Defense Strategy in the Obama Administration

[buglerbilly]

Defense Strategy in the Obama Administration

Comment by Leo Michel, Senior Research Fellow at the INSS



In April 2009, when Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced his recommendations for President Barack Obama’s first defense budget - a total of nearly $670 billion for fiscal year 2010--his message was clear: the Pentagon must “rebalance (its) programs in order to institutionalize and enhance our capabilities to fight the wars we are in today and the scenarios we are most likely to face in the years ahead, while at the same time providing a hedge against other risks and contingencies.” If Washington’s defense cognoscenti did not doubt the Secretary’s determination to “rise above the politics and parochialism that have too often plagued…our nation’s defense,” many were skeptical that, when all is said and done, U.S. defense strategy would fundamentally change direction.

As the Obama Administration entered its second year, the skeptics’ ranks had thinned a bit. The pragmatic and plain-speaking Mr. Gates, who served from November 2006 to January 2009 as President George W. Bush’s defense chief, reportedly enjoys excellent relations with the President and other top members of the national security team. Moreover, Mr. Gates is widely respected by both Democrats and Republicans in Congress, where he will soon deliver a cascade of assessments and recommendations [This comment was first published in January – Ed.]. These include the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) - the Pentagon’s comprehensive examination of defense strategy and priorities intended to support long-term budget plans - as well as separate reviews covering the U.S. nuclear posture, ballistic missile defenses, and space policy. Tough decisions on specific issues lay ahead - on Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and arms control, to name a few - and President Obama might not side squarely with his defense chief in every instance. But based on his performance so far, Mr. Gates seems reasonably well-positioned to achieve many of his “rebalancing” goals.

Security challenges

Understanding the threats and opportunities posed by the current and projected strategic environment is a critical piece of the defense strategy puzzle, and senior Administration officials and military officers involved in the forthcoming reviews already have shed considerable light on their thinking.

One top civilian official, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michèle Flournoy, has listed five key challenges shaping the strategic environment: the rise of violent extremism; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; fundamental shifts in the balance of power (e.g., the rise of China and India); failed and failing states; and increasing tensions in the “global commons” due, in part, to competition for natural resources and the effects of climate change. These long-term challenges are aggravated, to varying degrees, by developments such as the global economic crisis, the increasing importance (and vulnerabilities) of “cyberspace,” and the spread of potentially destabilizing technologies. Moreover, this daunting set of problems must be addressed while the United States remains engaged in “hot” conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, without mentioning other simmering crises - involving Iranian and North Korean nuclear weapons issues - that might explode with little or no warning.

Thus, according to Ms. Flournoy, the defense establishment must think in new ways about the nature of future warfare, the size and structure of its military forces, and how to balance “strategic risk” among competing priorities. Like other top Administration officials, she no longer uses the “global war on terror” - a Bush Administration formulation consciously discarded by President Obama - as a primary organizing principle of national security policy,. At the same time, she has acknowledged the rise of militarily potent non-state actors and the blurring of lines between conventional “force on force” warfare and counterinsurgency. In an environment characterized by prolonged “hybrid” conflicts that combine aspects of conventional and counterinsurgency campaigns, military forces alone cannot produce strategic success. Hence, as Ms. Flournoy has argued, the overall defense effort must be integrated into a “whole of government” approach - involving diplomatic, intelligence, economic, development assistance, and other civilian tools - to meet U.S. national security objectives.

Leading American military officers seem to be reaching similar conclusions. Army Chief of Staff George Casey, echoing his civilian leadership, has argued that the Army’s first responsibility is to “win the wars we are in.” He, too, has assessed that future conflicts likely will involve U.S. forces pitted against non-state actors armed with increasingly sophisticated weapons and information warfare skills. (Such conflicts, he has advised, “will look more like Israel’s war with Hezbollah in 2006 than the conventional 1991 war with Iraq.”) Marine General James Mattis, head of the Joint Forces Command that plays a key role in transforming U.S. forces to meet future missions, has further warned that American technological superiority is sometimes overrated; in any event, it cannot substitute fully for ground forces when the objective is to defeat a determined insurgency. And even traditional concepts of deterrence are now under scrutiny. For example, Marine General James Cartwright, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has cautioned that the proliferation of dangerous technologies-- such as ballistic missiles or weapons of mass destruction in the hands of reckless governments or fanatical terrorists--obliges the United States to reconsider how best to deter a conflict “that could be over in minutes” without necessarily crossing the nuclear threshold.

Priorities and trade-offs

How the Pentagon will propose specifically to prioritize threats, military missions and capabilities is not yet clear, but the overall thrust of its expected recommendations is already taking shape. Broadly speaking, the QDR is expected to advocate much greater emphasis on the kinds of equipment, programs, and capabilities needed to protect American troops and prosecute the “hybrid” conflicts underway in Iraq and Afghanistan. This likely will translate into efforts to augment helicopter support, air transport, mine-resistant armored vehicles, personnel protection equipment, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets (notably unmanned aerial vehicles), as well as to improve military education and training. A further expansion of the active duty Army and Marine forces (beyond the levels authorized by Congress near the end of the Bush Administration) might be proposed, since existing forces have been seriously stressed by repeated combat deployments; this could include additional capabilities for the Special Operations Command due, in part, to its important role in training foreign military forces.

This shift in emphasis will come with a price tag, and Mr. Gates has acknowledged that the Pentagon budget has entered “a zero-sum game.” In his first budget skirmishes with Congress (including with influential Democrats anxious to protect jobs in their constituencies), the defense secretary has fared well. Despite intense lobbying by a number of defense contractors, he won support for terminating expensive but (in his judgment) unnecessary programs to build additional ultra-sophisticated fighter aircraft (the F-22), futuristic army vehicles, a new constellation of communications satellites and an extravagant fleet of presidential helicopters. As he told an audience of defense industry leaders last July: “We cannot expect to eliminate risk and danger simply by spending more - especially if we’re spending on the wrong things.”

The likely results of the nuclear posture review are less clear. The President clearly wants to achieve substantial reductions in strategic nuclear arms as a result of a new arms treaty with Russia. It is far from certain, however, that this will be accompanied by a fundamental change in the decades-old American reliance on its “triad” of intercontinental land- and submarine-based missiles plus strategic bombers. And while President Obama declared last April in Prague that his Administration “will take concrete steps towards a world without nuclear weapons,” he quickly added that “(a)s long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies.” Indeed, while debate has continued inside the Administration and Congress over the need to design new warheads that could make the aging nuclear arsenal more safe, secure and reliable without resuming explosive testing, Mr. Gates won the President’s approval to begin work on a new generation of ballistic missile submarines and an additional $700 million to modernize the nuclear weapons infrastructure.

Similarly, while the Obama Administration has cut some of the more esoteric missile defense programs (such as the air-borne laser) pursued by the Bush administration, it has certainly not abandoned missile defense entirely. Under plans announced by the President last September, the United States will discard the previous project of placing ten ground-based interceptors in Poland by 2017, supported by an X-band radar in the Czech Republic, in favor of a two-phase program: by 2011, to deploy sea-based SM-3 interceptor missiles to protect the areas of Europe most threatened by the near-term Iranian short and medium-range missile threat; and, between 2015 and 2020, to deploy upgraded, ground-based SM-3s in southern and northern Europe capable of protecting all of the European Allies. In addition, the United States will deploy, by the end of 2010, some 30 ground-based interceptors in Alaska and California to boost its territorial defenses against a potential long-range Iranian missile threat. Meantime, the military will continue research and development on a two-stage interceptor of the type previously planned for Poland - just in case.

Washington no doubt will pursue parallel efforts, also attempted by previous administrations, to develop some form of cooperation with Russia on missile defenses. This could include, for example, linking U.S. (and possible future NATO) warning radars with Russian-controlled radar sites. Still, it remains highly unlikely that the United States would put itself in a position to depend on Russian data for mission success.

Implications for Europe

By and large, the “rebalancing” of U.S. defense strategy holds the potential for strengthening transatlantic defense and security relations. The QDR likely will underscore the U.S. commitment to NATO and the growing convergence between the North American and European Allies on the critical importance of integrating a wide spectrum of civilian and military tools in a “comprehensive approach” to challenging stabilization operations. The fact that Ms. Flournoy’s office has included European representatives inside the planning staff preparing the QDR testifies to the Pentagon’s willingness to take Allied views into account in framing issues for U.S. decision makers.

In this context, a number of senior Administration officials, including Mr. Gates, have sought to promote more effective cooperation between NATO and the European Union in delivering a “comprehensive approach” in Afghanistan and the Balkans. Indeed, one of the important U.S. objectives in welcoming France’s decision to “take its full place” in NATO military structures and advocating that a European officer (French Air Force General Stéphane Abrial) assume leadership of Allied Command Transformation was to encourage a much closer, pragmatic and effective NATO-EU relationship.*

Much will depend, of course, on U.S. policy decisions that are NATO-related but take place outside strictly NATO channels. Some experts have suggested, for example, that the Administration reconsider previous plans (approved under Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld) to reduce the U.S. military permanently stationed in Europe (principally in Germany, Italy and the UK) from the current approximately 80,000 personnel to a total closer to 35,000. Their arguments against such cuts: deep reductions would be counterproductive to U.S. efforts to increase Allied capabilities and interoperability through day-to-day interaction and periodic exercises; and, particularly in light of a more assertive Russia, they might increase concerns, already brewing among some of the Allies, about U.S. capability to meet NATO’s Article 5 (collective defense) commitment. And while European Allies so far have not expressed serious concern about the near-term prospects for further U.S.-Russian strategic arms reductions, they likely will want reassurance that the U.S. “extended deterrence” will remain credible for the indefinite future.

Defense industry issues are another important facet of the transatlantic relationship, and here the jury is still out. Mr. Gates’ decision to halt the F-22 procurement was accompanied by his recommitment to a robust Joint Strike Fighter program - a decision welcomed by the seven Allied development partners. He has promised a “fair, open and transparent” competition between the Northrop-EADS consortium and Boeing Corporation over the pending contract, valued at over $35 billion, to provide the U.S. Air Force with a new fleet of tanker aircraft. Still, some influential Members of Congress will want him to favor the Boeing product. In another contentious area, Mr. Gates reportedly was a key force behind President Obama’s decision last August to order an interagency review of U.S. export controls. Many - in government and the private sector - increasingly view those controls a relic of the Cold War and harmful to developing a real “two-way street” in high-technology cooperation with Europe. Here again, the Administration will have to convince some skeptical but influential Members of Congress to change the restrictive legislation.

For many Americans, however, the biggest test facing transatlantic solidarity and effectiveness will be decided in the caldron of Afghanistan, which the President, in mid-2009, called “a war of necessity.” NATO’s difficulty in meeting its force requirements there extends beyond troop levels. Some Allies continue to invoke “caveats” that restrict how and where their nation’s forces can be employed by the NATO commander. In addition, the costs associated with the difficult mission are taking a heavy toll on several European troop contributor nations. U.S. frustrations with the European Allies have been growing for some time now, but despite these, Washington has strong incentives to try to maintain the Alliance’s commitment. After all, ability of the Allies to sustain their Afghan commitments over several years testifies to the value of Alliance structures for consultations, planning, decision-making, capabilities development, and mutual support in difficult operations.

Yet the questions are legion. Will the U.S. decision to increase its forces in Afghanistan during 2009-2010 succeed in stabilizing the security situation? Will the troop increase reinforce perceptions in Europe that this is an “American war,” thereby strengthening pressures within some Allied countries to draw down their military participation? And if the Europeans’ military commitments in Afghanistan begin to erode, will they really follow through on promises to contribute more to non-military aspects of the “comprehensive approach” - for example, in police training and mentoring, funding for an expanded Afghan National Army, finding sustainable development alternatives to the opium poppy culture, and capacity-building for struggling civilian ministries and regional governments?

Speaking in Prague last April, President Obama noted that none of the fast-changing global challenges can be solved quickly, “but all of them demand that we listen to one another and work together; that we focus on our common interests, not on occasional differences; an that we reaffirm our shared values, which are stronger than any force that could drive us apart.” One thing is clear: if Europe wants to preserve a strong transatlantic defense and security link with a U.S. partner that is more inclined to multilateral solutions, it should seize this opportunity. A grave setback for the Euro-Atlantic community’s effort in Afghanistan might not mean the end of NATO, but it would seriously damage its credibility both inside and outside the Alliance.

In that event, stay tuned for another, less transatlantic and more U.S.-centric “rebalancing” of its defense strategy.

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By Leo Michel, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies, the “think tank” component of the National Defense University, Washington, DC.

(These are the authors personal views and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the U.S. Government. )

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* On September 9, General Abrial became the first European to hold one of the two “supreme commander” positions in the 60 year history of NATO.

[buglerbilly]

Opportunities for the U.S. Army to Position its Ground Force Modernization Efforts for Success

07:18 GMT, March 11, 2010

Since 2003, the Future Combat System (FCS) program has been the centerpiece of the Army’s efforts to transition to a lighter, more agile, and more capable combat force. In 2009, however, concerns over the program’s performance led to the Secretary of Defense’s decision to significantly restructure and ultimately cancel the acquisition program. As a result, the Army is outlining a new approach to ground force modernization. This statement outlines the Army’s preliminary post-FCS actions and identifies the challenges DOD and the Army must address as they proceed. This testimony is based on GAO’s report on the Army’s Ground Force Modernization effort scheduled for release March 15, 2010. It emphasizes the December 2009 decision to begin low-rate initial production for Increment 1 of the Brigade Combat Team Modernization.

In its draft report that is currently with DOD for comment, GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense mandate the Army correct the identified maturity and reliability issues with the Increment 1 systems and network prior to approving any additional production lots. The GAO also recommended the Secretary of the Army not field the Increment 1 network or systems until the identified maturity and reliability issues have been corrected.

DOD has not yet responded to the GAO recommendations.

What GAO Found

The Army is implementing DOD direction and redefining its overall modernization strategy as a result of the Secretary of Defense’s decision to significantly restructure the FCS program. It is transitioning from the FCS long-term acquisition orientation to a shorter-term approach that biannually develops and fields new increments of capability within capability packages. It now has an approved acquisition program that will produce and field the initial increment of the FCS spinout equipment, which includes unmanned aerial and ground vehicles as well as unattended sensors and munitions. It has preliminary plans for two other major defense acquisition programs to (1) define and develop follow-on increments and (2) develop a new Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV). The individual systems within Increments 1 and 2 are to be integrated with a preliminary version of an information network. Currently, the Army is continuing selected development work—primarily that related to Increments 1 and 2, and the information network—under the existing FCS development contract. The Army has recently released a request for proposals for the technology development phase of the proposed GCV development effort. The Army’s projected investment in Increments 1 and 2 and GCV is estimated to be over $24 billion through fiscal year 2015.

With these modernization efforts at an early stage, DOD and the Army face the immediate challenge of setting themon the best possible footing by buying the right capabilities at the best value. DOD and the Army have an opportunity to better position these efforts by utilizing an enhanced body of acquisition legislation and DOD policy reforms—which now incorporate many of the knowledge-based practices that GAO has previously identified—as well as lessons learned from the FCS program. Preliminary plans suggest the Army and DOD are strongly considering lessons learned. However, DOD recently approved the first of several planned low-rate initial production lots of Increment 1 despite having acknowledged that the systems and network were immature, unreliable, and not performing as required. That decision reflects DOD’s emphasis on providing new capabilities quickly to combat units. This decision did not follow knowledge-based acquisition practices and runs the risk of delivering unacceptable equipment to the warfighter and trading off acquisition principles whose validity has been so recently underscored.

The Army needs to seize the opportunity of integrating acquisition reforms, knowledge-based acquisition practices, and lessons-learned from FCS into future modernization efforts to increase the likelihood of successful outcomes.

The fully report (GAO-10-493T) can be viewed here: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10493t.pdf

[buglerbilly]

Mullen: The Proper Use of the Military

Mar 25, 2010



I’ve watched and advised two administrations and I’ve come to three con*clusions—t*hree principles—about the proper use of modern military forces. The first is that military power should not —maybe cannot—be the last resort of the state. Military forces are some of the most flexible and adaptable tools to policymakers. We can, merely by our presence, help alter certain behavior. Before a shot is even fired, we can bolster a diplomatic argument, support a friend or deter an enemy. We can assist rapidly in disaster-relief efforts. We can help gather intelligence, support reconnaissance and provide security. . . .

Not every intended target of one’s deterrent will act rationally, and not every good intention will be thus received. Longer-lasting, more sustainable effects will most assuredly demand a whole-of-government, if not a whole-of-nation, effort. Defense and diplomacy are simply no longer discrete choices—one to be applied when the other one fails—but must complement one another throughout the messy process of international relations. . . .

U.S. foreign policy is still too dominated by the military, too dependent upon the generals and admirals who lead our major overseas commands. It’s one thing to be able and willing to serve as emergency responders; quite another to always have to be the fire chief. Secretaries [Hillary Rodham] Clinton and [Robert] Gates have called for more funding and more emphasis on our soft power, and I could not agree with them more. Should we choose to exert American influence solely through our troops, we should expect to see that influence diminish in time. In fact, I would argue that in the future struggles of the asymmetric counterinsurgent variety, we ought to make it a precondition of committing our troops that we will do so only if and when the other instruments of national power are ready to engage as well.

That brings me to point No. 2: Force should, to the maximum extent possible, be applied in a precise and principled way. Though it can never lessen the pain of loss, precisely applying force in a principled manner can help reduce those costs and actually improve our chances of success. The battlefield is not necessarily a field anymore. It is in the minds of the people. That is why the threshold for the use of indirect fire in [Afghanistan] is so high. In this type of war, when the objective is not the enemy’s defeat but the people’s success, less really is more.

My final principle is: Policy and strategy should constantly struggle with one another. Some in the military would prefer political leadership that lays out a specific strategy and then gets out of the way, leaving the balance of the implementation to commanders in the field. But the experience of the last nine years tells us a clear strategy for military operations is essential, and that strategy will have to change as those operations evolve.

In other words, success in these types of wars is iterative; it is not decisive. There isn’t going to be a single day when we stand up and say, that’s it, it’s over, we’ve won. We will win, but we will do so only over time and only after near constant reassessment and adjustment. Quite frankly, it will feel a lot less like a knock out punch and a lot more like recovering from a long illness.

The worst possible world I can imagine is one in which military commanders are inventing or divining their strategies—their own remedies—in the absence of clear political guidance, sometimes after an initial goal or mission has been taken over by events. That’s why we have and need political leadership constantly immersed in the week-to-week flow of the conflict, willing and able to adjust as necessary but always leaving military commanders enough leeway to do what is expected of them.

Policymakers, after all, have other concerns beyond those of the military that must be considered when taking a nation to war, including cost, domestic support, international reaction and so forth. At the same time, military leaders at all levels much be completely frank about the limits of what military power can achieve, with what risk and in what time frame. . . .

Contrary to popular imagination, war has never been a set-piece affair. The enemy adapts to your strategy and you adapt to his. And so you keep the interplay going between policy and strategy until you find the right combination at the right time. What worked well in Iraq will not necessarily work in Afghanistan. What worked well today will not necessarily work tomorrow. The day you stop adjusting is the day you lose.

Navy Adm. Mike Mullen is the chairman of U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. This is adapted from a speech he gave recently at Kansas State University. Photo: US Navy

[buglerbilly]

Jointness a Threat To Beating China: Analyst

By christopher p. cavas

Published: 7 Apr 2010 16:40

lThe Pentagon's relentless pressure on each of the armed services to cooperate more fully with each other and pool their resources could leave the United States unprepared to face its most capable potential adversary, a key strategist said April 7.

"The secular religion of jointness," said Bryan McGrath, is making the Department of Defense "ill-prepared" to defend commercial globalization that in turn is underwritten by sea power.

"The inability to do this leaves our country ill-prepared to meet the one adversary we could face - China," he added.

McGrath, a retired U.S. Navy officer who was the primary author of the service's latest maritime strategy, spoke in Washington at a Heritage Foundation panel on sea power.

"Jointness has made our armed services the envy of the world," McGrath noted. "No nation can match our ability to synchronize combat power. It is also a paradigm of acquisition and strategic planning.

"But jointness has gone too far," he charged. "It is an impediment to intellectual and strategic thinking."

With a need to embrace and support the needs of the land services, the Navy, McGrath said, is unable in the current climate to strongly advocate for sea power. A military strategy that clearly favored sea power over airpower and land power would never make its way out of the Pentagon, he said.

"Sea power must receive greater emphasis as an enabler of a grand strategy in a multipolar world," he declared. "But I fear it will not."

The Pentagon has not yet faced up to the challenges represented by a growing Chinese blue-water navy, McGrath said. "We are whistling past the graveyard."

A response to the Chinese should be based on a maritime strategy, McGrath said. "We must find a way to have a national debate about sea power and its centrality to the world."

The Chinese themselves are pointing the way, McGrath observed.

"We must find a way to embrace Confucian duality as effectively as the Chinese do. We should work to encourage good behavior, but we need to be thinking more about what a war with China would look like. Planning to fight a war with China does not guarantee a war or make it more likely. It simply means that nations should be prepared to fight and win a war they cannot afford to lose, in this case with China."

In response, one veteran naval strategist rose from the audience to challenge McGrath.

The Navy often is described as arrogant in its relations with other services, observed Dick Diamond, a retired naval officer. "Now you have us believe the Navy is drinking the Kool-Aid of jointness."

A key test as to how far the Navy and Air Force are embracing jointness, Diamond noted, will be the release in about two months of internal reports on the Air-Sea Battle, a Navy-Air Force effort to pool their resources to meet tactical challenges on the battlefield.

"The report that the joint Air Force-Navy cell gives their leadership, and what their service chiefs sent forward to the secretary of defense, will answer the question of whether the services are really on board with jointness or not," Diamond told a reporter Wednesday. "It will be a perfect laboratory."

[buglerbilly]

Building State Department Muscle

Link Security Assistance to Foreign Policy Priorities

By PAUL CLAYMAN

Published: 5 April 2010

Albert Einstein, channeling Dr. Seuss, famously remarked, "A question that sometimes drives me hazy, am I or are the others crazy?"

U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates must sympathize. Between campaigning against plus-ups in his budget for purchases such as the C-17 transport plane and the Joint Strike Fighter's second engine, Gates routinely advocates for increasing State Department authority and funding in core foreign policy areas such as security assistance.

Promoting other agencies' budget growth often is seen as the definition of crazy through the lens of Washington's zero-sum budgetary game. Fortunately for Gates and the rest of us, he is as sane as ever.

In a February address at the Nixon Center, he emphasized that "whatever we do should reinforce the State Department's lead role in crafting and conducting U.S. foreign policy, to include foreign assistance, of which building security capacity is a key part."

That vision is absolutely correct. As Gates implies, his counterpart at State is properly charged with determining which countries should receive U.S. assistance, as well as the timing, content and duration of such assistance.

The Defense Department, however, has been moving the other way. Responding in 2006 to the urgency of Afghanistan, Iraq and global counterterrorism efforts, Congress authorized a Pentagon request for new, albeit temporary, security assistance authorities. These authorities widened the mission for an already-stressed Department of Defense while eroding the tradition of State Department leadership in aligning security assistance with America's foreign policy priorities.

Major elements of this security assistance structure will soon expire, however, and the time has come to rethink the underlying authorities beyond the immediate needs of Afghanistan and Iraq. Gates anticipated this need and proposed a more robust State Department role in his December "pooled resources, shared responsibility" memo to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Under his plan, the State and Defense departments would pool security assistance funds into a single account and then obligate those funds jointly.

Though innovative, "pooled resources, shared responsibilities" is an inappropriate construct for conducting America's foreign policy. For the first time, it would grant the secretary of defense a veto over foreign policy decisions made by the secretary of state. That, in turn, would misalign the roles of the Defense Department in policymaking and the contribution of security assistance to America's delicate diplomatic balance.

At a baser level, the presumption that eight congressional committees, including two authorizing committees in each chamber and two appropriating subcommittees in each chamber, could effectively collaborate in supporting this solution is disconnected from Washington's reality.

There is an alternative, however, that is truer to Gates' call for stronger State Department leadership, less complex and more consistent with our policy tradition. Section 506 of the Foreign Assistance Act authorizes the president to direct the drawdown of resources from any agency of the government to provide disaster assistance, to counter terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and to fight narcotics trafficking, among other things.

This authority does not explicitly include security assistance, yet an amendment to include this type of aid under the drawdown authority umbrella would better represent the State and Defense departments' appropriate roles. Rather than trying to craft some new concept of shared jurisdiction through pooled resources, shared responsibility, it would unify decision-making authority under the president, acting in his dual capacity as America's commander in chief and top diplomat.

Amended Section 506 authority would allow the secretary of state to link security assistance to the larger foreign policy environment, just as she currently does when providing disaster assistance and efforts to counter transnational threats. To support those goals, she would submit drawdown recommendations to the president.

At the same time, Congress could appropriate security assistance funds to the Defense Department that would be available to support the president's administration-wide decision. No change in State Department appropriations would be required.

A drawdown authority solution would achieve these gains while still giving the Defense Department an important role. Just as with foreign military financing and sales, these inputs are received in part through the routine, working-level collaboration between departments both in the field and in Washington.

Additionally, such drawdown requests are coordinated by the White House's National Security Council and Office of Management and Budget, allowing DoD a venue to express its views.

Gates' vision of "the State Department's lead role in crafting and conducting U.S. foreign policy" as stated in the memo offers hope that the Defense Department might accept this proposal. Doing so would position us to heed important advice from Dr. Seuss: "Step with care and great tact and remember that Life's a Great Balancing Act. Just never forget to be dexterous and deft. And never mix up your right foot with your left." ■

Pul Clayman is an independent consultant and former chief counsel to U.S. Sen. Richard Lugar, R-Ind., chairman and later ranking member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

[buglerbilly]

Lynn Details Approach to Changes in Warfare

(Source: US Department of Defense; issued April 28, 2010)

LOS ANGELES --- Warfare has changed, and the U.S. military must shift to meet the new threats, Deputy Defense Secretary William J. Lynn III said to the World Affairs Council here last night.

Lynn said he and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates have tried to shift military strategy “to move the tectonic plates of our national security environment.”

The Defense Department is doing more to fight the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan while still preparing for future conflicts, Lynn said. Past strategy, he told the group, did not pay enough attention to current conflicts, and the department has changed the balance toward fighting today’s wars.

The biggest change in war is that rogue nations, terror groups and even criminal gangs can field increasingly lethal technologies, the deputy secretary told the audience.

“Terrorist organizations and rogue states seek weapons of mass destruction, insurgents are armed with [improvised explosive devices] that can penetrate even our most sophisticated armored vehicles,” he said. “We even see criminals who have world-class cyber capabilities.”

The military must be ready to face these challenges, he said, and still maintain the capabilities to take on peer competitors.

Another change is that wars, conflicts, emergencies are longer than they used to be, Lynn said. The old strategy was based on fighting two major, nearly simultaneous conflicts. But planners thought the wars would be like Operation Desert Storm in 1991 – a powerful, quick war.

“But the concept no longer fits our current reality,” Lynn said. “We are already fighting two wars, and it wasn’t the intensity of the initial combat phase that proved the most challenging in Iraq and Afghanistan. Rather, after eight years in those two conflicts, we are finding the duration of those conflicts is what places the most stress on American’s military. These wars have now lasted longer than the United States’ participation in World War I and World War II combined.”

War has moved more toward asymmetric threats. No nation or group can match the U.S. military’s conventional strength, Lynn said, so they don’t try.

“Rather than fighting us head-to-head, they use IEDs to counter our mechanized advantage or guerilla tactics to avoid direct combat,” he explained. Some countries also are investing in weapons such as surface-to-surface missiles, cyber capabilities and anti-satellite technologies to deny U.S. access to battlefields.

The cyber threat is another profound change in warfare, Lynn told the group.

“There is no exaggerating our nation’s dependence on information networks,” he said. The Defense Department alone has thousands of networks, millions of computers and more millions of computer users. All major weapons systems, the intelligence and logistics efforts and personnel programs rely on information technology.

“The Internet is magical in its ability to connect us to others,” Lynn said, “but it is a two-way street. Over the past 10 years, the frequency and sophistication of cyber intrusions has increased exponentially.” More than 100 foreign intelligence services are trying to hack into U.S. systems, he said, and foreign militaries are developing offensive cyber capabilities.

President Barack Obama has called the cyber threat one of the most serious challenges America faces, Lynn said. Cyber attacks threaten not only the U.S. military, but also the American infrastructure and economy, he added.

Lynn said the department is addressing all of these threats. The U.S. military is developing the capabilities to handle the range of conflict from low-end insurgencies to high-end near peer wars. The military services are adjusting the way they recruit, train and retain servicemembers in face of long wars. And the United States is working to counter asymmetric attacks and to continue to enhance asymmetric advantages of its own.

The way the Defense Department buys equipment, programs services also has to change, Lynn said, acknowledging that the department has not been a good buyer. Changing the way the acquisition process works is an important part of funding the capabilities to handle future threats, he added.

To illustrate his point, Lynn noted that Apple developed the iPhone in 24 months. “That’s less time than it would take for us to budget for an IT program,” he said. “I’m serious. Just to prepare, defend and receive congressional approval for our budget takes about 24 months.”

Overall, he added, it takes 81 months – nearly seven years -- from an IT program first being funded until it becomes operational. This means the equipment already is four generations old by the time it gets in the hands of servicemembers.

Cancelling programs that don’t work, are redundant or are too specialized is another way to shape the budget, Lynn said. Gates has made the hard decisions, he told the group, and the programs he has cancelled or recommended for cancellation would have cost $330 billion if they continued.

“By exercising program discipline, we are able to direct resources to the highest priority programs,” Lynn said. “These tough decisions enhance our ability to protect the American people.”

The changing environment places great stress on the military and the department, the deputy secretary said. “Succeeding in these tumultuous times, while prevailing in Afghanistan and Iraq, will not be easy,” said he added. “But I’m confident that we have charted a path that will keep out nation safe.”

-ends-

[buglerbilly]

Pace of Changes Clouds Future, Mullen Says

(Source: U.S Air Force; issued April 27, 2010)

WASHINGTON --- The pace of changes in the military and in the world has made looking ahead a difficult proposition, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said April 26.

Navy Adm. Mike Mullen told members of the Colorado Air National Guard's 140th Wing during a town hall-style meeting at Buckley Air Force Base, Colo., that they're part of a rapidly changing world.

"Things are changing so fast, particularly in the Guard and Reserve, to keep up with the missions we have," Admiral Mullen said. "I'm not sure exactly what (the future) looks like."

Admiral Mullen also spoke of the pace of changes in medical treatments and technology, and the demands that have been placed on military families.

"The relationship and integration of our families is more important than it's ever been," he said, adding that his wife, Deborah, met with the servicemembers' families during their visit.

"I believe we're changing in ways, medically and in the (intelligence) world, where we don't know exactly how it all ends up, and we need to," the chairman said.

Admiral Mullen said he is especially grateful for the high rate of recruitment and retention since 9/11 from servicemembers who understand the demands ahead of them. Many are driven by the loss of Americans on 9/11, he said, adding that he is as well.

"This is personal to me. The plane flew in under my office," Admiral Mullen said of the attack on the Pentagon. "I lost people there. It hasn't happened since, not because people haven't tried, but because of the extraordinary effort of our whole government.

"It was these wars that focused us," he continued. "I drive by the Pentagon Memorial almost every day I'm there, and I'm reminded of the 3,000 people who died" at three sites during the terrorist attacks.

"Al-Qaida is still out there and they don't want to just kill 3,000 people," Admiral Mullen said. "They'd like to kill 30,000 or 40,000 if they could. The ability to defend against that is why we're here. It's what you're about."

The chairman said it's not enough that recruitment and retention are at record highs. The military still needs the right people with the right skills and the right leaders, he told the Airmen.

"When people ask me about betting on our military for the future, I'm betting on you," he said. "But I'm not just interested in keeping the numbers up. We need the right people with the right skills."

Admiral Mullen challenged the Airmen to live up to their own leadership potential while also growing new leaders. The need for leadership at such a time of change presents great opportunities, he said.

"There's nothing more difficult, and yet it is the most-exciting form of leadership," he said.

The focus on retaining the right servicemembers and growing leaders "is the people side of this, and we've got to make sure we get this right," the chairman said. "Lead well and mentor well. Someone mentored you, and I would expect you to do the same."

Diversity will continue to be important in the military, Admiral Mullen said.

"In the long run, our military must represent America," he said. "To the degree that we don't, we will drift away."

Admiral Mullen thanked the Airmen for their service, noting that the Guard and Reserve have been critical to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Today's military, he said, is the best ever.

"Thanks for what you're doing," Admiral Mullen said. "You're the best I've ever seen. You've made a difference in two wars we didn't anticipate, and you've adjusted incredibly well."

Admiral Mullen noted the greatly extended length of deployments and decreased time at home that servicemembers have experienced since the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks. And, he said, the Guard and Reserve were "nowhere near where they are today" in capabilities 10 years ago.

During a question-and-answer session with the Airmen, Admiral Mullen was asked about the trend toward using more unmanned aircraft. Air Force leaders, he responded, should take note of how Navy leaders moved toward modernizing the fleet. Although newer manned aircraft are much more capable and fewer are needed compared to older models, they are very expensive, he said.

"The hard facts are, the only possible way to (recapitalize) your Air Force is to decommission airplanes," Admiral Mullen said. "It's not going to start raining money here. That's very upsetting, and I understand all that. But the recapitalization requirement is very real, and we're trying deal with what the balance will be. In the end, for the health of the military, it's going take tough decisions on the part of the leaders."

Air Force officials should know in the next 12 to 24 months what the future balance of manned and unmanned aircraft will look like, the chairman said.

Admiral Mullen also spoke of tough decisions regarding future military budgets, noting rising U.S. budget deficits.

"We're not an insignificant part of that," he said. "We've got to spend the money well."

-ends-

[buglerbilly]

Barack Obama sets out security strategy based on diplomacy instead of war

Report described as clean break from Bush years addresses fresh challenges including rise of India and China

Ewen MacAskill in Washington guardian.co.uk, Thursday 27 May 2010 23.40 BST


Air Force Academy cadets celebrate graduation. But their role may change under Obama's strategy. Photograph: Mark Reis/AP

Barack Obama has set out a new national security strategy described as a clean break with the Bush doctrine of unilateralism, which addresses fresh challenges that include homegrown terrorism, cybersecurity and the rise of India and China.

The report says the US has been hardened by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that in future the emphasis will be on diplomacy, with war as a last resort. "Our long-term security will not come from our ability to instil fear in other peoples, but through our capacity to speak to their hopes," it says.

Obama identifies nuclear proliferation, al-Qaida, economic collapse and climate change as the main threats, and suggests a shift in military thinking away from traditional warfare to counter-insurgency.

The 52-page report, is Obama's first. White House aides contrasted it with a report by George Bush in 2002 that paved the way for the strike against Iraq in 2003, and another report in 2006.

Foreign policy analysts expressed scepticism, saying its lofty aspirations were not reflected in the hard reality of the world, such as his failure to close Guantánamo Bay and the use of drones in Afghanistan and Pakistan. They asked what Obama would do if his policy of diplomatic engagement with Iran and North Korea failed to produce results.

Others questioned whether it marked as big a break from the Bush doctrine as the White House suggested. Although it stresses international co-operation rather than unilateralism, Obama has not abandoned the use of pre-emptive strikes.

Anthony Cordesman, one of the leading foreign and military analysts in the US, based at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, said: "It gives foreign aid and partnership with other states as much emphasis as military security. It stresses that the US is part of a multi-polar world, rather its leader, emphasises engagement with allies, sees the UN a key fact in international affairs, and sees improving relations with Russia and China as priorities, rather than rivalry and confrontation.

"Give or take some liberal rhetoric, it is a return to a centrist, pragmatic US national strategy."

Mark Lynch, associate professor of international relations at George Washington University, writing on the Foreign Policy website, welcomed the strategy: "It marks a clean break with the past ... [It] gets the big things right and offers a clear and effective framework for American foreign policy and national security."

The thrust of Obama's policy is to engage with China and India, and with former enemies, of which the most important is Russia. "We will continue to deepen our co-operation with other 21st century centres of influence – including China, India, and Russia," the report says.

It adopts the shift long advocated by General David Petraeus, the overall US commander, to concentrate on counter-insurgency. The report says: "We will continue to rebalance our military capabilities to excel at counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, stability operations, and meeting increasingly sophisticated security threats, while ensuring our force is ready to address the full range of military operations."

While the Bush administration repeatedly referred to the threat from Islamists, this report avoids such usage. While acknowledging the continuing threat from al-Qaida, it also focuses on the FBI's concerns about "the threat to the United States and our interests posed by individuals radicalised at home".

It adds: "The federal government will invest in intelligence to understand this threat and expand community engagement and development programmes to empower local communities."

The report regards cyber crime as one of the most serious threats to national security. "The very technologies that empower us to lead and create also empower those who would disrupt and destroy.

"They enable our military superiority, but our unclassified government networks are constantly probed by intruders. Our daily lives and public safety depend on power and electric grids, but potential adversaries could use cyber vulnerabilities to disrupt them on a massive scale," the report warns.

The administration's counter-strategy is to invest in specialists and technology, to work with the private sector, strengthen laws for dealing with hackers and have plans in place, comparable to those for dealing with natural disasters.

[buglerbilly]

Barack Obama's same old brand new security strategy

The present US administration's approach has more in common with past presidencies than it might admit

Richard Fontaine guardian.co.uk, Thursday 27 May 2010 19.18 BST


Barack Obama speaks about the war in Afghanistan at West Point in December 2009. Photograph: Charles Dharapak/AP

Barack Obama's national security strategy is being interpreted as a break with his predecessor's. But for all of its rhetorical distancing, there is more continuity – with Bush and other recent US presidencies – than most perceive.

The transatlantic relationship is still the cornerstone of international engagement. The gravest danger to the US comes from weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists. The US still reserves the right to act unilaterally and does not rule out pre-emption, even if it does not trumpet that fact. It will maintain military superiority, promote democracy and human rights, isolate Iran and North Korea, and counter extremism. It will work against the Taliban and with the Iraqis.

There are a few differences in substance and many in tone. But it would be wrong to say this is a break with the past – US interests and values are longstanding and the tools it possesses for pursuing them are stable.

The realities of the international system and continuing US interests always inform its foreign policy. The differences that exist are on the margin and, while that margin can be consequential, the new strategy should be seen in the context of the country's history.

Yet it is wrong to describe the new strategy as Bush redux – it is more America redux. Administrations centre their foreign policy within the broad course of tradition and then describe their approach as a dramatic shift. We can expect this administration less to tread new ground but rather to pledge to do things more effectively. Time will tell.

Richard Fontaine is a senior fellow at the Centre for a New American Security, a nonpartisan national security thinktank in Washington.

[buglerbilly]

Obama's national security strategy is light on the human rights agenda

By Jackson Diehl

Monday, May 31, 2010

What sort of international order does Barack Obama seek? Last week he gave a detailed answer: "One that can resolve the challenges of our times -- countering violent extremism and insurgency; stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and securing nuclear materials; combating a changing climate and sustaining global growth; helping countries feed themselves and care for their sick; resolving and preventing conflict, while also healing its wounds."

That's a big agenda. But isn't something missing? Nowhere in that long sentence, in the introduction to his new national security strategy, does Obama suggest that the international "engagement" he proposes should serve to combat tyranny or oppression, or promote democracy. In that sense, it is typical of the first comprehensive account Obama has offered of his administration's goals in the world. In theory -- as in the practice of his first year -- human rights come second.

Big, set-piece Washington policy statements often provide a road map to the struggles over policy inside an administration, and the 52-page paper Obama released last Thursday is no exception. The White House's left-leaning "realists" -- who seek to limit U.S. foreign engagements, shift resources to domestic programs and jettison the "freedom agenda" of George W. Bush -- seem to have won all of the big arguments. Definitions of strategy throughout the report, from how to defeat al-Qaeda to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to dealing with North Korea and Iran, exclude any mention of democracy or human rights.

Like the Bush administration before it, the Obama team says America has an interest in the creation of a Palestinian state -- but unlike Bush, Obama doesn't say that that state should be democratic. The policy says al-Qaeda's extremist ideology should be combated with an agenda of "hope and opportunity," but doesn't mention freedom. A section titled "Promote a Responsible Iran" says "the United States seeks a future in which Iran meets its international responsibilities . . . and enjoys the political and economic opportunities that its people deserve." Does that include free speech and free elections, as the opposition Green Movement has demanded? The paper doesn't say.

Proponents of an Obama freedom agenda did get one chapter of the report, titled "Values." But its very segregation from the other three "interests" -- "Security," "Prosperity" and "International Order," gives its proposals a fenced-off feel. The policy begins with a couple of big qualifications: The United States will promote its values mainly "by living them at home," and it will "recognize economic opportunity as a human right." That means that "support for global health, food security and cooperative responses to humanitarian crises" will share attention and resources with the fight against tyranny and torture -- which will be welcome news for rulers in places such as Burma and North Korea.

The report's discussion of "engagement with non-democratic regimes" is solid, so far as it goes. It says the administration will pursue a "dual-track approach" in which it will cajole governments about human rights while supporting peaceful opposition. "When our overtures are rebuffed," it says, Washington will use "public and private diplomacy" and "incentives and disincentives" in "an effort to change repressive behavior."

But will this policy apply to Russia -- where the administration so far has offered nothing but incentives? "We support efforts within Russia to promote the rule of law, accountable government and universal values," the policy not-very-clearly says. How about the Arab Middle East? "We will continue to press governments in the region to undertake political reforms and to loosen restrictions on speech, assembly and media," says a sentence buried on Page 45.

Maybe such textual analysis is meaningless. But Obama's written strategy has a lot in common with what has actually happened since he took office. It will sound more than familiar to the dissident Greens of Iran, or to the leaders of the nascent pro-democracy movement in Egypt, who are already deeply disillusioned with this administration. It will confirm the thinking of Vladimir Putin of Russia and Hu Jintao of China that strategic partnership with the United States won't require domestic reforms.

Obama has already demonstrated that he does not accept Bush's conclusion that the promotion of democracy and human rights is inseparable from the tasks of defeating al-Qaeda and establishing a workable international order. But nowhere in his 52-page doctrine is there a coherent explanation of why.

[buglerbilly]

Ares

A Defense Technology Blog

"We need to think more about strategy..."

Posted by Paul McLeary at 6/29/2010 2:10 PM CDT

While briefing reporters on issues concerning the FY11 defense budget this morning at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Andrew Krepenevich painted a pretty bleak portrait of what he sees as the dearth of real, hard strategic thinking by the Pentagon and among the civilians in the Executive branch.

His comments followed closely those he put forth in a paper earlier this month where he complained that the Obama administration’s recently released national security strategy “offers no concrete suggestions on how the administration hopes to achieve [its stated] objectives or how inconsistencies between these objectives might be resolved by establishing strategic priorities.” This morning, he also offered that while the tightening budgets brought about by the current fiscal crisis means that “we need to think about budgets,” it also means that in order to make fully informed budget decisions, “we need to think more about strategy.”

Krepenevich went on to say that the lack of strategic thinking “is striking to me because if you don’t have that kind of comprehensive strategy when you’re looking across several types of enduring challenges—when you’re looking at shifts in alliance relationships, when you’re looking at declining defense resources—and you don’t have a strong sense of what are the priorities here…the matter of strategy I think has been greatly undervalued.”

In a paper released earlier this month, Patrick Cronin of the Center for a New American Security also tried to tackle the strategy conundrum that American defense planners have created for themselves. Also taking the financial crisis as a starting point from which to work, Cronin writes that “while the United States stands to remain the world’s preeminent power for some time, the era of boundless commitment and profligacy has passed. To ignore this reality could precipitate decline rather than perpetuate preponderance.” Titled, Restraint: Recalibrating American Strategy, Cronin calls for a less expansive view of American power that must try and stamp out every potential problem that it uncovers in the dustier precincts of the globe.

Instead of calling for an era of isolation, he advocates that in the near-term at least, the United States will need to “think harder before reacting and committing our finite resources, to look for asymmetric responses – those with low costs and high returns – rather than those that deliver high returns at an equally high cost and to get our own house in order.” With a $13 trillion national debt and an economy that is unsteadily digging itself out of what is being termed the “Great Recession,” budgets for both expeditionary military adventures and high-ticket foreign aid packages will be extremely tight, and as a result, Cronin writes, “the United States can best pursue a protracted period of global order by resisting the temptation to solve all the world’s problems. The United States must pursue a strategy characterized by, in a word, restraint. Restraint is not a strategy, but it can help the United States preserve its limited means to focus on essential commitments.” Given the economy and the spiraling national debt, restraint might not be a choice, but rather a necessity.

[buglerbilly]

More on this............

DoD Adviser: Foes' Advances Might Lead to F-35 Fleet Shrinkage

By JOHN T. BENNETT

Published: 29 Jun 2010 14:52

The Obama administration may have to rethink whether the U.S. military will need 2,500 F-35 fighter jets, and needs to craft a clear, prioritized national security strategy, a top Pentagon adviser told reporters June 29.

The world has changed tremendously since when the F-35 fighter was designed, and potential American foes have acquired systems that could render other kinds of U.S. aircraft, missile systems and other platforms more useful in certain situations than the multibillion-dollar F-35, said Andrew Krepinevich, president of the Washington-based Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

With possible American enemies, like China, developing and fielding ever-more advanced systems - such as sophisticated radar suites and surface-to-air missiles - Pentagon and administration officials must examine if the Lockheed Martin-made Lightning II will bring as much "value" to combat by the time it comes online next decade as thought decades previous when it was designed, he said.

Though the program has recently been in the spotlight due to significant cost growth and schedule delays, the Pentagon plans to buy a total of 2,457 of the three F-35 variants. Defense Secretary Robert Gates and other senior DoD officials have tethered part of their legacies to turning around the program and one day fielding a fleet of that size.

But because it might not be as useful from so-called forward air bases or aircraft carriers because of foes' advanced air defenses, the Defense Department might have to swallow hard, buy fewer F-35s and use any savings to buy other aircraft and missiles.

Such alternatives, Krepinevich said, might prove more useful in combating such advanced air defenses. But, he added, "it depends on how we deal with this problem."

That very question is being studied as part of two ongoing internal Pentagon studies: one on the U.S. military's proper global posture, and another on how it should carry out long-range strike operations, said Krepinevich, who is a prominent member of the Defense Policy Board. That panel provides advice on a range of key issues directly to the defense secretary.

Krepinevich described a world that is rapidly changing, driven by a number of demographic and technological trends.

For one, CSBA analysts "see a lot of upset young people" that will be tempted to join groups like al-Qaida. That is an increasingly combustible trend, Krepinevich noted, because "greater and greater destructive power" is ending up "in the hands" of such individuals and groups.

Another emerging threat is the proliferation of both nuclear and precision-guided weaponry, he said, adding cyber attacks and the increasing vulnerability of U.S. space assets also will be major drivers of American security requirements.

Against that backdrop of threats, Krepinevich said the Obama administration needs a better overall security strategy. The administration does not appear to have put together a detailed, broadly focused security plan like the one Washington used to guide its actions during the Cold War.

The White House earlier this year released the Obama administration's first National Security Strategy. But that closely parsed study, Krepinevich said, is mostly a "public relations document." To the CSBA president, it is "striking" that the administration has not put together a more detailed version of the NSS.

He spoke to reporters during a briefing on a new CSBA analysis of the fiscal 2011 defense budget request. That study paints a rather bleak picture.

The study, compiled by CSBA budget guru Todd Harrison, describes a "growing wave of recapitalization requirements for aging equipment near the end of service life, despite continued growth in acquisition funding."

It also notes the Pentagon's 2011 budget "does little to control rising personnel costs for both DoD civilians and military personnel." Harrison also found "healthcare costs in particular continue to grow well above the rate of inflation." That is driven, in large part, by the "addition of new and expanded benefits and the growing disparity between the annual premium military retirees pay for TRICARE (which has not risen in 15 years)," the report states.

The administration's intention to reduce the deficit, and the continued economic slowdown, will place external pressures on defense spending.

Harrison sees a series of tough choices ahead for Pentagon officials. And many will pit people versus machines.

"The central challenge for the defense budget in the coming years is to find the right balance between personnel-related costs, such as pay, pensions, and healthcare, and equipment-related costs, such as new weapon systems and on-going military operations," according to the report.

"It can also be viewed as an intergenerational question-a choice between funding pay and benefits for today's military (and retirees) or funding the equipment and training needed for those who will fight tomorrow's wars," Harrison wrote. "The fiscal reality is that in a flat or declining budgetary environment, the Department will not be able to fund both to the same extent that it does today."

[buglerbilly]

Ares

A Defense Technology Blog

U.S. Military Capability - What Would You Cut?

Posted by Michael Bruno at 6/30/2010 4:47 AM CDT

Recently announced Pentagon spending reform efforts are a step in the right direction, but true cost savings will not occur until the U.S. military trades off missions or capabilities, warn independent analysts at one of Washington's highly regarded defense think tanks.

At the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Senior Fellow Todd Harrison says that if Washington really wants to save money, “stop doing things.” CSBA President Andrew Krepinevich stresses that actual cost reductions often are a fraction of planned savings, if only because all of the stakeholders rarely agree to go as far as announced, while actions like quantity-of-order reductions actually drive up spending elsewhere.

The two men offered their comments Tuesday almost as a sidenote during a CSBA briefing to reporters on the Fiscal 2011 defense budget request. Their overall, sobering assessment echoes previously grim comments made around town on the challenges facing defense spending - but the analysts nonetheless tried to put a silver lining on it all. In the end, one way or another, the fiscal pressures are forcing hard choices that were overdue, they said.

http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20100629.Analysis_of_the_FY/R.20100629.Analysis_of_the_FY.pdf

CSBA folks have been warning about this for a while. “The days of nipping and tucking are coming to an end,” Jim Thomas said almost a year ago. “We’re going to have to look at mission trades.” Still, while I fear they are right ultimately, current Pentagon and Capitol Hill thinking seems to be a little further behind.

Take Michele Flournoy, undersecretary of defense for policy, who said last year, “We need new competencies, but we can’t afford to lose the old ones.” Or look at the fact that the recent spate of speeches by Defense Secretary Robert Gates have been about challenging the armed services to think deeply about what exactly they need to do (see his May speech to the Navy establishment). At this rate, we'll probably see another Quadrenniel Defense Review come and go before true mission tradeoffs are even started. If so, I'm afraid they might be more dramatic than necessary, if only because they were started later.

I know such conversations are difficult, they go to the heart of America's vision of itself on the world stage. And, of course, there are huge sums of money tied to any one military capability, meaning change may have to be forced in the end. But CSBA has a track record of reasonable forecasting, and as we have blogged about elsewhere, ideas are rolling in (PDF) around Washington on what to cut.

Change, it seems, appears headed our way.

[Deks]

Apparently, they're talking about chopping the B-1B's.