits lethal force to be used only as a last resort, and only to prevent imminent attacks.

The United States officially bans "assassination" under Executive Order 12333, issued by President Ronald Reagan on December 4, 1981, but Koh said "the use of lawful weapons systems ... for precision targeting of specific high-level belligerent leaders when acting in self-defense or during an armed conflict is not unlawful, and hence does not constitute 'assassination.'"

Mary Ellen O'Connell of the University of Notre Dame Law School said: "We just don't have the right to bomb people where there's no armed conflict," drawing a contrast between Pakistan and Afghanistan, where U.S. forces are waging a nearly nine-year-old war.

Even if militants use Pakistan as a staging ground for Afghan attacks, O'Connell said the sovereign boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan must be respected.

"The United States is not fighting in self-defense against Pakistan. We do not hold Pakistan responsible for cross-border incursions into Afghanistan and may not, lawfully, use military force in Pakistan in response to those incursions," she said.

Addicott, the former legal adviser to Army Special Forces, disagrees: "The battlefield in the 'war on terror' is global and not restricted to a particular nation. As in World War Two, there are no national limitations or boundaries. This is war and we are entitled to kill them anywhere we find them."

"We can kill them when they're eating, we can kill them when they're sleeping. They are enemy combatants, and as long as they're not surrendering, we can kill them."

WEIGHING PROS-AND-CONS

Killing senior militants has its drawbacks. Chief among them is the loss of intelligence that could be gleaned by capturing and questioning them.

In secret documents from 2007 that were recently made public, then-CIA director Michael Hayden highlighted the value of capturing al Qaeda leaders. In an agency document, Hayden details how al Qaeda lieutenant Abu Zubaydah became "one of our most important sources of intelligence on al Qaeda" after his March 2002 capture.

Among other things, he helped U.S. authorities identify Khalid Sheikh Mohammed as the mastermind of the September 11 attacks, whose interrogation, in turn, led U.S. authorities to other high-value targets plotting attacks on U.S. soil.

"It is a balance, a difficult balance," a U.S. military official said. "There's no doubt about it, (targeted killing) impacts your ability to gather first person intelligence. But it has other beneficial effects like removing (leadership) capabilities."

Riedel, the former CIA analyst now with the Brookings Institution, said drone strikes were effective at killing but "the real homerun is taking a senior leader prisoner who, in the course of debriefing, leads you to other senior people and opens the door to a greater insight into the enemy you're facing."

"It's a Catch-22. What do you do with these guys? It's a real policy dilemma which the Obama administration has yet to address," a senior U.S. government official said.

In addition to the closing of Guantanamo, Obama has committed to transferring responsibility for detention facilities to the Afghan government.

Another senior U.S. government official cited the arrest in Pakistan of the Afghan Taliban's top military commander, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, as an example of the constraints on the CIA now that its secret "black site" prisons have been closed.

Though Baradar was nabbed in a joint operation with Pakistan's ISI intelligence service, giving the CIA custody was never an option. Baradar has started talking but the U.S. government official said the information flow would be greater were he held in CIA custody.

U.S. military officials also cite an attack in September 2009 by helicopter-borne Special Operations Forces on a car in which one of east Africa's most wanted al Qaeda militants, Kenyan-born Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, was a passenger.

"We may have been able to capture the guy but the decision was made to kill him," a U.S. defense official said of the Somali operation. A factor in the decision, the official said, was uncertainty about "what would we do with him" if he was captured alive.

In many instances, operations never get off the ground because of the risks.

A former U.S. intelligence official said there were discussions late in the Bush administration about the possibility of using armed drones to help Mexican fight narco-traffickers. But the idea of "shooting missiles on the outskirts of Mexico City" ran into opposition, he said.

The Pentagon also considered taking military action in Somalia as intelligence poured in early last year about pirates establishing large camps from which they could launch attacks on commercial ships, counterterrorism and defense officials told Reuters.

The Navy had gone so far as to draw up plans for "lethal strikes" on the camps but the idea was nixed in part because of concerns about civilian casualties and what the U.S. military would do with those who are injured or captured given the country's lawless state. Some of the beachfront camps were set up in densely populated areas.

"The rhetorical question was: Should we go after the base camps," one official said. "We didn't go to their camps because of concerns about civilian casualties and about there not being a government there to turn them over to or to deal with the aftermath."

NATO's top commander, U.S. Admiral James Stavridis, told Reuters there were "active discussions" now about "taking actions ashore," from promoting development to discourage pirating to "burning skiffs, taking out camps." He said drones were "part of our operational footprint wherever we go."

PAKISTAN'S DEEPENING ROLE

An American diplomat tells a story about a meeting he had with Pakistani parliamentarians that offers a window into the tough position that nation is in when it comes to the drone attacks.

The message from each lawmaker seemed straightforward: CIA drone strikes against militants in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan cause terrible damage and must stop.

Then, in the middle of the session, according to an account provided to Reuters, one of the parliamentarians slipped the American guest, who specializes in the region, a handwritten note: "The people in the tribal areas support the drones. They cause very little collateral damage. But we cannot say so publicly for reasons you understand."

U.S. officials say they go along with this "game" understanding that public acknowledgment of any Pakistani role in the U.S. targeted killings could have major implications for the government in Islamabad, already struggling in the face of militant accusations it is an American puppet.

A former U.S. intelligence official said the CIA was conducting the drone strikes instead of the U.S. military because the covert nature of the program gives Islamabad the "fig leaf of deniability."

"They can't stand up to their own people and say they're in league with the U.S.," the official said.

Anecdotal evidence cited by U.S. officials suggests that opposition to the drone strikes is stronger in major population centers, where the Taliban have less of a presence, than in the tribal areas, where the Taliban hold sway and the missiles rain down.

Significantly, U.S. and Pakistani officials say, there have been no major public protests against them, not even among the tribes being targeted.

Most of these attacks have targeted militant hideouts in remote mountainous areas, where there are few if any civilians. A tribal elder from North Waziristan, who declined to be identified, told Reuters: "People have chosen silence. They want to get rid of the Taliban and if the (Pakistani) army cannot do it now, then it (drone attacks) is fine with them."

"As long as things are moving forward, people's minds are changing. There is no anger against the strikes as long as civilians are safe. There have been civilian deaths but not in big numbers," the elder told Reuters.

Another tribesman, who did not want to be named for safety reasons, said: "We prefer drone strikes than army operations because in such operations, we also suffer. But drones hit militants and it is good for us."

Brigadier Asad Munir, a retired ISI officer, said the drone attacks have become "routine" in the tribal areas. "If they find 10 targets a day, they will do it. It will not spark any fresh anger," Munir said. "People have gotten used to it."

BEHIND THE FACADE

The truth is the CIA would not be able to find the militants in many cases without the help of Pakistan's spies and informants, officials say.

"You need guys on the ground to tell you who they (the targets) are and that isn't coming from some white guy running around the FATA. That's coming from the Pakistanis," a U.S. official said, referring to the semi-autonomous Federally Administered Tribal Areas along the Afghan border.

A Pakistan security expert, Ikram Sehgal, agreed. He said the intelligence underpinning the drone strikes has improved precisely because of increased Pakistani cooperation.

"The drone attacks after May last year have been very targeted and they have done a lot of good in terms of taking out the bad guys. And I think that has been possible because of the fact of Pakistan Army officers being in American camps in Afghanistan giving that actionable intelligence which is required," he said.

As the raw intelligence from the drones pours in, Pakistani intelligence liaisons work directly with CIA and military teams in Pakistan and Afghanistan to avoid miscommunication with agents and informants in the field. "We have Pakistanis around to help with coordination," a U.S. military official said.

But tension remains beneath the surface. While their leaders cooperate, many in the Pakistani military deeply resent the drone strikes, complicating efforts to bring Pakistan wholeheartedly on board in the battle against Islamist militants.

"This is a proud military and many hate the drone program because it is a constant reminder that they're not in control," a former U.S. intelligence official said.

CAN DRONES WIN THE WAR?

U.S. intelligence officials proudly tout the drone campaign as the most precise and possibly humane targeted killing program in the "history of warfare."

The target selection process is a secret but, according to the former intelligence official, individuals who are nominated to be "high-value targets" must be vetted by CIA lawyers to determine if they pose "a continuing and imminent threat."

The agency often uses specially designed missiles that have a small blast field with minimal shrapnel to limit "collateral damage", as unwanted casualties are known in military circles. Targets are often killed by the concussion created by the explosion.

Recent advances in drone technology also help to reduce civilian casualties. A U.S. official said: "Weapons can be steered away at the last moment if there's any possibility whatsoever that a non-combatant may be at risk. That speaks to the extreme precision of this system."

An official who has watched several drone strikes recalled the precision with which a CIA operator focused one of the drone's cameras on its target, identifying the wanted man by his missing left arm. A lawyer is always present, he said.

A senior U.S. government official said the strikes themselves may be more precise than ever, but target selection was only as good as the underlying intelligence.

While improved, U.S. officials acknowledge their limited ability to get first-hand intelligence. They rely heavily on satellite and drone imagery, and cell phone intercepts.

Even the Pakistanis have had difficulties in the past ensuring a reliable supply of intelligence in a region where people are often executed as spies.

One intelligence official estimated that as many as 70 Pakistani agents had been killed in the tribal areas and, at one point, areas around Miranshah in North Waziristan, the main Taliban and al Qaeda hub in the area, had become a black hole in terms of intelligence collection.

For some, however, it's not the technology or intelligence as much as the strategy that is flawed.

Addicott, the former legal adviser to Army Special Operations Forces, asks: "Are we creating more enemies than we're killing or capturing by our activities? Unfortunately, I think the answer is yes. These families have 10 sons each. You kill one son and you create 9 more enemies. You're not winning over the population."

"Drones don't impress them," Addicott added. "In the mind of the radicals we're cowards, we won't fight face-to-face. This is what they teach in the madrassas."

He is referring to the pro-Taliban religious schools which help produce many of the movement's anti-American foot-soldiers.

According to Sehgal, who is chairman of Pathfinder G4S, Pakistan's largest private security firm, these madrassas turn out between 7,000 and 15,000 "hard-core" students each year, eclipsing the number being killed by CIA drones and U.S. forces in Afghanistan.

Within the intelligence community, the verdict is still out on whether the CIA's targeted killing of Baitullah Mehsud degraded the Pakistani Taliban's capabilities -- one of the main objectives in any targeted killing.

Since his death last August, there have been fewer attacks against civilians in Pakistan -- 1,019 between August 6, 2009 and April 30, 2010, compared to 1,875 attacks between October 1, 2008 and August 5, 2009, according to a review of the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center's database.

But a U.S. counterterrorism official familiar with the data said the change was likely the result of Pakistani military offensives against militants in the tribal areas, rather than Mehsud's death, noting a downward trend in attacks prior to the August drone strike that killed him.

Baitullah's successor, Hakim