The USN's future?

[buglerbilly]

Interview: U.S. Navy Undersecretary Robert Work

By christopher p. cavas

Published: 4 Feb 2010 21:39

Bob Work was one of the foremost naval analysts in Washington when he was tapped in late 2008 to serve on President Obama's Pentagon transition team, where he was in charge of the Navy issue team. A former Marine artillery colonel, he has a wide knowledge of Navy and Marine Corps programs - past and present - and is a deeply experienced military strategist and wargamer. He took office as the Navy's second-highest-ranking civilian in May.



Undersecretary of the Navy Bob Works speaks during a Feb. 2 interview in Washington. (SHEILA VEMMER / STAFF) On Feb. 2, Work sat down for his first interview since the 2011 budget proposal was submitted.

Q. What is the theme to this budget submission?

A. At the broadest level, the two basic things are rebalancing the force and reforming the way we do business. Those two themes are well reflected inside our budget. There were four strategic objectives.

SecDef told us to improve your ability to defend the U.S. and civil authorities at home. Do better at counterinsurgency and counterterrorist operations, build the capacity of partner states, deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments, prevent proliferation and counter weapons of mass destruction, and operate effectively in cyberspace.

Importantly, he said you had to be able to do that and maintain a strong nuclear deterrent and do not give up on your conventional warfighting dominance. Pretty expansive mission list in a time of tight resources.

The theme for the Navy is balancing all of these different missions. We think we were able to come up with a pretty good plan in aviation and shipbuilding, which reflected these budget priorities. You'll see, for example, improvements at the low end because we've stabilized the LCS program and increased the Joint High Speed Vessel program quite significantly, to 23 vessels.

There was a big debate within the department on patrol craft, PCs. People said these are very good for irregular warfare. But when we looked at it we said we wanted to have self-deployable platforms that have a lot of payload space that you can take to the fight whatever you need - SEALs, Marines, [a] Riverine squadron. So we decided to increase the Joint High Speed Vessel program, at the same time SLEPing [service life extension program] the 13 PCs we have, so they're going to be with us well into the 2020s. But the Joint High Speed Vessels will take over for them, because we like their self-deployability aspects - they can be a sea base, they can be an Africa Partnership Station, they're extremely flexible.

So when you combine LCS and the Joint High Speed Vessel together, that's going to be 78 small craft with a lot of payload space that can be configured for a lot of these irregular warfare missions.

At the high end, one of the clearer signals out of the Quadrennial Defense Review was a demand for more ballistic missile defense ships and ships that are able to operate in the open ocean in an anti-access environment. So we now have a very good and stable plan for large surface combatants, for example. We've made a choice - a good one in my view - that the DDG 51 is the hull of choice, upgraded with the Air and Missile Defense Radar [AMDR] and the SPY-3 active X-band, and together with those two that's going to be able to handle the integrated air and missile defense mission.

There are a lot of other things that went on but we were able to do exactly what the SecDef asked us to do. Kind of squeeze down the capability portfolio that was focused on conventional warfare and improve at both ends of the conflict spectrum. The whole idea of rebalancing is reflected in our plan and I think we're reforming the way we do business.

Q. The AMDR is supposed to start with the DDG 51 hull in 2016?

A. That's the plan. The AMDR study made a choice between an improved volume search radar and the AMDR, and because of the growth potential of the AMDR and its better capabilities we chose the AMDR.

We hope that the AMDR will be ready for the FY '16 ship. And the SPY-3, we're quite confident that that will be ready. It will be more of an integration challenge on the hull, making sure that the combat system is set - that we have the right crewing.

So our hope is that the FY '16 DDG will be the first Flight III.

Q. The AMDR effort had been envisioned as a dual-path development - a smaller radar for DDGs and a larger one for the big CG(X) cruiser. With cancellation of the cruiser, is this now a single-path development?

A. It's a single path. The size of the aperture was always the big thing - the larger the aperture, the better the performance. We've settled on a 14-foot aperture, and that's the single aperture we're focused on. … We're confident that will fit on the DDG 51 hull.

Q. Is the Navy seeking money to build the SSBN(X) outside normal ship procurement funds?

A. When the 2009 shipbuilding plan was published, the SSBN(X) - the first to be purchased in 2019 - our plan did not have the cost for that platform in its core budget. The Navy took a lot of heat for that. The Department of Defense said, "You will put that cost in core." We looked at the level of resources and this is the way we kind of handled this. We want to debate over this platform, it's an important debate to have. …

With the 30-year plan, we've essentially broken it into three segments: from FY '11 through FY '20, from FY '21 through '30, then '31 to '40. In each of these different segments, you're going to have different challenges, and unquestionably the biggest challenge in that second segment is the fact that we will be purchasing the SSBN(X), we assume, in core.

Because of the level of resources we think it is prudent to plan for, the SSBN(X) will take a large percentage of that yearly shipbuilding budget, which will constrain our choices for the other ships we might want to build. As a result, in the far planning period you see the size of the fleet decline, slightly.

The impact of the SSBN(X) is real; it's something we have to look at. We have it in core and we welcome working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and with Congress to try and figure out the best way to handle this planning period in which this important national asset's going to be.

Q. Are you prepared to fund the research and development portion for the next few years?

A. Oh, absolutely. That's in our base budget, it's fully funded. We have, I think, $6 billion between now and FY '15, the first year we have advanced procurement for the first boat. So it is a robust R&D program. The analysis of alternatives for the platform has just been briefed, and we have money in the budget transferred to the Department of Energy for the reactor. We've already signed an agreement with the British on a common missile compartment. So work is proceeding apace on the SSBN(X). FY '19 seems like a long way out, but it's not really, not when you're spending $6 to $7 billion on R&D.

Q. So it's really the procurement part of that program the Navy would like some relief on?

A. In the 2020s, we will be constrained in buying non-SSBN(X) ships. In many of those years, we might only be able to buy one attack submarine or one major surface combatant, or some combination thereof. So the debate we have to have is: Is that what we want? But there's going to be another QDR in 2013, another in 2017, so those types of issues will be debated many times between now and then.

Q. What's a base price for that replacement SSBN(X)?

A. We're extremely conservative in pricing. I think we have the average price at about $6 billion.

Q. Conservative?

A. We don't want it to cost $6 billion; we want to be cheaper than that. But it is a very important platform, it is going to have to be very survivable - it's the most survivable leg of our nuclear deterrent. We've been conservative and over time we hope it will be cheaper than what we think right now. But we want to be sure we don't underestimate that ship.

Q. With the upcoming Littoral Combat Ship downselect, Navy officials seem to be wary of repeating the protest problems the U.S. Air Force has had with its tanker program. What can the Navy do to stave off that situation?

A. We can't control whether a protest occurs, but we can make sure the RfP [request for proposal] is extremely solid, and cannot be attacked from the angle that the RfP unfairly biases the selection toward one of the two hulls. The key thing people have to know is the Navy is happy with both designs - either fits the requirements. Both teams have been very good. We haven't tested it out, but all the data we have right now says both designs will meet the key performance parameters [KPPs] as desired.

Total ownership cost has been designed right into that ship - small crew, open architecture combat systems, reliance on offboard systems. One of the key things is going to be procurement cost. There will be some jostling back and forth where people will say this platform is better than the other platform, but the key thing the Navy has said is we're happy with both of the platforms. Both have advantages and disadvantages, but they all meet the KPPs.

Q. If the final determination really comes to price, will it be absolute? Is, say, $20 million enough to sway the decision?

A. That I can't answer. I don't know how that would break out. The acquisition officials will look at the two designs and say, are these credible bids? Can they deliver on performance? I can't get into what the final deciding factor will be because we haven't seen the bids.

Q. But the total package is a factor in making the decision, rather than just on price?

A. Oh yeah, there are several other things. One of the key parameters is production cost, but there are other parameters in the RfP.

Q. Is this really a 55-ship LCS fleet? I saw one plan where the two ships from the losing bidder would be disposed of. Is it 53?

A. We actually get to 55, a little slower than what we had expected, but we bid up faster with JHSVs than expected.

Q. You'll keep the two ships from the losing design?

A. That's a good question. I don't know what the final determination on that would be. Obviously, we have some very unique design ships, like we leased the HSV. But I don't know what the thinking is on that.

Q. The previous LCS plan had the Navy buying five and six ships per year - plenty for two shipyards. But now you've dropped down to fours and threes, moving to mostly twos and ones. Is that enough to keep two shipyards in the program?

A. One of the big differences between this 30-year plan and previous plans is that before, we planned to build to a 55-ship run and then have a decade or more where you're not building any. With this shipbuilding plan, we'll be building LCSs consistently year-to-year throughout the 30-year period. That gives us a lot of flexibility - if we decide we want to have 65 ships we'll have the capacity. … But right now we think 55 is the right number. We have set it up so that we can hold a competition between two yards throughout the 30-year period. Sometimes you'll have more ships in a given year to compete, but the whole thing will be set up to the yards can compete and we can keep the costs down.

Q. More problems have surfaced with the LPS 17-class amphibious ships, and Northrop Grumman has come in for a new round of criticism for weld issues and quality. What still troubles you about the work the company is putting out? Can they do more to fix the situation?

A. Between 2001 and now, we've really started to bring on a whole lot of new classes of ships. The T-AKE. Two different LCSs. The Virginia-class submarines. The LPD 17 program. Each has had its challenges, the LPD 17 program has more challenges than we had hoped. The basic design of the ship, we're very happy with, and the quality of the ship is getting better, although there have been these nagging problems, and NAVSEA is working with Northrop Grumman to resolve them.

Our confidence in the ship is reflected in the fact that we have the 11th LPD 17 in our plan, so the basic ship we're very comfortable with, and we're working with Northrop Grumman and all of our shipbuilders to make sure that performance is good and that we get ships that have few problems, covered by warranty, and we get them to the fleet as fast as we can. But the LPD 17 has been a challenge, no question.

In the main, I'm not worried [about Northrop Grumman's ability]. I think [shipbuilding president] Mike Petters and the shipbuilding team at Northrop Grumman understand the problems and are trying to work at them piece by piece. They've had a lot of challenges in doing so - stemming from the Katrina issue, their work forces and quality control. So, no, overall I think Northrop Grumman knows what needs to be done and I'm pretty confident they're going to be able to do it.

Q. What's the current Marine Corps lift requirement? Two Marine expeditionary brigades?

A. The Marines have to be very happy with the way the QDR came out. We had a target for 33 amphibious ships: 11 big decks, 11 LPD 17s, 11 LSDs. We already have 12 LSDs bought and paid for in the fleet. The 30-year shipbuilding plan has the 11th LPD 17 in the plan and funded. We have eight LHDs and LHA 6. LHA 7 is an FY '11 ship that will get us to 10. So we'll have the 33 ships, but we'll have one fewer big deck and one extra LSD. That gets to the requirement for 33, the minimum needed to do a two-MEB assault.

The MEBs will be specially tailored for the assault if we had to do it, but in this QDR the key thing is the amphibs will look very much as part of a fleet design in which you have a series of capability containers. The small ones are the LCSs and JHSVs. Medium capability is the SSNs and our cruisers and destroyers. Our large capability containers are the LSDs and LPDs. Our extra-large containers are the big-deck amphibs, and the extra-extra-large containers are our carriers.

They all have flexible payload space - LPD 17 is just like a giant LCS. So OK, you've got to go to Haiti? Why not take your extra-extra-large box and put helicopters on it? So we argued that the amphibs were critical to the overall design of our battle force. And we didn't focus so much on the two-MEB assault as we did on the flexibility these ships provide to every combatant commander who's screaming for them. I want them for Africa Partnership Station. I want them as a sea base.

One of the highest-demand signals coming out of the QDR besides ballistic missile defense ships is for independent amphib steamers that can go be an Africa Partnership Station or a mobile sea base.

So 33 amphibious ships is the requirement we've set in the plan, and we've hit that number pretty close throughout the 30-year period, but in the far planning period we fall down a little because of the SSBN(X) problem.

Not only that, we took the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) [MPFF] squadron, which was really designed for high-end, forcible entry, assault follow-on echelon stuff, and we now want three MPF squadrons with enhanced sea-basing capabilities. We'll have three squadrons with an LMSR, a T-AKE cargo ship, and a mobile landing platform [MLP], plus our 23 JHSVs. The Marines have to be saying "holy moly." Between the 33 amphibs, the three MPF squadrons with enhanced sea basing capabilities, and the 23 JHSVs, the Marines have got to be happy their lift requirements are going to be met in almost [every] case you can imagine.

Q. The Naval Operations Concept was to have had a lot to say on this, but it's been held in abeyance. Is that still coming out?

A. That's a good question. The last time we did a force structure assessment for the Department of the Navy was in 2005-06, and that's what set the 313-ship fleet requirement. There have been a lot of decisions made since then, primarily by the SecDef and the PB10 budget decision, as well as this QDR. So we're going to do a new Force Structure Assessment [FSA]. The Naval Operating Concept has been pretty much fully written and has been subscribed to by the Navy and the Marines. … But we have to do a new FSA.

When you look at the new 30-year shipbuilding plan, we just say we start at 313 because that's the most recent FSA. … So if you ask me today what's the number for the fleet? I would say it's about 300 ships, and I just don't know if it's going to be 313, 320. 313 is the baseline off which we say, here are the decisions that have been made that will change the 313 baseline.

Q. What were some of the conclusions of the hull-radar study for a new surface combat ship that would include the Air and Missile Defense Radar?

A. It's a very impressive study, extremely well done. Conducted by Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory. A red team by Paul Schneider from DASN [Department of the Navy Research, Development & Acquisition] ships. Extremely well done.

We knew we wanted a dual-band system, an S-band search radar and an X-band. Essentially, the two choices we have are volume search radar or AMDR, SPQ-9B or SPY-3? And the best solution out of that study was a 14-foot aperture on the AMDR and the SPY-3. Put those two together and you have a pretty capable air and missile defense ship. I am very satisfied the study will withstand scrutiny from anyone. They might not agree with the decision, but they're not going to say this was some type of cooked book.

Q. So you're going to release an unclassified version of the study to the public?

A. That is a good question. I don't know the answer. I'll try to find out.

Q. Is there another hull planned for surface combatants over the 30-year plan, or is it DDG 51s forever?

A. The plan shows we're going to build 71 DDG 51s Flight I through IIA, so we're going to buy nine more IIAs through 2015. Then we ship to the integrated air and missile defense version of the DDG 51. We're still doing the work to say exactly [what] that ship will look like, but we believe the basic DDG 51 hull will be the platform for that. How many do we buy? There's a number in the plan through about 2030, then you have a DDG(X).

The Flight III is the integrated air and missile defense version of the DDG 51. What the DDG(X) will be remains to be seen. Will it be a variation of the DDG 51 hull? Don't know, might be another hull. But it's so far out it's hard for us to know.

But we'll be building the 51 hull - the first was authorized in 1986 - for about 40 years.

Q. Are you satisfied with your new 30-year aviation plan?

A. We did very well. One of the key things was to improve our rotary-wing lift. So the H-1 program was fully funded in a good, sustainable production stream. That platform has proved to be extremely good, both the Z and the Y - the Y in particular because of the tremendous command-and-control package. So good news on the H-1.

Good-news story on the H-53K. There was a snag in that program, we brought the IOC [in-service date] back, but the program is well-funded. V-22, well-funded - not at the level per year that if we had all the money in the world we would want, but at a good, sustainable rate. And with the H-60 program, all in really good shape.

The P-8s, again in good shape. That program is proceeding in place and will replace all the P-3s.

We were just given $4 billion to replace the EA-6B Prowler expeditionary attack squadrons, with EA-18G Growlers, and we're going to get those planes in the fight a lot sooner than we expected. … We will actually keep the Prowlers on the decks of the carriers longer than [we] expected to. We can get the first Growlers in the fight as quickly as we can.

Q. Were those plus-up airframes or reprogrammed F-18Fs?

A. No, those are plus-ups. DoD gave us the money to buy 26 additional aircraft on top of the numbers we were planning for the carrier decks. As a consequence, we keep the E/F production line open another year, to 2013.

The Joint Strike Fighter program also has been restructured, but we think it's a sustainable run and reflects what we can actually execute. So the JSF, E/F/G, our P-8 programs, and BAMS is funded. At the very end game DoD gave us $2 billion to add to the N-UCAS program, which will allow us to better reflect what we want out of that program.

So from an aviation perspective the Department of the Navy couldn't be happier right now. There are still challenges, obviously, but overall, when you look at our shipbuilding and aviation accounts we're sitting okay.

Q. What was the thinking behind the cancellation of the EP(X) program? Shifting the mission to other areas or dropping the mission?

A. Different platforms. There are a lot of different ways to look at this. We're not certain if it's an unmanned system, a system of systems. We haven't come to a definitive conclusion yet.

Q. There is a story line that elements in the Navy are urging the service to withdraw from the JSF program, buy more Super Hornets, and focus on developing a sixth-generation strike fighter that would be manned or unmanned. Are you aware of this debate?

A. There are always pockets within the Navy and the Air Force that have different opinions. If you search for them you can think there's some type of big debate. But at the top level - the secretary and me, the CNO and the commandant - there is absolutely no wavering on JSF, in either the B or C form. We are committed to that platform. That is going to be the fifth-generation platform that we have.

Now, there is a lively debate over whether or not the N-UCAS demonstrator should result in a penetrating, ISR strike bird, or be more of an F /A-XX strike fighter. That debate has not quite been resolved. Having this extra $2 billion added to the budget is going to help us resolve that debate. So we will end the E and F program line at some point and commit fully to the JSF as soon as that program is on solid ground and we finish out the buys of the Es and Fs and Gs we have right now.

Then the next thing we'll focus on like a laser beam is that N-UCAS. What is that going to be? An A-12-like platform that's extremely low-observable, more of a bomber ISR penetrator, or more like a strike fighter? That's going to be an issue we're going to resolve by the next QDR, because the timing will be such that we're going to have the demonstration program done, we will have proven whether we can operate these unmanned systems on board the big deck, we will have more technology maturation, we'll have a lot better understanding on the requirements for the system. I'm very bullish on N-UCAS. I just don't know exactly what it's going to look like, but I think we're going to resolve that over the next three or four years.

Q. Is there still a strike fighter gap?

A. There was a lot of debate and angst over strike fighter shortfalls on the Hill last year. We have a requirement for 10 carrier air wings. Do we have enough airplanes - is there exactly 44 in every single one? No, but we don't need it. The way the Navy does it is a tiered readiness rotational cycle, where [wings] that go out on deployment are fully up and ready, and the ones that are ready to surge are fully up ready, and the ninth and 10th wings are training up.

We did a lot of management mitigation, things that resolved the, we considered pretty much eliminated, any perceived strike fighter shortfall. … That was before the JSF restructuring occurred. So now, in POM12, we'll be looking at it again, what other management levers will we have to do, and we're actually right now having a debate within the department, and we're going to take it over to Congress and tell them exactly what we found out.

But we felt very comfortable that we had a good, solid plan prior to the JSF restructuring. And the JSF restructuring will cause us to look at it one more time.

Q. So is the phrase "strike fighter shortage" still operable?

A. There are management levers we still have to pull. For example, in our first plan, we only thought we were going to do a certain number of SLEPs of F/A-18 Es and Fs, and As and Cs. Well, we might have to do some more now. But we think we have the problem well identified, and we have the management tools to help us address whatever that shortfall is going to be.

We lost a certain number of tails in the JSF restructuring which we now will have to take into account. But we were able to come to a good solution as a department. The Navy and Marines agreed on the management moves we have to take to ameliorate the shortfall. We're in a good position overall but there's still more work to do.

Q. Air-Sea Battle is a new construct between the Air Force and the Navy. Descriptions of this have varied. What is it?

A. It's focused on one thing and one thing only. Joint operations in an anti-access environment against a high-end competitor who has achieved parity or near-parity in guided weapons warfare and battle networks. So it's very much how would the Air Force and the Navy operate in such an environment to prevail and gain dominance over the opposing battle network.

It could be a regional power who has gotten all sorts of high-end systems from another power. It could be any type of power that really says I want to be able to compete in this particular regime.

Air-Sea Battle really is focused on that high end, and it's part of that rebalancing that the secretary asked us to do: operating in an anti-access environment. Air-Sea Battle was secretary-directed to the Air Force and the Navy to say, think about it, how would you go about this problem? And don't come up with separate service solutions, I want you two services to work together like the Army and Air Force did in the 1980s on air-land battle.

Q. Do you see an overlap of platforms carrying out non-standard roles? A B-52 bomber, for example, performing maritime reconnaissance?

A. Absolutely. We've seen this movie before. In the Maritime Strategy, B-52s were armed with Harpoon [anti-surface] missiles so they could make long-range anti-ship strikes. What you would see in Air-Sea Battle, I would think, is a Navy submarine force, with the Air Force saying, "If the submarine force could do this mission for me, that's going to help in the overall construct." So you might see submarine doing different missions, [or] Air Force F-22s doing long-range offensive counter-air to help a carrier battle group get in close. All sorts of different joint tactics and ideas on how to protect bases, where Air Force tankers and ISR and Navy P-8s are going to be operating out of.

I expect all of those things to happen. The first time we'll hear about it is a Navy-Air Force warfighter conference due this May, where there will be ideas about some of the things the services need to do to tackle this problem. I don't have anything definite to talk about, but I think by May we'll be able to talk specifics.

Q. There are no replacement SSGN submarines in the new 30-year plan. Does the SSGN concept have a future?

A. Covert under-sea strike is an advantage for us in a wide variety of scenarios. The Office of the Secretary of Defense has asked the Navy to say how do you handle covert underwater strike in the future? How do you keep the strike capacity of the submarine force at a level we need to have? That might be having more Virginia payload tubes in a future flight of Virginia [attack submarines] where you would have a combination SSN/SSGN platform. It might say you need to have an SSGN.

The capability we want is capacity in our submarine force to be able to do this strike mission. The question is how much we need and what is the best way to handle it. That study may say you're going to need a couple more SSGNs. It might say add a couple Virginia payload tubes to a couple Flight 4 subs and you're going to be covered.

We've committed to doing the midlife engineering and refueling overhaul on the 13th and 14th Ohio-class submarines, so they're in service for 42 years. The 30-year plan says we will replace those 14 Ohios with 12 boats because we're assuming we'll have a life-of-the-hull reactor core [that doesn't need refueling]. We don't do the 13th and 14th Ohio until late in this decade. If it turns out we don't need the 14 Ohios through the transition, you could potentially make those SSGNs. So we have a lot of on and off ramps right now.

But first we have to do the study and say what is the requirement for undersea strike and undersea strike capacity and how might you go about doing it in the cheapest way possible.

SSGNs may or may not have a future, but right now we do not have them recapitalized.

- By Christopher P. Cavas in Washington.

[buglerbilly]

Marines want to go back to traditional amphibs

By Philip Ewing - Staff writer

Posted : Sunday Mar 21, 2010 8:42:25 EDT

More than two years before the amphibious assault ship America enters the fleet, Marine officials have already drawn up early plans for a version of the ship that includes a major component America is missing — a well deck.

The “LHA 8 concept,” as it was called in a presentation Monday by Marine Corps Combat Development Command, would combine new aviation features the Marines want in the America class with a traditional big-deck capacity for landing craft and green gear.

Although the Navy’s most recent shipbuilding program includes no plans for such a ship, the notional drawings for a hybrid LHA 8 — America is LHA 6 — show that elements within the Corps are eager to get back to traditional amphibs as soon as possible. Navy Secretary Ray Mabus has said it would be prohibitively expensive to alter the designs for America or the follow-on LHA 7, so they’ll be built as planned.

America and the unnamed LHA 7 were designed without well decks to create a “Marine Corps aircraft carrier” built around the F-35B Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter variant and big rotary-wing aircraft such as the MV-22 Osprey and the future CH-53K Super Stallion.

The future of the ships formerly known as LHA(R) was never stable; advocates pushed for them to be warships, Military Sealift Command auxiliaries or a combination of both. As it happened, Navy officials decided the first two Americas would have gray hulls, but planners inside the Marine Corps came to quietly regret that the next big-deck amphibs won’t be able to send gear and troops ashore in traditional landing craft.

[buglerbilly]

Navy Changes Or US Power Fades

By Greg Grant Wednesday, March 31st, 2010 3:28 pm

The Navy faces an operational “tipping point” where the demand for overseas presence will far exceed the number of ships, according to the influential Center for Naval Analyses.

CNA’s new report, “The Navy at a Tipping Point: Maritime Dominance at Stake?”, which was provided to DOD Buzz, is being used by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations to evaluate future force plans. It says that despite a 20 percent decrease in the size of the total battle fleet over the past 10 years, the number of ships deployed, around 100 at any given time, has remained constant.

The Navy has been able to pull this off with a smaller fleet by lengthening deployments and more frequent cruises. What has suffered is training, as the number of available training ships has declined. Now, however, the Navy faces a dilemma, that of maintaining forward presence and meeting maritime security requirements in the face of a shrinking battle fleet and declining resources, CNA says.

The military’s future unfolds in a world of constrained federal budgets and Navy budgets will not experience growth rates above inflation; “getting well” in future budgets is a myth, CNA says. Rising shipbuilding costs, ever increasing personnel and health care costs, and the need to fund ongoing operations will all exert serious downward pressure on ship numbers. If the Navy continues on the current shipbuilding course of about six or seven ships per year, the battle fleet will face a steady decline over the next two decades that will see it go from 286 ships today to around 230–240 ships from 2025 and out.

What to do? The Navy must change its strategy. CNA offers five strategic options for the future Navy: Two Hubs; One Plus Hub; Shaping; Surge; and Status Quo Shrinks. Each option involves either a significantly reduced force structure or a significant change in strategy.

Two hubs

For the past 60 years, the Navy has maintained significant combat capability in two “hubs”: in the Western Pacific and the Mediterranean during the Cold War and the Western Pacific and North Arabian Sea/Arabian Gulf today. To maintain a two hub strategy with a strong presence in the Pacific to counter Chinese naval expansion and in the Gulf to counter Iran, along with Aegis ships for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) missions and to support ongoing operations will demand cuts elsewhere.

The biggest losers in this scenario are the Marines, as amphibious ship numbers would be significantly reduced, as well as other “low end” ships, such as the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV), in favor of high end combatants. Overseas engagement missions would be drastically reduced. Surge capacity would be negatively impacted in favor of visible presence in the two hubs, deployments would be lengthened and training would also suffer.

The Navy would also risk losing relevance in low end operations and the ability to respond quickly to humanitarian disasters along Haiti lines. Counter-piracy operations and partnering with smaller foreign navies would be cut way back.

One Plus

A one hub Navy would be centered on the Western Pacific (WESTPAC). It would reduce carrier strike groups (CSG) and CSG presence in the Gulf as Iraq winds down and would provide limited support in Afghanistan with a low end “routine,” not constant, presence in CENTCOM area with amphibs and LCS. Fleet surge capacity would be reduced in favor of major combatant presence in WESTPAC. BMD missions would be prioritized as WESTPAC, CENTCOM and EUCOM, in that order.

This approach risks producing an unbalanced fleet, CNA says. Carriers and surface strike ships would be stacked in the Pacific while Norfolk would become home for low end engagement ships and missions. It would have the advantage of increasing ships for engagement and partnering with smaller foreign navies, counter piracy and other littoral missions while maintaining the Navy as far and away the dominant maritime force in the Pacific.

“It also assumes that the internal Navy culture can be overcome and that the Navy can create two separate fleets with different emphases and objectives and training and manning and equipping for their missions,” CNA says.

Shaping

This option sees the Navy moving to an “engagement” model. It would sacrifice high end ships, such as carriers and Aegis, for building the largest fleet possible with cheaper and smaller ships, such as the LCS, JHSV and corvettes. “It could concentrate its efforts on maximizing engagement and interoperability with other maritime forces, creating a fleet that is busy with many maritime security operations and low-end contingencies for a chaotic, messy world.”

Large deck amphibs would be emphasized, used as afloat staging bases, naval special warfare would be big winners and littoral forces would be used to patrol ungoverned spaces and support counterterrorism and counterinsurgency “from the sea.” A reduced forward deployment would result in WESTPAC; it would assume that China’s naval force is developing more slowly. This strategy would also lean heavily on the Air Force and regional allies, particularly in the Pacific, where “routine” CSG cruises would be the norm.

Some high end and big war escalation capability would be lost. BMD missions would be maintained or grow. “It would risk escalation dominance and control in favor of trying to achieve regional stability and security through engagement and de-escalation.”

Surge

This approach is based on a powerful “home fleet” able to surge forward with powerful strike groups to overwhelm any aggressor. It would get by with fewer carriers and other high end surface combatants because it would give up presence missions. BMD missions would be maintained with minimal presence. “It would be created by the knowledge among allies and potential adversaries that the United States could mobilize its fleet and be able to exercise maritime dominance at any place on the globe.”

The “future fight” would be emphasized over the “current fight.” This option would require a more stable world with less low end presence requirements. “Most important, this option assumes that the foreign policy of the United States becomes less activist, and more like that of an “off-shore balancer,” with greater attention to domestic issues and reliance on deterrence… A navy that stays at home and prepares for the future is a navy that America last saw in the isolationist days between the world wars. ”

Status Quo Shrinks

This is the most dangerous option, CNA says. This navy would be based on proportional cuts across all platforms to maintain a “balanced fleet.” The Navy struggles to maintain all current missions, but slowly loses that ability as the battle force shrinks. Readiness would suffer as maintenance and training is sacrificed for shipbuilding. Still, the reduction to a 230 ship navy is inevitable. There is a steady erosion of combat capability and forward presence.

“The inevitable conclusion of this process is that the shrinking status quo Navy will do all things, but none of them very well (“managing” at 2/3 speed and hoping there are no shocks to the system). The steady slide down the slope could easily erode combat credibility (“hollowing out of the fleet”) and lead to less reassurance of allies in WESTPAC and other places around the world, over time,” the paper says.

CNA’s Conclusions

The Navy must choose. In the projected budget environment it has no choice. CNA says there is no magic number where the fleet ceases to be a global navy. “When you are no longer present in one or two areas of vital national interest with dominant maritime forces, you are at the ‘tipping point.’”

“The Navy can remain the global maritime power with either the 2 hub or 1+ hub–WESTPAC option. Both preserve a global presence for the Navy and allow it to be a force for reassuring allies, deterring the major maritime challenger, and working within joint and combined environments to address the security threats in the two top priority areas of global politics for the foreseeable future. The Shaping and Surge options sacrifice either presence or combat credibility to an extent that threatens the Navy’s ability to maintain its status.

They could be chosen only within the context of major changes in U.S. foreign policies; an acceptance of a much diminished role for the United States as a leader willing to act only in concert with other nations in protecting the global system from low-end threats, or a neo-isolationist America willing to go it alone on high-end threats and letting other issues resolve themselves at the local and regional levels. If the Navy refuses to choose an option, it faces the prospect of a long, slow glide into the Shrinking Status Quo.”

[buglerbilly]

From USNI.............

Issue: April 2010 Vol. 136/4/1,286

More Henderson, Less Bonds

By Commander Henry J. Hendrix, U.S. Navy

Each Influence Squadron should have one riverine detachment housed on or below decks of the mother ship, which could be a dry cargo and ammunition ship like the USNS Robert E. Peary (T-AKE-5), pictured above in February 2010. The rest of the squadron (clockwise from center) would consist of three 90-meter multi-role vessels (an 80-meter variant is pictured here); one joint high-speed vessel like the Swift (HSV-2), anchored here in Mobassa, Kenya, in January 2010; and four 150-foot coastal patrol craft.

Not only do Influence Squadrons save money by deploying lower-priced ships, their sheer numbers also allow for more presence, a U.S. Navy version of the on-base percentage in Major League Baseball.

For generations, avid baseball fans have been able to recite the batting and earned-run averages of their favorite players and have known instinctively that the higher the former and the lower the latter would pave the way to victories. These statistics, like gravity, ruled their lives-that is, until financial writer Michael Lewis and his 2003 bestseller, Moneyball, challenged conventional wisdom by revealing a cadre of Major League Baseball insurgents within the Oakland Athletics' front office.

Led by General Manager Billy Beane, they held such heretical thoughts as "on-base percentage is more important than either batting average or slugging percentage" and "pitchers can only be effectively measured independent of the defense around them." This out-of-the-box thinking allowed Beane's Oakland club to win more regular-season games than any team except the Atlanta Braves, despite having one of the lowest payrolls in the American League. Beane looked at things differently and learned to do more with less money. Moneyball unintentionally suggested a new way to look at another American institution-the U.S. Navy.

Our Navy, larger than the next 13 international navies combined, can be compared to the highest-paid team in baseball. With its Barry Bonds super carriers, Mark McGwire cruisers, and Sammy Sosa destroyers, today's Navy consists of all power hitters, with huge slugging percentages and salaries to match. But what if there were another way to build the team? Oakland's ten-time All-Star and two-time World Series champion Ricky Henderson epitomized the ability to get on and get home by setting a career record for runs scored (2,295)-despite a .279 lifetime batting average-because he also held the career records for walks and stolen bases as well as a lifetime on-base percentage of .401. What if presence, the naval version of the oft-neglected on-base percentage, was actually the most critical naval mission?

A Look Back

In April 2009, a Proceedings article, titled "Buy Ford, Not Ferrari," generated considerable debate. The article proposed a decrease in the number of carrier strike groups by one or two to free up manpower and funding to solidify commitments to mid-range expeditionary strike groups. It also recommended an increase in spending on more numerous, less technologically sophisticated, and cheaper surface craft that would form Influence Squadrons and increase U.S. presence in critical theaters.

From the start, visceral objections erupted against cutting the number of carrier strike groups, an option now approaching inevitability because of fiscal constraints and the carriers' vulnerability-perceived or real. But much of the debate suggested that the squadron itself had been largely accepted in function with only its form remaining a source of contention. Criticisms of the various platforms seemed to focus on the questionable utility of the Influence ships in a high-end conflict. One persuasive criticism argued that the Navy can't afford to buy vessels that could make no contribution should the nation find itself in a naval war with a peer competitor.

The international strategic environment that defines the backdrop for naval operations continues to evolve, with fewer support missions in the Persian Gulf but rising challenges in the waters of the Philippines and Indonesia, increasing agitation in the Caribbean and Central and South America, as well as growing threats along the shores of Africa. The rise of China as a Pacific naval power is defining the future test for the Navy.

Accompanying these challenges is an austere fiscal environment, partly the result of the United States remaining mired in a broad recession. Thus, defense spending has decreased, and the naval shipbuilding budget has remained stagnant at or around $13 billion a year. That these tribulations should manifest themselves just as the Navy approaches the mass retirement of the Reagan administration's "600-ship Navy" platforms (if you buy them all at once, you stand to lose them all at once) only compounds the problems facing naval force managers.

One can only shove so many ships into a $13 billion procurement bag. The price tage for Littoral Combat Ships is $600 million. Ballistic-missile-defense Arleigh Burke-class Aegis destroyers/San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock ships/Virginia-class nuclear-powered attack submarines come in at $2 billion. Ohio-class ballistic-missile submarine replacements cost $6 billion. And Gerald Ford-class nuclear-powered aircraft carriers set us back $10 billion. This continues to suggest a need for a new, cheaper, yet larger force structure.

The Nature of Influence

The goal of one nation's diplomacy is for other nations to align their interests with one's own, or at least not set themselves in direct conflict. Countries pursue diplomacy through a variety of means, one of which is the forward deployment of naval power to areas of national interest. Some nations interpret the presence of American naval units as stabilizing elements that ensure the security and cohesion of the local political-economic environment. Others take umbrage, viewing U.S. ships as elements of coercion and restrictions against the expansion of their own influence. No nation ignores gray-hulled warships flying the Stars and Stripes.

For nearly 20 years none has challenged the supremacy of the United States in the open-ocean, blue-water environment. Increasingly, the contest of ideas is being waged in niche arenas, in the littorals, the near-shore green-water areas, and up and down contested riverine estuaries that provide concealment and cover for terrorists, pirates, and warlords. It is in these areas that the slow erosion of law and order is an accepted fact of life, and it is in these areas that the U.S. Navy must go if it is sincere in its strategic premise that preventing wars is at least as important as winning them. This is the environment of the Influence Squadron.

It is a naval force tailored to missions both new and old. Harking back to the founding of the republic, Influence Squadrons will be numerous enough to combat piracy-the only naval mission actually enshrined within the U.S. Constitution-and strong enough to take on terrorists who smuggle weapons across the seas as well as interdict the drug lords whose products kill more Americans per month than al Qaeda has in its history. Larger numbers of platforms will also enable Influence Squadrons to both provide local medical assistance in the form of vaccinations and respond swiftly to natural disasters and thus prevent epidemics of such diseases as dysentery and cholera.

In addition, the simplified characteristics of the Influence Squadron's platforms will help the Navy to build partnership capacity and perform security force assistance missions without over-awing local coalition partners with Aegis-level technology. These missions will extend and solidify the continuing U.S. role of defining and administering the global political-economic system. To perform these missions, Influence Squadron commodores will need a strong and varied complement of platforms to cover low-end missions. Function, in this case, will follow form.

Getting Specific

To embed a credible capability to operate in the porous inshore waterways where criminal and terrorist networks abound in the South American, African, and Pacific island areas of operation, each Influence Squadron should have one riverine detachment assigned. These would be composed of one 49-foot riverine command boat to provide mobile liaison, communications, and command-and-control capabilities; three 38-foot patrol boats to conduct inland waterway patrol and interdiction to preserve rivers for friendly use as lines of communications and to deny the enemy their use; and two 33-foot assault boats to deny the use of rivers and waterways to waterborne and immediate shore-sited hostile forces by barrier and interdiction operations.

This detachment would cost approximately $40 million and represents the current standard riverine detachment force. Its composition and equipment have been proven under wartime conditions on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, and it should be maintained. There has been some thought, given that the Navy has proposed standing up a fourth riverine squadron, to transitioning the riverine force to up-armored 11-meter rigid-hull inflatable boats. But this option, although cheaper in the short run, would be more expensive in decreased mission capability in hostile environments and lives lost.

To extend influence into the coastal realm, several low-cost candidates for coastal patrol craft are available from small U.S. commercial shipyards heavily invested in new construction techniques that allow them to build sturdy composite hulls in the 100- to 200-foot range for relative low cost. Some of these shipyards have already sold their designs to foreign navies.

For example, Maritime Security Strategies Inc., based in Tampa, Florida, has employed yacht-construction techniques to create coastal patrol craft with a 6-foot draft; 150-foot length; a gun; a scalable C4I (command, control, communication, computer, and intelligence) capability; and room to take vertical replenishment, launch and recover unmanned aerial vehicles, or host a shipping-container-size mission module aft-all priced to go at $20 to $40 million a copy. These capabilities combined with low costs make this particular platform attractive not only for the U.S. Navy, but also for our regional coalition partners who would like to have ships similar to our own to foster better security cooperation. Each Influence Squadron commodore should have four of these vessels commanded by lieutenants to cover the close-in, shallow, green-water environment.

In what is commonly referred to as the littoral, the Navy needs a ship capable of dealing with local security issues, yet inexpensive enough to be purchased in large numbers by the United States and its coalition partners. Austal's 90-meter multi-role vessel (MRV), with its 40-mm naval gun, 500-square-meter logistics deck, helo deck, and hangar, seems to meet all the mission requirements. In addition, its 28-day endurance and the fact that it can be built in a U.S. shipyard only adds to its attraction. While many critics might point to its aluminum hull technology, the same used to construct the joint high-speed vessel (JHSV), this ship seems perfect for littoral sea-control operations. The United States should trade Tiffany-priced capabilities for sheer numbers to increase American presence. Under these conditions, three such vessels, at a cost of $150 million each and commanded by lieutenant commanders, will be included in each squadron.

The MRVs will be supported by one JHSV assigned to each Influence Squadron. The Swift (HSV-2), the prototype of these fast (50-plus knots) aluminum-hulled, wave-piercing catamarans, has already proved its utility in the influence/engagement arena where it has served in a variety of roles ranging from forward staging platforms for Marines and special forces, providing intra-theater combat cargo lift of up to 600 tons of men and materiel, and carrying supplies during humanitarian-relief operations.

HSVs have already served as global fleet station hub ships off the shores of Africa and South America, passing thousands of pounds of medical and food supplies to local populations and civil organizations. JHSVs will have a certified flight deck for landing manned helicopters and a state-of-the-art C4I suite. With an endurance of up to 4,000 nautical miles, the JHSV will be the critical logistics link that will tie together the riverine, green-water, and littoral elements of the Influence Squadron. Led by a commander, these ships are conservatively priced at $170 million dollars a copy.

The All-Important Mother Ship

The final element of the standard Influence Squadron is the mother ship. This is the platform that will serve as the central dispersal point for food stores, spare parts, medicine, construction materials, and fuel supplies for all the other components of the squadron, transferring these supplies by way of vertical or connected replenishment techniques. Mother ships will serve as the home of the squadron commodore, staff, the training cadre, a two-helicopter detachment, and a small, flexible Marine security force. They will carry the riverine detachment boats either on deck or in their holds, deploying them with cranes and assisting the coastal patrol craft during long transits.

Mission modules configured within Conex storage containers for the PCs, MRV-90s, and the JHSVs can also be carried on or below the mother ships' decks, providing additional tactical flexibility. Mother ships should also have the capability to launch, land, and maintain helicopters as well as having ample storage capacity below decks and elevators and cranes to move materials from the ships' holds to topside staging areas. As a home base for a Marine security force, the mother ship will allow the squadron commodore, in consultation with his Marine force officer in charge, to embark a scalable Marine contingent on one or multiple ships within the squadron for security operations at sea or ashore.

As a command vessel, the mother ship should also have a sound command-and-control capability. Fortunately, the U.S. Navy already has this type of ship in production, the Lewis and Clark-class T-AKEs. At $400 million dollars each, the price is more than right, given the capabilities these ships bring to bear.

The last element of the Influence Squadron, the string that binds all the other elements together, are the numerous and relatively inexpensive unmanned platforms to provide air, surface, and undersea surveillance as well as communications relay nodes. Exemplar platforms such as Thales' Spartan Scout unmanned surface vehicle, Insitu's Integrator unmanned aerial vehicle, or Bluefin's autonomous underwater vehicle, maintained and deployed from all squadron ships, will exponentially expand the commodore's as well as the theater commander's awareness.

On an annual basis the deployed Influence Squadrons should be joined by the hospital ships Mercy (T-AH-19) and Comfort (T-AH-20) to become Medical Service Groups. Alternatively, the PCs and JHSVs can be configured to provide medical support at the pier in austere ports. One need look no farther than relief operations in Indonesia (2005), the Philippines (2009), or Haiti (2010) to understand that this form of medical diplomacy has been an overwhelming success in both the Atlantic and Pacific theaters. Acting in conjunction with humanitarian nongovernmental organizations such as Doctors Without Borders and receiving funding and other logistical support from interagency institutions such as USAID, these ships have brought both standard and sophisticated medical capabilities to regions that would otherwise go without.

It is difficult to overstate the positive public impact these missions have had in the past and could have in the future. Terrorism and unrest against the United States will not occur in villages where the elders are grateful in the knowledge that an entire generation will reach maturity because Americans came with compassion, concern, and professionalism in gray and white ships to give vaccinations and perform surgeries to correct birth defects and other abnormalities. This is a truly positive "influence" in people's lives.

What Happens in a High-End Conflict?

As stated previously, the most often heard critique of Influence Squadrons is that with rising peer competitors in the world, the U.S. Navy does not have the resources to waste on assets, such as the lightly armed PCs and MRVs, as well as JHSVs that would have no utility in a high-end conflict. But in the face of an increasingly anti-access/area-denial strategic environment, the Navy will likely find itself imposing an economic blockade of the enemy, slowly depriving the opposition of critical resources before methodically rolling back the perimeter. In such an environment the Navy will need coastal patrol vessels and MRVs, and lots of them, to patrol a boundary defined by hundreds of archipelagic islands as well as vast areas of open-ocean to interdict blockade runners. To keep these vessels on station and our conventional high-end forces supplied, we will need the JHSVs and T-AKEs normally assigned to each Influence Squadron during peacetime to carry the freight.

So, there it is. An updated Influence Squadron arrayed against the entire scope of steady-state engagement missions, ready to help prevent wars and able to contribute to winning them. Some might ask why the Littoral Combat Ship is not included within the Influence Squadron, and the answer would be is that it is, at more than $600 million a copy, too expensive for the capabilities it brings to the environment. Taken as a whole, each squadron will cost the nation $1.35 billion, less than the cost of one Arleigh Burke-class destroyer (or two LCSs), but having the ability to provide ten ships' worth of naval presence, credibility, and compassion forward in the areas deemed most likely to serve as the seedbed of problems in the future. A wise man once said that there is no such thing as notional presence and one cannot surge credibility. He may have been more right than he knew, and historically, now is a good time to conclude by re-examining a basic precept of naval strategy.

What is the base nature of naval power? What is the critical component of national power that the Navy brings to the day-to-day friction that is the geo-strategic reality? Since World War II, the Navy's force structure has been aligned to its power-projection mission, the ability to take the hurt to the nation's enemies over the horizon, to go deep downtown to the enemy's capital and critical infrastructure.

For good or ill, the United States has largely defined the global political-economic system that exists today. Global trade through the free, unencumbered use of the international commons is a major component of this system, and the U.S. Navy has been its guarantor for more than 60 years. However, the declining number of surface combatants has compromised the Navy's ability to administer the system. Regions to which we no longer have enough ships to deploy, or for that matter no longer visit, find themselves adrift and either sink into instability or seek another power to maintain order.

In our absence, we may find that someone else has taken it upon themselves to redefine the rules of the neighborhood, stating, for instance, that an exclusive economic zone has more sovereign characteristics than the United States is prepared to acknowledge. The U.S. Navy could respond by conducting a freedom-of-navigation exercise, but soon we will go away for a prolonged time, and the new rules will begin to reassert themselves again. But this time they have a bit more legitimacy, because the U.S. Navy is, once again, not there. To define your environment, you have to be present.

In Moneyball, a baseball general manager advanced the theory that what really mattered was getting on base to create the opportunity to score. The discussion here suggests that naval presence is a strategic end in itself; as long as you are present, you establish and maintain the rules in the area where you operate. In ten years, through an alternative shipbuilding scheme that converts one high-end platform's worth of investment per year into ten less complex ships, the U.S. Navy would gain 100 ships' worth of war-preventive naval presence.

Remember, the high-end portion of the Navy does not just go away. Ninety percent of the shipbuilding budget would still go toward these platforms. And, as stated in 2009's "Buy Ford, Not Ferrari" article, they would still be sailing to hotspots or being held in high readiness in home waters in case someone attempts to intimidate an Influence Squadron. It is a truism that only a fool plays with a grizzly bear cub in the woods, because the mother bear may be just over the hill. Our high-end force will remain over the hill, ready to respond. The Navy can finally do what A Cooperative Strategy for 21st-Century Seapower calls for: preventing wars by increasing its presence through investing in cheaper and more numerous Influence Squadrons.

Commander Hendrix is a strategist assigned to the Pentagon. A former U.S. Naval Institute General Prize winner, he has a Ph.D. from King's College, London, and wrote the 2009 Naval Institute Press book, Theodore Roosevelt's Naval Diplomacy.

[buglerbilly]

Dissecting the Influence Squadron Pt 2

April 6, 2010

tags: motherships, small warships, USNby Mike Burleson
.
Navy Riverine Forces would receive integral support within the Influence Squadron.

A New Navy for a New Century is the goal, as we continue to peek inside the Influence Squadron devised by Commander Henry J. “Jerry” Hendrix, U.S. Navy. Here in the April 2010 Proceedings, we learn more about the concept for restoring numbers and maintaining sea control by the US Navy with “More Henderson, Less Bonds“.

Yesterday we discussed the imperative need for such a concept, with a fleet shrinking under the weight of outdated concepts involving massive firepower of supercarriers, Aegis destroyers, giant amphibious ships, and nuclear attack subs from the Cold War. Instead we think a lighter footprint is called for, not only to increase drastically fallen ship numbers in an age of sterile shipbuilding budgets, but also for ships more relevant to the concerns of littoral warfare, where the Navy needs to be in this new environment. As a starter, Jerry would see the Influence Squadron something like this:

The Influence Squadron-Riverine Detachment

one 49-foot riverine command boat
three 38-foot patrol boats
two 33-foot assault boats
Cost-About $40 million

According to Jerry, these craft would extend the reach of the Squadron, which would itself extend the reach of the Blue Water element of carriers, destroyers, and subs. The latter we recognize as immensely effective and powerful, but aren’t right for modern sea control, which would more effectively and less costly be performed by these “new cruisers”. Neither are they adequate for operating with allied navies, which often consist of corvettes, frigates, and patrol boats, to guard their coastlines from pirates and smugglers.

I also appreciate the plan to deploy coastal warships of 100-200 ft, that price in the tens of millions, from “$20 to $40 million a copy”. This is a huge leap in thinking when present day warships usually start at half-billion dollars each, and end up at the $10 billion. But this is how you restore ship numbers, and such craft are sufficient for most problems of modern seapower such as anti-piracy and anti-narcotics smuggling. Today we are using $2 billion Aegis destroyers and $700 million LCS for this type of extreme low tech work!

The Influence Squadron-Coastal Element

Austal Multi-Role Vessel at $150 million each
Joint High Speed Vessel at $170 million each
Motherships-Lewis and Clark-class T-AKEs at $400 million

Now we are spreading out further from shore, but in layers, giving future foes no leeway. In the ongoing anti-piracy mission off Somali, we see the new insurgents at sea slipping through the net of the very powerful but very few Western frigates, no matter how individually capable they are. This is how the guerrilla is intimidating Western armies on land. Despite the lack of capability, they can still do power and presence thanks to their dispersed numbers and agility.

Other essential support (including medical help from large Hospital Ships) would come from unmanned vehicles which are transforming war on land, sea, and air, such as:

Thales’ Spartan Scout unmanned surface vehicle
Insitu’s Integrator unmanned aerial vehicle
Bluefin’s autonomous underwater vehicle
Finally for some cost comparisons:

One Influence Squadron-$1.35 billion (10 ships)
Two Littoral Combat Ships-$1.4 billion
1 Arleigh Burke Destroyer-$1.8 billion
Only a small portion of the Blue Water budget would need be diverted to the new ships, about 10% according to the author. The contrast in purchases would be dramatic, as we pointed out: up to 10-1.

So, for all the current Navy woes, from inadequate presence, declining force structures, over-complicated ship programs constantly delayed and suffering enormous cost-overruns, the answer seems simple. The Influence Squadron provides more ships, which are affordable and easy to build, which would also provide work for long-suffering shipyards, while at the same time are more relevant for where the Navy wants to be, dominating the littorals as it already does with the Blue Water.

*****

[buglerbilly]

LPD-17 Funding Shapes Future Capabilities

Apr 30, 2010



By Michael Fabey

Congressional decisions on LPD-17 funding could shape the future capabilities for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, as well as mold the shipbuilding industrial base, according to a recent report by the Congressional Research Service (CRS).

Although the Navy’s planned 313-ship fleet plan, first presented to Congress in February 2006, calls for a 31-ship amphibious force that includes 10 LPD-17s, Navy and Marine Corps officials agree that a 33-ship amphibious force that includes 11 LPD-17s would be needed to minimally meet the Marine Corps’ goal of having an amphibious ship force with enough combined capacity to lift the assault echelons (AEs) of two Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs). A 33-ship force would include 15 amphibious ships for each MEB, plus three additional ships.

The Navy’s Fiscal 2011-15 shipbuilding plan calls for procuring an 11th and final San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ship in Fiscal 2012. The Navy estimates the procurement cost of this ship at $2 billion. The ship received $184 million in Fiscal 2010 advance procurement funding, and the Navy plans to request the remaining $1.87 billion of the ship’s procurement cost in the Fiscal 2012 budget. The Navy’s Fiscal 2011 budget does not request any additional advance procurement funding for the ship.

But the Pentagon may need the LPD design beyond the ship’s procurement time frame.

“Some observers have suggested using the LPD-17 design as the basis for the LSD(X), a new class of amphibious ships that the Navy plans to start procuring in FY 2017 as replacements for the Navy’s 12 aging Whidbey Island/Harpers Ferry (LSD-41/49) class amphibious ships,” CRS says in its report.

“Procuring a 12th LPD-17 in FY 2014 or FY 2015 might be consistent with a strategy of using the LPD-17 design as the basis for the LSD(X) because it would keep the LPD-17 production line open until the start of LSD(X) procurement,” CRS notes. “Navy officials have mentioned the option of modifying the LPD-17 design as one possible approach for developing the LSD(X) design, but the Navy is also studying other possible approaches, including developing an all-new design. Navy plans do not call for procuring any LPD-17s beyond the 11th ship planned for FY 2012.”

Fiscal 2011 issues for Congress include whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy’s proposed funding profile for procuring the 11th LPD-17, and whether to provide the Navy with any direction concerning the design of the LSD(X) or procurement of LPD-17s beyond the 11th ship, CRS reports.

Photo: US Navy

[buglerbilly]

Danger Room - What’s Next in National Security

Gates Takes Aim at Navy, Questions Carrier Fleet

By Nathan Hodge May 3, 2010 | 3:57 pm



Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has already taken aim at the Air Force’s favorite project, the F-22 Raptor Stealth fighter, and he schwacked the Army’s beloved Future Combat Systems. Now he’s letting the Navy know that their sacred cow — the carrier strike group — is next. (If I was a sailor, I’d call it a rhetorical warning shot across the bow.)

In a speech today at the Navy League symposium, Gates said the service needed to take another look at plans to keep 11 carrier strike groups for the next three decades. “In terms of size and striking power, no other country has even one comparable ship,” Gates noted.

“To be sure, the need to project power across the oceans will never go away,” he said. “But, consider the massive over-match the U.S. already enjoys. Consider, too, the growing anti-ship capabilities of adversaries. Do we really need eleven carrier strike groups for another 30 years when no other country has more than one? Any future plans must address these realities.”

It’s a message the Navy has thus far been resistant to. The service has taken some steps to buy smaller, faster shore-hugging ships, and has also embraced riverine operations for the first time since Vietnam. But Gates suggested that the service was still wedded to multi-billion-dollar ships that may in the future be increasingly vulnerable. The aircraft carrier may be the ultimate symbol of American military power. But with the right missile aimed at it, a carrier can go from fearsome to fearful sitting duck in a hurry.

“The virtual monopoly the U.S. has enjoyed with precision guided weapons is eroding – especially with long-range, accurate anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles that can potentially strike from over the horizon,” he said.

That point should be familiar to Danger Room readers: As we’ve noted here before, China has been testing anti-ship ballistic missiles designed specifically to target aircraft carriers. And as ships rise in price — like the next-generation, Ford-class carrier under construction here — cost itself becomes a vulnerability. A Ford-class carrier with a full complement of aircraft, Gates noted, “would represent potentially $15 to $20 billion worth of hardware at risk.”

And that’s overkill when it comes to many kinds of maritime threats the Navy now faces. “In particular, the Navy will need numbers, speed, and the ability to operate in shallow water, especially as the nature of war in the 21st century pushes us toward smaller, more diffuse weapons and units that increasingly rely on a series of networks to wage war,” he said. “As we learned last year, you don’t necessarily need a billion-dollar guided missile destroyer to chase down and deal with a bunch of teenage pirates wielding AK-47s and RPGs.”

[Photo: DoD]

Read More http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/05/gates-takes-aim-at-navy-questions-carrier-fleet/#more-24271#ixzz0muoyyRwg

[buglerbilly]

GATES speech............

Gates: Sea Services Must Question Embedded Thinking

By Jim Garamone

American Forces Press Service

NATIONAL HARBOR, Md., May 3, 2010 – The Navy and Marine Corps are going to have to question some embedded thinking, such as whether the Navy needs 11 carrier battle groups or whether the Marines ever will launch another amphibious landing, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said here today.

Gates spoke at the Navy League’s annual Sea-Air-Space Convention at the Gaylord National Convention Center.

The world is changing, and the sea services must be on the leading edges of those changes, Gates said to an auditorium full of Navy and Marine Corps officers and defense contractors that was just a bit smaller than an aircraft carrier’s hangar deck.

Gates made a case for examining the bedrocks of naval strategy, noting that carrier battle groups have been the Navy’s main fleet formation since 1942.

“Our current plan is to have eleven carrier strike groups through 2040,” Gates said. But a look at the facts is warranted, he added. The United States now has 11 large, nuclear-powered carriers, and there is nothing comparable anywhere else in the world.

“The U.S. Navy has 10 large-deck amphibious ships that can operate as sea bases for helicopters and vertical-takeoff jets,” he said. “No other navy has more than three, and all of those navies belong to allies or friends.”

The U.S. Navy can carry twice as many aircraft at sea as the rest of the world combined, Gates said. Under the sea, he told the group, the United States has 57 nuclear-powered attack and cruise-missile submarines – more than the rest of the world combined, and 79 Aegis-equipped surface ships that carry about 8,000 vertical-launch missile cells.

“In terms of total-missile firepower, the U.S. arguably outmatches the next 20 largest navies,” Gates said. “All told, the displacement of the U.S. battle fleet – a proxy for overall fleet capabilities – exceeds, by one recent estimate, at least the next 13 navies combined, of which 11 are our allies or partners.”

The United States must be able to project power overseas, Gates said. “But, consider the massive overmatch the U.S. already enjoys,” he added. “Consider, too, the growing anti-ship capabilities of adversaries. Do we really need 11 carrier strike groups for another 30 years when no other country has more than one?”

The Marine Corps is now 202,000 strong. It is the largest force of its type in the world, and exceeds in size most nations’ armies. Between the world wars, the Marine Corps developed amphibious warfare doctrine and used it to great effect against the Japanese during World War II. Whether that capability still is needed, however, is worthy of thought, the secretary said.

“We have to take a hard look at where it would be necessary or sensible to launch another major amphibious landing again – especially as advances in anti-ship systems keep pushing the potential launch point further from shore,” Gates said. “On a more basic level, in the 21st century, what kind of amphibious capability do we really need to deal with the most likely scenarios, and then how much?”

The sea services must be designed to meet new challenges, new technologies and new missions, Gates said.

Nations and terror groups are not going to challenge the conventional might of the United States, he noted. Rather, they are working on asymmetric ways to thwart the reach and striking power of the U.S. battle fleet.

“At the low end, Hezbollah, a non-state actor, used anti-ship missiles against the Israeli navy in 2006,” Gates said. “And Iran is combining ballistic and cruise missiles, anti-ship missiles, mines, and swarming speedboats in order to challenge our naval power in that region.”

A bit farther up the scale, the virtual monopoly the United States has had with precision-guided weapons is eroding, the secretary said, especially with long-range, accurate anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles that can potentially strike from over the horizon.

“This is a particular concern with aircraft carriers and other large, multi-billion-dollar blue-water surface combatants, where, for example, a Ford-class carrier plus its full complement of the latest aircraft would represent potentially $15 billion to $20 billion worth of hardware at risk,” Gates said. “The U.S. will also face increasingly sophisticated underwater combat systems – including numbers of stealthy subs – all of which could end the operational sanctuary our Navy has enjoyed in the Western Pacific for the better part of six decades.”

The sea services already are addressing many of the challenges of the 21st century, the secretary said. The Navy, for example, is building partnership capacity through the Africa Partnership Station in the Gulf of Guinea. Sailors are training with friends and allies to secure vital shipping lanes in Southeast Asia. Seabees and other sailors are digging wells and building schools in Djibouti. Naval officers lead the multinational efforts to counter the piracy around the Horn of Africa. Naval doctors, nurses and corpsmen that treated those injured in the Haitian earthquake and sailors also are helping with crises like the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, Gates said.

“Then, there are the wars,” he said. “With roughly 25 ships – and more than 20,000 sailors – in the [U.S. Central Command] area of operations, there is no doubt that this is a Navy at war.”

Tens of thousands of sailors also have served on the ground alongside soldiers and Marines. The sailors serve on provincial reconstruction teams, as finance clerks, on riverine crews, as Seabees, as SEALs and as medical corpsmen. “These men and women are vital to the mission and helping to ease the strain on our ground forces – and doing so without fail and without complaint,” Gates said.

The secretary said the Marines have been “game-changers” in Iraq, and now in Afghanistan. “In March, I had a chance to meet with Marines at the tip of the spear in a town called Now Zad – a place that had been, for nearly four years, a ghost town under the jackboot of the Taliban,” Gates said. “Then came a battalion of Marines, who, after months of hard work and sacrifice, have slowly brought the town back to life – creating a model for operations elsewhere.”

The military needs more innovative strategies and joint approaches, the secretary said. He called the agreement by the Navy and Air Force to develop an Air-Sea Battle Concept encouraging. It has “the potential to do for America’s military deterrent power at the beginning of the 21st century what Air-Land Battle did near the end of the 20th,” he said.

But the military also must shift investments toward systems that provide the ability to see and strike deep along the full spectrum of conflict, Gates said.

“This means, among other things, extending the range at which U.S. naval forces can fight, refuel, and strike, with more resources devoted to long-range unmanned aircraft and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities,” he explained.

It also means new sea-based missile defenses and a submarine force with expanded roles that is prepared to conduct more missions deep inside an enemy’s battle network. “We will also have to increase submarine strike capability and look at smaller and unmanned underwater platforms,” Gates said.

The secretary acknowledged talk that his push to rebalance the force to provide more resources to fight today’s wars has gone too far.

“In reality,” he said, “in this fiscal year, the Department of Defense requested nearly $190 billion for total procurement, research, and development – an almost 90 percent increase over the last decade. At most, 10 percent of that $190 billion is dedicated exclusively to equipment optimized for counterinsurgency, security assistance, humanitarian operations or other so-called low-end capabilities.

“In these last two budget cycles,” Gates continued, “I have directed a needed and noticeable shift – but hardly a dramatic one, especially in light of the significant naval overmatch.”

Resource discussions always foster debates about gaps in military capabilities, Gates said, and the solution usually offered is “either more of what we already have or modernized versions of pre-existing capabilities.”

“This approach ignores the fact that we face diverse adversaries with finite resources that consequently force them to come at the U.S. in unconventional and innovative ways,” he continued. “The more relevant gap we risk creating is one between the capabilities we are pursuing and those that are actually needed in the real world of tomorrow.”

Gates said the sea services must remember that as the wars draw down, money will be required to reset the Army and Marine Corps – the services that have borne the brunt of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

“And there will continue to be long-term – and inviolable – costs associated with taking care of our troops and their families,” he said. “In other words, I do not foresee any significant top-line increases in the shipbuilding budget beyond current assumptions. At the end of the day, we have to ask whether the nation can really afford a Navy that relies on $3 [billion] to $6 billion destroyers, $7 billion submarines, and $11 billion carriers.”

[Riđđu]

What is he trying to say?


SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT M. GATES
NAVY LEAGUE SEA-AIR-SPACE EXPO
GAYLORD CONVENTION CENTER
NATIONAL HARBOR, MD

MONDAY, MAY 3, 2010 Thank you for that introduction. And my thanks to the Navy League, which has been, for more than a century, a firm and at times fierce advocate for sea power and American engagement abroad.
It is a real pleasure to be here this afternoon. While I have spoken to the military service organizations for the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps, this is my first opportunity to attend your annual gathering. To start on the right foot, I should note that, for the first time in history, the Pentagon has now had officers from the sea services in back-to-back terms in the top two positions in America’s military – a Marine chairman of the joint chiefs and Navy vice chairman, followed by a Navy chairman and Marine vice chairman. I suspect many of you think we finally got the line-up right.
The topic of this year’s exposition is: “Responding Globally: Engaged at Sea and Ashore.” Considering our military’s unprecedented level of global engagement – especially the sea services – I cannot think of a better subject.
The pattern of engagement is reflected in a range of activities around the world that would no doubt leave Alfred Thayer Mahan spinning in his grave: building partnership capacity through the Africa Partnership Station in the Gulf of Guinea; training with friends and allies to secure vital shipping lanes in Southeast Asia; digging wells and building schools in Djibouti; leading multinational efforts to counter the scourge of piracy around the Horn of Africa; dispatching hospital ships to treat the poor and destitute; helping with crises like the oil spill along the Gulf Coast; and responding to natural disasters, most recently in Haiti – efforts that demonstrate our servicemembers’ incredible compassion and decency.
Then there are the wars. With roughly 25 ships – and more than 20,000 sailors – in the CENTCOM area of operations, there is no doubt that this is a Navy at war. Every time I visit Iraq or Afghanistan, I am struck by the number of sailors on the ground – one of the great unappreciated stories of the last few years. Tens of thousands of sailors have been to theater – including officers commanding provincial reconstruction teams, finance clerks, riverine crews, engineers, the SEALs and the Corpsmen, and our “devil docs.” These men and women are vital to the mission and helping to ease the strain on our ground forces – and doing so without fail and without complaint.
And then, of course, there is the role of the Marine Corps, whose impact has been a game-changer: first in Anbar province, key to the turnaround in Iraq, and now in southern Afghanistan, the center of gravity in that war. In March, I had a chance to meet with Marines at the tip of the spear in a town called Now Zad – a place that had been, for nearly four years, a ghost-town under the jackboot of the Taliban. Then came a battalion of Marines, who, after months of hard work and sacrifice, have slowly brought the town back to life – creating a model for operations elsewhere.
For years now, the Corps has been acting as essentially a second land army. As General Conway has noted, there are young, battle-hardened Marines with multiple combat tours who have spent little time inside of a ship, much less practicing hitting a beach. Their critical work well inland will be necessary for the foreseeable future.
Many of the tasks and roles I’ve just mentioned would have been unthinkable as recently as a decade ago, and are with our sea services to stay. But we must always be mindful of why America built and maintained a Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard in the first place. Indeed, it was an Army general, Ulysses S. Grant, who said that “[m]oney expended in a fine navy, not only adds to our security and tends to prevent war in the future, but is very material aid to our commerce with foreign nations in the meantime.” In fact, this country learned early on, after years of being bullied and blackmailed on the high seas, that it must be able to protect trade routes, project power, deter potential adversaries, and, if necessary, strike them on the oceans, in their ports, or on their shores. We cannot allow these core capabilities and skill sets to atrophy through distraction or neglect.
This is even more important considering that, with America’s ground forces dedicated to the campaigns in the Middle East and Central Asia, the weight of America’s deterrent and strategic military strength has shifted to our air and naval forces. So in the next few minutes I’d like to offer some perspective on the challenges facing America’s sea services as they strive to field and fund the capabilities our nation will need for the decades ahead – focusing on three central questions:


What kind of qualities should the maritime services encourage in a new generation of leaders?



What new capabilities will our Navy-Marine Corps team need, and which ones will potentially be made obsolete?



How can we be sure that our procurement plans are cost-effective, efficient, and realistic?


As a starting point, given the complex security challenges America faces around the globe, the future of our maritime services will ultimately depend less on the quality of their hardware than on the quality of their leaders. I addressed this question to the midshipmen at the Naval Academy a month ago by citing some of the towering figures from our sea services. Leaders like:


Lieutenant General Victor Krulak, the visionary behind the Higgins boat who later contributed greatly to our understanding of counterinsurgency in Vietnam;



Admiral Chester Nimitz, who as a young officer helped develop the circular formation for carrier escorts, used to great effect in World War II and for decades afterwards;



Admiral Hyman Rickover, whose genius and persistence overcame the conventional wisdom that nuclear reactors were too bulky and dangerous to put on submarines; and



Finally, Roy Boehm, who after World War II designed and led a special new commando unit that became the Navy SEALs. Boehm’s legacy is at work every night, tracking down our country’s most lethal enemies in Afghanistan and elsewhere around the world.

The reason I wanted to talk to midshipmen about these leaders – and why I am citing them today – is not that they were always right. Nor that they should be emulated in every way – to put it mildly. What is compelling about each of these leaders is that they had the vision and insight to see that the world and technology were changing, they understood the implications of these shifts, and then they pressed ahead in the face of often fierce institutional resistance.
The qualities these legends embody have been important and decisive throughout the history of warfare. But I would contend that they are more necessary than ever in the first decades of this century, given the pace of technological changes, and the agile and adaptive nature of our most likely and lethal adversaries – from modern militaries using asymmetric tactics to terrorist groups with advanced weapons. Our officers will lead an American military that must have the maximum flexibility to deal with the widest possible range of scenarios and adversaries.
Second, in order to be successful, the sea services must have the right make-up and capabilities. Surveying our current force, it is useful to start with some perspective – especially since the Navy, of all the services, has been the most consistently concerned about its size as measured by the total number of ships in the fleet.

It is important to remember that, as much as the U.S. battle fleet has shrunk since the end of the Cold War, the rest of the world’s navies have shrunk even more. So, in relative terms, the U.S. Navy is as strong as it has ever been.

In assessing risks and requirements even in light of an expanding array of global missions and responsibilities – everything from shows of presence to humanitarian relief – some context is useful:


The U.S. operates 11 large carriers, all nuclear powered. In terms of size and striking power, no other country has even one comparable ship.
The U.S. Navy has 10 large-deck amphibious ships that can operate as sea bases for helicopters and vertical-takeoff jets. No other navy has more than three, and all of those navies belong to allies or friends. Our Navy can carry twice as many aircraft at sea as the rest of the world combined.
The U.S. has 57 nuclear-powered attack and cruise missile submarines – again, more than the rest of the world combined.
Seventy-nine Aegis-equipped combatants carry roughly 8,000 vertical-launch missile cells. In terms of total missile firepower, the U.S. arguably outmatches the next 20 largest navies.
All told, the displacement of the U.S. battle fleet – a proxy for overall fleet capabilities – exceeds, by one recent estimate, at least the next 13 navies combined, of which 11 are our allies or partners.
And, at 202,000 strong, the U.S. Marine Corps is the largest military force of its kind – exceeding the size of most world armies.

Still, even as the United States stands unsurpassed on, above, and below the high seas, we have to prepare for the future. As in previous eras, new centers of power – with new wealth, military strength, and ambitions on the world stage – are altering the strategic landscape. If history shows anything, it’s that we cannot predict or guarantee the course of a nation decades from now – the time it takes to develop and build the next generation of ships, a process that has been likened to building a medieval cathedral: brick by brick, window by window – over decades.
Our Navy has to be designed for new challenges, new technologies, and new missions – because another one of history’s hard lessons is that, when it comes to military capabilities, those who fail to adapt often fail to survive. In World War II, both the American and British navies were surprised by the speed with which naval airpower made battleships obsolete. Because of two decades of testing and operations, however, both were well prepared to shift to carrier operations. We have to consider whether a similar revolution at sea is underway today.
Potential adversaries are well-aware of our overwhelming conventional advantage – which is why, despite significant naval modernization programs underway in some countries, no one intends to bankrupt themselves by challenging the U.S. to a shipbuilding competition akin to the Dreadnought race prior to World War I.
Instead, potential adversaries are investing in weapons designed to neutralize U.S. advantages – to deny our military freedom of action while potentially threatening America’s primary means of projecting power: our bases, sea and air assets, and the networks that support them.
We know other nations are working on asymmetric ways to thwart the reach and striking power of the U.S. battle fleet. At the low end, Hezbollah, a non-state actor, used anti-ship missiles against Israel’s navy in 2006. And Iran is combining ballistic and cruise missiles, anti-ship missiles, mines, and swarming speedboats in order to challenge our naval power in that region.
At the higher end of the access-denial spectrum, the virtual monopoly the U.S. has enjoyed with precision guided weapons is eroding – especially with long-range, accurate anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles that can potentially strike from over the horizon. This is a particular concern with aircraft carriers and other large, multi-billion-dollar blue-water surface combatants, where, for example, a Ford-class carrier plus its full complement of the latest aircraft would represent potentially $15 to $20 billion worth of hardware at risk. The U.S. will also face increasingly sophisticated underwater combat systems – including numbers of stealthy subs – all of which could end the operational sanctuary our Navy has enjoyed in the Western Pacific for the better part of six decades.

One part of the way ahead is through more innovative strategies and joint approaches. The agreement by the Navy and Air Force to work together on an Air-Sea Battle concept is an encouraging development, which has the potential to do for America’s military deterrent power at the beginning of the 21st century what Air-Land Battle did near the end of the 20th.
But we must also rethink what and how we buy – to shift investments towards systems that provide the ability to see and strike deep along the full spectrum of conflict. This means, among other things:


Extending the range at which U.S. naval forces can fight, refuel, and strike, with more resources devoted to long-range unmanned aircraft and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.
New sea-based missile defenses;
A submarine force with expanded roles that is prepared to conduct more missions deep inside an enemy’s battle network. We will also have to increase submarine strike capability and look at smaller and unmanned underwater platforms.

These changes are occurring even as the Navy is called on to do more missions that fall on the low end of the conflict spectrum – a requirement that will not go away, as the new naval operational concept reflects. Whether the mission is counterinsurgency, piracy, or security assistance, among others, new missions have required new ways of thinking about the portfolio of weapons we buy. In particular, the Navy will need numbers, speed, and the ability to operate in shallow water, especially as the nature of war in the 21st century pushes us toward smaller, more diffuse weapons and units that increasingly rely on a series of networks to wage war. As we learned last year, you don’t necessarily need a billion-dollar guided missile destroyer to chase down and deal with a bunch of teenage pirates wielding AK-47s and RPGs.
The Navy has responded with investments in more special warfare capabilities, small patrol coastal vessels, a riverine squadron, and joint high-speed vessels. Last year’s budget accelerated the buy of the Littoral Combat Ship, which, despite its development problems, is a versatile ship that can be produced in quantity and go places that are either too shallow or too dangerous for the Navy’s big, blue-water surface combatants. The new approach to LCS procurement and competition should provide an affordable, scalable, and sustainable path to producing the quantity of ships we need.

There has been some talk that the rebalancing effort of the last couple of years – where resources and institutional support have shifted towards what is needed in the current conflicts and other irregular scenarios – has skewed priorities too far away from high-tech conventional capabilities. In reality, in this fiscal year the Department requested nearly $190 billion for total procurement, research, and development – an almost 90 percent increase over the last decade. At most, 10 percent of that $190 billion is dedicated exclusively to equipment optimized for counterinsurgency, security assistance, humanitarian operations, or other so-called low-end capabilities. In these last two budget cycles, I have directed a needed and noticeable shift – but hardly a dramatic one, especially in light of the significant naval overmatch that I described earlier.
These issues invariably bring up debates over so-called “gaps” between stated requirements and current platforms – be they ships, aircraft, or anything else. More often than not, the solution offered is either more of what we already have or modernized versions of preexisting capabilities. This approach ignores the fact that we face diverse adversaries with finite resources that consequently force them to come at the U.S. in unconventional and innovative ways. The more relevant gap we risk creating is one between the capabilities we are pursuing and those that are actually needed in the real world of tomorrow.

Considering that, the Department must continually adjust its future plans as the strategic environment evolves. Two major examples come to mind.
First, what kind of new platform is needed to get large numbers of troops from ship to shore under fire – in other words, the capability provided by the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle. No doubt, it was a real strategic asset during the first Gulf War to have a flotilla of Marines waiting off Kuwait City – forcing Saddam’s army to keep one eye on the Saudi border, and one eye on the coast. But we have to take a hard look at where it would be necessary or sensible to launch another major amphibious landing again – especially as advances in anti-ship systems keep pushing the potential launch point further from shore. On a more basic level, in the 21st century, what kind of amphibious capability do we really need to deal with the most likely scenarios, and then how much?

Second – aircraft carriers. Our current plan is to have eleven carrier strike groups through 2040. To be sure, the need to project power across the oceans will never go away. But, consider the massive over-match the U.S. already enjoys. Consider, too, the growing anti-ship capabilities of adversaries. Do we really need eleven carrier strike groups for another 30 years when no other country has more than one? Any future plans must address these realities.
And that bring me to the third issue: the budget. I have in the past warned about our nation’s tendency to disarm in the wake of major wars. That remains a concern. But, as has always been the case, defense budget expectations over time, not to mention any country’s strategic strength, are intrinsically linked to the overall financial and fiscal health of the nation.
And in that respect, we have to accept some hard fiscal realities. American taxpayers and the Congress are rightfully worried about the deficit. At the same time, the Department of Defense’s track record as a steward of taxpayer dollars leaves much to be desired.

Now, I know that part of the problem lies outside the Defense Department – and it has been this way for a long time. One of my favorite stories is about Henry Knox, the first secretary of war. He was charged with building the first American fleet. To get the necessary support from the Congress, Knox eventually ended up with six frigates being built in six different shipyards in six different states.
In this year’s budget submission, the Department has asked to end funding for an extra engine for the Joint Strike Fighter as well as to cease production of the C-17 cargo aircraft – two decisions supported by the services and reams of analysis. As we speak, a fight is on to keep the Congress from putting the extra engine and more C-17s back in the budget – at an unnecessary potential cost to the taxpayers of billions of dollars over the next few years. The issues surrounding political will and the Defense budget are ones I will discuss in more detail at the Eisenhower Library on Saturday.
None of that, however, absolves the Pentagon and the services from responsibility with regards to procurement. These issues are especially acute when it comes to big-ticket items whose costs skyrocket far beyond initial estimates. Current submarines and amphibious ships are three times as expensive as their equivalents during the 1980s – this in the context of an overall shipbuilding and conversion budget that is 20 percent less. Just a few years ago, the Congressional Budget Office projected that meeting the Navy’s shipbuilding plan would cost more than $20 billion per year – double the shipbuilding budget of recent years, and a projection that was underfunded by some 30 percent. It is reasonable to wonder whether the nation is getting a commensurate increase in capability in exchange for these spiraling costs.

The Navy’s DDG-1000 is a case in point. By the time the Navy leadership curtailed the program, the price of each ship had more than doubled and the projected fleet had dwindled from 32 to seven. The programmed buy is now three.
Or consider plans for a new ballistic missile submarine, the SSBN(X). Right now, the Department proposes spending $6 billion in research and development over the next few years – for a projected buy of twelve subs at $7 billion apiece. Current requirements call for a submarine with the size and payload of a boomer – and the stealth of an attack sub. In a congressional hearing earlier this year, I pointed out that in the later part of this decade the new ballistic missile submarine alone would begin to eat up the lion’s share of the Navy’s shipbuilding resources.
To be sure, the most recent 30-year shipbuilding plan is a step in the right direction. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Roughead have worked hard to create reasonable budgets and reset the service “in stride” to reduce operational disruptions. At the same time, the Navy’s innovative energy security and independence initiative not only helps the environment, but also will save money in the long term.
Even so, it is important to remember that, as the wars recede, money will be required to reset the Army and Marine Corps, which have borne the brunt of the conflicts. And there will continue to be long-term – and inviolable – costs associated with taking care of our troops and their families. In other words, I do not foresee any significant top-line increases in the shipbuilding budget beyond current assumptions. At the end of the day, we have to ask whether the nation can really afford a Navy that relies on $3 to 6 billion destroyers, $7 billion submarines, and $11 billion carriers.

Though I have addressed a number of topics today, I should add that I don’t pretend to have all the answers. But, mark my words, the Navy and Marine Corps must be willing to reexamine and question basic assumptions in light of evolving technologies, new threats, and budget realities. We simply cannot afford to perpetuate a status quo that heaps more and more expensive technologies onto fewer and fewer platforms – thereby risking a situation where some of our greatest capital expenditures go toward weapons and ships that could potentially become wasting assets.
A concluding thought. The number and kind of ships we have – and how we use them – will be ever changing, as they have for the last 200-plus years. What must be unchanging, what must be enduring, is the quality of the sailors and Marines onboard these ships and serving ashore. They must have moral as well as physical courage; they must have integrity; they must think creatively and boldly. They must have the vision and insight to see that the world and technology are constantly changing and that the Navy and Marine Corps must therefore change with the times – ever flexible and ever adaptable. They must be willing to speak hard truths, including to superiors – as did their legendary predecessors.
Over the past three and a half years, in the fury of two wars, I have seen the future of the Navy and Marine Corps onboard ships, on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan, at Navy bases and Marine camps, and at the Academy. These young men and women fill me with confidence that the future of our sea services is incredibly bright and that our nation will be secure in their hands.
Thank you.

[buglerbilly]

U.S. Navy Secretary Demands End to 'Nutty' Contracts

By CHRISTOPHER P. CAVAS

Published: 5 May 2010 16:27

In a sometimes passionate and even strident address, U.S. Navy Secretary Ray Mabus on May 5 kept up the clarion call for a rigorous scrub of all service acquisition programs. He added energy efficiency to the imperatives to eliminate cost growth and reduce the price of production in programs.


U.S. Navy Secretary Ray Mabus speaks May 5 to an audience at Sea-Air-Space 2010. (MC2 KEVIN S. O'BRIEN / U.S. NAVY)

"We have to re-examine everything we do. Nothing can be taken for granted," he told a luncheon audience at the Navy League's Sea-Air-Space symposium in Washington.

"We have to continually make sure we have the right platforms to do the missions we have been given," Mabus said. "And we have to have the capability to explain, defend and tell the American people why we need what we are asking them to pay for."

Mabus laid out five key principles of his acquisition reform effort:

■ Clearly identify requirements.

■ Raise the bar on contract performance.

■ Rebuild the acquisition work force.

■ Support the industrial base.

■ "Make every single dollar count."

Unlike a May 3 speech before a similar audience by U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates, Mabus did not single out specific programs where he expected improvement. Instead, he pointed to three - the P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, the SSN 774 Virginia-class submarine and the T-AKE 1 Lewis and Clark-class dry cargo ships - as examples of programs that are "meeting in spades" benchmarks such as getting increasing benefits from learning curves and successively reducing unit costs.

Mabus moved the mark on one traditional benchmark.

"On time and on budget is a baseline, not a target," he declared. And if programs can't meet the new goals, he said, "I'm not going to hesitate to cancel programs."

In line with Navy efforts to increase competition at any opportune level, prime contractors will be expected to do the same with their subcontractors, Mabus said. He said that energy efficiency, both in the manufacturing process and in the final product, would increasingly be a factor in judging program performance as well as in contract awards.

Navy acquisition professionals will be "going through every contract, line by line, to make sure the terms of those contracts make sense for what they are meant to do, and are fair to the contractor and the government," he said.

"Some of the contracts I've looked at have just been downright unfair to the customer: us," he said, his voice rising. "When things go wrong, it shouldn't be just up to the government to make things right."

Without giving any specifics, Mabus cited a "really egregious" example in which a Navy supplier agreed to work around a contractual requirement that additional item orders were to be done only by traditional mail. Both the Navy and the contractor agreed, Mabus said, to handle additional orders by e-mail as a more efficient communications method.

"There was never a problem until the program started coming to a close," Mabus almost shouted, "and at the very last order, the company said, 'We're not going to honor the terms of the contract' because we hadn't sent the orders by mail … and that we owed them tens of millions of dollars!" Clearly fuming, Mabus continued.

"That's not fair. That's nutty. It's not fair to the taxpayers, and it's not fair to our sailors and Marines. If we pay for that, it's going to come out of something our sailors or Marines need to do the job."

[buglerbilly]

Navy League 2010: BMD community pins hopes on Arleigh Burke restart

By Sam LaGrone

13 May 2010

The US Navy is planning a cost-conscious approach to the Arleigh Burke-class Flight IIA destroyer restart programme and the upcoming Flight III development, according to a senior official at Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA).

Since production of the DDG 51 destroyers recommenced in 2009, the navy has said it wants to optimise the legacy warship as a ballistic missile defence (BMD) platform built around the remnants of the cancelled next-generation cruiser (CG[X]) initiative.

Captain Peter Lyle, NAVSEA's DDG 51 programme manager, told a press briefing at the Navy League's Sea-Air-Space 2010 exposition on 3 May that the restart – beginning with hull number DDG 113 – will mark the first time BMD capabilities have been designed into a ship from the hull up, as opposed to retrofitted after it has entered service.

The challenge will be to remain focused on the BMD mission and prevent the "desire from well-intended folks to bring on the latest capability and improvements", Capt Lyle said.

"You're going to have to focus on cost, optimise it and beat down those folks that want to make it better. The budget constraints are real and we want to make a ship that's [just] good enough."

General Dynamics Bath Iron Works (BIW) and Northrop Grumman have both secured contracts to fund the next round of Arleigh Burke construction.

220 of 603 words
Copyright © IHS (Global) Limited, 2010

[buglerbilly]

U.S. House Seapower Chair Wants Ship-Retirement Limits

By JOHN REED

Published: 13 May 2010 19:33

U.S. House Armed Services seapower panel chairman Rep. Gene Taylor, D-Miss., will work to insert language into the 2011 defense authorization bill requiring the U.S. Navy to replace every two warships it retires in the coming years with three brand-new ships. It's a move designed to get to a 313-ship fleet.

"There have now been at least three [Chiefs of Naval Operations] who tell us that they need a minimum of 313 ships and yet they submit budget requests that don't get them anywhere near that - in fact, this request would actually take us backward by about four ships if enacted," Taylor told reporters May 13 after his subcommittee's mark of the bill.

Taylor went on to say that he will also work to keep two 30-year-old Tarawa Class amphibious assault ships, the USS Nassau and USS Peleliu, in commission since "they still have about 10 years of life left."

The congressman also wants to keep two frigates in service past next year, a move - designed together with keeping the two amphibious assault ships in service - to limit the number of ships the Navy retires next year to six.

"We'd then commission seven ships next year, decommission six ships instead of the 10 that the Navy wants to, and grow the fleet rather than shrink it," Taylor said.

Taylor hopes to insert this language into the authorization bill during next week's House Armed Services Committee markup of the bill.

[buglerbilly]

U.S. Carrier's Construction Issues 'Minimal'

By CHRISTOPHER P. CAVAS

Published: 18 May 2010 15:02

Engineers building the new U.S. aircraft carrier Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) are making some design changes to avoid "electrical cable routing issues" that could interfere with some internal arrangements.


A combination model and live shot digital photo illustration of the aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78). (NORTHROP GRUMMAN SHIPBUILDING)

The problems have been found "in limited areas of the ship design," said Margaret Mitchell-Jones, a spokesperson for Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding.

"As can happen with any lead ship of the class performing first-of-a-kind activities, we have identified some interferences between cable arrangements and other design features that require correction. In these cases, changes to the design are being made and lessons learned applied," Mitchell-Jones said in a statement.

Those changes include moving some wireways where electrical cable is strung and changing some cable supports, she added. "These issues are not widespread. We have not yet run any cable, but a small percentage of the cable supports that have been installed may require alteration."

The impact on the ship's cost or construction schedule is still being evaluated, she said, "but expect it to be minimal."

The U.S. Navy's Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) acknowledged the problem but downplayed the impact.

"The Navy is aware that [Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding] has identified some interferences between cable arrangements that require correction," NAVSEA said in an e-mail statement May 14. "The Navy understands this to be a small percentage of the cable arrangement design to date and results in no module fit-up issues."

Overall, NAVSEA seemed satisfied with the amount of rework being done on the ship to correct mistakes.

"The amount of rework experienced to date is not a significant percentage of the overall design and production effort," NAVSEA said. "The issues identified to date by [Northrop] have had minimal impact."

The ship, first of a new class of carriers, is under construction at Northrop's shipyard in Newport News, Va. More than 61 percent of the structural modules for the Ford already are complete, Mitchell-Jones said. "The fit-up of CVN 78 structural modules is as good or better than previous Nimitz-class carriers," she added.

[buglerbilly]

CSBA Releases New Report

(Source: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; issued May 18, 2010)

The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments today released its latest report: “AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept,” by Jan van Tol with Mark Gunzinger, Andrew Krepinevich and Jim Thomas.

The report provides a detailed assessment of how potent anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities will likely make traditional US power projection operations increasingly risky and costly in the future.

Using the Western Pacific Theater of Operations (WPTO) as the most stressing potential case, it explores how the United States and its allies could employ a candidate AirSea Battle operational concept to maintain a stable military balance in the Western Pacific.

“An AirSea Battle concept must address high-end military operations in the WPTO,” according to Jan van Tol, “though widespread proliferation of A2/AD capabilities would make the concept highly applicable across a range of other scenarios.”

“CSBA’s research and analysis over the last fifteen years point to a growing need for an integrated effort between the Air Force and Navy to address the growing challenges posed by formidable A2/AD capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region and elsewhere,” stresses Andrew Krepinevich.

CSBA’s analysis finds that the Air Force and Navy’s ability to execute highly integrated operations along the lines set forth in AirSea Battle could greatly enhance their effectiveness across a range of A2/AD contingencies, while the long-term cost efficiencies to be realized are highly desirable from a budgetary perspective.

“We need to strengthen the connective tissue between our strategy and the resources devoted to supporting it,” stresses Jim Thomas. “The operational concept provided in AirSea Battle accomplishes this at a level of detail not seen since the 1980s, when an Army-Air Force concept known as AirLand Battle enabled the Services to establish clear priorities regarding programs and force structure.”

AirSea Battle provides intellectual grist for Air Force-Navy efforts to develop their AirSea Battle concept as directed by the 2010 QDR.

“CSBA’s independent approach provides a useful counterpoint to what is likely to be a more nuanced effort by the Services,” offers Mark Gunzinger. “Our goal is to raise awareness of this important issue and enhance the debate over how best to proceed.”

Click here for the electronic version of the report (144 pages in PDF format) on the CSBA website. Related presentation slides are also available.

http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20100518.Air_Sea_Battle__A_/R.20100518.Air_Sea_Battle__A_.pdf

-ends-

[buglerbilly]

U.S. House Panel Wants Report on BMD Ships Needed

By RICK MAZE

Published: 19 May 2010 12:11

As part of a continuing battle over the size of the U.S. Navy, the House Armed Services Committee wants to know whether the Navy needs more surface combatants to provide adequate missile defenses.

By voice vote and with little discussion, the committee approved an amendment sponsored by Rep. Todd Akin of Missouri, ranking Republican on its seapower subcommittee, that asks for a report by March 1, 2011 about the number of surface ships required for sea-based missile defense.

Current Navy plans for a 313-ship Navy includes 88 cruisers and destroyers, but Akin said that might not be enough considering the growing missile threat, particularly when fleets are operating within the range of land-based missiles. He specifically spoke about China, which has extensive anti-ship weapons. "It would be helpful to be able to defense our ships against this type of weapon," Akin said. "It doesn't seem like we are making the kind of progress we should."

The 2011 report ordered by the committee would look at whether upgrading existing and planned Aegis ships would meet the Navy's requirement for sea-based defenses or whether additional ships would be needed. To make that determination, lawmakers want the report to include an analysis of how many Aegis ships are needed in each combat theater, with a description of how a limited number of ships might be deployed.

The report also evaluate of how technological advancements would strengthen anti-ship defenses.

An order for a report is not final until Congress completes work on the annual defense bill but it is unlikely to be dropped, aides said. Exactly what the report should include might change as lawmakers continue work on the bill but a demand for a report rarely is dropped after a committee vote, aides said.

[buglerbilly]

CSBA AirSea Battle Concept: More Stealth, Long-Range Strike to Counter Chinese Battle Networks



I spent the morning at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment’s release of their new report “AirSea Battle: A Point of Departure Operational Concept” (you can find the report here as well as the briefing slides). Lots to unpack here from the 123 page report, the author’s brief and the lively discussion that followed.

CSBA says that China’s military modernization aims at denying U.S. air and maritime freedom of maneuver and access in the Western Pacific (WestPac) by targeting bases and ships with precision guided missiles. China’s buildup of increasingly capable anti-access/area-denial “battle networks” will, over time, make the current “American way of war” prohibitively costly.

This shift in the military balance is perhaps best exemplified by China’s widely reported development of “carrier killing” anti-ship ballistic missiles, a weapon that potentially threatens the very symbol of American military might and global presence.

CSBA president Andrew Krepinevich emphasized that CSBA’ AirSea Battle concept is not about fighting a war with China, or “rolling back” China’s influence in the Western Pacific. Instead, it should be seen as an “offsetting strategy” that reaffirms a U.S. commitment to maintaining presence, coalitions and influence in that strategically vital area.

CSBA’s AirSea Battle concept envisions a two stage campaign. The first phase would be to survive what would likely be Chinese pre-emptive strikes on U.S. and allied bases across the Western Pacific, particularly airfields. It envisions more than just trusting in missile defenses and base hardening. Prompt U.S. counterattacks would first go after the PLA’s reconnaissance strike complex, the U.S. would try to deny China the ability to accurately target fixed installations and ships and conduct battle damage assessment.

This “blinding campaign” is at the core of the AirSea Battle concept, said CSBA’s Jim Thomas, the PLA’s surveillance and targeting systems are the “Achilles heel” of its anti-access networks. In any WestPac confrontation, one of the PLA’s main advantages is its very large, and growing, arsenal of precision guided missiles; those missile magazines could be rendered useless if they can’t be guided.

If China loses it’s over the horizon situational awareness, U.S. naval assets regain their freedom of maneuver and ability to close in on the Chinese mainland. Short ranged tactical aircraft could also be moved closer if allied bases weren’t being bombarded with PLA ballistic missiles. The blinding campaign would include cyber attacks, PLA space assets would be targeted, electronic warfare aircraft would spoof PLA radars and sensors and seaborne pickets would be targeted.

The blinding campaign would be followed by strikes against the PLA’s fixed and mobile missile launchers using land and sea based manned and unmanned stealthy penetrators. Using stand-off and EW, the U.S. would try and open corridors in PLA air-defenses. Simultaneously, PLA Navy ships and subs would be targeted to prevent them from getting out into the open ocean.

If the first phase of the campaign aims to prevent China from achieving a “knock-out blow,” the second phase would aim to win what would possibly be a prolonged conflict. In the second phase of the campaign, CSBA envisions the U.S. seizing the initiative by targeting PLA assets on the mainland and seas, establishing a blockade of Chinese sea lines of communication, surging supplies and warfighting material into WestPac and ramping up industrial production of precision guided weapons.

The real value of the ASB concept, Thomas said, is not to develop a new war plan, but rather to develop a conceptual “lens” through which to view future investment decisions. Peering through that lens, CSBA recommends some pretty hefty shifts in investment to execute an effective ASB campaign.

Much of what CSBA recommends program wise emphasizes stealth, long-range and prompt strike, redundancy and Air Force and Navy interoperability. There is a very extensive list of programmatic and force structure changes in the report, including:

• To mitigate the ballistic missile threat to Guam and other WestPac bases the Air Force should harden its bases on Guam and refurbish bases on Tinian, Saipan and Palua to allow aircraft dispersal and force China to play a shell game with American aircraft; the Air Force-Navy should jointly assess tactical air-based ballistic missile defenses and laser weapons; and BMD exercises should be carried out with Japan.

• The Air Force and Navy should invest in a long range strike capability against time sensitive targets in a cost imposing strategy to force the PLA to beef up its own defenses; and the Navy should consider investing in conventionally armed, relatively short range sea-based ballistic missiles, similar to Tomahawk, that could be spread across the fleet’s VLS tubes.

• The Air Force and Navy should develop and field long-range next generation stealthy air platforms, both manned and unmanned, and payloads for these platforms; the Navy version capable of operating off of carriers.

• The Air Force and Navy should jointly develop a long-range precision strike family of systems that include: ISR, EW and strike. The Air Force should develop a stealthy multi-mission, long-range persistent bomber as part of this strike family. The Navy should expedite developing and fielding a carrier-based drone.

• The Air Force and Navy should develop joint command and control mechanisms to enable Air Force aircraft to target enemy ships using Navy surveillance and targeting systems.

• The Air Force and Navy should jointly develop a long-range anti-ship missile.

• The Air Force should equip some of its B-2 stealth bombers with an offensive mine laying capability to mine Chinese harbors.

• The Air Force and Navy should significantly increase investment in joint EW platforms both manned and unmanned.

• The Air Force and Navy should increase research and development in laser weapons for land and sea based point defense against missiles.

I’ll have much more as soon as finish reading the entire report.

– Greg Grant

Read more: http://defensetech.org/2010/05/18/csba-releases-its-airsea-battle-concept/#ixzz0oSG3zLqH
Defense.org

[Gubler, A.]

I read this report a few weeks ago. Its full of assumptions and the same uber Sino missile stuff beloved of a certain sector. I was not impressed.

[buglerbilly]

The CSBA slides are always worth taking a look at.............

http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20100518.Slides_AirSea_Batt/R.20100518.Slides_AirSea_Batt.pdf

[buglerbilly]

I read this report a few weeks ago. Its full of assumptions and the same uber Sino missile stuff beloved of a certain sector. I was not impressed.

Well plenty in the USA are still looking for a replacement for the Soviet Union............and plenty in China are eager to take that slot.

In my opinion both groups are in the minority thankfully and future dangers, in my opinion, lie in the Lateral Warfare sector that is Extremism through Religion and/or Phobia.

All reports have assumptions and whether one agrees with or dislikes or disregards such assumptions, within themselves they are reasonable to make even if you or I think them wrong, slanted or erroneous.

[Gubler, A.]

AirSea battle struck me as more of a great sounding name needing a concept to support it. Its all the same old missile range tables on a map that assumes that just because a weapon is in range of something that its going to achieve some kind of significant effect.

[Gubler, A.]

All reports have assumptions and whether one agrees with or dislikes or disregards such assumptions, within themselves they are reasonable to make even if you or I think them wrong, slanted or erroneous.

Well talking a lot about one nation’s ballistic missile threat without even mentioning the dominant counter BMD capability is pretty assumptive. AirSea is as hollow as the reports in which it copies. It’s the same stuff Stillion used to write and the APA picked up on about China being able to destroy US pacific bases and aircraft carriers with their ballistic missiles. It’s not even original crapola.

[buglerbilly]

Actually, I agree with you.........

It seems to me that there is no real concept much beyond what has already been revealed previously. That seems to be the real problem, HOW do they, the USA, react to or inter-act with the PRC and its own ambitions?

Certainly the bruhaha of the Taiwan scenario is just so much posturing as I do not believe the current PRC leadership will take proactive Military action to "acquire" Taiwan when Commercial and Political scenarios are much more likely to achieve Unification. IF unification is achieved, THEN what is the scenario that the USA or Japan would like to see and how would they react to this event?

[Gubler, A.]

Any realistic strategic assessment of China vs USA has to start first with economics. It is impossible for China to go to war with the USA and not suffer an immense economic collapse. Or if China was willing to revert to the Cultural Revolution level of coercion over its population and lose all growth and wealth and fight a war with the USA it does not have access to the raw materials and capital infrastructure to sustain a war economy without massive contraction. Any act of war would also write off a considerable part of their acquired wealth which is held in credits and foreign investments. It would probably be in the USA’s economic interest to be weaned off Chinese imports (in the main consumer items and not crucial to a war economy) and be allowed to appropriate all Chinese assets in the USA if a war was started.

As to China’s military capability (as is now and planned for the next decade or so) if they do decide to commit economic suicide much of it is decidedly inferior. So what if China launches 100 ballistic missiles at Okinawa or Guam. They will do about as much as Iraq’s attempts to Scud America out of Desert Storm. With the inaccuracy of these weapons with conventional warheads and the US’s investment in BMD warning and interception they will not have significant effect on these bases. China’s limited air and sea force is decidedly inferior to the US Navy who could place at least four carriers into their waters in a few weeks and sustain that presence for decades. Not to mention all the other air and sea forces that would rush to the region and bases in Japan and Taiwan.

The end result would strike me as something as the Falklands War on a grand scale. Lots of Chinese dying valiantly as their inferior forces are ripped apart by a military force in a league very much higher than their own.

[Unicorn]

Abe, a realistic assessment that is far more reasonable than the "China will destroy us all" scenarios being pushed by the doom and gloom merchants and the Chinese fanboys.

At the end of the day, the difference in capability between the USA and ANYONE else is a matter of US first, daylight second and then a couple of countries a bloody long way third.

Unicorn

[buglerbilly]

Course correction in carriers’ future

By Jeanette Steele, UNION-TRIBUNE STAFF WRITER

Sunday, May 23, 2010 at 12:05 a.m.


Seaman Robyn Rogers, 24, a quartermaster, uses a compass to plot the ship’s position on the bridge of the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln. (Jeanette Steele / U-T)

On the bridge of the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln, there’s a 20-year-old quartermaster with a No. 2 pencil, a compass and a big map unfurled on a table.

In one of the ironies of America’s modern Navy, that map and that quartermaster are the official method of navigation for the $4 billion carrier and the 5,000 souls on board.

Even as the Navy installs the most high-tech equipment on its carriers — including the San Diego-based Carl Vinson, which recently returned to the fleet after a four-year overhaul — none of the nation’s 11 flattops is certified to rely on electronic navigation.

So if the United States put a man on the moon in 1969, why is it still using pencils on the bridges of nuclear-powered ships?

Because the Navy, like an aircraft carrier, doesn’t change direction quickly.

“It’s only been 10 to 12 years ago that we started down this road, transitioning from a paper Navy for navigation to a paperless Navy for navigation,” said Cmdr. Ashley Evans, deputy navigator for the Navy in Washington, D.C.

The Navy is poised to radically change the way it has sailed since the days of wooden ships. This summer, Navy leaders are expected to issue an order that allows skippers to stop maintaining up-to-date paper “charts” — what sailors call maps — on board.

Four of the Navy’s carriers possess the electronics to navigate by computer; the rest are set to receive the gear by 2013.

It takes about a year to become certified for operating the equipment, and none of the Navy’s carrier crews has done so yet. But some destroyers and cruisers currently sail with the computer readout as the primary guide.

“The Navy is slowly getting out of the archaic,” said Senior Chief Petty Officer James Fox, the Lincoln’s leading quartermaster and an 18-year veteran of ship bridges.

“When I first came into the Navy, they said, ‘Oh, GPS — no one will ever trust it because what if we lose power?’ ” Fox said, referring to the Global Positioning System satellites that feed the Lincoln real-time information on its whereabouts.

“But as some of these old salty sailors retire, what they realize is that if we lose power, we’ve got a lot more worries than our exact position,” he said.

The Navy uses specialized navigation charts, which it had to first computerize. That process alone took eight or nine years.

“It’s been a long-anticipated change that the team worked hard toward for years,” said Evans, who admits he’s an old-school sailor who could, in a pinch, use a sextant to navigate — just as captains did when battleships still had sails. Carrier crews still keep a sextant on the bridge, but there may be only one sailor aboard qualified to use it.

The Navy’s future is on display aboard the Freedom, the first in a new class of vessels called littoral combat ships.

When the sleek Freedom sailed toward San Diego Bay last month, it was comparatively quiet on the bridge. No fussing over plotting points on a map. No paper charts. No officer calling out commands to be repeated by the helmsman and the quartermaster in a chain reaction of voices.

Two officers drove the vessel using a couple of throttle levers. Electronics, including satellite navigation, ruled the day.

“I want to go left, I go left. Speed up, slow down. There’s nothing between me and those controls,” said Lt. Todd Sehl, 31, the Freedom’s officer of the deck. “No telephone game, not like on a normal ship.”

Not all minds are made up about the “quartermaster in a box,” as the satellite readout is sometimes called. Not even among the Internet generation.

“They are replacing my job on the smaller ships,” said Quartermaster 2nd Class Sarah DeGraw, a 20-year-old sailor on the Lincoln, which is based in Everett, Wash. “Quartermaster is one of the oldest rates in the Navy.”

One of DeGraw’s duties is to update the paper charts, which she acknowledges is tedious and labor-intensive for a Navy with a directive to shed personnel and reduce costs.

Still, she said: “Electronics — you can never rely on them. It’s not only charts; it’s the way we communicate.”

What’s next, she asks: Sailors on the bridge won’t have to know semaphore, the series of colored flags used as ship-to-ship communication for hundreds of years? Right now, junior quartermasters use flashcards to quiz themselves on signal flags during downtime on the bridge.

Cmdr. James Lins, the navigator on the Lincoln, is a fan of continuing the paper and electronic methods simultaneously, one backing up the other. He worries that satellites can get out of sync without the bridge knowing it — until it’s too late.

“Is it over-redundancy? Yeah. But there are only 11 carriers in the Navy. I think we owe it to the taxpayer to make sure that we are safe,” said Lins, who as the “gator” — the nickname for the ship’s navigation officer — sleeps just steps away from the bridge.

“If you run something like this aground, there’s gonna be hell to pay — and rightfully so,” he said.

Inexorably, the Navy is steaming toward automation. Warships were once steered with a big wooden wheel, Evans points out. Now they’re talking about putting voice recorders, like the “black boxes” in airplane cockpits, on some vessels.

“Bridges have gone from being out in the wind and the cold, with a wheel, to being enclosed and modernized — to what they are today,” Evans said.

Jeanette Steele: (619) 293-1030; jen.steele@uniontrib.com

[buglerbilly]

Sea Services Release Naval Operations Concept 2010

(Source: US Navy; issued May 24, 2010)

WASHINGTON (NNS) -- Similar to the collaborative signing of the Maritime Strategy, "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower," the Chief of Naval Operations and Commandants of the Marine Corps and Coast Guard released the Naval Operations Concept 2010 (NOC 10) http://www.navy.mil/maritime/noc/NOC2010.pdf (112 pages in PDF format), which guides implementation of the strategy and describes how, when and where U.S. naval forces will contribute to enhancing security, preventing conflict and prevailing in war.

NOC 10 describes the ways with which the sea services will achieve the ends articulated in the Maritime Strategy, signed in October 2007.

"The Naval Operations Concept charts more precisely how our naval forces can and do put into motion our Maritime Strategy," said Adm. Gary Roughead, chief of naval operations. "Free from territorial boundaries, naval forces can responsively maneuver to meet global needs and challenges when and where they happen."

NOC 10 states who the naval forces are, what they believe, where they operate, what they provide the nation, and what capabilities they employ to meet the demands of a complex, evolving security environment. NOC also describes how naval forces use the sea as maneuver space and are employed across the range of military operations.

NOC 10 recognizes that naval forces continuously operate forward—and surge additional forces when necessary—to influence adversaries and project power.

For more information on the Maritime Strategy go to: www.navy.mil/maritime. For more information on NOC 10 go to: www.navy.mil/maritime/noc.

-ends-

[buglerbilly]

Few Surprises in U.S. Naval Operations Concept

By LANCE M. BACON

Published: 25 May 2010 15:26

The U.S. Navy on May 25 released the final version of its Naval Operations Concept, but the document held few surprises and did not discuss how a shrinking Navy can sustain current operations tempo.


In addition to the traditional 3-2-1 carrier construct, the NOC also emphasizes ballistic missile defense and emerging threats common to littoral missions.

The 112-page document, 24 pages of which are pictures and quotes, was penned to explain how maritime forces will provide forward presence, maritime security, humanitarian assistance/disaster response, sea control, power projection and deterrence over the next 10 years, said Rear Adm. David Woods, director of the Strategy and Policy Division. The NOC, which Woods called a "pretty important document of the Navy," also addresses overarching concepts, such as using the sea as maneuver space.

The key, it seems, will be to maintain a flexible fleet, according to the document.

The document, which replaces the 33-page NOC from 2006, reveals the challenges of a Navy in transition. On one hand, it emphasizes the traditional 3-2-1 carrier construct - three forward deployed, two ready to go within 30 days and one ready in 90 days. But the NOC also emphasizes the emerging threats common to littoral and ballistic missile defense missions.

The document intentionally does not provide the number of ships, aircraft and sailors the Navy has and will need to fulfill the various missions. The NOC instead considers the 30-year shipbuilding plan as its guide and looks to tie together and articulate operations, Woods said. As such, its general descriptions fail to address how multiple or complex needs would be met by a shrinking Navy that faces sustained high operational tempos.

"There is nothing we can't accomplish," Woods said. "Really, it is, 'How much can you accomplish?' That is determined by force size and structure."

Woods repeatedly said the forward-looking NOC is a "requirements doctrine" and is not "aspirational." But the doctrine's successful implementation clearly relies on technologies and ships that are not yet a part of the fleet. For example, the littoral combatant ship "will address the most pressing capability and capacity shortfalls in the littoral," the document said. The ship's modular mission packages will provide strike missions, mine countermeasures, surface warfare and undersea warfare missions, replacing many aspects of the current inventory.

"This doesn't describe things we would like to have that are not in development," Woods said. "It does describe the next 10 years, and what we believe the maritime strategy will deliver for the nation."

A previous version of the NOC was nearly complete in the fall of 2008. Woods, who worked on the Navy's Quadrennial Defense Review team, said this document was held until after the QDR to "make sure it aligned with leadership."

[buglerbilly]

An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2011 Shipbuilding Plan

(Source: Congressional Budget Office; issued May 25, 2010)

The Navy is required by law to submit a report to the Congress each year that projects the service’s shipbuilding requirements, procurement plans, inventories, and costs over the coming 30 years. Since 2006, CBO has been performing an independent analysis of the Navy’s latest shipbuilding plan at the request of the Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces of the House Armed Services Committee.

Today CBO released its latest report that summarizes the ship requirements and purchases described in the Navy’s 2011 plan, and estimates their implications for the Navy’s funding needs and ship inventories through 2040.

The Navy’s report—issued in February and covering fiscal years 2011 to 2040—contains some significant changes in its long-term goals for shipbuilding. The new plan appears to increase the required size of the fleet compared with earlier plans, while reducing the number of ships to be purchased—and thus the costs for ship construction—over the next three decades.

Despite those reductions, the total costs of carrying out the 2011 plan would be much higher than the funding levels that the Navy has received in recent years, according to analysis by CBO. Specifically,

-- Language in the 2011 shipbuilding plan and in related briefings by the Navy implies that the service’s requirement for battle force ships (aircraft carriers, submarines, surface combatants, amphibious ships, and some logistics and support ships) now totals 322 or 323—up from 313 in the Navy’s three previous long-term plans. The battle force fleet currently numbers 286 ships.

-- The 2011 plan calls for buying a total of 276 ships over the 2011–2040 period: 198 combat ships and 78 logistics and support ships. That construction plan is insufficient to achieve a 322- or 323-ship fleet. In comparison, the previous shipbuilding plan (for 2009) envisioned buying 40 more combat ships and 20 fewer support ships over 30 years.

-- If the Navy receives the same amount of funding for ship construction in the next 30 years as it has over the past three decades—an average of about $15 billion a year in 2010 dollars—it will not be able to afford the purchases in the 2011 plan.

-- The Navy estimates that the construction of the new ships in the 2011 plan will cost an average of about $16 billion per year. Expenditures for other activities that are typically funded from the Navy’s budget accounts for ship construction—such as refueling nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and outfitting new ships with various small pieces of equipment after the ships have been built or delivered—will add about $2 billion to the Navy’s average annual shipbuilding costs under the 2011 plan, in CBO’s estimation, bringing the average cost to a total of $18 billion per year.

-- Using its own models and assumptions, CBO estimates that the average total cost to implement the Navy’s plan will come to $21 billion per year, about 18 percent higher than the Navy’s estimates overall. That figure masks considerable variation over time, however: CBO’s estimates are 4 percent higher than the Navy’s for the first 10 years of the plan, 13 percent higher for the following decade, and 37 percent higher for the final 10 years of the plan. Those differences result partly from different estimating methods and different assumptions about the design and capabilities of future ships.

The estimates also diverge because CBO accounted for the fact that costs of labor and materials have traditionally grown much faster in the shipbuilding industry than in the economy as a whole, whereas the Navy does not appear to have done so. That difference becomes more pronounced over time.

This study was prepared by Eric Labs of CBO’s National Security Division.

Click here for the full report (34 pages in PDF format) on the CBO website.

http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/115xx/doc11527/05-25-NavyShipbuilding.pdf

-ends-

[buglerbilly]

New U.S. Navy Fleet Unaffordable: CBO

By CHRISTOPHER P. CAVAS

Published: 26 May 2010 17:11

The U.S. Navy's plan to build a new fleet over the next 30 years doesn't provide for enough replacement ships, a study says, and the Navy's planned budget for that time period falls far short of supplying enough money.


The U.S. Navy estimates a cost of $10.6 billion per ship for CVN 78-class aircraft carriers. The Congressional Budget Office estimates $12.4 billion. Above, the first ship in the class, Gerald R. Ford, is represented in a combination model and live s (NORTHROP GRUMMAN)

The Navy envisions buying a total of 276 ships over the next 30 years at an average annual cost of about $16 billion in 2010 dollars for new construction, or about $18 billion for total shipbuilding, which adds in the cost of refueling aircraft carriers. Using a different calculus, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates the cost for new ships at an average $19 billion per year, or $21 billion per year for total shipbuilding.

Eric Labs, who wrote the study, noted in the report that statements in the latest shipbuilding plan and in related briefings by Navy officials point to a planned fleet of 323 ships for most of the next 30 years, up from the long-stated 313-ship goal. But he concludes the construction plan is insufficient to achieve a 323-ship fleet, and that the planned 323-ship fleet is unaffordable if the Navy continues to average about $15 billion per year for shipbuilding.

Overall, CBO estimates the costs of the 2011 shipbuilding plan are about 18 percent higher than the Navy's estimates. But the disparity in estimates is better in the near term, with only a 4 percent differential over the next decade, and grows in future years. CBO's forecasts for the last 10 years of the plan rise to as much as 37 percent higher than the Navy's.

The Navy, for its part, acknowledged in the 2011 plan that the accuracy of cost estimates diminishes in the second decade of the 30-year plan, becoming "notional" in the far term "due to the uncertainty of business conditions affecting the shipbuilding industry."

Among the differences in Navy and CBO cost calculations are:

■ CVN 78-class aircraft carriers. The Navy estimates a cost of $10.6 billion per ship; CBO estimates $12.4 billion.

■ SSBN(X) ballistic missile submarines. Navy: $7.2 billion each; CBO: $8.2 billion each.

■ SSN 774 Virginia-class attach submarines. The Navy and CBO agree at a price of $2.5 billion per sub.

■ SSN 774I Improved Virginia-class: Navy: $2.9 billion. CBO: $3.3 billion.

■ DDG 51-class destroyers, current Flight IIA version. Navy: $1.6 billion each; CBO: $1.8 billion.

■ DDG 51-class destroyers, improved Flight III version. Navy: $2.0 billion each; CBO: $2.4 billion.

■ DDG(X) replacement destroyers. Navy: $2.4 billion each; CBO: $4 billion.

■ Littoral Combat Ships: The Navy and CBO agree at a price of $600 million each; CBO's estimate for future replacement ships rises slightly to $700 million while the Navy's price doesn't change.

■ LSD(X) amphibious dock ships. Navy: $1.3 billion each; CBO: $1.7 billion each.

■ LHA 6/LH(X) amphibious assault ships. Navy: $3.4 billion each; CBO: $4.2 billion.

Labs noted in his report that the cost for Gerald R. Ford, first of the CVN 78 class, could grow even further. He based that on historical precedent for a first-of-class ship; the fact that the Navy told him there is a 60 percent probability the final cost will exceed the service's estimate; and the high number of new and critical technologies that are being developed for the ship, including the as-yet-untried electromagnetic launch system (EMALS) that will replace traditional steam catapults.

CBO also noted that calculating the design, cost and capabilities for the new SSBN(X) submarines "are among the most significant uncertainties in the Navy's and CBO's analyses of future shipbuilding." Among the chief problems are indecision and disagreement as to the size, configuration and requirements of the submarine - an issue now being targeted by the House seapower subcommittee as one for increased scrutiny.

[Zen9]

Pencils have no requirement for batteries, unless your in the dark and need a torch, erasure is not possible with normal magnetic fields, and the chart so marked can be stored for examination at a later date. Assuming the paper is good, such a chart could survive in good storage for some 500 years or more.

There is also the issue that doing things the hard way, by hand, often gives one a more subtle appreciation of the benefits of automation and what processes are going on inside said automation.
Paper and pencil are immediate, lasting, and reliable, which is a key consideration on a military vessel.

[Weasel]

"...

Carrier crews still keep a sextant on the bridge, but there may be only one sailor aboard qualified to use it.

..."

To not have or know how to use a sextant? I can't think of a bigger detriment to "knowing" seamanship. It is tactile, requires skill and eventually some of those who do know it learn an appreciation of the 3D Space we call our Solar System.

I would argue a sextant teaches a person:

Tides
Weather
and greater situational awareness that is difficult to get through just logging hours at sea.


Why Tides and Weather? Because all of that is affected by bodies within our Solar System. If you know where Jupiter is and you know where the moon is, then you can figure out tides, so much more easily and more's the point, pick up something goofy more easily.

cheers

w

[Deks]

You're probably right, though in the days of GPS they'd probably hardly ever actually use it, which no doubt it why noone knows how anymore.

[Weasel]

You're probably right, though in the days of GPS they'd probably hardly ever actually use it, which no doubt it why noone knows how anymore.
lol. I am an old fossil...

did I mention surveying a shoreline?

cheers

w

[buglerbilly]

US Navy Unveils New Naval Operations Concept

May 28, 2010



By Bettina H. Chavanne

The U.S. Navy added one more piece to its operational puzzle today with the unveiling of its Naval Operations Concept 2010 (NOC 10), a defining document meant to support the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), 30-year shipbuilding plan and the three-year-old maritime strategy.

The NOC 2010 explains “how, where and when we would exercise our core competencies” as outlined by the Navy’s 2007 maritime strategy, says Adm. David Woods, director of strategy and policy for the Navy and an author of the document. Woods was also instrumental in building the service’s goals into the recent QDR. This is the first NOC since 2006, and the first time the Coast Guard is a signatory to the document.

The NOC 2010 is precise in form, although slightly vague on detail. The introduction says the document “does not prescribe Naval Service tactics, nor is it doctrine. Rather, it serves as a precursor to the development of both.”

The NOC is not “aspirational,” according to Woods. “It does not describe things we would like to have that are not already in development or in our plan. It does describe what we believe maritime strategy will deliver to the nation.”

Four years ago, the NOC was 33 pages long. This year it is a 115-page treatise with the thesis: Sea as Maneuver Space. “Naval forces continuously operate forward — and surge additional forces when necessary—to influence adversaries and project power.”

Despite Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ recent harsh critique of the Navy’s requirements process, Adm. Woods says he believes the NOC 2010 “fits in very well” with a more streamlined Defense Department. “[Gates] asked us to take a look at the assumptions of what we own or buy and their relevancy,” Woods says. “This isn’t a requirements document … it talks about how we will execute [our goals].” The ships or aircraft with which the Navy will execute those goals is “something else,” he says.

Credit: US Navy

[buglerbilly]

Navy’s Drone Death Ray Takes Out Targets at Sea

By Nathan Hodge May 28, 2010 | 3:15 pm



For years, the U.S. Navy has been pursuing a workable ray gun that could provide a leap ahead in ship self-defenses. Now, with a series of tests of a system called the Laser Weapon System, or LaWS), it may be one step closer to that goal.

Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), the service’s technology development arm, announced today that LaWS had “successfully tracked, engaged, and destroyed” a drone in flight, during an over-the-water engagement at San Nicholas Island, Calif.

It’s certainly not the first time lasers have shot down an unmanned aerial vehicle — last year, the Air Force zapped several drones with beam weapons in a series of tests at China Lake, Calif. — but this test brings an additional bit of realism — and an extra technical challenge. Laser beams can lose strength as they move through the moist, salty sea atmosphere above the sea, so the Navy needs directed-energy weapons that can work effectively on ships.

The LaWS is essentially a laser upgrade to the MK 15 Close In Weapon System (CIWS), a.k.a. the Phalanx gun, a radar-guided autocannon that is already installed on Navy surface combatants. According to NAVSEA, the system tested (shown here) fired a laser through a beam director installed on a tracking mount, which in turn was controlled by a Mk 15 CIWS. That’s the basically same system that controls the Phalanx.

It represents a possible next step for the Phalanx system, which is currently limited by the range of its 20mm autocannon (Raytheon, manufacturer of the Phalanx, is also marketing a missile system to replace the gun). The Phalanx is a last line of defense against sea-skimming anti-ship missiles and hostile aircraft, but the laser wouldn’t replace the gun completely. Theoretically, directed energy weapons would increase the range of the system, but you would still have the gun as a backup if the laser fails to do the job.

LaWS might also have other applications: land-based Phalanx guns have been used to shoot down incoming rockets and mortars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and a laser Phalanx could — theoretically — avoid the problem of the “20mm shower” (unexploded rounds falling back to earth).

And after all, what’s a holiday weekend at Danger Room without news of the latest directed-energy weapon?

[PHOTO: NAVSEA]

[Chunder]

You're probably right, though in the days of GPS they'd probably hardly ever actually use it, which no doubt it why noone knows how anymore.

I remember John Johansen saying that over the Artic Circle he lost Both of his GPS signals (including backup)...

So if he knew bugger all he would have been polar bear meat.

[buglerbilly]

U.S. Navy Budget Still Untenable, CBO Affirms

Jun 1, 2010



By Bettina H. Chavanne

According to the U.S. Congressional Budget Office, Capitol Hill’s nonpartisan scorekeepers, the U.S. Navy Department’s latest long-term shipbuilding outline remains underfunded and incapable of actually growing the naval fleet.

CBO’s assessment follows similar conclusions ever since the Navy first issued its so-called 313-ship plan four years ago, as well as intense scrutiny from Pentagon leadership and general Washington concerns about federal spending and proper budgeting.

In a report publicized May 26, CBO noted the average total cost to implement the Navy’s current 30-year shipbuilding plan will come to $21 billion per year. That is about 18% higher than the Navy’s overall estimates. CBO said it accounted for steeper growth of labor and material costs than the Navy did in its estimates, which helps explain the divergence in figures. CBO’s estimates are 4% higher than the Navy’s in the first 10 years of the Navy’s plan, 13% higher for the next decade and 37% higher in the final third.

CBO also noticed the Navy’s shipbuilding plan “appears to increase the required size of the fleet compared with earlier plans, while reducing the number of ships to be purchased — and thus the costs for ship construction — over the next three decades.” The Navy’s three previous long-term plans specified a 313-ship fleet at its peak, while the 2011 plan totals 322 or 323, according to CBO.

Regardless, Defense Secretary Robert Gates recently called out shipbuilding programs as a lead example of how the armed services must come to better grips over what they really need, and how to provide it. “The Navy and Marine Corps must be willing to re-examine and question basic assumptions in light of evolving technologies, new threats and budget realities,” Gates said in his address to the Navy League’s annual Sea Air Space show May 3. “We simply cannot afford to perpetuate a status quo that heaps more and more expensive technologies onto fewer and fewer platforms.” He questioned whether a Navy that “relies on $3 to $6 billion destroyers, $7 billion submarines and $11 billion carriers” is affordable (Aerospace DAILY, May 4).

Credit: US Navy

[buglerbilly]

Navy: Force Structure Needs More Review

By PHILIP EWING

Published: 2 Jun 2010 12:37

Despite last week's release of what was billed as a major new strategy, the Navy needs another internal review to determine its long-awaited force structure goals, top planning officials said June 2, but its conclusions won't appear in their own separate report.

Capt. Mark Montgomery and Capt. John McLain, both top planners and key authors of the new Naval Operations Concept, said the Navy would determine how many and what kind of ships it needs in the "future war-fighting campaign scenario review" mandated for all the services by another recent planning document: the Quadrennial Defense Review.

Top officials will incorporate the outcome of that review into future budget submissions, said Navy spokesman Lt. Tommy Buck:

"The future war-fighting campaign scenario details required to perform service force structure requirements analysis are still being updated within the Defense Department," he said. "Until this process is complete, it is not possible to establish a definitive Navy force structure requirement. When the war-fighting campaign scenarios are complete, we will begin a new force structure assessment and incorporate the results into the 30-year shipbuilding plan."

Originally, top Navy leaders said the NOC would be what contained details for the ships the Navy needs to execute the maritime strategy it released in 2007, but Montgomery and McLain said in a conference call June 2 that officials decided not to make the NOC a "requirements document."

By comparison, a draft version of the NOC obtained by Navy Times in 2008 did include a section on force structure, which laid down new ideas for how the fleet might work. Examples included the notion of four-ship amphibious ready groups, instead of today's three-ship groups; and new permanent "global fleet stations" which would rely heavily on gators, which, in turn, could require a fleet of as many as 42 amphibs.

Last week's NOC included no such specifics or new ideas.

Instead, the document codifies and re-summarizes familiar Navy concepts such as force projection, maritime security and humanitarian response. McLain said the new NOC was "particularly applicable" to the U.S. response to this year's disaster in Haiti, in that the strategy emphasizes the importance of using all forms of American power - including the State Department, for example, as well as military power. But the Haiti response took place months before the NOC's release on May 25.

[buglerbilly]

DDG 1000 Could Get New Missile-Defense Radar

By CHRISTOPHER P. CAVAS

Published: 2 Jun 2010 18:30

The Pentagon's decisions to eliminate half of a new radar system for the U.S. Navy's DDG 1000 Zumwalt-class destroyers - and delay the first of the ships by a year - are not, as many surmised, a result of cost growth or poor program performance.


Pentagon officials are trying to get a new, more advanced and capable radar into the new DDG 1000 Zumwalt-class destroyers. (Northrop Grumman)

Instead, they are an effort to get a new, even more advanced and capable radar into the new ships.

The new radar is the Air Missile Defense Radar (AMDR), a system currently in the early stages of development. The Navy plans to fit the radar, which will be designed from the start to handle ballistic missile defense, into new Flight III versions of its venerable DDG 51-class destroyer. The first Flight III ship is to be ordered in 2016.

Now, the service seems to be holding a place for the AMDR in its advanced DDG 1000 ships which, ironically, were cut back because the service said the design had too little missile defense capability.

The decision to remove the SPY-4 Volume Search Radar (VSR) from the DDG 1000's dual-band radar (DBR) was announced June 2 by Pentagon acquisition chief Ashton Carter at a news conference to discuss Nunn-McCurdy cost breaches. Carter also announced the ship's service introduction would be delayed from 2015 to 2016.

The DDG 1000 was one of six programs experiencing substantial cost growth or change and, like all six, required the Pentagon to reassert that the program "is essential to the national security."

In the case of the DDG 1000, the Nunn-McCurdy breach was due to the Navy's mid-2008 decision to cut the number of ships in the class from seven to three. Since development and test costs remain the same no matter how many ships are built, the average per-ship cost rose.

Navy leaders said their decision to cut DDG 1000 production and re-start the DDG 51 production line was because priorities had changed. More ballistic missile defense (BMD) was needed, and the Navy chose to continue development of the Lockheed Martin Aegis combat system, carried by the DDG 51s, for sea-based BMD.

The move to put the AMDR on the DDG 1000 would make those ships BMD-capable as well.

"Given that the Navy is engaged in the AMDR competition for the future S-band radar, why spend the money on a three- or four-of-a-kind approach to create these one-offs, when in fact in about the same schedule - with the one-year slip - you can have a fairly good match to whatever comes out of the AMDR program?" an industry source said.

Navy officials were unable late Wednesday to provide details on the DDG 1000 changes.

"We are currently assessing how yesterday's decisions apply to our programs," said Cmdr. Danny Hernandez, a Navy spokesman at the Pentagon.

Testing and development of the DBR will continue, however, according to letters sent by Carter to Congressional leaders to explain each program. Copies of the letters were obtained by Defense News. The letters did not explain the rationale in deleting the VSR from the baseline design of DDG 1000, nor for delaying the ship's service introduction.

The announcements caught a number of Navy and industry officials by surprise. Only last summer, the DDG 1000 program manager expressed satisfaction in the development of the DBR.

"As for the volume search radar, operationally I'm not aware of any [issues] with the EDM," or engineering development model, Capt. Jim Syring said last August. "With the full production system started now at Lockheed, I'm not aware of any VSR issues. It's S-Band, it's well known. Lockheed does a good job with S-band.

"There have been no issues with X-band," Syring said. "We took that EDM to sea and tracked some very classified cruise missiles in terms of difficulty."

Prime contractor for the DBR is Raytheon, which is responsible for the SPY-3 X-band multifunction radar and the controllers that marry the system with Lockheed Martin's SPY-4 S-band volume search radar. The DBR, the industry source said, is still scheduled to be installed on the new aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78), already under construction by Northrop Grumman, and on the as-yet-unnamed CVN 79. No decision has been made on the radar for carriers beyond CVN 79.

Raytheon, along with Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin, is one of three competitors for the AMDR program. All three companies submitted proposals in April, and the Navy is considering its next step - a decision to downselect to one or two competitors or move ahead with all three. An announcement could come as early as September, according to the industry source.

[buglerbilly]

Ares

A Defense Technology Blog

Navy in Rebalancing Stage, Strategist Says

Posted by Paul McLeary at 6/4/2010 11:01 AM CDT



To follow up on the release of the U.S. Navy’s Naval Operations Concept 2010 (NOC) document last week, U.S. Navy Captain Mark Montgomery, branch head for strategic concepts for the Navy, participated in a conference call with reporters to flesh out where the document fits within the Navy’s doctrine hierarchy. He said that in the “strategic continuum of Navy documents,” the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea Power remains the end goal, while the NOC is meant to compliment that document and “to ascribe in more detail how and where we'll operate and what specifically the naval forces provide the nation.”
Montgomery also said that the NOC is part of a larger effort to rebalance the Navy to meet conventional threats, irregular threats, and the complex operating environment presented by enemies that might be able to mix the two. “We don't have the ability to build two navies, a high-end navy and a low-end navy,” he said. “We have to perform our core missions with one navy, and so that navy has to be able to operate across the spectrum of operations.”

Montgomery also said that the Navy “doesn't necessarily think in terms of high-end and low-end. We recognize that that's a comfortable framework. But I think naval strategists see ourselves as applying our capabilities across a spectrum of operations and that those take any number of different forms and that it's our requirement, it's our job to take the capabilities that we possess and apply them in the given context.”

Unmanned systems will play a critical role in this regard, Montgomery said, adding that “you'll see a significant role for the UAS and then UAS’s also contribute to power projection and to a lesser extent to deterrence and humanitarian assistance and disaster response. And all these -- they contribute to all our missions, but particularly in maritime security and in sea control, they are envisioned to play critical roles.”

(Pic: US Navy)

[buglerbilly]

Axing DDG 1000 Radar Could Save Money, Enable BMD

By CHRISTOPHER P. CAVAS

Published: 4 Jun 2010 19:43

The Pentagon's move to delete half the radar system for the U.S. Navy's DDG 1000 Zumwalt-class destroyers could save more than $600 million and may eventually open the door to giving the ships a ballistic missile defense capability, industry sources said.

The decision to eliminate the S-band Volume Search Radar (VSR) from the ship's Dual Band Radar (DBR), announced June 1 as part of a program restructuring brought on by a Nunn-McCurdy breach, means the ship will rely on the Raytheon SPY-3 X-band Multi-Function Radar (MFR) as its primary radar.

The Navy was unwilling to discuss how much money the move will save.

One source said it would be at least $100 million per ship, while an industry source said it would be "at least" $200 million for each of the three planned Zumwalts.

In letters sent to Congress on June 1 to explain the Nunn-McCurdy breaches, DoD acquisition chief Ashton Carter also said the initial operational capability (IOC) for the Zumwalt had been shifted from 2015 to 2016.

One source said the move reflects a "more realistic date" and is more in line with production and contractual realities.

The DDG 1000 was one of six programs whose cost growth required the Pentagon to reassert that the program "is essential to the national security." Its Nunn-McCurdy breach was due to the Navy's mid-2008 decision to cut the number of ships in the class from seven to three. Since development and test costs remain the same regardless how many ships are built, the decision boosted average individual cost per ship.

Navy leaders said changing priorities led them to cut DDG 1000 production and re-start DDG 51 Arleigh Burke-class destroyer production. More ballistic missile defense (BMD) was needed, and the Navy chose to continue development of the Lockheed Martin Aegis combat system, carried by the DDG 51s, for sea-based BMD.

Sources said the decision to eliminate the VSR was "purely a budget decision" and not a reflection of any decision to install BMD capability in the ships.

But an industry source insisted the move meant space, weight and power would be available for the possible future installation of a BMD radar - which could be the Air Missile Defense Radar (AMDR), currently in the early stages of development. The Navy plans to fit that radar, which will be designed from the start to handle ballistic missile defense, into new Flight III versions of its venerable DDG 51-class destroyer. The first Flight III ship is scheduled to be ordered in 2016.

"Given that the Navy is engaged in the AMDR competition for the future S-band radar, why spend the money on a three- or four-of-a-kind approach to create these one-offs, when in fact, in about the same schedule, you can have a fairly good match to whatever comes out of the AMDR program?" the industry source said.

"You could do it," a technical source said. "If Zumwalt were to stay around and take on a BMD mission, it's certainly an option."

Raytheon, Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin bid for the AMDR contract in April, and the Navy is considering whether to downselect to one or two competitors or move ahead with all three. An announcement could come as early as September, according to the industry source.

The same technical source, however, noted that the Navy is requiring the AMDR phased array to fit into the 12-foot hole that currently houses the Aegis system's SPY-1 radar, and the VSR.

Prime contractor for the DBR is Raytheon, which is responsible for the SPY-3 MFR and the controllers that marry the system with the SPY-4 S-band volume search radar, whose arrays are made by Lockheed Martin. Navy officials confirmed the DBR still is to be installed on the new aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78), already under construction by Northrop Grumman, and on the as-yet-unnamed CVN 79. No decision has been made on the radar for carriers beyond CVN 79.

In the case of the carriers, the VSR will replace two large air search radars carried by current ships, and also become the primary air traffic control radar.

The Navy has been testing both radars for some time. The SPY-3 MFR reportedly has exceeded technical expectations and will receive upgrades to give it a better volume search capability.

The VSR encountered "no serious problems," according to an industry source, although its performance "was acceptable but somewhat below expectations." Combined with dramatic cost growth - the radar was originally forecast to come in at about $20 million per ship - "it simply became a cost-benefit tradeoff." The drop in the number of radars that would be built also contributed to the radar's cost growth, the industry source said.

The Navy was apparently caught off guard by the June 1 announcements. Although the service realized by late 2008 that the program would be in breach of Nunn-McCurdy, service officials were unable to respond to media queries following the June 1 Pentagon press briefing.

The service did not respond to repeated requests by Defense News to speak to an informed expert on the subject, and a seven-question press query took three days to process.

[JimWH]

So DDG-1000 is now due to be in the water and working by 2015 or 2016? Surely that's a bit ambitious given that (AFAIK) no steel has been cut? [NB: could be wrong about that]
Meanwhile, in spite of the discussion of a new priority on BMD, the core mission of the DDG-1000 was always NGFS, for which the AGS was the crown jewels. Have there been any serious discussions (i.e. by people paid to think about it, not by internet fanboys) about mounting AGS on any platforms other than DDG-1000?
I'd have thought there was a reasonably good case to be made for mounting a couple aboard a smallish commercial hull as what amounted to a monitor. DDG-1000 is designed to be a survivable LO asset in contested waters... but most US amphibious operations happen in the context of an already permissive environment (i.e. the CSG have already wiped out all obvious resistance, and there are plenty of Aegis ships in company to keep it that way whilst the 'phibs go in). Given that the development cost have already/will be payed for, it seems a shame to only get 6 of them to sea (aboard 3 ships) given how effective they'll be, and therefore I'd imagine that a case for a low cost, low manned single mission NGFS ship would be relatively compelling.

[buglerbilly]

Navy Shifts to Multi-Missions



By Greg Grant Wednesday, June 9th, 2010 2:20 am

Welcome to the new normal: climate change, energy shortages, burgeoning populations, food and water scarcity, natural disasters and disease. And where exactly does this Hobbesian brew of globalization’s dark side occur? Most frequently in the world’s littoral waterways, also known as the “fragile maritime neighborhoods,” according to a briefing by Rear Adm. Philip .H. Greene, director of the Navy’s irregular warfare office.

The good news, at least for the Navy, is that mounting troubles in the littorals represent a “growth marketplace,” and the services’ relevance is “growing exponentially,” says Greene’s brief, given at a conference on irregular warfare last month. The Navy is uniquely suited to provide “persistent engagement” in those trouble spots so that they don’t devolve into catastrophic failed states.

Greene says a new focus on the “brown” and “green” waters will require a shift to more “multi-mission” ships and forces. As the Navy’s newly released Naval Operations Concept 2010 (NOC) puts it, the service is “rebalancing” to better confront irregular threats, placing (slightly) more emphasis on brown water riverine operations, foreign training missions and maritime constabulary activities (counter-smuggling, piracy, etc.).

The Navy’s operational experience in irregular warfare is growing, Greene says. He points to the significant lessons learned from the accelerated deployment of the Littoral Combat Ships (LCS); the Fire Scout drone; the value of multi-missions ships such as the Vinson, Higgins and Bainbridge; the Africa Partnership Station; and ferried support to the Haiti relief efforts that will help shape requirements for the Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSV).

Going forward, the general guidance from OSD is for the Navy to expand security force assistance, improve general purpose and special operations forces integration and increase the number of aerial drones and other sensors.

The Navy is making investment decisions to comply, Greene says, both in last year’s budget, the 2011 request and as the Navy builds its 2012 budget request that will include more helicopters for special operations forces, LCS mission modules and module enhancements, more JHSVs, more sea based mid-ranged aerial drones such as the MQ-8 Fire Scout and the Hummingbird technology demonstrator and tactical sea based drones; and more money for civil affairs type training.

Additional naval irregular warfare priority areas in future budgets include: data fusion for distributed small scale forces; better interoperability with other U.S. government and coalition partners; support for more P-8A Poseidon surveillance aircraft; more helicopters (MH-60S/R); the Scan Eagle drone: and improving the amphibious force structure’s ability to support irregular operations.

Read more: http://www.dodbuzz.com/2010/06/09/navy-shifts-to-multi-missions/#ixzz0qMqagu4M

[buglerbilly]

U.S. Navy's Lean Manning Backlash

Report: Fewer Sailors Erode Readiness, Cut Ship Life

By PHILIP EWING

Published: 21 June 2010

An independent probe into the state of the U.S. Navy's surface force has found widespread, systemic dysfunction in its manning, readiness and training, and repudiates much of the service's high-level decision-making in the last decade.

The report - commissioned by Adm. John Harvey, the Fleet Forces commander, and produced by a seven-member panel led by retired Vice Adm. Phillip Balisle that included two serving rear admirals - warns that unless the Navy mends its ways, it will continue to see surface ships condemned in inspections and sail unready to fight.

Although sailors and Navy observers have pointed before to many of the problems and trends that Balisle's "fleet review panel" uncovered, the report provides the clearest, most detailed look yet at how a preoccupation with saving money drove the surface Navy to a low point.

"It appears the effort to derive efficiencies has overtaken our culture of effectiveness," the Balisle report says. "The material readiness of the surface force is well below acceptable levels to support reliable, sustained operations at sea and preserve ships to their full service life expectancy. Moreover, the present readiness trends are down."

How did it happen? Driven by top-level pressure to be as efficient as possible, Navy leaders in the early 2000s made a series of interrelated decisions to cut sailors, reform training, "streamline" fleet maintenance and take other steps in keeping with the philosophy then en vogue of "running the Navy like a business."

The fleet organized itself into layers of "enterprises," which thickened already legendary layers of military bureaucracy and made command relationships difficult to understand, the panel found.

At the time, every commander assumed what his colleagues were doing would make up for what he was doing in his own area: For example, as the fleets reduced the number of people aboard ships, they expected incoming sailors to be so well prepared by the simultaneous "revolution in training" that every young new expert could take the place of many previous journeymen. As it happened, the "revolution" trained sailors by computer, and many of them arrived at their first ships never having touched the equipment they were to operate. Ships began to fall into bad shape.

Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead said that the move to "optimal manning" made practical sense earlier this decade, but "changes to the structure ashore, changes in some of the oversight functions" have come to hurt ships' ability to train, do maintenance and fight.

Between 1994 and 1999, about 3.5 percent of ships failed inspections by the Board of Inspection and Survey, Balisle's commission found. From 2005 to 2009, almost 14 percent of ships failed. Not only does this hurt the fleet of today, it means the Navy can't keep around the ships it says are vital to building its hoped-for fleet of at least 313.

"Independent reports indicate that if the surface force stays on the course that it is presently on, DDGs will achieve 25-27 years of service life instead of the 30 years planned and 40 years of extended service life desired," the report says.

Even the highest-profile and most vital system aboard the Navy's front-line warships - Aegis - fails much more often than panel members expected; technical problems with cruisers' and destroyers' SPY-1 radars have gone up by 45 percent since 2004, the report said. But because of smaller crews, poor training and the complicated bureaucracy of getting repairs or replacement parts, many ships sail while "consciously accepting degradation."

"Technicians can't get the money to buy spare parts," according to the report. "They haven't been trained to the requirement. They can't go to their supervisor because, in the case of the [destroyers], they likely are the supervisor. They can't repair the radar through no fault of their own, but over time, the non-responsiveness of the Navy system, the acceptance of the SPY degradation by the Navy system and their seniors, officers and chiefs alike, will breed (if not already) a culture that tolerates poor system performance…. Sailors are losing their sense of ownership of their equipment and are more apt to want others to fix it."

The panel found other examples of how it says the fleet tolerates mediocrity, including low levels of technical skill: "[I]t appears that a significant portion of the surface force is lacking in [personal qualifications], and this in turn suggests that many of our ships' leaders are at worst not dedicated to training their sailors, or, more likely, simply are more tolerant of non-completion. Recent incident reports wherein non-qualified watch standers made critical errors tend to provide further confirmation."

These trends, combined with a longstanding surface culture to "get underway at all costs," put ships in danger because they set sail even if they're not ready, the report said.

Although it doesn't mention incidents by name, the report's description gibes with several high-profile mishaps, including the 2009 grounding of the cruiser Port Royal off Honolulu and a March buoy strike by the destroyer The Sullivans off Bahrain. Inexperienced watch-standers and broken equipment helped contribute to both those accidents, each of which resulted in the firing of the ship's commanding officer.

Balisle, now a top executive with DRS Technologies, headed the Naval Sea Systems Command until his retirement in 2005. He declined to comment on his report through a spokesman.

Capt. Cate Mueller, a spokeswoman for Fleet Forces Command, said Balisle's report didn't tell the Navy anything it didn't already know.

"Fleet leaders, based upon their own prior analysis, believed that many of the problems that the panel subsequently identified - including manning shortfalls, inadequate shipboard and shore maintenance, and insufficient training - were taking a toll on surface force readiness," she said. "In that regard, the fleet review panel confirmed, in context and in detail, what fleet leaders had suspected."

She also reaffirmed what senior Navy leaders have hinted for the past few months: They're swinging the pendulum in the other direction by looking to increase crew sizes, improve training and re-teach the fleet to maintain its ships and equipment.

But Mueller would not comment on specific recommendations in Balisle's report, including precise numbers for how many sailors the panel thinks the Navy needs: 4,496 new sea billets and 2,028 shore and maintenance billets, for a total of 6,524 new billets. Those numbers are based on an overall recommendation that surface ships be automatically manned at 110 percent over their base level, to account for the roughly 8 percent effective loss of crew the committee discovered across the board.

Mueller would only concede that "it's safe to say that the intent is to shift billets from shore to sea ... except those being shifted into shore maintenance billets from other shore billets."

The Balisle report also recommends fleet commanders impose "red lines" below which ships can't fall and still get underway. For example, a ship just emerging from a long period in the yard would need to be certified by Naval Surface Forces to ensure it had qualified sailors and working equipment to be able to operate safely.

Port Royal went to sea on the first day after a four-month yard period, but its commanding officer wasn't qualified and much of its critical navigation gear wasn't working. Moreover, the ship's watch-standers weren't confident about where exactly it was, all of which contributed to the ship getting stuck on a coral reef for four days just off Honolulu Airport, heavily damaging the Aegis cruiser. ■

E-mail: pewing@militarytimes.com.

[buglerbilly]

Talking Naval Strategy in Newport



The Naval War College held its 61st annual strategy forum earlier this month at Newport R.I. and videos of the various speeches and presentations can be found here on the NWC web site.

http://www.usnwc.edu/events/csf/CSF2010Video.aspx

Some quick hits from the keynote addresses:

Speaking to the faithful, CNO Adm. Gary Roughead extolled the importance of the Navy to the free flow of commerce across the world’s oceans, including the flow of information via undersea cables and fiber optics: “the internet swims with the fishes.” He also stressed the commitment of the Navy to the current fight as shown by the numbers: 14,000 sailors are on the ground in Central Command versus 10,000 at sea.

Pointing out the obvious, Roughead said the Navy faces serious financial challenges. The fleet actually shrank during the run up in defense spending that began in 2001 (and is now tapering off); it’s the smallest it’s been since 1960. Yet, the demand signal from the COCOMs continues to increase; they recognize forward presence is key to influencing friends and intimidating potential enemies.

He worries about a declining shipbuilding budget while China is in the midst of a naval buildup. He did say the two navies were working together and cooperating at sea (China is due to take command of counter-piracy TF 151).

The issue of rising costs of just about everything in the face of declining budgets dominated much of Navy Secretary and newly named Gulf Coast disaster manager Ray Mabus’ presentation. There are no sacred cows, he said, everything is on the table and open to cuts (I take that to include carrier strike groups).

A formal gate review will be conducted for every major weapons program that will gauge cost vs. capability. On time and on budget must be the standard; where that standard isn’t met, the program will be cancelled or restructured. Mabus vowed to provide industry stable designs and stable intentions. In return, the Navy expects platform costs to come down with each year of production. He also said to expect more fixed price contracts.

Read more: http://defensetech.org/2010/06/21/talking-naval-strategy-in-newport/#more-7779#ixzz0rWza4Ts0
Defense.org

[buglerbilly]

CNO to the Navy: The Shipwreck Is Coming

(Source: Lexington Institute; issued June 22, 2010)

What can you say to a military service that is faced with a shrinking force structure, increased demand for its services, growing threats and declining budgets? How about get ready for a train wreck; or in the case of the U.S. Navy, a shipwreck.

In a speech on June 8 at the Naval War College, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Gary Roughead, made it clear to his audience -- and one would hope the entire Navy -- that they are confronted by a potential disaster of titanic proportions. Simply put, the mismatch between the nation’s willingness to invest in national security, on the one hand, and the demands it makes on the military, on the other, is reaching a crisis point. With a lackluster economy and deficits of a trillion dollars or more projected out at least a decade, it is becoming clear to everyone that defense spending is going to decline sharply. No reasonable observer can really believe the administration’s promise to hold defense spending essentially flat. Cuts are coming.

What makes this situation particularly dangerous for the Navy is that it is ill-prepared to weather such a downturn. According to the CNO, the Navy has little fat left to cut. The size of the Navy actually shrank over the past decade, even as the defense budget soared. The Fleet is the smallest it has been since 1916, its personnel and operating costs continue to rise and the industrial base that supports the Navy has shrunk to a handful of companies and shipyards. Yet, the demands on the Navy continue to grow.

The last great power to experience such a situation, Great Britain in 1972, was forced to abandon its forward deployments and security commitments to half the globe. Then the U.S. Navy was able to take up the slack. Today, there is no one.

It is ironic that the Navy should be in such a position just at the time when in many ways it is more powerful and capable than ever before. Yes, the Navy has shrunk in size. However, in the absence of a blue water threat and deploying an array of modern platforms and weapons systems, it can exercise near total command of the sea. The modern nuclear carrier will soon deploy an extraordinarily powerful air wing consisting of F/A-18 E/F and F-35 strike aircraft, the state-of-the-art E-2D Advanced Hawkeye and the new F-18G Growler electronic warfare platform.

Carrier-launched unmanned aerial vehicles will soon join this array. New surface combatants including the DDG1000, advanced DDG51s and the Littoral Combat Ship with its modular mission packages will provide unparalleled capabilities in surface warfare, mine countermeasures, ASW and anti-aircraft/missile defense. Naval missile defenses based on the Aegis radar and the Standard Missile 3 are so good that the administration plans to expand its deployment to at least 38 surface combatants and to make it the centerpiece of a new land-based theater missile defense system. Then there is the fleet of nuclear submarines, in particular the Virginia class with its innovations in sonar arrays, photonic masts, enlarged launch tubes and power plant.

There have been various proposals for how to hold back the tide and make the maximum use of the Navy as a declining asset. So far, the strategies proposed -- just muddle through, focus on key centers of national interest or hubs, withdraw from forward deployments in favor of surging the Fleet on demand or create a two-tier Navy -- are backward looking. Each reflects an approach to the international order in which the United States and its military are at the center of the global security system.

Perhaps it is time that this assumption is challenged. Otherwise, the Navy is facing a shipwreck.

Click here for the text of Roughhead’s speech (Word format), on the US Navy website.

http://www.news.navy.mil/navydata/people/cno/Roughead/Speech/100608%20Current%20Strategy%20Forum%20FINAL.doc

-ends-

[buglerbilly]

Cutesy video on the future of Forcible Entry from the Sea aka the USMC its "support service" the USN..............:punch

Interesting for the emphasis given to EFV, Osprey, F-35 and HSV...........Curious for the "hints" at future capability that are not necessarily in programs already, e.g. dual, tandem-seat Tiltrotor Gunship, Quad Tiltrotor Heavylift (part of the current heavylift program), and a TAK-R-type vessel with Amphib-type Docking Area in the stern............

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m2eWjFOlKyI

[buglerbilly]

Navy: Widespread faults caused LPD 17 woes

By Philip Ewing - Staff writer

Posted : Thursday Jul 1, 2010 15:28:28 EDT

Endemic government and contractor failures — including shoddy workmanship and bad quality control — caused the engineering problems aboard the fleet’s San Antonio-class amphibious ships, according to a new Navy report, and, in the case of San Antonio itself, the $7.5 million repairs it needs might prevent it from making a deployment in the near future.

“Inadequate government oversight during the construction process failed to prevent or identify as a problem the lack of cleanliness and quality assurance that resulted in contamination of closed systems,” said the Navy report, released Thursday. “Material challenges with this ship and other ships of the class continue to negatively impact fleet operations. Failures in the acquisition process, maintenance, training and execution of shipboard programs all share in the responsibility for these engineering casualties.”

Another example is that San Antonio was “designed to be manned and operated presuming that all automated control and monitoring systems were properly operating,” the report said. But with its technical systems “not functioning as designed, the ship was unable to effectively operate and maintain the engineering plant.”

The document is the product of a Navy investigation into what caused engine damage aboard the class-leading amphibious transport dock San Antonio, a warship that has struggled ever since taking shape at Northrop Grumman’s shipyard in Avondale, La.

In January, the Navy announced the latest round of problems — the lube oil systems aboard San Antonio and its siblings were contaminated and damaging their main engines, so Navy engineers needed to sideline them for inspections and repairs. Several of the ships were quickly remedied, but San Antonio and the fifth ship, New York, got the worst of it.

Although New York has at least been able to get underway using three of its four main diesel engines, San Antonio is laid up in a Norfolk, Va. dry dock until August or September. Engineers not only are repairing its lube oil systems, they’re attempting a first-of-its kind repair job on a bent crankshaft, cutting their way through the ship’s decks to get to its machinery spaces.

Adm. John Harvey, head of Fleet Forces Command, charged Rear Adm. Michelle Howard earlier this year with finding out how it all happened. A redacted version of her report, dated May 20, was released Thursday.

Margaret Mitchell-Jones, a spokeswoman for Northrop Grumman, issued a written statement:

“The report’s findings support many of the findings from the industry/Navy technical team investigation into the bearing damage on the LPD main propulsion diesel engines this spring, resulting in a corrective action plan with recommended actions which are already in process. Northrop Grumman has aggressively prosecuted the issues and we are focused on corrective actions and moving forward.”

Rear Adm. Dave Thomas, commander of Naval Surface Force Atlantic, told reporters it was too early to tell how San Antonio’s repairs would affect deployments for the rest of the fleet. He also said engineers were using the lessons of San Antonio to make repairs to the lube oil systems in the rest of the ships in the class.

Thomas deferred questions about the report’s recommendation for “a bottom up, top down review of [the Supervisor of Shipbuilding’s] Gulf Coast quality control process,” to Naval Sea Systems Command. A spokeswoman for NAVSEA had no response Thursday.

[buglerbilly]

U.S. Missiles Deployed Near China Send a Message

By Mark Thompson / Washington Thursday, Jul. 08, 2010


The U.S.S. Ohio, a guided-missile submarine, moors at a harbor in Pusan, South Korea, on Feb. 21, 2008

Choi Jae-Ho / AFP / Getty Images

If China's satellites and spies were working properly, there would have been a flood of unsettling intelligence flowing into the Beijing headquarters of the Chinese navy last week. A new class of U.S. superweapon had suddenly surfaced nearby. It was an Ohio-class submarine, which for decades carried only nuclear missiles targeted against the Soviet Union, and then Russia. But this one was different: for nearly three years, the U.S. Navy has been dispatching modified "boomers" to who knows where (they do travel underwater, after all). Four of the 18 ballistic-missile subs no longer carry nuclear-tipped Trident missiles. Instead, they hold up to 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles each, capable of hitting anything within 1,000 miles with non-nuclear warheads.

Their capability makes watching these particular submarines especially interesting. The 14 Trident-carrying subs are useful in the unlikely event of a nuclear Armageddon, and Russia remains their prime target. But the Tomahawk-outfitted quartet carries a weapon that the U.S. military has used repeatedly against targets in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Iraq and Sudan.

That's why alarm bells would have sounded in Beijing on June 28 when the Tomahawk-laden 560-ft. U.S.S. Ohio popped up in the Philippines' Subic Bay. More alarms were likely sounded when the U.S.S. Michigan arrived in Pusan, South Korea, on the same day. And the Klaxons would have maxed out as the U.S.S. Florida surfaced, also on the same day, at the joint U.S.-British naval base on Diego Garcia, a flyspeck of an island in the Indian Ocean. In all, the Chinese military awoke to find as many as 462 new Tomahawks deployed by the U.S. in its neighborhood. "There's been a decision to bolster our forces in the Pacific," says Bonnie Glaser, a China expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. "There is no doubt that China will stand up and take notice."

U.S. officials deny that any message is being directed at Beijing, saying the Tomahawk triple play was a coincidence. But they did make sure that news of the deployments appeared in the Hong Kong–based South China Morning Post — on July 4, no less. The Chinese took notice quietly. "At present, common aspirations of countries in the Asian and Pacific regions are seeking for peace, stability and regional security," Wang Baodong, spokesman for the Chinese embassy in Washington, said on Wednesday. "We hope the relevant U.S. military activities will serve for the regional peace, stability and security, and not the contrary."

Last month, the Navy announced that all four of the Tomahawk-carrying subs were operationally deployed away from their home ports for the first time. Each vessel packs "the firepower of multiple surface ships," says Captain Tracy Howard of Submarine Squadron 16 in Kings Bay, Ga., and can "respond to diverse threats on short notice."

The move forms part of a policy by the U.S. government to shift firepower from the Atlantic to the Pacific theater, which Washington sees as the military focus of the 21st century. Reduced tensions since the end of the Cold War have seen the U.S. scale back its deployment of nuclear weapons, allowing the Navy to reduce its Trident fleet from 18 to 14. (Why 14 subs, as well as bombers and land-based missiles carrying nuclear weapons, are still required to deal with the Russian threat is a topic for another day.)

Sure, the Navy could have retired the four additional subs and saved the Pentagon some money, but that's not how bureaucracies operate. Instead, it spent about $4 billion replacing the Tridents with Tomahawks and making room for 60 special-ops troops to live aboard each sub and operate stealthily around the globe. "We're there for weeks, we have the situational awareness of being there, of being part of the environment," Navy Rear Admiral Mark Kenny explained after the first Tomahawk-carrying former Trident sub set sail in 2008. "We can detect, classify and locate targets and, if need be, hit them from the same platform."

The submarines aren't the only new potential issue of concern for the Chinese. Two major military exercises involving the U.S. and its allies in the region are now under way. More than three dozen naval ships and subs began participating in the "Rim of the Pacific" war games off Hawaii on Wednesday. Some 20,000 personnel from 14 nations are involved in the biennial exercise, which includes missile drills and the sinking of three abandoned vessels playing the role of enemy ships. Nations joining the U.S. in what is billed as the world's largest-ever naval war game are Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, France, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Peru, Singapore and Thailand. Closer to China, CARAT 2010 — for Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training — just got under way off Singapore. The operation involves 17,000 personnel and 73 ships from the U.S., Singapore, Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand.

China is absent from both exercises, and that's no oversight. Many nations in the eastern Pacific, including Australia, Japan, Indonesia, South Korea and Vietnam, have been encouraging the U.S. to push back against what they see as China's increasingly aggressive actions in the South China Sea. And the U.S. military remains concerned over China's growing missile force — now more than 1,000 — near the Taiwan Strait. The Tomahawks' arrival "is part of a larger effort to bolster our capabilities in the region," Glaser says. "It sends a signal that nobody should rule out our determination to be the balancer in the region that many countries there want us to be." No doubt Beijing got the signal.

Read more: http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2002378,00.html?xid=rss-topstories#ixzz0t9ZBo6OF

[buglerbilly]

Navy Balances Wants And Needs

Jul 13, 2010



By Bettina H. Chavanne
Washington

It must come from the sea,” said the chief of naval operations, Adm. Gary Roughead, recently about any new U.S. Navy procurement, leaving open to interpretation the programs and projects that will be included in coming budgets.

The Navy is “reimagining naval power,” he said. “With cyber-power and unmanned systems we must ask ourselves fundamental questions.” If new capabilities proposed for procurement do not “come from the sea,” Roughead is not interested.

The Navy no longer has the luxury of being interested in every new program or platform. The defense budget is getting slimmer. And pressure is coming from above to trim programs deemed unnecessary or inefficient.

“The Navy and Marine Corps must reexamine and question basic assumptions in light of evolving technologies, threats and budget realities,” Defense Secretary Robert Gates told an audience at the Navy’s Sea-Air-Space symposium here. “We cannot afford to perpetuate a status quo that heaps more expensive technologies onto fewer platforms.” He questioned whether a Navy that “relies on $3-6-billion destroyers, $7-billion submarines and $11-billion carriers” is affordable.

“The biggest question is what are we going to afford?” Roughead said. “There is no way we can spend our way out of this challenge. We have to think our way out.” This is not a local problem, it is a global issue, he added. Every country faces cutbacks, and partnerships among nations may prove one way to maintain a strong maritime presence without having to spend more money.

The fundamental need for power projection will not change, Roughead noted, although the global financial climate will. “In the U.S. we must juxtapose the realities of a compressed defense budget against the growing demand for military, and especially naval, power,” he said.

Roughead said “it is time to act,” and cited programs the Navy has trimmed or truncated. “We canceled two littoral combat ships because of excessive cost,” he said. “We’ve canceled missile programs because we were not getting the return on investment we would like.” He also noted the streamlining of departments within the Navy, a new focus on managing manpower, ownership and energy costs, and more solid budget plans.

But will it be enough? And will the cuts leave the Navy with gaps in capability? Gates thinks not. Referring to the Navy’s plan to have 11 carrier strike groups through 2040, Gates acknowledged, “The need to project power across the ocean will never go away . . . but consider the massive overmatch the U.S. already enjoys. Do we really need 11 carrier strike groups for another 30 years when no other country has more than one?”

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) issued its assessment in May that the Navy’s latest shipbuilding plan is not executable as written—it is underfunded and incapable of growing the fleet.

In a report publicized May 26, CBO noted the average total cost to implement the Navy’s current 30-year shipbuilding plan will come to $21 billion per year. That is about 18% higher than the Navy’s overall estimates. CBO said it accounted for steeper growth of labor and material costs than the Navy did in its estimates, which helps explain the divergence in figures. CBO’s estimates are 4% higher than the Navy’s in the first 10 years of the Navy plan, 13% higher for the next decade and 37% higher in the final 10 years.

CBO also noticed the Navy’s shipbuilding plan “appears to increase the required size of the fleet compared with earlier plans, while reducing the number of ships to be purchased—and thus the costs for ship construction—over the next three decades.” The Navy’s three previous long-term plans specified a 313-ship fleet at its peak, while the 2011 plan totals 322 or 323, according to CBO.

But Roughead stands behind the numerous plans and strategies that have emerged in recent months. “We are committed to our 2007 Maritime Strategy,” as well as to the National Security Strategy, the Navy’s future as laid out in the Quadrennial Defense Review and the latest Navy Operations Concept, he said. The service hopes to achieve its strategic goals despite financial problems with the fleet it has now. And Roughead believes the key to success lies in building strong bilateral relationships.

“The U.S. Navy does not need to do everything, nor do we want to,” he said. “Global challenges require global response.”

Credit: Northrop Grumman

[Milne Bay]

U.S. Missiles Deployed Near China Send a Message



Their capability makes watching these particular submarines especially interesting. The 14 Trident-carrying subs are useful in the unlikely event of a nuclear Armageddon, and Russia remains their prime target. But the Tomahawk-outfitted quartet carries a weapon that the U.S. military has used repeatedly against targets in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Iraq and Sudan.

That's why alarm bells would have sounded in Beijing on June 28 when the Tomahawk-laden 560-ft. U.S.S. Ohio popped up in the Philippines' Subic Bay. More alarms were likely sounded when the U.S.S. Michigan arrived in Pusan, South Korea, on the same day. And the Klaxons would have maxed out as the U.S.S. Florida surfaced, also on the same day, at the joint U.S.-British naval base on Diego Garcia, a flyspeck of an island in the Indian Ocean. In all, the Chinese military awoke to find as many as 462 new Tomahawks deployed by the U.S. in its neighborhood. "There's been a decision to bolster our forces in the Pacific," says Bonnie Glaser, a China expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. "There is no doubt that China will stand up and take notice."

U.S. officials deny that any message is being directed at Beijing, saying the Tomahawk triple play was a coincidence. But they did make sure that news of the deployments appeared in the Hong Kong–based South China Morning Post — on July 4, no less. The Chinese took notice quietly. "At present, common aspirations of countries in the Asian and Pacific regions are seeking for peace, stability and regional security," Wang Baodong, spokesman for the Chinese embassy in Washington, said on Wednesday. "We hope the relevant U.S. military activities will serve for the regional peace, stability and security, and not the contrary."

Last month, the Navy announced that all four of the Tomahawk-carrying subs were operationally deployed away from their home ports for the first time. Each vessel packs "the firepower of multiple surface ships," says Captain Tracy Howard of Submarine Squadron 16 in Kings Bay, Ga., and can "respond to diverse threats on short notice."

The move forms part of a policy by the U.S. government to shift firepower from the Atlantic to the Pacific theater, which Washington sees as the military focus of the 21st century. Reduced tensions since the end of the Cold War have seen the U.S. scale back its deployment of nuclear weapons, allowing the Navy to reduce its Trident fleet from 18 to 14. (Why 14 subs, as well as bombers and land-based missiles carrying nuclear weapons, are still required to deal with the Russian threat is a topic for another day.)

Sure, the Navy could have retired the four additional subs and saved the Pentagon some money, but that's not how bureaucracies operate. Instead, it spent about $4 billion replacing the Tridents with Tomahawks and making room for 60 special-ops troops to live aboard each sub and operate stealthily around the globe. "We're there for weeks, we have the situational awareness of being there, of being part of the environment," Navy Rear Admiral Mark Kenny explained after the first Tomahawk-carrying former Trident sub set sail in 2008. "We can detect, classify and locate targets and, if need be, hit them from the same platform."


China is absent from both exercises, and that's no oversight. Many nations in the eastern Pacific, including Australia, Japan, Indonesia, South Korea and Vietnam, have been encouraging the U.S. to push back against what they see as China's increasingly aggressive actions in the South China Sea. And the U.S. military remains concerned over China's growing missile force — now more than 1,000 — near the Taiwan Strait. The Tomahawks' arrival "is part of a larger effort to bolster our capabilities in the region," Glaser says. "It sends a signal that nobody should rule out our determination to be the balancer in the region that many countries there want us to be." No doubt Beijing got the signal.

Read more: http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2002378,00.html?xid=rss-topstories#ixzz0t9ZBo6OF

Co-incidence my foot. All appear on the 4th July, the same day that China was to carry out ballistic ASM tests aimed at taking out aircraft carriers.
The Chinese choice of July 4 for these tests was quite deliberate, as was the US Navy response.
The games have well and truly begun.
MB

[buglerbilly]

Ares

A Defense Technology Blog

No more sonobuoy launcher for MH-60R?

Posted by Bettina Chavanne at 7/21/2010 7:37 AM CDT

This morning at the Farnborough Air Show, U.S. Navy program manager for H-60, Capt. Dean Peters, talked about issues facing the MH-60R, or Romeo, helicopter's sonobuoy launcher.

Peters said the aircraft's Airborne Low Frequency Sonar (ALFS) worked so well during last year's deployment of the aircraft there "was not much need for the [sonobuoy] launcher." The potential exists, he says, to "take out the sonobuoy launcher," and launch fewer buoys using a different type of launch system. The goal is reduce the amount of cabin space taken up by the launcher.

"We have to rethink anti-submarine warfare now that we have ALFS," says Peters. ALFS provides so much range that it might be wise to have another helicopter prosecute the mission and "have the sonar remain in the dip."

It is a stretch to say this is the end of sonobuoys altogether, Peters notes, "but there is a way to reduce. We're evaluating other options to free up space and reduce cost."

[buglerbilly]

Ares

A Defense Technology Blog

"It must come from the sea," Top U.S. Admiral Says

Posted by Paul McLeary at 7/22/2010 7:17 AM CDT


(On the bridge of the new Littoral Combat Ship USS Independence. Photo: Paul McLeary)

Back in May, the Congressional Budget Office published a report which noted that if the U.S. Navy were to fulfill it’s current 30-year shipbuilding plan, the average total cost to implement it would come to $21 billion per year.

That’s about 18 percent higher than the Navy’s overall estimates of what it will need to carry out the plan. Oops!

The CBO said the numbers it came up with were higher because it accounted for steeper growth of labor and material costs than the Navy did in its estimates, while noting that the Navy’s shipbuilding plan “appears to increase the required size of the fleet compared with earlier plans, while reducing the number of ships to be purchased—and thus the costs for ship construction—over the next three decades.”

In the July/August issue of DTI, Bettina Chavanne crunches all of these numbers while flagging some cryptic comments made by the chief of naval operations, Adm. Gary Roughead, who said earlier this spring that any solution the Navy comes up with for its future needs “must come from the sea.”

Well, sure. Bettina allows Roughead to elaborate:


“The biggest question is what are we going to afford?” Roughead said. “There is no way we can spend our way out of this challenge. We have to think our way out.” This is not a local problem, it is a global issue, he added. Every country faces cutbacks, and partnerships among nations may prove one way to maintain a strong maritime presence without having to spend more money.

[Milne Bay]

Missouri Arrives At Submarine Base New London


(Source: U.S Navy; issued July 23, 2010)



GROTON, Conn. --- The nation's newest and most-advanced nuclear-powered attack submarine, Pre-Commissioning Unit (PCU) Missouri (SSN 780), arrived at Naval Submarine Base New London July 22 in preparation for commissioning.

Missouri completed sea trials earlier and a material readiness inspection by the Navy's Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) team. INSURV is a survey team established by Congress to assess Navy surface ships, aircraft carriers and submarines and ensure they are properly equipped for prompt, reliable and sustained mission readiness at sea.

"Today really marks the first day where the sub starts to become part of that fleet, which will culminate with the commissioning," said Capt. Michael Bernacchi, commodore of Submarine Squadron 4, which will be Missouri's home squadron. "The crew has done an unbelievable job over the past five months, just a tremendous amount of work getting the ship ready. They are clearly ahead of the game, and we're very excited to have them here at sub base and part of squadron four."

Cmdr. Timothy Rexrode, the commanding officer of Missouri, is looking forward to the ship's commissioning July 31.

"This really is the biggest honor I've had in my professional career," said Rexrode. "I'm proud to bear the name Missouri and to get out to the fleet and work for the Navy and the nation."

There are five Missouri natives among the submarine's crew. They are Electronics Technician 1st Class John M. Tyhurst, a Joplin native; Sonar Technician Seaman Benjamin A. Bowers, a Green Ridge native; Lt. Patrick Donovan, a Springfield native; Machinist's Mate 2nd Class Nicholas C. Koblick, a St. Louis native; and, Fire Control Technician 2nd Class Ryan J. Thruston, a Jefferson City native.

Construction on Missouri began in December 2004; the submarine's keel was authenticated during a ceremony on Sept. 27, 2008 at the Electric Boat facility in North Kingstown, R.I.; and, she was christened during a late morning ceremony at Electric Boat on Dec. 5, 2009.

Another milestone occurred on April 16 during "In Service Day," when crew members moved aboard the submarine, bringing her systems to life, beginning general day-to-day operations and preparing for sea-trials, work-ups and commissioning.

Rexrode leads a crew of about 134 officers and enlisted personnel. A native of Spencer, W.Va., Rexrode graduated with honors in 1990 from West Virginia University, receiving a Bachelor of Science degree in Aerospace Engineering. In addition, Rexrode is a distinguished graduate of the United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College, holding as Master's in Military Studies. He also received a Master's of Arts degree in Administration from Central Michigan University.

Wife of U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, Becky, christen the vessel at the ceremony last December. Her initials were welded into a plaque inside the boat during the keel laying ceremony and serves as the submarine's sponsor.

Missouri is the fifth Navy ship to be named in honor of the people of the "Show Me State." The last USS Missouri, the legendary battleship, was the site where Fleet Adm. Chester Nimitz, Gen. Douglas MacArthur, and many other U.S. and Allied officers accepted the unconditional surrender of the Japanese at the end of World War II on Sept. 2, 1945.

Missouri is built to excel in anti-submarine warfare; anti-ship warfare; strike warfare; special operations; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; irregular warfare; and mine warfare missions. Adept at operating in both the world's shallow littoral regions and deep waters, Missouri will directly enable five of the six Navy maritime strategy core capabilities - sea control, power projection, forward presence, maritime security, and deterrence.

The 7,800-ton submarine Missouri is being built under a teaming arrangement between General Dynamics Electric Boat and Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding-Newport News. At 377-feet long, Missouri is slightly longer than a football field. She has a 34-foot beam, will be able to dive to depths greater than 800 feet and will operate at speeds in excess of 25 knots submerged. Missouri is designed with a nuclear reactor plant that will not require refueling during the planned life of the ship, reducing lifecycle costs and increasing underway time.

The USS Missouri Commissioning Committee, an IRS-designated 501(c)3 nonprofit charity, was created to increase awareness of the submarine's commissioning. The Commissioning Committee offers information about the development of the submarine, as well as history on former Navy ships named for the "Show Me State."

[buglerbilly]

BAE Systems to Modernize Destroyers Under U.S. Navy Ship Repair Contract

(Source: BAE Systems, Inc.; issued July 27, 2010)



BAE Systems has won a contract worth up to $500 million to modernize 11 US Navy Arleigh Burke-class (DDG 51) destroyers. (US Navy photo)NORFOLK, Va. --- BAE Systems, Inc., a leading U.S. non-nuclear ship repair, modernization, and conversion company, will modernize 11 Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) class guided missile destroyers under a contract with the U.S. Navy with a potential value of $365 million. This work, along with the recent acquisition of Atlantic Marine, reflects BAE Systems' efforts to support new-era requirements of customers for the readiness and sustainment of equipment and systems.

The company received the multi-ship, multi-option drydock contract to service ships home-ported or visiting the Norfolk area.

The company will start executing the contract in August when it begins planning, modernization, maintenance, and repair work on the flagship of the class, the USS Arleigh Burke. The contract consists of an initial one-year award plus four option years. If all of the options are exercised, the total value of the engagement could reach between $350 million and $500 million.

“This contract, coupled with those for CG 47-class and amphibious ships in Norfolk, San Diego, and Hawaii, reinforces BAE Systems’ robust, trusted partnership with the Navy,” said Bill Clifford, president of BAE Systems’ Ship Repair business. “We already will be well into the DDG modernization process on the USS John Paul Jones (DDG 53) in San Diego when the USS Arleigh Burke comes into Norfolk for the same work. This will allow us to leverage our experience in San Diego to provide an enhanced final product to the Navy,” Clifford said.

Having executed 21 Chief of Naval Operations availabilities on DDG 51-class ships since 2006, BAE Systems Norfolk Ship Repair has more than 1.5 million man-hours of experience in DDG maintenance and repair. The company has also made significant investments in facilities and process improvements.

BAE Systems Ship Repair is a leading non-nuclear ship repair, modernization, and conversion company, focusing on drydock and ship repair services for the U.S. Navy, other defense agencies, and commercial customers. It has major operations in Norfolk, San Diego, San Francisco, and Hawaii, and it recently added operations in Mayport and Jacksonville, Florida; Moss Point, Mississippi; and Mobile, Alabama through the acquisition of Atlantic Marine.

BAE Systems is a global defense, security and aerospace company with approximately 107,000 employees worldwide. The Company delivers a full range of products and services for air, land and naval forces, as well as advanced electronics, security, information technology solutions and customer support services. In 2009 BAE Systems reported sales of £22.4 billion (US $36.2 billion).

-ends-

[buglerbilly]

E-2D Advanced Hawkeye Delivered to Norfolk Naval Station

Story Number: NNS100729-29 Release Date: 7/29/2010 4:53:00 PM

By Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Matthew Bookwalter, Navy Public Affairs Support Element, East

NORFOLK, Va. (NNS) -- The E-2D Advanced Hawkeye, the Navy's newest airborne early warning and control aircraft, was delivered to the fleet July 29 at Naval Station Norfolk.

Adm. Gary Roughead, chief of naval operations, accepted the Hawkeye on behalf of the Navy during a ceremony held on Chambers Field.

"It's going to be a game changer with information dominance for the U.S. Navy," Roughead said.

The Advanced Hawkeye, while not significantly changing the mission of early warning and control, will enable the aircraft to perform its mission with greater improvements. The new aircraft will be able to scan a larger area, detect smaller objects, process information faster. The aircrews will be able to accomplish these tasks through improved all glass cockpits and tactical operators stations.

"While the Advanced Hawkeye may look familiar, on the inside it is a totally new aircraft," said Gary Ervin, president of Northrop Grumman's Aerospace Systems Sector. "The systems represent a multi-generational leap in technology."

The advanced Hawkeye will go to Airborne Early Warning Squadron (VAW) 120, the "Greyhawks," first. They are the Navy's Fleet Replacement Squadron and will train pilots and Navy flight officers to fly and operate the new systems before assignment to an operational fleet squadron.

"Now it is up to Cmdr. Watkins and the 700 professionals of VAW 120 to push this aircraft to the limit and unlock its great potential," said Ervin. "The work they do will set up for a seamless transition to the fleet."

Like its predecessors, the E-2D is designed to last for many decades. Space has been left for advancement as new technology emerges.

"For longer than I have been in the Navy, the fleet has relied on the Hawkeye," said Vice Adm. Allen Myers, commander Naval Air Forces Pacific. "It's the first to launch and the last to recover on the flight deck, and has earned the reputation as the ears and eyes of the fleet."

[buglerbilly]

US Navy's readiness deficit blamed on excessive cost-cutting

By Sam LaGrone

05 August 2010

Over-zealous cost-cutting efforts within the US Navy's manning and training budgets, dating back 20 years, have been blamed for a decrease in the service's operational readiness.

Combat system failures in surface combatants are giving officials particular cause for concern, with 50 per cent of Ticonderoga-class cruisers in one study receiving unsatisfactory Aegis readiness ratings.

Lean manning practices and reliance on automated systems were also identified as contributory factors in the engine failures that have blighted the procurement of San Antonio-class landing platform dock ships.

Both issues were acknowledged by the head of US Fleet Forces Command, Admiral John C Harvey Jr, when he addressed Congressional representatives on 28 July. He told the House Armed Service Committee's subcommittees on readiness and seapower and expeditionary forces that a senior navy panel had examined Board of Inspection and Survey reports for eight cruisers and found that four of them had received unsatisfactory Aegis scores.

The panel, led by retired Vice Admiral Phillip M Balisle, attributed the failures to a lack of qualified personnel on board and the service's byzantine system for requisitioning spare parts. "These trends ... were 20 years in the making and will not go away overnight," Adm Harvey told the legislators.

201 of 407 words
Copyright © IHS (Global) Limited, 2010

[buglerbilly]

Naval Analyst Ron O’Rourke Releases Updated Shipbuilding Assessment



The Congressional Research Service’s excellent and prolific naval analyst Ron O’Rourke is out with an updated report today looking at the Navy’s shipbuilding plan; the report also looks at a number of the proposed alternatives to the Navy’s plan including the Independent Panel Assessment of the 2010 QDR (which I derided).

As O’Rourke points out, the Navy’s FY2011 budget keeps the goal of a 313 ship battle fleet. Yet, the service’s 30 year shipbuilding plan includes 276 ships and does not reach the 313 ship goal. Additionally, the Navy estimates its 30 year plan requires an average of $16 billion per year; a recent Congressional Budget Office analysis of the plan puts the figure closer to $19 billion. CBO says:


“If the Navy receives the same amount of funding for ship construction in the next 30 years as it has over the past three decades—an average of about $15 billion a year in 2010 dollars—it will not be able to afford all of the purchases in the 2011 plan.”

Other question marks stand out. O’Rourke asks whether Defense Secretary Robert Gates endorses the 313 ship plan as the 2010 QDR doesn’t establish specific force level requirements. Also, the Navy says it is undertaking a force structure assessment that might produce a new battle fleet goal. Additionally, O’Rourke asks whether the demand signal for ballistic missile defense ships in Europe and elsewhere is adequately met by a force of 88 Aegis equipped cruisers and destroyers.

O’Rourke notes that in its recommendations for a larger, 346 ship Navy, the QDR Independent Panel Assessment cited the 1993 Bottom-Up Review (see Table C-1). While O’Rourke doesn’t comment specifically on the panel’s recommendations, he adds Gates’ comments on the panel’s report from an August 11 letter to Congress:


“I completely agree with the Panel that a strong navy is essential; however, I disagree with the Panel’s recommendation that DoD should establish the 1993 Bottom Up Review’s (BUR’s) fleet of 346 ships as the objective target. That number was a simple projection of the then-planned size of [the] Navy in FY 1999, not a reflection of 21st century, steady-state requirements.

The fleet described in the 2010 QDR report, with its overall target of 313 to 323 ships, has roughly the same number of aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered attack submarines, surface combatants, mine warfare vessels, and amphibious ships as the larger BUR fleet. The main difference between the two fleets is in the numbers of combat logistics, mobile logistics, and support ships. Although it is true that the 2010 fleet includes fewer of these ships, they are all now more efficiently manned and operated by the Military Sealift Command and meet all of DoD’s requirements….”

– Greg Grant

Read more: http://defensetech.org/2010/08/17/naval-analyst-ron-o%e2%80%99rourke-releases-updated-shipbuilding-assessment/#more-8713#ixzz0wueFIKgp
Defense.org

[buglerbilly]

U.S. Navy Leverages DDG-51 Work

Aug 19, 2010



By Michael Fabey

As the U.S. Navy took delivery last month of the DDG 107 guided missile destroyer, the service continued to leverage its long-term shipbuilding experience with the DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class program to drive down costs and incrementally increase capability.

Shipbuilder Northrop Grumman was able to deliver the destroyer with fewer sea trial issues despite having to revamp its yard in Pascagoula, Miss., after Hurricane Katrina, and having to put the ship through its final paces in the wake of the Gulf oil disaster.

The ship represents a transition for the Navy and the DDG-51 program, which is enjoying a resurrection as a key part of the Pentagon’s missile defense strategy and is now being put through a series of redesigns.

Mature design

“The DDG-51 Flight III will be based on the mature DDG-51 Flight IIA design, of which the Navy has 29 operating at sea today,” Navy Lt. Callie Ferrari says.

“These new ships will share parts and training in common with DDG-51 Flight IIAs, and will leverage the infrastructure of today’s fleet. With an evolutionary approach to delivering enhanced capabilities, the Navy will achieve a reduction in risk and a shorter fielding timeline.”

At the same time, the Navy is making sure it keeps a lid on costs. “The Navy is scrutinizing every aspect of the DDG-51 Combat System to reduce the program support cost to acquire the system,” Ferrari says.

“The Navy is procuring many of the same systems for DDG 113 and follow-on ships that will be installed on DDG 51-78 in their modernization availabilities.”

“The Flight III DDG-51 would leverage many years of prior production of DDG-51s,” the Congressional Research Service notes in a recent report.

Some examples of the same-system procurement, Ferrari says, include the machinery control system and common display consoles. Where possible, procurements for DDG-51, Aegis modernization, and other Aegis-related work are being combined to increase quantity, thereby reducing cost.

“The Navy is leveraging competition for major subsystems to keep costs down,” Ferrari says.

For example, the Navy conducted a full and open competition for the main reduction gears on DDG 113 and follow-on ships.

Moving forward

One driving concern is pushing the Navy to go full steam ahead with its expanded DDG-51 program. “The rapid proliferation and complexity of ballistic and anti-ship missile threats are the primary drivers for the restart of the DDG-51 Flight IIA line and follow-on development of DDG-51 Flight III,” Ferrari says.

The future DDG-51 Flight III will be a multi-mission destroyer with unparalleled capabilities in ballistic missile defense and anti-air warfare, Ferrari says.

The ships will be tailored for integrated air and missile defense. Additionally, incorporation of the AN/SQQ-89A(V)15 anti-submarine warfare (ASW) combat system will provide advanced ASW capabilities, Ferrari says.

The key, according to defense analyst Loren Thompson of the Lexington Institute, is the integrated Aegis Combat System and its ability to provide a maritime missile defense shield. “The Aegis Combat System has become the centerpiece of the Obama administration’s missile defense plan,” he says.

Photo: US Navy

[buglerbilly]

New ICBM Killer Could Grow Beyond Aegis

Aug 20, 2010



By Amy Butler

HUNTSVILLE, Ala. — Though the U.S. Missile Defense Agency wants its future SM-3 IIB ICBM-killer to be “compliant” with the Aegis system, the weapon could expand beyond the confines of the Aegis MK41 vertical launcher.

MDA is now in the early stages of planning for a procurement of its new interceptor, which is dubbed SM-3 IIB to emphasize the need to integrate with existing SM-3 systems. But it is not assumed that SM-3 manufacturer Raytheon will necessarily win the contract to do this work.

The goal with this program is to field an ICBM killer that builds as much as possible off of existing sensor and fire control architectures; in essence, MDA hopes to avoid a new stovepipe and integrate the system into today’s design, says MDA Director Army Lt. Gen. Patrick O’Reilly. The objective is a system that is “compliant” with the Aegis ship-based sensor and fire control; Aegis employs the SM-3 Block 1A, he says.

However, David Burns from MDA’s Advanced Technology Directorate says the IIB need not comply with the confines of the MK41 vertical launch system now placed in the eight-pack configuration on Aegis destroyers. Instead, bidders can simply design a new launch module as long as it fits into the MK41 module’s footprint; the result could be a launch system with fewer interceptors, each of which is larger in diameter and length. This would allow the missiles to go farther and faster to make a kill.

The MK41 limits the diameter of a solid-rocket motor to about 21 in. Another launch system, the MK57, for example, would allow for a booster about 27 in. in diameter.

MDA money will flow to three contractors for risk reduction work on component technologies, including the kill vehicle (a smaller system could provide more velocity at booster separation), divert-and-attitude-control and sensor systems, O’Reilly says.

A winner is expected in 2013, with fielding slated for late 2020.

Photo credit: DOD

[buglerbilly]

The End of U.S. Maritime Dominance? Not So Fast Argues Naval Strategist



In a new research paper I came across, Geoffrey Till, a top-notch historian and naval strategist, looks at the notion that this is shaping up to be China’s century, not America’s, and that the maritime decline of the U.S. is a foregone conclusion. He contends that predicting the rise and fall of great power maritime dominance is a bit trickier and harder to measure than many claim.

The debate itself is being driven by economics, of course; China’s GDP witnessed an astonishing 10-fold increase between 1978 and 2004. A “highly effective” government stimulus program and massive credit expansion meant China recovered quickly from the financial crisis; the U.S. has not. In 2000, U.S. GDP was eight times larger than China’s; now it’s only four times larger. “Historically, growth in GDP has a high correlation with naval expenditure,” writes Till.

The other major driver is China’s “growing and absolute dependence on overseas commodities, energy and markets.” That fact alone means China “has little choice but to become more maritime in its orientation.” Some of China’s naval modernization can be seen as making up for decades of neglect.

What about the naval balance? While the Navy’s planned expansion to 313 ships may never happen, its current level of 280 ships seems overwhelming, says Till. Numbers of ships don’t tell the whole story. Borrowing from Bob Work’s analysis, Till cites tonnage as a better indicator of fleet strength as “the offensive and defensive power of an individual unit is usually a function of size.”

Tonnage wise, the U.S. battle fleet has a 2.63:1 advantage over a combined Chinese-Russian fleet. Factoring in the advantage the U.S. Navy possesses in its vertical launch magazines (actual strike power) an enormous 20-power superiority exists. That’s not all:


“Its 56 SSN/SSGN nuclear power submarine fleet might on the face of it seem overpowered by the world’s other 220 SSNs and SSKs but the qualitative advantages of the U.S. submarine force are huge. It is much the same story with regard to the U.S. Navy’s amphibious and critical support fleets, in its capacity to support special forces operations, in its broad area maritime surveillance capabilities, in its U.S. Coast Guard (the equivalent of many of the world’s navies) and in the enormous advantage conferred by the experience of many decades of 24/7 oceanic operations.”

The real strength of a navy should be measured not by the number of units, Till argues, but how those compare to the requirements the platform is intended to perform.

Till also questions Chinese shipbuilding prowess, noting deficiencies in quality assurance, innovation and experience expected in “an industry in the first flush of youth.” While China’s manufacturing success is impressive, it remains mostly labor-intensive, low priced consumer items. It remains far behind Germany and Japan in technological innovation and the export of machinery.

– Greg Grant

Read more: http://defensetech.org/2010/09/02/the-end-of-u-s-maritime-dominance-not-so-fast/#more-8870#ixzz0yQMawnmc
Defense.org

[buglerbilly]

Ares

A Defense Technology Blog

Shrinking Budgets and the Future of Joint Naval Ops

Posted by Paul McLeary at 9/2/2010 1:07 PM CDT

In the interest of providing a little more perspective on what the recent postponement of the Littoral Combat Ship downselect and what frequent criticisms of the program might mean for the future of the U.S. Naval force as a whole, you have to look at some of the figures--numbers of ships, yearly shipbuilding goals, etc.--that the Navy is projecting in its five and thirty-year shipbuilding plans.

A great analysis of the many budgetary factors the Navy must consider as it moves forward with the LCS program was published in the latest issue of the Naval War College Review. Ronald O’Rourke writes that while trying to hammer out a schedule to begin the big build of the expected 55 LCS hulls it wants, the Navy must first grapple with its FY 2011–FY 2015 shipbuilding plan that calls for fifty ships of various classes to be built -- an average of ten per year. O’Rourke charges that this does not “necessarily mean that the service has solved its long-term challenge of shipbuilding affordability.”

The Navy was able to fund this fifty-ship plan in part because twenty-five of those ships—half the total —are relatively inexpensive LCSs and JHSVs [Joint High Speed Vessel]. Since LCSs and JHSVs are to account eventually for about 25 percent of the Navy’s planned 313-ship fleet, they are temporarily overrepresented in the Navy’s shipbuilding plan.

O’Rourke crunches the numbers and finds that over the lifespan of the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan, even if its shipbuilding requests are met, the Navy is currently projecting that it will face “significant shortfalls” in the numbers of attack submarines and cruisers/destroyers--even as the sustainment costs rise significantly. What’s more, after FY15 when the Navy builds less LCS and JHSV’s, it will start building a planned twelve replacement ballistic-missile submarines, which at $6-7 billion a pop, is equivalent to almost half of the service’s annual budget for new ship construction. In other words, something is going to have to give.

There are a host of things that the Navy and the Pentagon can do, of course, to try and rectify this growing budgetary problem, including increasing the Navy’s budget in real terms; identifying more cost-cutting measures; extending the service lives of ships in the current fleet; relying more on less-expensive unmanned platforms; and of course, make a concerted effort to train local coast guards and navies around the world to take more of a role in patrolling off their own coasts, lessening the burden on the U.S. fleets.

A few of these options, we all know, just aren’t going to happen. Given the constrained economic environment the United States--and the rest of the world--currently faces (England and France are sharing aircraft carriers!) defense budgets are only going to tighten. Add to that the fact that we have a Secretary of Defense who projects his intentions by asking a roomful of naval officers “whether the nation can really afford a Navy that relies on $3 [billion] to $6 billion destroyers, $7 billion submarines and $11 billion carriers,” and the budget question is effectively settled.

So, what to do? One of the options mentioned above--partnering with and training allies to share some of the maritime security mission--is a task that many in the Navy see as essential to ensuring the continued flow of goods across vital sea lanes that feed the “just-in-time” economic model that today’s industrialized nations operate under.

In the same issue the Naval Review, Admiral James Stavridis, head of the US European Command, and Lt. Cdr. Richard E. LeBron, explicitly call for more naval partnerships across the globe to help protect sea lanes. They single out NATO’s Operation OCEAN SHIELD, the EU’s Operation ATALANTA, and Combined Task Force 151—all supporting international efforts to combat piracy off the Horn of Africa—as excellent examples of successful collaborative, international, efforts at sea security. While the numbers of ships involved in each operation might be relatively small, “even more valuable would be increased inputs from overhead satellites and greater deployment of maritime patrol aircraft and long-range surveillance assets.” The U.S. Navy, of course, has started to push hard in the unmanned arena, as have the Europeans, as my colleague Andy Nativi reported yesterday.

When it comes to partnership, the U.S. Navy has been running its Africa Partnership Stations for several years now, where it trains local coast guards and naval forces in best practices for securing their own coastlines, but Stavridis and LeBron point to several NATO program that are bolstering “close cooperation and exchange of information related to antipiracy efforts between various players within NATO and between NATO, the EU, the UN, the African Union, and the Arab League,” and call for commercial ships to be added to this network for increased situational awareness on the high seas, since there are more commercial ships than military vessels operating at any given time.

Sticking with the theme of partnership and how it lessens the ultimate load that the U.S. Navy must bear around the globe is a piece by Coast Guard Cmdr. Sean Schenk in the Sept. issue of Proceedings. Highlighting U.S.-sponsored regional training centers, Schenk complains that the multiple, well-intentioned Navy and Coast Guard training, exercise, and equipment transfer programs to partner nations “are often compromised by insufficient follow-though,” and that plans “rarely look past the day” equipment arrives or an exercise winds up, and “comprehensive needs assessments for countries and regions are either lacking or not coordinated among government agencies.”

Sounds familiar, no?

Schenk’s solution is much the same as the one Stavridis and LeBron proposed: partner with regional and international organizations to assist in these missions. He points to several successful training programs in Malta and Kenya as evidence that with the proper guidance, funding, and long-term vision, local forces can provide some level of safety along their own coasts. While this alone won’t solve the Navy’s budgetary headaches, it is a vision for the future that more and more naval officers seem to be embracing.

[buglerbilly]

Feds: Man Sold Inferior Metal for Subs

September 08, 2010

Philadelphia Daily News

A Fairless Hills man and his company were charged yesterday in a scheme to bilk Uncle Sam by selling inferior metal to a U.S. Navy subcontractor that was helping to build submarines.

James R. Bullick, 42, and his company, Bristol Alloys, Inc., were charged by criminal information, a process in federal court that generally indicates the defendant intends to plead guilty.

Defense attorney Michael Diamondstein said Bullick and his company had cooperated with investigators and would continue to do so. "[Bullick] will do whatever he can to rectify this situation," Diamonstein said.

The charging document said Bullick and Bristol were in the business of selling metal to various customers, including a Navy subcontractor, Garvey Precision Machines, Inc., which supplied parts used to build Virginia Class submarines. (Garvey, of Willingboro, N.J., was not implicated in any wrongdoing.)

The alleged scheme occurred from at least 2004 until October 2009 and cost the government more than $1 million, the charging document said.

Authorities said the metal parts had to meet certain Navy specifications and requirements, including that the defendants document compliance with heat-treating requirements of the metals, which were used for the submarines' hulls.

The charging document said that Bullick and Bristol created phony heating-test certifications, which had been "falsely altered" to reflect heat treatments. Authorities said no such heat treating ever occurred.

If convicted of the single count of major fraud against the U.S., Bullick, who was president and half owner of Bristol, could face 37 to 46 months behind bars under advisory sentencing guidelines. Bristol, which is now defunct, could be fined as much as $5 million.

© Copyright 2010 Philadelphia Daily News. All rights reserved.

[buglerbilly]

Virginia Class Subs Pass Critical Test

September 11, 2010

The Day, New London, Conn.

The Navy can continue to order Virginia-class submarines from Electric Boat now that the program has passed a series of extensive tests.

Electric Boat, with the Northrop Grumman Newport News shipyard in Virginia, began building the fast-attack submarines in 1998. But they could only construct the first 14 of the 30-member class before the program would have to prove its worth.

The 14th submarine will be authorized in fiscal 2012.

During the past year and a half, the crew on the first ship of the class, USS Virginia (SSN 774), has operated at sea in a variety of situations with representatives from military testing agencies on board. Most of the testing was done on the Virginia but some of the other early Virginia-class submarines participated as well.

"Really the only thing we don't test is the warhead of the torpedo," said Capt. Michael Jabaley, the Navy's Virginia-class program manager.

Some tweaks were made to improve certain systems as a result of the testing but "nothing significant," Jabaley added.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics signed a memorandum on Sept. 3 stating that the Virginia-class program passed this evaluation, what is known as achieving "Milestone III." The memorandum also authorized construction through the remainder of the class.

EB President John P. Casey said it was "reassuring that the Department of Defense found it appropriate to approve this milestone.

"This was anticipated but it is an important and necessary part of the DOD acquisition process, essential to the continued success of the Virginia program," he said Friday.

Navy officials signed a $14 billion contract with Electric Boat in December 2008, committing the service to buy the next eight Virginia-class submarines -- one ship per year in 2009 and 2010 and two ships per year from 2011 through 2013.

The contract for the next group of submarines should be awarded to Electric Boat by the end of 2013, a five-year deal for nine submarines, Jabaley said. The Navy's shipbuilding plan calls for purchasing two submarines annually from 2014 through 2017 but only one submarine in 2018.

The reduction in 2018 is "budget driven," Jabaley said.

"Obviously building two per year is more cost effective than one per year but if the money is not there for that 10th ship, then you just can't do it," he said. "That is a goal of ours over the next three years before the contract is awarded, to work within the Navy to try to figure out if we can get additional funding and add that 10th ship back in."

The shipbuilding budget will be under pressure with the introduction of a new class of submarines, the Navy's next generation of ballistic-missile submarines that will replace the current fleet of Ohio-class, or Trident, boats.

The design and production of the Ohio replacement program will stretch into the second half of the 21st century. EB is working on the design.

Jabaley said the argument for a 10th Virginia-class submarine in the next contract is bolstered by the fact that EB continues to deliver the ships ahead of schedule and under budget.

The seventh ship of the class, USS Missouri (SSN 780), was commissioned at the Naval Submarine Base in July, nine months ahead of schedule. There are five additional submarines under construction and six more under contract.

© Copyright 2010 The Day, New London, Conn.. All rights reserved.

[buglerbilly]

SEPTEMBER 20, 2010.

Navy Moves to Save Northrop Grumman Yard

By NATHAN HODGE

WASHINGTON—The U.S. Navy moved to increase the viability of shipbuilding at Northrop Grumman Corp.'s Avondale, La., shipyard, accelerating plans to buy oil tankers and announcing spending on training in the region.

In an unusual move, the Navy announced that it would move up construction of a new class of double-hulled oil tankers to 2014, three years earlier than planned. That proposal could provide new work for Avondale, which has lacked for new orders after 2013, when the yard is scheduled to deliver the second of two amphibious transport ships under construction. The Navy hasn't put an estimated price on the new tankers.


Bloomberg News
Northrop announced in the summer that it would wind down ship construction at the Avondale. La., facility in 2013, a blow to the Gulf region.

Northrop announced this summer that it would wind down ship construction at the Avondale facility in 2013 and move some work to a shipyard in Pascagoula, Miss.

The Navy, meanwhile, wants to ensure that its two amphibious transports, the LPD-23 and LPD-25, are completed at Avondale and that Louisiana's shipbuilding industry remains viable.

"There are challenges in completing the last two ships in a shipyard in the aftermath of making an announcement that you're going to close the shipyard," Sean Stackley, assistant secretary of the Navy for research, development and acquisition, said Friday. "Those challenges cannot be understated."

Randy Belote, a Northrop spokesman, said the company's decision to consolidate its Gulf Coast shipbuilding was "driven by a strategic business approach to reduce our industrial footprint to be more in line with the Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan." The Navy previously had no ship orders available for Avondale after 2013.

Northrop's announcement about Avondale was a blow to the Gulf Coast region, which was still struggling in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina five years ago and this year's Gulf oil spill. The Avondale yard is the largest industrial employer in Louisiana, directly employing around 5,000 workers.

Ron Ault, president of the Metal Trades Department of the AFL-CIO, said in a prepared statement that the Navy's new oil-tanker plan "buys us some breathing space to keep Avondale open beyond Northrop Grumman's scheduled shutdown date."

Northrop, which is based in Los Angeles, is weighing a complete exit from the shipbuilding business, which includes the Pascagoula yard and another major facility, in Newport News, Va.

The Navy, however, wants to maintain competition in the shipbuilding industry. "Having an industrial base that can keep the costs down is critically important to us," said Cmdr. Victor Chen, a Navy spokesman.

In addition to the accelerated proposal to buy the oil tankers, the Navy said it would fund $10 million toward apprentice training and $6 million for infrastructure improvements at other facilities in the Gulf region.

Friday's moves also underscored the Defense Department's concerns about the ownership of Northrop's Newport News, Va., shipyard, the sole U.S. designer and builder of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and one of only two U.S. companies capable of designing and building nuclear-powered submarines.

[buglerbilly]

Navy Finalizes Plans for Guam Buildup

September 21, 2010

Stars and Stripes|by Travis J. Tritten

SASEBO NAVAL BASE, Japan -- The U.S. Navy firmed up plans Tuesday for a military buildup on Guam that could lead to a historic shift in military forces in the Pacific.

The Navy's record of decision finalizes where facilities will be built for 8,600 Marines scheduled to move from Okinawa by 2014 and identifies the planned pace of the massive construction effort, according to a brief released by the Department of Defense Joint Guam Program Office.

But the Navy delayed decisions on controversial plans to build military training ranges on Guam's ancestral land and to dredge coral in Guam's main harbor for an aircraft carrier berth, according to the brief.

The full report on the buildup was not available immediately after it was signed by Assistant Secretary of the Navy Jackie Pfannenstiel early Tuesday. The joint program office said it would post the full document online by Wednesday.

The start of construction will depend on funding, upcoming decisions from a new military-civilian panel, and further reviews of ancestral land and harbor dredging proposals, said Gen. David Bice, executive director of the joint program office.

"We don't anticipate any construction activity until the first of next year," Bice said in a Tuesday phone interview from his office on Guam.

Utilities funding from the Japanese government is critical, he said.

The United States is in talks with Japan and the Japanese Bank of International Cooperation over the country's $740 million contribution for wastewater, power and water upgrades on Guam.

Japan agreed in 2006 to fund the upgrades as part of the shift of Marines from Okinawa.Improvements to Guam's underdeveloped utilities are needed before construction crews and servicemembers can begin arriving on the island.

A piece of the Japan funding will pay to tap wells on military land and connect the supplies to Guam public water utilities, Bice said.

"We need to have the funding for the water," he said. "We need that pretty quick, by next year."

Before the end of the year, the government of Guam, the U.S. military and federal agencies will also form a coordinating council, which will help guide construction and solve concerns over the influx of workers on the island, he said.

The governor of Guam, who first proposed the idea, will appoint members to the council, Bice said.

Meanwhile, a federal historic preservation review will determine the fate of Guam's Pagat land, an area with remnants of pre-colonial Chamorro culture.

The land is listed on the National Register of Historic Places but is a preferred site for Marine Corps training ranges.

Pfannenstiel delayed the decision on using Pagat for training until the end of a review required by the National Historic Preservation Act, Bice said.

The Navy will also study the health and quality of coral in Apra Harbor after public concern over planned dredging for the carrier berth, he said.

Plans call for aircraft carriers to make port stops, but there will be no carrier home-ported on Guam.

"We have agreed to defer a decision on a specific site, even though Polaris Point is the preferred site," Bice said.

The civilian-military panel will help to ease concerns over the pace of the buildup but it is still likely the military will use the Pagat land for training ranges and dredge the harbor despite the delays, said Guam Sen. Judith Guthertz, chair of the legislature's Committee on the Guam Military Buildup and Homeland Security.

"My approach now is to work with this and move forward and negotiate some things that benefit our community," Guthertz said.

Guam Congresswoman Madeleine Z. Bordallo issued a statement saying she is encouraged by the record of decision but concerns remain over "critical" issues such as the training range and dredging.

She again urged the military to locate the ranges on the nearby island of Tinian, an option that Bice said has been ruled out.

[buglerbilly]

Navy pilots under scrutiny for dip into Lake Tahoe

By Jeanette Steele

Originally published September 23, 2010 at 4:19 p.m., updated September 23, 2010 at 6:58 p.m.


YouTube video of Navy helicopters over Lake Tahoe.

Comment on the original video is worth printing................. "It looks like a couple of Navy or Coast Guard helicopters practicing a deep swell water rescue. They dunked both choppers into the water. Amazing bit of flying."

Two Navy helicopters from North Island Naval Air Station were damaged, and their pilots are now grounded, after some bizarre flying over Lake Tahoe last week.

A Navy spokesman confirmed Thursday that a video posted on YouTube is genuine footage of two MH-60 Romeo helicopters from North Island’s Helicopter Maritime Strike 41 squadron.

The video shows the $33 million helicopters flying low over the lake. One seems to lose control, spinning and crashing into the water. The pilot then regains control and pulls the craft back into the air.

The Navy wouldn’t identify the pilots or say whether the helicopters were supposed to be hovering over Lake Tahoe, only saying that the entire Sept. 13 flight is under investigation.

The pilots are not flying until the Navy wraps up an aviation mishap board investigation, said Lt. Aaron Kakiel, spokesman for the Naval Air Forces command at North Island.

Lake Tahoe is not a normal training area for Navy pilots, he said.

The pilots could face administrative action — and even lose their flying qualifications — depending on the outcome of the investigation.

Though the YouTube video only catches one crashing, both helicopters hit the water because they didn’t have sufficient power to hold their hovering positions, Kakiel said.

The damage suffered by the two aircraft is estimated at between $50,000 and $500,000. They had to land at Lake Tahoe Airport to be repaired.

Watching the video made retired Navy jet pilot Steve Diamond think the helicopter crew may have had a legitimate reason to be hovering over Lake Tahoe.

Somebody out hotdogging probably wouldn’t do it in view of another aircrew, or over a popular tourist destination, said Diamond, who retired in 2002.

“Somebody has to be a total moron to do it in total view of tourists and in a recreational area, when everyone has a camera these days. We don’t really have morons flying naval aircraft,” he said.

“It’s possible they were troubleshooting a problem; you don’t know,” Diamond said. “It’s easy to make a snap judgment, but there are other possibilities.”

A different set of pilots flew the aircraft home, Kakiel said. HSM-41, which trains new pilots, dispatched another crew on a commercial flight to fly the helicopters back Sept. 16.

The MH-60 Romeo is the Navy’s newest helicopter and is considered state of the art. Its usual missions take it over the open ocean for anti-ship and anti-submarine warfare.

The MH-60s were flying home from Mather Air Force Base near Sacramento where they had taken part in an air show. Needing to refuel, the pilots were headed to Lemoore Naval Air Station when the incident happened.

A typical crew for the MH-60 Romeo is a pilot, co-pilot and crewman.

Jeanette Steele: (619) 293-1030; jen.steele@uniontrib.com. Follow on Twitter @jensteeley

[buglerbilly]

U.S. Navy Prepares To Say No

Quick-Response Policy Is Wearing Out Ships, Crews

By CHRISTOPHER P. CAVAS

Published: 27 September 2010

NOT surprising that the tempo of Operations is leading to increasing wear-and-tear, what is surprising is that this appears to have come as a surprise to many people! :grenade

The U.S. Navy has always prided itself on answering the call to duty.

After the 2003 invasion of Iraq, a new Fleet Response Plan (FRP) put fighting forces at an ever-increasing operations tempo. Six-month deployments have turned into seven or even eight, and ships and units head quickly back to sea, sometimes just weeks after returning. It is not unusual for more than half the fleet's 289 ships to be underway on any given day...........

See remainder of article here............

http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4788754

[buglerbilly]

More Engine Woes Revealed on U.S. Navy's LPD-17

By CHRISTOPHER P. CAVAS

Published: 30 Sep 2010 21:40

This vessel and class of vessel appears to be turning into a very sorry saga.........

The troubles of the USS San Antonio, first of a large class of amphibious transport ships, haven't quite come to an end yet; the U.S. Navy and its engineers are continuing to find and fix a host of problems plaguing the 25,000-ton ship.


The San Antonio spent nine months at this shipyard in Norfolk, Va., undergoing engine repairs. (CHRISTOPHER P. CAVAS / DEFENSE NEWS)

Earlier this year, engineers searching for the cause of vibrations in the drive train discovered that imperfections in the way the ship's engines and main reduction gears were installed were threatening to eventually wreck the vessel.

"The foundation bolts were not properly aligned or tightened. The main reduction gear was not properly installed and checked out," Adm. John Harvey, commander of U.S. Fleet Forces Command, said in a Sept. 20 interview at his headquarters in Norfolk, Va.

Remainder of article here..............

http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4821407&c=AME&s=sea

[buglerbilly]

U.S. Military Sealift Command Reconfigures Tanker Fleet

08:20 GMT, October 11, 2010 WASHINGTON



The fleet of tankers operated by the U.S. Navy's Military Sealift Command (MSC), is being reconfigured to meet fuel requirements in support of U.S. forces worldwide.

This seagoing force of government-owned and U.S.-flagged chartered ships, is acquiring a new chartered ship, MT Empire State, as two government-owned ships complete their service to the command.

The newly built, U.S.-flagged Empire State came under charter to MSC for up to five years Oct. 7 and will operate worldwide carrying refined petroleum products for DoD, primarily between commercial refineries and DoD storage and distribution facilities.

Empire State is owned and operated by a private shipping company under contract to MSC. Built at General Dynamics, NASSCO in San Diego, the double-hulled Empire State is 600 feet long and has a cargo-carrying capacity of approximately 331,000 barrels. The ship's construction was completed in July 2010, at which time Empire State went to work for MSC under a short-term charter.

Two of MSC's four government-owned tankers transferred out of service Oct. 1. USNS Paul Buck and USNS Samuel L. Cobb began their service to MSC in the mid 1980s, along with three other new construction T-5 tankers that came under long-term charter to the command in 1985 and 1986. In 2003, MSC purchased four of those ships - Buck, Cobb, USNS Lawrence H. Gianella and USNS Richard G. Matthiesen. Since then, these ships have served as the core of MSC's tanker fleet along with an MSC chartered shallow-draft tanker.

"Our T-5 tankers have served us well for the past 25 years, and as they approach the end of their service lives, the State-class ships will allow us to continue to fulfill our requirements to transport fuel for the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) - Energy," said John Joerger, MSC's tanker project officer. DLA Energy procures and manages fuel for all of DoD.

Upon deactivation from MSC service, Cobb and Buck transferred to the U.S. Maritime Administration's National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF), which comprises about 30 dry cargo ships and tankers kept in reserve for possible activation and use in support of national defense and national emergencies.

Gianella transferred to MSC's Maritime Prepositioning Force in 2009 and Matthiesen will remain in service to MSC until early 2011, when the ship will join Cobb and Buck in the NDRF.

In fiscal year 2010, MSC carried 1.5 billion gallons of petroleum products worldwide in support of DoD operations ranging from delivering fuel to combat forces operating in Iraq to replenishing McMurdo Station, Antarctica and Thule Air Force Base in Pituffik, Greenland.

Military Sealift Command operates approximately 110 noncombatant, civilian-crewed ships that replenish U.S. Navy ships, conduct specialized missions, strategically preposition combat cargo at sea around the world and move military equipment and supplies used by deployed U.S. forces.

----
Laura Seal, Military Sealift Command Public Affairs / NNS

[buglerbilly]

CNO Releases 2011 Guidance

(Source: US Navy; issued Oct. 18, 2010)

WASHINGTON --- The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) released his Guidance for 2011 to the fleet Oct. 18.

Adm. Gary Roughead's CNO Guidance (CNOG) emphasizes the important issues regarding the future of naval operations.

CNOG reaffirms Roughead's three focus areas: to build the future force, maintain the Navy's warfighting readiness, and develop and support Sailors, Navy civilians, and their families.

In the Guidance, Roughead addresses a multitude of issues including maritime strategy, operational tempo, building and sustaining strong international relationships, maintaining a competency-based and mission-focused force and the importance of science and technology initiatives.

The current CNOG continues to emphasize CNO's 18 intentions with a focus on five specific areas: continue to be the dominant, ready naval force across all maritime missions; build a Navy with appropriate force structure and strategic laydown; maintain decision superiority; align the requirements, resources and acquisition processes; and evolve and establish international relationships.

Roughead also addresses the current challenges the Navy faces due to the resource constrained environment.

"We must look at this time as one of opportunity where boldness and innovation are the path to the future," writes Roughead. "It is up to each of us to do so."

To view CNO’s 2011 Guidance, visit http://www.navy.mil/features/CNOG%202011.pdf.

-ends-

[buglerbilly]

Ares

A Defense Technology Blog

Navy's Adm. Roughead on Tour

Posted by Paul McLeary at 10/19/2010 7:09 AM CDT

Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead has been out and about this week with an ambitious agenda talking up everything from cutting $28 billion in budgetary bloat over the next five years, to adding 32 new ships to the Navy’s inventory by 2024, to using more biofuels, to doubling down on unmanned assets.

It has taken the sea service some time to rebound after being publicly shamed by Secretary of Defense Gates last spring, when he told a roomful of Naval officers and journalists that “you don’t necessarily need a billion-dollar guided missile destroyer to chase down and deal with a bunch of teenage pirates wielding AK-47s and RPGs,” and called into question the need for eleven carrier groups. But Roughead is back, and a few days after talking up the possibilities that the concept of offshore balancing holds for giving the Navy more of a role in future conflicts, and laying out plans for a “greener” more energy efficient service in the near future, the Admiral has released his CNO Guidance for 2011.

The guidance states that “we will emphasize the affordable production of multi-mission ships and aircraft, [and] capabilities required not desired.” In other words, we’re not just doing this because we can. But when it comes to shipbuilding, the numbers don’t necessarily look great. As ARES noted recently, the Navy’s shipbuilding plan can only be pulled off successfully if all of the planned Littoral Combat Ships and Joint High Speed Vessels are able to be constructed on time and within certain budgetary constraints. The two variants are set to account for about 25 percent of the Navy’s planned 313-ship fleet, and the success of the LCS program in particular is hardly a done deal.

As we know, two LCS variants have already hit the water, but only after blowing their budgets apart, and with enough delays and program cancellations and restarts to scuttle a lesser program. Just as a refresher, plans the Navy drafted at the program’s outset called for each ship to cost only $220 million, but documents that accompanied the 2010 Navy budget request showed that the Lockheed-built ship, the USS Freedom, wound up running $637 million, while the General Dynamics/Austal-built USS Independence came in at $704 million.

Still, the two competitors are currently building one more LCS each. Lockheed Martin recently told ARES that it is more than 70 percent complete with the build for LCS 3, the USS Fort Worth, at its shipyard at Marinette Marine in Wisconsin. Their competitor, the team of General Dynamics/Austal, refused comment on the progress of LCS 4. All of this comes against the backdrop of the program’s latest drama, which saw the Navy request that bidders hand in Final Proposal Revisions (FPR) by September, and that those proposals “remain valid for 90 days.”

As for the rest of the CNO’s Guidance, Roughead promises that “we will pursue unmanned systems as an integrated part of our force,” and “reducing our reliance on fossil fuels and improving the reach of our afloat forces and the resilience of our shore energy sources.”

To this last point, last week Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus announced ambitious goals of demonstrating a "Green Strike Group" composed of biofuel-powered nuclear vessels and ships in 2012 and 2016; slash petroleum use in the Navy’s commercial vehicle fleet by 50 percent by 2015; make sure that fully half of the Navy's total energy consumption comes from alternative sources by 2020.

[buglerbilly]

Final piece on Roughheads 2011 vision................

Next Year in The Navy: Drones, Energy Savings, Tweeting

By Spencer Ackerman October 18, 2010 | 4:31 pm



It’s not just about keeping the peace without holding territory. Admiral Gary Roughead, the head of the Navy, followed on his recent naval-strategy speech by releasing a sketch today of what he wants the nation’s sailors to focus on in 2011. Among the highlights: more drones; getting energy costs under control; and better use of Facebook.

Roughead recently said he’s identified about $28 billion in budgetary fat to cut over the next five years. Cognizant of the belt-tightening times, he says up front in his guidance for 2011 that any future adjustments for the Navy are tied to “our ability to reduce overhead,” a top priority for Defense Secretary Robert Gates — and a must for getting the Navy up from 288 ships to the 320 that Roughead wants to see by 2024.

One potential road to cost control: ships and planes that don’t need sailors and pilots. “We will pursue unmanned systems as an integrated part of our force,” Roughead states, “ensuring that the move to ‘unmanned’ truly reduces personnel requirements.”

The Navy’s long had a penchant for drones, like the undersea Long Term Mine Reconnaissance System that lets ships know where mines lurk, or the X-47B spy plane. It’s even studying sea and avian life to get ideas for new drone designs. Roughead, a drone enthusiast, wants to press forward, intending to get a Fire Scout drone helicopter onto a Coast Guard cutter to help with counternarcotics missions and port security.
Last week, Roughead said that he considered undersea drones a potential “a breakthrough in naval warfare,” Inside the Navy reported, if the Navy can get them “to operate for periods of three to four weeks in high-current areas.”

But Roughead’s guidance doesn’t have anything more specific about new drone acquisitions or development. (Watch for that in the Navy’s next budget.) Nor is it clear how much money the drones can really save the Navy. Out of an approximately $170 billion budget last year, it spent a mere $3 billion on the Fire Scout, for instance.

Another Roughead priority for his undersea drones is to “develop a long-endurance, safe power source” for them, fitting in with a broader Navy need to reduce “our reliance on fossil fuels.” Last week at a Navy energy forum, Roughead and Navy Secretary Ray Mabus talked up the virtues of biofuels and looked forward to cutting petroleum use in half by 2015. It’s even introduced a biofuel/petroleum blend to power its F/A-18 Super Hornet jet, what it calls a “Green Hornet.”

Whether similar blends will power the rest of the fleet, manned and unmanned, remains to be seen. But the Navy’s now looking at fuel costs as a trade-off with everything else the service wants. Rear Adm. Philip Hart Cullom, the Navy’s energy chief, recently said that the Navy’s dependence on fossil fuels led it to spend over $5 billion on gas in 2008 when global prices spiked, noting the upcharge meant “about $4 billion less of something else that you were not able to buy.”

There’s a lot of ambition packed into Roughead’s 2011 agenda beyond the drones and the cost-cutting. He pledges, for instance, to move the Navy’s computer networks “toward a model that is agile, relevant, secure and cost effective,” envisioning a “seamless transition” from the Navy’s current NMCI network to its desired Next Generation Enterprise Network. But as Danger Room has reported, the service recently inked a $3.3 billion deal just to allow it to cut ties with NMCI and its contractor, Hewlett Packard. Not an auspicious sign for Roughead’s plans to, among other things, enhance the navy’s new crew of information-sector specialists, the Information Dominance Corps as “an elite cyber force.”

One challenge that’s not as daunting as using drones or greening the fleet: better tweets. Roughead pats the Navy on the back for using “emerging media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and Flickr to reach key audiences and deliver messages in a timely manner through a growing medium.” Here, for instance, is an Information Dominance Corps Facebook page. And the Navy’s official Twitter feed is one of the livelier mil-twitter accounts.

Next up appears to be bolstered social-media training for sailors: Roughead writes that the way ahead is to “further enhance our use of social media as a tool to reach our Sailors and their families and teach our commands, Sailors and their families to use it responsibly.” Loose tweets sink fleets, after all.

Read More http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/10/next-year-in-the-navy-drones-energy-savings-tweeting/#more-33472#ixzz12oQ0ictg

[Exsandgroper]

Nulka missile decoys to guard US carriers
Julian Kerr From: The Australian October 23, 2010 12:00AM

SPECIAL REPORT
CONFIDENCE in the capabilities produced by Australia's most successful collaborative defence program, the Nulka ship-launched active missile decoy, has been reinforced by plans to deploy it on US Navy (USN) nuclear aircraft carriers.
Although this decision has yet to be announced either in Australia or the US, details are included in USN 2010 budget papers.

Nulka brings together hovering rocket, autonomous systems and electronics technologies to lure enemy anti-ship missiles with active radar seekers away from their targets.

After launch, Nulka employs a broad-band radio frequency repeater to radiate a large, ship-like radar return while hovering in a ship-like trajectory calculated to provide the most attractive target for single or multiple missiles.

Conventional wisdom had suggested it was not possible for such a soft-kill system to protect something with the massive radar cross-section of a 102,000-tonne aircraft carrier.

However, trials carried out aboard USS Kitty Hawk at Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercises in 2008, and by USS Abraham Lincoln at RIMPAC 2006, have resulted in the decision to extend installation of Nulka to the USN's 10 Nimitz-class supercarriers.

The launching system software is currently being upgraded to suit Nulka for carrier operations as an integral element of their Ship Self Defence System. The first carrier installation is expected to be on USS Abraham Lincoln in 2012.

Nulka is already deployed by the USN on more than 100 ships, ranging from Ticonderoga class missile cruisers, Arleigh Burke class destroyers and San Antonio class amphibious ships to Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates.

The system also equips the RAN's FFG-7s and Anzac-class frigates, and is fitted to Canada's Iroquois-class destroyers.

The Nulka concept originated in the late 1980s in the laboratories of the Defence Science and Technology Organisation.

The system was then developed and brought to market by AWA Aerospace, purchased in 1996 by the future BAE Systems Australia (BAES), which is still the project's prime contractor.

The electronic payload was originally developed by the USN's Research Laboratory and is now produced by the US company Lockheed Martin Sippican. The solid fuel rocket motor, initially manufactured by ADI (now Thales Australia) in Australia, is now provided by the US company Aerojet.
Program management and system engineering is carried out by BAES at their new facility in Melbourne. Flight control units and the thrust vector controllers that position the decoy in the selected trajectory independent of ship movement, wind and weather, are manufactured at BAES' Adelaide facility.

Final assembly of propulsion units is undertaken by Thales at its facility at Mulwala in NSW.

The system is consolidated at Mulwala by BAES personnel and each completed Nulka round is placed in a hermetically-sealed canister manufactured by Milspec that acts both as a storage container and launch tube.

The canisters are then placed in Varley-manufactured shipping containers for delivery to customers.

The only element of Nulka specific to an individual ship is the trajectory that it follows in flight.

A range of trajectories or combinations of trajectories is pre-loaded into the flight control unit, which after initialisation selects the optimal flight plan drawing on data from the ship's combat system, concerning both the type of threat and the location of friendly ships.

Although Lockheed Martin is the principal sub-contractor to BAES, BAES Business Development Manager of Weapon Systems Peter Osbourne, describes the relationship as a partnership. His sentiments are echoed by the USN's Nulka program manager, Ed Settle, who says the joint effort "fostered an exceptional spirit of co-operation between the US and Australian navies".

Celebrations are taking place in late October to mark the delivery of the 1000th Nulka round.

Cheers

[buglerbilly]

Pentagon Contract Announcement

(Source: US Department of Defense; issued Oct. 28, 2010)

Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding, Inc., Pascagoula, Miss., is being awarded a $48,107,835 modification to previously awarded contract (N00024-10-C-2229) for additional planning and advanced engineering services in support of the LHA replacement (LHA[R]) Flight 0 amphibious assault ship (LHA 7).

Work will be performed in Pascagoula, Miss., and is expected to be completed by May 2012. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year.

The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C., is the contracting activity.

(ends)

Navy Awards Northrop Grumman $48 Million Advance Procurement Contract for Multi-Purpose Amphibious Assault Ship LHA 7

(Source: Northrop Grumman Corp.; issued October 28, 2010)

PASCAGOULA, Miss. --- The U.S. Navy has awarded a $48 million cost-plus fixed-fee contract modification to Northrop Grumman Corporation for advance procurement of long-lead materials and performance of engineering/planning efforts for LHA 7, the second in the Navy's newest class of large-deck amphibious assault ships. The first ship, America (LHA 6) is being built in Pascagoula and is currently 33 percent complete.

With this award, Northrop Grumman will provide additional engineering, planning and technical support for the current contract. The Navy issued the initial contract in June for $175 million. The work will be performed at the company's Pascagoula facility.
"This contract modification continues the ongoing advance procurement process for the Navy's newest large-deck amphibious ship," said Kevin Jarvis, program manager for large deck programs. "These large deck ships are important to the U.S. Navy's fleet and our team is committed to quality builds. The advance procurement allows our focus to remain on our supply chain management and design development as we prepare for the eventual construction of the ship."

LHA 7 will be 844 feet long and 106 feet wide and weigh 44,854 tons. Its hybrid propulsion system will drive it to speeds in excess of 22 knots on its gas turbines, but also will run cost-efficiently on its auxiliary electric propulsion motors. It will accommodate 1,204 crew and can surge to accommodate 1,871 troops.

LHA 7 will have an extended hangar deck with two higher hangar bay areas, each fitted with an overhead crane for aircraft maintenance. The ship will also provide increased aviation fuel capacity, stowage for aviation parts and support equipment. In addition, LHA 7 will be able to embark and launch the MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft, cargo and attack helicopters, and the short take-off vertical landing (STOVL) variant F-35B Lightning II Strike Fighter.

Northrop Grumman Corporation is a leading global security company whose 120,000 employees provide innovative systems, products, and solutions in aerospace, electronics, information systems, shipbuilding and technical services to government and commercial customers worldwide.

-ends-

[buglerbilly]

Northrop Warship Gets Failing Combat Grade from U.S.

(Source: Reuters; issued Oct. 29, 2010)

WASHINGTON --- A $1 billion-plus warship developed by Northrop Grumman Corp. is ineffective and unsuitable for combat, according to the Pentagon, dealing a blow to the company as it looks to sell its shipbuilding unit.

Michael Gilmore, the Pentagon's top weapons tester, assessed the LPD-17 amphibious warfare ship as being "not effective, not suitable, and not survivable in a combat situation," a Defense Department spokeswoman said.

The reasons for the assessment are classified, spokeswoman Cheryl Irwin said in an email. The ship, designed to carry Marines and landing craft, was found to be capable of conducting amphibious operations in a "benign environment," she said.

The 10 planned ships of the LPD-17 San Antonio class are a key element of the U.S. Navy's ability to project power, including for humanitarian assistance and disaster response. The Marines have not conducted a large-scale amphibious assault since the 1950-53 Korean War.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates has repeatedly questioned the future of such forcible U.S. landings, "especially as advances in anti-ship systems keep pushing the potential launch point further from shore," as he put it in May.

The LPD-17's shortcomings were described in a "Combined Operational and Live Fire Test and Evaluation" report sent to Congress in June. It found they would stand up better under enemy fire than its four classes of predecessor ships but ultimately lacked survivability, Irwin said.

Gilmore's assessment was first reported by Bloomberg.

TROUBLED PROGRAM

Northrop and General Dynamics Corp. are the military's main shipbuilders. The LPD-17 program long has been troubled by cost growth, schedule slips and construction problems, particularly on the earlier ships in the program. (end of excerpt)

Click here for the full story, on the Reuters website.

http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN2925533020101029

-ends-

[buglerbilly]

Ares

A Defense Technology Blog

Navy Facing "a new fiscal reality"

Posted by Paul McLeary at 11/2/2010 9:45 AM CDT

In the wake of Secretary of Defense Gates calling for Pentagon bean counters to find $100 billion in savings over the next five years, the services are scrambling to cut costs where they can. The process won’t be easy says Adm. Jonathan Greenert, vice chief of Naval Operations, who told the Center for Strategic and International Studies yesterday that upcoming budgets are going to introduce “a new fiscal reality for most of our [officers] and most of our senior executive service. They’ve gone fifteen years on supplemental appropriations. We’ve been on them since at least ’95…and we have really not had a lot of folks really need to be accountable for the fiscal performance out there because there’s always been a supplemental around the corner.”

Greenert didn’t single out any underperforming programs by name, but stressed that the Navy was going to have little patience for programs that are “just not going to get there.” He did say that the service sees multiyear procurement deals for programs as one of many ways to reduce costs, along with a greater focus on fixed-price contracts.

One surprise came while the Admiral was talking about Naval aviation. He described the UCAS—the Navy’s still-under-development unmanned carrier aircraft system, as “our future air wing” and complained that “the cost to put an aircraft in the air for one hour is currently untenable. We have to look at that.” He mentioned looking at flight simulators as a possible alternative to putting pilots in the seat, and in the air during training.

On the acquisition and procurement side, Greenert lauded what is called the “hostage exchange”—where Navy requirements officers are sent to spend time in acquisitions offices in order to understand a little better the entire process. “If you’ve got a two-year tour in the Pentagon,” he said, “maybe spend six months over at a PEO. And we’ve seen great payback already.”

Imagine that. Understanding the acquisitions and procurement process before, you know, trying to acquire and procure things.

[buglerbilly]

DATE:09/11/10

SOURCE:Flight International

US Navy overcomes mass P-3C grounding scare

By Stephen Trimble

The US Navy has quietly overcome a grounding scare that programme officials now acknowledge brought the Lockheed Martin P-3C Orion fleet "to its knees" only 12 months ago.

With the P-3C's replacement aircraft - the Boeing P-8A Poseidon - still four years away from operational status, a series of inspections revealed structural damage that led to the grounding of all but 49 of 120 combat-coded Orions by September 2009.

The Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) has since returned 33 of these aircraft to flying status within a 12-month period. Programme officials were forced to stand up a new supply chain to deliver critical aluminium extrusions in less than half the normal lead-time, says Capt Aaron Rondeau, the navy's P-3 integrated product team lead.


© US Navy

The goal now is to keep enough P-3Cs flying until the Boeing 737-based P-8A replaces the Orion completely by 2019.

Keeping the P-3C fleet flying even this long was never planned. Adapted from the Lockheed L-188 Electra regional airliner in the 1950s, the navy originally planned to start retiring the fleet almost 20 years ago, but cancelled the Lockheed P-7 replacement programme in 1990.

Concerns about the P-3C's structural health soon followed. Designed with a service life of 7,500 flight hours, the fleet today averages about 16,000h, says Bob Holmes, the navy's P-3C sustainment lead. Moreover, calculating the P-3C's fatigue life had been neglected, as the service's methodology previously focused on crack allowance versus fatigue life.

"When you start [a fatigue tracking policy] that late in the programme, it's very difficult to manage - unlike the air force which does it from the get-go," Rondeau says.

The navy formally launched a service life assessment programme for the Orion in 2000, which led to a full-scale fatigue test on a P-3C about two years later. "After full-scale fatigue tests came in it was pretty scary," Rondeau says.

The navy had hired Lockheed to perform the assessment based on a software algorithm developed in the 1980s.

"It turned out the old algorithm from the 1980s was underestimating the actual damage done to the airplane," says Mark Jarvis, Lockheed's director of P-3 design and production.

The new tools predicted that nearly the entire fleet faced catastrophic fatigue damage. Rather than grounding the fleet, NAVAIR engineers developed a special structural inspection kit to repair damaged areas. Starting in 2005, the navy also realised the underside of the wing was particularly damaged. After fixing the forward half of the underside of the wing, the navy turned to inspect the back half.

"When those results came in it was pretty devastating," Rondeau says. In December 2007 alone, the navy grounded 30 aircraft. Further inspections in September 2009 grounded another 10, with even more groundings occurring in between.

[buglerbilly]

DATE:10/11/10

SOURCE:Flight International

US Navy to keep some P-3Cs, despite replacement by P-8A

By Stephen Trimble

A subset of the US Navy's Lockheed Martin P-3C Orion fleet is being upgraded to remain airworthy for at least a decade beyond its scheduled replacement by the Boeing 737-based P-8A Poseidon.

In addition to fleet-wide fatigue repairs, the navy is investing to replace the outer wing assemblies on at least 29 P-3Cs. The first 17 have already been ordered, with the service currently soliciting vendors for another 12, plus options for two more.

Lockheed, the P-3C manufacturer and outer-wing replacement contractor, believes the USN will buy even more assemblies and keep substantial numbers of Orions flying beyond the type's scheduled retirement date.


© Liz Goettee/US Navy
A P-8A Poseidon flies above a P-3C Orion

"There's going to be a subset of P-3s that the new platform at this point is not scheduled to take over," says Mark Jarvis, Lockheed's director of P-3 design and production. "We still think, if you look at their special mission airplanes, there is a universe of anywhere between 40 to 60 possible re-wing candidates."

Navy officials, however, are less optimistic. "We're up to a 29 outer-wing requirement right now," says Capt Aaron Rondeau, P-3 integrated product team lead. "I think that's probably going to stay at that number."

Rondeau acknowledges that the current requirement has declined from an original figure of 54 cited in 2007. This was reduced after the navy determined that about 25 wings were repairable as their damage had been caused by corrosion and not fatigue.

The USN agrees that the re-winged subset of its P-3C fleet will be maintained beyond the bulk of the Orion fleet's 2019 retirement date to perform special missions. This includes its 16 EP-3E Aries II electronic intelligence aircraft. The navy has installed Raytheon's littoral surveillance radar system on at least seven P-3Cs, providing a capability similar to the US Air Force's Northrop Grumman E-8C JSTARS.

Navy officials earlier this year cancelled the service's EPX programme, which would have replaced its EP-3s. Funding and requirements for a new programme are currently being determined.

[buglerbilly]

Ares

A Defense Technology Blog

The Navy's Submarine Problem

Posted by Paul McLeary at 11/10/2010 11:31 AM CST



My colleague Mike Fabey had a piece up yesterday about a new Congressional Research Service report that lays out some inconvenient facts about the future of the U.S. Navy’s submarine fleet.

In short, the Navy doesn’t seem to have figured out a way to align its stated need for 48 submarines with its build schedule for new Virginia class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs), or its yearly shipbuilding budget.

The Navy’s so-called 30-year shipbuilding plan, as updated for Fiscal 2009 and earlier years, showed the SSN force recovering to 48 boats by the early 2030s, the CRS pointed out. But the latest update indicated that benchmark may not be made after all. “The Navy’s new Fiscal 2011 30-year (fiscal years 2011-2040) plan shows the SSN remaining below 48 boats through 2040. The change is due to a reduction in planned SSN procurements,” CRS reported. “The Fiscal 2009 plan included procurement of 53 SSNs over 30 years, while the Fiscal 2011 plan includes procurement of 44 SSNs over 30 years.”

The reduction in SSN procurements in the Fiscal 2011 plan, the CRS reported, may be due in large part to the planned procurement of 12 next-generation SSBNs (nuclear-powered strategic ballistic-missile submarines) in Fiscal 2019-2033. “The Fiscal 2009 plan did not account for the cost of these 12 SSBNs, while the Fiscal 2011 does, apparently causing reductions in planned procurement rates for SSNs and other types of ships during that period,” the CRS reported.

And what about those 12 Ohio class SSBN’s? The Congressional Budget Office estimated earlier this year that “the lead ship of the Ohio replacement class in 2019 will cost $13 billion,” with each successive ship coming in at about the $6 billion to $ 7 billion range, bringing the cost of the twelve-ship replacement up to about $99 billion. “That may leave scant room in the Navy’s already-stretched shipbuilding budgets to afford other vessels in the Navy’s wish list,” the CBO said. That $6 -$7 billion price tag, one must remember, comes out to about half of the Navy’s annual $15 billion shipbuilding budget, which means that during the 15-year period (FY2019-FY2033) when the Navy plans on building these ships, it would severely restrict its ability to build other ships.

I recently spoke with Craig Hooper, a San Francisco-based national security expert who has written widely on Naval and Pacific Basin security issues, and he expressed skepticism over the Navy’s submarine plans. “With no viable means for our submarine builders to compete and drive down costs,” he says, “I expect the SSBN(X) build schedule to slide right, go over-budget, and ultimately shrink to maybe a 10-boat buy.” Given the current budget situation, Hooper says that the Navy might start looking for ways to allow future Virginia Class subs to serve different roles. “It would be a very interesting world if future Virginia Class SSNs had the flexibility to serve in either the conventional SSN, SSGN or strategic SSBN roles. That would be both a massive force multiplier and a boon for the bottom line.”

But the thing about trying to predict the future is that it always changes. “Strategic deterrent is also changing,” Hooper said. “As conventional weapons get increasingly accurate, America might be able to really reduce the number of submarines slated to serve in the traditional nuclear deterrent role.”

U.S. Navy photo

[buglerbilly]

CNO Presses Navy’s Value Case

By Colin Clark Tuesday, November 16th, 2010 6:37 pm



In what is beginning to look like a concerted effort to position the Navy for expansion in hard times — or at least to protect what it has left — Adm. Gary Roughead offered a new version today of a speech he first unveiled last month in which he predicts the rise of naval forces as land forces face increasing obstacles to operations in the wake of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Mega cities will cluster on the littoral, concentrating as many people in their ambit by 2050 as lived on the entire globe in 2004. Africa will loom larger in the next 10 to 15 years Africa than it does today. The expanded, deeper Panama Canal will play a “key role” in altering sea-borne traffic, able to transship over 90 percent of the world’s ships and almost that much of the Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) ships, Roughead remarked at the Hudson Institute in a speech billed as a major address.

Perhaps the best news for navy types is that global warming will, very simply, mean there will be more water for navies to secure. And the admiral argued, in a new wrinkle to the speech, that navy ships may be expensive in the short term but provide the country with enormous value over the long term. He pointed to the USS Enterprise carrier whose first deployment was during the Cuban missile crisis. “That is a good investment,” he said....................

Read more: http://www.dodbuzz.com/2010/11/16/cno-presses-navys-value-case/#ixzz15VASq8T1

[buglerbilly]

CNO to Congress on LCS: 'We're Going To Have To Act'

By CHRISTOPHER P. CAVAS

Published: 16 Nov 2010 18:52

The clock is ticking on the U.S. Navy's request to Congress to change the rules so the service can buy both Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) designs. Contract offers from competitors Lockheed Martin and Austal USA expire on Dec.14, and if lawmakers don't agree to the change by then, the Navy - anxious to award construction contracts and get the program into high gear - could miss an opportunity to move ahead with both LCS types.


Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead has told Congress the time is now for lawmakers to change rules to allow the Navy to buy both Littoral Combat Ship designs. (MARINE CORPS)

"We're going to have to act," Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead told reporters Tuesday in Washington.

Asked what would happen if Congress does not act by the deadline, Roughead repeated his first answer.

"We're going to have to act," he said again. "We'll carry through on the strategy and the authorization that we have." .................edited...................

Read more: http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=5059024&c=AME&s=SEA

[buglerbilly]

Heli-Power 2010: USN strives to avoid 'rotorcraft gap'

November 17, 2010

The US military faces a significant drop in rotorcraft capability in the next 15 years unless a major effort is launched to develop new aircraft for the major services in the near term.

That was the warning given to the Helipower 2010 conference by Brad Schieferdecker, associate director for technology development at the Naval Aviation Center for Rotorcraft Advancement (NACRA).

Painting what he dubbed ‘a pretty bleak picture’, Schieferdecker outlined the results of an internal NACRA study on the helicopter production schedules of the aircraft operated by the major services.

For example, US Navy helicopter production is scheduled to end in 2020 while in-service aircraft are slated for replacement from 2026.

‘In another 10 years we will be out of production of the main airframes. The worry is that our industrial base will stagnate as a result. Now is the time that we need to start replacing aircraft,’ Schieferdecker said.

The potential of a shortage in rotorcraft numbers in coming decades has been picked up by Congress, which mandated a series of studies under the Future Vertical Lift (FVL) initiative.

However, the overarching effort to develop a common aircraft that could address future rotorcraft needs across the Department of Defense, the Joint Multi-Role (JMR) programme has yet to get consensus from the services.

Schieferdecker said since its reliance on the UH-60 Black Hawk placed the US Army more at risk by a ‘rotorcraft gap’, it had jumped ahead and launched its own Phase 1, with designs on flying two demonstrators by 2017.

‘It’s an army plan. The navy has been involved in the meetings but we have not yet placed any money on the table. A technology demonstration is important to the navy and there are issues such as adopting the aircraft for ship-board operations that need to be considered.’

He said Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) was currently putting requirement teams together to work on the JMR question.

Others at the conference picked up on Schieferdecker’s comments and questioned the sense of allocating the bulk of S&T funding to the US Army when the JMR project was critical to all the services.

Meanwhile, Schieferdecker revealed that NACRA had developed its own flying test bed at Patuxent River NAS under the T-Rex initiative, allowing the organisation to carry out its own technological demonstrations without relying on borrowed aircraft from various programmes of record.

Such testing will fall under four areas of focus: digital interoperability, safety/survivability, future concepts and reduction of total ownership costs (RTOC) – with the first two consider the key areas. For example, when the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter enters service, despite be touted as a digital, networked aircraft, it will be unable to communicate with naval helicopters.

The issue of survivability was thrown into sharp relief by figures provided by Schieferdecker that revealed 390 helicopters had been lost on operations since 2001 for a loss of 526 lives.

By Tony Skinner, London

[buglerbilly]

DATE:18/11/10

SOURCE:Flight International

P-3C concerns may freeze deliveries from Lockheed plant

By Stephen Trimble

US government officials may freeze deliveries from a major Lockheed Martin aircraft factory after finding "quality issues" on P-3C Orion wing components.

A team of inspectors from the Defense Contract Management Agency and Naval Air Systems Command are assessing Lockheed's plans for fixing the root causes of the issues, the company says.

If the inspectors decide Lockheed's plan is inadequate, the team can order a freeze on all deliveries from and new contracts for the factory in Greenville, South Carolina, or order Lockheed to develop another plan.

Lockheed expects the inspectors "will acknowledge that we are making good progress and have confidence in our ability" to fix the causes of the quality problems in Greenville, the company says.

Lockheed's Greenville site is spread across 65Ha (161 acres), where aircraft maintenance and overhaul services are performed in 16 hangars with 31 bays. It is installing outer wing assemblies on 17 P-3Cs operated by the US Navy, plus about 40 more for other P-3 customers.


© US Navy

The inspections began earlier this year after "quality issues" were discovered on corner wing fittings on P-3Cs delivered to the USN, Lockheed says.

The company was given a 180-day deadline to develop the correction plan, which expires on 20 November.

[buglerbilly]

This article is a very worthwhile read..........interesting stuff.................

Leadership and Accountability

November 2010

We will still need men and women in uniform to call things as they see them and tell their subordinates and their superiors alike what they need to hear, not what they want to hear . . . More broadly, if as an officer you don’t tell blunt truths or create an environment where candor is encouraged, then you’ve done yourself and the institution a disservice.

The time will come when you must stand alone in making a difficult, unpopular decision, or when you must challenge the opinion of superiors or tell them that you can’t get the job done with the time and the resources available . . . There will be moments when your entire career is at risk.................edited..............

Read more: http://blog.usni.org/2010/11/10/leadership-and-accountability/

[buglerbilly]

Boeing delivers US Navy's 10th C-40A derivative aircraft

November 22, 2010

Boeing today delivered the 10th C-40A transport/cargo aircraft to the US Navy. The Boeing 737-700 commercial derivative was modified at the company's Wichita facility for its Navy mission.

"The C-40A has a critical mission to deliver personnel and supplies to all areas of the world, and we're proud to play a part in making sure that can happen," said Steve Wade, general manager of Boeing Global Transport & Executive Systems.

The C-40A is equipped with a main-deck cargo door and can be configured for troop transport, cargo transport or both. With superior range and performance; a state-of-the-art flight deck; 21st century avionics; and quiet, clean, fuel-efficient engines, the C-40A increases the Navy's capability for rapid response to the fleet worldwide.

Boeing and Navy representatives marked the completion of the modification at a delivery ceremony today.

"The C-40A plays an important role in the Navy Unique Fleet Essential Airlift (NUFEA) fleet," said Vice Adm. Dirk Debbink, Chief of Navy Reserve. "These fuel-efficient, extremely flexible logistics-support aircraft are an integral part of every maritime mission, from humanitarian assistance to power projection. The bottom line is the ability of the C-40A to provide our nation important, Navy-unique airlift capability at a lower cost. We welcome this new aircraft into the fleet!"

The Navy C-40As, which replace the service's fleet of C-9s, are based at the Naval Air Station (NAS) Joint Reserve Base (JRB) in Forth Worth, Texas, at NAS Jacksonville, Fla., and at NAS North Island in San Diego, Calif. The new aircraft will be immediately stationed at NAS JRB Fort Worth, where crews will provide transition training for crews at NAS Oceana, Va., a new C-40A location scheduled to open next year.

Boeing is on contract to deliver two additional C-40As; one 737 is currently being modified at the Wichita facility, while the other is on the Boeing Commercial Airplanes production line in Renton, Wash.

"We're looking forward to continuing to enhance the Navy's fleet of C-40As with as many aircraft as are required to support this mission," said Wade. "The C-40A is a proven workhorse, whether it is delivering humanitarian aid to the scenes of natural disasters or military equipment to ships and troops on the ground."

Boeing's Global Transport & Executive Systems business, based in Wichita, supports Boeing commercial derivative aircraft including the executive-fleet C-32A and C-40B/C, the Navy's C-40A and E-6B, and the National Airborne Operations Center's E-4B.

Source: Boeing

[buglerbilly]

Navy Hard-Pressed To Meet Sub Numbers

Dec 7, 2010

By Paul McLeary
Washington



Despite flat defense funding and the assertion by Defense Secretary Robert Gates that the U.S. Navy’s shipbuilding budget will not rise significantly in future years, the service continues to insist that its fleet of 256 ships must eventually increase to 313 in coming decades.

While the story lines that surround the tortured acquisition history of programs like the Littoral Combat Ship have drawn criticism from the press and Washington think tanks, there has been something going on under the sea that is just as important to the Navy’s future fighting prowess. According to its 30-year shipbuilding plan released earlier this year, the submarine fleet is slated to overtake surface combatants as the service’s largest resource drain over the next three decades, as aging Los Angeles-class attack submarines are retired and new—and expensive—hulls are put in the water. Most of this expense will come from the Virginia-class program, which now costs about $2.5 billion per hull, and will eventually number 25 hulls at a build cost of $63 billion.

The big build starts in 2011 when the Navy doubles the production rate to two submarines per year, with work being done by General Dynamics Electric Boat and Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding.

The Navy operates 53 attack submarines, 44 of which are Los Angeles-class boats, with another 14 Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and four Ohio-class guided missile submarines (SSGNs). Beginning in 2015, the service is embarking on a massive retirement plan, with remaining Los Angeles-class subs mothballed and replaced by Virginia-class attack vessels.

The Ohio-class SSBN’s will reach the end of their service life in 2027. Plans call for replacing 14 Ohio SSBNs with 12 new SSBNs starting in 2019. The Navy doesn’t plan on replacing the four SSGNs, converted from SSBNs after the Cold War, when they retire in the late 2020s.

And here is where the budgeting problems start.

When it comes to replacing SSBNs, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated earlier this year that “the lead ship of the Ohio replacement class in 2019 will cost $13 billion,” with each successive ship coming in at about the $6-7-billion range, bringing the cost of the 12-ship replacement to about $99 billion. “That may leave scant room in the Navy’s stretched shipbuilding budgets to afford other vessels [on its] wish list,” the CBO stated. That $6-7-billion price tag comes to about half of the Navy’s annual $15-billion shipbuilding budget, which means that during the 15-year period (Fiscal 2019-33) when the Navy plans on building these ships, its ability to build other vessels would be severely restricted.

Under the Navy’s 2011 30-year Shipbuilding Plan, the service says it requires 48 attack submarines and four SSGNs “to sustain our capabilities in these areas.” Still, the service’s current plan puts it on course to purchase 44 attack submarines through 2040, which would not reach its desired number. According to CBO estimates, the number of attack submarines would sink to a low of 39 in 2030 before rising to 45 in the last five years of the plan. The number is expected to drop so dramatically due to the retirement of the Los Angeles-class submarines, while the Virginia class will not be built fast enough to replace them.

Craig Hooper, a San Francisco-based national security expert who has written widely on naval and Pacific Basin security issues, is skeptical about the Navy’s submarine plans. “With no viable means for our submarine builders to compete and drive down costs,” he says, “I expect the SSBN(X) build schedule to slide right, go over-budget and ultimately shrink to maybe a 10-boat buy.” Given the current budget situation, and the fact that instead of growing, budgets might in fact contract slightly, Hooper says that the Navy should start looking for ways to allow Virginia-class subs to serve different roles. “It would be a very interesting world if Virginia-class SSNs had the flexibility to serve in either the conventional SSN, SSGN or strategic SSBN roles. That would be a massive force multiplier and a boon for the bottom line,” he says.

“[The] strategic deterrent is also changing,” Hooper adds. “As conventional weapons get increasingly accurate, America might be able to really reduce the number of submarines slated to serve in the traditional nuclear deterrent role.”

Photo: US Navy

[chefman21]

Is there a chance that the US is going to have move away from being a global presence to a more regional role? They will still be a global presence obviously, but my gut feeling is that they are going to have to pick and choose very carefully where they decide to maintain their presence.

[buglerbilly]

Nah unlikely, the idea of 2 1/2 wars at the same time, or whatever the 1990's basis was for the increased fleet, has been long a dead duck strategy in any case................

[chefman21]

The thing that got me wondering is that they have so many internal problems such as health and education, and they have been at war a long time, that I'm not sure the public is going to support an increase in funding to the defence budget. I think you are right though. American patriotism is still a strong culture, and they have been the number one superpower for the most part of the last 60 years. That's a hard thing to change.

[buglerbilly]

EMALS Hopes for First Shot Before Christmas

By CHRISTOPHER P. CAVAS

Published: 8 Dec 2010 17:49

The first launch of an aircraft by the U.S. Navy's new electro-magnetic launch system could take place by mid-December, an event that would mark a major step ahead for a program with its full share of critics and doubters.


An F/A-18E Super Hornet set for takeoff from a carrier's steam catapult. A similar aircraft will make the first launch from a new electromagnetic launch system. (Lt. Reann Mommsen / U.S. Navy)

"The shot should take place within a couple of weeks," said Rob Koon, a spokesman for Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR). Asked if the engineers were trying to make the launch before Christmas, Koon replied, "that's what they're hoping for."

The Electro-magnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) is a critical piece of technology that will be installed in the new Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft carriers, the first of which is now under construction. If the system isn't ready in time, the Navy would have to revert to older steam catapults to launch aircraft from the ships, a move that would mean costly delays and redesigns............EDITED...........

Read more: http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=5192796&c=AME&s=AIR

[buglerbilly]

Ares

A Defense Technology Blog

Navy Successfully Fires 33-Megajoule Railgun Shot

Posted by Paul McLeary at 12/10/2010 3:06 PM CST

In a demonstration Friday afternoon, the Office of Naval Research set a world record by conducting a 33-megajoule shot of its Electromagnetic Railgun at the Naval Surface Warfare Center.


Video: ONR

Rear Adm. Nevin Carr, chief of naval research, said that "the 33-megajoule shot means the Navy can fire projectiles at least 110 nautical miles, placing sailors and Marines at a safe standoff distance and out of harm's way." High velocities also make the system tactically relevant for air and missile defenses, Carr said.

To put it in some perspective, the 33-megajoule shot could reach a Mach 5 velocity at extended distances, perhaps more than 200 nautical miles.

[chefman21]

That's so cool:thumbsup

I wonder how much weight a projectile has to be to make it efficient?

Now, they just need to get Nokia involved and shrink the bloody thing...

[JimWH]

A rail gun's effect will work almost entirely on Kinetic Energy, and as we should all recall from high school physics, KE=1/2mv^2. So, even a very light projectile can still be incredibly effective if it's moving fast enough. As evidenced above, they're now able to fire a projectile with 33MJ of energy, which is bloody huge.

[Unicorn]

Cue video about the Transformers 2 railgun mounted on an Arleigh Burke class destroyer.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_6qizxSFckc

Unicorn

[buglerbilly]

Navy launches first aircraft using EMALS

NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND PATUXENT RIVER, Md. – The Navy made history Saturday when it launched the first aircraft from the Naval Air Systems Command, Lakehurst, N.J., test site using the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System, or EMALS, technology.

The Navy has been using steam for more than 50 years to launch aircraft from carriers. Saturday, the Aircraft Launch and Recovery Equipment (ALRE) program launched an F/A-18E Super Hornet using the EMALS technology that will replace steam catapults on future aircraft carriers.

“This is a tremendous achievement not just for the ALRE team, but for the entire Navy,” said Capt. James Donnelly, ALRE program manager. “Saturday’s EMALS launch demonstrates an evolution in carrier flight deck operations using advanced computer control, system monitoring and automation for tomorrow’s carrier air wings.”

EMALS is a complete carrier-based launch system designed for Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) and future Ford-class carriers.

“I thought the launch went great,” said Lt. Daniel Radocaj, the test pilot from Air Test and Evaluation Squadron 23 (VX-23) who made the first EMALS manned launch. “I got excited once I was on the catapult but I went through the same procedures as on a steam catapult. The catapult stroke felt similar to a steam catapult and EMALS met all of the expectations I had.”

The current aircraft launch system for Navy aircraft carriers is the steam catapult. Newer, heavier and faster aircraft will result in launch energy requirements approaching the limits of the steam catapult system.

The mission and function of EMALS remain the same as the steam catapult; however, EMALS employs entirely different technologies. EMALS will deliver the necessary higher launch energy capacity as well as substantial improvements in system weight, maintenance, increased efficiency, and more accurate end-speed control.

“I felt honored to be chosen as the Shooter to help launch the first live aircraft tested on the new EMALS track at Lakehurst,” said Chief Petty Officer Brandon Barr, Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division Test Department, Lakehurst. “It was very exciting to knowingly be a part of naval aviation history. Petty Officers 1st Class Hunsaker and Robinson, Petty Officers 2nd Class Williams, Wong, and Simmons, were the sailors on my team who worked together to help make this test a success. We all look forward to seeing this cutting edge technology deployed on the Gerald R. Ford."

“I’m excited about the improvement EMALS will bring to the fleet from a capability and reliability perspective,” said Cmdr. Russ McCormack, ALRE, PMA-251, deputy program manager for future systems. “EMALS was designed for just that purpose, and the team is delivering that requirement.”

The system’s technology allows for a smooth acceleration at both high and low speeds, increasing the carrier’s ability to launch aircraft in support of the warfighter.

The system will provide the capability for launching all current and future carrier air wing platforms – lightweight unmanned to heavy strike fighters.

Engineers will continue system functional demonstration testing at NAVAIR Lakehurst. The team will expand aircraft launches with the addition of T-45 and C-2 aircraft next year.


Photo 1: “The Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System launches its first F/A-18E Super Hornet on Saturday Dec. 18 at Naval Air Engineering Station Lakehurst, N.J.” U.S. Navy photo by Kelly Schindler.


Photo 2: “An F/A-18E Super Hornet lifts off the runway after the first launch by the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System on Saturday Dec. 18 at Naval Air Engineering Station Lakehurst, N.J.” U.S. Navy photo by Kelly Schindler.

[buglerbilly]

Video of events up to and including the launch..............

[buglerbilly]

Congress Wants Ship Missile Defense Plan

Dec 23, 2010

By Michael Fabey



Congress wants the U.S. Navy to submit a report by March 31 to show how the service plans to incorporate its ship-based ballistic missile defense requirements with its force structure needs, according to the recently passed defense authorization legislation.

The report should include :

• An analysis of whether the requirement for sea-based missile defense can be accommodated by upgrading Aegis ships that exist as of the date of the report or by procuring additional combatant surface vessels.

• A discussion of whether such sea-based missile defense will require increasing the overall number of combatant surface vessels beyond the requirement of 88 cruisers and destroyers in the Navy’s 313-ship fleet plan.

• A discussion of the process for determining the number of Aegis ships needed by each commander of the combatant commands to fulfill ballistic missile defense requirements, including the number of such ships required to support the “phased, adaptive approach” to ballistic missile defense in Europe.

• A discussion of the impact of Aegis Ashore missile defense deployments, as well as deployment of other elements of the ballistic missile defense system, on Aegis ballistic missile defense ship force structure requirements.

• A discussion of the potential effect of ballistic missile defense operations on the ability of the Navy to meet surface fleet demands in each geographic area and for each mission set.

• An evaluation of how the Aegis ballistic missile defense program can succeed as part of a balanced fleet of adequate size and strength to meet the security needs of the U.S.

• A description of both the shortfalls and the benefits of expected technological advancements in the sea-based missile defense program.

• A description of the anticipated plan for deployment of Aegis ballistic missile defense ships within the context of the fleet-response plan.

Photo: MDA

[buglerbilly]

Navy Efficiencies Announced

(Source: US Navy; issued Jan. 7, 2011)

WASHINGTON --- The Secretary of Defense announced Jan. 6 a series of efficiencies decisions designed to save the Department of Defense more than $150 billion during the next five years.

According to Secretary Robert M. Gates, the savings would be achieved primarily by reducing overhead costs, improving business practices and culling excess or troubled programs.

Most of the resulting savings will be used by the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force to invest in high-priority programs that strengthen warfighting capabilities. The intent of these proposed changes is to improve support to operational forces, and to reprioritize resources to fund the Navy of today while building the Navy of tomorrow.

No fleet area was exempt from this review.

"Secretary Gates charged the Navy and Marine Corps to scrub everything, eliminate the unnecessary or underperforming, find savings, and apply those savings to warfighting," said Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus. "We have done that. Hard choices were made, but they were necessary to make certain we are the most efficient and effective fighting force we can be.

"Secretary Gates' leadership has resulted in reasonable and responsible reforms that will ensure the Navy and Marine Corps remain the most formidable expeditionary fighting force the world has ever known," said Mabus.

"The Navy enthusiastically participated in Department of Defense efficiency efforts," said Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead. "I am pleased with the rigor undertaken throughout this process, the results of which will contribute to the Navy's warfighting capabilities."

A concentrated effort was taken to identify and eliminate excess overhead costs to protect force structure and invest in modernization. In broad terms, military manpower was enhanced by trading overhead staff and shore billets to buy fleet manning requirements. Specifically, the Department of the Navy is proposing to use efficiencies savings to:

-- Accelerate development of a new generation of electronic jammers to improve the Navy's ability to fight and survive in an anti-access environment.

-- Increase the repair and refurbishment of Marine equipment used in Iraq and Afghanistan.

-- Develop a new generation of sea-borne unmanned strike and surveillance aircraft.

-- Purchase more of the latest model F-18s and extend the service life of 150 of these aircraft as a hedge against more delays in the deployment of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).

-- Purchase additional ships, including a destroyer, a littoral combat ship, an ocean surveillance vessel and fleet oilers.


In order to achieve efficiencies savings of more than $35 billion over five years, the Department of the Navy proposes to:

-- Reduce manpower ashore and reassign 6,000 personnel to operational missions at sea.

-- Use multi-year procurement to save more than $1.3 billion on the purchase of new airborne surveillance, jamming, and fighter aircraft.

-- Disestablish several staffs (but not the associated platforms) to include submarine-, patrol aircraft-, and destroyer-squadrons plus one carrier strike group staff.

-- Disestablish the headquarters of U.S. 2nd Fleet at Norfolk, Va., transferring responsibility for its mission to the Navy's Fleet Forces Command, also located in Norfolk, Va.

"The initiatives we have undertaken will allow the Navy to address readiness and warfighting capabilities, optimize organizations and operations and ensure that resources are optimized in operations and maintenance initiatives. These savings and changes will enable us to be the Navy the nation needs today and into the future," said Roughead.

During the Cold War, U.S. 2nd Fleet had distinct and significant operational responsibilities. Disestablishing this command would affect approximately 160 military positions. No ships will change homeport as a result of the disestablishment of 2nd Fleet. The Hampton Roads area, which includes the cities of Virginia Beach, Norfolk, Chesapeake, Newport News, Hampton, Portsmouth, and Suffolk, is the location of the world's largest naval station. It is homeport to 77 ships, which includes aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, large amphibious ships, submarines, and a variety of supply and logistics ships, as well as 300 aircraft, 35 aircraft squadrons, 356 tenant commands.

In addition, a number of flag officer billets and Senior Executive Services or equivalent positions will also be eliminated or downgraded. Monetary savings from reductions in senior personnel will be relatively modest and will create fewer, flatter, more agile and effective organizations. Monetary savings from reductions in senior personnel will be relatively modest and will create fewer, flatter, more agile and effective organizations. Furthermore, U.S. Navy Europe, like other service components in which will eventually be reduced to a three-star command, will take place over a longer period because of that command's unique role in the NATO transformation effort.

"This Department simply cannot risk continuing down the same path - where our investment priorities, bureaucratic habits, and lax attitudes towards costs are increasingly divorced from the real threats of today, the growing perils of tomorrow, and the nation's grim financial outlook," said Gates, at the conclusion of the announcement.

"These times demand that all of our nation's leaders rise above the politics and parochialism that have too often plagued considerations of our nation's defense - whether from inside the Pentagon, from industry and interest groups, and from one end of Pennsylvania Avenue to the other," he said. "I look forward to working through the next phase of the President's defense reform effort with the Congress in the weeks and months ahead - to do what's right for our armed forces and what's right for our country."

-ends-

[buglerbilly]

CNO Discusses Shipbuilding, Future Force at 23rd SNA National Symposium

(Source: U.S Navy; issued January 14, 2011)

ARLINGTON, Va. --- The chief of naval operations (CNO) was the keynote speaker during an annual banquet at the Surface Navy Association's 23rd National Symposium in Arlington, Va., where he spoke on the importance of future force and current operations of the Navy, Jan 14.

Adm. Gary Roughead spoke on the important role of naval leadership in strengthening the future force of the Navy.

"Our job, as the nation's leaders, is to ensure Sailors have the ships, the aircraft and the submarines that will enable them to accomplish the mission," said Roughead. "We are maintaining our unrelenting emphasis on leader diversity, so that the best ideas to keep our Navy great are able to be heard."

Roughead discussed the need to increase the number of ships in the Navy. Although 313 is commonly referred to as the "floor" of what the Navy needs, he emphasized that more ships are needed, and that we require a combination of balance and quantity to build the Navy for the future.

"Three hundred thirteen is the numerical floor because it gives us global capabilities," he said. "At some point, quantity becomes a capability. Although it appears to be years away, [that] looming prospect of 'block end' of service life across several classes of ships that where built in the 1980's when we get into the 2020's requires action in the very near term to chart a course through that very challenging period. As the commander in the Pacific and the commander in the Atlantic, I can tell you that I never had enough ships, even before we developed the maritime strategy," said Roughead.

Recognizing the need for new ships, CNO stressed the importance of the Navy working with the shipbuilding industry to control costs. He stressed the need for restraint and appetite suppression, explaining that it will take the combined effort from both the Navy and the industry to realize efficiencies in shipbuilding.

"I expect Navy leaders to take a disciplined approach in determining our needs," he said. "An approach based in the maritime strategy that strives to balance among the six core capabilities, linking each purchase to a capability or capabilities will be the test I will apply. Our program submission for Fiscal Year 2012 funds our most pressing requirements and continues our investment in force structure even in the context of increasing fiscal pressure. To do this, hard decisions must be made in the short term to ensure a long term shipbuilding plan is viable."

Roughead also reiterated the Navy's position on the repeal of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy.

"Combat effectiveness is what we provide as a Navy," said Roughead. "And repeal will neither change who we are or what we do. The time is right, the time is now, and we will lead a prompt and thoughtful implementation."

The Surface Navy Association was founded in 1985 to "promote great coordination and communication among those in the military, business and academic communities who share a common interest in naval surface warfare."

-ends-

[buglerbilly]

U.S. Navy Chief Isn’t Sweating China’s Sea Power

By Spencer Ackerman January 19, 2011 | 8:48 am



As Chinese Premier Hu Jintao prepares for today’s state dinner at the White House in his honor, the headlines are filled with questions about his control over China’s rapidly modernizing military. So it falls to Adm. Gary Roughead, the Navy’s top officer, to signal that he’s not worried about Chinese seapower — either with optimism that his Chinese counterparts will be responsible mariners or with unsubtle reminders that they’re not yet as good as his own sailors.

In barely a month, China’s made big strides in military technology, rolling out a stealth jet prototype called the J-20 and reaching what the U.S. Navy calls “initial operating capability” on its DF-21D “carrier killer” anti-ship missile. Much as the new Chinese weaponry has caused anxiety in U.S. defense circles, Roughead signaled that he doesn’t think the Chinese can rapidly develop new weapons systems that can compete with what the U.S. has.

“[A]s you get into higher-end capability, I am not so sure that the rate of acceleration is the same,” Roughead told a Financial Times interviewer. “When you start moving into higher-end capabilities, the incremental improvements are harder, more costly and more complex.” That’s in line with Defense Secretary Robert Gates publicly questioning “just how stealthy” the J-20 is during his recent trip to China.

On that trip, though, the Chinese military tested the J-20, apparently without Hu’s knowledge. And that seemed in line with the past two years’ worth of increasing Chinese military assertiveness. It wasn’t even two years ago that the People’s Liberation Army Navy, known as the PLAN, harassed a U.S. spy ship in the South China Sea. But Roughead was far more welcoming than angry with the PLAN in his interview.

Global maritime cooperation? “I would very much like the PLAN to be part of that and in fact they are.” New Chinese subs and satellites? “As we all seek to do… they clearly want to assure that operational space around the mainland and the areas they consider to be vital and important.” Growing Chinese sea power in general? “[C]onsistent historically with the economic rise of powers.” If there’s a message there, it’s that the U.S. Navy isn’t looking for a confrontation.

And if there’s a subtext, it’s that the U.S. would dominate one if the Chinese bring it. The Navy’s top information officer, Vice Adm. Jack Dorsett, said earlier this month that the Chinese haven’t yet knitted together all their sea, air and land fighting forces or integrated them with their new technologies. Roughead let it be known that the U.S. Navy is “experienced in the application and the use of very high-end equipment in operational environments on a daily basis,” and keeps 37 percent of the fleet forward deployed — “I don’t know what percentage I would put on the PLAN that is forward-deployed,” he added.

The carrier-killer missile? Sure, the Chinese will have it fully ready in “the next couple of years,” but can it overcome the “challenges of finding, targeting and then hitting” a maneuvering U.S. Navy ship? What’s more, for all the talk about the PLAN developing an anti-ship missile to cheaply blunt the power of an aircraft carrier, Roughead noted that the Chinese are building their own carrier, which “speaks a little about the value of them.” And just because the PLAN builds a carrier, “[k]nowing how to operate it and being very competent in those operations is something very different,” he said.

Same goes for the new Chinese submarine production. “I would submit that our new Virginia class is the best in the world,” Roughead said, adding that no one should discount the U.S.’ growing skills at anti-submarine warfare.

Gates returned from China without a solid commitment from the People’s Liberation Army to create a military-to-military communications channel. That means interviews like Roughead’s are going to be pored over in Beijing for keys to U.S. military intentions. And how Chinese admirals interpret the U.S. Navy chief’s interview — emphasizing the cooperation or the U.S.’ military advantage — will say something about their own.

Photo: DoD

[buglerbilly]

U.S. Navy Focuses On Surface Ship Funding

Feb 18, 2011

By Michael Fabey



The U.S. Navy’s focus on funding surface fleet ships in the fiscal 2012 budget request is proving to be a bonanza for aircraft carriers, Landing Helicopter Assault (LHA-7) amphibious assault replacement ships and San Antonio LPD-17-class vessels.

The Navy plans to spend a combined amount of about $6 billion for construction and research and development work on those vessels during the upcoming fiscal year.

The budget request includes $555 million in construction funding and another $137 million for research and development for the CVN-21 and $530 million for the refueling and complex overhaul of the USS Abraham Lincoln CVN-72.

The budget also requests $2 billion for the LHA-7s, compared to $950 million in fiscal 2011, as part of the second increment for the program.

The largest of all amphibious warfare ships, the LHA-7 represents a step up from the Tarawa-class LHAs, which are reaching the end of their extended service life in 2015.

The budget requests $1.9 billion for the LPD-17s, compared to $1.4 million in fiscal 2011 for the 11th and final ship of the class. The funding includes line shutdown costs for the San Antonio-class ships, which are replacing 41 vessels across four different ship classes.

Over the next five years, the Navy plans to buy five more ships across all classes than the service had initially planned to acquire (Aerospace DAILY, Feb. 15). By comparison, the Navy is cutting its intended aircraft purchase numbers by 31 to 973.

For the previous decade, though, the Navy was much more focused on its aircraft. The service spent more than $50 billion for fixed-wing aircraft and aircraft-related work between 1999 and 2009, according to an Aerospace DAILY analysis of contracting data provided by the National Institute for Computer-Assisted Reporting.

By comparison, the Navy spent a bit more than $15 billion for carriers — excluding nuclear components — and amphibious assault ships combined, the analysis shows.

Photo: US Navy

[buglerbilly]

Construction Begins on Navy's Newest Aircraft Carrier

Story Number: NNS110225-02 Release Date: 2/25/2011 3:32:00 PM 0 Comments


NEWPORT NEWS, Va. (Nov. 13, 2009) Robert Bowker, a structural welder with Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding, welds the initials of Susan Ford Bales into the keel of the aircraft carrier Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) during a keel laying and authentication ceremony. Gerald R. Ford is the newest class of aircraft carrier. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Cory Rose/Released)

From Program Executive Office Aircraft Carriers Public Affairs

NEWPORT NEWS, Va. (NNS) -- Advance construction started on the nation's newest aircraft carrier Feb. 25 with a "first cut of steel" ceremony at Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding Newport News, Va.

The steel plate cut will be used in the construction of the carrier, which has yet to be named, but will be designated CVN 79.

The carrier represents the second in a new class of ships designed to replace Enterprise and Nimitz-class carriers and save more than $5 billion in total ownership costs during its planned 50-year service life when compared to Nimitz-class carriers.

"Today we mark the beginning of the advance construction of CVN 79, second of the Gerald R. Ford-class of aircraft carriers," said Rear Adm. Michael McMahon, Program Executive Officer (PEO) for Aircraft Carriers. "It's an important step in continuing carrier construction using advanced technologies and efficiencies to reduce both ownership and procurement cost in this new class of carriers."

Ford-class aircraft carriers, while retaining the same hull form as the Nimitz class, contain several advanced technology systems including Electromagnetic Aircraft Launching Systems, advanced arresting gear, dual band radar, a redesigned smaller island and a new propulsion plant. The first ship in the class, Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78), is also under construction at Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding-Newport News and is scheduled to be delivered to the fleet in September 2015.

The PEO for Aircraft Carriers, an affiliated PEO of Naval Sea Systems Command, focuses on the design, construction, system integration, delivery and life-cycle support of all aircraft carriers.

[buglerbilly]

U.S. Navy Protects Carriers And Subs

Mar 1, 2011

By Michael Fabey



The U.S. Navy brass loves to perpetuate the cliché that the first question any U.S. president asks during a time of overseas crisis is: Where are the carriers?

But what the service is less likely to trumpet is that this has been the very same question among federal budget cutters through the years, especially since the end of the Cold War.

Indeed, carriers and their costly cousins, the Navy’s submarine fleet, have been targeted by many as relics of an obsolete deep-water strategy to defeat a defunct Soviet superpower. Even though both vessels have proven themselves to be operationally relevant in current conflicts, their enormous price tags have made them a large bull’s-eye for defense cost cutters.

To keep their prized vessels viable in today’s economic climate, the Navy has had to prove the carriers and submarines were relevant in terms of their acquisition and procurement — that the service could squeeze enough cost out of the programs to make them worth the time and investment.

The service says it has done just that with its Ford-Class carriers and Virginia-Class subs, and there is evidence to suggest the Navy is on the right course.

Nonetheless, it is easy to see why budget cutters take aim at sub and carrier programs. The Navy has spent about $16.5 billion on submarine-related contracts and modifications since 1999, according to an Aerospace DAILY analysis of federal contracting data provided by the National Institute for Computer-Assisted Reporting.

That was the fifth-highest single category among Pentagon expenses, the analysis shows. Ranking sixth during that time were aircraft carrier expenses, at about $15.9 billion. When nuclear components and related work are factored in, though, submarine and carrier work totaled about $42.3 billion. By comparison, the total for fixed-wing expenses — the largest single expense category during that time — and engines is about $40 billion, the analysis shows.

To keep the budget cutters away, the Navy has focused on trimming procurement and life-cycle costs out of both the Virginias and Fords.

For example, the service wants to cut the acquisition costs for its fiscal 2012 subs, partly by reducing the time it takes to build them. And the service wants to cut costs further by incorporating changes like a large-aperture bow array and 12 vertical launch tubes.

On the Fords, the Navy has a new power plant meant to reduce reactor department manning by 50% and make more electricity.

The new class also will incorporate electromagnetic catapults, which will further cut manpower needs, and redesigned weapons stowage, handling spaces, and elevators to reduce manning, increase safety, and increase weapons throughput. And the ships’ integrated warfare system is intended to be adaptable to technology upgrades without requiring expensive retrofits.

For the most part, these are incremental changes — but the “savings” add up, especially over the life of a ship. When you are talking about such large platforms, even the smallest of percentage savings can mean a great deal. And they can be enough, the Navy is finding out, to keep the budget cutters away.

Image: Northrop Grumman

[buglerbilly]

Baby Boomers Will Upgrade U.S. Sub Fleet

Mar 2, 2011

By Michael Fabey



With its ballistic-missile submarine replacement program anchored by milestone authority and a fiscal 2012 request for about $1.1 billion in R&D funding, the U.S. Navy is set to develop and build SSBN(X) boats without sinking the rest of its shipbuilding plan.

While it is apparent the Navy plans to use the Virginia-class attack submarine program as a template for the SSBN(X), there is uncertainty about whether the new boomers will resemble a modified Virginia, improved version of the current SSBN model or a hybrid of both.

What is certain, though, is that the Navy is committed to developing and deploying the new submarines.

The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review emphasized the need to replace the SSBNs—the most survivable and capable of the strategic deterrence legs of the nuclear triad, according to the 2009 Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States.

The U.K. uses the same D5 submarine missiles and is working with the U.S. on developing and building a common missile compartment.

While the U.K. plans to replace its ballistic submarine fleet a few years behind the U.S. schedule—despite a split between factions within the British government over whether the procurement should go ahead—U.K. funding has carried the compartment development thus far and the British remain on board, for now.

There’s no uncertainty about SSBN(X)’s high price. As the Congressional Research Service (CRS) recently noted, only a new nuclear-powered aircraft carrier rivals a boomer’s shipbuilding cost.

Including the fiscal 2012 budget request, the Navy R&D investment for the new sub class amounts to a bit more than $2 billion. Some estimates put R&D as high as $7 billion.

CRS and Congressional Budget Office reports suggest individual sub price tags of $5-7 billion, with fleet acquisition costs running between $69 billion and more than $110 billion.

To put that in perspective, the Navy has spent at least $15.5 billion for submarine expenses—excluding nuclear reactor procurement—since 1999, according to a DTI analysis of contracting data provided by the National Institute for Computer-Assisted Reporting.

The Navy plans to start building the lead SSBN(X) in fiscal 2019, making sub buys concurrent with wholesale end-of-service-life retirements of SSN 688 submarines, CG-47 guided missile cruisers, DDG-51 guided missile destroyers and LSD 41/49 dock landing ships.

“While the SSBN(X) is being procured, the Navy will be limited in its ability to procure other ship classes,” the service acknowledged in a 30-year shipbuilding plan.

The CRS notes the service may fall short of the number of attack submarines it needs because of resources required to build the SSBN(X).

A lot has to happen before the SSBN(X)-buying bonanza starts. The program received Pentagon Milestone Authority this year, providing Defense Department approval to develop technology and refine requirements.

The Navy says it will focus on the propulsion plant, missile compartment development and platform development technologies such as the propulsor, electric actuation, maneuvering and ship control.

The service says it wants to use “the successful Virginia-class acquisition program” as a template for new boomers.

The Navy is buying two Virginia-class subs a year under a multiyear contract with Electric Boat and Northrop Grumman. “The Ohio replacement will leverage the latest Virginia-class design tools, equipment and manufacturing techniques” with an eye toward finding common development areas and reducing design costs, Naval Sea Systems Command acquisition officials said in a statement. “Basically, it would be an improved SSBN version, using Virginia-class technology,” Rear Adm. Joe Mulloy, deputy assistant Navy secretary for budget, says. “The initial plan is for 16 (missile-launch) tubes, a new-design reactor plant, and similar antennas and design to the Trident and Virginia-class submarine.”

There would be no advanced torpedo room, he adds, but the Navy wants to improve stealth. While the Virginia is perhaps the stealthiest sub the Navy has, service officials tell lawmakers that a simple modified design of the attack sub would likely not work for the SSBN(X)

The Navy won’t comment on whether it will pursue a dual-team SSBN(X) contract.

Northrop Grumman representative Jerri Dickseski says, “We have a successful relationship with Electric Boat and the Navy on the Virginia-class submarine program and envision continuing this partnership . . . in producing future submarines.”

General Dynamics Electric Boat built the existing Ohio-class fleet, and its president, John Casey, doubts any other company could match such work.

Photo: US Navy

[buglerbilly]

Navy to correct delayed aircraft launch system

By Christopher P. Cavas - Staff report, Navy Times

Posted : Wednesday Mar 9, 2011 22:00:02 EST

The new Electronic Aircraft Launch System under development for the U.S. Navy took a “pause” to correct problems that appeared after the first test launch in December, a top Navy official said March 9.

The Navy conducted its first test launch of the system using a real aircraft, rather than a test load, on Dec. 21 at its catapult testing facility in Lakehurst, N.J. But no further flights have been made since the successful launch of an F/A-18E Super Hornet.

The problem, said Sean Stackley, the Navy’s top acquisition official, was a “gap” between the motors as the system worked to accelerate the aircraft to launch speed.

The EMALS consists of a number of linear motors in series, Stackley explained. “In the handoff from motor to motor, as the aircraft is accelerating, there is a gap. That needs to be tuned.”

The Navy and contractor General Atomics have been working on the system’s software to cure the problem, Stackley said.

“We took a pause, we’re coming back with corrections, and coming back with a system functional demonstration this month,” he said during a hearing of the Seapower and Projection Forces subcommittee of House Armed Services Committee.

Stackley made his remarks in response to a question by new chairman Rep. Todd Akin, R-Mo., about the system’s progress.

The EMALS is a key element in the design and operation of the Navy’s newest aircraft carrier, the Gerald R. Ford. The ship is about 20 percent complete, according to testimony presented earlier March 9 by Adm. Gary Roughead, chief of naval operations, and the system is “on schedule to support delivery” of the carrier in September 2015.

The EMALS program has suffered numerous delays during its development, however, and is reported to have nearly exhausted the margin of error to deliver components on time to shipbuilder Northrop Grumman Newport News so they can be installed on the carrier. Further EMALS delays, one source said, could begin to impact the carrier’s building schedule and threaten cost increases.

Along with the associated Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) aircraft recovery system, EMALS is expected to increase the pace of launch and recovery operations on the carrier by 25 percent.

“We are carefully watching components delivered to Newport News,” Stackley said. “I think the risk is acceptable, absolutely.”

[buglerbilly]

CBO Testified on the Navy’s Shipbuilding Plans

(Source: Congressional Budget Office; issued March 10, 2011)

Yesterday CBO senior analyst Eric Labs testified before the House Armed Services Committee’s Subcommittee on Seapower and Projections Forces to discuss the challenges that the Navy is facing in its plans for building its future fleet.

The testimony focused on the costs and force structure implications of the 30-year shipbuilding plan that the Navy released last year. It did not address in detail the Navy’s 2012 10-year plan, which was released last week. CBO has not yet performed a detailed analysis of the new plan; however, because the differences between the two plans appear to be minor, CBO’s discussion of the long-term affordability of the Navy’s shipbuilding program encompassed some specifics about the 2012 plan:

-- If the Navy receives the same amount of funding for ship construction in the next 30 years that it has over the past 30-years—about $15 billion per year (measured in 2011 dollars)—it will not be able to afford all of the 276 ships in the 2011 plan.

-- CBO’s analysis of the 2011 plan showed that the Navy would need $21 billion a year for all necessary activities in the Navy’s shipbuilding accounts. Of that amount, $19 billion a year would be required for new ship construction. Under the 2012 plan, CBO expects the required level of funding to be very similar.

-- Under its 2012 plan, the Navy plans to buy 106 ships over the next 10-years, compared with 104 ships for the same period under the 2011 plan. The breakdown between combat ships and support ships is essentially the same in the two plans. Under both plans, the Navy would buy 30 support ships between 2012 and 2021, although the composition of those ships varies slightly. Under the 2012 plan, it would buy 76 combat ships versus 74 under the 2011 plan.

-- Over the next five years (2012 to 2016), the Navy plans to spend 9 percent more in real terms on new ship construction than in the last five years (2007-2011). The Navy’s estimate of spending for ship construction over the next five years, however, is in line with the longer-term historical average, which is about $15 billion per year in 2011 dollars.

--There are several reasons to believe that, over the next 30 years, the overall costs of the Navy’s 2012 shipbuilding plan would probably be somewhat lower than the costs of the 2011 shipbuilding plan. Nevertheless, CBO’s preliminary analysis of the 2012 plan indicates that the Navy will continue to have a long-term funding challenge, particularly in the 2020s, when the new class of ballistic missile submarines is expected to be built: Carrying out its plans would cost substantially more than the amounts the Navy has historically spent on shipbuilding.

Click here for the full report (31 pages in PDF format) on the CBO website.

http://cboblog.cbo.gov/?p=1962

-ends-

[buglerbilly]

CNO Assesses Russian, Chinese Navies

By CHRISTOPHER P. CAVAS

Published: 16 Mar 2011 22:00


The U.S. Navy seeks ways to work with the Chinese and Russian navies, said Adm. Gary Roughead, chief of naval operations. (MCS Tiffini Jones Vanderwyst / Navy)

"The Russian Navy is moving again."

That was the description given Wednesday by Adm. Gary Roughead, the U.S. Navy's chief of naval operations (CNO), when asked for his assessment of America's former Cold War opponent.

"The Russian Navy still has great ambition, still has great pride," he said.

The collapse of the Soviet Union significantly reduced the navy, Roughead noted, with most shipbuilding programs coming to a halt or dragging out.

"That has stopped in recent years," he said. An improving Russian economy will mean "you're going to see an increase in their capability and capacity, with new shipbuilding programs taking hold." Roughead noted the recent move by Russia to acquire several French-designed Mistral-class amphibious ships as an indication of rising interest in increased operations.

The navy "will now begin to rebuild itself," he said, "and bring more modern capability to bear and operate more widely."

Roughead did not speak of a growing Russian naval force as a threat.

"I believe we should work closely with the Russian Navy to see where we can work together," he said, and cited operations with Russian ships working to counter pirates off Somalia.

Roughead was asked for his assessment of the Russian and Chinese navies during an appearance before the Senate Appropriations Committee's defense subcommittee. It was the last of several hearings before the House and Senate to present the 2012 budget request.

The Chinese Navy is the fastest-growing in the world today, Roughead said.

"We see their submarine fleet expanding, their surface combatants expanding. But it's also how they're using their command and control facilities," he said, "and the nature of expanding beyond the first island chain," the ring of islands that surround the Chinese mainland.

The strategic objectives of China's naval expansion seem to be same "that nations and navies have had throughout history," Roughead said. "As economies rise it follows there will be a strong navy."

"They want to ensure their sea lanes are able to be used," he told Sen. Dan Coats, R-Ind., who specifically asked about China's anti-carrier missile capability.

"There has been a lot of discussion about the Dong Feng 21 missile," Roughead acknowledged. "But the DF 21 is no more an anti-access weapon than a submarine is. I would argue that you can put a ship out of action faster by putting a hole in the bottom than by putting a hole in the top."

Noting the superiority of the U.S. Navy's Virginia-class attack submarines over the several types China is building, Roughead declared that "even though the DF 21 has become a newsworthy weapon, the fact is our aircraft carriers can maneuver, and we we have systems that can counter weapons like that."

"My objective," in regards to the Chinese, Roughead said, "is to not be denied ocean areas were can operate, or not be restricted in our ability to operate."

The Chinese being constantly scrutinized as to their intentions, Roughead told Coats.

"I think it's important to gain insight into what their intent is," he said. "So we watch developments very closely."

China's designs on the Arctic Ocean were also questioned by Sen. Lisa Murkowski, R-Alaska, who asked how the Navy planned to respond to increased activity in the region due to climate change.

"There is no question in my mind that the Arctic is changing," Roughead said. But along with working closely with the Coast Guard, the CNO again observed that "the most important thing is to become party to the convention of the Law of the Sea" treaty, long hung up in the Senate. "If we are not party to that treaty we will not have a seat at the table as this unfolds."

[buglerbilly]

DATE:04/04/11

SOURCE:Flight International

Comment: Digging deep for naval aviation's future

In less than three decades from 1910, the aircraft carrier rose to overcome centuries of naval tradition and be crowned the new ruler of the seas. Even today, the floating flight deck is the US Navy's heart. And as naval aviators reflect on their first century, it is worth considering the aircraft carrier's prospects for the second.

Every innovation in warfare is followed by a countermeasure. Stealth overtakes the radar; then radar is adapted to detect the first generation of stealth. But the aircraft carrier has been immune to this phenomenon. Able to fling fighters and bombers off its flight deck, it can stand off a great distance from its target. It is encircled by protective ships, both above and below the surface. These traits have ensured survivability, from the Gulf of Tonkin to the Taiwan Straits to the Persian Gulf.


© US Navy

But since 1996, when two US carriers intervened in a stand-off with Taiwan, China has focused on forcing the carrier battle group far back into the Pacific Ocean. The arrival of China's first anti-ship ballistic missile and the Chengdu J-20 prototype signal that the carrier will never again have free access to the Taiwan Straits.

Still, the real threat to the carrier is a balance sheet, not a weapon. With a price tag of about $11-12 billion, the next generation of ships in development will strain the navy's ability to pay for vessels and the weapons that make them useful. No countermeasure has ever proven more effective than an empty treasury.

[buglerbilly]

US naval aviation back on the rise


© Northrop Grumman
How Northrop Grumman sees the carrier deck of 2020

Retired Vice Adm Robert Dunn remembers being called to the Secretary of the Navy's office. It was 1989 and the US Navy was still at the peak of its Cold War, 600-ship glory. Defence spending, however, was already in decline and the navy's top civilian, Henry Garrett, had a tough decision to make. As deputy chief of naval operations for aviation, Dunn's portfolio included two projects for a carrier-based, long-range strike aircraft - a re-engined Grumman A-6E Intruder called the A-6F - and a far more ambitious project called the McDonnell Douglas/General Dynamics A-12 Avenger II.

"We can't afford the A-12 and the A-6F," Garrett told Dunn. "Which one do you want?" "I think we better go with the A-12 because that is going to be a more capable aircraft," Dunn said. Almost 22 years on, however, Dunn says: "In retrospect, I don't know if it was good advice or not." In fairness, there were few options. An era of naval aviation was coming to a close. In 1989, navy leaders could choose between two projects for a long-range strike aircraft; by the end of the next decade there were no such projects in development or anything similar in service.

On 7 January 1991, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney cancelled the A-12, citing design shortfalls and cost overruns. Six years later, the navy retired the last A-6E with no true replacement. The navy was changing in 1989 and the future became about limiting schedule delays, cost overruns and high operating costs. At the time of Dunn's meeting with Garrett, however, it still seemed right to advocate for a revolutionary aircraft. "There was a time when the navy was pushing the envelope much more," says Eric Wertheim, author of the US Naval Institute's "Combat Fleets of the World". If there was any doubting the shift in strategy, in December 1992 the navy awarded Boeing a $3.72 billion contract to develop the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, which meant abandoning the Grumman F-14 contract. "The basic problem with the F-14 - not that it wasn't a good aircraft, it was a superb aircraft - but the cost per hour of the F-14 was twice that of the F-18 and at that time, with the budgets coming down, it was a matter of affordability," Dunn says.

SUPER HORNET

"No question about it," says Norman Polmar, a naval consultant and author. "The F-14 in its time was one of the most versatile and capable fighter aircraft in the world. They proceeded with the Super Hornet at the direction of the Department of Defense in order to save maintenance money. I can assure you the F-14 was the preferred aircraft." Norman Friedman, another author and naval strategist, notes that the F-14 decision was in step with the navy's new operational vision, which implied a shift in emphasis from deep attack to littoral warfare.

"The key issue at the time was money - it often is," Friedman says. "There was also a conscious choice that the navy would not be doing heavy-duty deep strikes; those would be left to the air force, with Tomahawks doing the precision strikes. On that basis, the shorter-range F/A-18 was very attractive."

A major element in naval aviation identity to emerge after the early 1990s was a grudging reliance on other branches of the US military.

"Today the navy is content to depend on land-based tankers, whether they are air force or allied to do their work in Afghanistan or Iraq," Dunn says. "But we wanted to be self-contained in those days. [Aircraft] like the A-16, A-12 and F-14 were very attractive because they were long range. They didn't require as much refuelling as the [Vietnam-era Ling-Temco-Vought] A-7s and later the F-18s.


© US Navy
Carrier deck circa 1991

"More and more, with the kind of missions popping up around the world today, there's a dependency on land-based tankers. Somewhere along the way we have to work with our sister services. We can't be self-contained all the time." With the retirement of the last F-14D in 2006, the F/A-18A-D Hornet and the F/A-18E/F became the only tactical fighters on carrier decks fulfilling the key roles - air superiority and attack. The consolidation of the carrier deck was not limited to fighters. The retirement of the A-6 also meant the loss of the KA-6, the tanker variant that dramatically extended the range of carrier-based air attacks.

Some still think the navy's consolidation went too far, especially when the Lockheed S-3B Viking was retired and replaced by helicopters for anti-submarine warfare and maritime patrol missions. "NAVAIR and the navy have made a significant effort to reduce their logistics chains on carrier decks," Wertheim says, but retiring the Vikings "takes away a capability that you just don't replace. You can't argue that you aren't losing capability." Dunn, however, thinks the navy made the right decisions about consolidation. "I've been in favour of reducing the number of types of aircraft because it so simplifies the logistics and maintenance support, which in many ways are the long poles in the tent," Dunn says.

He also stresses that the S-3B's capabilities were not only replaced by helicopters. "Don't forget the satellites that we're depending upon," Dunn says. "As far as [anti-submarine warfare], they're depending more and more on [attack submarines] that are part of the battle group." It is a lesson that epitomises a slogan of modern management - do more with less. By contrast, the US Air Force took an entirely different approach in the early 1990s - it launched the F-22 programme.

A 2005 study by Rand's project air force analysed the results of these two approaches.

The Lockheed Martin F-22 introduced a fighter that combined stealth, supercruise and integrated avionics, including all-new airframe, structural materials, engine, radar and cockpit systems. The F/A-18E/F was based on an existing airframe, engine and avionics. While the F-22's development cost was $7.2 billion over budget, the F/A-18E/F was delivered on cost, the Rand report concludes.

"If you were to go back in time to 1990 and say this is how your acquisition strategy is going to end up in 2011, how are you going to feel about it? My feeling is the air force would really be rethinking it," Wertheim says.

"The navy invested in EA-18 Growlers instead of just putting all their investment in stealth," he adds. "The navy waited for that technology to mature somewhat. You're seeing some of the issues you're having with the F-22 with their reliability because of the maintenance requirement. Their reliability is not what they hoped for." Not everyone is convinced the navy's approach was the right one. Polmar says the F/A-18E/F strategy worked but it helps that the navy has not faced a more capable adversary. "So far we've not met any opponents that have been able to beat a formation of F-18s," he says.

LONG-RANGE BOMBER

That situation seems to be changing rapidly. In December, the US military acknowledged China had fielded an anti-ship ballistic missile. Both Russia and China have also revealed prototypes for fifth-generation fighters to compete with the F-22 and Lockheed Martin F-35. Meanwhile, US navy and air force strategies on next-generation combat aircraft seem to be going in opposite directions. The air force is developing a new long-range bomber, while the navy plans to introduce the F-35C on carrier decks by the end of the decade, along with a possibly revolutionary system called the unmanned carrier-launched airborne surveillance and strike (UCLASS) system. The navy may also replace the F/A-18E/F with the FA-XX in the mid-2020s. If the navy eventually combines the F-35C, UCLASS and FA-XX on to a single carrier deck, the capabilities of such a force would probably be recognisable to the fleet Dunn envisaged when he sealed the fate of the A-6F in Garrett's office in 1989.

"That's what it's all about," Dunn says. "Any thinking naval aviator will say the air force has the punch and the stay-ability if they have the bases. They don't often have the bases, so that's why the navy has to be ready."

[buglerbilly]

Navy Seeking Production Stability: HII CEO

Apr 5, 2011

By Michael Fabey



The U.S. Navy is through with making new molds for its warships and is looking for more production-line stability from its shipyards, according to Michael Petters, president and CEO of Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII), the newly minted spin-off of the former Northrop Grumman shipbuilding units.

“We’re entering a period now — and this could be most of the decade — where there’s not a whole lot of lead shipbuilding going on,” Petters said April 4 at a press briefing on the new company’s operations. “It’s a different mindset.”

It is also a mindset that should mesh well with HII’s plans for corporate and financial success. The company’s Newport News Shipbuilding unit is already geared up for serial production work for the Navy’s aircraft carriers and Virginia-class submarines, especially if the government can untangle budget constraints and make the money available to start the two-subs-per-year production that the Navy and the company already have under contract.

The Ingalls Shipbuilding yards along the Gulf, though, are just getting into the production-line mode as the company finishes up what Petters called “underperforming” contracts for LPD amphibious transport dock ships and a next-generation LHA-6 amphibious ship for joint operations.

Those contracts — negotiated shortly after Hurricane Katrina ravaged the region and the yards — contained “aggressive” pricing provisions, Petters says. On top of that, the company was building the DDG-1000 destroyer—a “one-of-a-kind” ship that proved to be a poor fit in a shipyard that needed to get back to serial production. “We would have this one ship sitting in our yard,” he says.

The company and the Navy negotiated a deal that shifted the DDG-1000 to Bath Iron Works and brought contracts for two more DDG-51 destroyers and another couple LPDs to the yard — ships, Petters says, that “we know how to build.”

That know-how will help the company “reboot” its operational focus at the Gulf yards and re-establish better serial production, Petters says.

With the DDG-1000 work moved and the underperforming LHD and LHA-6 work nearly completed, the Ingalls unit promises to make better profits as it focuses on the production line of the other Navy and Coast Guard vessels, Petters says.

Another piece of that puzzle for financial success is the closing of the shipyard in Avondale, La. Petters called the decision a “capacity” issue and reiterated that the company is open to suggestions about keeping the yard open.

The new shipbuilding CEO makes it clear HII has no visions of growing its U.S. Navy shipbuilding business in the near term. But, he adds, the business the company has now is both visible and stable.

Photo: USN

[buglerbilly]

BAE Systems Selected to Demonstrate Tactical Laser System for the U.S. Navy

(Source: BAE Systems; issued April 7, 2011)

ARLINGTON, Va. --- BAE Systems has received a contract valued at $2.8 million from the U.S. Navy to demonstrate a Tactical Laser System (TLS) that can be integrated with existing U.S. Navy gun mounts.

The TLS couples a solid-state high-energy laser with the weapons module to provide extremely precise targeting and counter-material disabling effects. The system also provides the ability to deliver scalable effects by varying the level of laser energy required, depending on the target and mission objectives.

“The Tactical Laser System provides a 21st century-directed energy weapon system with speed-of-light precision effects against surface threats,” said Mark Signorelli, vice president and general manager of Weapon Systems for BAE Systems.

“The TLS is revolutionary because it combines kinetic and directed energy weapons capability,” said Signorelli. “Our approach is an effective and affordable solution for the customer, because this system can be integrated into existing shipboard mounts.”
BAE Systems intends to collaborate with Boeing Directed Energy Systems, located in Albuquerque N.M. for the development of the Tactical Laser System.

BAE Systems will display the Tactical Laser System in booth #1419 at the Navy League Sea Air Space Exposition April 11-13 at the Gaylord National Resort and Convention Center in National Harbor, Md.

-ends-

[buglerbilly]

Video: Navy Laser Sets Ship on Fire

By Spencer Ackerman April 8, 2011 | 12:54 pm



With clouds overhead in the salty air, irritable Pacific waves swelled to up to four feet. Perfect conditions, in other words, for the Navy to fry a small boat with a laser beam — a major step toward its futuristic arsenal of ray guns.

Researchers mounted the Maritime Laser Demonstrator, a solid state laser, aboard the USS Paul Foster, a decommissioned destroyer. Off the central California coast near San Nicholas Island on Wednesday, the laser fired a 15 kilowatt beam at an inflatable motorboat a mile away as both ships moved through the sea. As the above video shows, there was a flash on the boat’s outboard engines, igniting both of them in seconds, and leaving the ship dead in the choppy waters.

All previous tests of the laser have come on land — steady, steady land — aside from an October test of the targeting systems. But for the first time, the Office of Naval Research has proven that its laser can operate in a “no-kidding maritime environment,” says its proud director, Rear Adm. Nevin Carr.

“I spent my life at sea,” Carr says in an interview with Danger Room, ” and I never thought we’d see this kind of progress this quickly, where we’re approaching a decision of when we can put laser weapons on ships.”

Fewer than three years after the Navy awarded Northrop Grumman a contract worth up to $98 million to build the Maritime Laser Demonstrator, it’s proven able to cause “catastrophic failure” on a moving target at sea the first time out, says Quentin Saulter, one of ONR’s top laser gurus.

“When we were doing the shot and the engine went, there was elation in the control room,” he says. “It’s a big step, a proof of principle for directed energy weapons.”

The Navy hopes that by the next decade, solid state lasers — which generate powerful beams of light by running electrons through crystals or glass — will be aboard its surface ships, disabling enemy vessels and eventually burning incoming missiles out of the sky. That latter goal will take at least 100 kilowatts of power. But a beam in the tens of kilowatts, ONR proved this week, is deadly, accurate and, Carr says, “can be operated in existing power levels and cooling levels on ships today.”

Solid state lasers are just the beginning. The Navy’s also working on a much more powerful Free Electron Laser weapon thanks to ONR’s research. That laser works across multiple wavelengths, compensating for debris in the sea air, to cut through 2,000 feet of steel per second once it gets up to megawatt class. Its electron injectors are ahead of schedule and ONR expects it to be ready in the 2020s, though after its solid state cousins are operative.

Next up will be to “develop the tactics, the techniques, the procedures, and the safety procedures that sailors are going need to develop” to wield laser weapons, Carr says. And then it’s time to scale up the laser’s power.

“This is an important data point,” the admiral says, “but I still want the Megawatt death ray.”

YouTube version of the video:

[buglerbilly]

Ares

A Defense Technology Blog

BAE Systems Proposes Upgunned Burke

Posted by Bill Sweetman at 4/11/2011 6:07 AM CDT

BAE Systems is using the Navy League Sea-Air-Space show this week to unveil a new proposal for the DDG-51 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers: Advanced Gun System - Lite, a downsized version of the gun turret that the company has been developing for the DDG-1000 Zumwalt destroyer.

The AGS-Lite uses the same gun as the full-size AGS and the same rocket-boosted, 155-mm caliber Long Range Land Attack Projectile (developed by Lockheed Martin), so it has the same 74 nm design range. This is the critical improvement over the Mk45 5-inch (127 mm) gun now fitted to Navy surface combatants, which has a 13-mile range. AGS and LRLAP were designed to provide fire support to forces on land.

On AGS-Lite, BAE Systems plans to reduce the number of ready and total LRLAP rounds, simplify the feed and eject system (accepting a lower rate of fire of six versus ten rounds per minute) and eliminate the stealth features of the turret, reducing weight from 100 metric tons to 51 tons (just under twice the weight of the Mk45 installation). The company also proposes to develop a simpler anti-surface-warfare round.

This is one of a number of developments that reflects the fact that as far as the US Navy is concerned, DDG-51 derivatives will dominate the surface combatant program into the foreseeable future. The result is that companies are trying to move their new technologies into future DDG-51s, particularly the evolving Flight III ships. Other new features being proposed include hybrid drive systems, to improve efficiency and provide energy for the new Air & Missile Defense Radar (AMDR).

AGS-Lite has advantages for the Navy, in that it helps close the gap in naval surface fire support capability that yawned open when the decision was taken to cap the Zumwalt line at three (very expensive) ships. It could also relieve the industrial and logistics challenges of having a total of six AGS in the fleet, firing a unique round. The downside, however, is that Flight III could morph into a virtually new ship with all its extra features - with attendant increases in cost and risk.

[buglerbilly]

Ship, Sub Building Efforts Back on Track: U. S. Navy Undersecretary

By CHRISTOPHER P. CAVAS

Published: 10 Apr 2011 12:19

The U.S. Navy's major shipbuilding and aviation programs are largely setting into stability, but questions are rising about the strategic outlook for the Navy and Marine Corps and the forces they will need in the future, all in the context of a declining defense budget.


Undesecretary of the U.S. Navy Robert Work recently sat down with Defense News for a wide-ranging interview. (U.S. Navy)

Navy Undersecretary Robert Work is in the center of the effort to define the Navy Department's direction and map out its future roles.

Q. How are you going to cut the budget for 2013?

A. First of all, we have not received fiscal guidance yet for POM 13 [Program Objective Memorandum]. We expect it momentarily. The way that this will work is the Navy and the Marines have been working on an expected top line which was based on last year's submission, the POM 12 submission, and that is due into the Department of the Navy on the 2nd of May. Then we will have three months to prepare the budget and turn it over to the Department of Defense, and then we'll go through the budget review throughout the rest of the year like we normally do. So we're expecting to get top level guidance here within the next week.

The Navy and the Marine Corps will refine their plans based on the guidance and will continually refine them until the 30th of July or so when it is due to the secretary of defense. So I'm expecting the numbers will change slightly, over time depending on how the budget negotiations go on the Hill, and we'll just adjust accordingly.............................EDITED.... .........

Read (a lot) more here:

http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=6189440&c=AME&s=SEA

[buglerbilly]

HPM, High-Energy Lasers To Arm U.S. Warships

Apr 12, 2011

By David A. Fulghum



Directed-energy weapons are being paired with traditional cannons to produce advanced shipboard defense against people, small arms, light boats and unmanned aircraft using non-lethal and low-power devices.

Future plans also include introducing high-power microwave (HPM) devices for counter-electronics attacks and high-energy lasers, say BAE Systems officials visiting Washington for the Navy League’s Sea-Air-Space Exposition. With high power outputs, the targets set for these directed-energy combinations include enemy air defense and anti-ship cruise missiles. Other options are to put HPM devices into unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or small missiles that can be carried by unmanned helicopters like the Fire Scout to patrol ahead of and above ships. The team of BAE Systems as integrator and Boeing, which is supplying the beam director, contends that the technology and platforms for both air and sea are available and await only the miniaturization of some key components.

The current 15-month program puts a two-phase, 10-kw laser on a ship-mounted, Mk 83 25-mm cannon. The cannons are being installed on virtually every surface ship in the Navy. And the laser supplement program will wrap up with a land-based demonstration. No additional crew is needed to operate the one-man, remote-control, gun and laser system. The laser beam director is installed on the left side of the gun mount and a laser source is located below it. The laser has integrated power conversion and cooling.

The Mk.83’s current electro-optical/infrared fire-control system would be used for initial detection of small boats, for example, at ranges of about 10 km. Targeting would then shift to the optics within the laser beam director at about 8 km.

“That gives a high-resolution capability to determine how many crewmen there are on a small boat, if they have weapons and what kind of weapons they are,” says John Perry, BAE Systems’ manager of business development for advanced systems. “We then transition to a low-power, eye-safe, green-laser, visual interruption mode.”

If the threatening behavior continues, there are more options available to the defenders. “We can switch to the [10-kw] high-energy laser mode and start to engage at 3-4 kilometers,” Perry says. “For a non-lethal engagement, we can target a portion of the boat away from the crew. It could be a radar or a deck-mounted weapon.”

Escalating the engagement a bit more, “We could cook off the ammunition — machine gun rounds, small missiles or rocket-propelled grenades. If it’s [an inflatable] boat, we can certainly puncture [air] bladders.”

The amount of time to create effects depends on the target range and the material type and can vary from two to tens of seconds. The pointing system ensures that the laser beam stays within 3 mm of the aim point even with both ships moving in a rough sea.

“For a [10-kw] deck-mounted system like this, in the future we think we can [target] UAVs,” Perry says. “When you get to hundreds of kilowatts [of laser power], you can move into anti-ship, cruise missile defense. Our approach is to get an initial capability out to the fleet to give them a chance to figure out a concept of operations and how it complements kinetics.”

Another part of the future plan for air targets is to take external cues from the ship’s radar so the gun/laser system can pick up a track, slew the gun mount and start tracking with optics within the beam director. Another type of directed energy envisioned for the Mk.83 gun mount is a BAE Systems-developed HPM weapon with an anti-electronic-attack capability.

By choosing the correct frequency span, HPM “has counter-electronics specific to swarms of small boats where you can stop their engines at [long] range,” Perry says.

“Unlike lasers, HPM beams don’t need a lot of accuracy. With a fan [of HPM energy] you can target 10-30 small boats. If you can knock out 50-75% of the engines in a swarm, you can then concentrate on the remainder with lasers or kinetic [cannons].”

Photo: Northrop Grumman

[buglerbilly]

Sea Air Space 2011: USN spells out future for Airborne Electronic Attack

April 12, 2011

The US Navy (USN) will continue to look at integrating its Next-Generation Jammer (NGJ) onto UAVs as it looks to provide an airborne electronic attack (AEA) capability for low-density, high-demand assets, according to officials.

Speaking at the Navy League Sea Air Space exposition in Washington, DC, Capt John Green, programme manager for AEA systems and EA-6B Prowler (PMA 234) described how UAVs would provide the next step beyond the 'threshold' EA-18G Growler and future F-35B AEA variants.

However, Green warned that currently, the E-18G was the only AEA platform with a research and development funding budget. With a view for this airframe to deal with low band operations and the F-35B to operate in medium bands, a shortlist of air vehicles capable of covering high bands had yet to be decided.

To date, the USN has conducted NGJ tests with the US Army's Shadow UAV but Green would not be drawn on naming additional UAVs being considered for the similar usage. However, he conceded that a number of AN/ALQ-99s, originally designed in the 1960s, would still be flying up until 2025 and perhaps beyond.

Although not yet a Program of Record, the USN said it expected an initial fielding of NGJ in 2019 and according to the navy, NGJ comprises a 'subset of overall EW system of systems' rather than a one-stop solution to cover every eventuality, Green explained.

The full spectrum jammer is designed for external carriage with a total of five different pods being developed. Green also described how industry was heading in the direction of using electronically scanned arrays.

However, he warned that weight and drag was an issue that needed resolving: 'It's a killer today. We need a streamlined pod that does not weigh a lot- it's a balancing act,' he stated.

In July last year, the USN awarded four contracts to joint ventures led by ITT/Boeing; Raytheon; Northrop Grumman; and BAE Systems, which will be reduced to two parties for the Technology Demonstrator phase. Green concluded that a single party would then be downselected for the final development phase.

'Dedicated stand-off jammers including the ALQ-99 and NGJ continue to be central to the navy's AEA strategy and we are moving towards low-density, high-demand issues,' he said.

[I] Andrew White, Washington, DC

[buglerbilly]

Moved - wrong thread!

[buglerbilly]

Ford Carriers Stay On Schedule

Apr 13, 2011

By Michael Fabey



While the rest of the aircraft carrier community breathed a collective sigh of relief in December when the U.S. Navy’s new Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (Emals) launched its first Boeing F/A-18E Super Hornet, shipbuilders and contractors for the next-generation CVN-78-class flattop knew the real work was just beginning.

While many in and out of the Navy worried about the risk of testing and refining a breakthrough technology like Emals concurrently with actual carrier construction, those building the ship and the aircraft-launching system say the real risk will be in maintaining the aggressive delivery schedule.

“If we were to wait for our new technology to be completely mature before deciding to include it, we’d never build a carrier,” says Navy Capt. Brian K. Antonio, Future Aircraft Carrier program manager. “There’s always concurrent development. It’s a balancing act—but we’re all on a schedule to launch in 2013.”

Keeping to schedule and making sure that technology works are key to making the CVN-78 Ford-class affordable and Navy shipbuilding plans viable. Delivering the ship on time will help cap construction costs, while Emals and other advancements promise to whittle away at lifecycle costs for a carrier class set to roam the seas into the coming century.

As the Navy’s most expensive ship to build or operate, any cost savings the service can realize on a carrier are certain to pay dividends.

“She’s coming together well,” said Rear Adm. Michael McMahon, carrier executive officer, at the Northrop Grumman shipyard in Newport News, Va., in February moments before the shipbuilder made its first steel cut on the next Ford-class carrier, CVN-79.

But there was less confidence about the future of the CVN-78—and the Ford-class program—in December. While Emals-maker General Atomics had succeeded in launching numerous heavy objects with the system, there had yet to be a successful Super Hornet takeoff.

“They took an enormous risk,” says Stuart Slade, senior naval editor for consultant Forecast International. “For a while, it didn’t look like it would pay off. It looked like we would have the world’s biggest helicopter carrier.”

An Emals failure would put the Ford’s future in doubt. It would be difficult—if not impossible—to rip the ship apart and reconfigure and rebuild it for a steam system.

Emals’ early herky-jerky progress had analysts working on briefings about how the Navy could have to develop some modified large amphibious ship derivation to fill the gap left by the Ford. The Dec. 18 Super Hornet catapult launch allayed those fears.

“It never dawned on me that we would not be able to launch that aircraft,” says Scott Forney, vice president of electromagnetic systems for General Atomics. “The real risk has always been in the production phase. My biggest concern was: How do we get ready to produce hardware in time for CVN-78?”

Northrop Grumman is keeping on pace with the schedule. Matt Mulherin, sector vice president, said in February that about a quarter of the ship’s structural units were in the dry dock.

One way the yard verified that its proposed design changes would meet Navy requirements was to put together a new simulation and modeling tool. It displayed flight-deck and other operations, as well as the impact of alterations.

“The program model emulates movement on the flight deck to verify that design features allow the ship to meet the requirements,” says Mike Shawcross, Newport News Ford-class vice president. The yard used the modeling to ensure that changes on the carrier help increase sortie generation and reduce manning, two of the Navy’s main objectives.

Some changes include: reducing the island size and moving it aft; decreasing the number of galleys, aircraft elevators and hangar bay doors; and replacing rotating radars with solid state-based systems.

“We needed to reduce the workload on the crew to allow the Navy to take sailors off the ship,” Shawcross says.

Including air wing manning cuts, Ford-class carriers will have 1,300 fewer sailors than the baseline Nimitz, even though the hull is essentially the same, Antonio says.

Slade says all the work is worth the effort. “She’s going to be an enormous improvement over the Nimitz class. With Nimitz, the primary role was alpha strike—to launch the attack wing. Now carriers need to support more land operations, they need to generate a more constant stream of aircraft.”

Doing that with significantly fewer people, he adds, is what’s going to make the Ford valuable in decades to come.

Image: Northrop Grumman

[buglerbilly]

Sea Air Space 2011: USN airborne battle management system gears up for OPEVAL

April 13, 2011

The US Navy's (USN's) E2-D Advanced Hawkeye will begin an operational evaluation (OPEVAL) in November concluding with flight tests aboard the USS Harry S Truman, according to the navy and Northrop Grumman.

Speaking at the Navy League Sea Air Space exposition in Washington, DC, Capt Shane Gahagan, programme manager for PMA-231 and James Culmo, vice president airborne electronic warfare programmes at Northrop Grumman, said four aircraft are scheduled to conduct the tests ahead of a proposed deployment date at the start of 2015.

Due to take place at Naval Air Station Fallon, Nevada, as well as on board the USS Truman, the OPEVAL will comprise the long range detection of 'stressing air and cruise missiles; sea target tracking; and precision tracking of manoeuvre assets,' Gahagan said. Tests will also include use of Hawkeye's AAS/ESS and ETS radar systems as well as its Tactical Navigation Cockpit display.

'We are now nearing the end of the development programme,' Gahagan stated while referring to February's Carrier Suitability tests which he described as 'the last major milestone in the development programme'. Culmo added that weapon system verification and subsystem qualification testing was due to be completed this year with 95 per cent of flight tests now complete.

The OPEVAL is due to conclude in March 2012 after the E2-D has completed successful take-offs and landings from the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier. According to Culmo, the production schedule will see a total of 75 aircraft delivered to the USN by 2019, with 20 platforms already approved by Congress.

Once OPEVAL is completed, the navy said one and a half squadrons would be equipped with the airframes each year with a 10-month transition for aircrews to train on the new systems. However, the navy said the in-service E2-C is expected to remain in service until 2026.

Additionally, Culmo said the navy and Northrop Grumman were also considering an 'off-board ISR' capability for the airframe as part of an 'evaluation from the warfighter's perspective' as well as an air-to-air refuelling capability in order to provide mission duration up to 12 hours. 'We will be doing this later in the year behind C-130 Hercules and Hornet aircraft,' he stated.

Finally, Northrop Grumman said it was also looking at development of an export variation: 'We have approval to talk to a number of partners who already have E2-Cs, who perhaps could upgrade to E2-Ds in the future,' Culmo stated. Interested parties are understood to include France, India, Japan, Malaysia and the UAE as well as Egypt and Taiwan.

Andrew White, Washington, DC

[buglerbilly]

BAE Systems Delivers Greater Intelligence Capabilities to Two U.S. Navy Ships

11 Apr 2011 | Ref. 069/2011

NATIONAL HARBOR, Md. – Today at the Navy League Sea Air Space Exposition, BAE Systems announced it has delivered two production units of the U.S. Navy’s primary shipboard intelligence system for U.S. naval forces, providing significantly greater intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting capability over legacy systems.

The first BAE Systems-built production system of the Distributed Common Ground System-Navy (DCGS-N), is currently being installed onboard the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) in Norfolk, Va. The second system was delivered to the government for immediate shipment to the USS George Washington (CVN 73) in Yokosuka, Japan.

“BAE Systems’ delivery of the Eisenhower and George Washington DCGS-N systems greatly contributes to the timely deployment of this crucial intelligence exploitation system to the Fleet. It provides critical capabilities that give the U.S. Navy a significant edge in maritime information dominance,” said Capt. Robert Parker, program manager for the U.S. Navy's Battlespace Awareness and Information Operations Program Office, Program Executive Office for Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence.

The systems are part of BAE Systems’ five-year, $72 million DCGS-N Prime Mission Product contract with the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command to manage DCGS-N development, production and support. More than 25 systems will be delivered under the contract.

"Fleet delivery of this DCGS-N system advances the Navy’s access to critical joint and national intelligence systems to support multiple mission areas," said Tom Hennies, director of C4ISR Solutions for BAE Systems. “Sailors and crew members can more efficiently get the information they need to carry out their missions.”

DCGS-N integrates applications and services onto a common infrastructure to share and disseminate vital data for analysis and targeting to support ashore and afloat missions. As the U.S. Navy’s component of the DoD’s DCGS family of systems, DCGS-N allows the Navy to exchange information and data across multiple security domains, warfare areas, environments and theaters.

BAE Systems is also working to deliver upgraded system capabilities with an early adopter upgrade scheduled for installation on the USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6) later this spring. The BAE Systems-led team also consists of General Dynamics, Sun Microsystems, ManTech, Space Dynamics Laboratory, InVisM, Argon ST and Athena Consulting.

[buglerbilly]

This is the 155-mm Advanced Gun System — Lite (AGS-L) proposed for the Up-gunned Burkes..............




BAE Systems continues the transformation of Naval land attack and surface warfare with the introduction of the 155-mm Advanced Gun System – Lite (AGS-L).

The 155-mm AGS-L system is based largely on the production AGS system and provides the same range, lethality, accuracy, all-weather operation and responsiveness in a system that is tailored for a low-impact installation on a DDG-51 or other similar-sized surface combatant.

62 calibre barrel

6 rounds per minute firing rate

180 x LRLAP/ASuWP mix of rounds with a maximum of 240 x LRLAP & 48 x ASuWP. The gun can fire 180 rounds in a continuous sequence hence the additional rounds carried for the max loadout most likely are stored near-to-mount.

The LRLAP has a rocket motor and GPS/IMU guided for a max range of 74 Nautical Miles, the ASuWP is a high-capacity standard round.

[buglerbilly]

Ares

A Defense Technology Blog

Laser and Microwave Weapons Support Naval Cannon

Posted by David A. Fulghum at 4/14/2011 8:59 AM CDT

Directed energy weapons are being integrated with traditional kinetic naval cannon to produce advanced shipboard defense against people, small arms, light boats and unmanned aircraft. In the future, cruise missiles will be added to the target set.

Options include non-lethal and low power effects. But the new combinations also offer lethal, higher power capabilities for a much larger target set including enemy air defense and anti-ship cruise missiles.

Plans include introducing high power microwave (HPM) devices for counter-electronics attacks and high energy lasers (HEL), say BAE Systems officials. Other options are to put the HPM devices into unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or small missiles that can be carried by unmanned helicopters like the Fire Scout to patrol ahead of and above ships.

The current 15 mo. program conducted by the team of BAE systems and Boeing pairs a two-phase, 10 KW laser on a ship-mounted, Mark 38 25mm cannon. No additional crew is needed to operate the one-man, remote control, gun and laser system. The laser beam director is installed on the left side of the gun mount and a laser source is located below it. The laser has integrated power conversion and cooling.

The Mk.38’s current electro-optical/infrared fire control system would be used for initial detection of small boats, for example, at ranges of about 10 km. Targeting would then shift to the optics within the laser beam director at about 8 km.

“That gives a high-resolution capability to determine how many crewmen there are on a small boat, if they have weapons and what kind of weapons they are,” says John Perry, BAE Systems’ manager of business development for advanced systems. “We then transition to a low-power, eye-safe, green-laser, visual interruption mode.”

If the threatening behavior continues, there are more options available to the defenders.

“We can switch to the [10KW] high energy laser mode and start to engage at 3-4 km.,” Perry says. “For a non-lethal engagement, we can target a portion of the boat away from the crew. It could be a radar or a deck-mounted weapon.” Escalating the engagement a bit more, “We could cook off the ammunition – machinegun rounds, small missiles or rocket propelled grenades. If it’s [an inflatable] rib boat, we can certainly puncture [air] bladders.”

The amount of time to create effects depends on the target range and material type and can range from a couple of seconds to tens of seconds. The pointing system ensures that the laser beam stays within 3mm of the aim point even with both ships moving in a rough sea.

“For a [10KW] deck-mounted system like this, in the future we think we can [target] UAVs,” Perry says. “When you get to 100s of KW [of laser power], you can move into anti-ship, cruise missile defense. Our approach is to get an initial capability out to the fleet to give them a chance to figure out a concept of operations and how it complements kinetics.”

Northrop Grumman also is touting a ship-mounted, high-energy, solid-state laser that has produced “counter-material” effects. Demonstrations of the Maritime Laser Demonstrator were conducted between Oct. 2010 and April 2011 at the Pacific Ocean Test Range near Naval Base Point Mugu from the USS Paul Foster. The directed energy system tracked and damaged moving, remotely piloted, unmanned small boats.

“Results show that all critical technologies for an operational laser weapon system are mature enough to begin a formal weapon system development programs,” says Steve Hixon, vice president from space and directed energy systems. “Solid-state laser weapons are ready to transition to the fleet.”

The laser was installed on a decommissioned Spruance-class destroyer for the final demonstration when it was integrated with the ship’s radar and navigation system. During the final three days of trials, the laser operated more than 35 times in wave heights of up to seven-and-a-half feet, says Dan Wildt, Northrop Grumman’s vice president of directed energy systems.

Part of BAE Systems/Boeing’s future plan for air targets is to take external clues from the ship’s radar so the gun/laser system can pick up a track, slew the gunmount and start tracking with optics within the beam director.

Another type of directed energy envisioned for the Mk.83 gunmount is a BAE Systems-developed, high power microwave (HPM) weapon with an anti-electronics attack capability.

By choosing the correct frequency span, HPM “has counter-electronics specific to swarms of small boats where you can stop their engines at [long] range,” Perry says. “Unlike lasers, HPM beams don’t need a lot of accuracy. With a fan [of HPM energy] you can target 10-to-30 small boats. If you can knock out 50-75% of the engines in a swarm, you can then concentrate on the remainder with lasers or kinetic [cannon].”

HPM weapons built for counter-electronics can disrupt or damage things like radars, missile guidance packages and sensor communications. Moreover, cannon have a limited number of rounds on board any ship, while lasers and HPM devices have a bottomless magazine as long as the ship is producing power. For example, 75KW of ship’s power produced 10KW of laser energy. Demands on the ship are less for HPM.

“We could have a Fire Scout [unmanned helicopter] out in front of a ship coming into port so that it can radiate from above,” Perry says. “We consider adding [HPM devices] to missiles to take an emitter over an enemy’s coastline” to conduct suppression of air defenses in littoral areas. HPM can focus large amounts of effective radiated power on a point in space. HPM requires only a couple of seconds of power draw [from the ship] because the pulse width is so short it only requires a few kilowatts.”

[buglerbilly]

L-3 Approved for Low-Rate Initial Production of EP-3E Spiral 3 Aircraft

(Source: L-3 Communications; issued April 15, 2011)

NEW YORK --- L-3 Communications announced today that its Platform Integration division has been approved to begin low-rate initial production (LRIP) of the U.S. Navy’s EP-3E Spiral 3-configured aircraft, featuring an upgraded intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) mission avionics suite. Under the LRIP program, L-3 will manufacture and install this new capability on three EP-3E aircraft.

The successful completion of developmental testing using the L-3-modified prototype EP-3E Spiral 3-configured aircraft provided the basis for the Navy’s LRIP decision. The operational test phase of this project is currently underway, after which a full-rate production decision will be made regarding the modifications of the remaining aircraft in the EP-3E fleet to the Spiral 3 configuration.

“The EP-3E Spiral 3 program continues to demonstrate the importance of using proven and validated technology insertion to stay ahead of threats,” said Nick Farah, acting president of L-3 Platform Integration. “This approach ensures the high-demand EP-3E fleet can meet emerging operational needs using innovative network-centric technology that is adaptable to other platforms.”

As part of the Spiral 3 modification, L-3 will install state-of-the-art communications intelligence (COMINT) equipment, replacing aging and obsolete sensors and increasing the aircraft’s networking capabilities. These modifications improve onboard data analysis and provide real-time tactical intelligence dissemination.

L-3 began design of the Spiral 3 improvements in late 2007, delivering the prototype used for testing in 2010.

L-3 Platform Integration provides complex integration services for military, commercial and OEM customers at its aircraft integration facility in Waco, Texas. Its products and services include avionics and aircraft modernization, flight sciences engineering and certification, MRO, major modifications, VIP interior completion, and serving as prime contractor for the C-27J Joint Cargo Aircraft.

Headquartered in New York City, L-3 Communications employs approximately 63,000 people worldwide and is a prime contractor in C3ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) systems, aircraft modernization and maintenance, and government services. L-3 is also a leading provider of a broad range of electronic systems used on military and commercial platforms. The company reported 2010 sales of $15.7 billion.

-ends-

[buglerbilly]

US Sailors in Key Roles on French Carrier

April 18, 2011

Associated Press



ABOARD THE CHARLES DE GAULLE -- U.S. Navy Lt. Patrick Salmon is getting ready for another day at work, strapping himself into the cockpit of his strike jet and roaring off this French aircraft carrier for his daily attack mission against Moammar Gadhafi's ground forces.

He'll be launched into action by Kyle A. Caldwell, another U.S. Navy lieutenant who operates the flattop's catapult systems. When Salmon is ready to set his plane back on deck, yet a third U.S. Navy lieutenant, Philip Hoblet, will be standing by in a French rescue helicopter, hovering just off the ship's bow in case any of the returning pilots are forced to ditch into the sea.

The United States, which originally led the Libya campaign, has been steadily reducing its role over the past two weeks. On March 31, it handed over command and control of the international campaign to NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and shortly after that it ceased all attack missions over Libya -- setting of a search by NATO for more planes capable of carrying out precision strikes against Gadhafi's forces.

NATO said Friday that the U.S. still flies one-third of the Libya operation's missions. But that refers to surveillance and refueling missions, not to attack flights over Libyan territory.

But even though the U.S. has withdrawn its forces from the front lines of the NATO campaign, a handful of Americans serving on this French navy carrier remain at the forefront of the action.

They are members of a little-known French-American naval exchange program in which U.S. officers spend time in the French navy -- known as the "Marine Nationale" -- and French officers spend time in the U.S. navy.

"Because French carrier pilots are trained in the United States, this helps a lot with standardization of procedures," said Cmdr. Matthew Hogan, 44. "We're very comfortable operating with each other."

Hogan, who is nine months into a two-year posting at the naval base of Toulon in the south of France, serves on the flattop as a staff officer for Rear Adm. Philippe Coindreau, commander of the French fleet conducting the airstrikes against Libya.

The carrier, known in the navy by its nickname "Le Grand Charles," began reconnaissance flights over Libya on March 22. Attack missions followed almost immediately, and the ship has acted as the tip of the spear for NATO s aerial campaign ever since.

France currently has only a single carrier in its inventory, while the U.S. operates 11 of the floating air bases. The French therefore long ago decided it wasn't cost-effective to organize a training program of their own for their pilots, but rely instead on U.S. Navy training.

French naval aviators and some support personnel regularly head to U.S. Navy bases in Mississippi and Florida to learn carrier operations.

The four American officers serving aboard live in or near the base in Toulon, but only Hoblet has his family with him. The others say they spend too much time at sea to make it worthwhile for their wives and children to relocate to a foreign country.

The Americans received their basic language training at the Defense Languages Institute in Monterey, Calif. Although they achieved fluency in French, mastering the intricacies of colloquialisms and idioms remains a challenge.

Caldwell, 38, remembers his confusion when his workmate told him: "Ne faut pas pousser la grand mere dans les orties" -- literally "don't push your grandmother into the nettles."

The English equivalent of the phrase is "don't try so hard."

"So when we're not working, we're mostly studying French," he said. Working in another language onboard a carrier involves the additional complication of communicating in intensely noisy conditions. Jet engines roar, cables clang across the deck, catapults thump as they heave planes aloft and lifts whine has they move planes from the hangars to the flight deck.

But the four have received high praise from French officers for their language abilities, their performance and their camaraderie.

Caldwell, who has worked on several U.S. carriers, said the similarities between the two navies outweigh the differences, and said the major distinction was the number of sorties he handles a day.

"On U.S. carriers, we trap about 160 aircraft a day at sea, but here it's just 35-40 a day," he said. "Also, on U.S. carriers we're able to launch and trap aircraft at the same time, but because of the shorter size here, we need to close the carrier deck for each operation."

© Copyright 2011 Associated Press. All rights reserved.

[buglerbilly]

Aegis Combat Systems Installed on Two New U.S. Navy Destroyers

(Source: Lockheed Martin; issued April 20, 2011)

MOORESTOWN, N.J. --- The U.S. Navy, supported by Lockheed Martin, has installed the Aegis Combat System aboard two new Navy destroyers, USS Gravely (DDG 107) and USS Jason Dunham (DDG 109).

The Aegis Combat Systems aboard the ships have also been certified as fully operational through the tests known as Combat Systems Ship Qualification Trials.

During the trials, the ships' Aegis Combat Systems were evaluated for combat-readiness through comprehensive surface, subsurface and anti-air warfare exercises. These included manned raids and electronic attack scenarios, as well as thorough testing of the systems' tactical data link and air defense capabilities.

"The Aegis systems installed on these two ships represent continued improvements to what is a very agile and capable Aegis system," said Carmen Valentino, Lockheed Martin's vice president of Future Surface Combat systems. "Our Aegis team has successfully delivered 15 technological evolutions to the Navy, taking the Aegis combat system from an anti-ship missile system to the basis for the U.S. approach to global missile defense."

The Aegis Weapon System includes the SPY-1 radar, the Navy's most advanced radar system. When paired with the MK 41 Vertical Launching System, it is capable of delivering missiles for every mission and threat environment in naval warfare.

Including these two new Navy ships, the Aegis Weapon System is deployed on 95 ships around the globe. Aegis is the weapon system of choice for Australia, Japan, Norway, the Republic of Korea and Spain. Aegis-equipped ships combined have more than 1,200 years of at-sea operational experience and have launched more than 3,800 missiles in tests and actual operations.

The USS Gravely and USS Jason Dunham are both Arleigh Burke class guided-missile destroyers.

Headquartered in Bethesda, Md., Lockheed Martin is a global security company that employs about 132,000 people worldwide and is principally engaged in the research, design, development, manufacture, integration and sustainment of advanced technology systems, products and services. The Corporation's 2010 sales from continuing operations were $45.8 billion.

-ends-

[buglerbilly]

Testing Proves Advanced Technology For AMDR

Apr 22, 2011

By Michael Fabey



WALLOPS ISLAND, Va.—As competition heats up for the U.S. Navy’s Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) program, the focus will be on developing the S-band digital beamforming technology on a shipboard platform in time for the DDG-51 Arleigh Burke-class destroyer Flight III upgrades planned for later this decade.

Digital beamforming is an approach to phased-array antenna pattern control that provides performance advantages over conventional analog beamforming techniques, including improved operations in environmental clutter, according to Lockheed Martin.

S-band digital beamforming technology was demonstrated last year and earlier this year during testing at the Naval Sea Systems Command (Navsea) testing site at Wallops Island on the Virginia Eastern Shore, Navsea and contractor officials have confirmed.

A joint U.S. and U.K. effort spearheaded by Lockheed and BAE Systems demonstrated the S-band digital beamforming for full radar operations in a littoral and maritime environment, tracking targets in both a sea and “land-clutter” environment, Navsea officials say.

The tests were part of the Advanced Radar Technology Integrated System Test-bed (Artist), which uses two advanced, multifunction S-band active phased array radars —one for each nation—“to develop technology and assess techniques for defeating emerging threats, such as smaller, faster targets in dense clutter,” according to Lockheed.

The tests also used reflectors located on Wallops and Department of Interior land north and south of the Navsea island facility, Navsea says.

The testing measured environmental data to provide evaporation ducts information and signal propagation estimates, taking advantage of NASA environmental radars and sensors, as well as Navy sea and wave buoys.

Allan Croly, director of Lockheed Martin’s naval radar programs, says Artist “leverages our combined technology experience and the open architecture inherent in our radar designs to jointly evolve capabilities, avoid duplication of efforts, and reduce cost and risk for future radar development.”

The future of radar development—at least on the U.S. Navy side—resides with AMDR. The AMDR is designed to provide ballistic missile defense, air defense, and surface warfare capabilities. It will consist of an S-band radar for ballistic missile defense and air defense, X-band radar for horizon search, and a radar suite controller that integrates the two radars.

The Navy expects AMDR to provide the foundation for a scalable radar architecture to defeat advanced threats, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) notes in its recent report on Pentagon acquisition programs released earlier this year.

The GAO estimates the cost of the AMDR program at about $15.7 billion—a price tag that has many shaking their heads, including contractors vying for the program. GAO says it would cost about $2.3 billion for research and development and another $13.4 billion to buy the AMDR radar systems.

The major competitors for AMDR include Lockheed, which developed and deployed the stalwart Aegis defense system; Raytheon, which developed a dual-band radar system for the truncated DDG-1000 Zumwalt-class destroyer program; and Northrop Grumman, also a major radar-program player that reportedly has been looking to leverage the technology honed for its active, electronically scanned array radar systems aboard many Pentagon aircraft.

Photo: US Navy

[Unicorn]

No doubt the RAN is interested, but all will depend on pricing. How much is software and how much new hardware.

.

[buglerbilly]

Energy Weapons Arm Ships

Apr 26, 2011

By David A. Fulghum
Washington



Cannon do not have to be lethal to be useful.

Directed-energy weapons are being paired with traditional kinetic naval weapons to produce an advanced shipboard defense against people, small arms, light boats and unmanned aircraft. Options include non-lethal and low-power effects.

But the new combinations also offer lethal, higher-power capabilities for a much larger target set including enemy air defenses and anti-ship cruise missiles.

Plans include introducing high-power microwave (HPM) devices for counter-electronics attacks and high-energy lasers, say BAE Systems officials, who were in Washington for the Navy League’s Sea-Air-Space Exposition. Other options are to put the HPM devices into UAVs or small missiles that can be carried by unmanned helicopters like the Northrop Grumman Fire Scout to patrol ahead of and above ships.

The team of BAE Systems as integrator and Boeing, which is supplying the beam director, contends that the technology and platforms, both air and sea, are available and await only the miniaturization of some key components.

The current 15-month program puts a two-phase, 10-kw laser on a ship-mounted, Mk. 38 25-mm cannon. The cannon are being installed on virtually every surface ship in the U.S. Navy. And the laser-supplement program will wrap up with a land-based demonstration. No additional crew is needed to operate the one-man, remote-control, gun and laser system. The laser beam director is installed on the left side of the gun mount and a laser source is located below it. The laser has integrated power conversion and cooling.

The Mk. 38’s current electro-optical/infrared fire-control system would be used for initial detection of small boats, for example, at ranges of roughly 10 km (6.2 mi.). Targeting would then shift to the optics within the laser beam director at 8 km.

“That gives a high-resolution capability to determine how many crewmen there are on a small boat, if they have weapons and what kind of weapons they are,” says John Perry, BAE Systems’ manager of business development for advanced systems. “We then transition to a low-power, eye-safe, green-laser, visual-interruption mode.”

If the threatening behavior continues, there are more options available to the defenders.

“We can switch to the [10-kw] high-energy laser mode and start to engage at 3-4 km,” Perry says. “For a non-lethal engagement, we can target a portion of the boat away from the crew. It could be a radar or a deck-mounted weapon.” Escalating the engagement a bit more, “we could cook off the ammunition—machine-gun rounds, small missiles or rocket-propelled grenades. If it’s [an inflatable] rib boat, we can certainly puncture [air] bladders.”

The amount of time to create effects depends on the target range and material type, and can range from a couple to tens of seconds. The pointing system ensures that the laser beam stays within 3 mm of the aimpoint even with both ships moving in a rough sea.

“For a [10-kw] deck-mounted system like this, in the future we think we can [target] UAVs,” Perry says. “When you get to hundreds of kilowatts [of laser power], you can move into anti-ship, cruise missile defense. Our approach is to get an initial capability out to the fleet to give them a chance to figure out a concept of operations and how it complements kinetics.”

Northrop Grumman also is touting a ship-mounted, high-energy, solid-state laser that has produced “counter-material” effects. During the Maritime Laser Demonstration, which was conducted from the USS Paul Foster between October 2010 and April at the Pacific Ocean Test Range near NAS Point Mugu, Calif., the directed-energy system tracked and damaged moving, remotely piloted small boats.

“Results show that all critical technologies for an operational laser weapon system are mature enough to begin a formal weapon system development program,” says Steve Hixon, vice president for space and directed-energy systems. “Solid-state laser weapons are ready to transition to the fleet.”

The laser was installed on a decommissioned Spruance-class destroyer for the final demonstration, during which it was integrated with the ship’s radar and navigation system. In the final three days of trials, the laser operated more than 35 times in wave heights measuring up to 7.5 ft., says Dan Wildt, Northrop Grumman’s vice president of directed-energy systems.

Part of BAE Systems/Boeing’s air-target plan involves taking external clues from the ship’s radar so the gun/laser system can pick up a track, slew the gun mount and start tracking with optics within the beam director.

Another type of directed energy envisioned for the Mk. 38 gun mount is a BAE Systems-developed, HPM weapon with an anti-electronics attack capability.

By choosing the correct frequency span, HPM “has counter-electronics specific to swarms of small boats where you can stop their engines at [long] range,” Perry says. “Unlike lasers, HPM beams don’t need a lot of accuracy. With a fan [of HPM energy] you can target 10-30 small boats. If you can knock out 50-75% of the engines in a swarm, you can then concentrate on the remainder with lasers or kinetic [cannon].”

HPM weapons built for counter-electronics can disrupt or damage systems such as radars, missile guidance packages and sensor communications. Moreover, cannon have a limited number of rounds on board any ship, while lasers and HPM devices have a bottomless magazine as long as the ship is producing power. For example, 75 kw of ship’s power produced 10 kw of laser energy. Demands on the ship are less for HPM.

“We’ve looked at combining HPM, laser and kinetic weapons as miniaturization improves,” Perry says. “Today that’s a challenge; but you could put a laser on one Mk. 38 mount and an HPM on another and integrate their functionality through a single operator who can toggle the desired effects. Our models show that when we scale up an HPM that can fit on the Mk. 38, we can push the range out to hundreds or thousands of meters. Once you lock onto a target, we have radar apertures—for emitting the HPM—that deploy and focus on the target. The field of view is measured in [single-digit] degrees.”

What’s more, certain frequencies may be modulated so the HPM emitter sweeps through parts of the spectrum to affect specific types of electronics.

“We could have a Fire Scout [unmanned helicopter] out in front of a ship coming into port so it can radiate from above,” Perry says. “HPM can focus large amounts of effective radiated power on a point in space. HPM requires only a couple of seconds of power draw [from the ship] because the pulse width is so short it only requires a few kilowatts.”

Photo: BAE Systems

[buglerbilly]

SecNav Posits Drone Ships Fueled by Sediment



At a breakfast meeting with DC-based defense reporters today, Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus (now clearly not in contention to be SecDef) sketched a future force of unmanned ships pulling power from the sea floor.


Office of Naval Research just did a patent on making energy with a combination of seawater and organic material at the bottom of the ocean. If this can work in large quantities, you can see an unmanned vehicle out there simply burrowing down into the bottom of the ocean trying to recharge. … It’s unmanned systems [like that] that offer tremendous versatility and tremendous reach.

The process gets a little more scientific than I’m capable of explaining comfortably, so I’ll let a 2010 news report do it for me. We also invite DT readers who are spooled up on this to explain as well…


These fuel cells convert naturally occurring fuels and oxidants in the marine environment into electricity making them a viable power source for long-term operation of autonomous underwater unmanned vehicles, in-water sensors, and devices used for surveillance and monitoring the ocean environment.


“Think of it as a battery that runs on mud,” ONR Program Manager Dr. Linda Chrisey said. “They are sustainable, environmentally friendly and don’t involve hazardous reactants like a regular battery might because they use the natural carbon in the marine environment. For example, we are working on a 4-foot long autonomous underwater vehicle that will settle on the seafloor and recharge its batteries using this fuel cell approach. We are already able to power many types of sensors using microbial fuel cells.”

While so far the experimentation on this has been essentially charging batteries for buoys or radio monitors, Mabus’ vision conjures up images of robotic ships controlling the world of The Matrix. Imagine unmanned nuclear subs that can derive power from the sea floor on their own?…Clearly some down sides to this kind of robotic warfare.

– Christian

Read more: http://defensetech.org/#ixzz1Kn1PpfNt
Defense.org



ONR’s microbial fuel cell generates electricity from mud

By Darren Quick

20:06 April 20, 2010


Bart Chadwick checks the condition in laboratory microbial fuel cells that may revolutionize naval energy use (Image: US Navy Photo by John F. Williams)

It is estimated there are approximately five nonillion (that’s 5x10 to the power of 30) bacteria on Earth, and although they generally get a bad rap, there are actually many beneficial bacteria that are vital to life on our planet. As we’ve seen previously, scientists are now looking to harness bacteria to produce electricity through microbial fuel cells. These microbial fuel cells (MFCs) convert chemical energy to electrical energy to offer a clean, efficient and reliable alternative to batteries and other environmentally harmful fuels. Recognizing this potential the Office of Naval Research (ONR) has developed an MFC that could revolutionize naval energy use by converting decomposed marine organisms into electricity.

These fuel cells convert naturally occurring fuels and oxidants in the marine environment into electricity making them a viable power source for long-term operation of autonomous underwater unmanned vehicles, in-water sensors, and devices used for surveillance and monitoring the ocean environment.

"Think of it as a battery that runs on mud," ONR Program Manager Dr. Linda Chrisey said. "They are sustainable, environmentally friendly and don't involve hazardous reactants like a regular battery might because they use the natural carbon in the marine environment. For example, we are working on a 4-foot long autonomous underwater vehicle that will settle on the seafloor and recharge its batteries using this fuel cell approach. We are already able to power many types of sensors using microbial fuel cells."

Dr. Leonard Tender, a research chemist in the Center for Bio/Molecular Science and Engineering at the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), working with scientists from the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, started to investigate electricity-generating microorganisms. The most promising, called Geobacter, was discovered in the Potomac River immediately downstream of NRL.

Geobacter, which helped the “Electric Microbe” make it onto Time magazine’s “Top 50 Inventions for 2009” list, has tiny hairlike extensions called pili that it uses to generate electricity from mud and wastewater. Researchers have developed a strain of Geobacter that is eight times more efficient than other strains at producing power. With its powerful return of clean energy it could reduce carbon emissions in the environment and change the way we fuel our vehicles and supply power to our homes.

"Essentially, they could go on for years without any kind of battery replacement," Chrisey said. For this reason, Navy researchers at the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center (SPAWAR) Pacific are using fuel cell-powered devices to track Pacific-endangered green sea turtles.

"The device is light, efficient and environmentally friendly," said Bart Chadwick, SPAWAR's Head of Environmental Sciences Branch. "The technology is helping track sea turtle populations, if they are feeding near Navy shorefront facilities, which informs Navy decision-making on port operations or construction."

ONR will highlight the microbial fuel cell as part of a showcase of its energy research initiatives for an Earth Day event on April 22 at the Pentagon.

[buglerbilly]

U.S. Navy Wants Modular Ship Construction

Apr 28, 2011

By Michael Fabey



Shipbuilders that want to obtain or retain U.S. Navy work should look to the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program for inspiration, Navy Secretary Ray Mabus says.

“You have to build with open architecture,” Mabus told a group of defense writers in Washington on April 27. “You have to build modular ships like the LCS, so you don’t have to change the hull when technology changes.”

To make that strategy successful, Mabus acknowledges, the Navy also has to change its shipbuilding ways. “We owe the industry more stable designs,” he says, adding the service can no longer design as it builds. “We owe them more mature technologies.”

When technology does change, the Navy must hold off until the next ship design or next block of ships instead of insisting the contractors shoehorn the enhancements on the vessels under construction, according to Mabus. Finally, he says, the Navy owes contractors transparency about the number of ships it wants and the money it plans to pay for them.

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO), U.S. Government Accountability Office and Congressional Research Service all have questioned the service’s shipbuilding plan.

The Navy, they say, cannot buy all the ships it says it needs in the upcoming decades with the funding that is likely to be available.

Further, CBO points out that while Navy officials continue to sell Congress on an overall fleet size of 313 in the early part of this century, the shipbuilding and buying plan really calls for a dozen or so more vessels — which could be even harder to afford. CBO counts support ships and other vessels that the Navy does not include in its 313 number.

And while 313 is the stated fleet goal, Mabus acknowledges the current plan should give the Navy about 325 ships by the 2020s.

As the Navy keeps a lid on technology insertions and provides better cost and ship-fleet figures to contractors, shipbuilders in turn owe the Navy a reduction in the cost and hours it takes to build the ships, Mabus says. And contractors need to up the ante they are willing to spend in their yards. “They should make the investments in infrastructure and the workforce so the hours will come down,” he says.

Photo: US Navy

[buglerbilly]

Second Sub in 2011 Ordered By U.S. Navy

By CHRISTOPHER P. CAVAS

Published: 29 Apr 2011 16:41

Using money from the newly-passed 2011 defense budget, the U.S. Navy on April 28 was finally able to do something it hasn't done for 20 years - order the construction of more than one submarine in a single year.


The Virginia-class attack submarine Hawaii enters Apra Harbor, Guam, for a scheduled port visit. The U.S. Navy has ordered two submarines to be built this year, a first in 20 years. (MC2 Corwin Colbert / Navy)

About $1.2 billion was awarded to General Dynamics Electric Boat to build the yet-to-be-named SSN 787, the 14th unit of the SSN 774 Virginia class of nuclear-powered attack submarines. The money comes after earlier contracts for long-lead items for the boat, such as the nuclear reactor.

Ordering the second sub was the Navy's top priority among items threatened by the continuing resolutions that kept the government running at 2010 levels for the first six months of fiscal 2011. A defense budget that included the second submarine was finally approved by Congress in early April and signed into law April 15.

The Navy and its submarine shipbuilding team of Electric Boat and Huntington Ingalls Industries have been working for years to bring down costs on the submarines to be able to afford two subs in a single year. The two-per-year threshold of $2 billion per sub - figured in 2005 dollars - was reached beginning with the 2012 submarine, but Congress last year added a second sub to the 2011 budget.

The $2 billion figure is somewhat mythical; factored for inflation, that amount in 2005 dollars equals about $2.6 billion in current monies.

Nevertheless, prime contractor Electric Boat claims the per-unit cost of a new Virginia-class submarine has come down about 20 percent since the first boat was ordered in 1998.

"Reducing the cost of Virginia Class ships to the point where the Navy can afford to acquire two ships per year has demanded an intense process of continuous improvement," John Holmander, Electric Boat's Virginia program manager, said in a press release. "Our task now is to ensure that we demonstrate additional improvement on each ship so taxpayers get the best possible return on the nation's investment in submarines."

Construction of Virginia-class submarines is shared equally between Electric Boat and Huntington Ingalls. EB builds its hull sections at Quonset Point, R.I., and assembles the submarines at Groton, Conn. HI's submarines are built and assembled at Newport News, Va. The shipbuilders alternate on completing each boat.

Newport News will complete the SSN 787, with delivery expected around 2016.

[buglerbilly]

SECNAV: 11 carriers ‘about right’

By Joshua Stewart - Staff writer

Posted : Saturday Apr 30, 2011 9:55:28 EDT


Rob Curtis / Staff
Navy Secretary Ray Mabus stressed his support for an 11-carrier Navy during a breakfast meeting with reporters April 27.

Days after the White House called for a $400 billion reduction in defense spending over the next decade, the Navy’s top civilian wanted to make one thing clear: The Navy needs 11 aircraft carriers.

“I think the number we’ve got is about right,” Navy Secretary Ray Mabus said Wednesday during a breakfast meeting with reporters.

He said the ships give the nation a wide array of capabilities that will continue to evolve to address the country’s needs.

“I do think that carriers give us an incredibly flexible platform and I think that the people of Japan would agree today on the flexibility of carriers,” Mabus said.

On April 13, President Obama called for $400 billion in defense cuts over the next decade. Where those reductions would come from has not been determined but much of that decision will likely fall to CIA Director Leon Panetta, the White House’s nominee to replace Defense Secretary Robert Gates. While in the House of Representatives between 1977 and 1993, Panetta voted for a 5 percent across-the-board cut in defense spending, but against a 10 percent cut. He also voted to cut funds for the Strategic Defense Initiative and missile defense program and supported a 40 percent reduction in overseas troops.

Reducing the number of carriers in the fleet is frequently mentioned as a way to cut spending. Besides removing the cost of a single warship, it reduces spending on aircraft and eliminates the need for ships that escort the carrier.

But talks of reducing the number of carriers have sparked controversy. In May 2010, Gates asked if the country truly needs to have 11 of the ships.

“Do we really need 11 carrier strike groups for another 30 years when no other country has more than one?” he said at the Navy League’s Sea Air Space Exposition. “At the end of the day we have to ask whether the nation can really afford a Navy that relies on $3 [billion] to $6 billion destroyers, $7 billion submarines and $11 billion carriers.”

Gates later clarified his statement after receiving backlash.

“I may want to change things, but I’m not crazy. I’m not going to cut a carrier, OK? But people ought to start thinking about how they’re going to use carriers,” he said.

Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead has also supported an 11-carrier fleet.

“If you want to be able to be the global navy, I think the nation needs 11 carriers. That allows us to run the response plan that we have, and I believe that 11 carriers are the number we should have,” he said.

That number will drop to 10 when the carrier Enterprise leaves service in 2012, and won’t return to 11 until the carrier Gerald R. Ford enters service in 2015. Mabus said he doesn’t think this will limit the Navy because carriers regularly are unavailable for maintenance, effectively reducing the fleet by one.

Both Roughead and Mabus have recently cheered the capabilities of big-deck amphibious assault ships — the Navy has nine in commission — saying it’s akin to having an extra fleet of flattops. Mabus highlighted the role amphibious ships play in enforcing the no-fly-zone over Libya, an operation with air support from Marine AV-8B Harriers and helicopters but not a single flight from a carrier.

[buglerbilly]

Navy to Christen Guided Missile Destroyer Michael Murphy

(Source: U.S Department of Defense; issued May 4, 2011)

The Navy will christen the newest guided-missile destroyer, Michael Murphy, Saturday, May 7, 2011, during a 10 a.m. EDT ceremony at General Dynamics Bath Iron Works, Bath, Maine. The new destroyer honors Navy SEAL (Sea, Air, Land) Lt. Michael P. Murphy who was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for his heroic actions during Operation Red Wings in Afghanistan June 28, 2005.

Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead will deliver the ceremony's principal address. Maureen Murphy will serve as sponsor of the ship named for her late son. In accordance with Navy tradition, she will break a bottle of champagne across the ship’s bow to formally christen the ship.

Designated DDG 112, Michael Murphy, the 62nd Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, will be able to conduct a variety of operations, from peacetime presence and crisis management to sea control and power projection. Michael Murphy will be capable of fighting air, surface and subsurface battles simultaneously and will contain a myriad of offensive and defensive weapons designed to support maritime warfare in keeping with “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.”

Cmdr. Thomas E. Shultz, a native of El Cajon, Calif., is the prospective commanding officer of the ship and will lead the crew of 279 officers and enlisted personnel. The 9,200-ton Michael Murphy is being built by General Dynamics Bath Iron Works. The ship is 509 feet in length, has a waterline beam of 59 feet, and a navigational draft of 31 feet. Four gas turbine engines will power the ship to speeds in excess of 30 knots.

-ends

[buglerbilly]

Army-to-Navy Transfer of U.S. JHSVs Finalized

By CHRISTOPHER P. CAVAS

Published: 5 May 2011 12:48

The move to transfer custody of all five Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSV) to the U.S. Navy was formally agreed upon May 2 with the signing of a memorandum of agreement between the Navy and U.S. Army.

The transfer was approved in December during Army-Navy war fighter talks. Previously, each service was planning to buy, field and crew its own force of JHSVs.

Uniformed Army personnel had been training to crew the new ships, with the first vessel scheduled to enter service late this year. Army watercraft personnel have been reassigned, and all JHSVs will be operated by the Navy's Military Sealift Command crewed by civilian mariners or contract mariners.

The ships are intended primarily for logistic operations, although they will be armed for self-defense. The aluminum, wave-piercing catamaran JHSVs are under construction by Austal USA in Mobile, Ala., based on a commercial ferry design.

In addition to the Navy and Army, the ships are intended for use by "multiple non-Navy customers," according to the memorandum.

The JHSV program was formed in 2006 from a merger of the Army's Theater Support Vessel and the Navy High-Speed Connector programs. The Navy has been handling design, contracting and oversight of the program.

The Army operates a sizeable fleet, including landing craft, tugs and barges to support waterborne logistic operations. At the instigation of the then-Army chief of staff, Gen. George Casey, the services last year discussed the potential transfer of all Army watercraft to the Navy, but in the end only the JHSVs will be transferred.

The Spearhead, first of the JHSVs, has been named by the Army and is scheduled to be delivered in December. The agreement notes that the Spearhead's name will be retained by the Navy, but the Navy can rename the other JHSVs should it choose.

The JHSV program currently envisions a total of 10 ships, but planners have envisioned a greater role for the vessels, and the number may grow to as many as 23.

[buglerbilly]

First Female Submariners Report to Submarine School

(Source: US Navy issued May 9, 2011)

NORFOLK --- Eight female officers selected for assignment to submarines will report May 9 to the Submarine Officer Basic Course (SOBC) in Groton, Conn., for initial submarine training.

These female officers will join 74 male counterparts to make up SOBC Class 10040.

The officers are among 18 women from the U.S. Naval Academy, Reserve Officer Training Corps and Officer Candidate School commissioning programs who were selected last year to enter the submarine service.

Female SOBC graduates will be assigned to eight different crews of guided-missile and ballistic-missile submarines once they have completed their training program, including six months of Nuclear Power School, six months of Naval Nuclear Prototype Training and 10 weeks of SOBC.

-ends-

[buglerbilly]

For U.S. Navy, Time To Say 'No'?

By CHRISTOPHER P. CAVAS

Published: 10 May 2011 16:19

VIRGINIA BEACH, Va. - The high pace of operations demanded by combatant commanders in the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and on terrorism is taking its toll on the U.S. military, a top commander said May 10.

As budget growth flattens at the Pentagon, the need is becoming stronger to re-examine those demands and, in the meantime, look for ways to dial back on the response.

"There's an insatiable demand for our forces," Adm. John Harvey, head of U.S. Fleet Forces, told a lunchtime audience at a joint war-fighting conference here.

"The requirements are being driven by the fight in Iraq and Afghanistan," he said, without questioning those war-fighting operations. But for other missions, "in my view we haven't really prioritized them."

A mechanism is needed, Harvey said, to "bring these combatant commands together."

All the armed services are charged with meeting the requirements of combatant commanders, the all-important commanders of joint commands such as Central Command, which oversees operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Last May, for example, Gen. David Petraeus, in charge of operations in Afghanistan, asked the Navy to ratchet up operations to maintain two, rather than one, carrier strike groups on station in the Arabian Sea to support combat operations in Afghanistan.

The Navy turned to its Fleet Response Plan (FRP), a post-9/11 effort to make the fleet more responsive to meet operational surges. The Navy found it could not meet Petraeus' 2.0 carrier group requirement, but has been able to sustain a 1.7 level, meaning two groups are on station about 70 percent of the time.

Currently, the Enterprise strike group is supporting Afghan combat operations, with the Ronald Reagan group having just relieved the Carl Vinson group in the region.

Adm. Gary Roughead, chief of naval operations, said earlier this year that the Navy was prepared to sustain those forces in the Central Command region for up to two years.

But the FRP was never meant to be a long-term solution, Harvey said.

"Surge capacity has become routine delivery," he declared. "For almost 10 years the Navy has essentially been operating on a demand-driven model. We have to hit the reset button."

"Over the past 10 years, meeting the demand has generated a price to be paid," Harvey said. "The piper will be paid in his time."

Part of that price has come in missed routine maintenance periods for ships, resulting in reduced service life and measurable increase in the number of failed material readiness inspections, Harvey said.

"Since 2005 an average of 50 ships a year violate our maintenance red lines in order to meet our operational commitment," he noted, adding that the number of ships failing inspections doubled from 2005 to 2009 to about 14 percent.

Harvey and his commands have been striving to reverse the worst of the trends. "We are doing an FRP reset," he said, looking at maintenance and training schedules and manning levels.

"I truly believe we have begun to reverse the most worrisome trends," he said. "We are seeing marked improvements in the material condition of our ships."

But, he said, "we have a long way to go."

"We need to take care of our ships and sailors and Marines and make sure that in the future we have the force wended," Harvey said. "Perhaps that means saying no to things today so we have the wherewithal to have the forces we need tomorrow."

At the heart of the discussion is "the sustainment of our force for the future," he declared. "The answer is a really hard look at the demand signal, how we respond to that signal."

"There has to be a conversation," he pleaded. "It has to take place. My belief is it's pretty much a one-way conversation."

The first step, he said, "is to establish a truly sustainable deployment level."

The problem is affecting all services, Harvey said. "For way too long, we have assumed the services are able now and will continue to be able to provide the same capability and ability as they have in the past," he said, calling that "an increasingly shaky presumption."

"We are each part of the greater whole. The individual components must be strong and whole."

"You cannot separate the performance of the joint force from the unique capabilities each service delivers to the joint force," he said. "At some point you have to have more certainty in terms of deployment, maintenance, training. That's what we are aiming for."

"Making the hard decisions concerning what, when and where we will dial down is a far better path to follow than the past of least resistance and take a percentage cut of what we are trying to do," Harvey said.

[buglerbilly]

Navy calling on gamers to help with security

By David Nakamura, Monday, May 16, 7:05 AM

To combat Somali pirates, the U.S. Navy has relied on warships, snipers and SEAL teams. Now, it is turning to the heavy artillery: Internet gamers.

This month, the Office of Naval Research will roll out the military’s first-ever online war game open to the public, crowd-sourcing the challenges of maritime security to thousands of “players” sitting in front of their computers.

The project — named MMOWGLI (the acronym for Massively Multiplayer Online Wargame Leveraging the Internet) — is a video game for policy wonks. It aims to replicate a traditional military strategy session on an exponentially larger scale, bringing together a diverse mix of government and outside experts that would be impossible even in the largest Pentagon conference room.

Through virtual simulation and social media tools made popular on Twitter and Facebook, players will work together to respond to a series of make-
believe geopolitical scenarios set off when private ships are hijacked off Somalia’s coast.

“We live in an echo chamber,” Lawrence Schuette, the naval research office’s innovation chief, said of the military. “The challenge is you always want to have an audience that’s diverse in background, diverse in thinking. It’s those intersections where you see creativity occurring. The advantage of online crowd-sourcing is obvious: You have many more intersections and many more diverse backgrounds.”

Thanks in part to pre-launch publicity, more than 7,000 people have signed up for MMOWGLI, far beyond the 1,000 that developers had anticipated for the $450,000 pilot project. Programmers from the Institute for the Future, a nonprofit based in Palo Alto, Calif., that is making the software, have postponed the launch date to be sure the game has enough capacity.

Schuette stressed that his office is more interested in building technology that can be used for research across military platforms than it is in generating groundbreaking anti-piracy policy. But piracy experts welcomed the exercise as a much-needed thought experiment.

“It is such a complex issue that has to do with local dynamics on the ground, governance, financial flows,” said Jennifer Cooke, director of the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “There is no single way to approach piracy in that area.

“Naval experts do not know the tools that Treasury can bring to bear,’’ she said. “Likewise, a Somali expert might not have knowledge of what possible mari*time strategies commercial shippers are able to employ.”

Innovate and Defend

MMOWGLI lacks the high-tech, shoot ’em up graphics of commercial video games. Video clips and storyboards will prompt players to envision scenarios. For example: “Three pirate ships are holding the world hostage. Chinese-U.S. relations are strained to the limit and both countries have naval ships in the area. Humanitarian aid for rig workers is blocked. The world is blaming the U.S. for plundering African resources.”

Players are then confronted with two boxes — Innovate and Defend — asking what new resources could “turn the tide” and what risks might result.

In the first round, players are limited to proposing Twitter-length, 140-character solutions, and the crowd votes on their favorite ideas, similar to “liking” something on Facebook, said Jason Tester, a game designer from the Institute for the Future. In ensuing rounds of the three-week game, teams will form around the most popular ideas and develop in-depth action plans.

It is all part of the Navy’s attempt to exploit the benefits of online “gamification,” the increasingly popular strategy of employing game-play mechanics in non-game situations to influence behaviors and direct people to a desired outcome.

Last year, the World Bank hosted a virtual game called EVOKE, centered around an online graphic novel whose characters prompted gamers to respond to imagined worldwide catastrophes, such as famine in Japan.

Aimed initially at college students in South Africa, the game went viral: 19,324 people from more than 150 countries registered to play, submitting 23,500 blog entries, 4,700 photos and 1,500 videos, said Robert Hawkins, a senior education specialist at the World Bank who helped develop the game.

“If you look at user-generated innovation, it’s already happening in the private sector,” Hawkins said. The theory is that “those closest to the ground and action have the best ideas as to what will work best.”

Practical vs. trendy

But as anyone who has spent time in an online chat room knows, moderating the debate against online bullies and sifting through thousands of comments to find quality ideas can be nearly impossible. During the EVOKE project, players coalesced around proposals that were unsustainable, such as floating greenhouses that would produce food 25 times too expensive to afford, said Rex Brynen, a professor of political science at McGill University in Montreal who blogs on strategic gaming.

“There was not enough quality control,” Brynen said of EVOKE. “Trendy development ideas that appeal to the 15- to 30-year-old age demographic catch on because they’re trendy, not because there is proof they would work.”

Hawkins dismissed the criticism, noting that the World Bank was using “nascent technology” to envision the world 10 years in the future.

“By no means were we proposing that the solutions outlined in a fictional story in 2020 are things the World Bank advocates,” he said. “What we wanted to do was inspire people and get them thinking about the possible.”

Schuette, of the naval research office, said his team is aware of the potential pitfalls of throwing out policy development to a nameless, faceless crowd. A dozen members of the Naval Postgraduate School, which is hosting the MMOWGLI Web site, will monitor the game around the clock, Schuette said.

Developers hope that MMOWGLI can help break down rigid military hierarchies by allowing players to remain anonymous.

“That’s old hat online, but it’s radically new to the military,” Tester said. “Everyone is looking forward to seeing if the winning team could be a four-star admiral, a Naval Academy cadet and someone from a nonprofit collaborating with each other.”

[buglerbilly]

The Cost-Effectiveness of Nuclear Power for U.S. Navy Surface Ships


A portion of the Bataan amphibious ready group.

CBO report looks at life-cycle costs of surface ships with nuclear reactors

09:25 GMT, May 16, 2011 In recent years, the Congress has shown interest in powering some of the U.S. Navy's future destroyers and amphibious warfare ships with nuclear rather than conventional (petroleum-based) fuel. In this study, the Congressional Budget Office estimated the difference in life-cycle costs (the total costs incurred for a ship, from acquisition through operations to disposal) between powering those new surface ships with nuclear reactors and equipping them with conventional engines.

SUMMARY

The U.S. Navy plans to build a number of new surface ships in the coming decades, according to its most recent 30-year shipbuilding plan. All of the Navy's aircraft carriers (and submarines) are powered by nuclear reactors; its other surface combatants are powered by engines that use conventional petroleum-based fuels. The Navy could save money on fuel in the future by purchasing additional nuclear-powered ships rather than conventionally powered ships. Those savings in fuel costs, however, would be offset by the additional up-front costs required for the procurement of nuclear-powered ships.

To assess the relative costs of using nuclear versus conventional propulsion for ships other than carriers and submarines, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) developed a hypothetical future fleet, based on the Navy's shipbuilding plan, of new destroyers and amphibious warfare ships that are candidates for nuclear propulsion systems. Specifically, CBO chose for its analysis the Navy's planned new version of the DDG-51 destroyer and its replacement, the DDG(X); the LH(X) amphibious assault ship; and the LSD(X) amphibious dock landing ship. CBO then estimated the life-cycle costs for each ship in that fleet—that is, the costs over the ship's entire 40-year service life, beginning with its acquisition and progressing through the annual expenditures over 40 years for its fuel, personnel, and other operations and support and, finally, its disposal. CBO compared lifecycle costs under two alternative versions of the fleet: Each version comprised the same number of ships of each class but differed in whether the ships were powered by conventional systems that used petroleum-based fuels or by nuclear reactors.

Estimates of the relative costs of using nuclear power versus conventional fuels for ships depend in large part on the projected path of oil prices, which determine how much the Navy must pay for fuel in the future. The initial costs for building and fueling a nuclear-powered ship are greater than those for building a conventionally powered ship. However, once the Navy has acquired a nuclear ship, it incurs no further costs for fuel. If oil prices rose substantially in the future, the estimated savings in fuel costs from using nuclear power over a ship's lifetime could offset the higher initial costs to procure the ship. In recent years, oil prices have shown considerable volatility; for example, the average price of all crude oil delivered to U.S. refiners peaked at about $130 per barrel in June and July 2008, then declined substantially, and has risen significantly again, to more than $100 per barrel in March of this year.

CBO regularly projects oil prices for 10-year periods as part of the macroeconomic forecast that underlies the baseline budget projections that the agency publishes each year. In its January 2011 macroeconomic projections, CBO estimated that oil prices would average $86 per barrel in 2011 and over the next decade would grow at an average rate of about 1 percentage point per year above the rate of general inflation, reaching $95 per barrel (in 2011 dollars) by 2021. After 2021, CBO assumes, the price will continue to grow at a rate of 1 percentage point above inflation, reaching $114 per barrel (in 2011 dollars) by 2040. If oil prices followed that trajectory, total life-cycle costs for a nuclear fleet would be 19 percent higher than those for a conventional fleet, in CBO's estimation. Specifically, total life-cycle costs would be 19 percent higher for a fleet of nuclear destroyers, 4 percent higher for a fleet of nuclear LH(X) amphibious assault ships, and 33 percent higher for a fleet of nuclear LSD(X) amphibious dock landing ships.

To determine how sensitive those findings are to the trajectory of oil prices, CBO also examined a case in which oil prices start from a value of $86 per barrel in 2011 and then rise at a rate higher than the real (inflation-adjusted) growth of 1 percent in CBO's baseline trajectory. That analysis suggested that a fleet of nuclear-powered destroyers would become cost-effective if the real annual rate of growth of oil prices exceeded 3.4 percent—which implies oil prices of $223 or more per barrel (in 2011 dollars) in 2040. Similarly, a fleet of nuclear LH(X) amphibious assault ships would become cost-effective if oil prices grew at a real annual rate of 1.7 percent, implying a price of $140 per barrel of oil in 2040—about the same price that was reached in 2008 but not sustained for any length of time. A fleet of nuclear LSD(X) amphibious dock landing ships would become cost-effective at a real annual growth rate of 4.7 percent, or a price in 2040 of $323 per barrel.

The amount of energy used by new surface ships—particularly those, such as destroyers, that require large amounts of energy for purposes other than propulsion—could also be substantially higher or lower than projected. Employing an approach similar to that used to assess sensitivity to oil prices, CBO estimated that providing destroyers with nuclear reactors would become cost-effective only if energy use more than doubled for the entire fleet of destroyers.

The use of nuclear power has potential advantages besides savings on the cost of fuel. For example, the Navy would be less vulnerable to disruptions in the supply of oil: The alternative nuclear fleet would use about 5 million barrels of oil less per year, reducing the Navy's current annual consumption of petroleum-based fuels for aircraft and ships by about 15 percent. The use of nuclear power also has some potential disadvantages, including the concerns about proliferating nuclear material that would arise if the Navy had more ships with highly enriched uranium deployed overseas. CBO, however, did not attempt to quantify those other advantages and disadvantages.

----
The full report can be downloaded at: http://goo.gl/Q3aps (PDF 1.84MB, 28 pages)

(Photo: USMC, Theodore W. Tirchie)

[buglerbilly]

US Navy drones: Coming to a carrier near China?

(AP) – 20 hours ago


In this Feb. 11, 2011 photo, Vice Adm. Scott Van Buskirk speaks during an interview on the bridge of the USS George Washington aircraft carrier at the Yokosuka Naval Base south of Tokyo. Buskirk said the U.S. is developing aircraft carrier-based drones that could provide a crucial edge as it tries to counter China's military rise in an interview with The Associated Press, indicated that the unmanned armed planes would likely be deployed in Asia. (AP Photo/Greg Baker)

YOKOSUKA, Japan (AP) — The U.S. is developing aircraft carrier-based drones that could provide a crucial edge as it tries to counter China's military rise.

American officials have been tightlipped about where the unmanned armed planes might be used, but a top Navy officer has told The Associated Press that some would likely be deployed in Asia.

"They will play an integral role in our future operations in this region," predicted Vice Adm. Scott Van Buskirk, commander of the U.S. 7th Fleet, which covers most of the Pacific and Indian oceans.

Land-based drones are in wide use in the war in Afghanistan, but sea-based versions will take several more years to develop. Northrop Grumman conducted a first-ever test flight — still on land — earlier this year.

Van Buskirk didn't mention China specifically, but military analysts agree the drones could offset some of China's recent advances, notably its work on a "carrier-killer" missile.

"Chinese military modernization is the major long-term threat that the U.S. must prepare for in the Asia-Pacific region, and robotic vehicles — aerial and subsurface — are increasingly critical to countering that potential threat," said Patrick Cronin, a senior analyst with the Washington-based Center for New American Security.

China is decades away from building a military as strong as America's, but it is developing air, naval and missile capabilities that could challenge U.S. supremacy in the Pacific — and with it, America's ability to protect important shipping lanes and allies such as Japan and South Korea.

China maintains it does not have offensive intentions and is only protecting its own interests: The shipping lanes are also vital to China's export-dependent economy. There are potential flash points, though, notably Taiwan and clusters of tiny islands that both China and other Asian nations claim as their territory.

The U.S. Navy's pursuit of drones is a recognition of the need for new weapons and strategies to deal not only with China but a changing military landscape generally.

"Carrier-based unmanned aircraft systems have tremendous potential, especially in increasing the range and persistence of our intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance operations, as well as our ability to strike targets quickly," Van Buskirk said at the 7th Fleet's headquarters in Yokosuka, Japan.

His fleet boasts one carrier — the USS George Washington — along with about 60 other ships and 40,000 sailors and Marines.

Experts say the drones could be used on any of the 11 U.S. carriers worldwide and are not being developed exclusively as a counterbalance to China.

But China's reported progress in missile development appears to make the need for them more urgent.

The DF 21D "carrier killer" missile is designed for launch from land with enough accuracy to hit a moving aircraft carrier at a distance of more than 900 miles (1,500 kilometers). Though still unproven — and some analysts say overrated — no other country has such a weapon.

Current Navy fighter jets can only operate about 500 nautical miles (900 kilometers) from a target, leaving a carrier within range of the Chinese missile.

Drones would have an unrefueled combat radius of 1,500 nautical miles (2,780 kilometers) and could remain airborne for 50 to 100 hours — versus the 10 hour maximum for a pilot, according to a 2008 paper by analysts Tom Ehrhard and Robert Work at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Work is now an undersecretary of the Navy.

"Introducing a new aircraft that promises to let the strike group do its work from beyond the maximum effective firing range of the anti-ship ballistic missile — or beyond its range entirely — represents a considerable boost in defensive potential for the carrier strike group," said James Holmes of the U.S. Naval War College.

Northrop Grumman has a six-year, $635.8 million contract to develop two of the planes, with more acquisitions expected if they work. A prototype of its X-47B took a maiden 29-minute flight in February at Edwards Air Force Base in California. Initial testing on carriers is planned for 2013.

Other makers including Boeing and Lockheed are also in the game. General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. — the maker of the Predator drones used in the Afghan war — carried out wind tunnel tests in February. Spokeswoman Kimberly Kasitz said it was too early to divulge further details.

Some experts warn carrier-based drones are still untested and stress that Chinese advances have not rendered carriers obsolete.

"Drones, if they work, are just the next tech leap. As long as there is a need for tactical aviation launched from the sea, carriers will be useful weapons of war," said Michael McDevitt, a former commandant of the National War College in Washington, D.C., and a retired rear admiral whose commands included an aircraft carrier battle group.

Some analysts also note that China may be reluctant to instigate any fighting that could interfere with its trade.

Nan Li, an expert at the U.S. Naval War College's China Maritime Studies Institute, doubts China would try to attack a U.S. carrier.

"I am a skeptic of such an interpretation of Chinese strategy," he said. "But I do think the X-47B may still be a useful preventive capability for worst-case scenarios."

The Air Force and Navy both sponsored a project to develop carrier-based drones in the early 2000s, but the Air Force pulled out in 2005, leaving the Navy to fund the research.

Adm. Gary Roughhead, chief of naval operations, said last summer that the current goal of getting a handful of unmanned bombers in action by 2018 is "too damn slow."

"Seriously, we've got to have a sense of urgency about getting this stuff out there," he told a conference. "It could fundamentally change how we think of naval aviation."

Copyright © 2011 The Associated Press. All rights reserved.

[buglerbilly]

U.S. Navy Shipbuilder Bets On Composites

May 17, 2011

By Michael Fabey



The sign outside the Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII) Composites Facility in Gulfport, Miss., states the company’s optimism about the potential for advanced materials in U.S. Navy shipbuilding: “Composites, the Wave of the Future.”

No other facility produces composite ship structures that are similar in size and complexity to those fabricated in the Gulfport facility—at least for ships, said Michael Petters, CEO and president of HII. “It’s a unique facility,” he added, during an April 4 press briefing on the new company’s operations.

HII—formerly Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding—is banking on the Navy continuing to use advanced composites in its vessels. The company is starting to realize, though, that the “wave of the future” is far from being a tsunami or even a significant storm surge—it’s more of a building surf break.

It’s not that the Navy is uninterested in composites. The service sees the benefit of composites, especially for a mast, deckhouse or other parts of a superstructure, as a means of stealth, controlling weight, reducing maintenance and making it easier to modify structures for technology upgrades.

“We’re exploring composites, certainly for the superstructure,” says Julie Christodoulou, director of the Naval Materials Div. at the Office of Naval Research (ONR).

Composites play into ONR’s vision of an integrated topside, using the DDG-51 Arleigh Burke-class destroyer Flight III upgraded ship as a template. With a composite mast, says Lawrence Schuette, director of innovation at ONR, “you don’t have an antenna farm,” since electronics are integrated within the structure. “The Navy can reduce overall maintenance cost.”

Other shipbuilding companies have also shown expertise in building small craft out of composites that are suitable for military operations. One of the most popular exhibits at the Navy League Sea-Air-Space Symposium and Exhibition in Washington last month was the Piranha carbon-composite unmanned surface vehicle from Zyvex Technologies of Columbus, Ohio. Measuring 53 ft., 8 in. long with an 11-ft., 7-in. beam, the boat has a draft of 2 ft., top speed of 45 kt. and a gyro system that keeps it steady in Sea State 6.

But despite its promise, composite construction is costly for most major shipbuilding. The Navy studied using composite materials to replace aluminum superstructures prone to cracking on its cruiser fleet, but decided the replacements would be too costly, says Scott Hale, Naval Sea Systems Command deputy program manager for in-service surface combatants. “If the Navy had enough money to put composites there,” Hale said during the Navy League SAS, “we would put them in there.”

The Navy and HII learned how expensive composite construction can be in building the DDG-1000 Zumwalt-class destroyer, whose deckhouse is made from composites. The Zumwalt is arguably the Navy’s most futuristic ship. Apart from the composite deckhouse, there are plans for advanced dual-band radar and electric-drive propulsion.

To test these capabilities, HII built a replica of the composite deckhouse and transported it by barge to the Navy’s radar-testing site at Wallops Island, Va. Navy research money funded the unique test facility, adding to the Zumwalt’s price tag—the lead ship alone is projected to cost more than $3 billion.

Zumwalt shipbuilders say that even though the number of vessels in the class was cut, to 3 from 24, the ship represents the future of Navy ship construction. The design of the ship—especially the use of deckhouse composites—will pay dividends when it comes to lifecycle costs.

HII sees the Zumwalt work as a natural progression for composites. The company made composite masts for the most recent LPD-17 San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock ships. It also built composite topside structures for the CVN-77 Bush and CVN-78 Ford aircraft carriers.

HII built fabrication hangars to handle Zumwalt work. The DDG-1000 deckhouse structure is double the width and five times the height of the San Antonio-class masts.

The biggest panels, which are fiber-reinforced, take more than 24 hr. to infuse with resin and to cure. HII uses conventional composite industry processes and also developed its own to fabricate the components of the structure, and to inspect each finished piece with ultrasound equipment.

Photo: US Navy

[buglerbilly]

AMDR Opens Up Competition For U.S. Navy Radar

May 19, 2011

By Michael Fabey



Northrop Grumman and Raytheon are embracing the U.S. Navy’s Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) program as a way to break the Lockheed Martin Aegis system’s lock on naval integrated ship and ballistic missile defense (BMD).

But Lockheed officials point to their more than 40 years of experience developing and deploying Aegis as a reason the company should be favored for AMDR work.

While the recent Aegis Advanced Capability Build (ACB) 12 upgrade with its multimission signal processor has added some limited integrated air and missile defense capability, AMDR is the first Navy radar that will be “purpose-built” for those simultaneous functions, notes Capt. Doug Small, AMDR program official at Naval Sea Systems Command (Navsea).

“The AMDR is more sensitive than SPY radar,” Small says. “Ballistic-missile-defense targets drive radar sensitivity. There’s no substitute for having detect-and-track at a long distance.”

But, Small says, “to do simultaneous air defense [with BMD], you have to spend less time doing air defense. It’s a radar resource issue.”

AMDR is solving that issue with digital beamforming, which will allow the radar to form and use a series of beams to locate and track targets. “The ability to create multiple beams digitally means you spend less time doing other certain functions,” Small says.

Lockheed says it demonstrated S-band digital phased-array antenna beamforming during recent trials at the Navsea testing site at Wallops Island, Va., through a joint U.S./U.K. radar effort as part of the Advanced Radar Technology Integrated System Testbed (Artist), which combines advanced, multifunction, S-band, active, phased-array radars (Aerospace DAILY, April 22).

“The technology is matured and ready to enter full engineering development for fielding on the Navy’s Flight III DDG,” says Brad Hicks, Lockheed Martin vice president of naval radar programs.

Leveraging its work and experience with active, electronically scanned array (AESA) radars for aircraft, Northrop has its own U.S. digital beamforming program — the U.S. Marine Corps’ Ground/Air Task-Oriented Radar (G/ATOR), which features an 8 X 10.5-ft. panel of several hundred multichannel transmit-receive modules with distributed receivers and exciters for anti-air warfare modes.

“We don’t see another way around this [AMDR] except with an AESA, “ says Arun Palusamy, Northrop’s director of integrated air and missile defense and naval strategy.

Northrop Grumman has an equity stake in an Australian company, CEA Technologies, which is delivering an advanced AESA S-band radar and X-Band illuminators for the Royal Australian Navy’s Anzac-class anti-ship missile defense upgrade program.

Further, the company touts its past shipbuilding participation in the DDG-1000 Zumwalt-class destroyer program, which initially was planned to mate X- and S-band radars in an AMDR-like suite atop a composite deckhouse structure. A similar radar suite is being developed for the CVN-78 Ford-class aircraft carriers.

The DDG-1000 radar suite since has been scaled back, but Navy officials acknowledge that the vessel’s Dual-Band Radar was a stepping-stone to AMDR.

The prime contractor for the DDG-1000 radar system is Raytheon, which also teamed with Northrop on the Cobra Judy Replacement program that marries a shipboard S-band phased array with an X-band dish to collect BMD data.

“AMDR is similar to the work [on] Zumwalt, CVN-78 and Cobra Judy,” says Denis Donohue, Raytheon’s director of above-water sensors.

“The program is very, very important to us,” adds Jim Barry, Raytheon’s technical director for seapower capabilities. “It’s right at our sweet spot.”

Photo: Northrop Grumman

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Navy delivers first EMALS components to CVN 78

May 18, 2011



NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND, Patuxent River, Md. – Naval Air Systems Command’s Aircraft Launch and Recovery Equipment program (PMA-251) delivered the first set of Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) components to the future Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) aircraft carrier May 9.

“Being able to deliver the very first EMALS components is exciting. We are committed to t